This paper explores the possibility of judicial review of legislative process (“JRLP”) in India. It draws on scholarship from other jurisdictions to outline a case in favour of JRLP in light of India’s particular context. It begins by critically analyzing the functioning of India’s Parliament, where we identify several fundamental weaknesses in the legislative process and demonstrate with examples how they are exploited to bypass debate and deliberation. The paper then considers several arguments advanced in favour of judicial review as a possible solution to weaknesses in the legislative process. In this regard, the paper distinguishes between two kinds of judicial review, referred to as “direct” and “indirect” JRLP. The paper considers the plausibility of employing direct and indirect JRLP in light of India’s constitutional provisions and existing doctrinal position, demonstrating that neither forms are necessarily barred, and have been employed in part. Finally, the paper outlines the case for and against the use of direct and indirect JRLP in the Indian context, and concludes by suggesting that these forms of judicial review may be a normatively desirable approach to remedying some of the fundamental weaknesses in India’s legislative process.
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