The African Union Use of Force to Uphold Democracy and Constitutionalism in Practice: How Far Have We Gone?

Magdalena Sylister

doi:10.5771/2363-6270-2022-1-84

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- 1–2 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 1–2
- 3–4 Preface and Acknowledgments 3–4
- 5–11 General Introduction Balingene Kahombo Balingene Kahombo 5–11
- 12–29 Constitutional Crises and the Jurisdiction of the African Union Balingene Kahombo Balingene Kahombo 12–29
- 30–52 Countering Constitutional Crises within the African Union Framework: Legality, Legitimacy and Suitability Kwaku Agyeman-Budu Kwaku Agyeman-Budu 30–52
- 53–83 The Nexus between Constitutionalism, Peace and Security in the Law and Practice of the African Union Trésor Muhindo Makunya Trésor Muhindo Makunya 53–83
- 84–134 The African Union Use of Force to Uphold Democracy and Constitutionalism in Practice: How Far Have We Gone? Magdalena Sylister Magdalena Sylister 84–134
- 135–178 Taking Stock of African Union’s Sanctions against Unconstitutional Change of Government Serugo Jean Baptiste, Balingene Kahombo Serugo Jean Baptiste, Balingene Kahombo 135–178
- 179–216 African Union Support to Elections in Africa: Rethinking the Preventive Role Marystella Auma Simiyu Marystella Auma Simiyu 179–216
- 217–220 General Conclusion Balingene Kahombo Balingene Kahombo 217–220
- 221–221 Impressum 221–221
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RiA Recht in Afrika | Law in Africa | Droit en Afrique , page 84 - 134

The African Union Use of Force to Uphold Democracy and Constitutionalism in Practice: How Far Have We Gone?

Autoren

Magdalena Sylister

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2022-1-84
- ISSN: 1435-0963
- ISSN online: 2363-6270
Abstract

This paper makes an assessment of how far the African Union (AU) has gone in exercising the mandate of use of force as one of tools for upholding democracy and constitutionalism within the continent. The key intention of this assessment is to scrutinize the suitability of the use of force in the AU’s framework as one of the channels for safeguarding democracy and constitutionalism. The work has employed qualitative research methods, relying on both primary and secondary data. Parallel to that, four case studies from selected AU missions in Africa have been relied upon (Burundi twice, Comoros, Mali and the Gambia). Findings reveal that generally the AU has made significant strides in utilizing its mandate in the use of force in upholding democracy and constitutionalism in Africa by restoring peace, rule of law, stability, human security and in safeguarding people’s will. The AU has also proved to be a reliable first responder in African constitutional crises given the fact that intervention by the UN system takes too long to be engaged and that the UN does not deploy peacekeeping forces where there is no comprehensive peace agreement. Despite that encouraging development, critical challenges still exist. The AU has not succeeded in addressing one notorious vice in Africa which largely contributes to recurrent constitutional crises, namely bad governance. Bad governance exists in various forms such as disrespect of presidential term limits, nepotism and willful disregard of the will of the people in general elections. Other challenges include financial constraints to adequately fund large scale operations, excessive reliance of donors for its peace operations, lack of political will from some African states, and difficulties in harmonizing interests of all parties to conflicts. In order to address these challenges, the AU should achieve its financial autonomy. It should explore further on the lead nation approach and put in place a more formal system on terms and conditions of participation of those nations and anchoring peace support operations. The UA should also make more efforts to instill upon African leaders the culture of good governance because it will greatly reduce constitutional crises which necessitate the use of force in addressing them. Lastly, the AU should discourage procuring of peace deals without the free consent of all the key actors in constitutional crises. Free consent is crucial in ensuring that the peace deals will be adequately respected. The overall outcome of this assessment therefore serves as an encouragement of the AU to continue working tirelessly in improving the mechanism of use of force because it has proved to be a potential tool for upholding democracy and constitutionalism in appropriate circumstances.
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