

Cultural Changes in the Turkic World

edited by

Filiz Kırıl, Barbara Pusch,

Claus Schönig, Arus Yumul



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ISTANBULER TEXTE UND STUDIEN

HERAUSGEGEBEN VOM
ORIENT-INSTITUT ISTANBUL

BAND 7

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WÜRZBURG 2016

ERGON VERLAG WÜRZBURG
IN KOMMISSION

Umschlaggestaltung: Taline Yozgatian

Titelfoto: Barbara Pusch

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>.

ISBN 978-3-95650-181-4

ISSN 1863-9461

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Ergon-Verlag GmbH

Keesburgstr. 11, D-97074 Würzburg

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Introduction

Over the last fifteen or twenty years, the Turkic world has undergone a host of remarkable changes of various shapes and size. Thus in Turkey – for many years the only independent Turkic state – slowly but steadily a process of transformation towards a more open and civil society has taken place. The aim to become a full member of the European Union has been a more or less powerful motor for internal changes, e.g., in the juridical and educational systems of Turkey. At least some parts of Turkish society have become more and more adapted to what one may call world civilization. At the same time, the country has had to face a wave of re-Islamization. However, even Islamist groups in Turkey have taken part in the processes of modernization and globalization. This transformation has not only affected ways of thinking and interpreting the world, it has also changed, for example, personal tastes and patterns of consumption. This globalization can also be felt in contemporary Turkish literature, the most prominent exponent of which is without doubt Orhan Pamuk. One may debate whether the general attitude towards non-Muslim citizens in Turkey has changed much, but what one can see is that these groups have become a topic in contemporary literature – and that the non-Muslims of Turkey are in the process of developing a new self consciousness. At the same time, the Turkish communities in Europe are also exhibiting many changes in their attitudes and behaviours, which should be investigated.

In the Turkic world outside Turkey the most radical change occurred with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the breakdown of one of the last colonial empires, new independent Turkic states appeared on the map: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Other Turkic peoples were able to preserve or gain a (more or less) autonomous status as regions within independent states, e.g. the Tatars, Bashkirs, Khakas, Tyva, Yakut, etc. Of course, gaining independence is always a crucial time for a people. Thus we find a great variety of nation building and identity creating activities – many of them following the same nationalist and sometimes chauvinist lines known from Europe and Turkey. For the first time, the non-Muslim Turks of Siberia and the Christian Gagauz of Moldova (and Bulgaria) have been noticed by a broader public in the West – some of them, the Tyva, because of their throat singing, some of them, the Gagauz, because they follow ancient but never forgotten trails to Istanbul to work there (as do many other Turks from outside Turkey who come to Turkey to work, do business, and study). Other Turkic peoples, like the Siberian Shors, are still only known to experts but have undergone many interesting cultural developments during recent years. The same holds true for the Turks of Iran, most of whom belong to the Oghuz subgroup of Turks; but one group, the Khalaj Turks, speak one of the most archaic Turkic languages. All the Turkic groups of Iran,

however, suffer from the cultural policy of the Iranian state. The Turks of China still remain in relative isolation. Their most numerous group, the (Modern) Uyghurs, are subject to increasing pressure from the central government. It will be interesting to observe the effects of the not only political but increasingly also cultural oppression of this minority on their relations with and their attitude towards the Chinese. But there are also other Turks in China, e.g. the Salars in Qinghai. Even if they live in a relatively remote area, their culture has not remained untouched by, e.g., Chinese and Tibetan influences.

Taking into account all of these interesting developments, Arus Yumul (Bilgi Üniversitesi İstanbul), Ildiko Beller-Hann (Orientwissenschaftliches Zentrum Halle), and Claus Schönig (Orient-Institut İstanbul) felt the need to bring together scholars working in different fields of Turkic studies to exchange our data, experiences, and impressions connected with the cultural changes in the Turkic world. Thus, on 6-7 December 2003 an international workshop entitled „Cultural Changes in the Turkic World“ was held at Bilgi University in İstanbul. Scholars from different countries gave lectures on topics, most of which – among other things – illustrate the great variety of changes in the Turkic world and their outcomes. Thank you very much, dear colleagues! Most of the papers given at the workshop are published in this book. It is our hope that others who are interested in different aspects of Turkic culture may profit from it.

Most of the organizational work for the workshop was done by Arus Yumul and Barbara Pusch (Orient-Institut İstanbul). Work on this publication was done mainly by Filiz Kiral (Orient-Institut İstanbul), Arus Yumul, and Barbara Pusch. Vanessa Karam was responsible for English language proofreading. Ildiko Beller-Hann was so kind to read and discuss all the circulars, invitations and papers I needed to write in order to bring together the participants and raise funds. We all extend our thanks to the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, which financially supported our workshop.

Claus Schönig

Orient-Institut İstanbul

July 5, 2006

Part 1: Cultural Changes in Turkey

New Tendencies in Turkish Literature and Some Aspects of Orhan Pamuk's Works

Börte Sagaster & Catharina Dufft

Since the 1980s, Turkish society has gone through fundamental changes. These changes are characterized on a political level by a stronger liberalization, and on a cultural level by the phenomenon of globalization. A growing number of minority groups and subcultures have gained public voice; their existence—and acceptance—in the public sphere prompts questions on the changes in the dominant value system of Turkish society (see Kandiyoti and Saktanber 2002). For the first time, the ruling state model of the Turkish nation has come seriously into discussion, and Turkish society has become more fragmented and socially modified.

The partial liberalization of Turkish society in the years following the coup d'état of September 1980 coincided with a growing development of cultural life, the press and literary production. With regard to literature, we can observe that the era of critical realism, which had been the dominant trend in the fifties and sixties, as well as the experimental modernism of the 1970s made room for a broader look on literature that is less connected with homogenous state ideas. Authors of the post-1980s see themselves first and foremost as experimental players on both a form and a subject level, with literature as their playground. As a consequence, new themes, styles and genres appeared, and already existing genres, as for example the historical novel or the crime and science fiction novel, have gained new forms and importance.

Concerning the historical novel, one of the first authors to thematize Ottoman history in a new and experimental way was Orhan Pamuk (b. 1952), whose works we will treat more extensively in the second part of this article. In his third novel *Beyaz Kale*, from 1985, he changed for the first time the temporal frame of his novels from the Republican present to the Ottoman past. Another author who since 1995 has become famous for the writing of historical novels, is the philosopher İhsan Oktay Anar: In his three novels, set in the Ottoman past, he mixes myth and reality to construct an immense “exotic stage design” for the human fantasy (Furrer 2000: 239). Other authors of historical novels include Reha Çamuroğlu, Gürsel Korat, Ahmet Altan, and Nedim Gürsel.

In the crime novel genre, from a vast spectrum of writers, only a few here will be named here: Ahmet Ümit, born in 1960, who has been writing crime fiction since the middle of the 1990s, gained fame with his first novel *Sis ve Gece* from 1996. The thematic spectrum of his novels ranges from the Turkish secret service system (*Sis ve Gece*), to Turkish communists in Moscow (*Kar Kokusu*, 1998), archaeological settings and multicultural Anatolian history (*Patasana*, 2000), Turkish

mafia circles (*Kukla*, 2002) and the cultural milieu of the Beyoğlu quarter of Istanbul (*Beyoğlu Rapsodisi*, 2003). Another writer who since 1994 has written at least 25 books belonging to the ‘thriller’ category, and who is obviously well received by Turkish readers,¹ is Osman Aysu. A third author, who has become famous recently (2003) with a travesty series hero who preferably solves cases in an Islamist or nationalist milieu, is Mehmet Murat Somer.

With regard to content, a shift from realism to fantasy and even the supernatural can be observed.² One of the earliest representatives of the genre of fantastic realism is Latife Tekin (b. 1957), whose 1983 novel *Sevgili Arsız Ölüm* with its fantastic features transgressed the limits of traditional “village literature” (*köy edebiyatı*) and started a public discussion on the role of realism in Turkish literature and Turkish cultural heritage (see Sagaster 2002: 7-27). Another author famous already in the 1970s for her fantastic-satirical short stories, is the female writer Nazlı Eray. Apart from these, the authors Hasan Ali Toptaş, Aslı Erdoğan, Hakan Şenocak, and Faruk Duman can be named.

The spiritual search for a deeper meaning of life is another dimension which has to be added to the treatment of recent Turkish literature. This search, it seems, takes several different directions: On the one hand, we have the ‘indigenous’ direction with an interest in Islamic thought; this trend is represented by authors such as Ali Haydar Haksal, Mustafa Miyasoğlu or the female writer Cihan Aktaş. An ‘outsider’ among the seekers of Islamic religious meaning is Metin Kaçan, who, after his famous 1990 novel *Ağır Roman*, which describes life in an Istanbul gypsy quarter using a fantastic slang language, turned in his second, 1997 novel *Fındık Sekiz* to Islamic mysticism. This novel, based on a travel allegory, depicts the metamorphosis of a debauched bohemian character into a pious Muslim.

On the other hand, recent Turkish literature also demonstrates a growing interest in Far Eastern Buddhist and Hindu philosophies.³ Vivet Kanetti, who also publishes under the pseudonym E. Emine and who is seen as one of Turkey’s few ‘New Age’ authors, writes about topics such as emotional intelligence, reincarnation and the limits of rationality.

A third tendency that has found the interest of Turkish writers is the cultural aspects of religion: in her work, Elif Şafak, one of the most successful authors of

¹ Although we have no concrete numbers, the fact that Osman Aysu’s books are featured in many bookshops among the “Bestsellers of the Month” provides some evidence for this assumption.

² The female writer Nazlı Eray is commonly regarded as one of the earliest and ‘most fruitful’ writers of Turkish fantastic realism. For her biography and work see *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türk Edebiyatçıları Ansiklopedisi* 2002: 310-311. Some others are Latife Tekin, Aslı Erdoğan, Hakan Şenocak.

³ For the literature of an author with an interest in Far Eastern religions see the works of Vivet Kanetti (pseudonym E. Emine). A writer who has recently become interested in Islamic thought is Metin Kaçan.

the young generation, treats aspects of various religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism.

On a formal level, genres are often mixed, creating hybrid texts with numerous inter-textual allusions. One writer who mixes elements of pop-art, science fiction and the thriller in an ironical and experimental way is Cem Akaş (b. 1968).

Another factor playing a role in the way post-1980 authors see themselves is a new sensitivity toward the limitedness of the dominant local literary models. Here we see the aim to produce a Turkish literature able to meet international standards.⁴ Borders between the 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' World are, in this view, only secondary, while literatures from regions as diverse as Europe (England, France, Germany), Latin America, Japan and India feature equally as examples of 'world literature'.

In contrast to this cosmopolitanism stands the comparatively narrow geographical space in which the new Turkish literature is produced. In general, the centre of literary productivity is Istanbul: Many of the post-1980 authors live and work here, and most of the major periodicals of the literary and cultural scene (like e.g. *Varlık*, *Virgül*, *E Aylık Kültür ve Edebiyat Dergisi*, *kitap-lık*) as well as a huge amount of periodicals with a small or even marginal group of readers are located here.

The 'typical' author of the new generation of Turkish writers comes from an urban, middleclass background, has a university education and often has lived abroad. He or she often writes from an individualizing and psychologizing perspective. However, the new interest in the individual does not mean that themes dealing with social problems are completely missing: While in the era of village literature, authors preferred to write about the lives of 'ordinary people' from rural areas, the new generation of writers now shows a special interest in the difficulties confronting urban fringe groups such as *gecekondu* inhabitants, gypsies, homosexuals, prostitutes or religious and ethnic minorities living among the Turkish Muslim majority.

This last point leads us to the political dimensions of Turkish literary writing of the last decades. The ideal of a Turkish society with a high tolerance for different religious, social and ethnic groups, which is conveyed by many of the literary texts, stands in sharp contrast to earlier ideals of a mono-cultural state. The rise of the historical novel with themes from the Ottoman past, for instance, to one of the most important forms of the Turkish novel, can be understood as the result of a new willingness of both Turkish authors and readers to integrate the Ottoman multicultural past into the perception of their own history.

⁴ For a discussion on the contemporary situation of Turkish literature between Cem Akaş, Ömer Aygün, Cem İleri, Yekta Kopan, Levent Şentürk, Murat Yalçın, Özen Yulan and Ayfer Tunç, see Tunç 2001: 59-79.

Orhan Pamuk and new tendencies in Turkish literature

After this general overview of Turkish literature we will now focus on a well-known post-1980 Turkish author, Orhan Pamuk. He is both an Istanbul author who has become very popular during the last two decades in and outside Turkey as well as a writer whose works carry many features that seem ‘typical’ of the new literature. In the following we will first briefly describe what makes Orhan Pamuk a ‘typical’ author of post-1980 Turkish literature. Then we will show to what extent Orhan Pamuk’s novels can be seen as a contribution to world literature. In order to determine what makes his novels accessible to readers in and outside Turkey we will then have a short look at the narrated space in which his characters interact. This will lead us to the stage where all of his novels take place, i.e. Turkey in a wider sense and more specifically Istanbul. We will now consider some aspects concerning the author and general tendencies within his works

Orhan Pamuk was born in Istanbul in 1952, where he still lives today. He comes from an urban, upper-class milieu, was educated at the American Robert College in Istanbul and has a university education. Moreover, he spent three years in New York during the 1980s (see *Tanzimat’tan Bugüne Edebiyatçılar Ansiklopedisi* 2001: 680-683 and Wroe 2004).⁵ By 2004 his published works included seven novels, his childhood-autobiography, a screen-play, a short story and various essays.

We find many of the tendencies of post-1980 Turkish literature in the works of Orhan Pamuk. He makes excessive use of meta-fictional and inter-textual elements and frequently combines different styles and genres. His works include narrative elements from crime fiction, the new historical novel, the political novel⁶ and even fragments of science fiction and the supernatural story.

Elements from crime fiction are found in many of Pamuk’s novels, e.g. in *Kara Kitap* (The Black Book, 1990) and *Benim Adım Kırmızı* (My Name is Red, 1998). The new historical novel is represented by *Beyaz Kale* (The White Castle, 1985) and, again, *Benim Adım Kırmızı*, and the political novel by *Kar* (Snow, 2002). The latter also contains science fiction elements. Comparable to the *Novelle* within Goethe’s *Wahlverwandschaften*, the synopsis of the science fiction story *Necip’in Hicranlı Hikayesi*, set in the year 3579 on the planet Gazzali, serves as a story within the story (see Pamuk 2002: 107-9). It is written and read to the

⁵ His family background is described in his childhood memories, *İstanbul. Hatıralar ve Şehir* as well as in his novels such as *Kara Kitap* and *Cevdet Bey ve Oğulları*, which contain autobiographical elements.

⁶ “Political novel” is a difficult, vague term. However, since *Kar* deals intensively with political matters and since the author uses the term for this novel himself, we have decided to use it in this context. One might add that though *Kar*’s narrated time comes close to today it can in some ways – according to the radical political changes occurring since its publication until today – almost be regarded as a historical novel as well.

protagonist Ka by Necip, a pupil at the religious high school in Kars. While the story narrates the friendship, affection and rivalry between the two boys, Necip and Fazıl, who are in love with the same girl, Hicran, the story not only reflects the relationship between the narrator, codenamed Necip, and his best friend, codenamed Fazıl, but also reads as an analogy to the poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905-1983), who is regarded as an ideologue of political Islam in Turkey.⁷ A work titled *Büyük Doğu*⁸ happens to be highly admired by the 'real' and 'fictitious' friends Necip and Fazıl. In this sense the exaggerated confrontation of polarities such as Western destructive rationalism vs. Eastern mystical spiritualism, religion vs. atheism, etc. within the science fiction story mirrors aspects of the plot of the 'real' story. The same holds true for those parts of the science fiction narration which take place in the future of the 'real' story.⁹

As an example of the playful use of elements of the supernatural story several passages in *Yeni Hayat* (The New Life, 1994) can be mentioned, e.g. the angel's appearance in the final scene. For a mystical reading of the novel see Yıldız Ecevit's extensive interpretations (Ecevit 1996: 133-188).

Another point mentioned above was the general shift in the perception of contemporary Turkish literature from one that distinguishes between 'First', 'Second', and 'Third' World literature to one that recognizes an all-inclusive world literature.

The place of Pamuk's novels in world literature

Authors such as Aziz Nesin (1916-1995) and Yaşar Kemal (b. 1923) introduced modern Turkish literature in a broader sense to the world. Both have been widely translated and hold many national and international awards.

⁷ Necip Fazıl Kısakürek is an established Turkish poet. His political convictions, however, are highly controversial since he is regarded as an important ideologue of Islamic political and nationalistic movements. (See Tanzimat'tan Bugüne Edebiyatçılar Ansiklopedisi 2001: 503-506; Burhanettin 2004: 129-156).

⁸ *Büyük Doğu* appears in the story as Necip's and Fazıl's favourite work. In this context *Büyük Doğu* can be associated with Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's ideological work *Büyük Doğu'ya Dođru: Ideolocya Örgüsü* (1959), which had a great influence on political formations in the above-mentioned context. With Kısakürek the expression *Büyük Doğu* stands for both spirit and substance, time and space on the one hand and as a symbol for a specific spirit of the Eastern world on the other. The term is connected with Kısakürek's belief that the East in a spiritual sense has lost itself by trying to identify with the West. Certainly, this stock of ideas implied by mentioning *Büyük Doğu* in the story within the story in *Kar* can be read as a sub-text of the story. See Rasim Özdenören: Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, in *İslamcılık, Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce*, İstanbul: İletişim 2004: 136-149, quote 142. For an evaluation of the magazine published by Kısakürek under the same name, *Büyük Doğu*, see the article by Okay 1992: 513-514.

⁹ Though in 'reality' it is Necip who is shot and Fazıl who will marry Hicran alias Kadife.

However, it is authors such as Orhan Pamuk who increasingly have taken their place within world literature in the new meaning of the term.¹⁰ Like no other post-1980 Turkish author, Orhan Pamuk, whose works have been translated into more than thirty different languages, became famous in the 1990s in and outside Turkey. His worldwide readership encompasses, speaking in his own literary terms, East and West¹¹. Thus, he is known not only in Europe and the United States, but also in the Islamic world (Iran, Arab countries) and the Far East (Korea, Japan).

The fact that a wider audience is aware of Turkish literature today is a sign of Turkey's growing connection to global influence and developments. Accordingly, the fact that Orhan Pamuk's second historical novel *Benim Adım Kırmızı* won the International IMPAC Dublin Literary Award in 2003 is a strong indication that Turkish literature is finding its place on the international literary scene.

One aspect that marks Pamuk as an author who is accessible to a worldwide audience is his ability to combine the local with the universal. In what follows we will therefore discover the connection of a local space and a global perception or the local as part of the universal.¹²

First of all, readers in the East and in the West are able to identify with the space, – mainly Istanbul –, where Pamuk's stories take place. In other words, Pamuk's local references are transportable.

In Pamuk's Istanbul a reader can find traces of both East and West if he or she so chooses. And even if the reader mainly concentrates on the narrated stories as such, whether they take place in the Ottoman past (*Beyaz Kale*, *Benim Adım Kırmızı*) or in the political reality of the easternmost part of Turkey in the early 1990s (*Kar*), it is possible for readers in and outside Turkey to identify with Pamuk's heroes and their specific surroundings, since they are foremost universal spaces and characters. Furthermore, the author plays with different styles and inter-textual hints, incorporating into his work both references to Turkish – and in a wider sense Eastern – as well as European – and in a wider sense Western – cultural heritage alike.¹³ One can follow these hints – one reader might be more susceptible to them than another – but one can just as well read the stories as such.

¹⁰ For a detailed and useful understanding of the term see Bachman-Medick 1998: 463-69.

¹¹ The terms 'East' and 'West' are typical of Pamuk's literary vocabulary and, certainly, reach far beyond the literal sense of the words.

¹² For an examination of the connection between the global and the local see Robertson 1998: 192-220.

¹³ Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar (1901-1962) can be seen as a predecessor for this practice. However, Tanpınar's talents and the position he holds as one of the major Turkish authors of the 20th century were not fully recognized during his lifetime. In fact, Tanpınar's literary works can be considered a model for various tendencies in the new post-1980 literature. He has been named by authors such as Orhan Pamuk and Elif Şafak as a formative influence on their own works. While Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar has only recently been translated in part, his literary importance is by now commonly recognized. See Atiş 1983: 1-22 and Naci 2002: 15

In a recent article about Orhan Pamuk, Ian Jack, editor of the literary quarterly *Granta*, is quoted as follows: “There must be many good writers in many, many places whose work doesn’t easily translate because it is so specific to the place. Orhan is, for one reason or other, accessible to us” (Feeney 2004).

Yet, Orhan Pamuk’s novels *are* specific to the place, which is generally Turkey, and more specifically Istanbul. Paradoxically, this seems to be one of the reasons why they are so accessible to a diverse audience.¹⁴ To sum up, readers inside and outside Turkey, or, more generally, an Eastern as well as a Western readership, can identify with the specific space where his novels are set since Pamuk manages to make this place transportable, accessible, and, in a literary sense, *walkable*. Therefore, Istanbul which figuratively as well as literally unites both East and West seems to be the perfect stage. In this sense we can consider Istanbul a ‘universal’ space.

As a place, Istanbul in itself represents all kinds of supposed contradictions, uniting what is generally seen as unsuitable. By virtue of its geographical setting, the city has always been a kind of bridge between different cultures. Furthermore, with its rich historical fabric, it is a mega-city with metropolitan features, centre of new cultural scenes, publishing houses, etc. – in short, a symbol of modernity. A city of approximately 13 million inhabitants, it is home to many disenfranchised groups living independently – yet these groups still are somewhat dependent on one another. Certainly, Istanbul represents all parts and all peoples of Turkey – officially 65% of the city’s population are not natives of Istanbul (see Seeger & Palencsar 2003/4: 75) Thus, the city encompasses urban and rural aspects, and a wide range of political and religious counterpoints.

In effect, Istanbul plays a role in all of Orhan Pamuk’s novels. Sometimes directly – when it serves as the stage for the plot, as it does in *Cevdet Bey ve Oğulları* (Cevdet and his Sons, 1982), *Beyaz Kale*, *Kara Kitap* and *Benim Adım Kırmızı*, and sometimes indirectly, as in *Sessiz Ev* (House of Silence, 1983), which is set nearby in a summer resort on the Marmara Sea, in *Yeni Hayat*, which takes place mainly on the roads of Turkey, and *Kar*, which is set in Kars and Frankfurt. But in these books the protagonists also hail from Istanbul and the scenes are described mainly from an Istanbul point of view. Moreover, since Istanbul nowadays is the home of people from all over Turkey, it contains features of Anatolia or a city like Kars as well.

Whereas narrative and style differ from novel to novel, the backdrop of Orhan Pamuk’s seven novels more or less deals with the extensive treatment of one theme, i.e. of finding one’s own identity between different worlds, also symbolized by the terms East and West. Istanbul by definition serves as an ideal setting for this search. Since Istanbul at the same time represents aspects of the rest of the country, we will now briefly take stock of some recent changes in Turkey.

¹⁴ Compare to Çiçekoğlu’s point of view: “Pamuk’s talent as a novelist is revealed in his capacity of telling a local story with a universal tone.” (Çiçekoğlu 2003: 16).

As pointed out in the introduction, the ideal of a Turkish society with a high tolerance for different religious, social and ethnic groups stands in sharp contrast to the former ideal of Turkey as a mono-cultural state. This development can also be seen as a move away from the oppression of those who were regarded as potential enemies of the secular state – system, toward a growing freedom of speech and, generally, an increasing tolerance for a multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious society.

This tendency is reflected in Orhan Pamuk's historical novel *Benim Adım Kırmızı*, with its colourful, vivid integration of the multicultural Ottoman past.¹⁵ His earlier novel *Yeni Hayat*, and, in particular, his most recent novel, *Kar*, reflect the ongoing changes in Turkey's political and economic development, including the increasing gap between the impoverished Southeast and the prospering Northwest during the past decades.¹⁶

At least until the last of the three military coups in 1980, and partly until today, Turkey was characterized by a strong military power which suppressed different kinds of potential resistance in order to protect and retain the secular, mono-cultural state-system. Only recently, due to the partial political and social liberalization following the last coup d'état, have the above-mentioned tendencies been allowed to increase. The way Pamuk perceives the change in Turkish society today is aptly illustrated by a statement in which he compares Turkey's past with the current world situation: *"Unfortunately, my country's funny and tragic history is perhaps turning out to be, because of George Bush, the funny and tragic history of the world. That is, the arrogant, not-very-reasonable elite of my country destroyed its democracy when backwards, illiterate, conservative parts of the country resisted so-called modernization, globalization"* (Feeney 2004).

That ignorance and the suppression of opposition does and did not lead the country further is also described in a precise, courageous and humorous manner through the plot of *Kar*. However, the fact that this more relaxed way of focusing on political issues is possible, is also evidence of a new openness in Turkey today.

In order to show how Pamuk's novels embrace and survive the different kinds of changes the country and society have gone through, – and this is further testament to the quality of his books –, we come back to Istanbul and finish this

¹⁵ Here again Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar can be mentioned, this time as a forerunner who brought back the literary remembrance of the Ottoman past. See Atış 1983: 18-19, quoted as: *"There can be no doubt that it (Beş Şehir, B.S./ C.D.) together with Tanpınar's unceasing flow of articles and essays calling for an appreciation of Ottoman poetry, music, art and architecture, has been a force in bringing about what the Turkish poet and scholar Talat Sait Halman termed in 1972, an awakening of interest in Ottoman history after several decades of lamentable neglect of this vast untapped source of fiction."* Compare also to Siedel 1992, 637, quoted as: *"Das (das Wiederaufleben osmanischer und islamischer Traditionen und die damit verbundene Kontroverse seit den 70er Jahren, B.S./ C.D) gilt ebenso Ahmed Hamdi Tanpınar (1901-1962) und Orhan Pamuk (geb. 1952), die beide die osmanische Vergangenheit positiv neu bewerten (...)"*

¹⁶ For the state of the country then, cf. Baykan & Robertson 2001: 191-192.

section with an example of how the historical dimensions of the changing perception of Istanbul are treated in Pamuk's work. Therefore, we will briefly compare the perception of Istanbul in Orhan Pamuk's first novel *Cevdet Bey ve Oğulları* with the one in *Benim Adım Kırmızı*:

Cevdet Bey ve Oğulları is the story of three generations of one family. Set in the time between 1905 and 1970, the book is also about the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the founding of the Republic (1923) and the following decades.¹⁷ The first part is written from the point of view Cevdet, one of the first Muslim entrepreneurs, and reflects in an insightful, subtle manner the way the city was perceived by the newly established bourgeoisie at the beginning of the 20th century. The old parts of the city – *eski* Istanbul – defined as everything that comes into the view of someone crossing the Galata Bridge from the north, looking towards the south –, are described as having a humiliating effect on the protagonist. As a result, Cevdet turns his back on them and establishes himself and his family in the new, modern, wealthy part of the city north of the Golden Horn.

In the second part of the book, which takes place between 1936 and 1939, we find Cevdet Bey, now successful, married to a pasha's daughter, with two sons, a daughter and grandchildren, thinking that while he had always planned to establish a family 'alafraŋga' he had ended up with a family 'alaturka'¹⁸. The identity of the following generations will lie somewhere in between, but this distinction shows how massive the changes that took place during this time were, and that it would take decades to find one's own identity by finding a balance between past and present, East and West, something Cevdet Bey's single life was too short for (compare to Elçi 2003: 203-205). The social changes and the changing perception of the past and of the spatial surroundings, which mirror the social changes, since the city, too, is changing rapidly, are shown via the following generations. Thus, the changes Cevdet's family goes through can be seen as general social changes of their time.

Benim Adım Kırmızı, by contrast, which takes place in 1591, is narrated from a present-day point of view of the city, into which the Ottoman legacy is easily integrated. In *Benim Adım Kırmızı*, the author portrays the complexity and beauty of a fallen empire from the multivisual perspective of 19 different points of view. *Eski* Istanbul, fled by Cevdet Bey 300 years later, and perceived by him as old, dead, and humiliating, functions in *Benim Adım Kırmızı* as the vibrant, powerful centre of this empire – with Topkapı Palace as its heart.

In conclusion, this paper could only touch on a few of the many aspects Istanbul represents in Orhan Pamuk's works. We have tried to show that by combining different perceptions of the city during the last century, Pamuk's novels

¹⁷ For the different time-levels in *Cevdet Bey ve Oğulları* see Nacı 2002: 104-107.

¹⁸ From the Italian 'alla franga' and 'alla turca', see Pamuk 1991: 107: "Alafraŋga bir aile kurayım dedim, ama sonunda hepsi alaturka oldu!" diye düşündü. (...) 'Sonunda hepsi alafraŋga olmak isteyen alaturka olduklari, bu da alaturkanın kendine özgü bir türüdür!'"

also link the heritage of the Turkish Republic to the Ottoman past, which the author describes as a culturally rich and colourful era. This extraordinary presence of Istanbul in his works, encompassing many different influences, stories and decades, also serves to introduce Istanbul as a setting and a motif to his worldwide readership. As a tendency it can be stated that Pamuk is recently forming a literary image of Istanbul which introduces the city as a literary place to world literature. Thus, it would be possible to compare Pamuk's Istanbul with the cities of other authors, such as James Joyce's Dublin, Amos Oz's Jerusalem or the New York of Paul Auster or Jonathan Lethem.

Pamuk's readers discover an Istanbul that perhaps – even if fictitious – shapes the way we understand the city and allows us to develop an idea of its complexion and what it stands for in Pamuk's fiction. At the same time an examination of Pamuk's Istanbul would make Istanbul as a literary city accessible to further-going comparisons. Thus it could also serve as an affiliation of Turkish literature to world literature.

This general tendency brings back to mind our initial evaluation that through experimental play, new themes and genres, and, not least, through a re-evaluation of the Ottoman past from a contemporary point of view, a new era of Turkish literature has emerged. In our view, this new form of Turkish literature in its vivacity, colour richness and individuality can hold its own on an international scale and has already found – as we hope to have shown with the works of Orhan Pamuk – its place in world literature.

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The Development of Food Culture in Turkey

Filiz Çakır Phillip

Like every area of culture, food culture is influenced by politics, history and geography. In this article, the background of Turkish food culture shall be explained, by means of various examples, beginning in Central Asia and continuing until present-day Turkey.

As nomads, Turkish tribes covered a long distance from Central Asia before reaching Anatolia. From the beginning we will have to ask whether it is enough to seek the roots of Turkish food culture in Central Asia. After Constantinople had been taken in the 15th century, it was the biggest metropolis in the Orient, offering itself as a platform for different cultures¹. Is the food culture that developed there an intercultural food culture or does it derive from one people?

Over time the sorts of things that we eat change; however, where and how we eat changes very slowly. In Central Asia, the area between the Caspian Sea and Sin Kiang, the nomadic tribes ate their food seated on a leather cloth they called *kenduruk*. In Anatolia today people also eat on such cloths, called *kendirik*. In the 11th century the leather cloths were exchanged for big trays called *tergi* or *terwsi* (Halıcı 1992: 202). Such trays were used in the Ottoman court in the 16th century (Ursinus 1985: 155) and are still used in Anatolia today.

The *sofra*, a round leather cloth originating with the Arabian Bedouin culture, was also often used by the Turks (Müller-Wiener 1995: 54). This custom was later modified by placing a tray, set on a small frame, on the leather cloth. This kind of feasting was adopted by Persian food culture. Usually these trays are round, but some are also square. In the beginning these trays were made out of iron, wood or stone. Later on they were also produced in zinc, copper or silver and decorated with ornaments. The size, form and decoration of such trays depended on the wealth of the purchaser.

The dining room

As nomadic tribes the Turks did not have any special place where they could eat. The food was prepared and eaten on the ground on the *sofra* or *kenduruk*. Later on in urban life this tradition was not broken. Neither in the architecture of the court nor in the palaces of the Seljuks or the Ottomans is it possible to detect the existence of a dining room. In the palace of the sultan, like in every other house, the biggest and most representative room was prepared for the given meal

¹ Culture not nation, since the term “nation” first came up after the French revolution.

and afterwards cleared again (Müller-Wiener 1995: 55). The architectural structure of Topkapı Palace serves as a good example of this.

The food

Since the time of the Seljuk, the Turkish tribes had four meals a day – two main meals and two meals in between. Later on, the second main meal was placed later in the evening, and since the 19th century only three meals are taken.

Turkish nomads mainly fed on their livestock and on milk products like cheese, butter or yoghurt. Mostly sheep and goat meat were preferred. This tradition has endured from the time of the Ottomans until present-day Turkey. Vegetables were not a common food during the nomadic periods. This kind of diet is still seen in central Anatolia. This part of Anatolia is, like Central Asia, very suitable for the growing of cereals and for the breeding of livestock. Because of the high consumption of grain, bread is the main food staple in Central Asia and Anatolia.

As in Byzantine times, the grain for baking bread in Ottoman times was the monopoly of the state. One of the most important tasks of the state was to monitor the daily amount of grain needed to feed the people. Grain was stored by the state, which also controlled the price. The district of “Un Kapı” in present-day Istanbul was the place where grain was traded.

The preparation of bread had many aspects. To suit the exquisite tastes of the sultan, the sultanness and the dignitaries, the bakers of the seraglio delivered pure white bread. Officials and other servants at the court were served less tasty bread of a lower quality. Bread was made from wheat delivered from Greece. Only for the bread of the sultan was high quality flour from Bursa used (Coco 1997: 109). The bread was sprinkled with different herbs like caraway, poppy seed and even opium to make it tastier.

Food culture

The Turkish tribes’ migrations from Central Asia to Anatolia and their transition from a nomadic to a sedentary life at the same time gave them the opportunity to encounter and become familiar with other people. The cultural mixture that occurred offered a variety of new possibilities. For that reason it would be wrong to look only for traces of Central Asia in the roots of Turkish food. Turkish food is much more than that; it is a mixture from Caucasia and the Balkans, from Crimea to Mesopotamia, combined with food from the eastern Mediterranean. In Central Asia meat and milk products are the main foods. The same kind of diet is found in Anatolia. From Mesopotamia comes the highly developed grain culture that in Turkish cuisine has enriched the Aegean and Mediterranean diversity of fruits and vegetables. A rich food culture is the result of these contacts, this rich-

ness also resulting from the expansion of the Ottoman borders. Turkish cuisine is a synthesis of all these cultures and has developed from Ottoman cuisine. The ability of the Turkish nomads to adapt to changing climate and geography made the exchange with other ethnic groups easier in Ottoman times. With the expansion of the Ottoman borders, Turkish cuisine developed to its highest form.

The world-famous Russian *borscht* became red cabbage soup. Food à la *pilaki* served cold seems to be of Greek origin, though it is now fully integrated into Turkish cuisine and regarded as typically Turkish. The main staples of Mediterranean cuisine are bread, wine and olive oil. In Central Asia, on the other hand, the characteristic foods are meat, fat and pasta. The cooking of dough, or cooking in water, could be of Chinese origin and may have been brought by the Turks first to the Middle East and then to the West (Yerasimos 2003: 65). Out of such mixtures of ethnic cuisine the Ottoman synthesis of rice, sugar and fat developed (Yerasimos: 2002: 13). Sugar came into common use in the Ottoman Empire after the Ottomans annexed Egypt in the 16th century. In addition, the 16th and 17th century saw the arrival of vegetables like tomatoes (Reindl-Kiel 1995: 61), red peppers, peas, beans, corn, potatoes, pumpkins and sunflower from the “New World”, coming via Spain and North Africa to the Ottoman Empire, before reaching Italy and France. The reason why these vegetables reached the Ottoman Empire first lies in the political landscape of the time. Political occurrences had a direct impact on the food. The connections between Madrid and Constantinople advanced trade, and the new vegetables reached the Ottoman Empire via this Mediterranean route. The European route was defined by relations to the Habsburgs. By way of cultural exchange, for instance, the gobbler came from Mexico to Constantinople, from where it reached European cuisine via the cuisine of the Habsburgs (Fragner 2003: 52). An example of influence from the East is the eggplant; it came from India to the Ottoman court at the time when the Caliphate resided in Baghdad.

In the 16th century, the time when the Ottomans were expanding their borders, the cuisine of the empire became richer in diversity and higher in cost. Meat had high social prestige (Faroqhi 1995: 228), food was paid more respect, and there were often huge celebrations at which the guests were served exceptional specialities. For the Europeans and Mediterraneans, the Ottoman cuisine of the 17th century was the best, most modern and richest (Fragner 2003: 54).

From the Manas epos we already know which meat the Turkish tribes in Central Asia prized as the best and most expensive: that of the black-headed sheep. It is said that the meat of a black-headed sheep has less fat. These sheep are bred on mountain pastures, which enhances the quality of their meat. The distribution of the meat among the family and the tribe is subject to strict rules. This is also true for the distribution of the meat among the tribes themselves (Ögel 1978). Some Turkish tribes like the *Aqqoyunlu* and *Qaraqoyunlu* were named after their totem. This shows that food played an important role even in the political hierarchy.

The French traveller Bertrandon de la Broquiere described in his book *Le voyage d'outremer* a food ceremony at court in honour of the ambassador of Milan, during the rule of Murat II, in the year 1432 in Bursa, at that time the capital of the Ottoman Empire. The description shows that at the court of Murat II the customs originating in the steppes were still valid, and that meat and rice were the main dishes. Originally rice came to the Middle East in the 15th century from East Asia through the court of Timur (Yerasimos 2003: 65) and then to Constantinople. Presumably rice was brought back to Anatolia by Hajj pilgrims. Various sources provide evidence that India sent huge amounts of rice to Mecca and Medina every year.

Ottoman cuisine during the reign of Mehmet II

The essential features of Turkish cuisine have hardly changed since the 16th century. The manner in which meals were prepared and cooked was thus established very early. Because of the general standard in the preparation, it was not necessary to take down the recipes (Reindl-Kiel 1995: 58). That is why traditional Turkish cuisine was based on an oral tradition, with recipes handed down from generation to generation. Written sources on food culture provided information about the medicinal use of certain ingredients. Like today, foods were prepared with many herbs and spices, which also were used in medicines to cure various diseases. The manuscript of Hekim Mehmed bin Mahmud Sirvani, written during the reign of Murat II (in three phases between 1421 and 1451), is a work for such purposes. The book includes more than 250 recipes, with instructions on how to use them and which diseases they can cure (Yerasimos 2002: 34). For a long time this book was rather ignored since its recipes were considered to be Arabian cuisine. Due to the influence of Byzantium, the Ottomans were more interested in Mediterranean cuisine. The script gives a good overall view of Middle Eastern cuisine in general.

Traditional Turkish cuisine began to take shape in the 15th century. After Constantinople was taken, a cuisine was born out of the mixture of the foods of local aristocrats and travelling warriors. Further mixtures with Greek, Jewish, Armenian, Levantine, Circassian, Georgian and Cappadokian food habits further enhanced and refined the Ottoman cuisine.

After Constantinople was conquered, the demand for meat was covered by stock breeders (*celepkeşan*). After the Tanzimat-reforms the state granted the *celepkeşan* tax privileges as an incentive to engage in wholesale trade. This wholesale trade was conducted by Greeks and Albanians for the Ottoman needs in Macedonia and Thessaly and, for their needs in Anatolia, by Turks and Armenians.

During the reign of Mehmet II the kitchen at court was divided into four departments. The first department (*kuşhane*) only cooked for the sultan himself. The second department (*baş mutfak*) prepared the meals of the sultan's immedi-

ate family. The other two departments took care of the sultan's closer kinship and the servants of the harem.

Süheyl Ünver's book *Fatih Devri Yemekleri* gives examples of dishes that were prepared in the Kuşhane of Mehmet II, dishes such as rice soup, bulgur soup, knuckle, lamb goulash, and *börek* (flaky pastry filled with spinach and rice). In the year 1473 an unusual entry appears in the kitchen book. The entry mentions that fish had to be purchased for the sultan's meal (Bozis 2002: 52). A closer look at such books reveals that shrimp and oyster were also purchased for the palace kitchen (Ünver 1995). Such entries are extremely important since a Muslim of the Hanafitic school is not allowed to eat shell fish. This leads us to the question of who in the palace ate such food, or since when the Turks eat seafood. These questions remain unanswered until today. It may be assumed that Byzantine princesses and, later on, European women in the harem introduced the habit of eating fish and seafood at court. In Byzantium fish was traditionally eaten by the poor and the monks; later, fish began to be eaten at the Ottoman court. To meet the needs of the Ottoman court, sweet-water fish was brought to Istanbul from far away (Yerasimos 2002: 17). In the Muslim world, fish did not have the same religious function as a special food for fasting, which made it a culinary speciality in Christian cuisine (Reindl-Kiel 1995: 77). In Byzantine times, fish was consumed in the daily life in the same amount as bread. The most fish was eaten during the orthodox period of fasting. When today in Eminönü, in Istanbul, *balık ekmeği* (fish and bread) is sold as fast food, it can be traced back to this tradition of fasting. Also, during the Ottoman era, fish was the main food product of the Jewish and Christian communities. For the Ottomans, on the other hand, fish was at the bottom of the list of common food products. The Turkish tribes did use some sorts of fish as a supplement to their daily meals. The main source of fish was primarily the Caspian Sea and Lake Aral. Sweet-water fish like trout and carp were known to the Turks. When the Turkish tribes came to Anatolia, they were introduced to other sorts of fish by the Byzantine, Armenian and Greek populations of the coastal region, and added those fish to their cuisine (Knich 1990: 16). According to Professor İlber Ortaylı, it is evident that the Turks started to use fish in their cuisine very late since the different sorts of fish bear Italian or Greek names. There are two kinds of fish with Turkish names; the swordfish and the turbot.

The political occurrences in the 17th century changed the eating habits of the Ottomans generally. The consequences of the defeat against Austria were especially significant. In the years between 1593 and 1606 Walachia and Moldavia offered strong resistance to the Ottomans. This resistance had a negative effect on the meat trade. As a result, the Ottomans had to loosen the state monopoly on meat. The changes in the meat trade led to higher prices, and people could no longer afford to eat large amounts of meat. From then on many dishes were prepared with olive oil in place of meat. The cuisine also began using intestines instead of meat (Yerasimos 2002: 48).

The use of olive oil is documented by historical sources, such as the reports of travellers. The Muslim population mainly used olive oil in oil lamps. In his book *Histoire generale du serrail et de la cour du grand seigneur de turcs*, Michel Baudier mentions in 1626 that the olive oil used in the cuisine of the court came from the Peloponnes and that the oil used in the sultan's food was delivered from Crete. He added that the Turks ate a lot of butter and butter fat and that they did not drink milk. Instead they drank yoghurt. Milk was consumed by the Christian and Jewish community (Bozis 2002: 52).

The cuisine of Constantinople has developed over a long time period to this day, first by way of oral tradition from the cuisine of the court and the aristocrats, then through *aşevleri* (taverns), and finally through restaurants and pubs (Bozis 2002: 1). Even though the Ottoman Empire participated in World War One, Ottoman cuisine survived as the most sublime cuisine of the Turks. Although the Ottoman court no longer exists today, the cuisine of the palace has survived in the soul of Istanbul. The city of Istanbul, for 500 years the capital of a vast empire and, until today, a multi-cultural metropolis, also took on the leading role in matters of cuisine. Istanbul was best supplied with all different kinds of food. This allowed the palace and the court to try out the newest recipes and to experiment with recipes in the preparation of special dishes. Thus the palace cuisine was developed, varied, refined and renewed. The art of cooking at court and the imperial cuisine in the different metropolises like Constantinople, Edirne, and Bursa were adopted by the people. The Anatolian *tarhana* soup (made from dried yoghurt and tomatoes) was varied with dates and cornels at court and so transformed into a delicacy (Knich 1990: 17). This so-called palace cuisine is still considered the golden age of Turkish cuisine (Halıcı 1992: 202). Ottoman aristocrats, made up of viziers, pashas and the elite military officers, spread this fine cuisine outside Istanbul. Still, it is not possible to attribute this cuisine to one group or people. Rather, Turkish cuisine was created from a multi-cultural mixture that includes such dishes as Circassian-style chicken, Arabian or Kurdish meatballs and liver Albanian style (Halıcı 1992: 204).

The custom of eating on the ground was left behind in the 19th century with the Tanzimat reformation period (1839-1876), making way for European tables and chairs (Ursinus 1985: 155). Such furniture was first seen at the Ottoman court and in the houses of aristocrats. The traditional lifestyle was first abandoned in the 19th century in the Pera district of Istanbul by the new aristocrats. The first modern restaurants were opened in Pera. The interior changed from Oriental to European style. In these times of changes two parallel lifestyles existed, one *à la Franca* and the other *à la Turca*. By eating at table, a new food culture began in the Ottoman Empire that centered on the individual. With the *à la Franca* table culture, the food culture began a socializing process and, in connection with this, new standards of hygiene arose (Samancı 2003: 71).

Until the 19th century the cuisine of the court used meat, rice, flour, oil, vegetables and fruit. Olive oil was not used as an ingredient in cooking. Relishing a cup of coffee after dining has a long tradition in Ottoman history, though coffee was not immediately accepted as a “national beverage”. Constantinople had to wait until 1543 to be introduced to coffee. One year later the export of mocha from Yemen through Damascus and Aleppo started. In the year 1555 the first coffee house was opened in Istanbul by two Syrians. Not until 1617, during the reign of Ahmet I, do the kitchen books contain written evidence of the purchase of coffee for the Ottoman court. Coffee did not become popular at the Ottoman court until the 17th century. Apart from the long coffee culture, the Ottoman court also drank tea in daily life. Due to the loss of Yemen in World War One, coffee became an import article (Reindl-Kiel 1995: 63). The growing of tea on the eastern coast of the Black Sea around Rize began after 1920. The custom of drinking tea after dining was first observed after 1950. In the time of the new Turkish Republic, coffee was a luxury item that fetched a high price on the black market (Bozis 2002: 26). During Turkey’s military regime, the situation became aggravated, and in 1982 the import of coffee was frozen as an austerity measure (Knich 1990: 12). Since then tea has been served after dining. Even though the economic policy and the coffee prices have changed so that drinking coffee is affordable today, tea has found its place in daily life and is not to be missed.

European influences

In the 19th century French cuisine gained a world-wide reputation for excellence. French cuisine was largely developed by the aristocrats and the chefs in their kitchens. About 20 years before the French revolution, a restaurant culture began in France. With the revolution this culture spread (Mennell 1988: 187).

