No Patience for „Wars of Choice“? – Der US-Kongress und die Auseinandersetzung über die militärische Interventionspolitik in der Ära Obama

Florian Böller

doi:10.5771/0175-274X-2017-2-66

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis
- 53–90 THEMENSCHWERPUNKT 53–90
  - 53–59 Parlamente in der Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik: Parlamentarische Kontrolle von Streitkräfteeinsätzen im Licht der Forschung Patrick A. Mello, Dirk Peters Patrick A. Mello, Dirk Peters 53–59
  - 60–65 The Bundestag as a Champion of Parliamentary Control of Military Missions Wolfgang Wagner Wolfgang Wagner 60–65
  - 66–71 No Patience for „Wars of Choice“? – Der US-Kongress und die Auseinandersetzung über die militärische Interventionspolitik in der Ära Obama Florian Böller Florian Böller 66–71
  - 72–78 Who is Policing the Police? – The Role of Parliament in Police Governance in Asia and Europe Mario J. Aguja, Hans Born Mario J. Aguja, Hans Born 72–78
  - 79–84 Scrutinizing Arms Exports in Europe: The Reciprocal Relationship Between Transparency and Parliamentary Control Diederik Cops, Nils Duquet, Gregory Gourdin Diederik Cops, Nils Duquet, Gregory Gourdin 79–84
  - 85–90 Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation: An Answer to the Double Democratic Deficit in the Area of CFSP and CSDP? Oliver Schwarz Oliver Schwarz 85–90
- 91–96 BEITRÄGE AUS SICHERHEITSPOLITIK UND FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG 91–96
  - The Sectarian Dimension of Political Legitimacy in Syria: The National Roots of Sectarian Violence in the Syrian war Maximilian Lakitsch Maximilian Lakitsch
- 97–98 NEUERSCHEINUNGEN 97–98
- 98–102 BESPRECHUNGEN 98–102
Durchsuchen Sie das Werk
Geben Sie ein Keyword in die Suchleiste ein
Access

S&F Sicherheit und Frieden , page 66 - 71

No Patience for „Wars of Choice“? – Der US-Kongress und die Auseinandersetzung über die militärische Interventionspolitik in der Ära Obama

Autoren

Florian Böller

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/0175-274X-2017-2-66
- ISSN: 0175-274X
- ISSN online: 0175-274x
Zusammenfassung

In contrast to the thesis that the War Powers of the U.S. Congress are defective and dysfunctional, congressional behavior can be understood as rational and strategic: First, members of Congress evaluate electoral interests when choosing to support or criticize presidential war policies. Second, congressional members assess whether the use of force abroad is aimed at preventing threats to US security interests. Such “wars of necessity” are likely to summon congressional support, whereas Congress is more skeptical towards humanitarian interventions (“wars of choice”). The thesis will be illustrated by comparing the two most recent cases of military interventions (Libya 2011, ISIS 2014).

Abstract

In contrast to the thesis that the War Powers of the U.S. Congress are defective and dysfunctional, congressional behavior can be understood as rational and strategic: First, members of Congress evaluate electoral interests when choosing to support or criticize presidential war policies. Second, congressional members assess whether the use of force abroad is aimed at preventing threats to US security interests. Such “wars of necessity” are likely to summon congressional support, whereas Congress is more skeptical towards humanitarian interventions (“wars of choice”). The thesis will be illustrated by comparing the two most recent cases of military interventions (Libya 2011, ISIS 2014).
Share