


Tomasz Mróz

Plato in Poland 1800–1950

Types of Reception – Authors – Problems



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<https://doi.org/10.5771/9783896659477>, am 16.11.2024, 20:10:32
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This work was funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Poland) as a project *Plato in Poland 1800–1950* (21H 16 0065 84) within the National Programme for the Development of Humanities 2017–2021 (NPRH Uniwersalia 2.1).



**NATIONAL PROGRAMME
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITIES**

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Language editing by Una Maclean-Hańckowiak

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at <http://dnb.d-nb.de>

ISBN 978-3-89665-946-0 (Print)
978-3-89665-947-7 (ePDF)

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-3-89665-946-0 (Print)
978-3-89665-947-7 (ePDF)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Mróz, Tomasz
Plato in Poland 1800–1950
Types of Reception – Authors – Problems
Tomasz Mróz
480 pp.
Includes bibliographic references.

ISBN 978-3-89665-946-0 (Print)
978-3-89665-947-7 (ePDF)



Onlineversion
Nomos eLibrary

1st Edition 2021

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Preface for international readers

This book, which I now have the pleasure of presenting to international readers, was originally written and published in Polish (*Platon w Polsce 1800–1950. Typy recepcji – autorzy – problemy*, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty, 2012) and initially intended for historians of philosophy researching Poland's philosophical tradition and for experts in ancient philosophy who felt the need to find out more about the history of their own research area. The book was the final outcome of a research project funded by the Polish government and carried out in the period 2008 to 2011. I then submitted the book as one of the requirements for the procedure of granting me my postdoctoral degree (habilitation) in 2014. An integral part of the research project was the publication of an anthology of texts that reflected the main trends and research areas of Polish Plato scholarship (Mróz, 2010). These texts were difficult to access at that time and some even had to be retrieved from manuscripts.

The aim of the English version of the book is to present a kind of map of the history of Polish research on Plato to international readers. I was encouraged to undertake this project on account of the more marked interest in Polish philosophy in recent decades, with works on the history of philosophy in Poland being increasingly published in English, and also in German or French. Most frequently these works have focused on the philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw school or on specific currents of reception of foreign philosophies in Poland, such as 19th century Polish Hegelianism. A separate set of studies available in Western European languages consists of works on the history of medieval and early modern thought in Poland, but the attention of international audiences has also been drawn to some outstanding figures of Polish philosophy, e.g. Wincenty Lutosławski, Leon Chwistek or Władysław Tatarkiewicz, who cannot be unequivocally classified into any particular trends of their times. At the same time, it seemed to me that a presentation of the Polish reception of Plato's philosophy would be of some value for foreign researchers, especially as this reception reflects a more complex image of Poland's philosophical tradition, and in some cases includes less well-known works and figures. My intention was to supplement the general image of Polish philosophy in an important area of the history of philosophical studies on Plato and the history of the historiography of ancient philosophy in Poland,

and so to fill a gap in the literature that had been graphically brought to my attention in Anthony Kenny's excellent *History of Philosophy* (Oxford, 2007). In Volume 2 of this work, which was devoted to medieval philosophy, there is a map of 'the world of medieval philosophy' (p. X) which may appear quite striking to Polish and other East European readers because of the vast blank spaces east of Munich and north of Constantinople. Since such blank spaces also still exist in the historiographical literature and discourse on European philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries, I saw the need to supplement this literature and fill in some of the white areas.

With the original target audience in mind, I decided to intersperse my narrative and arguments with quotations so as to provide examples of the language and style used in discussing Plato. The quotations chosen were significant, graphic and vivid, but also sometimes suggestive and earthy in character. When it came to the translation of the book, an attempt was made to ensure that the quotations remained as close to the original as possible, yet this led to numerous translation difficulties, for it was impossible to portray the sometimes archaic charm of the language to the English-speaking reader, and some of their ambiguity and the peculiarities of their style may have been lost in translation. It is to be hoped that at least some of the richness of expression and the colourful idiosyncrasy of the style can still delight non-Polish speaking readers. As for various Polish forms of the titles of the dialogues, they have been anglicised and made more uniform.