The word “gastronomy” was used for the first time in a poem by Joseph Berchoux in the year 1801. The origin of the word is Greek, and today this word also signifies gourmet and chef (Mennell 1988: 339).

French influence also found its way to the Ottoman court and Ottoman cuisine. This influence began with the visit of Ottoman ambassadors to Paris. The changes taking place in Ottoman society and lifestyle as well as the reforms that were carried out are also connected to this influence. The sultan moved from Topkapı Palace to Dolmabahçe Palace, which was built on the French model of Versailles. Sultan Abdulaziz visited Europe, and in the Pera district Istanbul began to take on the shape of a European city. Restaurants, hotels, theatres and clubs were opened. Together with these changes, an Ottoman bourgeoisie arose in Istanbul, in the beginning made up of non-Muslim citizens who brought new and different tastes to Ottoman cuisine. Dishes prepared with béchamel sauce go back to this era. The dish *hünkâr beğendi* is a good example of this: an eggplant

mousakka originally from Iran, in Ottoman cuisine it was prepared with béchamel sauce and became an eggplant gratin called *hünkar beğendi*.

The Ottomans did not use much cutlery when eating. In the early 19th century (during the reign of Sultan Mahmut II), however, the use of cutlery was more widely adopted and eating with one's hands stopped (Coco 1997: 105). The climax of this change was reached when during the reign of Abdülhamit II, instead of the traditional wooden spoons and fruit knives, gold-plate cutlery for 120 persons, including oyster forks, was ordered (Bozis 2002: 57).

In addition to French influence, Russian influence is also worth mentioning. After the Bolshevik takeover of Russia in 1918, about 200,000 regime opponents, amongst them members of the aristocracy, bourgeoisie and high-ranking military officers, came via the Crimea to Istanbul. These refugees brought a fresh spirit of life to the streets of Pera and to Cadde-i Kebir. They opened new bars, restaurants, nightclubs, pastry shops and cafés. They contributed much to the Europeanization and modernization of Ottoman society. In 1940 a pastry shop was opened which changed ownership in 1950; shortly thereafter the first fast food restaurant in Turkey was opened there under the name *Atlantik*. The *Atlantik* served hamburgers and various kinds of cold and warm sandwiches (Bozis 2002: 87).

Istanbul has two Russian restaurants that have stayed in business until today. The *Rejans* and *Ayaspaşa* became famous in Istanbul for their Russian salad, chicken Kiev, lamb Karski and *borscht* soup. Interestingly the name *Rus salatası* (Russian salad) was changed to *Amerikan salatası* (American salad) as a consequence of the rising sympathy for America after 1950 (Eksen 2001: 19).

During the time of the Ottomans, tradesmen and guilds retained their international character. The kitchen chefs and cooks at the Ottoman court were mainly Christians from Cappadocia, both Greeks and Armenians. Regulations after 1922 led to the exclusion of non-Turkish tradesmen and cooks from the guilds. As a result, the internationality of the guilds dramatically decreased.

Traditional fast food: Kebab

In the year 1501 Beyazıt II had the guilds instructed about hygiene and prices in a document in which the word *kebab* was mentioned for the first time in writing. „*Abcılar, kelleciler, kebaçılar ve böreciler yiyecekleri iyi pişirtsinler; satıcılar bunları iyi pişirtsinler ve tabaklarını temiz suyla yıkasınlar ve onları temiz bezlerle silsinler...*” (Mantran 1995).

In the 19th century the famous “Ottoman Walk” (*kır gezisi*) was replaced by the Kağıthane grill party (Kağıthane mangal). When Edmondo de Amicis, a famous traveller and author from Italy, visited Istanbul in 1874, he witnessed such a grill party. He considered eating kebab in bread (*pide*) spread with butter a punishment for small sins.

In the 1940s, kebab became popular in the big cities. Shortly thereafter, meat-balls (*köfte*) became a common fast food for the lower classes. One of the reasons for this was the introduction of margarine instead of butter in 1950. Margarine was cheaper than butter. Even though margarine was declared to be healthier than butter, the aim of the *köfte* makers was definitely to keep the sales price as low as possible. That is why such fast foods were generally prepared with margarine.

In addition to *balık ekmek*, *köfte ekmek* made its way into the history of Turkish food as a traditional fast food, before the advent of the hamburger. In the 1920s a family came to Istanbul from Turkmenistan and became famous as the founders of *Sultanahmet Mesbur Halk Köftecisi*. They have been in business for four generations (Eksen 2003: 31), and still today the best *köfte* in Istanbul is said to be served in their restaurant.

With the changing *Zeitgeist*, hamburgers became more popular than *köfte*. Then, the menus of the fast food restaurants began featuring the *döner*-sandwich (slices of lamb grilled on a rotating spit, served in pita bread), a lower calorie variation on Turkish fast food. The actual *kebab* boom began in the last 15 or 20 years. In Turkey as well as in the rest of the Middle East, *kebab* reached the height of its popularity. In addition, this form of fast food has become popular in Europe through Turkish guest workers and entrepreneurs who specialize in *döner* and *kebab* restaurants. Today it is not possible to imagine European fast food without the *kebab*.

Eating outside one's home was not always a symbol of wealth; at times it was a sign of poverty. As in the Roman Empire, the 16th-century inhabitants of Cairo and Istanbul did not cook at home. They either ate out or brought cooked food to their homes. In the 16th century, only six percent of the houses in Istanbul had a kitchen. The food demand was supplied by official food supply houses or similar institutions. Not only the poor and homeless but also the working classes, students, teachers, etc. were fed there. This tradition continued for a long time, with the government leading and controlling these houses (Yerasimos 2003: 68).

Besides those organizations that took care of feeding the community, a separate coffee house culture also existed that has to be mentioned here. When the sultans began to prefer ruling from the harem rather than the battle field, the Janissary became unemployed. As a result, they settled in the cities and, one by one, opened coffee houses. Besides enjoying coffee, tea and water pipes, the coffee house customers also ate small snacks while discussing politics. As time went on, the Janissary became politically involved and powerful as coffee house owners. In 1730 Sultan Ahmet was dethroned after an uprising which went down in Ottoman history as the Patrona Halil Uprising and was masterminded out of such a coffee house. Sultan Mahmut II recognized the threat of the Janissary and ordered them removed of their power and their coffee houses closed (Kırlı 2003: 76).

The fast food phenomenon

“*Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral*” says Berthold Brecht in his *Three-penny Opera*. Through globalization and rapid economic growth, fast food has gained an important role in our lives. When we speak of fast food today, we think not only of hamburgers or *döner*, but also of a habit or variation of eating that has become multinational. The fast food phenomenon transcends the social pyramid as it serves both low and high income earners. Modern fast food enjoys an extraordinary popularity. Its success probably lies in the progress that fast food culture has experienced over the time. And for many fast provides the feeling of unlimited freedom.

It is clear that there are two kinds of fast food: “traditional fast food” and “industrial fast food”. When comparing them, various questions arise: What does fast food mean? Is it eating fast? Is it preparing fast? Is it fast service? Is it the American way of eating that has made its way into our lives?

Fast food in the sense of eating fast was invented by businessmen and not by restaurant owners (Zischka 1993: 370). This shows that fast food is a product of industrialization and, therefore, first appeared in highly developed countries.

As fast food is presented as an industrial product of America, consumers are led to believe that they are not only exercising the freedom to choose what they want to eat but also are partaking in the imagined wealth associated with America. What the big fast food companies are selling is not only food but also a total package of American style, standards, wealth, freedom and the universal feeling of being at home, things that bring even the hardest fast food opponents down. Therein lies the secret of fast food’s immense success.

Companies such as *McDonald’s* have a systematic “global production-consumption” marketing orientation, which first brought them success in the working-class suburbs of America. In order to reach a broader spectrum of consumers, they opened their first restaurant outside of America in 1968 and, from then on, continued to globalize their business. Certainly the flexibility and the adaptability of the company also contributed to its success. The corporation tries to reach every layer of society: their low prices target consumers with low incomes, and with the addition of salads to their menus, they attempt to attract consumers who are more aware of what they eat and who wish to eat healthier.

Cultural differences enrich humanity as long as they are not used as a tool for discrimination. The main argument of fast food opponents is that through the globalization of food, the fast food consumers lose their awareness towards cultural differences and diversity. The fast food companies’ answer to this dilemma is adaptability and flexibility. While spreading American idealism, they also make an attempt to reflect national and regional diversity and religious considerations in their menus. For instance, it is not possible to order a burger made out of pork in Turkey. For every country there is an adapted menu; in Norway

Mclaks, in Holland *Groenteburger* (Ritzer 1997: 127), in Turkey *Dürüm Köfte*, *Mcpide* and the traditional yogurt drink *ayran*. Special menus are made for the fasting month of *ramazan* for consumers in Turkey as well as the Middle East. Despite such efforts and attempts to adapt, the opponents of fast food still see it as the evil face of globalization that creates cultural impoverishment and degeneration. As the pace of daily life becomes faster, speed at work and in private life is in ever higher demand. This contributes to the success of fast food. If one opposes fast food, this means that one at the same time opposes the speed of daily life. In the same way that fast food represents a certain lifestyle, its opponents are seeking an alternative or anti-fast-food ideology.

In human history, traditional fast food mostly developed in response to states of emergencies. Soldiers ate what they could carry and things that were quick and easy to prepare. The same was true for travellers. Because of the distances and the long journey times, *khans* and caravanserais were built. Their function was to offer exhausted travellers and their beasts of burden a place to rest, to supply them with food and to give them shelter for the night. In such resting places, guests could not order à la carte, but had to eat whatever was being served. The era of eating while travelling began in the 19th century with the railway and railway stations. Later, there followed highways and resting places with gasoline stations, providing food and gasoline.

During the Crimean War, 1853-1856, canned food was used for the first time in history and mass production had its breakthrough (Zischka 1993: 371). Today it is impossible to imagine life without canned food.

Some of the first fast food chains in Europe were seen in the 1970s near American housing areas, for example, in Munich in 1971. The first fast food restaurant in Turkey was opened in the Taksim district of Istanbul in 1986 (Aytar 2003: 117).

Even though *McDonald's* was founded in 1940 in San Bernardino, California by Maurice and Richard McDonald, who implemented the first fast-food assembly line production of hamburgers there in 1948, it was not until six years later, when Ray Kroc, the founder of the *McDonald's* empire, took over and bought the rights to sell licenses for further *McDonald's* restaurants, that the key development for the growth of fast food restaurants through franchising took place. With the selling of licenses the first step was made towards globalizing fast food. Ray Kroc was the first to use franchising in the fast food business, a concept first used in the sewing machine and automobile industries (Ritzer 1997: 121). With this concept the company was also able to expand outside of America. Through Ray Kroc's marketing strategies, by 1996 *McDonald's* was able to open 18,000 restaurants in 89 different countries on six continents. While in America and Europe *McDonald's* targets low-income consumers who want good food cheap, the target consumers in Turkey are those with a higher income. These consumers are sold the idea that being able to eat at *McDonald's* is a privilege. The main is-

sue here is not the fast eating but the fact that one can afford it. A similar situation was seen in Russia when the first *McDonald's* restaurant opened in Moscow in 1990. The price of a meal was equivalent to the average monthly salary.

Today the franchise system is not only used by American companies but by Turkish companies also. Local investors quickly recognized the potential of franchising. Many Turkish catering companies and fast food restaurants operate according to this model. This is a good example of thinking globally and acting locally.

McDonald's-style franchising is used for both Turkish and international cuisine. We cannot imagine contemporary Turkish gastronomy without the Chinese, Italian, Spanish, Russian and Mexican specialities served by Turkish restaurant owners. Even though one from time to time might think that the traditional cuisine is being displaced and degenerated by industrial fast food, the Turkish or Istanbul cuisine has been able to develop its own character and to offer a platform for the international specialities which have found their place in Turkey since 1990 when the Turkish economy opened up to foreign investors.

Research on food and food culture in Turkey began in the 1980s (Faroqhi 2003: 19). Since then, a lot has been examined and written and, as a result, the population has become more sensitive to the issues of food and food habits, regarding both the cuisine of Istanbul as well as the regional Anatolian cuisine. Even though traditional Turkish cuisine may be threatened by the ever-growing international fast food and franchising, the latter two constitute an enrichment of Turkish cuisine in general.

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Küreselleşen Kulüp Kültürünün Ticari ve Kültürel Ağları: İstanbul Durağı

Sübeyle Kırca Schroeder

Küreselleşme sürecinin bir sonucu olarak kültürler günümüzde her zamankinden daha fazla etkileşime girmişlerdir. Kültürel etkileşimin yeni biçimleri, kültür ürünlerinin ve fikirlerin iletişim teknolojileri yoluyla yayılması ve aynı zamanda insanların, sermayenin ve ticaretin gittikçe artan akışkanlığı ile oluşur. Toplumsal hayatın çeşitli alanlarında gözlemlenen bu akışkanlık, yaşam tarzlarının ve kimliklerin oluşumunda çok sayıda kültür içi ve küresel ağların rol oynadığına işaret eder.

Bu çalışmada, yerel kültürel pratiklerle küreselleşen müzik ve eğlence trendlerinin nasıl bir etkileşim içinde olduğunu ve yeni bir kültürel alan yarattığını İstanbul'da gelişen kulüp¹ kültürünü ele alarak inceleyeceğim.² İstanbul'da gelişen bu yeni kültürel oluşumu anlayabilmek için kültür içi ve dışı etkileşimleri birlikte ele alarak incelemek gerekir. Hannerz'ın (1992) da belirttiği gibi, kültür dinamik tir ve kültür içi ve dışı etkilerin benimsenip emilmesi sürecinde gelişir.

Elektronik dans müziğinin gelişimi ve kulüp kültürünün oluşumu, İstanbul'da 1990'ların başına rastlar. Bu yıllara rastlaması tesadüfi değildir; Özal dönemi liberal ekonomi politikalarının biçimlendirdiği sosyo-ekonomik, politik ve kültürel bağlam yeni kültürel oluşumların ortaya çıkmasına zemin hazırladı. Bu yıllar aynı zamanda Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılışının ardından, liberal ekonomi politikalarının yaygınlaşmasına paralel olarak küreselleşme sürecinin hız kazandığı yıllardır. Küreselleşmeyi, bir merkezin diğer ulusları ve kültürleri etkisi altına alarak homojenleştiren ve tek yönlü bir süreç olarak değerlendiren bakış açısına yönelik eleştiriler yine bu yıllarda etkili olmaya başladı. Held vd. (1999) ve Bird vd. (1993) gibi yazarlar, ulusal kültürlerin uzun süredir melez özellikler gösterdiğini, Amerika'nın popüler kültür üzerinde yıllarca süren ekonomik hakimiyetine rağmen son yıllarda yerel ve ulusal alternatiflerin arttığını ileri sürerler. Ulusal ekonomilerin, kültürlerin ve yaşam biçimlerinin kendileri de artık küreselleşme sürecinin parçasıdır. Müzik kültürlerinin akışkanlığı ve melez yapıları küreselleşme sürecinde yaşanan bu değişimi gösteren en çarpıcı alanlardan biridir. 1980'li yıllarda popülerleşmeye başlayan rap veya elektronik dans müzik türleri küreselleşmeyi bu açıdan tartışmak için bize önemli veriler sunar.

¹ Kulüp, çeşitli elektronik dans müzik türlerinin DJler tarafından çalışıldığı dans mekanına verilen isimdir.

² İstanbul, kulüp kültürünün ve sektörün Türkiye'de ilk geliştiği ve daha sonra da merkezi haline geldiği yer olduğu için bu çalışma İstanbul üzerine yoğunlaştı.

Başlangıçta alt kültür olarak ortaya çıkan elektronik dans müziği, dönüşüm geçirerek popülerleşti ve 1990'lı yıllarda gençlik için "küresel bir alan" (global space) haline geldi. Bu küresel alanın İstanbul durağına baktığımızda, küresel kulüp müzik kültürünün İstanbul'un kültürel yapısıyla iç içe geçerek yerel eğlence kültürünün ve piyasasının bir parçasını oluşturduğunu görürüz.

Kulüp kültürünün oluşumu sürecinde etkin olan dinamikleri ikiye ayırarak incelemek mümkündür. İlki, son otuz yıldan bu yana devam eden ulusal ve küresel medya endüstrilerinin yeniden yapılanmasıdır; diğeri ise Türkiye'de bu yeniden yapılanmaya zemin hazırlayan ve 1980'lerden beri uygulamada olan liberal ekonomi politikalarının oluşturduğu sosyo-ekonomik, politik ve kültürel bağlamdır. Bu dinamikleri kısaca tartıştıktan sonra, İstanbul kulüp eğlence sektörünün ve kültürünün gelişmesinde küresel kültür ve finans ağlarının rolünü ve yerel müzik kuruluşlarıyla ilişkisini inceleyeceğim. Söz konusu ağların nasıl işlediğini anlamak için 2002 yılında yürüttüğüm alan araştırmasında 5 müzik organizasyon şirketinin yöneticileriyle mülakat yaptım.³ Son bölümde ise küresel piyasanın gençlik için ortak "küresel bir alan" oluşturma çabalarının nasıl değerlendirilebileceğini tartışacağım. Bu tartışmada ileri sürülen düşünce, küresel olanın sosyal yaşamı ve kültürel pratikleri belirleyen bir çerçeve oluşturmadığı, ancak bu sürecin bir taraftan sosyal ve kültürel pratikler alanında çeşitlenmeye yol açarken, diğer taraftan gruplar arası kutuplaşmaya da neden olduğudur.

Kulüp Kültürünü Oluşturan Dinamikler

Kulüp kültürünün oluşumunda rol oynayan dinamikler temelde ikiye ayrılarak incelenebilir: Birincisi, 1970'lerde başlayan ulusal ve küresel medya endüstrilerinin yeniden yapılanması sonucu ortaya çıkan medya endüstrisindeki genişleme stratejileridir. Bu stratejiler sonucu oluşan sistem medya çalışmalarında "oligopoli" olarak bilinir; yani şirketler gittikçe büyür ve az sayıdaki bu dev şirketler piyasayı kontrol eder. Medya şirketlerinin genişlemesiyle pek çok ülkede görülen kamudan özel sektöre geçiş süreçleri arasında bir paralellik vardır. Ulusaşırı medya şirketleri çeşitli ülkelerdeki sektörle işbirliği yapmak ve yerel firmaları, markaları almak için ciddi rekabet içindeler. 1980'ler ve 1990'larda gelişen büyük ölçekli medya kurumları farklı medya ürünlerinin üretimlerini bünyelerinde barındırmak istediklerinden kurumlar arası evlilikler sürekli artıyor.

Neo-liberal ekonomi politikalarının yaygınlaşması ve sermayenin uluslararasılaşması medya ve eğlence endüstrilerinde görülen bu tür değişim ve dönüşümleri beraberinde getirdi. 1997'de yapılan Dünya Ticaret Organizasyonunun 'Telekomünikasyon Endüstrilerinin Küresel Liberilizasyonu Antlaşması' buna bir örnektir. Telekomünikasyon ve medya endüstrilerinin özelleştirilmesiyle birlikte, medya

³ Club 1920, Urban Bug, Future Generation, Hip Production ve Kod Music isimli müzik organizasyon şirketleri alan araştırmasına dahil edildi.

holdingleriyle bu kurumlar arasında müzik, görsel imaj dahil bilginin dijitalleşmesi ile ilgili bir dizi birleşme ve ortak projeler gerçekleştirildi. Bu medya holdinglerinin kültürel ürünleri kendilerinin üretip yeni telekomünikasyon ve bilgisayar altyapısıyla dağıtması gerçek anlamda küresel medya-eğlence-bilgi şirketlerinin oluştuğunu ve gelişmeye de devam ettiğini gösterir. Çalışmanın konusu olan elektronik dans müziğine üretim ve dağıtım açısından bakıldığında -diğer kültürel formlara, örneğin sinemaya göre- büyük şirketlerin kontrolünün bu sektörde görece daha az olduğu görülür. Yine de aşağıda inceleneceği gibi, elektronik dans müziğinin küreselleşmesinde ve ticari bir boyut kazanmasında özellikle merkezi Avrupa'da bulunan multi-medya şirketlerinin rolü oldukça önemlidir.

İstanbul'daki kulüp kültürünün ve sektörünün oluşum sürecinde rol oynayan önemli dinamiklerden diğeri, 1980'lerden beri süre gelen liberal ekonomi politikalarının oluşturduğu sosyo-ekonomik, politik ve kültürel bağlamdır. Tarihsel olarak İstanbul, ticaret konusunda Doğu ve Batı'nın birleştiği bir yer ve dolayısıyla çeşitli melez kültürel formların merkezidir. Şehrin tarihsel konumu günümüzde de devam eder ve uluslararası kapitalizme eklenmeye ve "küresel bir şehre" dönüşürülmeye çalışılan İstanbul, Türkiye'nin dünya piyasalarına açılan kapısıdır.⁴

İstanbul'un küresel tüketim kültürüne entegrasyonu 1980'lerin sosyo-ekonomik, politik ve kültürel ortamında gelişmeye başladı. Dönemin politik havası ve neo-liberal ekonomi politikaları ticari alanda elit bir kitle yarattı ve özellikle bu kitlenin çabaları Türkiye'nin küresel ekonomiye entegrasyonunu hızlandırdı. Bu süreç, İstanbul şehrinin yapısı ve görsel imajındaki değişimlerle bütünleşince, yerel olanın küresel olanla nasıl birleştiği daha da görünür hale geldi.⁵ Bu değişim özünde demografik, politik, ekonomik ve kültürel dir. Son yirmi yıldır yerel yönetimlerde ağırlıklı olarak İslamcı ve sağ partilerin iktidarda olması nedeniyle, söz konusu değişiklikleri önemli ölçüde bu ideolojilerin biçimlendirdiği görülür. Yerel yönetimler ve iktidar yürüttükleri politikalarla, İstanbul'un tarihsel imajını, kültürlerin ve metaların akışındaki merkezi rolünü yeniden canlandırma çabası içindeler.⁶

Son yirmi yıldır devam eden liberalleşme sürecinde, Türkiye'nin serbest piyasaya kapılarını açması toplum tarafından gittikçe daha fazla kabul gördü. Bu sü-

⁴ Küreselleşme ve İstanbul üzerine tarihsel bir inceleme için bkz. Çağlar Keyder'in "Arka Plan" makalesi. (2000)

⁵ Bu dönemde İstanbul'un yapısal ve görsel imajındaki değişiklikleri orta sınıf açısından inceleyen Ayşe Öncü'nün (1997) "The myth of the 'ideal home' travels across cultural borders to Istanbul" isimli makalesi oldukça ilginç bir çalışmadır.

⁶ Örneğin, yerel yönetimler kültürel bilinci yeniden canlandırmak amacıyla Topkapı Sarayı ve Haliç çevresindeki bazı bölgeleri yeniden düzenleyip restore ettiler. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminde Müslümanların merkezi olan bölgeleri bugünkü şehir merkezinin bir parçası haline getirme çabasıdır bu yapılar. Osmanlı yaşam tarzını simgeleyen ahşap köşkler ve benzeri nostaljik cafe ve restoranlara olan ilgi arttı. İslam dünyasıyla Avrupa arasındaki diyalogu geliştirmek için düzenlenen zirveler veya ramazan aylarında Osmanlı tarzı eğlence mekanlarının ve kültürünün yeniden canlanması, bu çabalara verilebilecek diğeri bazı örneklerdir.

reçte egemen politik kültürün üretilmesinde önemli bir rol oynayan medya, kentli orta sınıf imgelerinin ve tüketimin yeni özelliklerinin oluşmasına katkıda bulundu. Bu da kaçınılmaz olarak yerleşik yapıların, hiyerarşilerin ve yaşam biçimlerinin dönüşmesine yol açtı. Maddi ve sembolik değişimler sadece şehrin coğrafi yapısını yeniden biçimlendirmekle kalmadı, bu değişiklikler aynı zamanda İstanbul'un sosyal ve kültürel yaşamında da kendini hissettirdi. Örneğin, liberal ekonomi politikaları giyim, fastfood, ileri teknoloji, medya ürünleri ve özellikle popüler müzik gibi küresel tüketim trendlerine yeni kapılar açtı.

Kulüp kültürü, İstanbul'un orta sınıf gençleri için bu dönüşümün önemli bir ayağını oluşturur. Diğer bir deyişle, liberalleşme süreci orta sınıf gençlere kültürel pratikler anlamında yeni alanlar yarattı; kulüp gibi eğlence mekanlarına giden ve bu kültürel oluşumun bir parçası olan gençlerin profili bunu yansıtır. Yaş aralığı 16-40 (Çobankent 2001: 17) olan *clubberlar* orta ve orta-üst sınıf mensubudurlar. Ancak burada belirtilmesi gereken iki konu var: Birincisi, yalnızca *clubberlar* değil, bu kültürel oluşumun gelişmesinde etkin rol oynayan müzik organizasyon şirket yöneticileri, kulüp sahipleri ve *Dj*ler de orta ve orta-üst sınıfa dahildirler. İkincisi ise, son yıllarda kulüp kültürünün popülerleşmesiyle birlikte kulüplere giden grupların sınıfsal ve kültürel yapısının heterojenleştiği görülmektedir. Ali Akay kulüp kültürünün yeni karşılaşmalara, yani zengin ve orta halli ve hatta para biriktiren fakir gençlerin birbirleriyle karşılaşmalarına yer açtığını söyler (Akay 2004: 41). Ancak Akay'a göre gençler, buralardan çıkıp günlük yaşamlarına döndüklerinde artık asıl ait oldukları yeredirler ve bazıları ayrıcalıklı konumlarını korumak için çaba gösterir. Akay, bu kültürel faktörün temelini oluşturan yapıyı "*liberal eşitsizlik*" olarak tanımlar.

Kulüp Kültürünün Gelişmesi ve Çeşitlenmesi

Bilgisayar teknolojilerinin gelişmesi ve müzik formlarının çok yönlü hareketliliği elektronik dans müzik türlerinin ve kulüp kültürünün gelişmesine ve popülerleşmesine yol açan temel unsurlardır. Avrupalı dans müzik yapımcılarına ve *Dj*lere ilham veren *tekno* müzik Detroit'teki siyahi müzisyenler tarafından geliştirildi. Onlar da 1970'lerde Kraftwerk ve Can gibi Alman sanatçıların yaptığı elektronik müzikten yararlandılar (Laing 1997: 129). Başlangıçta alt-kültür olarak ortaya çıkan elektronik dans müziği ve kulüp kültürü zaman içinde dönüşüm geçi- rerek küresel bir kültürel alan haline geldi. Bazı müzik ve kulüp türleri halen alt-kültür olduklarını idda etseler de, *tekno*, *drum&bass*, *house* ve *trans* gibi elektronik müzik türleri en fazla küreselleşen kültürel formlar arasında yer alırlar.

Elektronik dans müziği ve kulüp kültürü yeni kozmopolit bir kültürel pratiktir, dahası diğer kültürel oluşumlar gibi, gençlere kimlik bilinci ve aidiyet hissi verir. Batının metropol şehirlerinde 1980'lerde gelişen elektronik dans müziği ve kulüp kültürü, İstanbul'da ancak 1990'larda yeni bir kültürel form olarak kendini göstermeye başladı. *Club 20* olarak bilinen mekan "Top 40s" çalmaktan vaz geçip

elektronik dans müzik türlerini çalarak ilk adımı atmış oldu.⁷ Başlangıçta yavaş bir gelişim gösteren bu sektör, özel partiler, açık hava partileri, elektronik dans müzik ağırlıklı festivaller gibi çeşitli organizasyonların artmasıyla 2000'li yıllarda altın çağını yaşamaya başladı.

2000'li yıllarda mekanların sayısının artmasıyla birlikte kulüpler arası farklılaşma da başladı. Dans müzik kültürü içerisindeki çeşitliliği genellemek veya kategorize etmek oldukça zordur. Yine de bu çalışmanın gerekliliği açısından bakıldığında, İstanbul'da bulunan kulüpleri müzik ağırları, büyüklükleri ve müşteri profilleri açısından kabaca ikiye ayırabiliriz.⁸ Kullandıkları venüerler, müzik tarzları ve Djler açısından küresel multi-medya şirketleri ile güçlü bağları bulunan birinci gruptakiler anaakım (mainstream) kulüpler denebilir. Bu grupta bulunan kulüpler, *Rapublic*, *Club Inn*, *Maslak Venue* gibi, mekan açısından daha geniş, dekorasyonlarında yeni trendleri takip eden ve genellikle uluslararası alanda tanınan Djleri getiren kulüpler. Buralarda çalınan müzikler ağırlıklı olarak küresel multi-medya şirketleri tarafından üretilen ve dağıtılan dans müzik türleridir. İkinci grupta yer alan kulüpler mekan olarak daha küçük, Dj seçimleri ve organizasyonları açısından daha yerel özellikler gösterir. Bu kulüpler müzik türleri ve müşteri profilleri açısından diğer gruba göre daha fazla çeşitlilik gösterir. Örneğin, bazıları homoseksüel bir kitleye hitap ederken (örneğin *Bar Bahçe*, *Neo*), bazıları harcama gücü daha fazla olan zengin elit bir gruba hitap eder (örneğin, *Soho*, *Godet*, *Buzz*). Kulüplerin müşteri profillerindeki bu farklılaşma müzik tercihlerinde de kendini gösterir; örneğin ikinci gruptakiler *house*, *trance* ve *techno* gibi belli müzik türlerini çalmayı tercih ederler.

Kulüpler arasında görülen farklılaşmanın yanı sıra açık hava partileri, elektronik dans müzik festivalleri İstanbul'un kulüp kültürüne çeşitlilik kazandırıyor. Son yıllarda İstanbul'da düzenlenen müzik festivallerinin yaklaşık üçte birini artık uluslararası elektronik dans müzik ağırlıklı festivaller oluşturuyor; *Alternative Music Festival*, *H2000 Music Festival*, *Dance and Techno Festival* en çok bilinen festivaller arasındadır. Bu organizasyonların ve katılan kitlelerin sayısının her yıl katlanarak artması, pek çok olgunun yanısıra İstanbul'un küresel kulüp kültürü ağırları içerisinde önemli bir durak olduğunun da göstergesidir.

Bu kültürel oluşumun yaygınlaşmasında, yayınların artmasının ve iletişim ağlarının genişlemesinin rolü oldukça önemlidir. Yabancı yayınların yanısıra İstanbul'da yayımlanan üç dergi vardır: *Zip Istanbul*, *ISTANbull... Dergisi* ve *Urban Bug*. Bu yayınlar kitapçılardan ve Beyoğlu'nda bulunan kafelerden ücretsiz sağlanabiliyor. Bu mekanlarda aynı zamanda aktiviteler hakkında bilgi veren flyer ve posterler de bulunuyor. Aynı isimli müzik organizasyon şirketi tarafından çıkarılan *Urban Bug* dergisi diğerleri arasında farklı bir yapıya sahip. 'The Guide for Alternative Urban Culture' alt başlığından da anlaşılacağı gibi, bu dergide İstan-

⁷ *Club 20*'nin yöneticisi ile söyleşi.

⁸ Kulüp çeşitleri oldukça fazla olduğundan ve hepsinin sadece iki kategoriye dahil edilemeyeceğinden buradaki kategorilerin özellikleri oldukça geniş tutuldu.

bul ve diğer metropol şehirlerindeki kulüpler, organizasyonlar ve Dj'lerle ilgili bilgiler yer alıyor. İngiltere'de bulunan üç multi-medya şirketinin İstanbul temsilciliğini yapan *Urban Bug* çıkardığı dergide onların promosyonunu yapan bilgilere ağırlık veriyor.

Radikal gibi bazı ulusal gazetelerde kulüp aktivitelerine yer veren bilgilere artık sık rastlanılıyor. Kulüp kültürünün yaygınlaşmasında en etkin araç kaçınılmaz olarak internet siteleri. *Future Generation*, *Clubbernation*, *Turntable (TT)*, *Preclub*, *Funkfield*, *Clubberworld* en popülerlerinden bazılarıdır. Bu tür siteler *clubberlar* arasındaki iletişimi ve etkileşimi artırarak bilgi akışını sağlar ve dolayısıyla *clubberların* küresel kulüp kültürünün bir parçası haline gelmelerinde etkin rol oynar.

İstanbul'da Gelişen Kulüp Kültürünün Küresel Ağları

2002 yılı itibarı ile İstanbul'da on beş profesyonel müzik üretim ve organizasyon şirketi bulunmaktadır.⁹ Biri dışında diğer şirket isimlerinin yabancı olması, yerlin küreselin içerisinde yer alma çabalarını açıkça ortaya koymaktadır. Uluslararası müzik turnelerine ev sahipliği yapmak, müzik festivalleri düzenlemek, kulüp işletmek, radyo yayını yapmak, Dj organizasyonları yapmak, CD üretmek, partiler ve diğer müzik aktivitelerini organize etmek gibi çeşitli aktiviteleri bünyelerinde barındıran bu firmaların çoğu 1990'lı yılların sonlarında kuruldu.

İstanbul'da gelişen kulüp kültürünü ve dolayısıyla sektörel oluşum sürecini anlamak için yerel sektörün küresel ağlarla olan ilişkisini incelemek gerekir. Yerel ve küresel arasındaki ilişkinin kurulmasında en etkin rolü Londra, Amsterdam, New York gibi Batı metropollerinde bulunan multi-medya şirketleri oynarlar. Diğer sektörlerde olduğu gibi multi-medya şirketleri de farklı coğrafyalardan para akışını sağlamak için mümkün olan her yola baş vururlar. Örneğin, bunların en büyüklerinden olan *Globalunderground* ve *Ministry of Sound*'un dünyanın pek çok ülkesinde işbirliği yaptığı kurumlar bulunmaktadır. Bu multi-medya şirketleri kulüp müziğinin üretim ve dağıtımında küresel markalar haline geldiler. İstanbul'daki organizasyon şirketlerinin de bu markalardan altı multi-medya şirketi ile işbirliği anlaşmaları bulunmaktadır.¹⁰

| İstanbuldaki Müzik Organizasyon Şirketleri | Uluslararası Multi-medya Şirketleriyle Ortaklıklar |
|--|--|
| Future Generation Hip Production Urban Bug | Ministry of Sound Renaissance Globalunderground Godskitchen, Slinky and Miss Money Penny's |

⁹ Bakınız <http://www.x-ist.com/rehber/org.htm>. Müzik üretim ve organizasyon şirketlerinin net bir tanımını yapmak zordur. Bazıları sadece müzik organizasyonu yapıyor, bazıları hem üretim hem de organizasyon yapıyor. Bu da sektörün değişken doğasına ilişkin özellikleri yansıtır.

¹⁰ Bu işbirliğine ait veriler 2002 yılında yapılan araştırma sonucu elde edilmiştir.

Müzik organizasyon şirketlerinin anlaşmaları öncelikle multi-medya şirketlerinin *Dj* turnelerini Türkiye’de organize etmeyi kapsıyor. Yabancı şirketler ses-ışık düzeni, dekorasyon, müzik tarzları ve *Dj* konusunda karar veriyorlar. Böylesi bir ortaklık birbirinin kopyası olan eğlence ortamlarının çeşitli ülkelerde yeniden üretilmesi anlamına geliyor. Sonuç olarak, standartları uluslararası bir multi-medya şirketi tarafından belirlenmiş küresel eğlence bağlamı, Asya’dan Avrupa’ya ve Arabistan’a değişik coğrafyalarda yaşayan genç kitlelerin tüketimine sunuluyor.

Küresel ağların diğer bir boyutu *Dj*lerin performans anlaşmalarını içerir. Organizasyon şirketleri festivaller, kulüpler ve açık hava partileri için multi-medya şirketleri aracılığıyla *Dj*ler getiriyor. Az sayıda da olsa Türkiye’den *Dj*ler, kulüp kültürünün önemli metropollerine davet ediliyor. 2002 yılı itibarıyla dört Türk *Dj* Avrupa’da plak çıkartmayı başararak bu camiada aranan *Dj*ler oldular. Türkiye’de plak üretim teknolojisi henüz olmadığından, bu çalışmalar sembolik de olsa müziğin iki yönlü akışkanlığı için bir başlangıç oluşturması açıdan oldukça önemlidir.

Radyo programları küresel ağların bir başka boyutunu oluşturur. Örneğin, *Ministry of Sound*’ın Türkiye temsilcisi *Future Generation*’ın (FG) elektronik dans müzik yayını yapan bir radyo istasyonu var. FG radyo programlarında temsil ettiği multi-medya şirketinin *Dj*, plak ve CD’lerinin promosyonunu yaparak piyasa paylarının artmasını sağlıyor. Nitekim bu işbirliği oldukça etkili bir promosyon stratejisidir.

Küresel ağların etkin faaliyetlerine rağmen, elektronik dans müzik sektöründeki iktidarın yatay dağılımı, rock, pop gibi diğer müzik türlerinin üretim ve dağıtımına göre daha geniştir. İstanbul üzerine yapılan bu araştırmanın da gösterdiği gibi, kulüpler, *Dj* ajansları, stüdyolar, büyük parti organizasyonları, radyo istasyonları, plak yapım şirketleri, müzik mağazaları, içki, uyuşturucu, moda ve giyim mağazaları bu kültürün oluşumuna etkide bulunan kuruluşlar ve unsurlardır. Bu ticari ağlara ek olarak, sponsorluk kulüp organizasyonları, festivaller ve açık hava partileri için hayati bir önem taşır. Müzik organizasyon şirketleri sponsorluk seçiminde oldukça seçici davranırlar; genel olarak alkollü ve enerji içecek firmaları, sigara firmaları ve medya gibi kurumlardan sponsorluk almayı tercih etmektedirler.

Melez Müzikal Formların Akışkanlığı ve Çoklu Müzik Ağlarının Gelişimi

Türkiye’de müzik piyasası içinde yabancı müziğin oranı sadece %10’dur ve kulüp müziğinin bunun içindeki oranı oldukça düşüktür.¹¹ Şunu da belirtmek gerekir ki, kulüp müzik sektöründeki ekonomik faaliyet diğer müzik aktivitelerine göre çok

¹¹ KOD Müzik şirketinin yöneticisi ile şöyleşi.

daha yüksektir.¹² Ancak bu alandaki gelirin önemli bir kısmı *Dj* organizasyonları, turneler, plak ve CD'ler aracılığıyla uluslararası multi-medya şirketlerine geri dönmektedir. Ekonomik ve kültürel ağların bu şekilde işlemesi Batı metropollelerinde ekonomik gücü elinde bulunduran seçkinlerin, küresel kültürün üretim ve tüketimini etkin bir biçimde kontrol ettikleri tezini kaçınılmaz olarak doğrular.

Öte yandan, ileri teknolojiler, yeni pazarlama stratejileri, müzik üretimindeki maliyetlerin düşmesi, zevk ve tarzlardaki değişimler ve kültürlerarası etkileşimin artması, müziğin lokal, ulusal veya global düzeyde merkezi güçten, yani büyük şirketlerin kontrolünden, gittikçe daha bağımsız hareket etmesini sağlıyor. Müzik üretiminde yaratıcılığı geliştiren ve iki taraflı müzik akışına olanak veren bu çoklu müzik ağları elektronik dans müzik piyasasının diğer bir boyutunu oluşturur. Elektronik medya aracılığıyla yapılan ve dağıtılan müzik türlerinin artması sonucu, teknolojiyi kullanarak müzik yapan ve dinleyen bir neslin geliştiğine ilişkin belirtiler çeşitli kültürlerde kendini gösteriyor. Böylesi aktif ve üretken gruplar müziği belli ölçüde büyük kuruluşların kontrolünden gittikçe uzaklaştırır. Yeni üretim ve tüketim teknolojileri yerel müzik türlerinin yeniden yorumlanmasına, dolaşıma girmesine ve küresel seslerle birleşmesine olanak sağlıyor. Türkiye açısından baktığımızda Mercan Dede'nin çalışmaları ilk akla gelen örnekler arasındadır. Bu melez müzik formlarının dağıtımı bağımsız yapımcılar, plak şirketleri, özel kulüp organizasyonları ve derleme CD'ler gibi çoklu yerel ve küresel ağlarla gerçekleşiyor. Küresel multi-medya şirketleri tarafından birebir kontrol edilemeyen bu ağlar, müzisyenler arasında iletişim ve etkileşim sağlayarak ortak müzik projelerin gelişmesine imkan veriyor.

Türkiye'deki müzisyenlerin ve yapımcıların bu ağlara dahil olmaları her ne kadar uzun bir geçmişe sahip değilse de, *Doublemoon* gibi yapımcı şirketlerinin ürettiği derleme CD'ler, çeşitli müzik projeleri, müzisyenlerini özellikle Avrupa'da tanıtmaya ve müzik piyasasına dahil etme yöntemleri çoklu yerel ve küresel ağların bu coğrafyada nasıl işlediğine ilişkin örnekler sunar. Marjinal, küçük ölçekli ve bazen alternatif sayılabilecek kulüplerin varlığı ve buralarda ortaya çıkan çeşitli müzik tarzları bu çoklu ağlar sayesinde gelişiyor. Bu müzik ağları özellikle Batı dışında yaşayan müzisyenler için, hem yerel hem de küresel elektronik dans müzik kültürünün bir parçası olabilmeleri açısından oldukça önemlidir.

Sonuç

İstanbul'da gelişen kulüp kültürü iç dinamiklerin dış etkenleri kendisine uydurduğu ve emdiği bir sürecin sonucunda oluştu. Bu kültürlerarası etkileşimler yukarıda anlatılan çoklu müzik ağlarının artmasını ve yaygınlaşmasını sağladı. Elekt-

¹² Bu konuda net bir rakam vermek mümkün değil, çünkü müzik organizasyon firmaları ve kulüpler ekonomik faaliyetleri ile ilgili istatistiki bilgi vermekten çekiniyorlar. Ancak kulüp endüstrisinin geliri hakkında bir fikir edinmek için Britanya'ya bakabiliriz: Kulüp endüstrisinin Britanya'da bir yıllık geliri iki milyar sterling'dir (Malbon 1998: 266).

ronik dans müzik ağlarının etkileşim içinde olduğu kurumlar (kulüpler, Dj ajansları, müzik organizasyon şirketleri, radyo istasyonları, plak şirketleri, içecek firmaları, medya, moda ve giyim mağazaları gibi) ilk bakışta herhangi bir merkezi güçten bağımsız gibi görülebilir. Ancak İstanbul’da oluşan popüler kulüp kültürünü göz önüne aldığımızda, küresel multi-medya şirketlerinin bu müzik ağları için odak bir nokta oluşturduğunu görürüz. Multi-medya şirketleri küresel kültürü kendi ekonomik çıkarları çerçevesinde biçimlendirmeye ve müziğin akışına ve eğlence mekanlarının fiziksel ve estetik standartlarına yön vermeye çalışıyorlar. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, kulüp kültürünün küreselleşmesi yerel müzik kültürlerinin ürettiği bağlamın dönüştürülmesi anlamına gelir. Küresel boyutta üretilen bu kültürel alan gençler için müzik etrafında gelişen yeni zevkler ve hazlar sunar; dolayısıyla yeni kültürel alanlar gençlerin özdeşleşebileceği kimlikleri durağan olmaktan çıkarır. Kültürel alanda görülen bu devingenlik kaçınılmaz olarak kültür ve kimlik konusunda süre giden tartışmalara yenilerini de eklemektedir.

İstanbul’da oluşan kulüp kültürüne baktığımızda, küresel biçimlerle bütünleşen müziksel ve sektörel bir gelişme görüyoruz. Fakat bunun, günümüz Türkiye’sinin müzik kültüründe belirleyici bir yere sahip olduğunu iddia etmek yanlış olur. Kulüp müziği ve bu müzik çevresinde oluşan kültür popülerleşti ancak yine de belli bir sınıf ve yaş grubuna ait kişiler için kültürel bir çerçeve oluşturur. *Time Out Istanbul* dergisinde belirtildiği gibi, Türkiye’nin müzik kültürü, *rock* ve *popun* etkisiyle hiç bir zaman karakteristik özelliğini kaybedecek noktaya gelmemiştir (2001: 213). İhraç edilen müzik kültürleri şehrin fiziksel, sosyal ve kültürel yapısını değiştiriyor, ancak türkü gibi geleneksel müzik biçimleri de değişen yeni kültürel ortam içerisinde dönüşerek varlığını sürdürüyor. Örneğin, türkü 1990’larda İstanbul’un müzik-eğlence dünyasında önemli bir ivme kazandı; Alevi ve türkü barlar alternatif eğlence mekanları haline geldi. Bu da gösteriyor ki, küresel ağlar bir taraftan kulüp kültürü aracılığıyla çeşitli coğrafyalarda küresel bir alan yaratırken, diğer taraftan belli bir coğrafyaya ait kültürel ve ekonomik dinamikler yerel müzik kültürlerini daha görünür hale getiriyor.

Post-modernist kuramcılarının belirttiği gibi, küreselleşme kişilerin kültürel kimlikleri ve deneyimleriyle yaşadıkları yer arasındaki ilişkiyi dönüştürüyor. Küreselleşen kulüp kültürü bu dönüşümü açıkça ortaya koyan bir alandır. Bu yeni kent- sel alanın yarattığı kültürel sonuçlar karmaşık ve çok boyutludur. Bir taraftan şehrin sosyal ve kültürel yüzeyini dönüştürüyor ve günlük yaşam pratiklerine ve müzik kültürlerine çeşitlilik katıyor. Connell ve Gibson’un işaret ettiği gibi “*müzik kültürel akışkanlığın ağlarını ve mekanlarını yaratır ama bunları politika, ticaret ve sosyal yaşam alanlarından bağımsız kılmaz*” (2003: 18). Bu nedenle, küresel ağların oluşturduğu kulüp kültürünün, Türkiye’nin kültürel ortamında Batı tüketim ideolojisi tarafından pompalandığı göz ardı edilmemelidir. Diğer taraftan, kültürel bir pratik olarak kulüp gruplar arası kültürel farklılıkları artırarak kutuplaşmaların oluşmasına neden oluyor. Batı kültürlerinde gruplar arası diyalogun kurulduğu bir alan olarak karşımıza çıkan kulüp kültürü, Türkiye’de kendilerini milliyetçi ve

İslami söylemlerle ifade eden gruplarla Batı kaynaklı değerler ve yaşam biçimleriyle özdeşleştiren gruplar arasındaki uçurumu artırıyor. Küresel ve yerel dinamiklerin ve etkenlerin iç içe geçmesiyle popülerleşen bu kültür, gruplar arası sınıfsal ve kültürel farklılıkları daha da belirginleştiriyor.¹³

Bu farklı kimliklerin inşasının ardında yatan nedenler nelerdir? Yerel ve küresel kimlikler arasındaki müzakereler nasıl yapılıyor? Kişiler müzik ve mekanlar aracılığıyla oluşturdukları kültürel kimliklerini nasıl tanımlıyor ve deneyimliyorlar? Bu tür sorular alan araştırmalarını kapsayan yeni çalışmalara işaret ediyor ve Batı dışı kültürel bağlamlarda deneyim, kimlik politikaları ve haz gibi konuları incelemek için daha geniş bir açı sunuyor.

