Taking Stock of African Union’s Sanctions against Unconstitutional Change of Government

Serugo Jean Baptiste; Balingene Kahombo

doi:10.5771/2363-6270-2022-1-135

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- 1–2 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 1–2
- 3–4 Preface and Acknowledgments 3–4
- 5–11 General Introduction Balingene Kahombo Balingene Kahombo 5–11
- 12–29 Constitutional Crises and the Jurisdiction of the African Union Balingene Kahombo Balingene Kahombo 12–29
- 30–52 Countering Constitutional Crises within the African Union Framework: Legality, Legitimacy and Suitability Kwaku Agyeman-Budu Kwaku Agyeman-Budu 30–52
- 53–83 The Nexus between Constitutionalism, Peace and Security in the Law and Practice of the African Union Trésor Muhindo Makunya Trésor Muhindo Makunya 53–83
- 84–134 The African Union Use of Force to Uphold Democracy and Constitutionalism in Practice: How Far Have We Gone? Magdalena Sylister Magdalena Sylister 84–134
- 135–178 Taking Stock of African Union’s Sanctions against Unconstitutional Change of Government Serugo Jean Baptiste, Balingene Kahombo Serugo Jean Baptiste, Balingene Kahombo 135–178
- 179–216 African Union Support to Elections in Africa: Rethinking the Preventive Role Marystella Auma Simiyu Marystella Auma Simiyu 179–216
- 217–220 General Conclusion Balingene Kahombo Balingene Kahombo 217–220
- 221–221 Impressum 221–221
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RiA Recht in Afrika | Law in Africa | Droit en Afrique , page 135 - 178

Taking Stock of African Union’s Sanctions against Unconstitutional Change of Government

Autoren

Serugo Jean Baptiste Balingene Kahombo

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/2363-6270-2022-1-135
- ISSN: 1435-0963
- ISSN online: 2363-6270
Abstract

This article examines the African Union (AU) sanctions against unconstitutional change of government. It reviews the legal background to this phenomenon and finds that unconstitutional changes of government remain recurrent and widespread across the continent. However, the AU has at its disposal a variety of sanctions, ranging from politico-diplomatic sanctions to targeted as well economic sanctions. Furthermore, perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government can be prosecuted at the domestic, regional and continental levels. But sanctions do not suffice to restore democratic order despite their punitive character. In fact, the AU also keeps diplomatic contacts and provides support to the establishment of transition governments, power sharing deals, and the organization of new elections. This fosters the rise of constitutionalism in times of crises which precedes the establishment of new democratic political orders. If this can be considered as a success in itself, the paper contends that in most of the cases, the AU and even Regional Economic Communities (RECS)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) fail to restore to power overthrown governments. Rather, de facto authorities succeed to retain their positions after legitimizing their governments through presumed democratic elections. In addition, member states and some RECs, such as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the situation in CAR in 2003, undermine the AU policy of sanctions. Be it as it may, the study concludes that the AU legal framework still has some loopholes in that a number of situations are not covered by it, such as infringing the principles of democratic government through fraudulent or delayed elections, and popular uprising. Therefore, it suggests that the better way to deal with unconstitutional changes of government is prevention. This requires a universal African adherence to common values and principles of democratic governance, including the ratification of relevant AU treaties and their implementation at the domestic level.
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