@article{2017:schmedes:regieren_i,
title = {Regieren im semi-souveränen Parteienbundesstaat . Die administrativen und politischen Koordinierungsstrukturen in der Praxis des deutschen Föderalismus},
year = {2017},
note = {In Germany, the legislative process is characterized by a balance of
interests between the federation and the Länder as well as between
the - potentially incongruent - political majorities at both state
levels . It is in particular the Bundesrat that embodies the opposed
relationship between parliamentary competition and federal negotiation
. At the same time, the Bundesrat constitutes a key component of the
mutual entanglement and balance of state power . Federal co-operation
between the federation and the Länder interferes with both the
structures and the principles of party competition . As a result of
Germany’s highly integrated and centralized party system as well as
of the party composition of the Bundesrat, there are many
interdependencies between the behaviour of the Länder governments in
the Bundesrat and the party competition at the federal and the Länder
level . The opposed relationship between the logic of federal
negotiation and the logic of party competition is clearly reflected in
the Bundesrat’s decision-making processes, which are characterized
by the interlocking of formal administrative and informal political
co-ordination structures . To a considerable extent, the German party
system is attributed influence in developing consensus-democratic
practices, especially in times of divergent political majorities
between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat .},
journal = {ZParl Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen},
pages = {899--921},
author = {Schmedes, Hans-Jörg},
volume = {48},
number = {4}
}