@article{2014:rauhut:avoiding_d,
title = {Avoiding Detection or Reciprocating Norm Violations?},
year = {2014},
note = {There is a growing body of research showing that people altruistically
enforce cooperation norms in social dilemmas. Most of this research
analyzes situations where norm violators are known and group members
enforce cooperation among each other. However, in many situations norm
violators are unknown and detection and punishment is enforced by
third parties, such as in plagiarism, tax evasion, doping or even
two-timing. Our contribution is threefold. Conceptually, we show the
usefulness of inspection game experiments for studying normative
behavior in these situations. Methodologically, we present a novel
measurement of strategic norm adherence and enforcement, asking for
continuous, “frequentistic” choice probabilities. Substantively,
we demonstrate that norm adherence in these situations is best
understood by coexisting distinct actor types. Self-regarding types
learn the inspection rate and calibrate their norm violations to
maximize own payoffs. Other-regarding types reciprocate experienced
victimizations by stealing from other unknown group members; even at
additional costs. We specify both mechanisms by agent-based simulation
models and compare their relative explanatory strength by behavioral
and attitudinal data in inspection game experiments (N = 220). Our
results suggest a modern sociological perspective, which combines homo
oeconomicus with homo sociologicus. Further, our findings contribute
to understanding conditional norm compliance in „broken windows“
dynamics, since we show under controlled conditions that such dynamics
may result jointly from self- and other regarding mechanisms.},
journal = {SozW Soziale Welt},
pages = {153--183},
author = {Rauhut, Heiko and Jud, Silvana},
volume = {65},
number = {2}
}