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The Challenge of Stability / Chapter 2: Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Procedural Legitimation
The Challenge of Stability / Chapter 2: Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Procedural Legitimation
Contents
Chapter
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1–12
Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
1–12
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13–24
Chapter 1: Introduction
13–24
Details
I. The Radicality and Currency of Legitimation durch Verfahren
II. Luhmann’s Early Political Sociology and Constitutional Adjudication
A. Applying Luhmann’s Sociology to a Normative Problem: Chapter 3
B. Using Systems Theory to Remedy an Analytical Problem: Chapter 4
III. How to Characterize this Book
A. Methodology
B. The Research Landscape
C. Structure
25–68
Chapter 2: Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Procedural Legitimation
25–68
Details
I. Complexity and Meaning, Or Luhmann’s Theory of Social Systems
A. Man’s Experience of the World
B. Intersubjectivity
C. Social Systems
D. Systemic Differentiation
II. The Impossibility of Justification in a Differentiated Society
A. Habermas’s Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Legitimate Law
B. Luhmann’s Counterargument from Functional Differentiation
1. The Impossibility of Consensus in a Differentiated Society
2. The Necessity of Decisionism in a Differentiated Society
a) Luhmann’s Political Sociology
b) Luhmann’s Sociology of Law
III. Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Why People Comply with the Law
A. Judicial Proceedings and the Entanglement of Self
1. Role Reciprocity and the Presentation of Self
2. Courtroom Publicity
3. Conditional Programming
4. Contact Systems
B. Political Elections and the Legislative Process
1. Elections
2. The Legislative Process
IV. Critiquing Legitimation durch Verfahren
A. Justifiability and the Concept of Political Legitimacy
1. Jürgen Habermas’s Debate with Niklas Luhmann
2. Stefan Lange and Chris Thornhill’s Nuanced Appraisal
3. Putting Luhmann’s Skepticism of Justifiability in Perspective
B. The Sources of Political Stability
V. Conclusion
69–146
Chapter 3: Judicial Review, Normative Legitimacy, and Legal Autonomy
69–146
Details
I. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty and the Two Criteria of Political Legitimacy
A. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty
B. The Two Criteria of Political Legitimacy
1. The Political-Equality Criterion
2. The Minimal-Justice Criterion
II. Judicial Review of Legislation and the Political-Equality Criterion
A. The ‘Chain of Legitimation’
B. Constitutional Provisions for Judicial Review
C. Public Support for Judicial Review
D. Does the Court Implement Our Self-Government by Articulating Our Rights?
1. Enforcing Constitutional Law
a) How the Legislature and the Court Implement Our Constitutional Rights
i. The Legislature
ii. The Court
b) The Bounds of Reasonable Legal Judgment
i. The United States
ii. Germany
c) How Far Does the Right to Bind Future Majorities Go?
i. The Argument from Democratic Choice
ii. The Argument from Constitutional Precommitment
d) Who Gets to Predict Legislative Behavior?
2. Public Reason
3. The Need for Unanimity
4. Re-Politicizing Our Constitutional Values
a) Forming the General Will
b) Holding Out the Promise of Change
c) Why the Constitutional Court?
III. Judicial Review of Legislation and the Minimal-Justice Criterion
A. Protecting Our Basic Human Rights
1. Distinguishing Between Constitutional and Human Rights
a) Underenforcing Our Basic Human Rights
b) Overenforcing Our Basic Human Rights
c) Zero-Sum Rights Controversies
2. Judicial Review as Insurance Against Future Violations
B. Emancipating Marginalized Communities
1. Preliminary Observations
a) Partial vs. Complete Illegitimacy
b) Defining Marginalized Communities
c) Determining the Essential Rights
2. Devising a Test for a Court’s Emancipatory Impetus
3. Does Judicial Review Pass the Futility Test?
a) How Expansive Can We Expect the Courts’ Rulings to Be?
b) Focusing on the Concrete Change in the Law
4. Conclusion
IV. Judicial Review and the Protection of Our Legal Autonomy
A. The Notion of Legal Autonomy
B. The Notion of Legal Autonomy and Niklas Luhmann’s Political Sociology
C. Generating a Presumption of Universal Acquiescence
1. Judicial Proceedings and the Absorption of Protest
2. Legislative Proceedings and the Generation of Systemic Trust
a) Sensitizing People to the Possibility of Change
b) An Alternative to Positivity Theory?
3. Maximizing Outcome Equality
a) The Judicial-Appointment Process
b) Disavowing Partisanship
c) Safeguarding the Openness of Constitutional Reasoning
i. Examples
ii. Increasing Interpretive Flexibility
D. Is Luhmann’s Theory of Systemic Trust Sufficiently Plausible?
1. Compliance and Institutional Legitimacy
2. The Causes of Institutional Legitimacy
V. Conclusion
147–202
Chapter 4: Judicial Appointments and the Specter of Politicization
147–202
Details
I. The Judicial-Appointment Process in Germany
A. The Nomination Phase
1. The Interparty Agreement
2. Party-Political Affiliations
B. The Confirmation Process
1. To Hear or Not to Hear
2. A Silent Parliament
II. The Concept of Politicization by Judicial Appointment
A. The Concept of (Judicial) Politicization
1. Politicization Within One Entity vs. Between Entities
2. The Two Angles to Politicization Between Two or More Entities
B. Transforming Constitutional Adjudication into ‘Politics by Other Means’
1. What It Means for Constitutional Adjudication to Be or Appear Political
2. How the Confirmation Process Helps Politicize Constitutional Adjudication
3. The Effects of Politicization on Constitutional Adjudication
III. Observations on the Concept of Politicization by Judicial Appointment
A. Partisan vs. Unanimous Confirmation Votes
B. The Purpose of the Parliamentary Confirmation Process
1. The United States
2. Germany
C. Politicization by Judicial Appointment and Institutional Legitimacy
1. Perceived Politicization and Institutional Legitimacy
2. Contentious Appointments and Institutional Legitimacy
3. Conclusion
D. The Meaning of Partisanship
IV. Discussing Politicization from a Systems-Theoretical Perspective
A. The Concepts of Social Systems and Systemic Differentiation
B. Systems Theory and Politicization by Judicial Appointment
C. Politicization by Judicial Appointment and the Confirmation Process in America
1. From Unanimous to Partisan Confirmation Votes
2. The Confirmation Hearings
D. Politicization’s Effect on Constitutional Adjudication and the Political System
1. Partisan Capture and the Political System’s Internal Differentiation
2. Functional Differentiation and Judicial Authoritativeness
E. The Likely Objection to My Conceptual Lens
1. Autopoietic Closure
2. Autopoietic Closure and Politicization Research
VI. Conclusion
203–204
Conclusion
203–204
Details
205–230
Bibliography
205–230
Details
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The Challenge of Stability , page 25 - 68
Chapter 2: Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Procedural Legitimation
Autoren
Theodor Shulman
DOI
doi.org/10.5771/9783748941583-25
ISBN print: 978-3-7560-0623-6
ISBN online: 978-3-7489-4158-3
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