Back to the Future – A Monastic Perspective on Corporate Governance

Emil Inauen; Katja Rost; Margit Osterloh; Bruno S. Frey

doi:10.5771/0935-9915-2010-1-38

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- 1–4 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 1–4
- 5–7 Introduction: Religion and the Organization Man Wenzel Matiaske, Gerd Grözinger Wenzel Matiaske, Gerd Grözinger 5–7
- 8–37 Economy and Justice: A Conflict without Resolution? Christian Hecker, Hans G. Nutzinger Christian Hecker, Hans G. Nutzinger 8–37
- 38–59 Back to the Future – A Monastic Perspective on Corporate Governance Emil Inauen, Katja Rost, Margit Osterloh, Bruno S. Frey Emil Inauen, Katja Rost, Margit Osterloh, Bruno S. Frey 38–59
- 60–81 Spiritual Cleansing: A Case Study on how Spirituality Can Be Mis/used by a Company Claudia Groß Claudia Groß 60–81
- 82–94 On the Proper Essence of Christian Economic Ethics Rainer Kreuzhof, Wolfgang Ockenfels Rainer Kreuzhof, Wolfgang Ockenfels 82–94
- 95–104 William Whyte’s ‘The Organization Man’: A Flawed Central Concept but a Prescient Narrative Dallas Hanson, Wayne O’Donohue Dallas Hanson, Wayne O’Donohue 95–104
- 105–106 Book Review 105–106
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mrev management revue , page 38 - 59

Back to the Future – A Monastic Perspective on Corporate Governance

Autoren

Emil Inauen Katja Rost Margit Osterloh Bruno S. Frey

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0935-9915-2010-1-38
- ISSN: 0935-9915
- ISSN online: 1861-9908
Abstract

The financial crisis is a crisis of governance as well. In search of answers and solutions many scholars and practitioners recommend improved output control, i.e. better external incentives or even stricter regulations. Monasteries demonstrate that alternative models may be more suitable to enhance sustainable governance quality and to reduce agency problems. In the long history of monasteries, some abbots and monks were known to line their own pockets and some monasteries were undisciplined. Monasteries developed special systems to combat these excesses thus ensuring their survival over centuries. We study these features from an economic perspective. Derived from an analysis of the Benedictine monastery of Engelberg we offer three improvements of applied governance designed to reduce agency problems. First, monastic governance emphasizes clan control rather than output control. Monasteries demonstrate that organizations can prevent agency problems by complementing external discipline with internal behavioral incentives, such as value systems and voice. Second, organization members making firm-specific investments are motivated by broad participation rights and co-determination. Third, the Benedictines are able to apply supportive external control mechanisms, which are not perceived as controlling.
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