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¹³ Kulüp Batı ülkelerinde farklı kültürel ve ekonomik yapıdan gelen gençlerin birarada eğlendikleri ortak bir alan, bir ölçüde sınıfsal farklılıkların aşıldığı bir alan olarak görülmektedir. Türkiye’de ise bu yeni melez kültürel alan kültürel farklılıkların ve çatışmaların yaşandığı bir alana dönüşmüştür. Bu konuyu ele alan ve halen devam eden etnografik çalışmamın bulguları, küreselle yerelin birleşiminden oluşan yeni kültürel bağlamın, şehirde yeni “diğerleri” ve yeni “farklılıklar” oluşturarak var olan kültürel hiyerarşinin yeniden üretildiğine işaret eder.

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Representing the Non-Muslims

Arus Yumul

A few years ago a friend of mine whose mother was Turkish and whose father was Laz told me that in her childhood and youth she was almost ashamed of her father's ethnic origin because in those years the connotation of being Laz was far from positive. Because it was associated with backwardness, provinciality and boorishness, she had carefully avoided identifying herself with her father's origins. Nowadays, she admitted that not only was she at ease in accepting her Laz roots as one of the constituent elements of her identity, but she also would have donated money, if she had had enough, to the establishment of an institute for the research of Laz culture. My first reaction to this confession was the impression that "*the distinction between the modern and postmodern with respect to identity must be something like this.*" Here it should be remembered that while for a long time any mention of ethnicity was considered inappropriate in "polite circles", in more recent decades ethnicity has become extremely popular and "being ethnic" has become fashionable.

It was in the 1990s that the word ethnicity made its appearance in Turkish official, political, intellectual and journalistic discourse. Whereas in the past the existence of Muslim ethnic groups had been officially denied, in the nineties at least liberals began to acknowledge that Turkey, as heir to a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire, was itself a multicultural society, in fact, a mosaic. Thus Turkish society has recently come face to face with the exotic culture of its Other in the form of ethnic arts, literature, music and cuisine. Such cultural products, robbed of their history and context, have been piled up and re-packaged for consumers. Diverse cultures have returned as homogenized folkloric exhibitions. Difference has been commodified, and a portrait of plurality and multiculturalism has been produced. It was again in this period that Turkish society rediscovered the non-Muslims.

My aim in this paper is to look at ways in which various discourses, or what Michel Foucault calls discursive formations, have worked together to construct the non-Muslims as specific objects of analysis in a particular way, and in the process have limited the alternative ways in which they may be constituted.

The rediscovery of the non-Muslims had as much to do with what Kevin Robins (1991) calls "*fascination with difference*" as with a nostalgic longing for old Istanbul at a time when Istanbulites were starting to feel the threat of rural migrants, who, with their lifestyles and cultures, were transforming the cultural landscape of the city. The so-called civilized and modernized sections of the population focused their attention on Pera, the most Westernized and cosmopolitan district of Ottoman Istanbul. Related to this nostalgia for bygone life-

styles, there emerged a longing for the old inhabitants of Pera, namely the non-Muslims. It was asserted that Istanbul had lost its civility with the departure of the non-Muslims. The latter were reconstructed as precious objects of the past that had to be protected. Having lived among non-Muslims in the past and being knowledgeable about their lifestyles became symbols of status or distinction. This nostalgic impulse involves what McCracken (1998) has called “patina”. McCracken suggests patina as a general term to refer to that property of objects by which their age turns out to be a key indicator of their higher status, and their promise to invoke nostalgia. Objects with patina are continuous reminders of the passage of time, and whenever elite lifestyles are endangered, patina acquires double significance, indicating both the special status of its owner and its owner’s special relationship to a way of life that no longer exists. This is what makes patina an exceptionally scarce resource, for it always indicates the fact that a way of life is now gone forever. Turkish society reconstructed the non-Muslims, among other nostalgic items such as antiques, as objects having patina. They were “seized from time”, made present and were assigned the nostalgic role as objects of value to be retrieved for the benefit of a weary, standardised and vulgarised Istanbul.

This discovery of non-Muslims in the nineties corresponded to what Stanley Fish (1997) has designated as “boutique multiculturalism”. Boutique multiculturalism, which should be differentiated from strong multiculturalism, “*is the multiculturalism of ethnic restaurants, weekend festivals, and high profile flirtations with the other in the manner caricatured by Tom Wolfe under the rubric of radical chic*” (378). Boutique multiculturalism is defined by its shallow and decorative relationship to the objects of its affection. In the Turkish version of boutique multiculturalism non-Muslims are depicted as esoteric objects and vestiges of the past that have to be preserved. The fact they are different is recognised. They are approached with curiosity, friendliness and tolerance. They are portrayed as warm, friendly, considerate individuals. They are seen as people who, with their different lifestyles, customs, cuisines, accents and so on, add depth and colour to the culture of the country. Intellectuals, writers, and journalists indulge in nostalgia for those days of yore when there were far more non-Muslims in Turkey. However, boutique multiculturalism keeps the multiplicity at the margins. Thus, the multiple identities within the nation are never pluralized as part of the nation. What is lacking in most of these accounts say non-Muslims is the acknowledgment of the fact that they themselves form an integral part of the nation; whereas such accounts portray them as outsiders, marginals or guests, non-Muslims stress that they seek inclusion and equality in a common society. Let me note in passing that such representations of ethnic or racial groups, so popular in the contemporary world, tolerate the folklorist Other deprived of its substance - like the multitude of ethnic arts, cuisines, and so on. Any “real” Other, by contrast, is instantly condemned for its fundamentalism, since “*the real Other is*

by definition “patriarchal”, “violent”, never the Other of ethereal wisdom and charming customs” (Žižek 1997: 37).

This fact is clearly demonstrated by the results of a number of recent surveys, which show that the majority of Turkish youth believe that non-Muslims are evil and that a great many people prefer not to have non-Muslims as their neighbours. Of course these findings have to do with the negative portrayal of non-Muslims by the media, politicians and others who through their privileged access to public discourse play a formative role in shaping attitudes and opinions about others in society.

It was again in the nineties that the non-Muslims were reconstructed as dangerous objects. This involved the revitalisation of old prejudices. The designation as non-Muslim has been stigmatized. Non-Muslims have been depicted as the root of all evil, as people who stabbed the Turks in the back, as the enemies within. Such discourses have rendered normal the pejorative use of the terms “Greek”, “Armenian” and “Jew”, as in the case of curses such as “son of a Greek”, “servant of a Jew” and “of an Armenian womb”.

The ethnic loyalties of the non-Muslims have been perceived as a destabilising force subversive to national unity. They have been approached with suspicion and mistrust. They have been pressed to contribute to national causes as a proof of their loyalty, not only by those who are negatively disposed towards them, but also by those who oppose anti-minority sentiments and practices. One such person, for example, after referring to the supposed affluence of non-Muslims advised the religious heads of the non-Muslim communities to contribute financially to the Bosnian cause. A liberal Turkish journalist, on the other hand, interviewing two Jewish journalists, persistently asked them if they, like all the other Jews living in Turkey and in fact all over the world, were not agents of MOS-SAD, thus implicitly questioning the loyalty of the Jewish community to the Turkish state and arousing the suspicions of the Turkish public that the Jewish community is serving alien purposes (Akman 1997). These examples, as well as the portrayal of non-Muslims as relics of the past that have to be protected, demonstrate that discursive formations once established as a ready-made way of thinking, rule out alternative ways of thinking or talking about a topic.

The concentration of non-Muslims in trade and industry—the outcome of historical circumstances—has been re-interpreted as a significant defect on their part. They have popularly been seen as exploiters of the wealth of the country at the expense of the Muslims, and without showing any signs of gratitude. Their presence in the economic sphere has been seen as damaging and dangerous to the welfare of the nation. Such discourses were recycled especially after research was published and a recent film was made on the Capital Levy (*varlık vergisi*) imposed during the Second World War. Although the Capital Levy was introduced as an emergency fiscal measure to tax war profiteers and high-income groups, it was applied in a discriminatory way and was imposed mainly on non-Muslims:

Non-Muslims had to pay ten times the Muslim rate and *Dönmes*—the crypto-Jews who had converted to Islam in the seventeenth century—twice the rate. Payment had to be made in cash and defaulters were deported to Aşkale, Erzurum for forced labour. The tax was instrumental in destroying the economic position of the non-Muslims and transferring control of the market to the Muslims.

In this context, I would like to describe a relatively recent TV commercial advertising Petlas, a Turkish tyre company, based on a real-life episode: During the Dardanelles War, when the vehicles carrying guns and ammunition to the front have run out of tyres, the commander of the regiment sends one of his soldiers, Muzaffer, to Istanbul, ordering him to find tyres at any cost, since the fate of the war depends on them. Muzaffer finds the tyres in a shop owned by a Jew who will only give the tyres in exchange for a cash down payment. The country is at war and money is tight. Determined to get the tyres through fair play or foul, Muzaffer resorts to forgery. Working through the night, he prepares an Ottoman banknote almost identical to the real note, with one important exception: Whereas real banknotes included a clause stating that the value would be paid in gold in Dersaadet (Istanbul), this one states that it will be paid with the blood of the martyrs in the Dardanelles. Next morning, at the break of dawn, Muzaffer goes back to the Jewish trader and purchases the tyres with the false note. The Jewish trader realises that he has been deceived only when he reads the statement concerning the method of payment, after Muzaffer has already left with the tyres. The state later pays the money to the merchant. The audience learns from the narrator, an old man, who had accompanied Mehmet Muzaffer to Istanbul during the episode and who is recounting the story to Petlas workers, that Muzaffer died in another battle. After referring to the importance of the “national” production of tyres (by Petlas) the narrator utters the following words: “Mehmet Muzaffer is proud of you my sons.”

The message the advertisement conveys is clear: If industrial production and economic activities are left to the “outsiders”, then at such crucial moments as war we will be left without the necessary supplies. As such, the ad mobilises fear and anxiety not only about national security but also about “outsiders”, “enemies in our midst”, a conception that triggers an intense “*boundary-drawing bustle, which in its turn generates a thick fall-out of antagonism and hatred to those found or suspected guilty of double-loyalty and sitting astride the barricade*” (Bauman 1989: 65). By depicting Jews, who have been living amidst Muslims for centuries, as outsiders the commercial both certifies the socio-cultural validity of the definition of the Turkish nation present in the popular mind, and reinforces it, despite official definitions to the contrary, as being Muslim.

Although based on a historical event, the Petlas advertisement, by depicting the Jews as controlling trade while Muslims heroically defend the fatherland, resorts to an ahistorical representation of the Jews, making no reference to the chain of events leading to this situation. The population of the Ottoman Empire

was divided into the categories of Muslims and non-Muslims. And in accordance with Islamic Law, non-Muslims professing monotheistic religions based on revelation were accorded the protection and tolerance of the state on the condition that they unequivocally acknowledged the primacy of Islam and the supremacy of Muslims. Besides paying an additional tax, there were certain restrictions imposed on them, the chief one being their exclusion from governmental service and the privilege of bearing arms. This state of affairs led to an ethnic division of labour, with Muslims dominating the government and non-Muslims the economy, especially, trade. What remains obscure in the advertisement is the fact that in the Ottoman Empire the key basis of power as well as status was service to the state: "*the wielders of political power, not the merchants, were the first citizens of the realm*" (Mardin 1973: 172).

That the merchant is a Jew amplifies the significance of stereotypical representation. The universal stereotype of the Jew as the eternal stranger is reaffirmed by the commercial. As a member of a supra-national people hated for their cosmopolitan internationalism, the Jewish merchant cannot be expected to display any sense of patriotism towards the fatherland. Although the advertisement makes no explicit reference to the merchant's identity, his Jewishness is inscribed on his body. His stature, size, facial structure, nose and so on, that is, his physicality, to use Eisenstein's (1996) term, are reminiscent of figures used to depict Jews in caricatures. He fits the ubiquitous profiteering Jewish merchant stereotype. As such the depiction points to the immutability of the otherness of the Jew. Although he utters just a few words, his accent discloses his identity. His physicality represents the polar opposite of the strong-built, tall and handsome Mehmet Muzaffer. His dress makes it clear that he is living a prosperous life, in sharp contrast with the poverty of the "authentic" members of the nation (Yumul 2004: 40-3).

In recent years another discourse that presents an idealised history concerning the tolerance of the Ottoman Empire towards its non-Muslim subjects has gained wide popularity. Representatives and religious heads of non-Muslim communities have been invited as speakers to conferences and seminars dedicated to the theme of tolerance in an effort to romanticise the Ottoman Empire's treatment of its non-Muslim subjects and disseminate legends of a peaceful coexistence throughout centuries of Ottoman rule. Concerning the hierarchical nature of Ottoman multiculturalism, this discourse has either remained silent about or implicitly justified the inferior status of non-Muslims.

Non-Muslim communities that were accorded the status of a religious community (*millet*) under the Ottoman Empire were allowed a considerable degree of autonomy in their internal affairs. In this system each ethno-religious group was placed under the leadership of its respective religious head, who was the administrative officer responsible to the state for his community and vice versa.

The Turkish Republic established in 1923 not only adopted a secularist policy but also embraced the civic conception of the nation, which, in principle, ac-

cords equality to all citizens irrespective of race, ethnicity or creed. Common laws, rights and duties bind its members. Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution stated that “*The word Turk, as a political term, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without distinction of, or reference to race or religion.*” The 1982 Constitution maintained this position. Thus, Article 66 reads that “*A Turk is someone associated with the Turkish state by the ties of nationality*”. Yet the ethos upon which the Republic is based has since its earliest years incorporated use of the word *Türk* in a racial, religious as well as political sense (Nişanyan, 1995). Vagueness has characterised the use of the word *Türk*, with different definitions emphasised at different times.

The legal status of non-Muslims in the Republic of Turkey was established by the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923), which recognises Jews, Greeks and Armenians as minorities. The Treaty stipulated that as citizens of Turkey they were entitled to the same civil and political rights as their fellow citizens, and that without distinction of religion, they were equal before the law (*Lozan Barış Konferansı* 1973: 10-4). Beyond the rights enjoyed by all citizens, the Treaty conferred on these communities the right to run their charitable, religious, cultural and educational institutions. The Treaty granted all three minorities the special privilege of maintaining their own laws governing family and inheritance matters (Article 42). The three minorities, however, yielding to the pressures exerted by the authorities, renounced this privilege. Thus the *millet* system ceased to exist; the authority of the heads of the non-Muslim communities was reduced to spiritual matters only. The non-Muslims became citizens and Turkey achieved legal unity. But across the ages, religion and nationality have been so inseparably intertwined that in the popular mind being *Türk* has been associated with being Muslim, and differences of faith have been used to advance nationalistic objectives. Despite official definitions to the contrary, it was the cultural identity of the demos, especially its religious identity, which constituted the nation, thus collapsing the political/legal category of “*Türk*” into a category of identity, and perverting the egalitarian logic of citizenship by rendering those left outside the cultural definition of the nation, explicitly or implicitly, into second-class citizens.

The categorisation of the population into Muslims and non-Muslims has been accompanied by status differentials. Here let me cite the remark of then President Süleyman Demirel in 1995, concerning the Kurdish problem, who, after pointing out that under the Lausanne Treaty Kurds were considered equal citizens of Turkey, added: “*We are telling the West that ... [the Kurds] are the owners of the whole of this country. Why should they be given minority rights and made second class?*” (*Turkish Daily News*, 10 May 1995).

The classification of the population into Muslims and non-Muslims has marked more than religion. It has involved not only status differentials but also in the dominant culture it has signified a divide between qualitatively different kinds of human beings. The prevalent portrayal of non-Muslim women in Turkish nov-

els and films has been as servants, prostitutes and mistresses. With their beguiling seductiveness these women arouse the sexual desires of Muslim males. The latter have no intention of marrying them. Rather, experiencing sex with non-Muslim women has been for them a way to make themselves over, to leave Muslim innocence and enter the world of experience. The sexually available female Other with her lasciviousness has been constructed in direct opposition to the assumed sexual purity of the Muslim female. One of the main objections of the intellectuals and columnists to the above-mentioned film on the Capital Levy was that it portrayed a Muslim woman falling in love with an Armenian man. The way women are represented is important because nationalism requires women to bear the burden of representation, for it is the women that are constructed as the symbolic carriers of the identity, honour and values of the collectivity.

As is apparent from the foregoing, non-Muslims have been imagined as falling outside the definition of the nation. In various discourses they have been assigned the symbolic role of representing all those characteristics and values that the authentic Turkish nation does not stand for. They have been depicted as outsiders, foreigners or guests. Although their existence in these lands extends over centuries, in some cases pre-dating Muslim existence, they have been constructed as the stranger in the Simmelian sense, that is, as the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, see themselves as people who belong to the land, and as such, oppose being portrayed as domestic aliens, as individuals who because of their ethno-religious backgrounds do not possess the right stuff to be considered real members of the nation. *“All through my school life and afterwards”*, resents an Armenian, *“I have repeatedly been asked the following questions: “Where did you come from?”; “Why did you come?”; “Are you from Greece?”; “Are you an immigrant?”; “Why did you settle in Turkey?” As a person belonging to a family [living in this country for generations], being exposed to such and similar questions makes me feel that we are not considered as integral parts of the whole. ... Nowadays I reply to these questions in the following way: “We have been here all the time; where did you come from?”* (Hancı 1995: 36).

Just as the representation of the non-Muslims has been ambivalent and ambiguous so was the response of the latter. Perhaps for the first time since the establishment of the Republic, it was in the nineties that non-Muslims began to get involved in identity politics. They demanded recognition and preservation of their cultures. Identity politics also involves claiming one's identity as a member of an oppressed or marginalized group. Non-Muslims, especially the intellectuals, started to talk openly about their present grievances and the injustices committed against their communities in the past.

They transformed themselves from the silent Other into one seeking recognition and equality, rather than toleration. A Jewish intellectual, Rifat Bali, for example, has recently asserted that the relationship of a modern nation state with its citizens cannot be based on granting toleration. This was new. On the other

hand, non-Muslims continued with their old survival strategy, namely that of maintaining a good reputation as law-abiding, loyal citizens providing willing hands to prop up the national economy, super-patrons promoting the nation's vision and destiny. They remained committed to displaying their faith in the system and their future. They were assimilated to various discourses of Ottoman pluralism and tolerance. In 1992, the Turkish Jews, for example, established the Quincentennial Foundation to mark the five hundredth anniversary of the acceptance by the Ottoman Empire of Sephardic Jews fleeing persecution in Spain.

In the nineties both the representation of the non-Muslims in Turkish society and the counter-representation of non-Muslims in their own communities have involved the articulation of a new discourse to an already existing one. This has resulted in ambivalence and ambiguity. Ambivalence is characterized by the co-existence of conflicting drives and sentiments towards the same object. It refers to the co-existence of love and hate.

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Islamic Patterns of Consumption

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Under the relatively liberal administration of the Motherland Party (1983-1991) Turkey witnessed the introduction of a market economy and the privatization of the mass media. Opening up the economy to market forces accelerated the emergence of *nouveaux riches*. During this process Islamic groups were also able to develop their own middle and upper middle classes by using the advantages of engaging in business in an open market economic system. This upward social mobility helped them to form their own educated elite. Through secular and modern education, Islamic actors also succeeded in transforming newly-acquired economic capital into social and cultural capital. As a result of this *embourgeoisement*, consumption gained a prominent place among Islamic groups. They have come to take part in consumerism as much as other sections of society do.

The transformation of Islamism in Turkey from radical and political struggles to moral and cultural representations in everyday life can be linked to the new ethics of consumption among Islamic actors. Since the 1980s a Turkish Islamic movement has developed through the appropriation of political avenues of participation. However, some recent changes in the post-1990 period can be related to the accommodation of Islam to the market economy and consumer society. In other words, Islamism has been transformed from within. The Islamic appropriation of new forms of urban economic and cultural life has reshaped the movement. As they pursue their economic interests, Islamic actors interact with society at large. Especially in inclusionary contexts where upward social mobility prevails, Islamic entrepreneurs and middle classes participate and become visible within the given public sphere, on the one hand, and try to mould new public spaces of their own in conformity with the requirements of the Islamic faith and Islamic way of life, on the other. This engenders tension with the ideological and collective prerequisites of the movement. In a sense, Islamic actors who owe their presence and empowerment to collective movements, are in the process of borrowing from secular lifestyles as they adopt modern consumption practices. Turkish Islamism now expresses more and more the traits of this cultural movement.

However, this is not a simple process of assimilation to worldly lifestyles or capitalistic forces. Consumption is significant because people can exercise control over how they consume and invest a sense of identity in the process. Moreover, consumption may generate important divisions among cultural groups. Middle class Islamic groups use the consumer components of clothing, eating and drinking, vacation and so on to demarcate a lifestyle, to mark out their way of life in contrast to the secular others. Their construction of a sense of identity occurs as much through the use of consumer items as it does through body poli-

tics. Consumption involving the human body and its Islamization through new kinds of physical statements has considerable significance.

The suggestion that social classes are in part constituted through cultural practices, including patterns of consumption, is not a new one. Veblen's (1934) and Bourdieu's work (1984) remain some of the most comprehensive treatments of the topic, although there have been other studies of the middle classes which have explored how consumption practices or lifestyles have served to differentiate between social groupings (Savage et al. 1992).

In the broadest sense, consumption practices work to reinforce social hierarchies. Whether or not such practices have become more important than the economic class position is difficult to judge, and in any case, the answer would vary depending on the social group in question. The economic approach to consumption explored the relationship between patterns of consumption and major economic classes. But in the context of Islamic morality we can shift our attention from economic to social definitions of class. In the social sciences, developing from Weberian perspectives, the notion has emerged of social status groups using consumption patterns as a means of marking out their group identity. For the purpose of this study, Weber's concept of social status has considerable significance, since he formulated the concept of status as encompassing the influence of ideas, beliefs and values upon the formation of groups without losing sight of economic conditions.

Income levels are only one part of the explanation of the new patterns of consumption. Consumer items have become involved in the processes, which have a degree of autonomy from economic class or even traditional social status groups. In this vein, Bourdieu emphasized the symbolic aspects of consumption and linked it to the making of distinctions and the marking of differences between groups whose position is established both by their socio-economic position in the system of economic capital, and by their position in the systems which transmit and reproduce cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984). These two systems are, however, regarded as linked but relatively independent of each other.

Yet traditionally, consumption has been seen as either a material process rooted in human needs, or an ideal practice, rooted in symbols, signs and codes. Bourdieu's *Distinction* sought to combine the importance of social status and patterns of consumption as a way of marking one way of life from another, with the idea that consumption involves signs and symbols, not only the satisfaction of different sets of needs. Here, Bourdieu may be seen as having attempted to combine the well-established economic approach to consumption through notions of social status groups with the newer analytical approach to signs, symbols, ideas and cultures. Departing from this point, it can be argued that the asceticism of 1980s Islamism has broken down into an ethic which promotes consumption as a means of establishing new Islamic social and cultural statuses.

In the post-1990 period affluent Islamic social groups used their purchasing power to claim social status through the visible display of commodities signaling high social standing. Patterns of consumption among the Turkish Islamic middle classes radically changed and the intensity of this practice reached a qualitatively new stage. Cultural patterns and lifestyles associated with middle class consumption as markers of status have been attractive to the Islamic circles. Western style furniture, modern home decorations, jeans, perfumes, attractive outfits, summer holidays and many other components of modern consumption have been emulated.

During an in-depth interview, the well-known Turkish Islamic intellectual Ali Bulaç complained that, although his family remained loyal to the religious tradition by taking their meals sitting on the floor, he had bought a large dining table at the behest of his wife. Instead of using the table for meals, the family employs it for other purposes: "It is not used [for dining]. We put books and other objects on it." In the house, the most spacious room decorated with Western style furniture is reserved for the guests, whereas the smallest and least comfortable room serves as the family living room. A formal living room that is always kept clean and tidy and is excluded from the usage of family members is typical of the modern middle class Turkish home. Bulaç also explained that the division of the inner house into formal and family living rooms was alien to him because in his hometown (Mardin) a single room could be used for multiple purposes by temporarily re-arranging the traditional light furniture. Bulaç tries to show how he could not avoid modern patterns of home decoration in the metropolitan city of Istanbul despite his unpretentious Islamic way of life. He says: "We are an Islamic family, but our use of the space is modern". Although urbanization has altered the patterns of consumption among rural-to-urban migrants, this example not only demonstrates that the use of identical products and the meaning attributed to them can vary across groups and categories within society, but also the fact that Islamic culture simultaneously adapts to and resists lifestyles associated with modernity.

*Goods Related to Islamic Consumption:
Pork, Alcohol, Cola, Perfume, Headscarves*

The above anecdote shows that the more the peripheral Islamic actors have access to central urban life and economy, the more they may seek Islamic sources of reference to redefine or redraw the boundaries of their world.

For instance, a hotly debated issue among Islamic groups concerns the possibility of their being exposed to products derived from pork in the big cities. It has been argued that Muslims may have eaten pork or lard unknowingly. One of the cover banners of *Aksiyon*, an Islamic community weekly, read "They are making us

*eat pork!*¹ Referring to the FAO's (Food and Agricultural Organization) reports according to which 3,000 tons of pork are consumed annually in Turkey, the weekly asks: "[In which sector] is this pork being used?" Pork and lard are not only forbidden (*haram*) for Muslims to eat, but all commodities produced from pork derivatives are considered ritually unclean (*necis*). For instance, toothbrushes, shaving brushes, shoes, leather outfits, hair gels, drug capsules, lipsticks, some other cosmetics and any other commodity containing pork derivatives or lard are all designated *necis* for pious Muslims; and a Muslim cannot perform the act of prayer (*namaz*) before removing all *necis* things from his/her body. The article warns Muslims to be extra vigilant in their consumption of certain items that might contain pork or its chemical derivatives. It states that 100,000 pigs are produced in the pig farms in Turkey; this large number is possible because pig breeding and reproduction are easy and inexpensive: On average a pig gives birth to twenty offspring a year, and a pig can eat everything except glass. The article further warns Muslim consumers to beware of the cheap hotdogs sold in the take-away stands (*biifeler*) because they have no brand names and are possibly made of pork.

In Turkey, from time to time the Islamic newspapers and magazines publish lists of food ingredients, citing scientific abbreviations which stand for pork derivatives, and encourage Muslims to establish research institutions on the issue. After mentioning that even in non-Muslim countries like the UK and the USA the state supports the formation of organizations that certify religiously allowed (*halal*) food, the newspapers give the Internet addresses of those organizations. By reporting such news concerning food consumption, Islamic actors seek to force the government and the Ministry of Health to be sensitive toward the issue and thus create a new public debate.

Whereas this example shows that exposure to consumerism has made Islamic actors more conscious of their Islamic identity, the following examples attest to the simultaneous processes of differentiation and de-differentiation through consumption.

Orthodox Muslims have long refrained from using perfumes containing alcohol. However, perfume consumption has recently gained popularity among Islamic groups. Some small Islamic firms produce perfumes that imitate the scent of famous Western brands but do not contain alcohol. Although, they use the same brand names, the perfumes are put into small bottles different from the originals. The imitation scents come in identical bottles and are only differentiated by their labels. In this way pious Muslim youth who wish to consume famous Western brand names are given the opportunity to do so by purchasing those semi-imitated fashionable perfumes. Since perfume without alcohol is very oily and leaves a longer-lasting odor on the skin, Islamic perfumes are sold in small bottles.

¹ See the web page of the magazine, <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/detay.php?id=11099>.

Another example concerning alcohol is related to cola drinking. In the 1990s the Islamic company, *İhlas Holding* started to produce *Kristal Cola* as an alternative to Western cola brands, which are claimed to contain alcoholic ingredients. The advertisement for *Kristal Cola* included the phrase “*Drink with trust*” (*Güvenle için*), implying that one can never be sure of the content of Western cola. Actually, the ideological dispute over soft drinks is not new in Turkey; some leftist groups in the 1970s promoted the consumption of the local brand *Ankara Gazozu* instead of Western cola brands. When the Coca-Cola Corporation first began operations in Israel, Islamic countries in the Middle East boycotted the corporation and the Arab world was encouraged to drink Pepsi-Cola instead. During the 1970s, Islamists in Turkey, too, were supporting Pepsi-Cola for the same reason. Although Coca-Cola has traditionally dominated the international scene (or at least until 2004), for more than four decades Pepsi-Cola has enjoyed a monopoly in the Arab world, as close ties with Israel prevented Coca-Cola’s sale in the Gulf. At that time, however, Islamists in Turkey did not call into question the Pepsi-Cola ingredients. In fact the support for Pepsi-Cola was totally political and radical because the campaign aimed to hinder the economic development of Israel. However, the above-mentioned Islamic dispute over the ingredients of Western cola comes from a completely new perspective and attests to the transformation of Islamism from radical to moral and cultural practice. However, this does not diminish the importance of the economic aspect. One should remember that the Islamization of some goods is not disconnected from the ambitious profit orientation of Islamic entrepreneurs, who are certainly aware of the huge market potential of Islamic-based consumption, but the demand is certainly rooted in the moral and cultural domain.

The symbolic value of *Kristal Cola* and newly established *Cola Turka*, also founded by pious Muslim entrepreneurs, shows how consumption is always the mechanism that promotes localization, or Islamization in this case. Islamic consumers of *Kristal Cola* or *Cola Turka* balance such Islamicizing with attempts to show how cosmopolitan they are in their consumption of global commodities. The idea of a given commodity having an Islamic quality is thus a sign of the consumers’ involvement in increasingly global relations. The point is that the global consumption is experienced within a given “Islamic locality”. These examples show that Islamic signs, symbols, rules and principles are being articulated through capitalistic forms of consumption. They express the ambiguous desire for the demand to accommodate the “modern” while remaining “Islamic”.

It is also significant that the cover banner of the first issue of the weekly *Aksiyon* read “*Consumption temples*” (*Tüketim tapınakları*), connoting that people were worshipping consumption in the big shopping malls of Istanbul like Akmerkez, Capitol, etc. This kind of news reveals the tension between Muslims’ desire to consume and their wish to distance themselves from non-Muslim contexts of consumption.

Islamic consumers do not solely purchase items of clothing, food, cosmetics, perfumes, furniture or a style of entertainment; they also try to create a sense of who they are through what they consume. Thus the term consumption involves not only the consumption of material objects but also of symbols. Muslims consume items, which helps them to create and sustain their own image of identity. What they consume are also cultural signs. Consumers are interested both in the status value and the symbolic meaning of the commodities purchased. The will to consume Western perfumes in an Islamic way, for example, reflects the importance of fine scent as a status marker on the one hand, and shows how the ingredients of the same scent marks Islamic identity, on the other.

The reality of living in the city has increased the awareness of style, the need to consume within a repertory or code which is both distinctive to a specific social group and expressive of individual preferences. The modern urban Islamic individual is no longer the austere and modest type who would not spend money on trivial items. Islamic status groups use patterns of consumption both as a means of demarcating themselves from others and as a means of winning social acceptance by imitating well-recognized cultural signs. All status groups use some markers to differentiate themselves from others. The markers Muslims use to realize this are neither identical to nor completely different from those used by other groups, and signify group values as well as individual esteem.

The emphasis of my research is on how consumption practices are embedded in broader cultural relations through which goods acquire meanings. This line of thinking focuses on how goods gain cultural values, and how they become a part of daily practices through which identities are built. Thus, consumption can be viewed as an active process involving the symbolic construction of an Islamic identity, which necessitates symbolic distinctions to differentiate the Islamic way of life from its secular counterpart. In a media-saturated, consumption-oriented, and increasingly urban social environment such as contemporary Turkey, the possibility of Islamic identity as a viable cultural alternative competing with the mainstream secular culture is contingent upon establishing these similarities and distinctions.

The visual images or the wording of headscarf advertisements in Islamic newspapers, magazines and television channels can also be interpreted as the desire of Islamic actors to be recognized as members of high status groups. To cite just one of many examples, advertisement slogans used by Islamic headscarf companies use slogans such as “*For first class worlds*” (*Birinci sınıf dünyalar için*) and “*What is real is noble*” (*Asıl olan asil olandır*) and are accompanied by the visual image of a fully veiled woman. Islamic clothing companies also use foreign words like “creation” and “collection” in their brand names without any hesitation.²

² For a detailed discussion of these advertisements, see Özlem Okur (1997).

Roland Barthes (1973) argues that there is always a dual aspect to consumption: it fulfills a need, as with clothing, but also conveys and is embedded within socio-cultural symbols. A headscarf, for example, can both cover the hair of a Muslim woman and signify an image of the pious “first class” or “noble” Islamic female in public life. The function of consumer goods cannot be separated from the symbolic meaning of commodities, or what Barthes calls their significations. Islamic consumption is embedded within systems of signification, of making and maintaining distinctions, always establishing boundaries in both intra-group relations with Islamic actors and inter-group relations with secular actors. Headscarf consumption among urban, middle or upper middle class Islamic women has different symbolic dimensions. First, the luxurious fabrics, colors and styles of the headscarves used by the new Islamic women stand in direct contrast to the casual appearance of the traditional head-covering. Rural Muslim women still wear their headscarves knotted under their chins, and often let the hair above their foreheads show. The traditional head-covering contrasts with the present wearing of the headscarf among urban Islamic women, who do not let a single hair escape the scarf in public. Their inspirational motivation is fashion, not traditional modesty. Second, the usage of codes and signs employed by high status Westernized groups such as “noble”, “first class”, “creation” and “collection”, reveals the urban Muslim woman’s desire to be accorded the same status, but still to be differentiated from them by the very practice of veiling. Third, this type of veiling by differentiating itself from the traditional head covering, which lacks any political dimension, gives veiling a political meaning on the one hand, but, in the post-1990 period with its emphasis on stylishness and luxury, mitigates Islamic militancy characterized by orthodox modesty, on the other.

Social Psychology of the Veiled Female and Islamic Consumption

Islamic women in public spaces are symbolically introducing a form of distance between their “selves” and their social others. The Islamic headscarf and dress, though providing neither isolation nor anonymity, bestow the idiom of privacy upon their wearer and allow her to stand somewhat separate from the social interaction while remaining a part of it. The images associated with the individuation strategies of veiled girls are reflected in their styles of dress. Some young veiled actors state that they do not favor the mass-produced dresses or images of the Islamic clothing (*tesettür*) companies, which leave no room for personal differences, tastes or choices. In their opinion, such dress appeals more to the middle class housewife. For the urban veiled youth, personal preferences and originality in dress become more important as they try to create their own styles through individualistic preferences related to consumption.

Among the youth, the style of wearing the headscarf varies according to personal taste. It does not emerge as a fixed article of clothing to be worn uni-

formly. The actors are continually adjusting and readjusting the headscarf, changing the height at which it is worn, tugging on the lower part of it, tightening its ends, etc. There is a knack that makes the headscarf more elegant by varying the colors of the various clothing items and individualizing the mode of wearing. Wrapping the headscarf has become an art form. The young headscarved actors who frequently habituate particular public spaces object to uniformity in the manner of veiling. In contrast to those of a more radical disposition, they prefer to lessen the social distance between their “selves” and the unveiled females instead of emphasizing the physical difference. And this is accomplished by using common brands of headscarves or styles of consumption. It is possible to claim that the effort of lessening the social distance between veiled and unveiled women is an emerging pattern among the new generation of Islamic females, which can be understood as the normalization process of veiling created by a modern understanding of consumption.

Visual signs such as dress styles and accessories become important in creating an impression about the Islamic self. Young Islamic females regard new consumption patterns as a practical technique for resolving the dilemma of being veiled and being visible; the dilemma of their co-presence with males in the public spaces and the Islamic rhetoric surrounding domesticity and femininity. In fact, the nature of consumption accommodates this dilemma.

The hyperfeminine appearance of the fashion-conscious veiled girls with their exaggerated make-up, fitted blouses and jeans, their Western-brand rucksacks, foreign cigarettes and cellular phones points to the change in the way the Islamic self is expressed. Empowered with such consumption practices, these young actors also recast their needs for gender socialization, thereby increasing the extent of their social presence in public. In the summer they wear tunics in various light colors over trousers or jeans. This style of dress completely contrasts with the traditional Muslim attire. The tunics are not very long, mostly not reaching their knees, and are shaped at the waist. They are not loose fit but rather tight, highlighting the body's feminine form. Thus the young women have transformed the veil into a fashion statement. In the summer many of them wear open shoes which show their feet, and their toenails and fingernails are often painted in bright colors like pink or red. They also use quite seductive make-up, especially on their eyes. In this middle class publicness, with their choice of light colors and garments like tunics and jeans, their high-heeled shoes and make-up, women are expressing their femininity in public within the limits of an Islamic dress-code.

However, not all Islamic males accept these new consumption preferences. Because the new consumption preferences of fashion-conscious Islamic women blur the differences between the veiled and unveiled, between the Islamic and the modern, a new conflict emerges.

While the Western styles adopted by the veiled actors are subject to certain strictures, the women's ability to express personal styles in one form or another

promotes autonomy of action. The veiled actors' insistence on playing with the symbols of the unveiled is certainly an essential signifier of their will to interact with the secular others, and they do not mind the aspersion or criticism of Islamic males. These women give the others enough cues for the game of social interaction with secular segments of society to go forward.

In everyday life a person may be preoccupied with presenting an image of self to others, thus adopting a particular style. That is, "*to be a self is to be a human body that is mimetically involved with other such bodies but nevertheless has a capacity to distinguish itself consciously from others and to regard its prospects as its own*" (Hare and Blumberg 1988: 27-8). These interactive consumption games with the secular others are used as a "*catharsis for anxieties*" (Goffman 1973: 14). This type of consumption not only gives the veiled actor flexibility, but by decreasing the display of attachment both to the religious means and ends of her behavior and to the opinions of puritan Islamic males, she is not trapped into a commitment to moral obligations. Goffman (1956) has written eloquently on the person as a sacred object, a bearer of a demeanor, a recipient of deference. The veiled woman's sense of worth and significance is threatened by her moral vulnerability because her social appearance has been perceived as the embodiment of Islamic morality. But new styles of veiling challenge this puritanism intrinsic to Islamic morality.

Goffman takes the term "personal front" to refer to the items of expressive equipment, the items that people identify with the performer herself. Clothing and sex are included in personal front. He divides the stimuli which make up personal front into "appearance" and "manner". And they may sometimes tend to contradict each other (Goffman 1973: 24). The reaction of puritan Islamic males is related to such contradictions between "appearance" and "manner". The Islamic man expects a confirming consistency between the veiled female's appearance and manner. When the veiled woman does not fulfill the expected roles of interaction, he feels that Islamic public morals have been compromised.

Bourdieu links such differing preferences to his major concept of habitus. They are shaped far more by these deep-rooted and long-standing dispositions than they are by surface opinions and verbalizations (Bourdieu 1984). Many Islamic males want to shape veiled women's preferences for even such mundane aspects of culture as entertaining, smoking, laughing, chatting, listening to music, playing games, etc., which are shaped by competing habituses. Wearing the veil is not by itself sufficient for a woman's moral position in the public sphere. However, by the introduction and spread of new lifestyles and consumption patterns, an issue not really problematized in practice during the eighties arose. More significantly, the continuous debate around the question of appropriate codes of public behavior and manners for young veiled women reflects the quest for change which may be named as an unintended transformation of Islamism from within.

The beauty of veiled women also gained importance with the rise of new Islamic middle classes. Beauty parlors catering to the needs of veiled women began to appear. The *Secret Face Güzellik Merkezi* at İstinye in İstanbul is one such center. The word, “secret” refers to the privacy (*mabremiyet*) of the veiled woman’s beauty. The advertisement for the center in the Islamic newspapers includes the picture of an unveiled, short-haired, modern-looking woman wearing a low-cut jacket, which might seem ironic at first glance. The paradox, however, is resolved in the written text, which explains that “*female employees serve veiled female customers*”. (*Bayan elemanlarla tesettürlü hanımlara hizmet verilmektedir.*) Similarly in the hair salons located in more conservative parts of İstanbul, like Fatih, separate rooms are reserved for veiled women so that males can neither see nor touch their hair. Both instances show the manner in which certain public places for women are privatized according to Islamic principles governing the distinction between the forbidden and non-forbidden (*mabrem* and *na-mabrem*).

Islamic Holiday Sites: Spaces That Allow Both Similarity to and Differentiation from Secular Morality

Holiday sites in the south of Turkey offer a comfortable exoticism, prioritizing pleasure for all. Although words such as “tranquil”, “peaceful” or “secure” are not frequently used in the ads for Turkish holiday sites marketing the three “S’s” (sand, sea, and sun), Islamic hotels in the same region frequently promote a “*peaceful, tranquil, untroubled vacation*” (*buzurlu tatil*) to emphasize that Islamic morality is protected, especially with respect to gender relations. The direct translation into English of the expression *buzurlu tatil* with its Islamic connotations is difficult. *Huzurlu tatil* means pleasure within the limits of Islam. The hotels offer summer vacations in conformity with Islamic rules: hours of praying are respected and only non-alcoholic beverages are served. With its Islamic connotation *buzurlu tatil* also refers to maintaining the Islamic boundary between the private and public sphere. This is provided by the architectural design of the hotels, which offer private spaces for women, such as separate beaches and swimming pools. Thus the creation of Islamic privacy in exterior spaces once more challenges the conventional distinction between private and public.

There are several Islamic holiday sites on the western and southern coasts of Turkey: Hotel Ionia, Hotel Kerasus, Hotel Amarante, Sunset Beach Hotel, Şah Inn Hotel, Gülnihal Suite Hotel and Caprice Hotel. These sites are part of Turkey’s flourishing Islamic market. There are also camping sites, spas and beach resorts that segregate men and women. A cursory survey of these sites shows that most of them carry foreign brand names. Another seeming paradox is found in the TV advertisement for Sunset Beach Hotel that begins with the image of a whirling dervish, symbolically representing the asceticism inherent in Sufi Islam, which encourages the annihilation of the self and withdrawal from worldly

pleasures. In these advertisements, entertainment within the limits of Islamic morality is visualized side by side with an otherworldly appeal; worldly pleasures are juxtaposed to ecstatic meta-worldly pleasures. Thus, the modern lifestyles of consumer society are mixed with the signs and symbols of unpretentious Islamic identities. Caprice Hotel advertises “*a modern vacation complex where the sound of Muslim prayer (ezan) is heard five times a day*”. An additional advertisement slogan of this site, “*the name of alternative vacation*” (*alternatif tatilin adı*) points to the Muslims’ will to differentiate themselves in the same consumption domain.

Another issue relates to body politics at Islamic holiday sites, namely, the style of swimsuits. Swimsuits for Islamic women include a tight headscarf, a long-sleeved top and full-length pants. They fit loosely so as not to emphasize the women’s figures and are made of a quick-drying synthetic material. Interestingly, not only the covering of women but also the covering of men becomes an issue in this context. According to the *Sunni* body of knowledge on Islamic rules and principles (*Sunni Fıkıh*), males should cover their bodies from the belly to the upper knees. For this reason, Islamic clothing companies produce proper swimsuits for Muslim men. This type of male swimsuit is known among Islamic groups as *haşema*, which is the abbreviation of *hakiki şeriat mayosu* (“genuine Sharia swimsuit”). The interesting point is that *haşema* is also the brand name of the first Islamic swimsuit company. The Islamic entrepreneur Mehmet Şahin, who designed this male swimsuit because of his own problems on the beach, said “*we used to have to cut off long pants, but we were not satisfied with this practice so we decided to establish the company*”.³ The company then expanded to include women’s swimsuits. “*We are even trying to develop a swimsuit that the sun can penetrate, so women can get a suntan*”⁴, Şahin said. *haşema*’s catalogue features over half a dozen different colors, and the company cannot keep pace with demand.

Although other Islamic clothing companies produce male swimsuits in the same style under different brand names, Muslim consumers refer to all such garments as *haşema* because Islamic vacation is a new phenomenon and until recently there was no term for this type of garment in the Islamic idiom. The idea of consuming male swimsuits was alien to Muslim men. Even the slogan used in the advertisements for *haşema* – “*finally you can swim*” (*artık denize girebilirsiniz*) – attests to the novelty of the phenomenon. Through the emergence of Islamic middle classes with their demand for summer holidays, a brand name has been transformed into the generic name for a specific Islamic garment.

Since the 1990s the radical Islamic discourse of the previous decade has been challenged by self-reflexive practices that prove the social significance of modern consumption preferences and lifestyles in Islamic circles. Private beaches for Islamic women, sports centers for veiled girls, non-alcoholic restaurants, Islamic

³ See the website. <http://ourworld.net/ingilizce-ders/ingilizce-okuma/passages-08.htm>

⁴ Ibid.

vacationing, and Islamic hairdressers and beauty parlors illustrate the formation of new pious middle classes attempting to carve out their own alternative spaces. As Nilüfer Göle points out, these are the sites where the boundaries between the moral and immoral, between private and public, are problematized by Islamism. The agency of the Islamic consumer appropriating his/her own consumption items and such social spaces are transformative forces that visualize the cross-fertilization of Islam and modernity. Illustrations of Islamic experiences of consumption are not simply adaptations to consumer society or market rationality but self-reflexive experiences. On that account, we can speak of a new Islamic framework in which Islamism is waiving its political claims but increasingly permeating everyday life practices (Göle 2000: 94-95). The main reason why Islamic actors adopt modern consumption is that they want to try different public behavior and actions, everything from appearance, dress codes and styles to new forms of sociabilities. It is a matter of readapting, testing and reacting to the taken-for-granted Islamic limits. Islamic consumption is part of the new forms of public visibility that Islam has acquired in the past decade. Not only do these new forms transform the composition and social imaginary of Islamism, but they also shape the Islamic individual by bringing about a new dynamic and gender conflict among the Islamic actors as they familiarize themselves with values of consumption and reflect upon their new cultural practices. What emerges is the possibility of Islamic subjectivity, and of thought and experience, as a function of modern consumption.

