Rüstungsexportkontrolle durch den internationalen Waffenhandelsvertrag

Max M. Mutschler

doi:10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-121

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
- 109–158 THEMENSCHWERPUNKT 109–158
  - 109–114 Optionen konventioneller Rüstungskontrolle jenseits des KSE-Vertrags Wolfgang Zellner Wolfgang Zellner 109–114
  - 115–120 Back to the Future? Revisiting Military Confidence-Building in Europe* Benjamin Schaller Benjamin Schaller 115–120
  - 121–125 Rüstungsexportkontrolle durch den internationalen Waffenhandelsvertrag Max M. Mutschler Max M. Mutschler 121–125
  - 126–132 The Shadowy Existence of the Weapons Review and Its Impact on Disarmament* Anne Dienelt Anne Dienelt 126–132
  - 133–139 Internationale Rüstungskontrollbemühungen zu autonomen Waffensystemen: Definitionen, Technik und sicherheitspolitische Implikationen Christian Alwardt, Johanna Polle Christian Alwardt, Johanna Polle 133–139
  - 140–145 Keep Dreaming: Cyber Arms Control is Not a Viable Policy Option Tobias Burgers, David Ryland Scott Robinson Tobias Burgers, David Ryland Scott Robinson 140–145
  - 146–158 Das Bio- und Chemiewaffenübereinkommen: zwei Rüstungskontrollverträge in der Krise? Mirko Himmel Mirko Himmel 146–158
- 159–164 BEITRÄGE AUS SICHERHEITSPOLITIK UND FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG 159–164
  - Shaping the Discourse: How Search and Rescue NGOs Got Under Fire in the Debate on Migration Benedikt Funke Benedikt Funke
- 165–166 NEUERSCHEINUNGEN 165–166
- 166–170 BESPRECHUNGEN 166–170
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S&F Sicherheit und Frieden , page 121 - 125

Rüstungsexportkontrolle durch den internationalen Waffenhandelsvertrag

Autoren

Max M. Mutschler

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2018-3-121
- ISSN: 0175-274X
- ISSN online: 0175-274x
Zusammenfassung

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) sets, for the first time ever, legally binding, international rules for arms transfers. However, due to several problems, in particular the lack of clarity of some of its central concepts, the ATT is far from a significant contribution to the reduction of irresponsible arms transfers. This is highlighted by a look at the arms transfers to the states fighting in Yemen. Among several other measures this article suggests that ATT member states make use of the annual conferences of states parties to debate their interpretation of the central concepts and criteria, with the goal of agreeing in a step-by-step process on how to apply them.

Abstract

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) sets, for the first time ever, legally binding, international rules for arms transfers. However, due to several problems, in particular the lack of clarity of some of its central concepts, the ATT is far from a significant contribution to the reduction of irresponsible arms transfers. This is highlighted by a look at the arms transfers to the states fighting in Yemen. Among several other measures this article suggests that ATT member states make use of the annual conferences of states parties to debate their interpretation of the central concepts and criteria, with the goal of agreeing in a step-by-step process on how to apply them.
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