The Future of Strategic Arms Control

Steven Pifer

doi:10.5771/0175-274X-2018-2-67

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
- EDITORIAL
  - Editorial: Nukleare Abrüstung in der Krise Götz Neuneck, Patricia Schneider Götz Neuneck, Patricia Schneider
  - Editorial: Nuclear Disarmament in Crisis Götz Neuneck, Patricia Schneider Götz Neuneck, Patricia Schneider
- 61–97 THEMENSCHWERPUNKT 61–97
  - 61–66 Der Nukleare Nichtverbreitungsvertrag und der neue Kernwaffenverbotsvertrag – harmonisch, kompatibel, unverträglich? Harald Müller Harald Müller 61–66
  - 67–73 The Future of Strategic Arms Control Steven Pifer Steven Pifer 67–73
  - 74–79 European Security and the Future of the INF Treaty Oliver Meier Oliver Meier 74–79
  - 80–85 Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry into Force Daryl G. Kimball Daryl G. Kimball 80–85
  - 86–91 Der Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty – ein Vertrag, der niemals kommt? Annette Schaper Annette Schaper 86–91
  - 92–97 North Korea and Arms Control: Past Agreements and Future Proposals Elisabeth Suh Elisabeth Suh 92–97
- 98–103 BEITRÄGE AUS SICHERHEITSPOLITIK UND FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG 98–103
  - Introducing Civil Clauses against Expanding Military Research at German Universities? A Descriptive and Ethical Analysis of the Discussion* Kerstin Schlögl-Flierl, Alexander Merkl Kerstin Schlögl-Flierl, Alexander Merkl
- 104–104 NEUERSCHEINUNGEN 104–104
- 105–108 Besprechungen 105–108
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S&F Sicherheit und Frieden , page 67 - 73

The Future of Strategic Arms Control

Autoren

Steven Pifer

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-2-67
- ISSN: 0175-274X
- ISSN online: 0175-274x
Zusammenfassung

U.S.-Russian strategic arms control faces an uncertain future. The post-Cold War nadir in relations, questions about compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, modernization programs and doctrinal questions pose challenges to the future of the strategic arms control regime. One possibility is that it ends in 2021 when the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires. A more ambitious approach could provide for further reductions but would require resolving questions where the two countries have substantial differences. Perhaps the best to hope for is New START’s extension to 2026, which will give all sides time to explore what comes next.

Abstract

U.S.-Russian strategic arms control faces an uncertain future. The post-Cold War nadir in relations, questions about compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, modernization programs and doctrinal questions pose challenges to the future of the strategic arms control regime. One possibility is that it ends in 2021 when the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires. A more ambitious approach could provide for further reductions but would require resolving questions where the two countries have substantial differences. Perhaps the best to hope for is New START’s extension to 2026, which will give all sides time to explore what comes next.
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