@article{2009:bach:incentive_,
title = {Incentive Effects in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Competitors – an Analysis of the Olympic Rowing Regatta in Sydney 2000},
year = {2009},
note = {A large part of the theoretical tournament literature argues that
rank-order tournaments only unfold their incentive effects if the
contestants all have similar prospects of winning. In heterogeneous
fields, the outcome of the tournament is relatively clear and the
contestants reduce their effort. However, empirical evidence for this
so-called contamination hypothesis is sparse. An analysis of 442
showings at the Olympic Rowing Regatta in Sydney 2000 gives evidence
that oarsmen spare effort in heterogeneous heats. This implies that
competition among staffs with heterogeneous skill levels does not
bring about the intended effort levels. However, a separate subgroup
analysis shows that only the tournament favourites hold back effort
whereas underdogs bring out their best when competing against dominant
rivals. A heterogeneous tournament could then be enriched by absolute
performance standards to increase incentives of the favourites.},
journal = {mrev management revue},
pages = {239--253},
author = {Bach, Norbert and Gürtler, Oliver and Prinz, Joachim},
volume = {20},
number = {3}
}