@article{2015:bller:more_than_,
title = {More than a „constitutionally created potted plant“? Der US-Kongress und die demokratische Kontrolle militärischer Interventionen},
year = {2015},
note = {Previous studies have characterized the U.S. Congress as uniformly
weak in carrying out its constitutional responsibility in the politics
of military interventions vis-a-vis the president. The picture,
however, has more nuances when not only legislative activism prior to
the use of force but also the efforts of Congress to control and
provide oversight to ongoing military interventions is evaluated. This
differentiated perspective on the various tools of democratic control
is applied to a structured-focused comparison of U.S. military
interventions between 1973 and 2013. Indeed, there is a considerable
variance in executive-legislative relations concerning the war powers
question, which contradicts the traditional finding of a consistently
weak Congress. While in some cases Congress is indeed deferential
towards the executive, there is also evidence of legislative
assertiveness, when members of the legislative branch perceive a
military intervention as not serving U.S. national security interests.
[ZParl, vol. 46 (2015), no. 3, pp. 622 – 644]},
journal = {ZParl Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen},
pages = {622--644},
author = {Böller, Florian},
volume = {46},
number = {3}
}