Hybride Kriegführung und das „Center of Gravity“ der Entscheidung

Johann Schmid

doi:10.5771/0175-274X-2016-2-114

Contents
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- Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
- 97–145 THEMENSCHWERPUNKT 97–145
  - 97–103 Postmoderne Interventionen: In der Grauzone zwischen Begrenzung und Entgrenzung kollektiver Gewalt Hans-Georg Ehrhart Hans-Georg Ehrhart 97–103
  - 104–108 Chimäre statt Chamäleon: Probleme der begrifflichen Zähmung des hybriden Krieges Felix Wassermann Felix Wassermann 104–108
  - 109–113 Tertium datur: Neue politische Konfliktformen wie sogenannte „hybride Kriege“ bringen alte Legitimationsmuster unter Druck Bernhard Koch Bernhard Koch 109–113
  - 114–120 Hybride Kriegführung und das „Center of Gravity“ der Entscheidung Johann Schmid Johann Schmid 114–120
  - 121–125 Die NATO und hybride Kriegführung Johannes Varwick, Aylin Matlé Johannes Varwick, Aylin Matlé 121–125
  - 126–133 Clausewitz und der Kampf um Anerkennung in hybriden Kriegen: Zur Motivation von IS Kämpfern Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Miriam Förstle Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Miriam Förstle 126–133
  - 134–140 Beyond Mere Terrorism: The Islamic State’s Authority as a Social Movement and as a Quasi-State Christoph Günther, Tom Kaden Christoph Günther, Tom Kaden 134–140
  - 141–145 Hybride Bedrohnung und Bevölkerungsschutz Dirk Freudenberg Dirk Freudenberg 141–145
- 146–156 FORUM 146–156
  - 146–150 „Wie wird Friede? “Zur Friedensethik von Dietrich Bonhoeffer Detlef Bald Detlef Bald 146–150
  - 151–156 Der Konflikt um die Ukraine: Was wir von Egon Bahr lernen können Ulrich Kuhn Ulrich Kuhn 151–156
- 157–157 NEUERSCHEINUNGEN 157–157
- 158–164 BESPRECHUNGEN 158–164
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S&F Sicherheit und Frieden , page 114 - 120

Hybride Kriegführung und das „Center of Gravity“ der Entscheidung

Autoren

Johann Schmid

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2016-2-114
- ISSN: 0175-274X
- ISSN online: 0175-274x
Abstract

With the takeover of Crimea by masked Russian soldiers without national insignia in February/March 2014, with the Kremlin at first denying its involvement, war became „hybrid“ in our minds. The follow-on conflict in eastern Ukraine further strengthened the perception of a hybrid way of warfare, raising the question: What is hybrid warfare? This article argues that the specific nature of hybrid warfare is a strategic one and can be identified by three main characteristics or tendencies: 1. Focusing the decision of the war/conflict as such primarily on a non-military center of gravity. 2. Operating in the shadow of different interfaces against specific vulnerabilities of the opponent, thus challenging traditional lines of order and responsibilities. 3. Creative combination and parallel use of different concepts, methods and means of warfare and fighting, hereby creating “new” mixed, hybrid forms.

Zusammenfassung

With the takeover of Crimea by masked Russian soldiers without national insignia in February/March 2014, with the Kremlin at first denying its involvement, war became „hybrid“ in our minds. The follow-on conflict in eastern Ukraine further strengthened the perception of a hybrid way of warfare, raising the question: What is hybrid warfare? This article argues that the specific nature of hybrid warfare is a strategic one and can be identified by three main characteristics or tendencies: 1. Focusing the decision of the war/conflict as such primarily on a non-military center of gravity. 2. Operating in the shadow of different interfaces against specific vulnerabilities of the opponent, thus challenging traditional lines of order and responsibilities. 3. Creative combination and parallel use of different concepts, methods and means of warfare and fighting, hereby creating “new” mixed, hybrid forms.
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- Copy DOI link doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2016-2-114