Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Law
A Study on Human-Machine Interactions in Ethically and Legally Sensitive Domains
Zusammenfassung
Jüngste Fortschritte in Robotik und KI machen es möglich, Roboter auch mit ethisch und rechtlich sensiblen Aufgaben zu betrauen. Besonders umstritten ist der Einsatz so genannter autonomer Waffensysteme (AWS), die eigenständig Entscheidungen über Leben und Tod von ‚Zielpersonen‘ treffen. Damit berühren sie zentrale Grundlagen des humanitären Völkerrechts, der internationalen Menschenrechte, des internationalen Strafrechts sowie der staatlichen Verantwortung.
Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht das Buch die Legalität und die völkerrechtlichen Folgen des Einsatzes autonomer Waffensysteme. Es zeigt Wege für künftige internationale Regelungen auf und skizziert das Konzept einer ‚geteilten Verantwortung‘ zwischen menschlichen Entscheidungsträgern und intelligenten Systemen.
Daniele Amoroso ist Professor für Völkerrecht an der Universität Cagliari und Mitglied des Internationalen Komitees für die Kontrolle von Roboterwaffen (ICRAC).
Abstract
Jüngste Fortschritte in Robotik und KI machen es möglich, Roboter auch mit ethisch und rechtlich sensiblen Aufgaben zu betrauen. Besonders umstritten ist der Einsatz so genannter autonomer Waffensysteme (AWS), die eigenständig Entscheidungen über Leben und Tod von ‚Zielpersonen‘ treffen. Damit berühren sie zentrale Grundlagen des humanitären Völkerrechts, der internationalen Menschenrechte, des internationalen Strafrechts sowie der staatlichen Verantwortung.
Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht das Buch die Legalität und die völkerrechtlichen Folgen des Einsatzes autonomer Waffensysteme. Es zeigt Wege für künftige internationale Regelungen auf und skizziert das Konzept einer ‚geteilten Verantwortung‘ zwischen menschlichen Entscheidungsträgern und intelligenten Systemen.
Daniele Amoroso ist Professor für Völkerrecht an der Universität Cagliari und Mitglied des Internationalen Komitees für die Kontrolle von Roboterwaffen (ICRAC).
- Kapitel Ausklappen | EinklappenSeiten
- I–4 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis I–4
- 5–30 Chapter I Introduction 5–30
- 1. A (Brief) History of the Debate on Autonomous Weapons Systems
- 1.1. “Taking the Human Out of the Loop”: The Issue of “Autonomy” in the Military Research and Policy Documents of the US Department of Defense
- 1.2. Questioning the “Dehumanization” of Warfare: From the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots to the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
- 2. What Counts as “Autonomy” in Weapons Systems? The Case for a Functional Approach
- 2.1. An Overview of Existing and Foreseeable Autonomous Weapons Systems
- 2.2. Normative Implications of a Functional Approach to Autonomy in Weapons Systems
- 3. Mapping the Ethical and Legal Debate on Autonomous Weapons Systems
- 4. Research Goals and Structure of the Book
- 4.1. Disclaimer: What this Book is not About
- 31–120 Chapter II A Legality “Test” for Autonomous Weapons Systems. The (In)compatibility of Autonomous Targeting with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 31–120
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Setting Up the “Parameters” of the Test
- 2.1. The Law of Targeting
- 2.2. The Right to Life under International Human Rights Law
- 3. The First Prong of the Test: Distinction
- 3.1. The Principle of Distinction under International Humanitarian Law
- 3.1.1. The Definition of Civilians and the Problem of Direct Participation in Hostilities
- 3.1.2. The Definition of Military Objectives and the Problem of Dual-Use Objects
- 3.1.3. Other Protected Persons and Objects under International Humanitarian Law
- 3.2. Issues of Distinction under International Human Rights Law
- 3.3. Distinction and Autonomous Weapons Systems: The Problem of Situation Awareness
- 3.3.1. Perception of the Elements in the Environment
- 3.3.2. Comprehension of the Current Situation and Projection of Future Status
- 3.3.3. Critique of the Arguments Denying Legal Relevance to AWS’ (Lack of) Situation Awareness
- 3.4. Summary of the Discussion
- 4. The Second Prong of the Test: Proportionality
- 4.1. The Principle of Proportionality under International Humanitarian Law
- 4.1.1. Collateral damage
- 4.1.2. Military Advantage
- 4.1.3. Excessiveness
- 4.2. Issues of Proportionality under International Human Rights Law
- 4.3. Autonomous Weapons Systems, Proportionality, and Balancing: Lost in Translation?