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Yeni Uluslararası Göç Hareketleri ve Türkiye'deki Moldovalı Kadın Hizmetçiler

Selmin Kaşka

İçinde bulunduğumuz dönem “göç çağı” olarak nitelendirilmektedir (Castles ve Miller, 2003). 20. yüzyıl farklı göç dalgalarına tanıklık etmekle birlikte (Abadan-Unat, 2000), yüzyılın son döneminde meydana gelen uluslararası göç hareketlerinin daha önceki göç hareketlerinden farklı yönleri olduğu bilinmektedir. Castles ve Miller, içinde bulunduğumuz dönemde insan hareketlerinin “küreselleştiğini, hızlandığını, çeşitlendiğini ve ‘kadınlaştığını’” belirtiyorlar (Castles ve Miller, 2003: 8-9). Gerçekten genel gözlemlerimize dayanarak uluslararası göçün dinamiklerinin değiştiğini söyleyebiliyoruz. Başka bir deyişle göçün hacmi, biçimleri ve göçmenlerin kompozisyonunda önemli değişiklikler gözlenmeye başlanmıştır. Bu yeni göç hareketlerinin yeni analizleri gerektirdiği açıktır. Örneğin, 1960’ların göç alan ve göç veren ülke ayrımları artık açıklayıcılığını yitirmektedir. O dönemin göç veren ülkeleri göç alan ülkeler haline gelmeye başlamıştır. Erder’in de belirttiği gibi, bu ayrımlar, bugünkü göç akımlarının ‘kaotik’, ‘ne zaman, nereye, nasıl yöneleceği bilinmeyen’ niteliğini açıklamakta yetersiz kalmaktadır (Erder, 2000).

Günümüzdeki göç hareketlerinin temel özelliklerinden biri de 1960’ların düzenli göç örüntüsünün hızla değişmeye başlamasıdır. Bugünkü göç akımları esas olarak “düzensiz göç” şeklinde tanımlanan bir nitelik taşımaya başlamıştır.¹ Bu makalenin konusu açısından düzensiz göç kavramı, düzensiz ikamet ve düzensiz çalışma açılarından ele alınacaktır.

Bu çalışma bakımından yeni göç hareketlerinin diğer bir temel özelliği ise göçün toplumsal cinsiyet boyutunda meydana gelen değişmedir. Göçmen kadın olgusu yeni bir olgu olmamakla birlikte bu olgunun analiz edilmeye başlanması oldukça yakın tarihlere rastlamaktadır. Bilindiği gibi, özellikle 1970-1980’lere dek göç çalışmaları toplumsal cinsiyet boyutu üzerinde durmamıştır ve göç hareketlerinde kadınların erkek göçmenlerin izlediği, göçün büyük ölçüde erkek göçmenlere dayandığı, kadınların erkek göçmenleri pasif izleyicisi oldukları yaklaşımı

¹ “Düzensiz göç” kavramını tanımlama yönündeki çabalar sürmektedir. Örneğin Uluslararası Göç Örgütü, bireylerin temel olarak, kaynak, transit ve hedef ülkelerin ilgili yasalarını ve düzenlemelerini dikkate almayan, düzenlenmemiş her türlü akışını düzensiz göç olarak tanımlamaktadır (IOM 2000: 2). Pratikte düzensiz göç farklı biçimler almaktadır. Göçmenlerin hedef ülkeye girişte o ülkenin yasal düzenlemelerini dikkate aldıkları, ancak o ülkede ikametlerinde bu düzenlemelere uymadıkları durumlar vardır. Bu nedenle, Ghosh’un düzensiz göçü hem göç veren hem de göç alan ülke açısından ele alan ve göç alan ülke açısından da düzensiz giriş, düzensiz ikamet ve düzensiz istihdam olmak üzere üç temel ögeyi birbirinden açıkça ayırt eden tanımlaması daha kullanışlı gözükmektedir (Ghosh 1998: 4).

egemen olmuştur. Ancak 1970 sonlarından itibaren özellikle feminist araştırmacıların çalışmaları toplumsal cinsiyet boyutu üzerine eğilmeye başlamıştır. Bununla birlikte, Kofman ve diğerlerinin de belirttiği gibi, “göçün kadınlaşması” olgusunda son derece hızlı bir değişim yaşanmaktadır, ancak bizim bu hareketi kavramsallaştırmamızın aynı hızla gerçekleştiği söylenemez (Kofman vd.2000; 21).

Son dönemlerde uluslararası göç hareketlerinde iyice belirginleşen kadın göçü olgusu ile ilgili olarak ortaya çıkan bir eğilim ev içi hizmetlerinin küreselleşmesi olgusudur. Bir yandan bu olguyu analiz etmeye çalışan teorik çabalar sürmekte, bir yandan dünyanın çeşitli yerlerinde yapılan örnek-olay çalışmaları bu olguyu anlamaya ve açıklamaya çalışmaktadır (Anderson, 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001; Parrenas, 2001; Saban, 2002, Ehreinreich ve Russell Hochschild, 2003.)

Bu makalede ben düzensiz göç ve toplumsal cinsiyet konularını Türkiye’de ev içi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı göçmen kadınlar bağlamında ele almaya çalışacağım. Önce 1990’lardan itibaren eski SSCB ülkelerinden Türkiye’ye yönelen yeni uluslararası göç hareketinin genel bir resmini çizmeye çalışacağım. Daha sonra, Moldova hakkında kısa bir bilgi aktaracağım. Son olarak da ev içi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı göçmen kadınlarla ilgili bazı gözlemlerimi aktaracağım. Türkiye’de ev içi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı kadın göçmenler, yeni uluslararası göç akımlarının toplumsal cinsiyet boyutunu izlemek için bir örnek oluşturmaktadır. Yaklaşık on-on beş yıldan beri süregelmekte olan bu olgu hakkında henüz yeterince bilgiye sahip değiliz. Bu olgunun çeşitli yönleriyle değerlendirilmesi, hem Türkiye’nin yeni göç hareketlerini nasıl deneyimlediğini anlamak hem de ev içi hizmetlerin küreselleşmesi olgusunu Türkiye bağlamında tartışmak için uygun bir başlangıç noktası oluşturabilir.

Türkiye’nin Yeni Uluslararası Göç Deneyimi

Göç veren ülke olarak Türkiye’nin uluslararası göç hareketlerindeki deneyimi iyi bilinmektedir. Çünkü Türkiye görece uzun bir dönem boyunca göç veren ülkeler arasında önemli bir yer tutmaktaydı. Bununla birlikte son dönemde Türkiye’nin göç tarihinde yeni bir eğilim ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. 1980’lerin sonlarından başlayarak Türkiye bir çok ülkeden - Orta Doğu, Afrika ve eski Doğu Bloku ülkelerinden - gittikçe artan sayıda göçmenin transit ya da hedef ülkesi haline gelmeye başlamıştır. Çeşitli ekonomik, sosyal ve politik gelişmeler bunun nedenini oluşturmaktadır.

Yeni göç hareketleri bağlamında Türkiye heterojen bir göçmen kitlesi ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu heterojen kitle içinde üç farklı kategoriyi transit göçmenler, mülteciler ve çalışmak ya da ticaret yapmak amacıyla Türkiye’ye gelenler oluşturmaktadır.² Bu yazıda üzerinde durulacak olan grup son gruptur. Bu grup dahi

² Bu konuda bkz. Erder 2000. Transit göç konusunda bkz. İçduygu, 1996 ve 2003. Mülteciler için bkz. Kirişçi, 2002.

kendi içinde heterojen bir yapı sergilemektedir. Bu grup Türkiye'ye esas olarak turist vizesiyle, dolayısıyla yasal yollardan giriş yapmaktadır. Bunlar arasında farklı ülkelerden, farklı etnik gruplardan farklı sosyo-ekonomik kompozisyona sahip kadın ve erkek göçmenler yer almaktadır. Ülkeye girişlerinde herhangi bir düzensizlik unsuru söz konusu olmamakla birlikte, düzensiz göçmen olarak tanımladığımız bu grup Türkiye'de ikamet ve çalışma izni ile ilgili kurallar bakımından düzensiz göçmen niteliğini almaktadırlar. Bu grupta bavul tüccarlarını, enformel ekonominin değişik alanlarında çalışanları, seks işçilerini, eğlence sektöründe, spor merkezlerinde, sağlık kuruluşlarında ve ev içi hizmetlerde çalışanları gözlemleyebiliyoruz. Bunlar arasında eski Sovyetler Birliği ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinden gelenler çoğunluğu oluşturmaktadır. Ben bu makalede eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkeleri üzerinde yoğunlaşacağım.

Eski SSCB Ülkeleri İle Artan Etkileşim

Türkiye ile eski SSCB ülkeleri arasında çeşitli alanlarda gittikçe artan bir etkileşim olduğu bilinmektedir. Türkiye'ye yönelik nüfus hareketleri ile ilgili mevcut istatistikler, yabancıların giriş-çıkış sayılarını, ikamet iznine sahip olan yabancıların sayılarını, evlilik yoluyla vatandaşlık edinenlerin sayılarını ve sınır dışı işlemlerini göstermektedir. Tüm bu istatistikler, bu etkileşimi yansıtmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle giriş, ikamet izni ve evlilik sayıları bu ülkelerden çeşitli amaçlarla Türkiye'ye gelenlerin ve Türkiye'de bulunanların hızla artmakta olduğunu göstermektedir. Hiç kuşkusuz bu tek yönlü bir akım değildir, Türkiye'den de söz konusu ülkelere çeşitli sektörlerde çalışma, eğitim, turizm gibi çeşitli amaçlarla bir akım olduğu bilinmektedir. Aşağıda, mevcut istatistiklere dayanarak, bu ülkelerden Türkiye'ye yönelik nüfus hareketlerinin bazı yönleri üzerinde durmak istiyorum.

İlk olarak giriş sayıları üzerinde durmak yararlı olacaktır. Bu sayılara baktığımızda, 1988 yılında eski Sovyetler Birliği'nden Türkiye'ye sadece 4505 giriş yapılmışken 2003 yılında bu sayının iki milyonu aştığını görüyoruz. Ek 1'deki tablo, 1997-2003 yılları arasında eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkelerinden Türkiye'ye giriş yapan yabancıları sayısal ve oransal olarak göstermektedir. Elbette tablodaki rakamların tümü göçmen sayılarını göstermemektedir. "Gerçek" turistler de bu rakamlara dahildir. Ayrıca bu rakamlar Türkiye'ye giriş sayılarını göstermekle birlikte, toplam kişi sayısını göstermemektedir, çünkü bir kişinin birden fazla sayıda giriş yapabildiğini biliyoruz. Bununla birlikte düzensiz göçmenlerin turizm şemsiyesi altında giriş yapmaları nedeniyle bu rakamları ele almakta yarar vardır.

Ek 1'deki tablo incelendiğinde, örneğin 2003 yılı itibariyle eski SSCB ülkelerinden Türkiye'ye turistik giriş yapan yabancıların sayısı 2.157.558'dir. Bu rakam o yıl toplam yabancı girişleri içinde %16'lık bir oran oluşturmaktadır. Yabancı girişleri içinde eski SSCB ülkelerine bakıldığında en fazla giriş sayısının Rusya Federasyonu'na ait olduğu görülmektedir (%59.6). İzleyen ülkeler ise Ukrayna (%10.5), Azerbaycan (%8.9), Gürcistan (%8.0), Kazakistan'dır (%3.0). Moldova

ise %2.7 oranı ile altıncı sırada gelmektedir. Bu altı ülkenin eski SSCB ülkelerinden toplam girişler içindeki oranı %92.7'dir, dolayısıyla diğer eski SSCB ülkelelerinden toplam %8.2 oranında giriş yapılmıştır.

Eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkelerinden yabancı girişlerinin toplam yabancı girişleri içinde oranına bakıldığında da, Türkiye'ye 2003 yılı içindeki toplam girişler içinde Rusya Federasyonu %9.8 gibi bir oran oluşturduğu görülmektedir.

Eski Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasından sonra kurulan devletler arasında Türki Cumhuriyetler olarak bilinen Azerbaycan, Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Özbekistan ve Türkmenistan'dan yapılan girişlerin toplamı yaklaşık 310 bindir. Bu ülkelerden yapılan girişlerin toplam eski SSCB ülkeleri içindeki oranı %14.2'dir. Bu ülkeler arasında Azerbaycan %8.9 ile ilk sırada gelmekte, onu Kazakistan (%3.0), Özbekistan (%0.9), Türkmenistan (%0.8) ve Kırgızistan (%0.6) izlemektedir.

Türkiye'deki düzensiz göçmen sayısına ilişkin bazı tahminler yapılmış olmakla beraber, niteliği gereği bu göç hareketinin hacmi hakkında istatistiklere sahip değiliz.³ Bununla birlikte eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkelerinden gelenlerin önemli bir kısmının düzensiz göçmen olduğunu öne sürmek yapılan gözlemlere dayanarak mümkün gözükmemektedir.

Bu göç hareketlerinin en önemli nedeni kuşkusuz ekonomiktir. Sovyetler Birliği döneminde istihdam oranın yüksek olduğu bilinmektedir. Ancak SSCB'nin yıkılmasından sonra pazar ekonomisine geçiş dönemi başlamıştır ve bunun en önemli etkilerinden biri işsizlik oranlarındaki ciddi artış olmuştur; hayat standardı da çok belirgin bir biçimde düşmüş, tüm bu faktörler yoğun bir göç hareketinin başlamasına neden olmuştur. Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasından sonra ekonomi alanındaki güçlükler yeni kurulan devletlerin vatandaşlarını bu dramatik koşullarla mücadele etmek için yollar bulmaya doğru itmiştir. Bu yollardan biri göç etmektir. Türkiye de hedef ülkelerden biridir. Bu durumu sadece "çekici faktörler" yardımıyla açıklayamıyoruz. Bilindiği gibi "çekici faktörler" göç edilen yerdeki ekonomik farklılıklar ve yaşam standartlarının göçmenleri göçe yönlendirdiğini öne sürer. Türkiye bu açıdan göçmenleri cezp edecek bir nitelikte görünmemektedir. Çünkü yüksek bir işsizlik oranı vardır, resmi rakamlar %10 civarında bir işsizlik oranı olduğunu göstermektedir, ancak bunun daha da yüksek olduğu yolunda yaygın bir kanı bulunmaktadır. Bu durumda sorulması gereken soru, göçmenlerin hedef ülke olarak Türkiye'yi seçmelerinin nedeninin ne olduğu sorusudur. Bu sorunun aşağıda da değinileceği gibi birçok cevabı bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan kuşkusuz en önemlisi, Türkiye ekonomisi içinde enformel ekonominin büyüklüğü ile ilgilidir. Kuşkusuz enformel ekonomiye giriş, çalışma ve oturma izni olmayan ve dolayısıyla formel ekonomide istihdam olanağını elde etmesi mümkün olmayan düzensiz göçmenler açısından görece çok daha kolaydır. Başka bir deyişle düzensiz göçmenler yalnızca enformel ekonomide istihdam olana-

³ Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı geçmiş yıllarda Türkiye'de bulunan yabancı yasadışı işçilerin sayısı ile ilgili olarak, birçok kez 1 milyon rakamını telaffuz etmişti. Örnek olarak bkz. *Milliyet*, 24.7.2001

ğı bulabilmektedirler. Türkiye'nin hedef ülke olarak seçilmesindeki bir başka neden de coğrafi yakınlıktır. Bu durum seyahat giderlerini görece ödenebilir bir düzeye indirmektedir. Bu ülkeler ile Türkiye arasında son yıllarda artan bilgi akışı ve etkileşim de önemli bir faktördür.

Bir başka faktör de Türkiye'nin bu ülkelere uyguladığı vize politikası ile ilgilidir. Türkiye'nin uyguladığı görece liberal vize rejimi bu ülke vatandaşlarının Türkiye'ye girişini kolaylaştırmaktadır Tüm eski Sovyetler Birliği devletleri vatandaşları Türkiye'ye girmek için vize almak durumundadır. Ancak bu ülkeler ile olan ilişkilerin niteliğine ve karşılıklı anlaşmalara bağlı olarak bazı farklılıklar da söz konusu olabilmektedir.⁴

Eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkeleri ile Türkiye arasında artmakta olan nüfus hareketlerini izleyebileceğimiz bir başka yön, turistik ziyaret hariç Türkiye'de çeşitli amaçlarla bulunan, başka bir deyişle Türkiye'de oturma iznine sahip yabancılarıdır. Ek 2'deki tablo bu sayıları ve oranları 1997-2003 yılları için vermektedir. Türkiye'de 2003 yılı itibariyle bu sayı toplam 152.203'tür. Bu sayının %19'luk bir bölümü eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkelerine aittir. Tablodan da görülebileceği gibi eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkeleri arasında bu konuda ilk sırada gelen ülke Azerbaycan'dır (%32.7). Onu sırasıyla Rusya (%21.1), Kazakistan (%11.8), Ukrayna (%8.0), Kırgızistan (%7.7), Türkmenistan (%5.7), Özbekistan (%3.7) izlemekte, Moldova %3.6 oranı ile sekizinci sırada gelmektedir. Ukrayna ise %3.3 oranı ile Moldova'yı izlemektedir. Bu ülkelerin eski Sovyet ülkeleri arasındaki toplam oranı %97.6'dır. Diğer altı eski Sovyet ülkesinin toplam oranı ise %2.4'tür.

2003 yılında turistik ziyaret dışı çeşitli amaçlarla Türkiye'de bulunan eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkeleri vatandaşları arasında Türki Cumhuriyetlere baktığımızda ise, bu ülkelerin %61.6 gibi büyük bir oranı oluşturduğunu görüyoruz.

Türkiye'ye toplam yabancı girişleri içinde eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkelerinin kendi içindeki dağılımına bakıldığında Rusya Federasyonu'nun, Türkiye'de oturma izni olan yabancılar arasında da Azerbaycan'ın ilk sırada geldiği görülmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Türkiye'de çeşitli amaçlarla bulunan yabancılar içinde eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkelerinden Azerbaycan'ın oranı %6.3'dür. Rusya Federasyonunun genel toplam içindeki oranı ise %4'tür ve eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkeleri arasında Azerbaycan'dan sonra ikinci sırada gelmektedir.

Ek 3'deki tablo, 1995-2001 döneminde evlilik yoluyla Türk vatandaşlığı edinen eski SSCB vatandaşlarını göstermektedir. Tablodan da görüldüğü gibi bu ülke vatandaşlarının evlilik yoluyla Türk vatandaşlığı edinme eğiliminde artış söz

⁴ Örneğin Dışişleri Bakanlığının vize uygulaması ile ilgili verdiği bilgiye göre, bazı ülke vatandaşları Türkiye'ye girerken sınır kapılarında iki aylık çoklu giriş vizesi alabilmektedir. Bu ülkeler Belarus, Rusya Federasyonu ve Ukrayna'dır. Sınırdan bir aylık çoklu giriş vizesi uygulaması Azerbaycan, Ermenistan, Estonya, Letonya, Litvanya, Moldova, Tacikistan ve Türkmenistan için sözkonusudur. Gürcistan vatandaşları sınır kapılarında onbeş günlük tek giriş vizesi alabilmektedir. (Vize uygulaması ile ilgili bu bilgiler, Dışişleri Bakanlığının web sitesinde yer almaktadır. (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ConsularInformation/ForForeigners/VisaInformation>).

konusudur.1995-2001 dönemindeki toplam 24.300 sayısı içinde en büyük oran Azerbaycan vatandaşlarına aittir (%44.8), izleyen ülkeler ise Rusya Federasyonu (%25.4), Moldova (%14.9), Gürcistan (%11.3) ve Türkmenistan'dır (%3.6).

Oturma izni ve evlilik yoluyla vatandaşlık edinme sayılarındaki bu artışları, başka bir deyişle söz konusu ülke vatandaşlarının Türkiye'de daha uzun süreli kalma eğilimlerini, Prof. Dr. Sema Erder ile yaptığımız düzensiz göç ve kadın ticareti konulu bir araştırmada "yeni eğilim" olarak nitelemiştik (Erder ve Kaşka, 2003).

Bu yeni nüfus hareketleri ile ilgili olarak istatistiklerin yanı sıra mevcut yasal çerçeve de önemli bir nitelik taşımaktadır. Burada belirtilmesi gereken nokta, Türkiye'nin kurumsal ve yasal çerçeve açısından son göç akımlarına hazırlıksız yakalandığıdır. Türkiye bu göç akımıyla karşı karşıya geldiğinde mevcut yasal çerçeve, yabancılarla ilgili çok sayıda yasal düzenleme olmasından ötürü sistematik bir nitelik taşımamaktaydı. Ayrıca konuyla ilgili bazı yasalar oldukça eski tarihlerle dayanmaktaydı ve yapıldıkları dönemin koşullarına uygun düzenlemeler içermekteydi. Bu nitelikteki yasal çerçevenin son dönemlerde ortaya çıkan ani ve yoğun insan hareketlerini düzenlemeye elverişli olmadığı açıktır.

Türkiye'deki yabancıların ikamet ve çalışma izinlerini düzenleyen yasalar arasında Pasaport Kanunu (1950, No. 5862), Yabancıların Türkiye'de İkamet ve Seyahatleri Hakkında Kanun (1950, No. 5683) ve Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri Hakkında Kanun önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Ayrıca Türk Vatandaşlık Kanunu da yabancıların vatandaşlık edinme kurallarını düzenlediği için önemlidir.

Son dönemlerde meydana gelen yeni gelişmeler dolayısıyla yasal çerçevenin bazı yönlerinde değişiklikler yapılmaya başlanmıştır. Bunlardan biri Türk Vatandaşlık Yasasında değişiklik yapan yasadır (No. 4866). Haziran 2003'te eski Doğu Bloku ülkesi vatandaşlarının, özellikle kadınların Türkiye'de ikamet ve çalışma izinleri sorununa çözüm olarak Türk vatandaşları ile sahte evlilik yoluyla vatandaşlık edinmeleri eğilimi nedeniyle bu yasadaki değişiklik yapılmıştır. Bu değişiklik bir yabancıya evlilik yoluyla Türk vatandaşlığını elde etmesini üç yıllık bekleme süresi getirmek suretiyle zorlaştırmıştır.

Yasal çerçevedeki bir başka değişiklik Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri Hakkında Kanun (No. 4817) ile getirilmiştir. Şubat 2003'te çıkarılan bu yasa, Türkiye'de yabancıların çalışmasını düzenlemekte ve çalışma izni ile ilgili kurallar sistemi getirmektedir. Bu yasa yabancıları Türkiye'de çalışma izni verme yetkisini tek bir kuruma, Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığına vermiştir. Önceki düzenlemede, çalışma izni farklı kurumlar tarafından verilmekteydi. Bu yasa uyarınca ve yabancı "kaçak" işçilik ile mücadele politikası paralelinde izinsiz yabancı işçi çalıştıran işverene ve yanında çalışan işçiye değişen miktarlarda para cezası uygulanmaktadır.⁵

⁵ 4817 sayılı Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri Hakkındaki yasa 6 Eylül 2003'de yürürlüğe girmiştir. Bu tarihten 15 Ocak 2004'e dek geçen 4 aylık sürede toplam 3.600 yabancı uyruklu kişi Türkiye'de çalışma izni almak üzere Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığına başvuruda bulunmuştur. Bunlardan 2000 kişi Türkiye'de ikamet edenlerdir, yurtdışından başvuru

Yeni Göçmenler Ülkesi: Moldova

Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasından sonra 1991'de bağımsız bir devlet olan Moldova, ciddi sorunlarla karşı karşıya kalan ülkelerden biridir. Bağımsızlıktan itibaren ciddi bir ekonomik kriz içindedir. Romanya ve Ukrayna ile komşu küçük bir ülke olan Moldova'da, Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasının ardından ücret ve maaşlar hızla düşmüş, kişi başına düşen milli gelir azalmıştır. 2002'de kişi başına ortalama yıllık gelir 417 Euro olarak hesaplanmıştır. Bu da Moldova'yı Avrupa'nın en fakir ülkesi yapmaktadır (Jandl, 2003). Nüfusu 4.3 milyon dolayında olan Moldova'nın ekonomisi büyük ölçüde tarıma dayanmaktadır. Birleşmiş Milletler tarafından hazırlanan rapora göre, Moldova'da kent nüfusunun toplam nüfusa oranı 1998 sonunda %42; kırsal nüfusun oranı ise %58'dir (UN, 2000). Öte yandan Moldova nüfusu içinde okuma yazma bilenlerin oranı yüksektir (%96).

Moldova'da farklı etnik gruplar yaşamaktadır. Romanyalı/Moldovalılar %64.5, Ukraynalılar %13.8, Ruslar %13, Gagavuzlar %3.5, Yahudiler %1.5, Bulgarlar %2.5 ve diğerleri %1.7 oranındadır.⁶

Bağımsızlıktan sonra Moldova'nın karşı karşıya kaldığı azalan gelirler, hızla artan işsizlik, sosyal güvenlik sisteminin ciddi biçimde zayıflaması gibi sorunlar sonucunda, 1990'ların ilk yarısında önemli bir dış göç hareketi başlamıştır; yasal göç olanağı çok sınırlı olduğundan, bu ülkeden kaynaklanan göç hareketlerinin çok büyük bölümü düzensiz göç hareketi niteliği taşımaktadır. Sleptova'nın belirttiğine göre, Moldova resmi rakamları düzenli ya da düzensiz Moldova'lı göçmen sayısını 2003 yılında toplam 234.000 olarak açıklamaktadır. Oysa, yine Sleptova'nın belirttiğine göre, daha gerçekçi bir nitelik taşıyan resmi olmayan tahminler, düzenli göçmen oranının çok düşük olduğunu, düzensiz göçmenlerin sayısının 600.000 ile 1.000.000 arasında olduğunu göstermektedir (Sleptova, 2003). Başka bir deyişle, ülke dışındaki Moldova vatandaşlarının çok büyük bir bölümünün bulunduğu ülkelerde yasal olmayan konumda çalıştıkları tahmin edilmektedir (Jandl, 2003).⁷

Yaşanan ciddi ekonomik sorunlar sonucu ortaya çıkan işsizlik hem nitelikli hem de niteliksiz emeği göç etmeye itmiştir. Moldova'da ortalama aylık gelir 40-

sayısı toplamı ise 1.600'dür. Bu 3.600 kişiden gerekli koşulları yerine getiren 530 kişiye çalışma izni verilmiş, belgelerindeki eksiklikleri tamamlaması için 600 kişiye ek süre verilmiş, bunlara 3 ay süre ile çalışma izni tanınmıştır. 220 başvuru reddedilmiştir, diğer 2250 başvurunun işlemleri devam etmektedir. Çalışma izni başvurularının çoğunluğu Pakistan, Hindistan, Güney Kore, Moldova ve Ukrayna vatandaşlarından gelmiştir (<http://www.ekocerceve.com/haberDetay.asp?haberID=3828&Kategori=8> (19.01.2004)).

⁶ <http://www.moldova.org>

⁷ Moldova ile ilgili olarak aktarılan bu verilerin sadece eğilim gösteren nitelikte olduğunu belirtmekte yarar var. Düzensiz göçle ilgili olarak hemen tüm ülkeler bakımından güvenilir istatistik elde etmek neredeyse imkansızdır. Bununla birlikte Moldova Cumhuriyeti hakkındaki demografik veriler, bu ülkenin istatistik sistemindeki yetersizlikler nedeniyle çok sağlıklı olmadığı belirtilmektedir. (http://www.undg.org/documents/1733-Moldova_CCA_-_Moldova_1997.pdf).

45 Euro civarındadır ve nüfusun yaklaşık %80'inin yoksulluk sınırı altında olduğu tahmin edilmektedir (Jandl, 2003).

Moldovalıların göç ettikleri ülkeler arasında Rusya, Ukrayna, Romanya, Çek Cumhuriyeti, Polonya, Almanya, İtalya, Portekiz, İspanya, Yunanistan, Türkiye, Kıbrıs ve İsrail sayılmaktadır. Bazı tahminlere göre, yaklaşık 200.000-250.000 (Jandl 2003 ve Sleptova 2003) Moldovalı Rusya'da, bir o kadarı da İtalya'da bulunmaktadır. Gagavuzlar için ise ana doğrultunun Türkiye olduğu belirtilmektedir. Hedef ülkelerin seçilmesinde coğrafi uzaklık, iş olanakları ve dil benzerlikleri gibi faktörler rol oynamaktadır (Jandl, 2003).

Genel olarak göç veren ülkelerdeki olumsuz koşulların öncelikle kadınları etkilediği söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. İşsizlik oranlarında kadın/erkek farkları bunu açıkça göstermektedir.⁸ Birleşmiş Milletler Kalkınma Programı'nın (UNDP) Moldova raporuna göre, 1994 yılında kayıtlı işsizlerin %62.7'si, 1998 yılı başında ise %68'i kadındır (UNDP, 2000).

Türkiye'deki Moldovalı Göçmenler

Türkiye'deki Moldovalı düzensiz göçmenler üzerine ayrıntılı ve güvenilir istatistikler bulunmamakla birlikte, Moldova'dan Türkiye'ye yönelik nüfus akışı hakkında var olan verileri sunmak istiyorum.

Tablo 1: Moldova'dan Türkiye'ye Gelen ve Türkiye'den Çıkış Yapan Yabancı Sayıları (1997-2003)

| Yıllar | Giriş Sayısı | Çıkış Sayısı |
|--------|--------------|--------------|
| 1997 | 50.596 | 38.772 |
| 1998 | 61.843 | 49.734 |
| 1999 | 77.260 | 63.285 |
| 2000 | 65.112 | 53.735 |
| 2001 | 46.895 | 49.205 |
| 2002 | 47.453 | 44.422 |
| 2003 | 58.905 | 54.908 |

Kaynak: İçişleri Bakanlığı Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü'nden alınan rakamlar

⁸ Örneğin Rusya'da 1990 ortalarına dek bu oranın 70/30 olduğu belirtiliyor. Öte yandan 1993'te kadınların ortalama ücreti erkeklerin üçte biri; emekli maaşları ise erkeklerin maaşlarının %70'i dolayında idi. Kırsal bölgelerde yaşayan kadınlar açısından bu rakamlar daha da kötüdür (Marsh 1998:103). Öte yandan Bridger'a göre, Moskova bölgesindeki ilk işten çıkarmalar savunma sanayinde, araştırma enstitülerinde ve bakanlıklarda çalışan kadın mühendis ve iktisatçıları vurmuştur (Bridger 1999:75). Dolayısıyla bu nedenler eski Sovyetler Birliği'nden önemli oranda kadının göç sürecine katılmasını açıklıyor.

Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, bu sayılar Türkiye'yi ziyaret eden ya da Türkiye'de kalan Moldovalıların gerçek sayılarını göstermemektedir, çünkü çoklu girişler bu sayılara dahildir ve ayırt edilmemiş durumdadır. Ayrıca bu veriler cinsiyete göre toplanmadığı için kadın ve erkek sayıları bilinmemektedir. Bununla birlikte, Turizm Bakanlığı tarafından yapılan Yabancı Ziyaretçi Anketi sonuçlarına göre, 2001 yılında Türkiye'den çıkış yapan Moldovalıların %75'i kadındır.

Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü'nün verilerine göre Türkiye'de ikamet izni verilen Moldovalıların sayıları ve ikamet nedenleri şöyledir:

Tablo 2: Türkiye'de İkamet İzni Verilen Moldovalılar (1998-2003)

| | 1998 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
|---------------------------------|------|------|------|-------|
| Muhtelif Sebeplerle İkamet Eden | 233 | 379 | 472 | 661 |
| Çalışan | 396 | 268 | 258 | 221 |
| Öğrenim Gören | 177 | 208 | 160 | 173 |
| Toplam | 806 | 855 | 890 | 1.055 |

Kaynak: İçişleri Bakanlığı, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü'nden alınan rakamlar

Tablo 2'de görüldüğü gibi, Türkiye'de ikamet izni olan Moldovalıların arasında çalışma izni olanların sayısı çok düşüktür. Bu da Moldovalıların çok büyük bölümünün gerek ikamet gerekse çalışma açısından düzensiz göçmen olduklarını göstermektedir. Öte yandan evlilik yoluyla Türk vatandaşlığı edinen Moldovalıların sayıları EK 3'deki tablodan izlenebilir. 1995-2001 döneminde bu sayılarda dalgalanma olmakla birlikte bir artış eğilimi de izlenmektedir. Evlilik yoluyla vatandaşlık edinme, oturma ve çalışma izni sorununu çözmek bakımından da önemlidir. Bununla birlikte, aşağıda da değinileceği gibi, Türkiye'de eviçi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı kadınların çok büyük bir bölümü için amaç Türkiye'ye yerleşmekten çok Türkiye'de belli süreler çalışmaktır.

Türkiye'de Ev İçi Hizmetlerde Çalışan Moldovalı Kadınlar

Türkiye'de ev içi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı kadınlar düzensiz göçmen emeğin belli bir türünü oluşturmaktadır. Bu emek türünün varlığını genel gözlemlere dayanarak saptayabiliyoruz ve bunların sayılarının artmakta olduğunu söyleyebiliyoruz. Ancak bu konuda istatistiksel veriler olmadığı için sayısal bilgi vermek mümkün değildir, başka bir deyişle eviçi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı kadınların sayısını bilemiyoruz.

Moldovalı kadınlar 1990'ların başlarında ekonomik nedenlerle Türkiye'ye göç etmeye başlamışlardır. Göç kararının daha çok ailenin yaşam stratejisinin bir parçası olarak alındığını söylemek mümkündür. Göç ederken amaç Türkiye'de çalışmaktır. Moldovalı kadınlar Türkiye'ye bir aylık turist vizesi ile giriş yapmaktadırlar, dolayısıyla girişleri yasaldır. Ancak vize süresinin bitiminden sonra Türki-

ye’de kalmaya devam etmektedirler, dolayısıyla düzensiz göçmen durumuna düşmektedirler. Yakın zamana dek bu grubun çalışması yasal düzenlemeye tabi değildi, yani bu yasal olarak düzenlenmemiş bir alandı. Ancak bu makalede daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, son zamanlarda çıkarılan bir yasa ile bir ölçüde de olsa düzenleme getirilmiştir (4817 sayılı ve 27.2.2003 tarihli, “Yabancıların Çalışma İzinleri Hakkında Kanun). Ancak bu yasanın Moldovalı ev hizmetçileri bakımından etkileri hakkında henüz bir şey söyleyebilecek durumda değiliz. Dolayısıyla önümüzdeki dönemdeki gelişmeleri izlemek bu konu ile ilgili yorum yapmamızı kolaylaştıracaktır. Ancak herhangi bir düzenlemenin yokluğunda, göçmenlerin yasadışı konumlarının onları güçsüz bir konuma yerleştirdiği bilinmektedir. Düzensiz göçmenler işverenlerle ücret ve çalışma koşulları üzerinde pazarlık yapabilecek konumda değillerdir. Dolayısıyla düşük ücretleri ve kötü çalışma koşullarını kabul etmek durumunda kalabilmektedirler.

Türkiye’de ev içi hizmetlerde çalışan yabancılar yeni bir olgu olduğu için bu konuda son derece az sayıda çalışma vardır ve bunlar da daha çok devam etmekte olan çalışmalardır. Ben UĞİNAR projesi çerçevesinde⁹ yaptığım görüşmelere ve basın taramalarına dayanarak aşağıdaki bazı ön gözlemleri sunmak istiyorum.

İlk göçmenler Türkiye hakkında bilgiyi farklı kaynaklardan, örneğin bavul tüccarları ve Moldova’da ya da eski Sovyetler Birliğinde bulunan Türk vatandaşlarından elde etmişlerdir. Türkiye’ye geldiklerinde orta sınıf ailelerin evlerinde çalışmaya başlamışlardır. Türkiye’de orta ve üst sınıflarda ev içi hizmetlerde temizlikçi, hizmetçi vb. istihdam etmek yaygın bir eğilimdir. Buna rağmen bu konuda yapılan çalışmaların sayısı son derece azdır.¹⁰

Türkiye’de çocuk bakımı, yaşlı ve hasta bakımı aile içinde ve enformel ilişki ağları yoluyla sağlanır. Yani bu tür hizmetler veren kamu/özel kuruluşlarının sayısı azdır. Bu bağlamda Moldovalı kadınlar ev içi hizmetlerde görece kolay biçimde iş bulabilmişlerdir. Başlangıçta Gagavuz kökenli Moldovalılar Türkçe bilmeleri dolayısıyla tercih edilmişlerdir. Moldova Cumhuriyetindeki Gagavuz nüfusun büyüklüğü 160.000 dolayındadır. Bununla birlikte, talep arttıkça Moldova’dan farklı etnik kökenli kadınlar da istihdam edilmeye başlamıştır. Bu alanda çalışanların çoğunu Moldovalıların oluşturduğunu gözlemlere dayanarak söyle-

⁹ “Uluslararası Göç, İşgücü ve Nüfus Hareketleri Araştırma Projesi” (UĞİNAR) Marmara Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Çalışma Ekonomisi ve Endüstri İlişkileri Bölümü öğretim üyeleri tarafından yürütüldü ve Marmara Üniversitesi Araştırma Fonu tarafından desteklenen ve 7 alt projeden oluşan bu araştırma, uluslararası göç, nüfus ve işgücü hareketlerindeki yeni eğilimleri ve bu eğilimlerin Türkiye üzerindeki etkilerini incelemeyi ve uygulamaya dönük politika önerileri geliştirmeyi amaçlamaktaydı. Bu alt projelerden biri göçün toplumsal cinsiyet boyutuyla ilgili idi. UĞİNAR çerçevesinde yaptığım çalışmaya dayanan ve bu makalede de yer alan bazı ön gözlemlerimi daha önce yayınlanan bir başka yazıda aktarmıştım (Kaşka, 2002).

¹⁰ Bunlar arasında Kalaycıoğlu ve Rittesberger-Tılıç (2001), Özbay (2002) ve Özyeğin’in çalışmaları (2001) sayılabilir.

yebiliyoruz, ancak yine gözlemlere dayanarak, Azeri, Gürcü, Bulgar, Türkmen kadınların da ev içi hizmetlerde çalıştığı bilinmektedir.

İstanbul'da ev içi hizmetlerde çalışmak isteyen Moldovalı göçmen kadınların iş bulma kanallarına gelince burada çeşitli yollar vardır. İlki Laleli'de bulunan bir otoparkta karşılaşma biçimindedir. Bu otopark bir tür enformel iş ve işçi bulma kurumu fonksiyonuna sahiptir. Hizmetçi, çocuk bakıcısı vb. arayanlar pazar günleri bu otoparka gitmekte ve orada beklemekte olan göçmen kadınlarla temas kurmakta, iş koşulları ve ücret üzerinde konuşmaktadırlar. Eğer anlaşma sağlanırsa göçmen kadın işe alınmaktadır. Bunun hala kısmen de olsa etkili bir kanal olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

İkincisi, genellikle aile danışmanlık şirketi adı altında çalışan özel istihdam bürolarıdır,¹¹ Bu şirketlere başvuru halinde işverene aradığı niteliklere uygun en az birkaç göçmen kadın hakkında bilgi verilmektedir, daha sonra iki taraf karşılaşmakta ve eğer anlaşma sağlanırsa göçmen kadın işe alınmaktadır. Bu şirketler verdikleri hizmet karşılığında genellikle işverenden belli bir oranda komisyon ücreti talep etmektedirler. Bu danışmanlık şirketlerine gazete ilanları aracılığıyla ulaşmak mümkündür. Bu şirketler verdikleri ilanlarda hizmetçilik, bakıcılık, ahçılık vb işleri yapmaya aday olan kadınlar hakkında kısa bilgi vermekte, adayın tecrübesinden ve Türkçe biliyor olmasından söz etmektedirler. Aile danışmanlık şirketlerinin yanı sıra yine işveren ile göçmenler arasında aracılık yapan ve örneğin bakkallık vb. gibi işlerle uğraşanları da görmek mümkündür. Bunlar genellikle dükkanlarına astıkları ilanlar aracılığı ile işveren adaylarına bilgi iletmektedirler. Aracılar da verdikleri hizmet karşılığında komisyon talep etmektedir. Hem aile danışmanlık şirketleri hem de aracılar iş arayan göçmen kadınlara ulaşmakta, diğer kanalların yanısıra tıpkı bireysel işveren adayları gibi Laleli'deki "otoparkı" da kullanmaktadırlar.

Bir üçüncü yol olarak ise ilişki ağlarından söz etmeliyiz. Özellikle ev içi hizmetlerde Moldovalı göçmen kadın çalıştırma eğiliminin yaygınlaşmaya başlamasından sonra, bakıcı, hizmetçi vb arayan işveren adayları, kendi yakınlarının çalıştırdıkları göçmen kadınların akrabalarıyla (örneğin kız kardeşleri, kızları, anneleri, diğer akrabaları ya da tanıdıkları) temasa geçmektedirler, böylece işverenler hiç tanımadıkları, hakkında hiç bilgi sahibi olmadıkları birini işe almak yerine, hakkında dolaylı da olsa bilgi sahibi oldukları Moldovalı bir kadını "tavsiye üzerine" işe almış oluyolar.

Ev içi hizmetler için belirlenen ücret genellikle aylık 300 dolardır. Ancak bu rakam hem ekonomik konjonktüre, hem işin hem de göçmen kadının emeğinin

¹¹ 2003 yılında çıkarılan 4904 sayılı Türkiye İş Kurumu Kanununun yürürlüğe girmesinden sonra, 19 Şubat 2004 tarihli Resmi Gazetede yayımlanan Özel İstihdam Büroları Yönetmeliği ve 2 Ağustos 2004 tarihli Resmi Gazetede yayımlanan Özel İstihdam Büroları Hakkında 1 no'lu tebliğ kapsamında özel istihdam bürosu olarak faaliyette bulunmak mümkün hale gelmiştir (<http://www.iskur.gov.tr/Mydocu/OIBDUYURU2-2.doc>). Başka bir deyişle özel istihdam büroları yasallaşmış ve formelleşmiştir. Ancak aile danışmanlık şirketi olarak faaliyet gösteren büroların ne kadarının formel olduğu ayrı bir konudur.

niteliğine göre değişebilmektedir. Aylık ücret yatılı olarak çalışan kadınlara ödenmektedir. Göçmen kadınlar haftada altı gün çalışmaktadır, pazar günleri ise izin günüdür. İş saatleri uzun ve belirsizdir. İşverenler evlerinde çalıştırdıkları Moldovalı kadınlara haftada ya da iki haftada bir kez Moldova'ya telefon etme izni vermektedir.

Ev içi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı kadınların yaptıkları işler çeşitlidir. Bazıları sadece temizlik, bazıları sadece çocuk bakıcılığı yapmaktadır. Bazıları yaşlı ya da hasta bakımı işini üstlenmektedir. Ancak genellikle bu işlerden birkaçını birlikte yaptıkları gözlenmiştir. Genellikle çalıştıkları evde, konutun olanaklarına bağlı olarak kendilerine ayrı bir oda verilmektedir, ancak bunun istisnalarından da söz edilmiştir.

Türkiye'de özellikle İstanbul ve Ankara gibi büyük şehirlerde ev içi hizmetlerde Moldovalı göçmen kadınları istihdam etme eğilimi gittikçe yaygınlaşmaktadır. Burada akla gelen soru Türk kadınlar yerine Moldovalı kadınların neden tercih edildiğidir. Yukarıda da değinildiği gibi, Türkiye'de orta-sınıf ailelerde gündelikçi olarak temizlik işleri yapan kadınların istihdam edilmesi çok yaygındır. İşverenlerin büyük şehirlere göç etmiş kırsal kökenli kadınlar yerine Moldovalı kadınları tercih etmeye başlamasının sebebi olarak, Moldovalı kadınların yatılı kalmayı kabul etmeleri, işlerini daha iyi yapmaları, iş disiplinine sahip olmaları, eğitilmiş olmaları gösterilmektedir. Örneğin çocuk bakıcılığı yapan pedagoji formasyonu-na sahibi kadınlar ya da hasta bakımı işiyle uğraşan hemşireler verilen örnekler arasındadır.

Moldovalı kadınlar kazandıkları paranın çok az bir kısmını Türkiye'de harcamaktadırlar, büyük kısmını Moldova'ya ailelerine göndermektedirler. Bunların büyük çoğunluğu evli ve çocuklu kadınlardır. Başka bir ülkede çalışmalarının nedeni olarak da çocuklarının eğitimi, ailenin hasta bir üyesinin tedavisi, ailenin birikmiş borçlarının ödenmesi, tasarruf ederek Moldova'da ev satın alma gibi nedenler göstermektedirler. Göçmen kadınlar bunların hiçbirini Moldova'da çalışarak gerçekleştiremeyeceklerini belirtmektedirler. İş bulma olanağı olsa bile aylık ücretler çok düşük olduğu ve ayrıca her an işyerinin kapanması ve işten çıkarılma riski söz konusu olduğu için göç etmenin onlara bir çözüm sunduğunu söylemektedirler.

Göçmen kadınlar, yukarıda sözü edilen "otoparkı" aynı zamanda kendi aralarında buluşma yeri olarak da kullanılmaktadır. Ayrıca ülkelerine para ya paket göndermek istediklerinde başvurdukları adres yine bu "otopark" olmaktadır. Genellikle minibüs/otobüs şoförüne ödenen belli bir ücret karşılığında para havale etmek ya da paket göndermek mümkün olmaktadır.

Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, Türkiye'ye yasal olarak (pasaport ve vize ile) giriş yapmaktadırlar ve Türkiye'ye girişte sınır kapılarında bir aylık turist vizesi alabilmektedir. Moldova'dan Türkiye'ye seyahat ya karayolu ile ya da havayolu ile olmaktadır. İstanbul'a geldiklerinde ilk durakları ise genellikle daha önce söz edilen "otopark" olmaktadır.

Ev içi hizmetlerde istihdam etmek üzere Moldovalı bir göçmen kadını işe alan işverenler, güvenlik gerekçesi ile onların pasaportlarını alıkoymaktadır. Eğer iş aile danışmanlık şirketi ya da aracı aracılığıyla bulunmuşsa pasaportu alıkoyan onlar olmaktadır. Şirketler ya da aracılar işverene karşı sorumluluğu da üstlenmiş olmaktadır. Pasaportların alınmış olması göçmen kadınlar açısından bir dezavantaj oluşturmaktadır, çünkü bu nedenle izin günleri olan pazar günleri bile ev dışına çıkmaya çekindiklerini belirtiyorlar. Öte yandan pasaportları alıkonulmamış olsa dahi, bir aylık turist vizesinin süresi bittiğinde, göçmen kadınların Türkiye'deki konumu yasadışı olmaktadır. Bu nedenle Moldovalı göçmen kadınlar çok belirgin bir biçimde ev dışına çıkma korkusunu ifade ediyorlar. En büyük korkuları polis tarafından yakalanmak ve sınır dışı edilmektir.

