Die Bundestagswahl 2017: GroKo IV – ohne Alternative für Deutschland

Richard Hilmer; Jérémie Gagné

doi:10.5771/0340-1758-2018-2-372

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
- 205–206 EDITORIAL Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer 205–206
- 207–371 DOKUMENTATION UND ANALYSEN 207–371
  - 207–222 Deutscher Bundestag 1998 bis 2017/18: Parlaments- und Wahlstatistik für die 14 . bis beginnende 19 . Wahlperiode Michael F. Feldkamp Michael F. Feldkamp 207–222
  - 223–242 Die Bundestagswahl 2017 im Spiegel der repräsentativen Wahlstatistik Eckhard Jesse Eckhard Jesse 223–242
  - 243–264 Ein komplexes Gebilde. Eine sozio-ökonomische Analyse des Ergebnisses der AfD bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 Knut Bergmann, Matthias Diermeier, Judith Niehues Knut Bergmann, Matthias Diermeier, Judith Niehues 243–264
  - 265–285 Parteienwettbewerb und Koalitionsbildung in Deutschland 2017/18: Eine Analyse der Wahlprogramme Simon Jakobs, Uwe Jun Simon Jakobs, Uwe Jun 265–285
  - 286–303 Die Entwicklung des deutschen Parteiensystems. Zur Bedeutung kurzfristiger Faktoren im Jahrzehnt des europäischen Wandels Oskar Niedermayer Oskar Niedermayer 286–303
  - 304–324 Mitgliederparteien – Niedergang ohne Ende? Elmar Wiesendahl, Benjamin Höhne, Malte Cordes Elmar Wiesendahl, Benjamin Höhne, Malte Cordes 304–324
  - 325–345 Freie Wähler zwischen Partei und Wählergemeinschaft. Mitglieder, Identität und Organisation Jens Walther, Michael Angenendt Jens Walther, Michael Angenendt 325–345
  - 346–371 Parteimitgliedschaften im Jahre 2017 Oskar Niedermayer Oskar Niedermayer 346–371
- 372–436 AUFSÄTZE 372–436
  - 372–406 Die Bundestagswahl 2017: GroKo IV – ohne Alternative für Deutschland Richard Hilmer, Jérémie Gagné Richard Hilmer, Jérémie Gagné 372–406
  - 407–436 Regierungsbildung „wider Willen“ – der mühsame Weg zur Koalition nach der Bundestagswahl 2017 Sven T. Siefken Sven T. Siefken 407–436
- 437–445 REZENSIONEN 437–445
- 446–446 MITTEILUNG 446–446
- 447–450 ABSTRACTS 447–450
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ZParl Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen , page 372 - 406

Die Bundestagswahl 2017: GroKo IV – ohne Alternative für Deutschland

Autoren

Richard Hilmer Jérémie Gagné

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0340-1758-2018-2-372
- ISSN: 0340-1758
- ISSN online: 0340-1758
Zusammenfassung

For the election on September 24, 2017, Angela Merkel’s second Grand Coalition had a remarkable record to present to German voters: stable economic growth, secure jobs and unemployment at a rare low . However, both coalition partners were dealt a blow: CDU/ CSU and SPD received their worst results since 1949 . Whilst citizens did acknowledge the country’s increasing wealth, they were still critical of its unequal distribution . Additionally, many voters were anxious about their financial outlook and the threat of old-age poverty in the mid and long run . Nonetheless, the public’s general mood had been mainly positive until the summer of 2015, when it started turning in light of an increasingly dramatic refugee situation . Despite an initially wide support for Merkel’s decision to accept Syrian refugees stranded in Budapest into Germany, scepticism and outright opposition grew fiercer as the number of refugee arrivals kept going up . At the end of the day, SPD voters disappointed by a government policy perceived as socially unjust shifted towards the Left Party, the Greens and the FDP, while an even higher number of former CDU/CSU voters turned towards the FDP and the AfD - out of protest against refugee policies . With an AfD score of 12 .6 percent, a party right of the CDU/CSU, managed for the first time not only to enter the national parliament, but also to achieve third rank . A new multitude of parliamentary parties (six instead of four) was not the least of factors complicating coalition building . At first, odds seemed high for CDU/CSU, FDP and the Greens to form a coalition but after weeks of difficult negotiations, programmatic and strategic discrepancies turned out to be too wide . Thus, the only option remaining was to re-establish the very Grand Coalition so severely punished by voters: a government on probation, arguably .

Abstract

For the election on September 24, 2017, Angela Merkel’s second Grand Coalition had a remarkable record to present to German voters: stable economic growth, secure jobs and unemployment at a rare low . However, both coalition partners were dealt a blow: CDU/ CSU and SPD received their worst results since 1949 . Whilst citizens did acknowledge the country’s increasing wealth, they were still critical of its unequal distribution . Additionally, many voters were anxious about their financial outlook and the threat of old-age poverty in the mid and long run . Nonetheless, the public’s general mood had been mainly positive until the summer of 2015, when it started turning in light of an increasingly dramatic refugee situation . Despite an initially wide support for Merkel’s decision to accept Syrian refugees stranded in Budapest into Germany, scepticism and outright opposition grew fiercer as the number of refugee arrivals kept going up . At the end of the day, SPD voters disappointed by a government policy perceived as socially unjust shifted towards the Left Party, the Greens and the FDP, while an even higher number of former CDU/CSU voters turned towards the FDP and the AfD - out of protest against refugee policies . With an AfD score of 12 .6 percent, a party right of the CDU/CSU, managed for the first time not only to enter the national parliament, but also to achieve third rank . A new multitude of parliamentary parties (six instead of four) was not the least of factors complicating coalition building . At first, odds seemed high for CDU/CSU, FDP and the Greens to form a coalition but after weeks of difficult negotiations, programmatic and strategic discrepancies turned out to be too wide . Thus, the only option remaining was to re-establish the very Grand Coalition so severely punished by voters: a government on probation, arguably .
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