Most of the footnotes in this book, as well as in the original Polish version, refer to Polish literature, and although these are unlikely to be of use to historians of Plato scholarship or Platonism in Europe, they may be of some value for researchers in the field of Polish studies, and so they have been retained in their original form.

The present English volume, like the original Polish book, is the result of a project funded by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland, and the anonymous experts of the Ministry should be thanked, for without their positive reviews it would not have been possible to undertake the effort of rewriting the book in English as a part of the National Program for the Development of Humanities (NPRH), *Uniwersalia* 2.1. I am also grateful to my home institution, the University of Zielona Góra, for granting me partial exemption from my teaching duties in order to carry out the work on the text of this book. Last but not least, I owe great thanks to Mrs. Una Maclean-Hańćkowiak, an essential collaborator in the NPRH project, for doing the language editing of the entire text repeatedly, which involved discussions on the structure of the text and on

more general issues concerning aspects of linguistics and translation, all of which were, for me, very fruitful and instructive.

Finally, I would also like to draw the readers' attention to three of my recent papers published in English, where further enquiries into issues touched upon in this book are developed. Their subjects are Lewis Campbell's studies on Plato (Mróz, 2019), Campbell's relations to Wincenty Lutosławski (Mróz, 2018), and the latter's correspondence with Bertrand Russell (Mróz, 2020).

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Introduction

0.1 *The scope of the research*

The subject of this work, Plato's reception in Poland, is not original, nor is it unknown in the research literature. Over one hundred years ago, the first text entitled *Plato in Poland* was published by Lewis Campbell, who enthusiastically reported on Wincenty Lutosławski's studies on Plato.¹ A synthetic study under a similar title was written by Izydora Dąmbska,² a representative of the younger generation of Kazimierz Twardowski's students. To this day this work is considered to be the most important reference point for research on the history of Plato's reception among Polish thinkers.³ Dąmbska's work can therefore be treated as a starting point for further research on this subject, as a preliminary outline of the problem and a catalogue of authors and works that require verification and ordering.

In relation to Dąmbska's work, the present study aims to deepen and expand research on the subject significantly, while narrowing the time frame. By focusing on one and a half centuries of the development of Polish philosophy in an extremely diverse and philosophically eventful epoch that was to have far-reaching consequences surviving up to the present day, it was possible to take into account phenomena that went unnoticed or were deliberately omitted by Dąmbska. This study focuses both on the numerous works on Plato that have been more or less acknowledged by Polish philosophers, as well as on forgotten or unknown authors and works or those that have been misjudged, underestimated or ignored. At times it also proved to be necessary to rectify erroneous information concerning both the biographic and bibliographic facts and data, and to reassess the impact and value of particular texts. In some cases new and unknown texts have been brought to light, in others – available information has been re-evaluated. It may also be of significance that the research on the history of

1 Campbell, 1893.

2 Dąmbska, 1972a.

3 Paczkowski even declared that the bibliography of Dąmbska's work covered all Polish studies up to the year of its publication (Paczkowski, 1998: 144). Nerczuk also relied above all on Dąmbska (Nerczuk, 2003: 57, note 1).

Plato's reception made it possible for more general conclusions to be drawn regarding the character of some of the trends in the development of Polish philosophy.

In justifying the scope of this study, it is easiest to provide arguments for enclosing the chronological framework within the years 1800–1950. This is a conventional framework covering the entire 19th century, which was unique in the history of Polish philosophy, followed by the interwar period, and the short post-war years that coincided with the last years in the lives of the two most important Polish researchers of Plato, namely Lu-
tosławski and Władysław Witwicki.