Ev içi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı göçmen kadınların önemli bir özelliği, Türkiye'de yerleşme amacı taşımamalarıdır, dolayısıyla göç geçici ve görece kısa süreli bir hareket olarak algılanmaktadır; yeterli parayı biriktirdikten sonra ülkelere geri dönmeyi planlamaktadırlar.

Moldovalı göçmen kadınlar tıpkı tüm düzensiz göçmenler gibi herhangi bir sağlık sigortası ya da sosyal güvenlik olanağına sahip olmadan çalışmaktadırlar. Üstelik çalışma koşulları ya da ücret ile ilgili konularda sorun yaşadıklarında şikayetçi olma olanağından da yoksunlardır, çünkü yasadışı göçmen olarak Türkiye'de bulunmakta ve bu durumun polise bildirilmesi endişesini taşımaktadırlar.

Bunun dışında onları kamusal alana çıkmaktan alıkoyan bir başka önemli faktör, eski Doğu Bloku ülkelerinden gelen kadınlara ilişkin önyargılardır. "Nataşa" adı dolaysız bir biçimde seks işçiliğini çağrıştırmaktadır. Basının yeniden ürettiği bu imaj, daha önce yürüttüğümüz bir araştırma sırasında Türkiye'de bulunan eski Doğu Bloku ülke vatandaşı kadınların belirttikleri en önemli sorunları arasındaydı (Erder ve Kaşka, 2003).¹²

Yapılan ön görüşmeler sırasında, Moldovalı göçmen kadınlar genellikle Türkiye'de çalışmaktan memnun olduklarını belirtmişlerdir. Onlara göre kocalarının Türkiye'de iş bulması daha zordur, çünkü Türk erkekleri arasında işsiz olan çoktur. Onlar için en önemli faktör para kazanıyor olmaktır. Bu nedenle ağır iş koşullarından genellikle şikayetçi değildiler. Çalıştığı aileden memnun olanlar açısından en büyük sorun, yukarıda da değinilen "polis korkusu"dur. Ancak göçmen hizmetçi ile yerli işveren arasındaki ilişkiler her zaman yolunda gitmeyebilmektedir. Bu ilişki resmi kurullarla düzenlenmemiş bir ilişki olduğu için tamamen tarafların inisiyatifine bağlı olarak yürümektedir. Bazı durumlarda işverenlerin kötü muamelesine maruz kalan, cinsel tacize maruz kalan kadınlar olduğu ön görüşmeler sırasında ifade edilmiştir. Uzun ve yorucu iş saatleri ve kötü çalışma koşulları sık olmasa da dile getirilen sorunlar arasındadır. Ayrıca örneğin hastalık

¹² Bu önyargı başka ülkeler için de geçerlidir. Örneğin Çin'in Malezya'da ev içi hizmetlerde çalışan Filipinli ve Endonezyalı kadınlar üzerindeki (Chin 1997), Remennick'in İsrail'deki Rusça konuşan kadınlar üzerindeki araştırması (Remennick 1999) benzer önyargıların bu toplumlarda da varolduğunu göstermektedir.

ya da kaza gibi durumlarda ne yapılacağı tamamen işverenin inisiyatifine bağlıdır. Bazı ailelerde göçmen kadına evde ayrı bir oda verilmemesi de dile getirilen sorunlardan biridir. İşverenden ve yasal düzenleme yokluğundan kaynaklanan sorunların yanı sıra göçmen kadınlardan kaynaklanan sorunlar da yaşanabilmektedir. Burada karşılaşılan önemli bir sorun göçmen kadının, ailenin izin verdiği süre ve miktarın dışında yaptığı telefon konuşmalarıdır. Ayrıca işveren yaptığı işten memnun kalmadığı zaman göçmen kadının işine son verebilmektedir. Bazı işverenler göçmen kadın çalıştırma deneyimleri sırasında hayal kırıklığı yaşadıklarını belirtiyorlar. Bu durumda ya başka bir göçmen kadın işe alınmakta ya da Türk yardımcı, hizmetçi, bakıcı istihdam edilmeye başlanmaktadır.

Sonuç Yerine

Son yıllarda meydana gelen uluslararası göç hareketlerinin eski göç hareketlerinden farklı nitelikler taşımaya başladığı bilinmektedir. Türkiye'nin de bu yeni göç hareketlerinde hedef ülkelerden biri olmaya başlaması, bu yeni göç hareketlerinin Türkiye bağlamında da incelenmesini gerektirmektedir.

Yeni göç hareketlerinin farklı niteliklerden biri de düzensiz göç ve toplumsal cinsiyet boyutunda karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Gittikçe artan sayıda kadının göç hareketlerine dahil olmaya başlaması dış göç ile ilgili çalışmalarda yeni araştırma gündemleri ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bunlardan birisi de “eviçi hizmetlerinin küreselleşmesi” biçiminde ifade edilmektedir. Birçok ülkede eviçi hizmetlerde artık neredeyse tümüyle göçmen kadınlar istihdam edilmektedir. Bunların pek azının düzenli göçmen konumunda olduğu bilinmektedir. Bu durum düzensiz göçmen kadın emeği ile ilgili çalışmaların artmasına neden olmuştur. İtalya ve İspanya gibi bazı ülkelerde bu alanı düzenli hale getirmek konusunda sınırlı da olsa bazı girişimler söz konusu olmakla birlikte, bu alanın hala esas olarak düzenlenmemiş bir alan olduğu görülmektedir.

Son yıllarda Türkiye’de de, ev içi hizmetlerde yabancı kadın emeği istihdamı belirgin bir eğilim olarak gözlenmeye başlanmıştır. Bu makalede, bu eğilimi Türkiye’de ev içi hizmetlerde enformel olarak istihdam edilen Moldovalı düzensiz kadın göçmenler üzerinde gözlemlere dayanarak izlemeye çalıştım. Moldovalı göçmen kadınlar üzerine yürütülecek araştırmalar ve sistematik gözlemler, ev içi hizmetlerin küreselleşmesi konusundaki gittikçe artan literatüre, Türkiye örneğinin eklenmesini mümkün kılacaktır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’de eviçi hizmetlerde çalışan Moldovalı kadınların konumunda, yabancıların çalışma izni ile ilgili yeni çıkarılan yasa bağlamında nasıl ve hangi tür değişiklikler meydana geleceğini izlemek yararlı olacaktır.

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Ekl: Eski SSCB'den Türkiye'ye Turistik Giriş Yapan Yabancılar (1997-2003)(000kişi)*

| Eski SSCB Ülkeleri | 1997 | | 1998 | | 1999 | | 2000 | | 2001 | | 2002 | | 2003 | |
|--|--------------|------|--------------|------|--------------|------|--------------|------|--------------|------|--------------|------|--------------|------|
| | Giriş Sayısı | % | Giriş Sayısı | % | Giriş Sayısı | % | Giriş Sayısı | % | Giriş Sayısı | % | Giriş Sayısı | % | Giriş Sayısı | % |
| Azerbaycan | 93.5 | 6.1 | 125.0 | 9.7 | 122.6 | 11.9 | 182.1 | 13.0 | 189.3 | 12.6 | 166.2 | 9.8 | 193.3 | 8.9 |
| Belarus | 2.0 | 0.1 | 7.7 | 0.6 | 7.7 | 0.8 | 10.0 | 0.7 | 15.4 | 1.0 | 22.2 | 1.3 | 31.6 | 1.5 |
| Ermenistan | 18.0 | 1.2 | 20.3 | 1.6 | 19.2 | 1.8 | 17.7 | 1.3 | 7.0 | 0.5 | 17.4 | 1.0 | 23.6 | 1.1 |
| Estonya | 2.3 | 0.2 | 4.0 | 0.3 | 2.2 | 0.2 | 4.3 | 0.3 | 5.3 | 0.3 | 6.5 | 0.4 | 6.1 | 0.3 |
| Gürcistan | 194.8 | 12.7 | 201.8 | 15.7 | 181.3 | 17.6 | 180.5 | 12.9 | 162.7 | 10.8 | 161.7 | 9.5 | 172.9 | 8.0 |
| Kazakistan | 47.0 | 3.1 | 52.4 | 4.1 | 30.5 | 3.0 | 40.7 | 2.9 | 41.5 | 2.8 | 53.0 | 3.1 | 65.8 | 3.0 |
| Kırgızistan | 8.3 | 0.5 | 7.0 | 0.5 | 5.5 | 0.5 | 8.2 | 0.6 | 7.9 | 0.5 | 10.3 | 0.6 | 14.2 | 0.6 |
| Letonya | 1.5 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.2 | 6.7 | 0.5 | 10.2 | 0.7 | 12.2 | 0.7 | 15.2 | 0.7 |
| Litvanya | 7.6 | 0.5 | 11.3 | 0.9 | 11.3 | 1.1 | 12.1 | 0.9 | 13.0 | 0.9 | 18.8 | 1.1 | 23.1 | 1.1 |
| Moldova | 50.6 | 3.3 | 61.8 | 4.8 | 77.3 | 7.5 | 65.1 | 4.7 | 46.9 | 3.1 | 47.4 | 2.8 | 58.9 | 2.7 |
| Özbekistan | 16.9 | 1.1 | 14.4 | 1.1 | 13.8 | 1.3 | 21.7 | 1.5 | 21.4 | 1.4 | 20.7 | 1.2 | 19.5 | 0.9 |
| Rusya Fed. | 980.0 | 64.1 | 636.3 | 49.4 | 423.2 | 41.0 | 680.8 | 48.9 | 753.0 | 50.0 | 957.4 | 56.2 | 1.285.8 | 59.6 |
| Tacikistan | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1.0 | 0.0 | 2.0 | 0.1 | 2.5 | 0.1 | 3.6 | 0.2 |
| Türkmenistan | 5.7 | 0.4 | 6.2 | 0.5 | 7.3 | 0.7 | 11.1 | 0.8 | 14.9 | 1.0 | 21.2 | 1.2 | 16.7 | 0.8 |
| Ukrayna | 100.5 | 6.6 | 138.3 | 10.7 | 127.6 | 12.4 | 153.7 | 11.0 | 214.0 | 14.2 | 184.5 | 10.8 | 227.3 | 10.5 |
| Eski SSCB Toplamı | 1.528.7 | 100 | 1.287.1 | 100 | 1.031.5 | 100 | 1.395.7 | 100 | 1.504.5 | 100 | 1.702.0 | 100 | 2.157.6 | 100 |
| Toplam Yabancı Giriş | 9.326.7 | - | 8.643.5 | - | 6.880.6 | - | 9.748.3 | - | 10.912.8 | - | 12.906.3 | - | 13.461.4 | - |
| Toplam Yabancı Girişleri İçinde Eski SSCB'nin payı | | 16.4 | | 14.9 | | 9.0 | | 14.3 | | 13.8 | | 13.2 | | 16.0 |

Kaynak: İçişleri Bakanlığı, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü'nden alındı.

* Her bir eski SSCB ülkesi için aynı yıl verilen oranlar, o ülkenin eski SSCB toplamı içindeki payını göstermektedir.

Ek 2: Türkiye'de Çeşitli Maksatlarla Bulunan Eski SSCB Ülkeleri Vatandaşlarının Dağılımı (Turistik Ziyaret Hariç) 1997-2003*

| Eski SSCB ülkeleri | 1997 | | 1998 | | 1999 | | 2000 | | 2001 | | 2002 | | 2003 | |
|--------------------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
| | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % |
| Azerbaycan | 4.587 | 25.5 | 6.439 | 27.9 | 7.930 | 31.4 | 10.564 | 33.5 | 10.044 | 34.3 | 9.935 | 33.7 | 9.502 | 32.7 |
| Belarus | 63 | 0.4 | 192 | 0.8 | 232 | 0.9 | 254 | 0.8 | 209 | 0.7 | 208 | 0.7 | 265 | 0.9 |
| Ermenistan | 30 | 0.2 | 43 | 0.2 | 43 | 0.2 | 48 | 0.2 | 51 | 0.2 | 59 | 0.2 | 73 | 0.3 |
| Estonya | 5 | 0.0 | 5 | 0.0 | 4 | 0.0 | 11 | 0.0 | 14 | 0.0 | 11 | 0.0 | 26 | 0.1 |
| Gürcistan | 594 | 3.3 | 692 | 3.0 | 723 | 2.9 | 685 | 2.2 | 761 | 2.6 | 788 | 2.7 | 958 | 3.3 |
| Kazakistan | 1.695 | 9.4 | 2.417 | 10.5 | 2.579 | 10.2 | 3.676 | 11.7 | 3.503 | 12.0 | 3.649 | 12.4 | 3.427 | 11.8 |
| Kırgızistan | 1.120 | 6.2 | 1.357 | 5.9 | 1.557 | 6.2 | 2.128 | 6.8 | 1.587 | 5.4 | 2.095 | 7.1 | 2.223 | 7.7 |
| Letonya | 9 | 0.0 | 20 | 0.0 | 8 | 0.0 | 14 | 0.0 | 20 | 0.0 | 13 | 0.0 | 23 | 0.0 |
| Litvanya | 27 | 0.2 | 54 | 0.2 | 79 | 0.3 | 50 | 0.2 | 47 | 0.2 | 55 | 0.2 | 65 | 0.2 |
| Moldova | 472 | 2.6 | 806 | 3.5 | 895 | 3.5 | 889 | 2.8 | 855 | 2.9 | 890 | 3.0 | 1.055 | 3.6 |
| Özbekistan | 652 | 3.6 | 806 | 3.5 | 896 | 3.5 | 1.118 | 3.5 | 1.099 | 3.8 | 1.108 | 3.8 | 1.082 | 3.7 |
| RusyaFed. | 4.846 | 27.0 | 5.744 | 24.9 | 5.459 | 21.6 | 6.871 | 21.8 | 6.235 | 21.3 | 6.454 | 21.9 | 6.134 | 21.1 |
| Tacikistan | 226 | 1.3 | 305 | 1.3 | 364 | 1.4 | 332 | 1.1 | 309 | 1.1 | 279 | 0.9 | 264 | 0.9 |
| Türkmenistan | 2.332 | 13.0 | 2.371 | 10.3 | 2.397 | 9.5 | 2.529 | 8.0 | 2.242 | 7.7 | 1.821 | 6.2 | 1.645 | 5.7 |
| Ukrayna | 1.314 | 7.3 | 1.862 | 8.1 | 2.064 | 8.2 | 2.326 | 7.4 | 2.290 | 7.8 | 2.150 | 7.3 | 2.312 | 8.0 |
| Eski SSCB toplamı | 17.972 | 100.0 | 23.113 | 100.0 | 25.230 | 100.0 | 31.495 | 100.0 | 29.266 | 100.0 | 29.515 | 100.0 | 29.054 | 100.0 |
| Genel Toplam | 135.914 | | 151.489 | | 162.229 | | 168.047 | | 161.254 | | 157.667 | | 152.203 | |
| Eski SSCB'nin payı | - | 13.2 | - | 15.3 | - | 15.6 | - | 18.7 | - | 18.1 | - | 18.9 | - | 19.1 |

Kaynak: İçişleri Bakanlığı, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü'nden alındı.

* Her bir eski SSCB ülkesi için ayrı ayrı verilen oranlar, o ülkenin eski SSCB toplamı içindeki payını göstermektedir.

Ek 3: Etilik Yolıyla Türk Vatandaşlığı Edinen Eski SSCB Vatandaşlarının Uyrıklığa Göre Dağılımı (1995-2001)*

| | 1995 | | 1996 | | 1997 | | 1998 | | 1999 | | 2000 | | 2001 | | Toplam | |
|------------------------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|-------|
| | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % | Sayı | % |
| Azerbaycan | 65 | 40.4 | 126 | 56.0 | 519 | 45.9 | 628 | 52.0 | 524 | 51.1 | 1.019 | 47.5 | 995 | 36.1 | 3.876 | 44.8 |
| Gürcistan | 35 | 21.7 | 16 | 7.1 | 142 | 12.6 | 149 | 12.3 | 109 | 10.6 | 235 | 11.0 | 293 | 10.6 | 979 | 11.3 |
| Rusya Fed. | 52 | 32.3 | 76 | 33.8 | 381 | 33.7 | 292 | 24.2 | 265 | 25.9 | 495 | 23.1 | 632 | 22.9 | 2.193 | 25.4 |
| Türkmenistan | 9 | 5.6 | 5 | 2.2 | 23 | 2.0 | 38 | 3.1 | 49 | 4.8 | 78 | 3.6 | 106 | 3.8 | 308 | 3.6 |
| Moldova | - | - | 2 | 0.9 | 65 | 5.8 | 100 | 8.3 | 78 | 7.6 | 319 | 14.9 | 728 | 26.4 | 1.292 | 14.9 |
| Eski SSCB toplamı | 161 | 100.0 | 225 | 100.0 | 1.130 | 100.0 | 1.207 | 100.0 | 1.025 | 100.0 | 2.146 | 100.0 | 2.754 | 100 | 8.648 | 100.0 |
| Diğer Ülkeler | 987 | 86.0 | 708 | 75.9 | 2.065 | 64.6 | 2.105 | 63.6 | 1.673 | 62.0 | 3.228 | 60.0 | 4.876 | 63.9 | 15.652 | 64.4 |
| Genel Toplam | 1.148 | | 933 | | 3.195 | | 3.312 | | 2.698 | | 5.384 | | 7.630 | | 24.300 | |
| Eski SSCB'nin payı (%) | | 14.0 | | 24.1 | | 35.4 | | 36.4 | | 38.0 | | 40.0 | | 36.1 | | 35.6 |

Kaynak: İçişleri Bakanlığı, Nüfus ve Vatandaşlık İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü'nden alındı

* Her bir eski SSCB ülkesi için ayrı ayrı verilen oranlar o ülkenin eski SSCB toplamı içindeki payını göstermektedir.

Part 2: Cultural Changes in the Turkic World

Sincan Uygurları ve Çinliler Arasındaki Etnik İlişkiler ve Kimlik*

Ildikó Bellér-Hann

Uygurların yaşadığı Sincan bölgesi Çin Halk Cumhuriyetinin bölünmez bir parçası olarak kabul edilir. Uygurların anavatanı sayılan bu bölge Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti toprağının altıda birini teşkil ettiği halde bölge nüfusu coğrafi şartlar yüzünden (17 milyon) nispeten düşüktür. (Çin'in nüfusu 1.2 milyara yakındır). Bu bölgede Çin hükümeti tarafından resmen kabul edilmiş olan 13 etnik grup yaşamaktadır, ancak nüfusun büyük bir kısmını Uygurlarla Çinliler teşkil eder. Uygurlar toplam nüfusun %47'sini, Çinliler ise %38'ini teşkil etmektedirler (Toops 2000: 155). Bölgenin coğrafi koşulları, dil ve etnik terkihi Çin'in diğer bölgelerinden çok farklıdır ve nüfusun büyük bir kısmı (yani Uygurlar) dil, din ve kültür bakımından Sovyet sisteminin çöküşünden sonra siyasi bağımsızlığına kavuşan Türk dilli Orta Asya halklarına (özellikle Özbeklere) daha fazla yakınlık göstermektedir. Bu halklarla Uygurlar ortak bir sömürge tarihini paylaştıkları halde, Uygurların şimdiki durumu daha farklıdır. Bu halklardan farklı olarak Uygurlar siyasi bağımsızlıklarına kavuşmamış ve kendilerine yabancı bir devletin parçası olarak sosyalist sistemde yaşamak zorunda kaldılar. Öte yandan, Çin sosyalizmi de önemli değişimler geçirmektedir. Çin'in diğer bölgelerinde olduğu gibi Sincan'da da değişim 1970'lerin ikinci yarısında Mao döneminin sona ermesiyle başladı. Deng Xiao Ping, Mao'nun belirlediği siyasetten vazgeçip, serbest pazar ekonomisine geçişe yol verdi. Deng'in gerçekleştirdiği reformlar arasında ikinci toprak ıslahatı, yani şahıslara sınırlı toprak mülkiyeti hakkı verilmesi önemli bir yer alır. İlk toprak ıslahatı sosyalizm döneminin başındaki "collectivisation" yani özel mülk olan toprakların birleştirilerek ortak mülk haline getirilmesi idi (Fairbank 1989, Madsen 1991, Soucek 2000: 263- 274, Hinton 1990).

Reformlar ülkede önemli sosyal dönüşümlere yol açtı ve Çin'in olumsuz imajını düzelterip iyileştirdi. Reform siyasetinin Sincan'daki bölgesel sonuçları - iktisadi ve siyasi "serbestlik"- yerel koşullara göre belirlendi. Bu özellikler Sincan'ın Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti içindeki yeri ve konumu ile ilgilidir:

Sincan'ın 18. yüzyıldan beri Çin'e ait olmasına rağmen burada yaşayan Çinli olmayan gruplar, özellikle Uygurlar, bölgeyi Çin'in iç sömürgesi olarak görmektedirler (Gladney 1997, 1998b, 1998/9, Sautman 2000).

* Bu araştırmayı finansal açıdan *Britanya Ekonomik ve Sosyal Araştırma Konseyi* destekledi (R000 235709). Bana araştırma süresince yardım eden Uygur köylülere, ve bilimadamları Dr. Tsui Yenhu and Prof. Fang Xiaohua'ya da teşekkürler. Türkçe metnin hazırlanmasında katkılarından dolayı Lale Yalçın-Heckmann'a teşekkür ederim.

Sovyetler Birliğinin çöküşünden sonra bağımsızlığa kavuşan Orta Asya'nın Müslüman (ve çoğu Türk dilli) halklarının deneyimlerinin Uygurlar üzerindeki etkisi Çin'deki hâkim kesimlerce tehdit olarak algılanmaktadır Uygurların diğer İslam ülkeleriyle ilişki kurması Çinliler tarafından gene aynı şekilde tehdit olarak görülmektedir. Bu yüzden ülke çapındaki “yumuşamalara ve açılmalara” rağmen hükümet Sincan'da siyasi “açılmayı” daha sınırlı bir şekilde ve dikkatle uygulamaktadır. (Dreyer 2000).

Uygurların halihazırdaki durumu Maoizm dönemine göre daha iyi olduğu halde, Uygurların hükümetten çeşitli şikayetleri mevcuttur: bölgenin zengin yer altı kaynaklarının sömürülmesi, Çin'in serbest pazar politikaları yüzünden hızla fakirleşen bölgelerinden Çinlilerin hükümet tarafından Sincan'a göçe teşvik edilmesi, Çinlilerin emek pazarında Uygurlardan öncelikli olması, hükümetin aile planlama siyasetinin 1990'lardan itibaren azınlıklara da uygulanıyor olması (*planlık toğut*), hükümetin İslam dinini baskı altında tutması (bu baskı 11 Eylül 2001'deki olaylardan sonra daha da arttı), hükümetin uluslararası teröristlere karşı savaştan faydalanıp Müslüman Uygurların insan haklarını ihlal etmesidir. Ayrıca, Sincan imparatorluk döneminden miras kalan bir anlayışla Çin'in ananevi sürgün yeri sayılır ki, buradaki çalışma kamplarında hem adi cinayetten, hem de siyasi faaliyetler yüzünden tutuklananlar bulunmaktadır. 1990'ların ortalarına kadar Çin nükleer denemelerini Sincan'ın çöllerinde sürdürdü. Bu nedenlerle Uygurlar 1990'lardan itibaren artan şiddetle Çin hakimiyetine karşı çıkmaya başladılar (Dillon 1995, Weggel 1984, Grobe-Hagel 1991, Toops 2000: 168, Hoppe 1998: 45-6).

Bu ve benzeri nedenlerle, günümüz Sincan'ında Uygurlar hakkında yapılan antropolojik araştırmaların odaklaşma konusu Çin-Uygur etnik ilişkileri ve bu ilişkilerin gerginliğidir. Bu araştırmalar otoriter devletin modern etnik kimliklerin ortaya çıkması ve belirginleşmesindeki rolünü vurgulamışlardır, ancak tarihi mirasın varlığı çoğu zaman gözden kaçmıştır. Araştırmacı antropologlar bu ilişkilerdeki gerginliğin tarihi boyutlarına pek inmeden günümüzdeki durumu genellikle sosyalist etnik siyasetle açıklamaya çalışıyorlar (Rudelson 1997, Smith 1999, Bovington 2001, Cesaro 2002). Çağdaş Çin devletinin etnik siyaseti her ne kadar esas olarak Sovyet örneğine dayansa da, etnik süreçlerin oluşumunda yerel şartlar ve tarihsel deneyimler de önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Burada savunulan tez, hem tarihte, hem de günümüzde, kimliklerin devamlı uyarlanabilen çok yönlü vefa bağlarıyla belirlendiğidir. Etnik kimlik, hem tarihte, hem de günümüzde olası aidiyetlerden sadece birisidir ve her zaman en önemlisi değildir. Haliyle, sosyalist devletin etnik siyaseti hem etnik kimliğin manasını değiştirdi, hem de Uygurların (ve diğer etnik grupların, örneğin Çinlilerin) etnik bilincinin gelişmesini teşvik etti. Ancak, her iki dönemde de (yani sosyalizm öncesi ve sosyalizm dönemlerinde) mücadele ve çatışma kadar barışçıl bir arada yaşama örnekleri de bulunabilir. Araştırmacıların sürekli etnik farklılıkları ve kültür kavramının kurgu yönünü vurgulamaları, bilim adam ve kadınlarını, bilmeden ve istemeden de olsa, dini, dilsel ve yöresel sınırların daha kesin hatlarla çizilmesine katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Sincan içtimai tarihine bir bakış

1. Grup sınırlarının belirlenmesi

Sosyalizm öncesi dönemlerde (söz konusu olan dönem 19. yy'ın sonu ve 20. yy'ın ilk yarısıdır) etnik kimlik, “yabancıların” kimi cemaatlerce benimsenmesi ya da dışlanması süreç ve biçimlerinde rol oynadığı halde, bu kimlik diğer kimliklerden daha önemli değildi.

Uygurların etnik kimliği sadece dil veya din farklılığına dayanmaz: Sincan’da Uygurlardan başka bir kaç ayrı Türk dili konuşan Müslüman gruplar da yaşadı (Kazak, Tatar, Kırgız, Özbek).¹ Bundan başka, Çinliler arasında da Müslümanlar vardı, ama Tunganlar Müslüman oldukları halde dil ve kültür açısından Çinli idiler. Bu yüzden, her ikisi de Müslüman olmakla beraber, Tunganlarla Uygurların ilişkileri iyi değildi (bu iki toplum, ayrıca, İslam’ın iki farklı mezhebini temsil ederler). Tungan-Çinli münasebetleri de çatışmalarla ve karşılıklı güvensizliklerle bezenmişti. Hâkimiyet son yüzyıllarda Mançular ve Çinlilerde olduğu halde, Müslüman ayaklanmaları zamanında durum geçici de olsa tam tersine döndü. Bu dönemlerde, örneğin Yakub Bey’in İslami düzeni altında Çinlilerden binlercesi din değiştirip Müslüman olmak zorunda kaldı. Gruplar arasındaki çatışmaların anısı sözlü edebiyatta kuşaktan kuşağa aktarılıp günümüze ulaşmıştır: bu hikâyeler ve şiirler hem Tunganlara hem de Çinlilere karşı verilen savaşları anlatmaktadırlar (Örnekler için bkz. Le Coq 1919: 78, Le Coq 1926: 60, Pantusov 1890: 75). Bu bağlamda, etnik kimliğin yapısı din, dil, yaşam tarzı ve tarihi tecrübelerle oluştu. Bu kimlikler sosyalizm öncesi dönemde de mevcuttu. ve çok sık ifade edildiği gibi sosyalist dönemde benimsenen devlet siyasetinin sonucu olarak ortaya çıkıp gelişmedi. Sosyalizm öncesi dönemde etnik kimlik günün siyasi koşullarına göre, bazen güçlenip bazen zayıflıyordu. İstikrarlı dönemlerde diğer kimliklerin etnik kimlikten daha güçlü olması mümkündü. Sosyalizm öncesindeki etnik kimlik bir kişiyi tanımlayan diğer aidiyetler bütünüünün bir parçası idi, ama her zaman diğer aidiyetlerden daha önemli ya da üstün değildi

Bu bölgedeki farklı aidiyetler içinde yöresel, özellikle vaha aidiyetinin önemini stereotipler gösterir. Bu tür sınır çizmelerde namus ve ahlak gibi kavramlar önemli rol oynadılar. Mesela, Sayram’ın hırsızların yeri olduğu söylendi, ve Kuşa ise “vurdumduymaz kocalar”la ünlü idi (Le Coq 1911: 46-7). Hotan’da, deyişe göre, her şehre yetecek kadar fahişe vardı (hatta bunlar arasında Çinlilerle ilişki kuranlar da mevcuttu). Ancak, sözlü gelenekler arasında olumlu basmakalıp tiplemelere de rastlayabiliriz, örneğin:

¹ Bkz. Hoppe 1998. Bu dönemde Uygurlardan bahsetmek aslında doğru değil, Uygur sözcüğü 20. yüzyılın ortalarında kullanılmaya başlandı. Daha önce Doğu Türkistan’ın vaha halklarına Sart veya Turk denilirdi, ama bu sözlerin anlamı daha geniş idi.

Atuş iyi bir şehirdir,
Pazartesi bazarı var,
fakir öksüzlere sadaka verilir,
ve sultan mazarı da burada bulunur (Jarring 1948: 81-82)

Justin Rudelson vaha kimliklerinin günümüz Sincan’ında özellikle aydınlar arasında büyük bir rol oynadığını iddia etse de, basmakalıp tipler sadece vahalar arasındaki farklılıkları vurgulamamakta: bunlar kimi zaman vahadan daha küçük yerlerle, vahadan daha geniş bölgelerin halkları arasında da ayırım yapmaktadır (Rudelson 1997). Örneğin, deyişe göre, Tokkuzak adamları hiç misafirperver değildir (Jarring 1985: 57, Stein 1904: 229), Ucat köylüleri ise dinlerine bağlı değildir, Güney Sincan’dakiler Kuzeyde yaşayan Tarançıları “kendi şehirlerini satmağa hazır olmakla” suçlarlar (Jarring 1948: 130). Basmakalıp tipler genellikle espriyle karışık ortaya çıksalar da, grupların kendilerini tanımlama ve diğer gruplarla aralarındaki sınırların belirlenmesi sürecinde önemli bir rol oynar. Ancak sabit ve değişmeyen sınırlardan ziyade daha esnek ve akışkan bir sınır çizme pratiğinden söz etmek olasıdır. Kişiler duruma göre farklı grup aidiyetlerini vurgulayabilirler, grup sınırları genişleyip darabilirdi. ²

2. Birlikte yaşamın barışçıl tarafları

On sekizinci asrın ortalarında Sincan Çin İmparatorluğu tarafından işgal edildi. İşgalciler önceleri yabancılar (yani Müslüman olmayanlarla) ve yerli Müslümanlar arasındaki ilişkilerin barışçıl olması için çatışmaları engelleyici bir siyaset benimsediler. On dokuzuncu yüzyılda yabancı egemenliğe karşı birkaç Müslüman ayaklanması vuku buldu (Kim 2004). Bundan sonra Çin imparatorluğu bölge üzerindeki kontrolünü daha sıkılaştırdı, ama günlük hayata umumiyetle karışmadı. Bu dönemlerde de Sincan günümüzdekine benzer çok kültürlü bir toplum idi, ancak köyler nüfus bakımından daha homojen, şehirler ise daha heterojen yapıdaydı.

Sincan tarihçisi Jo Fletcher’e göre Mançu imparatorluğunun egemenliği altında hüküm süren tabakalar için en tehlikeli şey yabancı egemenliğinin gayri meşruluğu, bir de dini farklılık idi (Fletcher n.d.: 579-80, 604-5). On dokuzuncu yüzyılın sonunda bölgede bulunan bazı seyyahlar Çinlilerin Müslümanlar arasında yaşamaktan pek hoşlanmadıkları kanısındaydılar: Bunun nedeni Müslümanların onları hor görmeseydi, yani siyasi baskı altında olmalarına rağmen ahlaki üstünlük iddiasındaydılar (Grenard 1898: 273). Bazılarına göre, bu nedenlerle, iki grup arasındaki ilişkiler çok sınırlı kaldı, örneğin pazarda ayrı ayrı yerlerde ve kendi grupları içinde (yani, Çinliler Çinlilerle, Müslümanlar ise Müslümanlarla) ticaret

² Burada belirtmek gerekir ki, Çinli göçmenler de homojen bir grup oluşturmadılar, bir kısmı fakirlik yüzünden kendi memleketini bırakıp Sincan’a gelmiş, bir bölümü ise hükümet tarafından bu bölgeye sürülmüştü. Bkz. Lattimore 1975: 50.

yaptılar (Cable & French 1942: 190-1). Güvensizliği arttıran başka faktörler de vardı: örneğin haram ve helal yemekler arasındaki farklılıklar. Bu farklılıkları Müslümanlar bazen abarttılar, mesela ördek onlar için haram olmadığı halde Müslümanlar Çinliler tarafından pişirilmiş ördeği yemezlerdi (Le Coq 1926: 35).

Uygurların Çinlilere karşı duyguları korku ve derin bir güvensizlikten ibaretti. Yirminci yüzyılın ilk yarısında, Çin imparatorluğunun çöküşünden sonra merkezi otorite Sincan üzerindeki kontrolünü kaybedip, bölge yerli Çinli ve Tunganların egemenliğine geçti. Bu dönemlerde Çinlilere karşı korku yerine küçümseme duygusu gelişti, Çinli hükümdarlar gözlerine ahlaksız ve zayıf göründüler (Hartmann 1902: 119-120). Hatta halk yerli memurların ahlak düşkünlüğü için bile Çinlileri suçladı. Tabii ki ahlaksızlık ne bir etnik grubun özelliğidir, ne de sadece egemen tabakalara atfedilebilir. George Hunter'a göre: "*the opium-smoking Chinaman, the hemp-smoking Turk, the degraded Tungan and the drunken Mongol were all gambling together on the ragged-looking street*" (Hunter 1908: 168).

Bu örnek etnik ayrışmanın toplumsal hayatın her alanında ve her zaman gerçekleştirilmesinin mümkün olmadığını gösterir: bazı alanlarda iki grup arasında sosyal ilişkiler kaçınılmazdı. Ancak iki grubun üyeleri arasındaki etkileşim ve birbirinden uzak durma kuralları çeşitli etmenlere göre değişti. Bunlar arasında sosyal tabakanın rolü önemliydi. Yerli toplumun yüksek tabakaları (beyler) ile Çinli yöneticiler arasındaki ilişkiler titiz kurallara göre denetim altına alınmıştı. Etnik kimliğin farklılığı bu sosyal seviyede belirleyici bir rol oynadı denebilir: Çinli yöneticilerle beyler hiyerarşinin üs-ast ilişkileri çerçevesinde birbirleriyle dikkatli geçinmek zorundaydılar. Diğer yandan, hükümetin yapısı iki grubun arasında yakın işbirliğini gerektiriyordu, bu etmen beylerin bir kısmının Çinlilere adapte olmasına yol açtı. Örneğin, resmi bayramlarda beyler Çinli yöneticilerin usulünde ata bindiler, ve halkı kulelere dağıtıp yöneticilere yol açtılar. Müslümanlara göre pis ve bu yüzden haram sayılan katır, beyler tarafından Çin usulüne uygun olarak arabalara koşuldu. Beylerin giyim tarzı da Çin usulünün taklidiydi. Yerel usulde giyinenlerin dahi kıyafetlerinin kesimi ve süsleme tarzı tamamen Çin modasını andırıyordu (Valikhanov 1961: 145, 352, 356; Stein 1904: 313).

Çinli yöneticilerin yanında kayıtsız görünmemek için bazıları Çinlilerin oturma ve selamlama tarzını da öğrendi (Valikhanov 1961: 345-6). Ama beylerin bu formalitede bile asimile edilmesi tam değildi, çoğu akıllıca bir uzlaşmaya vardı: "*But the black silk cap with the red button of office is a poor head-covering for a good Turki Muhammadan, accustomed to shelter his shaven head under a substantial fur-cap when the temperature is so low as it was just then. So my Begs soon compromised comfort and appearances by making one of their attendants wear the cap imposed by their Cathay masters, while they themselves kept their heads warm with mighty furs*" (Stein 1904: 313). Çinli adetleri başka alanlarda da etkisini gösterdi: örneğin, zengin Müslümanlar 19. yüzyılda pencerelerini Çinlilerinkine benzer bir şekilde kağıtla kapatırlar (Valikhanov-Veniukov 1865: 147).

Genelde Çinli yöneticiler yerli tebaayla, onların örf-adetleriyle, dilleriyle, düşünceleriyle pek ilgilenmedi, onlarla yerli tercümanlar yoluyla konuşmayı tercih etti. Yerli tercümanların rolü bu toplumda pek belirsizdi. Müslümanlar ve Çinliler arasındaki ilişkide kilit konumda olan bu kişiler (beylere benzer bir şekilde) rüşvet almaya eğilimleri vardı (Grenard 1898: 273-5). Genellikle ahlaksızlıkla tanımlanan bu tercümanlara taraflardan hiç biri (yani, ne yerliler, ne de Çinliler) güvenmezdi. Onlar da giyimde ve adetlerinde kısmen Çinlileri taklit ettiler.

Bu dönemde, dil kullanımı ilişkilerin asimetrik olduğunun göstergesidir; yerli memurlar biraz Çince öğrendikleri halde Çinliler ender olarak Turki dili/Uygurca öğrendiler. Ama bu konuda da sosyal ve mesleki konum önemli farklılıklara sebep oldu: Çinli tüccarlar müşteri bulmak için Turki dili öğrenmeye yöneticilerle kıyaslandığında daha hevesliydi. Hatta günlük ilişkilerini sürdürmek için bir tür Turki-Çince karışık bir dil/argo geliştirdiler ki, bu dil bu düzeydeki uzlaşmanın bir işareti sayılabilir (Jarring 1951: 28). Ayrıca, dil kullanımının genelde asimetrik olmasının istisnalarına rastlamak da mümkün, bazı kişiler öteki grubun kültürüne karşı alışılmıştan fazla ilgi gösterdiler: Owen Lattimore Maralbaş'ından Kaşgar'a seyahat ettiği zaman ona rehberlik yapan bir Çinlinin Turki şiir ve şarkıları çok iyi söylediğinden söz eder. (Lattimore 1930: 314.) Alman bilim adamı Martin Hartmann ise Arif isimli Aksulu bir Naqşibendi dervişine rastlamış. Arif Çince yazı dilini hiç bilmediği halde Çinceyi nisbeten iyi konuşuyormuş, ve üstelik Çin atasözlerine ve Çin örf ve-adetlerine büyük bir ilgisi varmış. Çinlilerin sayıca daha kalabalık olduğu Sincan'ın kuzeyinde Çin halk müziği yerli Müslümanların (Tarañç) şarkılarını önemli bir şekilde etkilemişti: her iki müzik geleneğinin de etkisini gösteren şarkılar ortaya çıkmıştı (Hartmann 1902: 120).

Çeşitli sosyal gruplar tarafından yaygın olarak kabul gören diğer Çin adetleri yeme-içme kültürünü ve hatta bazı mesleklerin öğrenilmesini de içerisine aldı (Valikhanov 1961: 345-6). Hatta yaşam dönemleri törenlerini de etkiledi: örneğin Müslümanlar Çinliler gibi beyazı matem rengi olarak kabul ettiler.³ Kaşgar'da çocuk doğduğu zaman doğumun vaktini gizli tutma geleneğinin de Çinlilerden kaynaklandığı söylenir (Sykes & Sykes 1920: 315).

Halk arasında Çinliler hakkında olumlu basmakalıp tipler, kalıpyargılar da ortaya çıktı, örneğin, Uygurlara göre Çince kitaplar bilimle dopdoludur; zengin ve başarılı olmak için Çinli yaşam tarzını taklit etmek gerekirdi. Yerli halk arasında özellikle Çin tıbbına/hekimliğine ve Çinli doktorlara karşı büyük bir saygı gösterilirdi. 1880 yıllarında Turfandakiler çocuklara çiçek aşısı yaptırmak için Beijing'den Çinli doktorları çağırdılar. 1892'de Turfan'a Tiençin'den gelen doktorları yerliler çok beğenmiş ve yerli hekimler onlardan ilaç satın almıştı. Evlat edinme grupları arasındaki barışçıl ilişkilerin bir başka örneğidir. Zaman zaman Çinliler yerli Müslümanların çocuklarını evlatlık olarak almışlardı. Bazı alışkanlıklara karşı gruplarca

³ Beyazın yas rengi olarak kullanılmasının Çinlilerden kaynaklandığı 19yy. Türkileri tarafından da zikredilmiştir. cf. Katanov 1976: 1184-5.

saygı gösterildi: yirminci yüzyılın başında güney Sincan'da, yani Aksu'da çok Çinli yaşadığı halde bunlar Müslümanların duyarlılığına saygı göstermek amacıyla domuzlarını şehrin dışında tutarlardı (Hartmann 1902: 115).

Din alanında da yakınlaşma denemelerinin örneği görüldü: Çinli bir yönetici Hotan'daki Müslüman bir türbeye sadaka verdikten sonra türbenin ünü ve itibarı Müslümanlar arasında daha da yükselmişti (Stein 1904: 227).

Görüldüğü gibi, yüksek sosyal tabakalar arasındaki yakınlaşmalar bazen kaçınılmaz olsa da, genelde sosyal gruplar arasında çatışmalar kadar din, dil ve kültür farklılıklarına rağmen barışçıl birlikte yaşama örneklerini de bulmak mümkündür.

Sosyalizm döneminin etnik siyaseti

Etnik baskı çeşitli şekillerde ortaya çıkar. Birincisi, etnik grupların varlıklarının açıkça reddedilmesi, diğeri, etnik grupların varlığının kabul edilmesi ancak yeni-den tanımlanması. Bu ikinci durumda, etnik baskı yok demek mümkün değildir: devlet tarafından resmen kabul edilmiş gruplar açıkça tanınabilir, ve bu surette devlet bunları daha iyi kontrol edebilir. Çin hükümeti, Sovyetler Birliğinde olduğu gibi bu ikinci yolu seçti. Çin'de 1950'lerde 55 etnik grup resmen tanınmış, ve bunlar özel haklara sahip olmuştur (ancak, bu statüyü almak isteyip de alamayan grupların sayısı bir kaç yüzdür).⁴ Uygurlar için Sincan Uygur Özerk Bölgesi bile kuruldu. Sosyalist devletin etnik siyaseti devamlı aynı kalmasa da, bazı özellikleri hiç değişmedi: siyasi özerklik her zaman sınırlı ve Çinli memurların ve kadroların kontrolünde kaldı.

Etnik grupların devletçe tanınmasının Uygurlara yarayan tarafları vardı: mesela, çocuklar Uygur okulunda okuyabilir ve üniversite giriş imtihanında azınlıkların "milletinden" olanlar, yani "milli" çocuklar daha az puan alsalar da üniversiteye kabul edilirler. Ancak bu ayrıcalığın başka bir yönü daha var: "milli" okulda okuyanların üniversiteye devam etme şanslarının Çince eğitim yapan okullarda okuyanlara göre daha az. Aslında, bu siyasetin hem amacı hem de neticesi Uygurları bölmektir. Uygur eğitim sistemine devam edenler çoğunlukla lise sona kadar okuyabilir (Rudelson 1997: 115).⁵ Köylü çocuklar arasında lise mezunlarının sayısı şehirlilere göre nispeten daha az, ve serbest pazar ekonomisinin de etkisiyle bu sayı her geçen gün daha da azalmaktadır. Üniversitelerde eğitim genellikle Çince yapılır ve "milli" okullarda Çince mecbur olduğu halde, Çin dilini yabancı dil olarak okuyan "milli" çocuklar bu dili üniversiteye devam edebilmelerine yetecek düzeyde öğrenememekteler. Çin eğitimi gören Uygur çocukları başka Uygurlar tarafından ancak "yarım Uygur", "mızacı/huyu Çinli" şeklinde tanımlanırlar. Sincan'da on üç tanınmış etnik grup olduğu halde bu kişilere Sincan'ın "on dördün-

⁴ Çin hükümetin etnik siyaseti hakkında bkz. Örneğin Mackerras 1995, Tapp 1995, Dreyer 1996, Schein 2000.

⁵ Azınlıklar arasında dil ve eğitim meselesi hakkında bkz. Mackerras 2003: 129-133.

cü milleti” denilir (Rudelson 1997: 128). Paradoksal bir şekilde, Uygur dilinin eğitimde serbestçe seçilebilmesi Uygurları bölmektedir: yüksek eğitimin şartı Çince’ye tamamen hâkim olmaktır ve bu yüzden bu seviyeye genellikle yalnız Çince dilli eğitim sistemine erken yaşlarda katılanlar ulaşabilir. Bu alanda başarılı çocuklar ise kendi halkları tarafından kısmen reddedilir ve onlara, Uygurca bilmelerine rağmen, Çin kültürünü benimsemişler gibi bakılır. Önceki dönemlerin yerli beyleri ve tercümanları gibi bu gruptaki günümüz Uygurları da iki grup arasında kalıyorlar: Çin diline hâkim olmanın meslek hayatında sağladığı avantaja rağmen, kendi toplumları tarafından kısmen reddedilirler (Smith 2000: 207).

