Lohnzurückhaltung und Lohnmilitanz: Belgien, Deutschland und die Niederlande, 1950–2010

Erik Bengtsson

doi:10.5771/0342-300X-2015-4-272

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- 244–244 Ist die Politik der Troika undemokratisch? Wolfgang Merkel Wolfgang Merkel 244–244
- 245–252 Spielarten des Kapitalismus und die Eurokrise Peter A. Hall Peter A. Hall 245–252
- 253–262 Digitale Arbeitswelten im europäischen Vergleich Stefan Kirchner, Markus Wolf Stefan Kirchner, Markus Wolf 253–262
- 263–271 Spielräume für eine gerechtere Steuerpolitik in den OECD-Ländern Sarah Godar, Christoph Paetz, Achim Truger Sarah Godar, Christoph Paetz, Achim Truger 263–271
- 272–279 Lohnzurückhaltung und Lohnmilitanz: Belgien, Deutschland und die Niederlande, 1950–2010 Erik Bengtsson Erik Bengtsson 272–279
- 280–289 Sachkapitalrenditen im historischen Vergleich – Deutschland im Abwärtstrend? Thomas Weiß Thomas Weiß 280–289
- 290–297 Tarifbindung und betriebliche Interessenvertretung: Ergebnisse aus dem IAB-Betriebspanel 2014 Peter Ellguth, Susanne Kohaut Peter Ellguth, Susanne Kohaut 290–297
- 298–303 Schulreformen in den USA – Trends, Nebeneffekte und Lektionen für Deutschland Sigrid Hartong Sigrid Hartong 298–303
- 304–308 Fachkräftepolitik als strategische Zukunftsaufgabe Wolfgang Schroeder, Ralf Rukwid, Jan Machnig Wolfgang Schroeder, Ralf Rukwid, Jan Machnig 304–308
- 309–312 Arbeitsort Privathaushalt: eine arbeitsschutzfreie Zone? Marta Böning Marta Böning 309–312
- 314–316 Buchbesprechungen 314–316
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WSI-Mitteilungen , page 272 - 279

Lohnzurückhaltung und Lohnmilitanz: Belgien, Deutschland und die Niederlande, 1950–2010

Autoren

Erik Bengtsson

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0342-300X-2015-4-272
- ISSN: 0342-300X
- ISSN online: 2942-3554
Zusammenfassung

This contribution questions the influential interpretation that strong unions and centralized wage bargaining facilitate wage restraint and that during the postwar period wage restraint was an important cause of strong economic growth performance. This view is contrasted with a power-oriented perspective that sees strong unions as conducive to redistribution from capital to labour, rather than wage restraint. The paper uses data on wages and productivity from 1950 to 2010 for Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, and shows that there has been more wage restraint after 1980 than before, and not more with more bargaining centralization. The results support the power-oriented understanding of wage bargaining institutions and suggest that the causes of wage restraint, its effects on investments and inequality should be reconsidered.

Abstract

This contribution questions the influential interpretation that strong unions and centralized wage bargaining facilitate wage restraint and that during the postwar period wage restraint was an important cause of strong economic growth performance. This view is contrasted with a power-oriented perspective that sees strong unions as conducive to redistribution from capital to labour, rather than wage restraint. The paper uses data on wages and productivity from 1950 to 2010 for Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, and shows that there has been more wage restraint after 1980 than before, and not more with more bargaining centralization. The results support the power-oriented understanding of wage bargaining institutions and suggest that the causes of wage restraint, its effects on investments and inequality should be reconsidered.
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