Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry into Force

Daryl G. Kimball

doi:10.5771/0175-274X-2018-2-80

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
- EDITORIAL
  - Editorial: Nukleare Abrüstung in der Krise Götz Neuneck, Patricia Schneider Götz Neuneck, Patricia Schneider
  - Editorial: Nuclear Disarmament in Crisis Götz Neuneck, Patricia Schneider Götz Neuneck, Patricia Schneider
- 61–97 THEMENSCHWERPUNKT 61–97
  - 61–66 Der Nukleare Nichtverbreitungsvertrag und der neue Kernwaffenverbotsvertrag – harmonisch, kompatibel, unverträglich? Harald Müller Harald Müller 61–66
  - 67–73 The Future of Strategic Arms Control Steven Pifer Steven Pifer 67–73
  - 74–79 European Security and the Future of the INF Treaty Oliver Meier Oliver Meier 74–79
  - 80–85 Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry into Force Daryl G. Kimball Daryl G. Kimball 80–85
  - 86–91 Der Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty – ein Vertrag, der niemals kommt? Annette Schaper Annette Schaper 86–91
  - 92–97 North Korea and Arms Control: Past Agreements and Future Proposals Elisabeth Suh Elisabeth Suh 92–97
- 98–103 BEITRÄGE AUS SICHERHEITSPOLITIK UND FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG 98–103
  - Introducing Civil Clauses against Expanding Military Research at German Universities? A Descriptive and Ethical Analysis of the Discussion* Kerstin Schlögl-Flierl, Alexander Merkl Kerstin Schlögl-Flierl, Alexander Merkl
- 104–104 NEUERSCHEINUNGEN 104–104
- 105–108 Besprechungen 105–108
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S&F Sicherheit und Frieden , page 80 - 85

Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry into Force

Autoren

Daryl G. Kimball

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-2-80
- ISSN: 0175-274X
- ISSN online: 0175-274x
Zusammenfassung

More than two decades after the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty has near universal support and has established a global norm against nuclear test explosions. The nuclear testing taboo impedes the development of new and more advanced nuclear warhead designs, which helps prevent dangerous nuclear competition, and maintain international security. Although the CTBT has created a norm against testing, the treaty has not entered into force due to the failure of eight key states, including the United States and China, to ratify. Over time, norms must be actively renewed and reinforced. In order to realize the full potential of the treaty, and to close the door on testing, friends of the CTBT states need to rejuvenate their efforts to achieve its entry into force and reinforce the taboo against nuclear testing.

Abstract

More than two decades after the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty has near universal support and has established a global norm against nuclear test explosions. The nuclear testing taboo impedes the development of new and more advanced nuclear warhead designs, which helps prevent dangerous nuclear competition, and maintain international security. Although the CTBT has created a norm against testing, the treaty has not entered into force due to the failure of eight key states, including the United States and China, to ratify. Over time, norms must be actively renewed and reinforced. In order to realize the full potential of the treaty, and to close the door on testing, friends of the CTBT states need to rejuvenate their efforts to achieve its entry into force and reinforce the taboo against nuclear testing.
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