Uygurlar şehirlik/köylülük temelinde yükselen bir diğer ayrışma da mevcut. Bu farklılaşmalar sosyalizm öncesi döneme dayansa da, sosyalist devlet bu farklılıkları pekiştirmiştir. Diğer gelişmekte olan ülkelerde gördüğümüz gibi köyden şehre göçü önlemek amacıyla köylülere köy ikamet tezkeresi, şehirlilere ise şehir tezkeresi verilir. 1980’lerin ortalarına kadar şehirlilik büyük bir avantaj demektir. 1990’lardan itibaren azınlıklar için yürürlüğüne giren aile planlama politikalarından dolayı şehirlilik artık o kadar avantajlı bir durum değildir.⁶

Diğer yandan, ikinci toprak reformu döneminde sadece “köylüler” devletten arazi alıp kullanma hakkına sahiptirler ve “sosyalist serbest piyasa” ekonomisi yüzünden fakirleşen şehirliler isteseler bile, toprak kullanma hakları resmen yoktur. İlginç olan, Uygurların çok büyük kısmını teşkil eden köylülerin kendi durumlarından hiç memnun olmamalarıdır (Sautman 2000: 250, Bellér-Hann 1997). Toprak kullanma hakkı köylülere özel yükümlülükler getirir: üreticiler imal ettikleri buğdayın bir kısmını mecburen devlete ve ucuzca satmak zorundadırlar ve kullandıkları arazi miktarına göre devlete “emek borcu” vermeye mecburdurlar. Kişi başına düşen toprak miktarı az, ve devlet hem üretim tarzına, hem de ürünün satışına müdahale ediyor. Üstelik devlet kendine hiç faydası olmayan ürünlerin üretimine imaline bile (örneğin mısıra) “Uygur köylülerini devletin gücünü günlük yaşamlarında devamlı hissetsinler” diye karıştırıyor. Bu örnek köy/tarım siyasetinin etnik siyasetle yakın bir ilişkisi olduğunu göstermektedir. Köylüler devlet tarafından zorla alınan vergileri ve yükleri beylerin zulmüne benzetiyorlar, bazı sözler ve deyişleri eski devri hatırlatıyor (*alwäng-yasaq*).

Tabii ki bu örnekler etnik siyasetin bütününe anlatmaz, ama en azından genel durum hakkında bir fikir verir. Günümüzde Uygur-Çinli ilişkileri ne kadar gergin olsa olsun, bu ilişkilerin barışçıl tarafını da görmek mümkün.

Güney Sincan’da köylerin büyük bir kısmı etnik homojenliklerini şimdiye kadar muhafaza etmişlerdir. Şehirlerin nüfusu daha karışık olmasına rağmen yerleşim şekilleri imparatorluk zamanında geliştirilmiş modellerin devamıdır: Uygurlar “kona şehir”de, Çinlilerin çoğunluğuysa “yeni şehir”de yaşamaktadır. Mesleki eğitim/uzmanlaşma bazen etnik ayrışmaları takip eder, ancak hükümet idare-

⁶ Karışık, yani köylü-şehirlilik arasındaki evlenmelerde, kanunun muğlaklığını insanlar kendi avantajları için kullanır. Ayrıca, Uygurlar arasındaki sık görülen boşanma ve yeniden evlenme pratikleri de bu siyasetin ustalıklı kullanılmasına yol açar.

lerinde Çinli ve Uygurlar yan yana çalışmaya mecburlar. (Bu da sosyalizm önceki durumu hatırlatır.) Hatta hükümet memurları aynı binalarda yaşamaktalar. Böylece günlük hayatta işbirliği kaçınılmaz olsa da, etnik sınırlar Uygurlar tarafından gene de vurgulanmaktadır: Uygur memurları çocuklarını “mizacı/huyu Çinli olmasın” diye Çinli memurların çocuklarıyla oynatmaz. (Çinliler ise genelde Uygurlarla yakınlaşmaya karşı değil). Son zamanlarda bölgeye göçmen olarak gelen fakir Çinlilerin bir kısmı nüfus memurluğuna kayıt olmaktan kaçınmaktadırlar. Bunun nedeni devletin kanunlarından (mesela aile planlanması, ikamet kanunu, vergi, emek borcundan kaçmak olabilir. Çin’in bu “yüzer gezer nüfusu” birkaç milyona ulaşmasına rağmen bu nüfus istatistiklere yansımamaktadır. Bunların bazıları Güney Sincan vahalarında, Uygur mahallelerine yerleşirler. Uygurların artık çalışmak istemedikleri işlerde kaçak olarak ucuza çalışır ve onların çocukları mahalledeki Uygur çocuklarıyla beraber oynayarak, Uygurca öğrenir. Bu düzeyde nispeten iyi komşuluk ilişkileri de gelişebilir. Bazen Çinlilerin, örneğin, bir Çinli annesi oğlunu Uygurların tesiriyle sünnet ettirmesi gibi Uygur adetlerine uyduğundan büyük bir gururla bahsedilir.

Çinli ve Uygurlar arasında nikâh yok denecek kadar az olsa da “karışık” ve sonu trajik olan aşk hikayelerini her tarafta duymak mümkündür. Söylentilere göre özellikle Çin erkekleri Uygur kızlarıyla evlenmek ister, ama Uygurlar böyle bir evliliği reddeder.⁷

Misafirperverliğin değeri Uygurlar arasında Türklere benzer bir şekilde çok yüksektir. Onlar domuz eti yemedikleri için Çinlilerin misafirperverliğinden hiç faydalanmaz, ama işyerinde şahsi ilişkiler iyi olduğunda onlar da Çinli meslektaşlarını evlerine hatta düğünlerine davet ederler. Bu daveti Çinliler memnuniyetle kabul eder: çünkü onlar genelde Uygur yemeklerini çok severler

Bu örneklerde Çinlilerin hâkimiyette olmalarına rağmen günlük hayattaki etnik ilişki kurallarının Uygurlar tarafından belirlendiğini görmekteyiz. Daha öncelerde olduğu gibi egemenlik Çinlilerde ama Uygurlar kendilerini ahlaki olarak daha üstün bir konumda görüyorlar. Dillerin öğrenilmesi bakımından da iki grup arasındaki ilişkilerin asimetrisi süregelmektedir. Şehirli Uygurların büyük bir kısmı biraz Çince konuşmayı öğrenmekte, (Uygur okullarında da Çince birinci yabancı dil olarak öğretilir). Çinliler arasında Uygurca konuşacak kadar iyi öğrenen az, ama şöyle örnekler de var: bir Uygur köyünde genç ve sempatik bir Çinli memur (komünist partisi sekreteri) kısa zaman içinde Uygurca pek iyi öğrendi ve yerli halkla çok iyi ilişkiler kurdu.

Etnik grupların yakınlaşmasının örneklerini başka alanlarda da görmek mümkün. Uygurlar tabii ki homojen bir grup teşkil etmez. Aydın, okumuş Uygurların (“milli”, yani Uygur okullarda okuyanların bir kısmı da dahil) bazıları Uygur köylüleri fazla dine ve batıl inançlara bağlı, eski kafalı olarak görürler ve bundan hiç hoşlanmazlar. Bunların bir kısmı Çinlileri ve Çinlilerin adetlerini daha medeni

⁷ Çinliyle evlenen kız ailesince kesinlikle dışlanır.

ve daha gelişmiş görürler. Kuça şehrinde böyle genç aydınlar Uygur kız arkadaşlarıyla beraber Uygurların dans evine gitme yerine Çinlilerin dans evine gitmeyi tercih ederler. Çinli erkekler ise aynı şekilde Uygurların dans evine gitmekten oradaki Uygur erkeklerinden korktukları için çekinirler.

Sonuç

Sosyalizm öncesi ve sosyalizm süresindeki durumu karşılaştırsak, ilk gözümüze çarpan nokta sosyalist devletin etnik kimliklere yaptığı derin etkidir. Bu tesiri kabul etmemek mümkün değil. Ancak günümüzdeki durum daha önceki devirlerde gelişmiş süreçler tarafından da etkilenmektedir: etnik kimlik başka bir şekilde olsa da, sosyalizm öncesi toplumda da mevcuttu. O zamanda da, bugüne benzer bir şekilde etnik kimlik aidiyetlerin sadece biriydi ve diğer yöresel ve sosyal aidiyetler kadar önemliydi. Ayrıca, Çinli ve Uygurlar arasında çatışmalar sıkça vuku bulsa da, günlük yaşamda bu etkileşimin barışçıl tezahürleri de vardı.

Çinliler özellikle sosyalizmden önceki zamanda dolaylı egemenliklerini sürdürdüler ve günlük hayata, yerlilerin öf-adetlerine ve dini alışkanlıklarına pek karışmadılar. Sosyalist devlet ise, özellikle Maoizm devrinde günlük hayatın hemen hemen her alanına karışmaktadır. (Tabii ki sosyalist devletin günlük hayata karışması da dönemden döneme değişti: şimdiki reform döneminde Kültür Devrimi dönemine göre insanlara daha fazla özgürlük verilir.) Yine de şimdiki dönemde siyasette ve bürokraside Çinli memurlar önemli bir rol oynar, yani bu bakımdan değişim kökten değil.

Gösterdiğimiz gibi, devlet siyaseti hem etnik gruplar arasında, hem de bugün bir etnik grup olarak kabul edilmiş olan Uygurlar arasında ayırım yaratmaktadır. Uygurların bir etnik grup olarak kabul edilmesi bir taraftan sosyalist devlet siyasetinin sonucudur, diğer taraftan da milli hareketlerin kökenleri sosyalizm öncesi dönemde yatmaktadır. Devletin bugün kullandığı egemenlik tarzının da yerli tarihte emsalleri vardır. Araştırmacılar iki grup arasındaki münasebetleri sadece uyumsuzluk ve çatışmalar açısından incelerlerse, devletin etnik grupların aralarındaki sınırları vurgulayıp onları birbirine karşı ustalıkla kullanması oyununa yardım eder ve tarihi gerçekleri de çarpıtmış olurlar.

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Ethno-Linguistic Processes in Post-Soviet South Siberia

Irina Nevskaya

In the 1990s, the Turkic languages spoken in South Siberia (Tuvan, Altai, Khakas, Shor and numerous other Turkic varieties) received a powerful stimulus for their further development due to a growth of the national sentiments and political changes in Russia as a whole. Tuvan, Altai and Khakas, were given the status of state languages alongside Russian in the respective national republics of the Russian Federation: Tyva (formerly Tuva), Mountainous Altai and Khakasia. This article describes the new sociolinguistic situation that arose after these languages were made official languages. Although it has no national administrative territory, Shor was able to revive its written form.

The process of national revival also touched minor ethnic groups of Turks in Northern (Kumandy, Tuba, Chalkan) and Southern (Teleut, Telengit) Altai. In the 1920s and 1930s, they were, rather voluntarily, united with Southern Altai ethnic groups (*Altai-kiži*) in the framework of the Altai Autonomous Region of the USSR and, until very recently, have not been considered separate nations. Consequently, their languages were treated as dialects of the Altai literary language based on the *Altai-kiži* linguistic variety. This worked more or less well for the Southern Altai varieties, in particular for Telengit, but not so well for the Northern Altai linguistic varieties very far from the *Altai-kiži* idiom. The speakers of Tuba, Kumandy and Chalkan had to learn Altai almost as a foreign language. Their native linguistic varieties did not have a literary form and were not taught at school. They were also, with rare exceptions, ignored by linguists. Together with other social and economic factors, this led to a gradual decline of these languages, making them acutely endangered. At present, they have the status of separate languages and attempts are underway to develop their literary forms.

The disintegration of the literary Altai language also involved the Teleut and Telengit ethnic groups, whose languages are quite close to the *Altai-kiži* idiom. The Telengit have not had any difficulty in using Altai as their literary form. However, at present, these groups are considered to be separate nations and want to develop a distinct literary form. This means that our understanding of the dialectal system of the Altai literary language has become outdated and is in need of review.

Turkic state languages of South Siberia

Tuvan, Khakas and Altai have been functioning as state languages along with Russian in the national republics for a few years already. Respective language

laws have been passed in all the republics, proclaiming equal status of both the Russian and national languages. This has opened up possibilities for broadening the social functions of these Turkic languages. Their use as languages of administration, mass media, education, etc. has fueled their fast development and created certain problems, e.g. a lack of specialized terminology. In all the republics, terminology commissions have been set up in order to fill this gap; orthographic norms have been discussed and developed, orthographic dictionaries and secondary and higher school textbooks published, etc. However, we can state that these language laws are not fully functioning in all these republics and that there are numerous problems with the implementation of these laws in practice. In fact, there are some indicators that even a state language, like Khakas, can come to the brink of being endangered.

The sociolinguistic situation in these republics is characterized by three major features: by bilingualism and misbalance (the overwhelming majority of the Turkic population are bilingual while very few people of non-Turkic population of these republics speak Turkic languages), and by the equal legal status of Russian and the national languages.

Contrary to the legal status, the demographic status of the South Siberian Turkic state languages differs. The Khakas sociolinguist Borgojakova (2004: 33–39) distinguishes three types of demographic situations found in this region: 1) a balanced one (found in Tyva), 2) a relatively balanced one (Mountainous Altai), 3) a misbalanced one (Khakasia). In Tyva, the native population prevails; the language has a full set of social functions. In Mountainous Altai, there are more Russian speakers than Altai ones; the Altai constitute one third of the population of the republic¹; the proclaimed equality of Altai and Russian is realized only partially. In Khakasia, the Khakas constitute only one tenth of the population; the overwhelming majority of the population is Russian speaking; the equal rights of Khakas and Russian remain a mere declaration.

The criterion of language transmission from generation to generation is also very important for diagnosing the sociolinguistic situation and the languages' "health". According to this criterion, Tuvan is the "healthiest" and strongest language of the region. All Tuvan children speak Tuvan; it is the language spoken at home in all Tuvan families. The situation is different in Khakasia. Sociolinguistic research conducted in 2000-2002 showed that only 1.6% of 11-14-year-old Khakas people speak only Khakas with their Khakas friends, although 29.8% of them can speak Khakas and use the language when speaking with older people. The situation is slightly better among other age groups. But the speed of the language loss is menacing: 69.8% of 21-30-year-olds can speak Khakas, whereas the

¹ Here we mean the entire indigenous Turkic speaking population of the Altai Republic, including all its ethnic and sub-ethnic groups.

percentage is drastically lower among the younger age groups: it is 64.1% among 18-20 year-olds, 34% among 15-17-year-olds, 29.8% among 11-14-year-olds and, finally, it is only 28.8% among 7-10-year-olds (Borgojakova 2004). Within the span of one generation the percentage of children learning Khakas as their mother tongue has declined by more than one half.

Among various factors that have led to this language shift in the recent past and that continue to have some degree of impact until now, the following should be mentioned :

- The massive influx of Russian-speaking people;
- Bilingualism of the native population;
- Official policy in the 1940s-1980s stressing assimilation and Russian monolingualism;
- Absence of sociolinguistic research in the region during a period of almost half a century;
- As a consequence, absence of information on the sociolinguistic processes in this region and on the consequences of native language loss for individuals and for the whole community;
- Stereotypes of bilingualism being harmful to the social adaptation of children: The older generations had suffered from a poor command of the dominant language and were trying to ensure that their children would not have the same problems with Russian; the price for that was loss of their native language; we observe this motivation not only in South Siberia but also in other parts of the Russian Federation (Vaxtin 2001);
- Low social prestige and limited social functions of native languages;
- Educational system: e.g. Khakas was not even taught as a subject in the majority of schools in Khakasia with the exception of a few national Khakas schools; only 6% of Khakas children in remote rural districts could receive primary education in Khakas; school curricula did not contain courses in native history, geography and culture.
- At present, there is an understanding of the danger of a complete loss of the native languages and a desire to prevent this. Measures are being taken to broaden their social functions. However, administrative measures alone are useless if the natural transmission of the language to the younger generation has stopped (Fishman 1991).

Important factors for the preservation of these languages are as follows:

- Increased tolerance of people belonging to the dominant culture toward Siberian native cultures and languages;
- Support of public national organizations and societies aimed at the preservation of the native languages and cultures;

- Dissemination of information about the indigenous languages and cultures of Siberia via the mass media, educational measures, etc.;
- Introduction of modern educational concepts and school curricula that preserve and develop the national languages and cultures;
- Permanent sociolinguistic and sociological research that analyzes and monitors the contemporary ethnic and linguistic processes and assesses the impact of measures taken on the current sociolinguistic situation;
- Linguistic research of Siberian native languages to establish a scientific basis for different kinds of modern textbooks: native language textbooks, language textbooks for people learning these languages as foreign ones, Russian textbooks for national schools, foreign language textbooks for national schools;
- Linguistic research aimed at developing the literary norms and terminology in these languages: on the one hand, the present literary norms reflect the state of the languages at the beginning of the previous century; they are at present very far from the spoken languages and in urgent need of revision; on the other hand, the official status of these languages demands an enormous broadening of their political, social and economic terminology.

The Khakas literary language is facing another linguistic problem now, which we would like to discuss in more detail. The Khakas variety chosen as the basis of the literary language in the beginning of the previous century, i.e. the Ust'-Abakan variety of the *Kača* dialect, was spoken by one of the largest groups of Khakas people at that time. In 1820 (Krivonogov 1997: 41-48), the *Kača* were even the largest group of Khakas speakers (36.6% as compared to the Sagays at 32.2%). In the 1920s, the *Kača* were also the most active and educated group of the Khakas population, producing the first Khakas linguists, teachers, authors of Khakas textbooks and the first Khakas writers. The situation is quite different now. The areas where *Kača* speakers live are adjacent to the Abakan-Krasnojarsk railway line. Thus, the contacts with Russian-speaking migrants have been most intensive there. As a result, *Kača* speakers have become Russified to a greater degree than the rest of the Khakas population. Thanks to their good command of Russian, they were also more mobile, so more *Kača* speakers left Khakasia than speakers of other dialects, foremost the Sagays, who were always a very large dialectal group in Khakasia. In the course of the second half of the twentieth century, the Sagays had assimilated the smaller dialectal groups, and in 1989 already constituted 68.1% of all Khakas speakers, i.e. more than the speakers of all other dialects taken together including the *Kača*, judging by the census data (Krivonogov 1997: 41-48). However, the Khakas literary norms are still based on the *Kača* idiom, which in many respects is very different from the Sagay idiom. This creates many problems for the majority of Khakas speakers who have to learn literary Khakas. Although literary Khakas has been taught for more than seven decades at school by now, the only speakers really using it are moderators on Khakas television and radio and Khakas language teachers. However, they are also

mostly Sagay speakers and have difficulties using the literary norm when speaking. As for modern Khakas literature, it uses the Sagay idiom since Sagays constitute the majority of the readers. What is necessary in this situation is a profound language reform which would base the new literary norms on Sagay. This question is being discussed at present in Khakasia and in the Turkological community in Siberia as a whole (Karpov 2004: 126-130).

Revival of literary Shor

The Shors are one of the most numerous native people of the Kemerovo region. They live in Mountainous Shoria, a mountainous area in the south of the Kemerovo Region adjacent to Mountainous Altai. According to census data, their numbers were: in 1897 – 11,674, in 1926 – 12,600, in 1959 – 14,900, in 1970 – 16,500 and in 1989 – 15,900 people.

Shoria developed as a separate nation with its own identity and national sentiment within the Turkic-speaking groups of this region during the last three centuries. Ethnologists delineate three main periods in the formation of Shor ethnic identity (Kimeev 1989):

1. The formation of territorial ethnic groups of Shors within the administrative ethnic territory (Russian *Kuzneckij uezd*), from the beginning of the seventeenth until the beginning of the twentieth century.
2. National and cultural consolidation within the autonomous national district (*Gorno-Šorskij nacional'nyj rajon*), 1926–1939. At that time, the processes of national development were very intensive. The most important contributing factors were the development of the literary language, school instruction in Shor, and the spread of literacy among the Shor population. At this time the language was vigorously developing its literary norms: it was taught at school; a considerable number of books in Shor were published (they number more than 150 titles); and the language, folklore and ethnology of the Shors were studied intensively.
3. From the early 1940s until the early 1980s, the Shor nation was subject to the active imposition of the dominant Russian culture. In addition to the negative factors common to the sociolinguistic situation in this region, a long period when the language was neither written nor taught at school should be added. In these years, the Shors not only lost their literary language, but they were also at the brink of full assimilation.

The tragic events of 1937-45 had a devastating effect on the national culture of the Shors. Beginning in 1942, when the last issue of the Shor-language newspaper *Kyzyl Šor* (Red Shoriya) was published and all the Shor schools were closed, the language was no longer written, nor was it taught in schools for half a century. Its functional sphere was reduced to home use and everyday topics. All the

other cultural needs were met by Russian, which became the language of education, literature, mass media, and administrative, political and economic relations. During this period, several generations of urban Shors grew up barely able to speak and understand Shor, if at all.

We are hopeful that at present, from the late 1980s until now, the Shors are living through the fourth period in the history of their nation – that of a national and cultural revival (Nevskaya 1998).

Thus, in 1985, the *Olgudek-Pajram* holiday was renewed and became traditional again. It is usually celebrated on the first Sunday of June, on the eve of haymaking. The festivities consist of ritual entertainment and sports. Symbolic sacrifice to the ancestors and local spirits and prayers for a good harvest and hunt are followed by competitions in national wrestling, tug-of-war, archery and the climbing of a horizontal bar. In the evening, quiz games about the history of the Shor people are held, some everyday life scenes from the past are performed, and people sing native songs. This holiday is very popular among the Shor people, especially the youth. A folk ensemble by the name of *Chyltys* (Star) was created in 1985. This ensemble still exists, combining education with cultural entertainment (Stukova in print).

The revival of *literary Shor* began with the publishing of Shor textbooks, the training of Shor language teachers, and the teaching of Shor at school and in Shor language circles. In 1988, the Department of the Shor Language and Literature was created at Novokuznetsk State Pedagogical Institute (NGPI; at present the Kuzbass State Pedagogical Academy). Its first head was Professor Andrej Čudojakov. The same year, the national department was opened at the Faculty of Philology and the training of Shor language and literature teachers began. One year later the Shor language began to be taught in a number of schools by teachers of different subjects – Shors by nationality. They were graduates of two-year courses given by the leaders of Shor language circles, organized in Novokuznetsk by Dr. Alisa Esipova. The Shor primer and textbooks for the primary stages of education were written by Dr. Nadežda Kurpeško (Kemerovo) and by members of the Shor Department. In 1994, the first five graduates of the national department began to work at schools in the Kemerovo Region. At present, about twenty teachers of Shor work at schools in the Taštapol and Meždurečensk districts of Mountainous Shoria, in both cities and villages. Some schools which had been closed between ten and thirty years ago have resumed teaching. Some schools have been newly built (Nevskaya 1998).

However, it might already be too late since the Shors have already lost a major part of their ethnic heritage during the period of oppression. Moreover, the current economic situation in the region motivates language shift. In the rural areas, there has been no work for decades, so the Shor population has moved to the cities, where language loss is very rapid as there is no use for the national language and proficiency in Russian is all that matters. Language transmission virtu-

ally stopped a few decades ago so that only the elderly people can still speak the language fluently. The epic tradition is also decaying since there are no longer any young story tellers. The few Shor story tellers are over seventy now.

According to the most recent research, the current demographic situation in Shoria is grave and the population is dramatically decreasing. Mortality among native people has risen due to the lack of life perspectives and the growing consumption of alcohol. Natural population growth has decreased; native people hesitate to bring children into a world of crisis and growing poverty. Young people aim to migrate to towns and large settlements, while only the elderly stay in their native villages (Sadovoj 1997: 217).

Moreover, literary Shor faces problems very similar to those of the Khakas literary language: its literary norms are in need of a profound reform. The literary variety is based on the Mras dialect of the Shor language. However, the majority of the Shor population still preserving their national language and traditional way of life now live in the upper reaches of the Kondum and Mras rivers, where a separate variety of the Kondum dialect has formed during the last decades. The literary norms should adapt to Kondum dialectal features. The orthography should also be revised as it is already actually being done by Shor writers and poets. Otherwise, it is difficult for the majority of Shors to read and understand written Shor.

Thus, we can state that despite the processes of national revival, the unfavourable factors that have led to the present-day demographic and sociolinguistic situation as well as to language shift still obtain. In addition, the Shors are the only major indigenous group who do not have any political autonomy or national administrative territory of their own in South Siberia. Thus, the language does not receive that legal support, no matter how insignificant it may be, that, for instance, Altai or Khakas have. The Shor language and culture remain acutely endangered.

Altai Turkic groups

A few “small-numbered” Turkic ethnic groups live in communities or dispersed on the territory of Mountainous Altai (mostly): the Teleut and the Telengt (alongside the *Altai-kizi*) represent Southern Altai ethnic groups (and corresponding linguistic varieties); the Kumandy, the Chalkan, and the Tuba are Northern Altai groups. None of the above-mentioned smaller groups is politically autonomous; for the most part, they live in industrially developed areas with predominantly non-Turkic populations (with the exception of the Telengt). Already in 1993 the Teleut and the Kumandy were included in the list of officially recognized *Indigenous Minority Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East*²:

² They are officially called „indigenous small-numbered peoples“; an ethnic group must number no more than fifty thousand people in order to be considered “small-numbered”

this is a special category of ethnic minorities that receive help and assistance from the state; the Telengt, the Tuba and the Chalkan joined them in 2000. The sociolinguistic situation of the Altai ethnic minorities is characterized by multilingualism: Russian, literary Altai and their own idiom.

1. *The Kumandy*

The Kumandy, an indigenous Turkic-speaking ethnic group of South Siberia, were first mentioned in official documents of the Russian empire in 1628. Four Kumandy areas can be found in different Russian governmental documents and debt books from the seventeenth century: Kumandy, Solun, Čabat (Čeban) and Kersagal. At present, the Kumandy live in the Solton and Krasnogorsk Districts of the Altai Region, and in the Turačak District of the Altai Republic. The majority live in the cities of Bijsk and Gorno-Altajsk. A smaller group of Kumandy lives in the Taštapol and Novokuznetsk Districts of the Kemerovo Region, geographically belonging to Mountainous Shoria. According to where they lived, the Kumandy used to be listed as *altajcy* (Altai people), *tatary* (Tatar people), *šorcy* (Shor people) in their passports, but beginning in the early 1960s they were officially defined as Kumandy. In 1926, for the first and for the last time, the Kumandy were registered in the USSR population census as an independent ethnic group numbering 6334 people (Satlaev 2002: 108). There are no exact data on the total number of Kumandy at present. The Kumandy form an ethnic majority only in the Šatobal village of the Solton District of the Altai Republic – slightly over 50% (200 people). In 1993, the Kumandy were included in the list of officially recognized *Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East*. In 2000, they were included in the list of indigenous small-numbered peoples as a separate ethnic group by a Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation. This was meant to guarantee them certain economic, educational and cultural privileges and governmental support, but these privileges often cannot be realized.

The Kumandy language is neither written nor taught at school. It is greatly influenced by Russian on all language levels. There exist only scholarly publications of Kumandy text samples. The only brief description of Kumandy grammar was done by N. A. Baskakov (1972). In the 1980s-1990s, the phonology of the language was described by I. J. Seljutina (1983; 1998). Since Kumandy was until very recently considered an Altai dialect, almost no research on it exists. The language is highly endangered; it has never been sufficiently documented or described.

(Russian *maločislennyj*). Having come under the dominance of the descendants of migrants, mostly Russian-speaking ones, the indigenous “small-numbered” peoples are, in fact, both ethnic and linguistic minorities now.

The Kumandy have to use the modern Altai orthography, which is based on Altai literary norms. School instruction is conducted in Russian. In the 1930s, a Kumandy ABC book was published (Kalanakova & Filatova 1933), but very soon after that, literary Altai was introduced as a school subject instead of Kumandy.

The main feature of Kumandy ethnic development in the twentieth century was a gradual loss of their ethnic culture and language, though there are no exact data about the depth of this transformation. The language transmission has almost stopped. The older generations can speak Kumandy, but the younger generations have switched to Russian (Satlaev 2002: 110).

At present, the Kumandy do not have their own national administrative territory because they are dispersed among different administrative territories of the Russian Federation. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Kumandy elite undertook several attempts to revitalize their national culture. The Association of Kumandy People was created. A Kumandy-Russian phrase-book was published under the edition of F. A. Satlaev, who is Kumandy himself, now deceased (Tukmačeva & Tukmačev 1990). Kumandy holidays are held annually in Bijsk and in the Solton and Krasnogorsk Districts of the Altai Region. A Kumandy-Russian dictionary was composed by two Kumandy people and published at their own expense in 1995 (Petrušova & Tukmačev 1995). The authors are not linguists, and their methods can be criticized because their dictionary contains not only lexemes but also their case forms as separate entries. Nevertheless, this proves that the Kumandy themselves are aware of the threat to their language and culture and are eager to preserve them.

2. *The Tuba*

The Tuba inhabit the Turačak, Choj and Majma Districts of the Altai Republic along the banks of the River Bija. In 1989, they numbered 2749 people and constituted 2.5% of the entire population of Altai and 8.6% of the Altais (Makošev 2002). The economic and social processes in the Republic in the 1960s–1980s had a devastating effect on this ethnic group: loss of traditional ways of life and migration to bigger villages and cities because of the so-called politics of “villages without perspectives”. The latter meant that small villages were joined to bigger ones, and all their institutions and social establishments were closed (schools, post offices, shops, medical facilities, etc.). In this way, sixty of eighty-nine Tuba villages were abandoned and disappeared in the northern parts of the Altai Republic (Makošev 2002). In villages with a compact Tuba population literary Altai was taught till the 1960s. At present, it has been introduced again as a school subject. Tuba has never been written, nor taught at school.

After sociolinguistic research in this region³ had been suspended for decades, in 1999 and 2000 two expeditions were undertaken in the places with a compact Tuba population. The 1999 research was organized by the Gorno-Altajsk State University (Sarbaševa 2001). The 2000 research was conducted by the Institute of Philology, Siberian Division of the Russian Academy, Novosibirsk (Nikolina 2001). 62% of the Tuba people unexpectedly acknowledged Tuba as their native tongue in 2000, as compared to 44.7% in 1999. However, this could be wishful thinking rather than reality, since the actual command of the language is much lower: among 10- to 19-year-olds, only 50% of the respondents who consider Tuba their native tongue can communicate in Tuba and only 6% of them speak it fluently. Nevertheless, this fact is still symptomatic in that it shows that the community wants to preserve their language, or, at least, wishes to give that appearance. These research projects uncovered a great gap between the Tuba generations when it comes to language proficiency: the active use of the mother tongue is minimal in the younger age group and gradually rises the older the respondents are. In the group of 50- to 87-year-olds, practically everyone speaks Tuba fluently. All in all, about 38% of the Tuba people have a good command of their language, and an additional 21% can understand it. 41% of the Tuba have no command of the Tuba language. A passive command of literary Altai is also characteristic for the Tuba population: about 6% can speak literary Altai and 28.7% understand it. Although 19.7% of the Tuba learned literary Altai at school and 7.9 attended primary schools where it was the language of instruction, still 19% of those who learned Altai can read but not speak it, 15% can understand it, and 11.5 do not know literary Altai. The main language used for communication within the community and with other communities as well as the language used for writing is Russian: 73.7% use Russian when communicating with speakers of Southern Altai idioms, and 65.5% use it even to communicate with Northern Altai Turks. In the family, only 15% of the Tuba speak Tuba with their children. The research also showed that the community worries about this situation and would like to preserve the language: 72.7% of the respondents expressed this wish. The Tuba consider Tuba and Russian to be the most important languages for them. 83.9 of the respondents want school instruction in Tuba, 41.6% in Tuba and Russian, only 1.9% in literary Altai. The community wants radio and TV broadcasting in Tuba as well as Tuba books and newspapers.

³ Detailed sociolinguistic research on the indigenous peoples of Siberia was conducted in 1967-1970 by the Institute of Philology, the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy under the auspices of V. A. Avrorin, the head of the Department of the Languages of the Siberian Peoples at that time. Valentin Avrorin composed a questionnaire which was used in all the interviews with Siberian indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, the results of this research have never become accessible to the broader public; they can only be used by the members of the Russian Academy. The modern sociolinguistic research conducted by the Institute of Philology was also based on this questionnaire so that the results of both researches could be compared.

3. *The Chalkan*

The total number of Chalkan is unknown because since 1926 they were not mentioned as a separate ethnic group but were counted as Altais. In 2000, a sociolinguistic research project was conducted in the areas populated by the Chalkan by the Institute of Philology of the Siberian Division of the Russian Academy alongside similar research on the Tuba (Ozonova 2001). The research showed that the majority of the Chalkans are bi- and trilingual. The first language is usually Chalkan, the second Russian. 81.6% of the respondents consider Chalkan to be their mother tongue, and 71% can really speak it fluently. This is evidence of the language's vitality. 44.7% of Chalkan also speak Chalkan with the children in their families and only 26.9% prefer Russian. Their command of Russian is very good: 91.5% speak Russian fluently. Only older people have difficulties speaking Russian. They prefer speaking Russian with other Altais because Chalkan is very different from other Altai languages. Thus, Chalkan functions as the language of family communication and of communication within the community. Since Chalkan does not have a literary form and is not written, the Chalkan use Russian in written communication. At school, Chalkan children learn literary Altai. They consider it a foreign language because it differs greatly from their idiom. The majority of Chalkan wish Chalkan to be taught at school as a school subject.

4. *The Teleut*

The Teleut are one of the smallest ethnic groups among the Siberian peoples. At present there are approximately two and a half thousand Teleut living in the southern part of Western Siberia in the cities of the Kemerovo Region, Altai Region and Altai Republic. Most Teleut are rural inhabitants: almost two thousand of them live in the villages Bekovo, Čeluxoevo, Verxovskaja, Šanda, Novo-Bačaty, and Teleuty. These villages are situated on the territory of the Belovsk, Gur'evsk and Novokuznetsk Districts of the Kemerovo Region. This group is called *Bachat Teleut* according to their main place of settlement on the banks of the Bolšoj and Malyj Bačat, a left tributary of the Inja River, which flows into the Ob River. At the beginning of the 20th century the Teleut groups were more numerous. Now they have become part of the Kalmaks of the north-west part of the Kemerovo Region who accepted Islam, the Čergin Teleut of the Altai Republic who have accepted the Altai ethnic identity, or the Zarinsk Teleut in the Altai Region who have become Russified (Funk 1993).

As early as the 1970s, Galina Fisakova came to the conclusion that Teleut is an independent language and not an Altai dialect (1979). However, the contemporary Teleut grammar and lexicon have not yet been sufficiently described, although scientific research on Teleut already goes back about two centuries. Sys-

tematic research on Teleut began with the onset of missionary activity by the so-called Altai Orthodox Mission. The Russian Orthodox Church began propagating Christianity among Siberian indigenous peoples as soon as Siberia became a part of the Russian Empire. The Altai Mission, founded in 1828, spread its influence over the territory of Mountainous Shoria, Mountainous Altai, and the Minusinsk Region, where Turkic-speaking indigenous peoples of Siberia (the Altais, Shors, Teleut, and Kumandy) lived. The first heads of the Altai Mission, Father Makarij (Gluxarev) and Father Stefan (Landyšev), founded the “new Siberian mission” which was based on the philosophy of the importance of studying the languages, traditions, and beliefs of aboriginal peoples. The Altai missionaries preached in the native languages of Siberia’s aborigines. They translated Christian literature into Altai, Shor, Teleut, and Kumandy. These translations were made with the help of priests who came from among the indigenous peoples, and were based on a deep knowledge of Siberia’s mythological traditions and languages. The Altai missionaries published books in the indigenous languages of the Siberian people, founded primary and secondary schools, and religious higher schools where they trained national priests and teachers for national schools. All this was preceded by long-term “field work” and intensive scientific research, conducted by the linguists of the Altai Mission. The results of the research were presented in the *Grammar of the Altai language (Grammatika altajskogo jazyka)*, published in Kazan’ (anon. 1869). A Turkic-Russian dictionary of the Turkic languages of South Siberia followed a few years later (Verbickij 1884). Thus, Teleut was even the first literary language in Mountainous Altai due to the fact that the Teleut were baptized first. However, being the language of an ethnic minority, it could not establish itself as a literary variety for the whole Turkic-speaking population of Mountainous Altai .

The language is acutely endangered (Nasilov 2002: 177-179). The processes of language shift are proceeding very rapidly: in 1979, only 56.1% of the Teleut spoke Teleut at home (Korusevko 1980). Since 1980, nobody has done sociolinguistic research on the Teleut. However, according to the Teleut’s own estimate, the situation has become even worse. Although Teleut is now taught as a subject at school in the village of Bekovo, there is little interest in this course on the part of the Teleut. The problem is that there are no trained teachers of Teleut. Some Teleut students are now studying at the Department of the Shor Language and Folklore, the Kuzbass State Pedagogical Academy; they are being trained as teachers of Teleut, but their knowledge of Teleut leaves much to be desired.

The Teleut were also included in the list of officially recognized Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East in 1993 and in the List of Indigenous Minorities of the Russian Federation by the Decree of the Russian Government No. 255 from 24 March 2000. According to the latter, the Teleut are estimated to number 3000 people. Thus, they are officially considered to be an ethnic minority that requires help and assistance from the state.

5. *The Telengit*

The Telengit were officially recognized as a separate ethnic group only in 2000 by the Decree of the Russian Government No. 255 from 24 March 2000. Consequently, earlier censuses classified them as Altai. According to the *List of Indigenous Minorities of the Russian Federation*, there are 15,984 Telengit. In 1990, the Russian Legislation began a discussion on the Indigenous Minorities. This stimulated the processes of ethnic consolidation and ethnic revival. In 1995, the Association of Southern Altai People *Telengit* was founded. The Northern Altai ethnic groups had already founded their own association in 1992. These developments contradicted the official policy of the Altai Republic which aimed at consolidating all Turkic-speaking ethnic groups in Mountainous Altai into an Altai nation. On the other hand, the ethnic revival stoked the interest of the broader public and of scientists in these groups and their long ethnic history.

The ethnonym *tele* is found in Chinese sources beginning in the fifth-sixth centuries. Until the seventeenth century, a Telengit-Teleut macro-ethnic group inhabited practically the whole of Southern Altai. In the beginning of the sixteenth century a compact group of Teleut moved to the territories adjacent to the southern reaches of the Ob River. They became Russian citizens and gradually formed a separate ethnic group. At the same time, Mongol tribes moved to the Southern and Central Altai and took part in the formation of the Telengit and *Altai-kiži* ethnic groups. In the south-eastern and southern parts of Mountainous Altai, an ethnic group of Telengits has formed who have preserved the ethno-cultural heritage of the previous epochs (Šerstova 1999: 65-75).

The Telengit populate the areas where the territories of Russia, Mongolia and Kazakhstan meet. They have preserved their traditional beliefs, traditional culture and their language, which is very close to literary Altai. Shamanism still plays a very important role in their ethnic culture. A peculiar feature in the areas where they live is the coexistence of Shamanism with practically all of the major world religions – Buddhism, Islam and Christianity. The national revival is now also connected with a revival of Orthodoxy among the Teleut. This movement is headed by Father Makarij – an Orthodox priest, himself a Teleut, whose family preserved the Orthodox religion during the decades of oppression. Beginning in the 1990s, traditional institutions of power (councils of the elders) were gradually restored by the Telengit community, similar to what was done by the *Altai-kiži* community. For example, in 1995, at a meeting of the representatives of all Telengit living in the village of Muxor-Tarxata in the Koš-Agač District, the elders (Telengit *zajsan*) of all the clans (Telengit *söök*) were elected. At presidential elections in the Altai Republic in 1997, there were more than ten candidates; the majority of them had been delegated by the clan structures (Oktjabr'skaja 2003).

Some conclusions

As we have seen, all the ethnic groups of the Altai Republic are trying to restore or to revive their traditional cultures and to preserve their languages. Today, they have a historic opportunity to realize these goals thanks to the assistance that the Russian State proclaims to give to indigenous ethnic minorities. However, ethnic revival in the Altai Republic is also connected with the growth of ethno-social tension. The republic numbers about eighty-five-thousand Turkic-speaking people altogether, which amounts to only thirty percent of its total population. As a result of the Northern and Southern Altai Turks' revived ethnic self-identification, the *Altai-kizi* ethnic group is also in the process of becoming an ethnic minority itself. Altai national leaders are very much worried that the disintegration of the Altai nation would bring about the disintegration of the republic in the long run. National sentiments were especially sensitive before the 2002 Russian census. There were rumours that the republic would be joined to the Altai Region and lose its national sovereignty. The Russian minister in charge of ethnic affairs had to come to Gorno-Altajsk, the capital of the Altai Republic, in order to reassure the Altai peoples that no such plans existed (Oktjabr'skaja 2003). The census has taken place; the republic still exists and is rapidly developing its economy and social structures. But the problems of its indigenous minorities have not yet been solved; this especially concerns the ethnic groups whose ethnic cultures and languages are acutely endangered. Gorno-Altajsk experts see a way out for them in switching to literary Altai rather than to Russian if they want to preserve their Turkic identity, since the prospects for their own linguistic varieties are not so promising. According to this view, literary Altai should become a uniting factor for all the Turkic-speaking peoples of Altai (Tybykova 2004). There are no resources (or no political will?) to introduce the mother tongues into school education at least as curricular subjects – no teachers, no teaching materials, no scientific foundation for creating teaching materials since the languages have not been sufficiently described. Therefore, it is put forward that they should learn literary Altai, but that during the Altai lessons they should always contrast their own linguistic variety with literary Altai (Tybykova 2004). While this could work well enough for the Telengit, whose language is not further from literary Altai than some dialects of the *Altai-kizi*, it would certainly not be possible even for Teleut, to say nothing of the Northern Altai linguistic varieties that are closer linguistically to Shor and Khakas than to literary Altai.

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The Gagauz Between Christianity and Turkishness

Astrid Menz

The Gagauz are a small Turkish community with probably not more than 300,000 members, living mainly in the Balkans. The main group of about 200,000 members lives on the territory of the former Soviet Union; according to the 1989 census roughly 150,000 Gagauz live in the Republic of Moldova and about 31,000 in the neighboring regions of the Ukraine. The second biggest group lives in Bulgaria, but their number is uncertain. Different authors have estimated between 30,000 and 300,000 Gagauz in Bulgaria. According to a 1992 Bulgarian census, they number 1478, only 402 of whom have Gagauz as their mother tongue. This surprisingly low number can be explained by the fact that the Gagauz language is rapidly being given up due to the way the Gagauz in Bulgaria conceive of their ethnic identity. I will go into the details of this self-conception below.

Although small groups of Gagauz are living in Greece, Romania, Turkey, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus and even South America, I will concentrate in what follows on the two main groups: the Gagauz in the Republic of Moldova and the Ukraine and the Gagauz of Bulgaria.

What makes the Gagauz different from the other Turkish groups in the Balkan countries is the fact that they are Orthodox Christians. Closely connected with their faith is the question of their ethnogenesis. There is no consensus among researchers about the origin of the Gagauz. And what is even more important is that the two main groups of Gagauz adhere to two completely different theses about their ancestors and thus their history. In view of the fact that the Gagauz living on the territory of the former Soviet Union migrated there from Bulgaria only about 200 years ago, the different opinions about their history and, connected with this, their ethnic identity, need to be explained.

In outlining the different theses of historians about the Gagauz ethnogenesis, I restrict myself to the major points that are of importance for the Gagauz in the re-making of their history: Basically, the various theses brought forth by historians can be divided into two main branches, one claiming a Turkic origin and the other a non-Turkic one, either Greek or Slavic, i.e. Bulgarian.

The Turkic thesis has two main subgroups: One that claims that the Gagauz are descendents of Pechenegs and Kumans who migrated from the north into Bulgaria where they mingled with Oghuz Turks. This thesis could explain their Christian faith, but it should be noted that there are no traces of a Kipchak origin in the Gagauz language, which is purely Western Oghuz and has been classified as a Turkish dialect (Doerfer 1959 and Doerfer 1965).

The other one claims a purely Oghuz origin, positing that a group of Seljuk Turks from Anatolia migrated in the 13th century to the Byzantine Empire,

adopted Christianity and were settled by the Byzantine Emperor in Dobruja, which is today part of Bulgaria and Romania.

The non-Turkic thesis claims that the Gagauz were simply Bulgarians or Greeks who supposedly changed their language in order to avoid pressure from the Ottoman authorities. Supporting this thesis are mostly anthropological arguments and the fact that the Gagauz language shows – mainly syntactic – similarities with Slavic languages. Its proponents are mainly researchers from the respective countries, i.e. Bulgaria and Greece.¹

It is difficult or even impossible to decide about the various theses because of the sparse historiography. A group with the ethnonym Gagauz was first mentioned in sources when a large group migrated to Bessarabia after the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812 (Radova 1995: 268). Before that time nothing of their history is certain. This leaves room for all kinds of speculations and constructions concerning their ethnogenesis.

Yet another problem is the very ethnonym Gagauz. There have been various attempts to establish a Turkic etymology of the word Gagauz, all of which suffer from various shortcomings with regard to language history. Without going into the details of the various etymological attempts, it can be said that what they all have in common is that they try to connect the ethnonym Gagauz with the Turkic tribal name *Oghuz* (Güngör & Argunşah 1991: 4-7 and Pokrovskaya 1996). I should like to emphasize, however, that all these attempts ignore the fact that two early anthropological works on the Gagauz in Bulgaria, Pees 1894 and Jireček 1891, state that the term Gagauz is not a self-designation, but one used only by their Bulgarian and Greek neighbors. The Gagauz themselves felt, according to these works, offended by this designation and referred to themselves either, according to their religion, as Greeks or, connected with the then rising nationalism, as Bulgarians.

I have conducted two linguistic fieldwork projects on the Gagauz language: one in 1993 in Bulgaria and one in 1995 in the Republic of Moldova. Most strikingly, when speaking with members of the respective groups about their history and self-perception as a group different from the majority in their countries was that all Gagauz in Bulgaria described themselves as “pure Bulgarians”, *temiz Bulgar* in Gagauz, whereas the Gagauz in Moldova claimed a Turkic descent.

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In Bulgaria every one of the few Gagauz I spoke to emphasized the fact that the Gagauz were of Bulgarian descent. They uniformly explained the fact that the Gagauz spoke Turkish with their wish to keep their faith under the pressure of Ottoman rule. They referred to the Pomaks, who acted the other way round and converted to Islam. I heard many stories about young girls who had thrown

¹ For a detailed discussion of the various theses see Özkan 1996: 10ff.

themselves into the Black Sea to avoid a forced marriage to an Ottoman nobleman or rape by Ottoman soldiers. This seems to be a common theme among the various ethnic groups from the region and is still vivid also among those who migrated to Moldova. During my fieldwork in Moldova a Gagauz painter gave me a small booklet that contained a ballad about a girl who threw herself into the Danube to escape her Ottoman abductors. Her last words are: “Instead of becoming a servant to the Turks, it is better to become a meal for the fish.”²

One explanation for this rejection of Turkishness is of course the very rigid ethnic policy, to say the least, of the Bulgarian government from the 1960s on that reached its peak in 1984-85. This policy, which aimed at building a single-nation state by assimilating all and especially the Muslim minorities, led even to a complete denial of the existence of a Turkish minority in Bulgaria. All Muslims of Bulgaria accordingly were understood to be Bulgarians who had been forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman period (see Eminov 1997). Such a rigid ethnic policy that included discrimination regarding job opportunities, language usage, etc. made it much more attractive for a Christian minority to explain their diversity as a result of external forces. It should be noted, however, that as early as 1891 Jireček noticed that the Gagauz tended to register as Greeks or Bulgarians in the national census. That points to the fact that religion is the main factor for the Gagauz of Bulgaria in selecting their ethnic or in this case even national identity. On the other hand, we can see in the materials from Bulgaria published by Zajączkowski 1966 that as late as the 1960s the Gagauz at least knew and maybe even sang folk songs whose theme was the Ottoman struggle against Russia for dominance on the Balkans. Similar songs are also given in Moškov 1904 and Manov 1938. This indicates that the strong rejection of Turkishness among the Gagauz of Bulgaria is indeed an outcome of the recent Bulgarian nationalist policies.

