Institution Matters: A Critical Analysis of the Role of the Supreme Court of India and the Responsibilities of the Chief Justice

Jahnavi Sindhu; Vikram Aditya Narayan

doi:10.5771/0506-7286-2018-3-290

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- 269–270 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 269–270
- 271–272 EDITORIAL: SPECIAL ISSUE „THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT IN CRISIS?” 271–272
- 273–366 Abhandlungen / Articles 273–366
  - 273–289 From Executive Appointment to the Collegium System: The Impact on Diversity in the Indian Supreme Court Aparna Chandra, William Hubbard, Sital Kalantry Aparna Chandra, William Hubbard, Sital Kalantry 273–289
  - 290–331 Institution Matters: A Critical Analysis of the Role of the Supreme Court of India and the Responsibilities of the Chief Justice Jahnavi Sindhu, Vikram Aditya Narayan Jahnavi Sindhu, Vikram Aditya Narayan 290–331
  - 332–351 Parochialism in Indian constitutional reasoning: The case of religious freedom Mathew John Mathew John 332–351
  - 352–366 Pathways of Political Narratives: Populist Rhetoric, the Supreme Court and the (Im)balance of Power Mouli Banerjee Mouli Banerjee 352–366
- 367–395 Berichte / Reports 367–395
  - 367–380 Transformative Constitutionalism, Constitutional Morality and Equality: The Indian Supreme Court on Section 377 Kanad Bagchi Kanad Bagchi 367–380
  - 381–391 Debate, Discourse and Dilemma: Putting Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan vs State of Maharashtra in Context Ayan Guha, Neha Chauhan Ayan Guha, Neha Chauhan 381–391
  - 392–395 Workshop Report: Shaping Law. Shaping Gender – Experiences from India, 11th till 13th October 2018, Berlin Tanja Herklotz, Siddharth Peter de Souza Tanja Herklotz, Siddharth Peter de Souza 392–395
- 396–403 Buchbesprechungen / Book Reviews 396–403
  - 396–400 George H. Gadbois, Jr.: Supreme Court of India, The Beginnings Medha Srivastava Medha Srivastava 396–400
  - 401–403 Anna Krueger, Die Bindung der Dritten Welt an das Postkoloniale Völkerrecht. Die Völkerrechtskommission, das Recht der Verträge und das Recht der Staatennachfolge in der Dekolonialisierung Felix Lange Felix Lange 401–403
- 404–412 Bibliographie / Bibliography 404–412
  - 404–404 RECHT UND ENTWICKLUNG ALLGEMEIN / LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN GENERAL 404–404
  - 404–406 AFRIKA /AFRICA 404–406
  - 406–408 ASIEN /ASIA 406–408
  - 408–409 LATEINAMERIKA / LATIN AMERICA 408–409
  - 410–412 NAHER UND MITTLERER OSTEN / NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 410–412
- 413–413 Call for Papers 413–413
- 414–414 Impressum 414–414
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VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee , page 290 - 331

Institution Matters: A Critical Analysis of the Role of the Supreme Court of India and the Responsibilities of the Chief Justice

Autoren

Jahnavi Sindhu Vikram Aditya Narayan

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0506-7286-2018-3-290
- ISSN: 0506-7286
- ISSN online: 2941-9603
Abstract

Today, the Indian Supreme Court serves as a constitutional court, a regular appeals court and as an equal partner in governance of the country. This year, questions over the administration of the Court repeatedly arose in public discourse, particularly with respect to the Chief Justice’s discretionary power in listing cases. This paper closely examines the manner in which the listing practices are employed to fulfil the various roles of the Supreme Court, and argues that the Court would perform better if the responsibility for its administration vested with the institution rather than the Chief Justice alone. We argue that with a heavy backlog, and a high number of cases being filed every year, the only realistic way that a Chief Justice can try to solve the crisis facing the Court is by seeking to hear and dispose of more cases quickly. Through an analysis of the listing practices employed by successive Chief Justices between 2012 and 2017, we show that this emphasis on disposal is problematic because it prioritizes cases that may be grouped together and cases that can be disposed of quickly irrespective of their relative importance in terms of content. Moreover, we show that this approach seems to encourage more litigants to try their luck before the Court, and effectively leaves the Court with relatively less time to hear constitution bench matters and regular matters. We further argue that the current ad-hoc and judge-dependent approach toward administering the Court runs the risk of being abused by wealthy litigants who may not have the most important or urgent cases. Finally, we argue that an institutional approach toward administering the Court would best answer the questions recently raised and the problems identified in this paper, and we outline how an institutional approach should work.
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