@article{2017:vatter:deutsches_,
title = {Deutsches Bundesrats- vs. Schweizer Senatsmodell im Lichte sich wandelnder Parteiensysteme: Repräsentation und Legitimität Zweiter Kammern im Vergleich},
year = {2017},
note = {There are two possible models for second chambers, which differ in
terms of institutional arrangements and actor behaviour . In the
German “Council Model“, Bundesrat members are appointed by
subnational governments and they act as instructed agents of their
Länder . Following the “Senate Model”, Swiss Councillors of
States are chosen by direct popular elections and, once in parliament,
they vote independently as voting instructions are banned by the
Federal Constitution . However, both design options make it necessary
for MPs to cope with a “Divided Government” (or: “Divided
Parliament”) . When it comes to passing important legislation,
German MPs organize in “informal grand coalitions”, Swiss
Councillors of States engage in flexible, variable ad hoc coalitions .
Parties and party strate- gies are at the heart of both adaption
strategies . But the recent transformation of party sys- tems
challenges those very strategies and influences the second chambers’
main principles (i .e . representation and legitimacy) . Compared to
the representation of territorial interests and despite fundamentally
different institutional arrangements, party logic has recently been
gaining importance in both systems . Moreover, the second chambers’
legitimacy depends both in Germany and in Switzerland on transparent
decision-making .},
journal = {ZParl Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen},
pages = {741--763},
author = {Vatter, Adrian and Freiburghaus, Rahel and Triaca, Ladina},
volume = {48},
number = {4}
}