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In Moldova the situation is different, as I mentioned above. The Gagauz settlement of the southern part of Moldova and the Ukraine goes back to the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. The Russian Empire invited Christian settlers from Bulgaria, especially after the Ottoman-Russian war of 1806-1812, to settle on this fertile soil and fill the gap that occurred with the forced exile of the Tatars who had formerly lived in this region. The Gagauz were a relatively privileged group in the Russian Empire, enjoying exemption from taxes and military service (see Troebst 1999).

² The ballad was given in a Moldovan, a Gagauz and a Bulgarian version together with a Russian translation. The different subtitles: “Moldovan folk ballad”, “Gagauz folk ballad”, and “Bulgarian folk ballad” exemplify that the same theme was common in the folk literature of these three ethnic groups. The booklet was published in 1988 (Ryvkina 1988) under the title *Dunajskaja ballada* [Danubian ballad].

Under Romanian rule, however, between 1866 and 1878 and especially after 1918 they were pressed to assimilate and partly forced to settle into Romania proper. They had to perform military service where they were forced to speak Romanian. Efforts were made to teach Romanian also in the villages. One result of this is the dictionary compiled by the Gagauz priest Mihail Ciachir published in 1938.

In 1944 Moldova finally fell to the Soviet Union and Sovietization might well have fostered the already anti-Romanian feelings. In 1957 came the official recognition of Gagauz as one of the languages of the Soviet Union and the introduction of a Cyrillic-based alphabet. Despite the fact that the Gagauz language and Turkish are linguistically closely related, Soviet researchers stressed an assumed Kipchak layer in the Gagauz language, probably to emphasize a distance between Gagauz and Turkish. Between 1960 and 1962 Gagauz language instruction was given in schools with Gagauz pupils. This was abolished in 1962 allegedly because parents preferred a monolingual Russian education. Nevertheless the Soviet-wide censuses of 1974 and 1989 indicate that the Gagauz tended to stick to their native tongue more closely than other minorities of the Soviet Union.³ As a written language, however, it was only used in a supplement of a newspaper and some literary works, mainly folk poetry, after 1962.

With Perestroika and Glasnost came a radicalization of the Romanian majority against the Soviet government on the one hand and the possibility for the Gagauz to articulate their demands for greater cultural autonomy on the other. When the Romanian Popular Front started their separatist policy, leading to the language law of 1989 that declared Romanian the sole official language, introduced the Latin script and aimed at a reunion with Romania proper, the Gagauz became more radical and began to strive for territorial independence. Alongside with or even caused by this differentiation from and rejection by the Moldovans – in 1990 the Moldovan parliament declared the Gagauz an ethnic minority whose homeland is Bulgaria – the Gagauz started a search for their history and put forward a claim of being a nation (*narod/balk*) (Demirdirek 1996). Another outcome of this policy was the strengthening of the Gagauz language. I will not go into the political struggle which led to the establishment of an autonomous region, *Gagauz Yeri*, in 1994 (Troebst 1999). Rather I shall focus on the major factors for the Gagauz in selecting their national identity, or, to be precise, in arguing for constituting a nation instead of an ethnic minority.

First, I would like to stress that according to my observations the questions surrounding Gagauz identity, history, and ethnogenesis are mainly of interest to

³ A comparison of the 1974 and 1989 census results concerning the Gagauz is given in Fane 1993; the results of the 1989 census can be found in a database on the ethnic minorities of Russia constructed by the Center for Russian Studies at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, accessible on the Internet: <http://www.nupi.no/RUSSLAND/DATABASE/start.htm>

a group of urban intellectuals. Most Gagauz villagers are more or less unaffected by a search for an independent Gagauz identity. For them, however, it was crucial that Romanian not become the only official language of the Republic of Moldova because only 4% of all Gagauz know Romanian, and that reunification with Romania proper not take place because of the negative image of Romania stemming from the past. Additionally, the daily struggle in a declining economy takes much of their energy. Most villagers I talked to were nostalgic about Soviet times, surely because they were economically much better off then. Freedom of travel, for example, is not that important when you cannot afford to buy fuel, as one villager explained to me. The idea of an independent Gagauz state was dismissed by most simply for pragmatic reasons. They did not feel close to Turks from Turkey mainly because Turks are Muslims while they are Christians. Secondly, they did not feel close to Turks because all the Turks they had ever seen were businessmen while they were farmers. As one man told me: “They don’t earn their money by the sweat of their brows”.

Villagers therefore felt not “Turkish” but simply Gagauz. They differed from the Moldovan majority in language, partly in custom and in their political and economic interests. Religion thus served to distinguish the Gagauz from the Turks of Turkey but was not strong enough to displace Gagauz identity in favor of Moldovan identity in the post-Soviet period.

The intellectuals on the other hand felt closer to the Turks from Turkey. They particularly welcomed the attempts at cultural and economic support from Turkey. Still they felt a need to distinguish themselves from the Muslim Turks (see also Demirdirek 2001: chapter 5). This led to a reconstruction of the history of the Gagauz, partly with the help of older theories about their ethnogenesis. According to this reconstruction, an Oghuz nomadic tribe “Guzi” migrated from the north and settled in Dobruja, where they mixed with the Pechenegs and Kuman. The Seljuk theory, and with it an Anatolian and, more importantly, Muslim history, was thus disregarded. Even the Scythes sometimes serve as ancestors for the Gagauz, an ancestry which is somehow quite popular among the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union. There is also a claim for the existence of an independent Gagauz state in Dobruja that allegedly flourished until it fell under “the control of the Ottoman conquerors in the XV century”⁴. For the Moldovan Gagauz the “many oppressive years under Ottoman rule”⁵ serve as an explanation for their migration into Bessarabia, and not as a claim of not being Turkic. Gagauz intellectuals emphasized their “Turkic” identity by means of the aforementioned reconstructed history and an increased use of “Turkic” motifs, especially from the great heroic past in the fine arts.

⁴ <http://www.yotor.org/wiki/en/ga/Gagauz.htm>

⁵ <http://www.governpub.com/Languages-G/Gagauz.php>

Language is, of course, a very important factor in establishing ethnic identity. It is thus no surprise that questions of language became of great importance and have been hotly debated since the period of Perestroika. Since the Gagauz share their faith and a good deal of folklore with Moldovans, Bulgarians and Russians, language is the main cultural difference among them. Connected with this is also the struggle to keep a distance from Turkishness of Turkey in order to justify being a separate nation and not just an ethnic group of immigrants on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The fear of being “swallowed up” by a much larger Turkic group can also have played a part in this. In 1995 Gagauz language classes were offered 3 hours per week in all village schools with Gagauz population. The rest of the curriculum was in Russian. In 1990 a Gagauz university was opened in Komrat. Discussions took place among intellectuals concerning what could be done to enrich the Gagauz lexicon, especially in the areas of technology and the sciences, in order to arrange for an exclusively Gagauz curriculum. One group favored adopting words from Turkish whereas another group favored Russian loans. It was argued that the respective vocabulary in Turkish was foreign, namely Arabic, anyway and that if the alternative was to use loans for scientific and technical terminology it would make more sense to use the loans already known to all Gagauz. The plans for a Gagauz curriculum were, however, not carried out.

The change of the alphabet from a Cyrillic-based to a Latin-based one was much disputed among the Gagauz in 1995. Again there was a group opting for a “Turkish” solution, i.e. the adoption of the Latin-based alphabet for Turkish, which was supported by Turkey. The other group opted for an individualized solution, arguing that the Turkish alphabet would not suit the Gagauz language because of phonetic differences. The latter group prevailed, and at the end of 1995 the new Latin-based alphabet was agreed upon. It differs from the Turkish alphabet in that it lacks the so-called soft-g and has an additional sign for the dental affricate ṭ in Russian and Romanian loans as well as a sign for an open e and for a presumed back e.

While language and the alphabet were still much debated in the public, print media in Gagauz started to flourish. The first Gagauz newspaper was *Ana Sözü* based in Kishinev, the capital of the Republic of Moldova.⁶ This newspaper was much criticized for its language. Its editors, like many Gagauz intellectuals, had attended Turkish language courses in Turkey and used words and phrases that the average Gagauz reader could not easily understand. Other newspapers were founded in Komrat, the capital of Gagauz Yeri, and Ciadir Lunga, the second biggest city. A one-hour weekly television program in Gagauz was broadcasted from Kishinev. Besides this, Turkish television was quite popular where available because of its entertaining programs. This, by the way, had an impact on the language, too. There has also been an intensive search for “famous” Gagauz persons

⁶ Since February 2005 *Ana Sözü* is accessible on the Internet: www.anasozu.com

in history. One of these famous Gagauz is Mihail Ciachir, a Gagauz priest, who was the first to write and publish in the Gagauz language. In 1934 he published a book on the history of the Gagauz (Ciachir 1934), in which he emphasizes their Turkic origin, even going so far as to state that the Gagauz spoke a purer Turkish than the Turks of Turkey. His history book continues to have a great impact on the ethnic concept of the Gagauz in the Republic of Moldova.

The declaration of Gagauz as one of the official languages of the Republic of Moldova in 1994 as well as its usefulness when traveling to Turkey led to a rise in the language's prestige. Thus parents who had been raising their children monolingually in Russian, because they thought the mastering of Russian most useful for the future of their children, now started to speak Gagauz with their children again.

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For both the Gagauz of Bulgaria and those of the autonomous region, religion is a decisive factor defining their ethnicity. While in Bulgaria it is used to claim Bulgarian ancestry, in the Republic of Moldova it serves to differentiate the Gagauz from the linguistically closest group, the Turks of Turkey. Language is practically no factor for the Gagauz of Bulgaria and consequently is not passed on to the next generation. In the autonomous region in Moldova language is the most important criterion for "Gagauzness". The efforts to pass on the language to the younger generation, a broader production of texts written in Gagauz, and, finally, the enrichment of the language are a logical outcome of this importance.

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“The Spirit of Manas Lives” The Importance of the Manas Epic for the Formation of the Nation of Kyrgyzstan

Hanne Straube

The “dismissal” into independence

In the course of the dissolution of the USSR, on August 31, 1991, the former partial Kyrgyz republic announced its independence and became a nation-state.¹ The new republic, however, was not created through a revolution or a liberation struggle against a colonial power but rather became independent through a “dismissal process”. Strictly speaking, the “burden of independence” (Mangott 1996: 65) was imposed.²

Kyrgyzstan, once part of a world power, was faced with the task of consolidating itself and finding its own position inside the new nation and for the outside world. Ways to social integration and the creation of a nation-state identity had to be found to fill the identity gap and the absence of a sense of national consciousness. With the collapse of the USSR, a decades-long standing framework broke down. In order to secure stability in times of transformations and crisis, a plausible ideology with reliable powers of integration is needed.

¹ This essay is based on empirical material that I collected through the support of the German Research Foundation (DFG) during several field visits, altogether for five months between 1999 and 2000. The research project “Ethnic-national identity determination and historical sense of consciousness building in the formation of the young Central-Asian republics Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan” was carried out from 1999 to 2002. It was part of the interdisciplinary study group “Sense of consciousness concepts as life and action determining orientation systems”, which took place from April 1, 1997 to March 31, 2002 under the leadership of Professor Dr. Klaus E. Müller and Professor Dr. Jörn Rüsen at the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut in Essen.

I was aided in translating literature, interviews and personal communications from Russian and Kyrgyz by my colleagues Mairamkul Sopueva, Šarapat Alieva, Ainura Kapalova and Dr. Pamira Kadyrbekova. Professor Dr. Marcel Erdal, Frankfurt/Main, Professor Dr. Mark Kirchner, Gießen and PD Dr. Claus Schönig, Istanbul, provided me with suggestions and advice on Turkish issues. The cultural anthropologist Doris Stennert read and critically commented on this text. The social anthropologist and member of our study group Dr. Britta Duelke substantially shaped this contribution through her suggestions and editorial review. The social anthropologist Dr. Monika Krenzel and Mr. Kurt Jauker helped with the translation from German to English. To all of them, my sincerest thanks.

² In the course of a referendum on March 17, 1991, still 94.5% of Kyrgyz citizens expressed their wish to remain with a renewed socialist Soviet Union (Trutanow 1994: 213).

During Soviet times, Kyrgyzstan belonged to the underdeveloped union republics, especially with regard to its infrastructure, industrialization, and the public health system (Götz/Halbach 1996: 209). Its political and economic needs make Kyrgyzstan today one of the structurally most unstable of the Central Asian states. The existing social fragmentation shows itself in regional, tribal and inter-ethnic conflicts because, beside the Kyrgyz, members of more than 80 ethnic or religious groups live in the titular nation.³ 75% of the population is Muslim, 20% Russian-Orthodox and 5% are members of other religions.⁴

The situation at the dismissal into independence therefore was not simple. The national rebirth of the linguistic and cultural identity was not only a key issue among the Kyrgyz population but also among many minorities. The constitution of an integrating “ideology” consequently became a national balancing act (Straube 2003: 291f).

The multi-ethnic situation, fueled by nationalistic propaganda, had already led to problems in the summer of 1990. In the area around Oş, in the southern Ferghana valley, which is populated by Kyrgyz, Tajiks and a large Uzbek minority, bloody confrontations resulting from the distribution of land near Uzgen took place. These escalated into a pogrom against the Uzbek minority and came to a halt only through military intervention (Tabišalijeva 1999: 21; Tishkov 1995: 134f).

In Kyrgyzstan, the question arises as to how far national identity and ethnic heterogeneity allow for a peaceful coexistence. Already in 1993, the “Republic of Kyrgyzstan” was renamed “Kyrgyz Republic”, a nominal start for establishing ethnic priorities. Indeed, President Askar Akaev propagated his concept of a “State of the Kyrgyz” in January 1994 under the guiding principle: “Kyrgyzstan – our common house” (Akaev 1995a: 91f). He emphasized that all groups in the country have a common history, and insisted on speaking of the “people of Kyrgyzstan” and not the “peoples of Kyrgyzstan”, stressing that this is in the spirit of the new constitution and, moreover, politically, historically and morally correct. In order to ensure inter-ethnic and national harmony, an “Assembly of the Peoples of Kyrgyzstan” was founded to protect the national interests of the different ethnic groups and to provide solidarity among the peoples of the Kyrgyz Republic (Elebaeva 1999: 190). The “Assambleja” – according to the model of an ethno-cultural self-administration prescribed by the state – is essentially an instrument for the prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts. 28 national culture centers

³ A nation is defined as “titular” when its name is derived from the “people” in the numerical majority.

⁴ Of the 4,822,938 persons living in Kyrgyzstan in 1999, 64.9% were Kyrgyz, 13.8% Uzbeks, 12.5% Russians, 1.1% Dungans, 1% Ukrainians, 1% Uigurs, 9% Tatars, 9% Tajiks, 7% “Turkish”, 4% of German origin, 4% Korean and 1.5% other ethnic groups (National Statistical Committee 2000: 26).

which offer language and cultural education were opened. In fact, however, an increase in ethnification of the nation-state can be observed. In all areas of public life, Kyrgyz patriotism and a trend to “ethnocracy” and “Kyrgyzization” are increasingly noticeable and lead to the exclusion from important positions of members of other ethnicities.

The current demographic circumstances are the result of Soviet settlement policies aimed at the assimilation of different nationalities. According to these policies, which also included plans for language and education, after the October Revolution the Soviet nation was to proceed in three phases: The different cultures and ethnic groups were first to “flourish”, and then “become close to each other”, and finally to “merge” into a single nation. In 1971 the process was declared completed and the ethnic question resolved (Von Gumpfenberg 2002: 29f). Actually, however, the problems of living together had not been resolved. Despite, or because of, the forced assimilation of different ethnicities in Central Asia over decades, the inter-ethnic, socio-cultural and economic chasms had been deepened. Not a multi-cultural but a bi-cultural society existed in Kyrgyzstan. The conflict lines ran not primarily between Kyrgyz and Russians but between urban and rural, between Russian, “Russified” and less “Russified”, between educated and uneducated, richer and poorer, privileged and less privileged segments of the population.

Also, with regard to the “language question”, the state has to perform a balancing act. The legislation on the statuses of the Russian and Kyrgyz languages is among the most disputed controversies in the country. With the end of the Soviet Union, the non-titular ethnic groups feared a loss of their privileges and positions, which caused a strong exodus, particularly between 1990 and 1994 (Landau/Kellner-Heinkele 2001: 27). This was also influenced by the 1989 law that made Kyrgyz the official state language, and by the occurrences in Uzgen and the deteriorating economic situation.

Organizations, government institutions and the educational sector were expected to complete the transition to Kyrgyz as the state language by January 5, 1998 (Elebaeva 1999: 183; Anderson 1999: 45). The non-Kyrgyz were to learn Kyrgyz. The high migration rate of the non-Kyrgyz population, however, had a very negative influence on the economy of the country, leading to a temporary postponement of the “language question”. Surprisingly, in May 2000, Kyrgyzstan was declared a bilingual state. The legislation which, besides Kyrgyz, now acknowledged Russian as an “official language”, was supposed to represent a step toward a society open to *all* Kyrgyz, independent of their ethnicity. This decree, however, is qualified by another regulation that encourages Kyrgyz from Afghanistan to settle in Kyrgyzstan, making it clear that Kyrgyzstan sees itself as the homeland of all Kyrgyz (Megoran 2000).

The question of whether the titular nation emphasizes the creation of a Kyrgyz identity or an identity of Kyrgyzstan can be examined by looking at the my-

tho-poetic and political way the *Manas* epic⁵ has been adopted for the construction of a nation-state ideology.

The Manas epic

Since the collapse of the USSR, many of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia have discovered the use of epics for political purposes. Until independence, the *Manas* epic, which was handed down only orally until 1858, belonged strictly to the realm of literature. After 1991 the epos became a symbol of national unity, meant to serve the consolidation of peoples and nationalities assembled in a sovereign, democratic state. The resultant ideological vacuum was supposed to be filled with values from the *Manas* epic to allow the rebirth of an identity based on myths of the past. President Akaev made the *Manas* memorial cult a personal priority. *Manasologists*, Kyrgyz scientists who research the epic, support him.

Approximately 10 months after the declaration of independence, on June 26, 1992, the parliament passed a mandate on the short and long term – beyond the year 2000 – strategic use of the epic for the development of a new nation state ideology (Kumar 1998: 17). The epic was to be embedded in history through a millennial celebration in 1995 and the erection of historic memorials. Studies about Kyrgyz history were to be publicized; literature, art, theater, music and movies about the *Manas* epic were to be produced for the population.

Today the *Manas* epic is projected to the world as an essential component of Kyrgyz identity and nationality. The epic is represented as the “spiritual treasury” of the Kyrgyz culture. For President Askar Akaev, it is *the* Kyrgyz contribution to world culture. The epic is considered as a foundation that supports several pillars of identity. The epic is used for the revitalization and enrichment of the language, for the recollection of pre-colonial traditions and for the retrieval of one’s own ethnic history, i.e. to support the “re-Kyrgyzization” of the Kyrgyz. The epic contains, according to popular opinion, ideas of freedom and patriotism, of unity, humanism and independence. It is supposed to serve the moral education of all Kyrgyz, especially the young.

Today, the epic offers help against external and internal enemies: against the disintegration of traditions such as hospitality and respect for one’s elders, against alcohol and drug problems, against tribalism, nepotism and corruption. According to Akaev, it demonstrates that greed and envy do not lead people to do good deeds (Akaev 1997b: 105f). When denouncing economic crime in 1995, Akaev warned that “*the spirit of Manas won’t forgive*” (Akaev 1995b: 159).

What is the epic about? *Manas*, according to Mussajew (1994: 176), deals with a history full of change and with the union of the Kyrgyz clans in their constant

⁵ I have italicized *Manas* when referring to the epic. When the hero is meant, standard writing is used.

fight against hostile neighbors. The epic personalizes this over three generations of the careers and fates of famous leaders. In the center are Manas, his son Semetej, and Semetej's son Sejtej. The number of additional characters, the length, content and sequence of the different episodes vary. The epic, written in verse form, consists of mythical, legend-like and historic episodes. It is recited by bards.

Čokan Valichanov (1835-1865), a Kazakh scientist, came in contact with a Kyrgyz bard in 1856. He was followed by the pioneer of Turkic language studies, W. W. Radloff (V. V. Radlov, 1837-1918), a German-born Russian linguist. In 1862 and 1869 Radloff undertook two expeditions in Kyrgyzstan to examine these languages. As the second "chronicler", he recorded stanzas of the epic. Until the beginning of the Soviet era, no other records of the epic are known. Only during the last decades, has *Manas* been collected in a systematic manner. In 1995, 65 variations of the three parts of the *Manas* epic were available in the Academy of Sciences in Biškek and in the archives in Leningrad (Mussajew 1994: 176, 213).

In its early form, the epic was not in chronological order. It initially became compiled "as a whole" by the bard Sagimbaj Orozbekov (1867-1930). He structured it, beginning with the birth of Manas (Prior 2000: 20). Everyone in Kyrgyzstan knows this epic. That each Kyrgyz is able to recite at least some verses, however, is contrary to my experience.

The content of the epic and the way it is interpreted and dealt with reflect ruling ideologies such as nationalism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism and communism, and, of course, also Soviet policies toward minority nationalities. The use of the epic for political purposes has also changed correspondingly. In 1861, Valichanov therefore called the epic "the Iliad of the steppe". This assessment supported the Soviet leadership's policies toward nationalities in the middle of the 1920s. At that time, it was still deemed desirable for all Soviet peoples to have a characteristic cultural asset at their disposal (Prior 2000: 7). A reevaluation of *Manas* took place, turning the epic into a world epic. Folklore was regarded as the people's valuable heritage that was passed on orally and *unchanged* from one generation to the next. From 1930 onwards, *Manas*, like the other grand epics of the Turkic peoples, was considered by the Soviets as a reactionary cultural product. Those who recorded the epics, like Kasim Tinistanov (1901-1938), were persecuted. The years 1945 to 1947, on the other hand, are regarded as the liberal phase in the politics of nationalities. *Manas* once again became a symbol of Kyrgyz cultural politics. In 1946, a lavishly designed Russian edition of the epic appeared. As a result of the "anti-epic wave" starting in 1951, *Manas* was removed from circulation (Prior 2000: 33f). Consequently one could speak of "epic politics"⁶, "politics with the epic" that were applied and adjusted according to pre-

⁶ Prior (2000) analyzes the history of the reception of *Manas* during the Soviet era. He relies on Abdykarov/Džumaliev (1995), the archived material from 1925 through 1995, governmental decisions, party documents, speeches, etc. and the political actions (including those of the Kyrgyz Communist Party) related to the Kyrgyz epics.

vailing ideological demands. *Manas* was valued, de-valued, suppressed or only selectively published.

The academic examination of epics or oral traditions requires attention be paid to the story tellers themselves in order to take into consideration the mnemonic methods, as well as to modifications made during recitations, to problems with translation, to literalization, etc. (Duchâteau 1988: 351; Vansina 1985). These are aspects that hardly play a role for the local interpretations of the *Manas* epic in Kyrgyzstan. In contrast, examinations by Western scientists (for example the Turkologist A. Hatto) are rejected as “ideological” (Mussajew 1994: 93f).

Many factors influence the rendering of the epic material: the conditions at its writing, perhaps the relationship between bards and chroniclers, as well as current political objectives and areas of interest (Hatto 1990; Prior 2000).⁷ Thus – according to Radloff – a bard might praise *Manas* as a friend of the Russian emperor and of the Russian people (Radloff 1965: xiv). He praises *Manas* as a defender of Islam (ibid.: xi). In the Sagimbaj version, *Manas* is even depicted as a pilgrim to Mecca (Mussajew 1994: 222). Today, the two-volume *Manas* encyclopedia⁸ published in 1995 claims that *Manas* possesses, like other leaders of significant groups, extraordinary gifts which allow him to appear as a messenger of heaven. Even his name points to a divine origin. He is depicted as the son of God, as if created by light, emerging from the figure of the Sun God, or perhaps *Manas* himself is the moon, the sun or her son (*Manas Entsiklopediya* 1995 (1): 402f). These motifs can also be found in other procreation myths.⁹

Numerous central themes of the *Manas* epic are found in Siberian and Central Asian epics, such as the tale of an older, childless married couple that had to wait a long time for offspring (*Manas Entsiklopediya* 1995 (1): 402). According to a popular belief, *Manas*’ mother became pregnant after, in a dream, she ate an apple that had a “parthenogenic” effect (Hatto 1990: 401). A pregnant woman’s craving the heart of a tiger, also a widespread belief, indicates an outstanding personality for the future child (Mussajew 1995: 41). Miraculous events and signs before the birth, such as announcements in dreams and messages from heaven, point to the child’s high potential that is then later confirmed by his exceptional talents, intelligence, courage and skills, his successes and heroic deeds.

Additionally, the narratives describing *Manas*’ path to heroism contain material known in other regions and religions.¹⁰ A group of 40 loyal men from various tribes who treat each other like brothers and who distinguished themselves

⁷ Prior (2000) calls this triangular relationship “patron, party and patrimony”.

⁸ Kariškulov, A. 1995. *Manas Entsiklopediya*. Vol. 1 and 2.

⁹ Cf. Neumann-Hoditz (1995: 21f.), among others, regarding the fathering of the forebear of Činggis Xan in the document “The Secret History of the Mongols.”

¹⁰ Similarly, oral traditions served to idealize the empire’s founder Timur Lenk (1336-1405), who is celebrated in present-day Uzbekistan for his uniting and integrating capacities (Schmitz 1997: 49f)

through strength in battle and loyalty to Manas, form an egalitarian community of shared destiny. Among them are also older, wise men who behave like “fathers” toward Manas. They represent his “new family”, replacing the old, thus creating the image of a “quasi-patrilineal family” (Müller 2003a: 28f). Manas is supposed to have moved with his “40 warriors” into the Ala-Too mountains in order to lead the Kyrgyz people back into the “land of their ancestors” (Mussa-jew 1995: 71). Today, Manas is depicted as the father of the Kyrgyz state. As President Askar Akaev commented:

More than 1000 years ago, ancestors led by Manas founded a Kyrgyz state (...). For various reasons listed in Manas, the state was destroyed. During the following 1000 years, the Kyrgyz were unable to unite and create a state because they were scattered in all directions (...). Today, after 1000 years, the Kyrgyz have received their independence. It is the second attempt in their history to create a free nation. It means that the dying embers of Manas’ fire have reignited. (Akaev 1997: 88)

The reunification then became the creative beginning phase. With the repatriation to the native country, with a firm hand and divine assistance, the hero achieved a new order out of chaos. Through his actions – repatriation and founding of the state – Manas becomes the savior of the Kyrgyz people.

1991 also emerges as a turning point for a new order that was to occur by referring back to its origins. Since Manas had created a state under comparable conditions, the Kyrgyz people could, according to Akaev, view his deeds as a model. Manas could help with important questions such as regulations regarding the journey through life and its directions (Akaev 1997b: 105f).

Today, the epic hero Manas is projected as the Kyrgyz founding father who is distinguished by special qualities, by age, ancestry, and continuity. Taking recourse to such principles of seniority and authority (Müller 2003: 23) provides the foundation for social hierarchies and with it, the supremacy of the Kyrgyz people.

The idea that present-day Kyrgyzstan was the ancestral home of the Kyrgyz, and that the Kyrgyz as an independent people therefore should lead the titular nation is derived directly from the epic by the President and the *Manasologists*. The Kyrgyz are said not only to represent the numerical majority but, as their story documented in the epic also shows, to have had the ability to integrate others. It is said that Manas not only peacefully united members of the different Kyrgyz clans, but also those that were conquered.

Today, Akaev positions the contemporary Kyrgyz people and himself as the successors of Manas (Akaev 1997b: 105f). By referring to Manas and by representing himself as the executor of Manas’ legacy, Akaev also legitimizes his presidency. Like Manas, Akaev sees it as his civilizing mission to introduce democracy. Akaev, as legitimate heir and successor of Manas, becomes himself the savior of the Kyrgyz, and the guarantor of democracy: Manas united, Akaev united. As a charismatic leader, he resembles Manas.

The millennium celebration

Western scholars have already pointed out the difficulties of dating Kyrgyz epics (Prior 2000: 1). Some Kyrgyz researchers attribute an age of 2500 to 3000 years to the *Manas* epic (Atamamedov/Orazov 1995: 7). One of the most popular views is that the epic is 1000 years old.

Plans for the 1000-year celebration of the *Manas* epic existed as early as 1947. The source for the dating, according to Prior (2000: 30f), was an eleven-line, Old Turkish rune inscription found on a tombstone in Mongolia in 1909 on which the year 847 A.D. was recorded. Ramstedt, its discoverer, deciphered the inscription. Since the name of a person mentioned on the stele contained the word *kan*, Bernštam (1910-1956) later concluded that this could refer to “Manas Khan”. Between 1942 and 1946, Bernštam argued in 15 articles the thesis that the inscription makes reference to the *Manas* epic. The Kyrgyz author Tschingis Aitmatow seized the opportunity to propose a *Manas* memorial celebration for which he lobbied during three successive congresses of the Communist party between 1976 and 1986.

After achieving independence, the notion of a national memorial service re-awakened. On the basis of the “arithmetic mentality” (Burke 1999: 97), which leads to the preference of round numbers for celebrations and the staging of “holy years”, after 1991, Aitmatow pushed for the appealing number 1000. He wanted to direct international attention to Kyrgyzstan through a resurgence of Kyrgyz spiritual heritage, demonstrated through celebrations. The year 1995 was declared the “year of national remembrance” (Kumar 1998: 7). The dates for the celebration – August 25th to 30th, 1995 – were, critics today agree, cleverly chosen because shortly thereafter the presidential elections were to take place.

The celebration was based on the proven principle of mimetic representation (Müller 1999: 82). The Kyrgyz tried to place their history, how they wished themselves to be seen, as effectively into the picture as possible. History, it was suggested, should be celebrated communally, and the example of *Manas* should point to the future and create a common identity. The event not only represented “the proof of one’s ancient tradition and an uninterrupted continuity of development but also the integration into ‘world history’” (Müller 1995: 17). UNESCO participated and leading foreign representatives were invited. The staging of the celebration, with its many folkloristic elements and its aim for authenticity, aspired to gain the interest of the global political audience.

With these celebrations, the nation tried not only to place itself into a time-frame, but also to locate itself spatially, since space is an additional component of identity. Monuments were meant to constitute and represent the nation historically and culturally (Tacke 1995: 16). In addition to the preparations for the celebration and in accordance with the edict, historical sites filled with memorabilia were erected. Local examples were meant to serve factuality and establish

authenticity because an event based on a legend without a spatial anchor loses significance. Per a 1992-decree giving the people the ability to visualize the epic, a village was erected near the capital city of Biškek, featuring an architectural “ethnographic memorial complex *Manas Ajili*” to be used for festivities, exhibitions, and to provide tourist appeal (Kumar 1998: 18). Together with this re-enacted ancestral village, a *Manas* memorial site was dedicated during the festival near the city of Talas in western Kyrgyzstan. Both were meant to serve as “commemoration sites” of a political, republican, but also a unified, constitutional Kyrgyz state. Certain variations of the epic from the 19th century locate the “seat of power of *Manas*” (Hatto 1990: 3) in the Talas valley, approximately 400 kilometers west of the capital. Localizing a specific place, where, evidently, decisions were once made, acted to reinforce the “occurrences of that time”. This sacred memorial place, along with a mausoleum from the 14th century, was to serve as a pilgrimage site in remembrance of Manas.

Included in the eternal natural memorials are also an impression of Manas’ foot, the tie-up for his horse, the resting place for the 40 heroes, etc. The complex includes a *Manas* museum where history is objectified by means of the documentation of collected and organized facts with memorabilia such as suits of armor, weapons, etc. serving as conclusive evidence.

While many young Kyrgyz viewed the national staging as something positive, the “Russified” urban Kyrgyz and members of minorities saw it more critically. In their view *Manas* is “ideology”. Much money was spent on the celebration, while unemployment and poverty prevailed.

The seven legacies

For the 1000-year celebration, the President first extracted “three legacies” from the available written variations of the epic and later expanded these to seven. Oral tradition was to be perpetuated. Through the compilation of the legacies, Akaev proved himself not only as a charismatic leader, but also as a “chosen one” with the gift to interpret the *Manas* texts, thereby taking another step in fulfilling his “mission” (Müller 2003b: 272f).

The seven legacies were to become the framework of the national identity. The first legacy demands the “unity of the people”. It warns of fragmentation through regional, tribal and ethnic separatism (Akaev 1997a: 6). The second, “international solidarity, friendship and cooperation” (ibid.: 30), concerns the friendship between ethnicities and nations. In the third, “national honor and civic pride” reminded Akaev of *Manas* and those whose honor it was to die for the people, and urged engagement in the development of the country (ibid.: 42). The fourth legacy commanded “working tirelessly” (ibid.: 52). With the fifth, Akaev calls for “humanism, generosity and forgiveness” (ibid.: 68). The sixth legacy urged “living in harmony with nature” (ibid.: 76). In the seventh legacy,

Akaev appeals for strengthening the Kyrgyz state and “guarding it jealously” (ibid.: 88).

Several institutions, among them the presidential palace itself, issued *Manas* programs to pre-schools, schools and universities, evidence of how methodically and didactically the epic was to be communicated. Instruction was intended to achieve historical awareness and cultural identity. A picture of *Manas* and the “mottoes of the legacies” decorate the lobbies of many Kyrgyz schools. Here, and in universities where Kyrgyz is the language of instruction, “*Manas* programs” are introduced, seldom, however, at Russian-medium institutions.

In his justification of the legacies, Akaev presents himself, like many other leaders of post-colonial states, as someone who was not interested in emulating the Europeans, but rather chose to call upon his “own origins” in order to successfully effect changes and a new beginning.¹¹ He sees the dramatic collapse at the end of the Soviet era as counterbalanced by “autarchic” and “ancestral Kyrgyz” ideas. *Manasologists* support him:

We did not, as many thought, adopt the idea of freedom, patriotism and independence from Europe or other countries. The ideas and the noble, human values, which are of great importance to all humanity, grew out of Kyrgyz ground. In the course of history, they emerged from the agonizing, painful life experiences of the Ala-Too-Kyrgyz. (Baigasiev 1997: 114f)

Concluding remarks

In Kyrgyzstan, one is concerned with building an operable strategy for creating an identity – to formulate this strategy requires a plausible concept of national consciousness. The current situation is directed back at history. One reverts back to an original myth which corresponds to a superior salvation plan and disseminates it as historical reality. This process is driven by the President, who represents himself as both the founder and nurturer of an old and new nationality. In his speeches, he refers to a Kyrgyz state that was founded more than 1000 years ago. The past – the time 1000 years ago – is the starting point and the reference system for the present and the future. The events of that time are conveyed as key actions with exemplary significance for establishing identity. Thus modern-day problems had already been solved in exemplary fashion by *Manas* a millennium ago. The newly established order was to become, as the one founded by *Manas*, an era of salvation. The Kyrgyz consider the oral traditions as “archives” in which memories of “*Manas*-time” are still preserved today. Patriotic bards are entrusted with their delivery. First of all, it was necessary to interpret the ar-

¹¹ C.f. Müller (2003b: 279), who points out examples of African leaders such as Leopold Senghor (1906-2001), Kenneth David Kaunda (born 1924), Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1922-1999).

chives, which the President strove to do through his “seven legacies”. To reinforce the credibility of Manas’ existence, local material documents are produced such as the mausoleum where he is supposedly buried, or the discoveries exhibited in museums. One points to the “tracks” of the hero and his 40 followers, in places of assembly, or his footprints in a rock, as if Manas had erected his own eternal monument himself (Müller 1999: 13). These markers throughout Kyrgyzstan are meant to prove that the Kyrgyz were already living in their current land at that time, and thus that they are autochthonous inhabitants.

Unlike myths, which are supposed to represent sacral and generally unchangeable texts, many ethnologists consider legendary tales, that is, those that report on the feats of ancestors and take place in historic times and well-known locations, as less reliable, indeed “untrue” tales. In principle, such traditions can be modified by anyone (Müller 1995: 12), which also applies to the orally handed down *Manas* epic. Here too, the intentions and ideological backgrounds of the bards and “chronologists” exert influence on the contents and account of the record. For instance, the texts of Sagımbaj Orozbekov (1867-1930), which the Bashkir folklorist Kayum Miftakov (1822-1948 or 1949) took up, show a turn towards a national and pan-Turkish thinking in the epic (Prior 2000: 11f). New in Sagımbaj’s version is the specific use of the term *Türk*. It appears for the first time in the pan-Turkish layout variations, specifically as the ethnonym for *all* Turkic peoples whose homeland is called *Türkistön* (ibid: 15). Consequently, Sagımbaj has nationalized the epic. This may have occurred under the influence of his chronologist, who was a pupil in a Jadidist¹² school which pursued pan-Turkish ideas.

Sagımbaj, for the first time, designated the members of Manas’ tribe as “Kyrgyz” (Hatto 1990: 622). Until then, in keeping with the the Turkic peoples’ tradition of epic heroes, Manas and other central heroes were called Nogay or Nogoij. The term “*Kirgiz*” was seldom used as an ethnonym in epic texts of the mid-19th century. (Hatto 1980: 70; Prior 2000: 15). Western scientists, such as Golden, assume that the ethnonym *Kirgiz* had a political rather than an ethnic function, and that the “modern Kyrgyz” was a creation of the Soviets (Golden 1992: 404f). Dividing lines to other people were hard to draw. Hatto considers it altogether problematic to perceive the epic as “purely” Kyrgyz, and emphasizes that the classification and interpretation of the *Manas* material is very difficult (Hatto 1982: 8).

Conspicuously, as described by Valichanov and Radloff, large discrepancies exist in the routes taken by the Bok Morun, a figure in the epos. Prior, who tested the travel routes, verified that both variations contained only one common toponym: Kopo or Kopu (Prior 1998: 267) – and this despite the fact that

¹² The term Jadidism stands for the reform movement founded by Tatar intellectuals in the 19th century in Kazan. According to Götz and Halbach (1994: 307), Jadidism was an attempt to modernize Islam (especially in the area of formal education) and aimed at emancipating Russian Muslims from colonial rule. On the national level the movement strived to unite the Turk peoples (pan-Turkism).

the names of localities always contained memorization aspects, often with spoken mnemotechnic functions.

In their attempts to make sense of and, at the same time, create and legitimize a national consciousness, Kyrgyzstan officials used strategies which appear to resemble those used in the developing Western European nations around 1800. There too, interest developed in the nation's own heritage, which was to counteract fragmentation. National unity was projected in a supposedly primeval time, from which the nation could emerge as something heaven-sent or a gift of nature. Here too, heroes from earlier times were said to have experienced the "first democracy" (Müller 1995: 12). The "ancient time of the nation" (Stagl 2002: 644f) was thought of as still alive in the tradition of the people. It was the task of the elite to rebuild the national culture thought to have been present originally. Through a "reconnection" to the spiritual world of the ancestors and the reconstruction of one's own spiritual history, a "return" to "pure values" was to be achieved. "National education" faced the fundamental task of conveying the "ancient" values and driving forward the "re-education" of a national character through a new connection with and a new adoption of the "people's heritage". School books, for example, played a significant role in this process (cf. Stagl 1999: 1237).

The process of "nation building" is also viewed in Kyrgyzstan as a "national rebirth" through which the people were to be led back to their roots. The "advanced age of a culture", even when the length of its lifespan is contrived, also creates proven support for ethnic and national identity. Whoever can claim an "older descent" and can prove an unbroken continuity until the present ranks highest. The Kyrgyz represent themselves, therefore, as an autochthonous, quasi "organically" grown community which is historically *unique* and *superior* to the others (Müller 1995: 17). For priority reasons, as also with other founding heroes, the ruler genealogy points to one "God" (Müller 1999: 108), attributing the characteristics of a "savior" to *Manas*.

The *Manasologists* – like the proponents of other national ideologies – depict the Kyrgyz as a community with a common origin and mentality that can serve others as an example by which to orient themselves, and with which others can be expected to connect (Stagl 1999: 1234f). The national unity of the "Kyrgyzstani" is supposed to materialize with the participation of all its inhabitants, but under the guidance of the Kyrgyz people. According to Kyrgyz interpretation, their claim to leadership is undeniable since it is based on an age-old epos which has simply come back to life. With this interpretation of the epic, the exclusion from the post-collapse USSR and the dramatic changes make sense: The turning point constitutes the transition from a gloomy decline to a bright, promising future. Only through this transition is a "revival" of the original state of the Kyrgyz nation and the observance of a paramount, quasi heavenly plan of salvation made possible.

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Syncretism in Salar Love Songs

Arienne M. Dwyer

Having melded Oghuz-Turkic, Tibetan, and Northwest Chinese linguistic and cultural elements, the Salars might be expected to show an equal degree of syncretism in their love songs. Indeed, they have maintained a nearly extinct apparently native song form *yur*, while also adopting the regional Chinese form *hua'er* 花儿. *Yur* are Turkic at least linguistically, though the melodies show Tibetan influences. This paper examines the degree of cultural, linguistic, and musical syncretism in varieties of *yur* songs, with reference to local Chinese and Tibetan love song forms. The use of metaphor is uniquely Salar, whereas musical ornaments are strongly influenced by local prestige forms and usually are Tibetan in origin.

Love songs are strictly taboo in households and villages, and music in general is today frowned upon by most modern Salars. The Turkic *yur* form will likely vanish in the coming decades.

The northern Tibetan plateau in the Chinese cultural context

The northeastern edge of the Tibetan plateau – today southeastern Qinghai and southern Gansu provinces – constitutes a cultural and geographic transition zone. Tibetans and speakers of Chinese (both Han Chinese and Muslim Chinese Huis) are numerically and culturally dominant in the region. Though the area is historically predominantly Tibetan, since the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), Chinese culture has exerted a steadily increasing influence there. Musically, both Chinese and Tibetan traditional and pop songs are popular with all ethnic groups, including the Chinese.

Overall in the People's Republic of China (PRC), non-Hans constitute only 9% of the total population, but are spread over 40% of China's landmass, especially in border areas. China has successfully reconceived the great civilizations it has incorporated on its periphery as planets, which orbit around a Chinese center. Thus, the Uyghurs, Mongols, and Tibetans now count as National Minorities, their territories were "always" a part of China, their musical traditions, once deemed "feudal," are at present considered excitingly raw and ethnic. To maintain the territorial integrity of the modern state, these minorities were encouraged (via the media, education, and selected preferential policies) to consider themselves first Chinese and secondly ethnic. Though government policy forbids ethnic chauvinism, in popular discourse, Han Chinese culture is

still considered superior to that of the minorities.¹ The arts of non-Han groups are not taken seriously, but are commodified, standardized, and staged as colorful tourist events. Many P.R.C. Han Chinese will assert that minorities are people who “love to sing and dance.”²

Capitalizing on the Western fascination with Tibet and the Japanese interest in the Silk Route, since the 1980s the Chinese government has promoted international tourism in minority areas. A decade later, domestic tourists followed suit. More than any other cultural force, however, popular music has begun to mitigate the extreme forms of Han chauvinism: since the 1990s, through local radio, television, and ubiquitous VCDs, the music of major ethnic minorities – particularly that of Tibetans and Mongols – has become quite hip for young people. A number of CDs featuring the “Three Tenors of the Grasslands”³ have appeared. These and other pop artists sing in Chinese but freely make use of traditional melodies of their respective groups. To mark the performance as “ethnic,” native-language phrasal embellishments are often incorporated, and Inner Asian geography is evoked, such as the grasslands and the so-called “Qinghai”-Tibetan Plateau.

In the following excerpt from the popular Tibetan singer Han Hong, a resident of Beijing, the melody is derived from a traditional Tibetan folksong, while the lyrics adhere to acceptable Chinese pop themes, that is, nature, love, and Chairman Mao.

Figure 1: Han Hong 韩红 (2001), *On Beijing's Golden Mountain* [4'03"]

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| 北京的金山上光芒照四方 | On Beijing's Golden Mountain his rays spread to the Four Directions |
| 毛主席就是那金色的太阳 | Chairman Mao is that golden sun |
| 多么温暖 多么慈祥 | How warm, how kindly |
| 把我们农奴的心照亮 | Lighting the hearts of our serfs |
| 我们迈步走在 | We walk step by step |
| 社会主义幸福的大道上 | Down Socialism's prosperous road |
| 哎 巴扎嘿 (in Tibetan) | Aaa.. [pa tʂa xe] |

¹ Actual and metaphoric references to the Hans are associated with masculinity, modernity, and “having civilization,” while references to minorities are associated with exoticism, femininity and sexuality, and “lacking civilization.” Though there is tremendous variation in the degree that people accept the strong form of this conceptual framework, it is still dominant among Hans. Even these minority groups themselves, as well as many foreign China specialists, at least unconsciously accept the idea of these minorities as inferior.

² Indeed, in 2003 more than one P.R.C. Han Chinese graduate student in the U.S., upon applying for a research assistantship on a project concerned with a non-Han group of China, actually made this very statement as a way of expressing interest in and knowledge of this group.

³ This is obviously a riff on the popularized Three Tenors of Europe; their grasslands counterparts are the Mongolian Tengger and the Tibetans Ya Dong and Rong Zhong Er Jia.

