@article{2016:sieberer:lehren_aus,
title = {Lehren aus Weimar? Die erste Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages von 1951 zwi- schen Kontinuität und Reform},
year = {2016},
note = {The article provides an in-depth case study of the genesis of the
first parliamentary standing orders of the German Bundestag in 1951 .
Descriptively, there is a strong continuity when comparing the
standing orders of the Reichstag’s internal rules during the Weimar
Repub- lic, with the exception of two major innovations (the
establishment of a question time and public committee hearings) and
conflicts regarding the rules on forming party groups, the procedures
for initiating recorded votes, and restrictions on financial bills .
Analytically, it remains to explain why the new rules exhibit such a
strong path dependence despite the Weimar Republic’s failure and
despite the fact that the new constitutional regime consti- tutes a
critical juncture on which far-reaching reforms could be expected .
There is evidence that a combination of actors’ perceptions,
short-term competitive political considerations and risk attitudes
explain the absence of a more fundamental reform . The relevant actors
did not blame the Weimar Republic’s failing on the institutional
structure of the Weimar Reichstag and the parliamentary majority
pursued well-defined small reforms to strengthen its position
vis-à-vis the opposition in the short run . Under these conditions,
large reforms with uncertain consequences were considered neither
necessary nor advantageous . Beyond the specific case studied in the
article at hand, this explanation suggests that actors’ rational
self-interest and path-dependency are complementary rather than
competing explanations for institutional reform . [ZParl, vol . 47
(2016), no . 1, pp . 3 - 25]},
journal = {ZParl Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen},
pages = {3--25},
author = {Sieberer, Ulrich},
volume = {47},
number = {1}
}