- 4.4. Summary of the Discussion
- 5. The Third Prong of the Test: Precaution
- 5.1. The Principle of Precaution under International Humanitarian Law
- 5.2. The Requirement of Precaution and the Right to Life under International Human Rights Law
- 5.3. The Implications of the Obligation to Take Precautionary Measures for the Human-Weapon Relationship
- 5.4. Summary of the Discussion
- 6. Conclusions: Has Autonomy in Weapons Systems “Passed the Test”?
- 121–160 Chapter III The “Accountability Gap” Problem. Who is to Blame for Autonomous Weapons Systems’ Misdoings? 121–160
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Structural Problems with Responsibility Ascription for AWS’ Misdoings
- 2.1. The Unpredictability of Autonomous Machines
- 2.2. The “Many Hands” Problem
- 3. Individual Criminal Responsibility
- 3.1. Direct Responsibility
- 3.1.1. The Participation to the Crime by Software Developers
- 3.1.2. The “Many Hands” Problem and Joint Criminal Enterprise
- 3.1.3. Limited Predictability of AWS and the Role of Dolus Eeventualis
- 3.2. Superior Responsibility
- 4. State Responsibility
- 5. Corporate Responsibility
- 5.1. Tort Liability for International Crimes
- 5.2. Product Liability
- 5.3. No-Fault Liability
- 6. Conclusions: The Inevitability of Accountability Gaps and Its Implications for the Legality of Autonomous Weapons Systems
- 161–216 Chapter IV Challenging Autonomous Weapons Systems as a Malum in Se AWS, Human Dignity and the Martens Clause between Ethics and Law 161–216
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Entering Ethical Concerns in the International Legal Discourse: A Précis on Human Dignity and the Martens Clause
- 2.1. Human Dignity
- 2.2. The Martens Clause
- 2.3. Wrap-up of the Discussion
- 3. The Ethical Arguments against Autonomy in Weapons Systems
- 3.1. Autonomy in Weapons Systems as a Breach of the Human Dignity (and Humanity) of Targeted People
- 3.2. Autonomy in Weapons Systems and the “Human Agency Removal” Problem
- 4. The Preservation of Human Agency in Targeting Decisions as a “Dictate of Public Conscience”
- 4.1. Investigating the “Dictates of Public Conscience” on the Issue of Human Agency and Lethal Decision-Making: a) States
- 4.2. b) International Organizations
- 4.3. c) Global Civil Society and Private Sector
- 4.4. d) Documents on AI not Directly Addressing the Issue of Autonomy in Weapons Systems
- 5. Conclusions
- 217–260 Chapter V A Normative Model of Meaningful Human Control over Weapons Systems 217–260
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Human Control vs. Weapon Autonomy: Striking a Balance between Humanitarian and Military Considerations
- 3. The Debate on Meaningful Human Control (MHC) over Weapons Systems: A Sketch
- 3.1. The Quality of Human Involvement
- 3.2. Shared Control Policies
- 4. Shaping the Content of a Normative Model of Meaningful Human Control
- 4.1. Primary Obligations: Control Privileges
- 4.2. Ancillary Obligations: Training and Design
- 5. The Way Forward: What Legal Regime for Meaningful Human Control?
- 5.1. An Overview of the Regulative Options in the AWS Debate
- 5.2. Possible Elements of a Future Protocol/Treaty on Meaningful Human Control
- 261–266 Epilogue 261–266
- 267–291 Bibliography 267–291