The murmured, percussive *pa ṭsa xe* (Tibetan *pa tra be*) constitutes ethnic quotation markers around the profoundly socialist Chinese text. *Pa tra* is a pattern with positive aesthetic associations: it resembles the auspicious endless knot, and is used in Tibetan literature to describe the pattern and texture of lush grasslands or of a carpet. *Pa tra* is also occasionally used in contemporized “traditional” folk songs accompanied by the Tibetan mandolin (*sgra snyan*), which emerged during the 1990s (also known as *rdung len*, see Anton-Luca 2002). The final particle *xe* is onomatopoeic for heroic or girlish laughter.⁴ Thus, the use of Tibetan melodic contours and the final phrase in Tibetan serves to legitimate the traditional roots of modern Chinese ethno-pop.

Though the socialist content of such lyrics may appear anachronistic, in China, even among most members of minority groups, the lyrics go unnoticed or even evoke nostalgia. These Sinified Mongolian and Tibetan pop songs are popular in north Tibet as well. Though in form and substance they have little in common with the local love song forms, their dominance in the media has been a factor in the decline of the Salar *yur*.

The Salars

One of China’s official minority nationalities, the Salars are a Turkic people in origin. They were likely the descendents of Salğur or Salır Turkmens who migrated eastward from Transoxiana to the northeastern edge of Tibet in the thirteenth century as a garrisoned contingent of the invading Chinggisid Mongolian army. Inter-marriage with Tibetans and later with Muslim Chinese has resulted in the development of a tricultural (and largely trilingual) group.

Living on the banks of the Yellow River on the northern edge of the Tibetan plateau, the Salars have a population of close to 90,000, approximately 30,000 of whom are fluent speakers. They trace their own origins to a mythic journey from “Samarkand” accompanied by a white camel and forty volumes of the Qur’an. Regardless of their religious status when they first arrived in northern Tibet, the next six hundred years witnessed the Salars’ involvement in all major streams of Islam in China; since the late 19th century, Kadirriyya and Jahriyya Sufism have been the best represented.

Increasingly, the local Salar religious leaders, *abuns* (*ākḥunds*), have been quite successful in disseminating the notion that good Muslims do not sing, especially not love songs. Contemporary Salar society is thus a paradox: their identity would not have survived without religion, yet precisely because of modern religious interpretation, all other indices of identity (i.e. folklore and language) are nearly extinct.

⁴ I am indebted to Jermay Jamsu for the elucidation of *pa tra be*.

Music and dance are at least publicly frowned upon by most modern Salar, due to this particular interpretation of Islam. The two likely indigenous song forms exist only as artifacts among the a few older members of the population: *yur* [jʉr] love-songs and *sagheshi* [saxəʃi] bridal laments.⁵

Salar song forms, however, can only be meaningfully viewed from within the larger, overlapping Tibetan and Chinese lyric and geographic realms, of which the Salar region of the Yellow River littoral is a part. The Tibetan realm, full of metaphor and embellishments, is best represented by the Tibetan love song form *layi* [lajə]. The love song forms of numerically smaller local groups such as the Salar *yur* and the Monguor *kugurjia* [kʰukərtʃia] forms have been stylistically influenced by *layi*. Much further to the east, away from Salar areas in the Chinese realm, *shan ge* 山歌 love songs are sung. These bear an indirect relation to local song forms insofar as the popular pan-ethnic *hua'er* dialogic songs of the transition zone are in part historically derived from *shan ge* (Schimmelpenninck 1997). *Hua'er* is a genre of dialogic song form sung in Chinese in festivals located in sacred places, clustering temporally around the summer solstice. These songs, which are usually a contest of wits but can constitute a courtship, are beloved by young and old of all ethnic groups. *Hua'er* 花儿 (also know as *shaonian* 少年) singing remains stubbornly popular among all ethnic groups, flourishing despite the disapproval of local Islamic and Daoist leaders.⁶

Figure 2. Lyric realms of Amdo Tibet: a taxonomy of love-song forms

| | | |
|------------------------------|--|--|
| Tibetan realm: | (Tibetan) <i>layi</i> | (sung in Amdo Tibetan) |
| Mono-ethnic, monolingual: | (Monguor) <i>kugurjia</i> | (sung in Minhe Monguor) |
| | (Salar) <i>yur</i> | (sung in Salar, and sometimes NW Chinese) |
| Both realms: | pop songs (e.g. Han Hong, 3 Ten- ors) | (sung primarily in standard Chinese) |
| Pan-ethnic : | <i>hua'er</i> 花儿 'flowers' | (sung in Northwest (NW) Chi- nese) |
| Chinese realm: | | |
| Mono-ethnic: | <i>shan ge</i> 山歌 'mountain songs' | (sung in local Chinese dialects) |

⁵ Bridal laments (*sagheshi*) are extinct, though a few women of the oldest generation can recall and perform them. See Dwyer forthcoming 2006.

⁶ Disapproval of *hua'er* is not limited to the Salar and Chinese Muslim religious leaders; a Daoist nun I met at the foot of Lianhua mountain in 2000 told me, despite her presence at the area's largest and most famous *hua'er* festival (southern Gansu), that her monastery in Shanxi did not condone *hua'er* singing because it was frivolous. Later in our conversation, however, she opened a bundle and out tumbled three of the latest *hua'er* audio cassettes.

The legacy of the Cultural Revolution (in which indigenous forms of cultural expression were persecuted) and fear of the local Imams have resulted in *yur* being taboo in the presence of household members; singers who still know them are very reluctant to sing them. The recordings which form the basis of this article are the result of a Salar colleague's (Mr. Ma Wei) and my coaxing of singers – who hadn't sung in eight or more years – to sing for us. I am indebted to Mr. Ma, and to the singers for their vocal generosity.

Salar music

We know almost nothing about the Salar musical tradition, and have few clues at present: the Salars have no known record of having played musical instruments except the mouth harp (cf. Ma & Ma 1989), which is not in evidence today. In recent years, mouth harps (*kuxεε* < Ch. 口弦, cf. Modern Chinese 口琴) have become available for tourists in Xunhua county. This development reflects external political liberalization: once considered “feudal”, limited ethnic musical expression has been condoned since the 1980s. The mouth harp is also an expression of internal religious belief; several Salars professed to me that “the mouth harp is the only instrument the Prophet Muhammed allowed [his daughter] Fatima” (1993 interviews). It is conceivable under these political and ethno-religious conditions that the use of the mouth harp could be revived and innovated by Salars as a “new tradition.”

Religious music is unknown, nor is there a Salar *makam* or *usul* tradition. Scanty pre-20th century historical materials do not mention Salar music, but there must have been a vocal repertoire and the use of the mouth harp, at a minimum. In the last century, however, the social contexts for musical expression became extremely limited. Though thirty years of external political suppression of cultural traditions (ca. 1950-1980) was followed by a period of liberalization which continues to the present, internal interpretations of Islam conversely became more restrictive. Thus, the few remaining Salar song forms not extinguished by external political pressures have nearly disappeared under religious pressure.

What remains are a few *a cappella* secular song forms: love songs, work chants [*lodoŋ xaozi*] < Ch. 劳动号子, and lullabies. For the Salars I interviewed, however, the latter two forms do not count as “singing.” Given that the only other genre, love songs, are taboo, singing and, by extension, all musical expression are highly endangered in the Salar world today.

Salar yur

Typical of the cultural transition zone of the Amdo plateau, Salar *yur* contain local metaphors and sensibilities and Tibetan and Chinese musical ornamentation. Etymologically, in many Turkic languages, *ır-yır* (the *y* is prosthetic) is a generic

term for ‘song’: Kyrgyz, Tuva, etc. *ır* ‘song’, Kazakh *zhır* ‘id.’, Uyghur *yur-la* ‘to sing.’ In Salar, the term *yur* refers specifically to Salar-language love songs; other songs are simply called *ge* [kɛɾ] 歌, from Chinese ‘song.’

In Salar *yur*, a two-line melody is repeated to form a four-line stanza; the degree of embellishment depends on the singer. Both text and performance are characterized by indirectness; Salar *yur* are never sung in public and the lyrics usually allude to erotic themes rather than stating them explicitly. In terms of metaphor, then, Salar *yur* are closer to Tibetan *layi* than Chinese *bua’er*. Melodically, Salar *yur* vary in their degree of syncretism, from a Central Asian-sounding style to a highly Tibetan-influenced style, as described below. The melodic relationship between the Salar *yur* and its potential Central Asian (particularly Turkmen) relatives is a topic meriting research.

If sung in the fields or mountains, Salar *yur* are intended to be overheard, though a blatant public performance is taboo, as is singing in the home, village, and in the presence of elders.

They are usually six textual and melodic lines with an A-B A-B melodic pattern. Though the improvisation of some lyrics by the singer was once possible, what survives today is a small corpus of set lyrics and a few tune types. Today even professional Salar singers have trouble with more than two stanzas of lyrics.

Love and love-antics are only alluded to through metaphor, and rarely stated explicitly. Typical metaphorical images in *yur* include the mill-house, the turning millstone; soaring, narrow cliffs; the peony (should I pick it?); the yellow sparrow; the sweetness of brown sugar, the bite of garlic, the willow-waist of the girl. The message of Salar love songs must be indirect at all costs; for this reason even metaphor is a bit risqué; instead, subtle word play is preferred. For example:

Look at me, I’ll sing you a song.
 If you shed your hair-covering (pot^hon+ jaz-),
 crops will grow by themselves.
 If wheat is sown (poyd+na jaz-), it will grow by itself.
 Its blossoming flowers are pure white, pure white.⁷

The text centers around a subtle play on words by the parallel use of homonyms (*jaz-* ‘to sow’ and ‘to loosen (the hair)’ and the near-homonyms *bogbdi* [povd+] ‘wheat’ and *boto* [pot^ho] ‘woman’s cap.’ Uncovered long hair is considered far too erotic to be exposed to public view. Yet on first listening, both the second and third lines sound merely like a wish for the fertility of the soil and a good harvest.

⁷ Excerpt of a *yur* (Salar corpus text 121), sung by Ma Jun 马俊, b. 1963. Recorded by the author on 26 March 1993 in Jishi zhen 集石镇, Xunhua county 循化县, Qinghai province. All recordings, transcriptions, and translations in this paper are by the author unless otherwise noted.

*Salar Love Song Archaeology: a stylistic sampling*⁸

Given that Salar-language love songs are rarely if ever sung spontaneously anymore, the material collected represents a sort of excavation through successive accretions of musical and textual influences. One can state with some confidence that the sample, though small, is representative, as the stylistic patternings are also found in the sampling made in 1992–1993 (see e.g. section 4 above). Below, we take a tour through four strata, from highly analytical modern surface forms all the way down to a likely older style with Central Asian roots. There are four basic types: a “Salar medley” style, a Performatized Style, an Old Style, and a Tibetanized Hua’er Style. The first two types represent *yur* codified through a homogenizing process: academic study in the first case, and dominant cultural normative pressure in the second. The third and fourth type, in contrast, represent a more unimpeded evolution of the probable original *yur* form, from the Old Style – a lightly Tibetified Central Asian form – to the fourth highly syncretic Tibetified *hua’er* Style, manifesting prolonged contact with both the Chinese and Tibetan cultural realms.

The texts are presented in different orthographies to accommodate the widest range of readers: Texts A (Salar Medley Style) and D (Old Style) are in the International Phonetic Alphabet; Text C is in a practical Turkic orthography; and Text D is in Chinese, as it is sung in that language.

A. The “Salar medley” style

The first kind of *yur* that a researcher is likely to encounter are published texts written in Chinese.⁹ These were collected in the mid-1980s by a small team of researchers headed by the Salar folklorist Han Zhanxiang. As they worked without recording devices, they committed what they heard to memory and to paper. Since modern Salar no longer has an orthography, however, Mr. Han and his team translated the *yur* texts directly into Chinese. Thus, no texts were ever written down in the Salar language itself. The published *yur* texts are sanitized amalgams rather than translations of any single *yur* performance. Similarly, when Mr. Han performs *yur*, he draws on his encyclopedic knowledge of *yur* melodies and texts to produce a composite performance that we dub here the Salar Medley Style.

In his performances, the highest-frequency metaphors from the love songs he has collected over the years are combined in one text. The melodic line is a bit choppy and singsong. Syllables are sung short and clipped, a fact which is only striking after hearing the elongated ‘steppe style’ syllables of the Tibetanized and

⁸ All recordings and annotations by the author, with the kind permission of the singers.

⁹ E.g. Xunhua Salazu (eds.), 1989.

Old Styles. Both filler syllables and ornamentation are absent. The singing sounds routinized. Nonetheless, both research on folklore and this particular singing style have been politically tolerated since the mid-1980s and the style is moderately influential. Mr. Han sings *Bashi guliuliu* ‘Little Round-head’ in this style; the text is in a phonemicized IPA transcription,¹⁰ with filler syllables marked with curly braces { }:

Figure 3. *Bashi guliuliu* (sung by Han Zhanxiang, folklorist, b. 1942, Alitiuli. Rec. Jan. 1999)

| | |
|--|---|
| {ey} baʃi guliuliu babin joχmɑχɑn | Round head, no ideas of her own. |
| {eh} bɛli leskitɕux bɛlʌ jɑrɑʃɑn | Slender little waist, suited for [a fitted gown] a waist. |
| {eh} toʌ leskitɕux dolɑʌ ¹¹ jɑrɑʃɑn | Slender ankles, suited for stockings. |
| {eh} bɛl leskitɕux bɛlʌ jɑrɑʃɑ:ːn | Slender little waist, suited for [a fitted gown] a waist. |

The text of this particular *yur* at least has been stable for nearly fifty years; Kakuk’s earlier research in the late 1950s¹² also includes a *Bashi guliuliu* text that is remarkably similar to this 1999 recording.

B. The Performatized love song

This type constitutes the homogenizing response of the dominant cultural center to ethnic musics. With cultural liberalization in the early 1980s, the Chinese government began to sponsor local song and dance troupes of the official nationalities. Selected young local talent was professionally trained and scheduled for regular local and annual national performances with other minority nationalities. The small Salar troupe is based in the county seat (Jishi zhen) of Xunhua County – the only county in the world to include “Salar” in its official name in Qinghai province. One of its singers, Mr. Ma Jun, graciously allowed me to record him in 1993.

His singing is, expectedly, very different from all the other styles. The melody appears to be a highly stylized composition produced by the troupe and embellished by the singer. Ma Jun sings with passion and delicacy, with great soaring swoops of melody but very light ornamentation. Formal training is evident in his

¹⁰ International Phonetic Alphabet; here, voiceless obstruents [p] [t] [k] [y] [tɕ] [pʰ] [tʰ] [kʰ] [qʰ] [tɕʰ] and so on have been phonemicized to b d g c ɕ p t k q tɕ and so on. The text in Romanized (*pinyin*-based) transcription is as follows: {ey} bashi guliuliu babin yoxmaghan / {eh} beli leskichuk bulgha yarashgan / {eh} toghe leskichuk dolagha yarashgan / {eh} bel leskichux belgha yarashgan.

¹¹ *Dolaq* also has the variant *doldoq* ‘stockings.’

¹² Kakuk’s sole consultant was the Salar linguist Han Jianye (Kerimu) in Beijing, so apparently this *yur* is considered by Salar researchers to be representative of the genre (Kakuk 1961: 102).

use of vibrato. Given that the textual source is the medley style, again, high-frequency metaphors are combined into one composite text. Filler syllables are used, as one would expect with this more expressive style, but are confined largely to initial position.

This style has been politically supported (since 1990), and is moderately influential, though there are very few trained practitioners. It is likely that this Performatized Style and the Salar Medley Style are tolerated because doing so fits in so well with the Chinese model of dealing with the arts of the minorities: standardizing, translating, sanitizing. (See figure 4)

As is typical in *yur*, the female object of affection is referred to as *yenggu* ‘girl’ but addressed usually as *singnɨ*¹³ ‘Younger Sister;’ the male object of affection (here, the singer) calls himself or is addressed as *gaga* ‘Elder Brother’. These may be calques from Chinese-language *hua’er* (*gaga* 哥哥 ‘id.’, *gamei* 妹妹 ‘Younger Sister’).

The Performance Style, though politically sanctioned, has very few practitioners. They enjoy relatively wide exposure, however, since they are public performers. Among ordinary Salar this form is widely tolerated, if officially disapproved by the Imams.

Figure 4. *Yur*. Performed by Ma Jun (Osman), professional singer, b. 1963, Jishi zhen (rec. May 1993)

| | |
|---|--|
| {ejo:: ijo ijo ajo} miniyi jenggu ɟajnaɣə | Oh, oh oh oh.....my ebullient girl! |
| {eɛa} jenggu ɟajnaɣə ɟajnaquma {jaɛe} | Esh! Ebullient girl, don’t be so obstreperous. |
| {hæ} gaganj alɣə ja. | Hey...Elder Brother wants you. ¹⁴ |
| gaganj almasa | If he can’t have you |
| goxu joxturonj ohteɟ joxturonj | He won’t have anything. |
| {ejo:::} az suzi ɟajnaɣə darɨ var a {tʃi} | Oh, boiling a little water has a limit. |
| jenggu ɟajnaɣə {jaɣa} darɨ joxturonj | But there is no limit to your boiling temper. |
| ejo: miniyi jenggu ɟajnaɣə joɟ | Oh, my ebullient girl, yosh! |
| {jo::a} daɛlɨ dalunɨ sen netɟɟeɣe juhkurdɨ | [Girl:] So why are you running on the main road? |
| {eɛe} deɟli dermenni {jaha} sen netɟɟi ilændɨ | Esh! Why does the stone mill turn? |
| {dɛe} daɛlɨ dalunɨ meniɨ ɟozə ujnaɟnɨ | [Boy:] Esh, my lambs are playing on the main road, |

¹³ The lexeme *singnɨ* < /sɨŋŋ/ < /sɨŋ/ ‘younger sister’. In modern Salar disyllabic words ending in a sonorant (e.g. n, l), the surface nominative form has merged with the historical third-person possessive forms, so that the underlying stem is now interpreted as vowel-final.

¹⁴ Chaste interpretations would gloss this phrase as: “Elder Brother wants you [as his bride]”.

| | |
|--|---|
| ujne[me] tɕix geldzi {jaha} jɛngu ɡajnaʁ+ne | I came out to play too, my ebullient girl. |
| {ejo:::} samzax+ samzaxn+ aχ a d+ɾ qama | Oh! There is nothing whiter than garlic |
| ji bardzana andan adz+ɬ+ mar+ joχturoŋ | After eating it there is nothing hotter. |
| gara řataŋni sen gara digeme | Don't say that brown sugar is brown. |
| {eɕ} jɛngu ɡajnaʁ {jaha} jise dɛhli dur {ř} | Oh, but to taste the bubbly girl is sweet. |
| {eɕ} řazɾ ɡoltɕ+id+g+{s} qom[uχ] qoltɕ+ digi | Esh, in the desert valley, in the desert valley, |
| ɡ+ɬ+ɬ torux d+ɾ: torux d+ɾ ler | these are as red as sand dates, |
| {eɕ} uɕere ɡ+ɬ+ɬ dur {tɕere} jise dɛhli dur | Esh, they are red to the eye, and sweet to taste. |
| {eɕ} jɛngu ɡajnaʁ | Esh, bubbly girl! |
| ɡillaquma {jaha} ɡagaŋ alɬ+ jo | Don't be anxious, your brother wants you. |
| ɡagaŋ alasa {jaha} ohteɕ joχturoŋ | If he can't have you, he will have nothing. |
| terden terdaron {je} | ...narrower than ye... |

C. *The Old Style*

This style is exceedingly rare and in this author's view the gem of these recordings. Both the text and the melody of this style are distinctive. The melody has an A-B A-B pattern, with a long, high, level, unornamented initial syllable. The melody descends through each line with a great deal of ornamentation. The loudness and length of the initial syllable is well adapted to the mountainous Inner Asian geography, as it is a sound designed to carry.

The use of metaphor in the text in Inner Asia at least is unique to the Salars, e.g. the swooping sparrow (below). Tibetan *layi* includes nature imagery as well, but favors eagles and other raptors. Also, while the nature imagery of *layi* is generally confined to the first stanza, the imagery in Salar *yur* continues in the second stanza.

Indirectness is absolutely essential to *yur*, and is created both by the extensive use of metaphor and by the use of evidential marking. The short, almost whispered *demish* "it is said that..." that occurs at the end of every stanza serves to distance the singer from his subject; he is not to be held fully responsible for the suggestive content of his lyrical performance. (See figure 5)

The question-and-answer format at the beginning of the second stanza (*nannighi yolinda dur ar i dese?* "If I asked, how would that be?") is also found as a didactic form in another nearly extinct Salar artistic genre, the wedding speech.

It is unknown how many singers are still able to perform this style of *yur*; at the most, there are perhaps a dozen singers, all elderly. They are in any event self-censored, as this type of singing, particularly for older people, is neither relig-

iously nor politically sanctioned. Still, it obviously brought Mr. Han great pleasure to sing for us in 1999.

Figure 5. Old Style *yur*, performed by Han Hasan (Sheyis), Altiuli, b. ca. 1935 (recorded Jan. 1999)

| | |
|---|---|
| {hej} daɕlɪt gayanɪ, daɕlɪt gayanɪ | The rocky cliffs, the rocky cliffs |
| {e} sɪngnɪ tɕɪkkali ɕɪzɪl gayanɪ | Little Sister emerges from the ruddy cliffs. |
| {he} jarɪ ət gelse {je} arasɪnda {ja} | my beloved comes by between them |
| {e} salar sedzɪur, birur var a {tɕɪ} | there is one solitary Salar sparrow |
| {he} ətkan ətɕɪ, kondan kon ar a | she passes by, and it is more than I can bear |
| {he} ɣɕɛn ɣɕɪɕɪ dɛrden dɛr ar a{ŋ} jɛŋgu:: | She flies by, and the cliffs are narrower than ye, girl.... |
| ...demiɕ. | ...it is said. |
| {he} nannɪxi jolɪnda dur ar i dese | If I asked, “How would that be?” ¹⁵ |
| {he} gɔxli asmannɪ samanda uɕɛn | flying through the azure sky |
| {he} sɛn bir qoɕnɪxi gamuɕ ganatɪ | with your pair of bamboo-green wings |
| {e} sɪnglɪ mɛwanda gara ganɪ(t)lɛr | Little sister, with your black wings |
| {he} chorlenmɛwan da {he::} anɪxi jɛŋgu | Girl, I cannot face you |
| {e} zhuazhualarɪna ¹⁶ qerin goɕada | the claws scrape the skin |
| {he} anɪ jolɪnda {je::} jɛŋgu qejnawɛn | On that way, oh my bubbly girl |
| {e} dɛrden dɛr ar {oŋ} dɛrden dɛr ar {oŋ} jɛŋgu | [the cliffs] are narrower than ye, narrower than narrow...girl... |
| ...demiɕ | ...it is said. |

D. The Tibetanized Hua'er Style

Since the Old Style singers are few, elderly, and generally unwilling to sing, and since the Performatized Style is too decontextualized, the only recourse younger Salar would-be singers have today is to emulate regional styles, i.e. Tibetan layi and pan-ethnic Chinese-language hua'er. The early North Tibetan Salars intermarried with Tibetans and freely adopted Tibetan social structures and language forms. In the 13th century the early Salars moved into the upper Yellow River littoral region, which was populated by ethnic Tibetans. Salars and Tibetans sometimes still live in the same villages, and in any case still live in proximity of each other. Still, for Salars today, Tibetan love songs are far less accessible than *hua'er*

¹⁵ Lit., “On which road would it be?”

¹⁶ This is a Chinese lexeme, but its sense here is unclear to both me and my Salar colleagues. 抓 [tʂua] are claws. Alternatively, 髻髻 (in standard Ch. *zhuājì*, i.e. [tʂuatɕi]) was a bun hairdo worn by women in the past; it could conceivably be pronounced as [tʂuatʂua] in rapid singing, in which case the line might read, “Her maiden hairstyle will be shorn”.

singing is: *layi* is more strictly in an exclusively Tibetan domain and is not associated with annual festivals devoted to that song form and to ritual. *Hua'er*, in contrast, can be enjoyed and sung at several dozen area festivals with people of all regional ethnicities, and is also sung “out of season” on the riverbank and in fields. *Hua'er* has, however, been strongly influenced by *layi* in its ornamentation.

The recordings sampled here represent a strongly Tibetan-ornamented *hua'er* style that is sung in Salar and Chinese, though overwhelmingly in Chinese. When singing for us, the talented singer Mr. Ma Zhongliang sang two samples in Salar before switching to Northwestern Chinese, commenting that “singing these in Salar is a bit awkward.”

This style is thus the most syncretic form recorded; in fact, it is dubious whether this style can really be included in the *yur* genre. Due to contact with singers of both *layi* and *hua'er*, the metaphor is of a nature-inspired, indirect Tibetan style, while the music constitutes a mixture of Tibetan and *hua'er* styles. It has the highest degree of ornamentation, and many carrier filler syllables are used to carry the ornamentation.

As in the Old Style, the stanza begins with one long, high, fortissimo syllable. But in this Tibetanized Style, the initial syllable climbs in pitch with many improvised embellishments on the way to the high tone, and forms a crescendo. Mr. Ma sings with enormous feeling, ranging from almost-whispered syllables to shatteringly loud ones.

Unlike in the other styles, carrier syllables can even be inserted between syllables of a word (cf. *cang* {a} *yīng* 苍{a} 蝇 < *cangying* ‘fly’ in line 4 below). The final intonational filler syllables, however, come directly from the *hua'er* singing style characteristic of Xunhua county on the north bank of the Yellow River. (See figure 6.)

The number of singers of this style is greater than that of the other types, and it is probably the most viable style of all surveyed here. However, the form will only survive in the Chinese language as a local *hua'er* variant. As such, it may well evolve into a form with few if any musical traces of Salar music at all.

Figure 6. *Yur* performed by Ma Zhongliang (Shulima), b. 1954 (in Chinese, recorded Jan. 1999)

| | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 哎::: {ŋe me bad} | Ah, |
| 我 角角里{ŋe} 切肉呵 {li jad} | In the corner, I am cutting meat. |
| {aja} 我右手俩{a ta dʒiu} 切呗 | Cutting with the right hand, |
| {le ŋe} 左手俩 {jo} 打了个 苍蝇 {ajaid}。 | Swatting at a fly with the left. |
| 哎呀我 可是 {a} 打觉苍蝇者 {a::} | Aiya, though I got the fly |
| 你妹妹收 {呀} 肉 {呵 jad}。 | Sister, you take the meat. |
| 哎呀, 你的味道们 | Aiya, your flavors... (sniffs) |
| 它就卷不来 苍蝇 {be ja::} 跟肉 {zhe::} 转 | they cannot be rolled into the fly and the |
| {a::lia::jai} | meat. ¹⁷ |

Syncretization: impact and theoretical implications

Yur is beloved but low-prestige and viewed as immoral. The tug-of-war between the love of singing and devotion to local interpretations of Islam, combined with the historical pressures of the Cultural Revolution, has resulted in the demise of Salar-language *yur*. In all but the last style, the lack of ability to improvise and embellish indicates that the song form is already fossilized. Stylistically, at least the Old Style Salar *yur* samples resemble Turkmen *aydım* songs in their A-B A-B structural patterns. The ornamentation of the two is quite different; this fact, however, does not provide supporting evidence for or against a possible Turkmen connection, since ornaments and filler syllables are the most subject to matrix cultural influence and ad hoc modification.

In the syncretization of love songs in the Tibetan-Chinese cultural realms, it is worth considering the possible parallels between musical contact and language contact. Musical ornamentation, like linguistic phonology, appears to be easily copied, with Tibetan musical ornamentation appearing in the last two naturally syncretic styles. Since improvisation is possible largely through this embellishment, it is easy to see how such a style can be copied so long as a song form is in active use. Similarly, where language contact is concerned, phonology is the level where contact effects are very noticeable. In the Salar case, a retroflex series of sounds was copied from local Chinese and Tibetan varieties.

Metaphor, however, appears much more resistant to language and cultural contact. Least easily copied is the basic poetic structure and melody, at least for the song forms (C & D) which have been allowed to evolve on their own.

¹⁷ While outsiders may have their doubts about the positive associations about meat, flies, and attractive young women, several independent local listeners confirmed that the language used here was extremely clever and evoked adroitness and deliciousness. Thanks to Dr. Wang Xianzhen for deciphering parts of the Chinese audio.

As for the future of the Salar *yur*, the only viable, productive song forms are those cast in the North Tibetan tradition (*hua'er/layi*) and mostly sung in Chinese. Since singing and all music are not condoned internally, the only available social context for music is outside of the Salar realm, e.g. at *hua'er* festivals or in staged performances. Song will no doubt live on with the Salars, but most likely in a language and a musical idiom other than their own. What may persevere, however, is Salar metaphor and poetic expression.

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Linguistic Data as An Indicator of Cultural Change: The Case of Iran-Turkic

Filiz Kızıl

Can language data be an indicator of cultural identity? In the case of minority languages such as the Turkic varieties spoken in Iran, which are more or less heavily influenced by Modern Persian, the question of the correlation between the degree of language contact and cultural identity could play an important role. Questions such as „What extralinguistic factors are significant for processes of language retention/maintenance, of language change, or even of cultural identity” are relevant to language contact studies as well as to sociolinguistic and ethnological studies. Linguistic change can be viewed in this context as an internal process variable of a given language system, while language contact is an external process variable which reacts to the coexistence of different systems and the circumstances of their contact.

Linguistic patterns, elements of language structure, varieties, and languages evolve in a process that is significantly shaped by social interaction, social structure, and social, economic and political factors. Within the formation and development of Iran-Turkic cultural identification, the following factors play an important role: the settlement history and cultural tradition, the interplay of historical and linguistic factors, socio-cultural similarities and differences, language contact and multilingualism, the delimitations of linguistic and cultural varieties, as well as the roles of normative centers. Developments within the languages sometimes give us insight into the relationships between the language communities. In other words, it has to be examined how recent language data from minority groups can serve as an indicator of cultural identity.

In the course of researching Iran-Turkic languages and dialects for many years, especially Iranian-Turkic language contact phenomena, I have undertaken numerous field studies in Iran, especially among the Azerbaijanians in the Northwest, the Khalaj in Central Iran, and the Qashqay in the South. It is from this linguistic perspective that I have gradually approached the topic of cultural identity and cultural change. Linguistic developments can provide clues to the relationships among language communities. The sociolinguistic interview introduced by Labov elicits two types of important data. The first kind provides extralinguistic information relevant to language contact, such as age, provenance, and occupation. The second type of data is raw data from which information concerning the quality of contact to date can be extracted. The Azerbaijanians of Iran, the Khalaj Turks, and the Qashqay Turks, who partially continue to lead a nomadic way of life, provide us with good examples of differing cultural developments.

The Turkic varieties of Iran

Linguistic investigations of Turkic minority languages spoken in Iran began relatively late, only in the early 20th century. One of the pioneers who studied the dialect of Tebriz was Karl Foy (1903/1904), who researched the linguistic characteristics of the Azerbaijanian variety spoken in Tebriz and neighbouring Urmia. In addition, Foy discovered that the Anatolian dialects, especially the dialect of Erzurum, constitute a dialect continuum with Azerbaijanian.

More intensive study of the Turkic languages and dialects spoken in Iran began with the so-called Göttinger expeditions and the extensive materials that were collected and analyzed under the direction of Gerhard Doerfer. The expeditions, which were conducted from 1968 to 1976, made a significant contribution to the previously neglected field of Iran Turkic studies. The linguistic data gathered in these field studies ultimately led to an expansion of the Oghuzic branch of the Turkic languages, thus impacting the linguistic history and the classification of the Turkic languages as a whole.

Numbering approximately 15 million, the Azerbaijanians, whose main area of settlement is located in the Northwest of Iran in the province of Azerbaijan constitute the largest group of Turkic speakers in Iran.¹ Their language, in particular the urban dialect of Tebriz, enjoys a high level of prestige within their own language community as well as among the speakers of the other Turkic languages and varieties of Iran. In addition, it is the *lingua franca* of Iran Turks and the dominant language of commerce in Teheran's Grand Bazaar. The Göttinger expeditions also collected transcription texts and word lists outside the province of Azerbaijan in the Azerbaijanian enclave of Galūgāh, which were analyzed and published in a volume titled *Oghusica aus Iran* (Doerfer, Heschke & Ravanyar 1990).

The Azerbaijanian of Galūgāh forms a bridge to the second largest group of Turkic minorities in Iran, the Khorasan Turks in the Northeast, whose dialects were once classified as Azerbaijanian. Closer examination, however, revealed that these dialects diverge significantly from Azerbaijanian. Khorasan Turkic, spoken by about 2 million people, is made up of six dialect groups² and is descended from the so-called *obya bolya* language, which used to be mistakenly compared with certain Anatolian texts of the 13th and 14th century (Doerfer 1993: 7 f.).

¹ Population figures for Iran tend to vary from one source to another. Demographic data are also vague as the population density differs from region to region, rising rapidly in some areas, and because minorities are not identified in official census reports. The population figures that I use are based on those found in the publications of Gerhard Doerfer and his collaborators as well as those published by Hendrik Boeschoten in the most recent volume of *The Turkic Languages* (1998: 13).

² The Khorasan Turkic dialects are: Bojnūrd in the Northwest, Qūcān in the North, Gūjgī in the Northeast, Soltānābād in the South, and Kharw-e Olyā and Langar in the Southeast. For details see Doerfer 1993: 24 f.

In the Northeast we also find another small Turkic minority language, Turkmen, spoken by a much smaller group of about 500,000 speakers. Continuing to the South of Iran, in the province of Fars, we encounter other Turkic language varieties, dialects of the formerly nomadic Qashqay tribes. The Qashqay Turks became settled in the Iranian province of Fars about 25 years ago and currently comprise an estimated 570,000 people. In recent times, most of the formerly nomadic Qashqay tribes have become settled. According to estimates, there are currently about 500,000 Qashqay speakers, of whom roughly 25% are nomadic or semi-nomadic. While they had been the object of ethnological studies (see Lois Beck 1986 and Oberling 1974), their language remained relatively unknown. Using data collected from an informant living in exile, David Soper was able to include the Qashqay dialect in his 1987 dissertation on *Loan Syntax in Turkic and Iranian*, which also featured the Tajik and Uzbek languages. The Qashqay Turks live in Southern Iran, in the province of Fars, with their center in Firuzābād. The first texts in transcription came out of the Göttinger expeditions in Firuzābād. Currently I am in the process of evaluating data that I collected in the 1990s among the Qashqay Turks of the Kešqulī tribe, who are settled in Nūrābād, a town east of Shiraz.

By far the smallest Turkic minority are the Khalaj of Central Iran, whose existence was “rediscovered” by the Göttinger expeditions as far as Turcology is concerned. Khalaj is spoken about 200 kilometers to the Southwest of Teheran, in the region of Khalajestān, of which the capital is Dastjerd, near the city of Qom. It is spoken by some 28,000 people only. To the question in Persian *torki barf mizaniid* ‘Do you speak Turkish?’ male Khalaj speakers, who speak Azerbaijanian fluently, tended to answer in Azerbaijanian, a circumstance which understandably misled the respective linguists to identify these speakers as Azerbaijanians. Thus was, for example, the experience of Minorski, who conducted field studies in Iran at the beginning of the twentieth century to study Iranian dialects. However, Minorski, a scholar of Iranian languages by training, made important notations concerning forms he recognized as atypical for Azerbaijanian. For socio-cultural reasons, the Göttinger expeditions were only able to collect linguistic data from male informants. Their research resulted in the publication of numerous articles, a Khalaj dictionary (Doerfer & Tezcan 1980), a Khalaj grammar (Doerfer 1988) and folklore texts of the Khalaj people (Doerfer & Tezcan 1994). The materials that I have collected in my field studies contain various text types, dialogue texts, and also linguistic data of Khalaj women. The language of the women differs from that of the men in that the women usually do not speak Azerbaijanian and their language shows less influence from Modern Persian. This can be explained by the distribution of traditional gender roles in Khalaj society. While men have better contacts to the world outside the community, women are mainly active in the inner-Khalaj community and their families. In this way Khalaj women are not simply fulfilling typical women’s roles such as child-bearing and rearing, but also

function as the main protectors of Khalaj culture and language. It should be added that the linguistic data I obtained from the Khalaj women represent an enlargement of Doerfer's materials and not a refutation.³

Among the Iran Turkic dialects, there are, of course, numerous transitional dialects such as Sonqori in Western Iran or Aynallu in the South. The neighboring areas also feature dialects that form a kind of continuum with the West Iranian Turkic dialects, such as the Anatolian dialects or the Turkic dialects of Northern Iraq, which, although they are called Iraq Turkmen, linguistically rather belong to the Southern branch of the Oghuzic languages.

As a result of spreading Iranian nationalism and the strong dominance of Persian, smaller Turkic varieties today face extinction. This is especially true of the Khalaj minority. According to Doerfer's estimates (1998: 276), the Khalaj language will have become extinct by the middle of the 21st century. Like Turkish and the Turkish dialects, the Iran Turkic languages and dialects belong to the Oghuzic subgroup of the Turkic languages.⁴ Khalaj, however, is an exception as it constitutes a discrete group within the family of Turkic languages. Moreover, Khalaj displays both features which are strongly influenced by Persian and archaic traits of Turkic patterns that mostly reflect an Old Turkic stage and have disappeared in the other Turkic languages. Beside its significance for language contact studies, Khalaj is extremely important for the linguistic history and classification of the Turkic languages.

Frequently linguistic processes provide essential clues to the history and cultural evolution of speakers. Thus, it is primarily through linguistic criteria that one can assess the historical and cultural relationships of minorities whose past has gone unrecorded by history books. For example, the Khalaj, whose language does not belong to the Oghuzic group of Turkic, must have a history separate from the Oghuz Turks. The archaic features of the Khalaj language are evidence of this language community's long isolation from other Turkic-speaking groups.

Influence from Modern Persian

The following are some very general remarks on the influence that Modern Persian has exerted on the Turkic varieties spoken in Iran. The intensive language

³ Doerfer traces the language of the Khalaj back to the dialect of the Arɣu as described by al-Kāšyārī in the sense that the Khalaj of today corresponds to the language of a portion of that people which Mahmūd collectively called „Arɣu“ (which merely means 'valley'). It is assumed that this Arɣu tribe was pushed westward by the Mongol incursions of the 13th century and came to settle in Central Iran. In addition to my descriptive work on the Khalaj language, I am examining this historical question. After my viewing of the relevant information in al-Kāšyārī (I will not go into the particular linguistic data here, see Kiral in press), I find that many questions remain unanswered.

⁴ For the classification and the history of the Oghuzic branch of the Turkic languages see Doerfer 1990 and Schönig 2002.

contact with Persian, Iran's sole official language, has taken place for generations and has led to language contact phenomena on all linguistic levels. Due to this intensive influence we find phonological changes such as lowering and delabialization of [ü] and [ö], e.g. in Khalaj and Qashqay. Iran-Turkic varieties show an abundance of lexical units which are intensively copied⁵ and which are sometimes used beside their Turkic expressions, e.g. in Azerbaijanian *ātaš* and *ot* 'fire'. In higher language registers copied lexical units which do not have Turkic correspondences are frequent, e.g. *vezārat* 'embassy', *dānešgāh* 'university', etc. In addition we can observe that complex units containing grammatical elements are also extensively copied, e.g. *bozortār* 'bigger' [*bozorg* plus comparative suffix *-tār*]. The high frequency of these complex copies from Persian would seem to have forced the copying of certain Persian grammatical elements in isolation, e.g. in Azerbaijanian *böyüxtār* and in Khalaj *bidiktār* 'bigger' [Turkic *böyüx/bidik* plus Persian comparative *-tār*].

It should be noted that the copying of Persian elements or structures can differ according to which Turkic system is doing the copying. In Khalaj or in Qashqay, for example, certain copied grammatical units are productive, whereas in Azerbaijanian they are restricted to complex copies, e.g. Khalaj *kin-i* and Qashqay *gün-i* 'a day' [Turkic *kin/gün* plus Persian indefinite *-i*], but Azerbaijanian *bir gün* 'a day'. Copies of the Persian type of complex sentence construction constitute an areal-typologically distinctive feature in the Turkic languages and varieties of Iran. In all Iran-Turkic varieties we find complex sentences introduced by conjunctions copied from Persian such as copies of *vaqti ke* 'when', *çon ke* 'because', *qabl az inke* 'before', *ba'd az inke* 'after', etc. Analogously, genuine Turkic strategies of left-branching complex sentences using subordinative nonfinite verbal morphology have been extremely reduced.⁶

As an alternative to the copying of Persian grammatical material, Turkic elements can be influenced by Persian with the result that they enter into combinations and acquire or discard functions often in accordance with their corresponding Persian structures. Those copies display combinational and semantic structural features of their equivalents. Modal constructions formed after their Persian counterparts are an example of this. They use modal auxiliary verbs to express modality in combination with a verb in the optative/imperative mood, where Persian employs the subjunctive, e.g. Khalaj *šäyim yäkälgäm* [want:prs:1sg *yä:come_opt:1sg*] 'I want to come', Qashqay *sän bašayiräy gäläy* [you succeed:prs:2sg *go:opt:2sg*] 'you can come'.⁷ In some cases even the valence of a verb can be changed such as in Iran-Turkic the verb for 'to eat', which can take a dative object in the meaning 'to fit', similar to Persian *xordan* 'to eat' which, in this meaning, is

⁵ This description of language contact phenomena employs the terminology of the Code-Copying Model (Johanson 1992).

⁶ See Kiral 2001 for copied complex sentence constructions from Persian.

⁷ For more details concerning modal constructions see Kiral 2005.

used mainly in spoken Persian varieties. These examples give us important information about the language system or register from which they are copied.

Sociolinguistic factors

With the exception of a very few publications, the majority of the Turkic dialects of Iran neither are written nor have any literary tradition. As a rule, the speakers of Iran-Turkic languages are bilingual in Turkic and Persian. In addition to their local variety, the male speakers usually are fluent in Azerbaijanian, which functions as the *lingua franca* of the Iran Turks and is also the main language of the Teheran bazaar. The Azerbaijanian language of Iran enjoys considerable prestige among the Iran Turks.⁸

Khalaj, like all of the other Iran-Turkic languages, is a spoken language only and is the object of heavy influence from Persian. For generations, the Khalaj have been multilingual in Khalaj, Persian and Azerbaijanian. During my extended stays among the Khalaj, I observed that Khalaj children no longer actively speak the language. Among the middle-aged, Persian tends to be the dominant language. Parents have told me that they prefer to speak Persian at home so that their children will not face difficulties at school or be disadvantaged compared to their Persian classmates. Doerfer predicted that the Khalaj language will have completely disappeared by the middle of the twenty-first century.

The researchers who participated in the Göttinger Expeditions had not been able to work with female informants, although Doerfer (1987: 13) did note that the researchers had casually observed that the women spoke Khalaj better than the men. The material obtained from female Khalaj speakers is also interesting because it shows that the Oghuzic influence that is present in the Khalaj spoken by the men does not occur in the women's speech. In fact, all other Turkic languages and dialects of Iran show influence especially from the Tebriz variety. This Oghuz-Turkic influence does not appear in the Khalaj spoken by the females, who as a rule do not speak Azerbaijanian. Therefore, when Khalaj women wish to communicate with other Iran-Turks, they speak Persian.

In my research, the sociolinguistic discourse analysis based on conversation analysis emphasizes face-to-face communication in which rules, interpretations, and assessments are determined. The discourse became the locus of language contact, where individuals with differing language competence and attitudes came together. The methods of conversation and discourse analysis can also be applied to examining attitudes toward language and stereotypes. Among other things, I have paid special attention to the individual speakers' attitudes toward language. The

⁸ Javāt Hayatī, an Iranian Turcologist of Azerbaijanian descent, has told me that in the near future Azerbaijanian will be taught in the public schools in the province of Azerbaijan.

comparison of different cultures reveals different "cultural scripts" within the language contact situation. I examined issues such as "Who speaks which language when to whom?" and discovered, for example, that parents had decided from a particular point in time, say the birth of a child, to speak Persian to this and all of their future children. In such a family, then, the parents speak Persian to each other; they speak Khalaj with the grandparents. Further, the parents speak Persian with those children who were born after the decision to speak Persian; and the children that were raised before this decision speak Khalaj with the grandparents but Persian with the parents, while all of the children speak Persian to one another. When strangers come together in open social situations (on the bus, in the bazaar), the age of the respective speaker plays an important role in determining which language is spoken. Younger generations choose Persian exclusively in such situations. One can observe that the language contact phenomena are more frequent and far-reaching than those found in the speech of elderly people. Khalaj spoken by older females shows significantly less influence from Persian than Khalaj spoken by middle-aged women or by the men of any age. In fact, women who are monolingual speakers of minority languages in general often speak these languages in a form containing fewer influences from contact languages.

The loss of social domains and the adoption of the dominant Persian language are two of the main reasons for contact-induced phenomena. These pressures can eventually lead to gradual language shift. In this context language attitude plays an important role. Azerbaijanian, which is used as a *lingua franca* among the Iran-Turks, has a relatively high degree of prestige. By contrast Khalaj has very little prestige among the Turkic language communities in Iran, one of the main reasons why Khalaj is in danger of linguistic extinction. Its speakers have become culturally assimilated, referring to themselves as Iranians who speak a strange mother tongue. Unlike the Azerbaijanians, the Khalaj speak Persian without a Turkic accent.

Like the minority Khalaj, the Qashqay Turks also speak Persian without a foreign accent. Unlike the Khalaj, however, they have not culturally assimilated. The Qashqay consciously practice their folklore and customs.

In some areas, the Turkic and Persian cultures undergo a kind of synthesis in which genuine and adopted customs merge. For example, marriages between female family members and Persian men are much less condoned among the Qashqay than among the Khalaj. The Qashqay are anxious to keep foreign influence to a minimum. An interesting linguistic phenomenon that serves as an indicator of tribal identity among the Qashqay occurs for example in the use of present tense forms. Thus, some Qashqay tribes consciously use the aorist only to denote the present tense.

Because of the increased usage of the official language and the pervasiveness of the media, influence from Persian is on the rise and is causing a generational conflict. I believe that as television increasingly becomes a part of family life,

cultural distinctions between the Persian majority and the smaller Turkic minorities whose native languages enjoy little prestige within their own speech communities will ultimately erode.

As mentioned at the outset, this article has been an attempt to approach the topic of cultural change from the perspective of language contact studies. The Turkic languages and dialects discussed here show varying degrees of influence from the Persian language. It would appear that the language attitude of speakers is one criterion involved in the process of cultural change. This is particularly evident in the case of the Khalaj, who have culturally assimilated and whose native tongue today is in danger of becoming extinct.

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