The Judicial Review of the European Union Industrial Cartels

Anca D. Chirita

doi:10.5771/1435-439X-2015-4-407

Inhalt
- Kapitel Ausklappen | EinklappenAutorenSeiten
- 371–372 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 371–372
- 373–390 A Long March towards Compatibility, Coherence and Consistency: the Future of China’s Investment Agreements Manjiao Chi Manjiao Chi 373–390
- 391–406 Von Flughäfen, Freizeitbädern und Fußballstadien – Europäische Beihilfenkontrolle als Ersatzstrukturpolitik? Robin van der Hout Robin van der Hout 391–406
- 407–440 The Judicial Review of the European Union Industrial Cartels Anca D. Chirita Anca D. Chirita 407–440
- 441–474 The Implementation of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in the European Union: An Analysis of its Relationship with the Brussels I-bis Regulation Erin H. DuBose Erin H. DuBose 441–474
- 475–506 National Constitutional Identities and the Legitimacy of the European Union – Two Sides of the European Coin Julia Villotti Julia Villotti 475–506
- 507–546 Das Streikverbot der deutschen Beamten im Spannungsfeld zwischen Grundgesetz und Europäischer Menschenrechtskonvention – Handlungsbedarf nach dem Steikrechtsurteil des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts vom 24. Februar 2014 Ulrich Widmaier, Siegbert Alber Ulrich Widmaier, Siegbert Alber 507–546
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ZEuS Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien , Seite 407 - 440

The Judicial Review of the European Union Industrial Cartels

Autoren

Anca D. Chirita

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/1435-439X-2015-4-407
- ISSN print: 1435-439X
- ISSN online: 2942-3589
Abstract

The public enforcement of the European Union (EU) prohibition of hard-core cartels,
in particular, price-fixing agreements, reflects the mission of the European Commission
(EC) to detect and punish any professional or trade association of producers or
manufacturers that pursue exclusively speculative commercial profits at the expense
of consumer welfare. Secret cartels among competing producers or manufacturers stifle
free competition on the basis of price or quantity. Most cartels affect the welfare
of intermediate consumers in a particular industry, thereby imposing significant restraints
upon competition. A classical division operates between horizontal and vertical
agreements. Horizontal agreements among producers or manufacturers that unlawfully
intend to fix prices, divide markets, or restrict competition, reflect a major
conspiracy in trade against the public interest. In contrast, vertical agreements among
manufacturers and their distributors or retailers are often perceived as less harmful.
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