The Lisbon Treaty introduced a small but significant change to the appointment procedure of the European Commission President, namely the requirement for the candidate proposed by the European Council to be elected by the European Parliament. Even though this was on paper only a minor modification of the existing procedure under which the EP had to consent to the member states’ chosen candidate, this reform had nevertheless the potential for wide-ranging repercussions within the EU’s evolving political system. This article examines the impact that these changes have had on the dynamics of electoral politics and executive appointments in the EU, arguing that while there has been a greater degree of politicisation, this has not resulted in the establishment of traditional left/right politics expected from the experience of national politics. Instead, the - somewhat paradoxical - effect of the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system has been to cement the grand coalition in the EP and a strengthening of the supranational institutions vis-à-vis the member states.
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