From this chronological framework it was necessary to eliminate a number of phenomena that were of secondary importance for Plato's philosophical reception, although they were significant for Polish culture. Studies on Plato's literary metamorphoses, which have their source in the Enlightenment tradition, have not been included in the present study.⁴ Likewise, the neo-humanism of the Vilnius school, inspired directly by Gottfried Ernst Grodek, has been omitted even though Grodek, despite adversities, was able to instil great passion for Greek antiquity, and especially for Plato, in the Vilnius milieu. The reason for this omission is that the interest in Plato of Grodek's students, of whom Józef Jeżowski and Adam Mickiewicz should be mentioned, did not yield results of a philosophical nature. They viewed Plato as a writer, a poet and an exponent of humanist ideals. For Jeżowski, Plato was an important subject of historical and philological research, and most of the Philomaths treated the dialogues as a source of moral ideals, of intellectual aristocratism, or as a model of *arete*. The case of Mickiewicz is sometimes referred to as "literary Platonism",⁵ and it should be mentioned that the exceptional phenomenon of the neo-humanism of Vilnius had a great influence on the formation of the personality and literary works of Poland's national bard. This has been the subject of a great deal of research and has a considerable literature. Unfortunately, Grodek's circle did not yield any lasting fruit in the form of the Hellenistic research tradition. As a result, poetic references to Platonism are not included in this work. These were usually fragmentary and sometimes transformed to such an extent that it was too difficult to distinguish superficial similarities from actual influences, and consequently, to determine clearly the influence of Plato.

4 Cf. Mróz, 2010b; 2012a.

5 E.g. Rudaś-Grodzka, 2003: 8–9.

Another omission is a work described as a translation of Plato's *Phaedo*,⁶ which actually consists of a translation of an adaptation of the *Phaedo* by Moses Mendelssohn, who put his own arguments for the immortality of the soul within the framework of Plato's dialogue. Although this work played a role in *Haskalah*, the Jewish Enlightenment in Poland, it remained insignificant with respect to the reception of Plato in Poland.

The history of Polish translations of the dialogues, which began in the inter-uprising era of the mid 19th century, forms a separate issue in the problem of the reception of Plato's philosophy. Of the many translators of the dialogues, the majority translated single dialogues only, usually focusing on Plato's Socratic writings and translating them because of their main character, Socrates, and not in order to learn about Platonism. These translators were mostly philologists or teachers of classical languages in gymnasia, and their interest in the dialogues was related to their teaching. Their aim was to familiarise students with the colourful and relatively simple language of Socratic dialogues and, at the same time, to draw their attention to moral issues, basic problems of logic, *etc.*⁷ Teachers also produced numerous works in which the structure of the dialogues and the logical construction of Socrates' arguments were dissected, explanations of the philological intricacies of the text provided, corrections suggested or remarks on the chronology of the dialogues added. These works, to a large extent derivative and sometimes directly based on German textbooks, have been omitted, with only a few exceptions.

The most important translator of Plato in the 19th century was Antoni Bronikowski, a teacher at the gymnasium in Ostrów. There is, however, no evidence of his acquaintance with philosophical issues, for, apart from his translations of the dialogues, which were generally not well-received, he did not write any introduction or studies on Plato's philosophy.⁸ For this reason, his activity is only recorded here. In contrast, the following writers

6 In the *Bibliography of Polish Philosophy* this work was listed under the name of Plato, with the following description: "*Phaedo on the immortality of the soul, from Plato, in three conversations* (translated into German) by the famous philosopher M. Mendelssohn, translated into Polish by J. Tugendhold" (*Bibliografia filozofii polskiej 1750–1830*, 1955: 193, item 838a). Dąmbaska wrote that it was "a Polish translation of the German paraphrase of the *Phaedo*, departing from Plato's original" (Dąmbaska, 1972a: 73). She nevertheless included Mendelssohn's *Phaedo* among the translations of Plato in her bibliography (Dąmbaska, 1972a: 81).

7 Cf. Mróz, 2012b.

8 Cf. Mróz, 2014a.

did make attempts at commentary: Felicjan Antoni Kozłowski⁹, the first Polish translator of the dialogues, later Stanisław Lisiecki¹⁰, and finally, in a unique way, Witwicki. Those three translators wrote studies on Plato's philosophy, and therefore their presence in the present work is justified even though they were primarily translators.

The question of Polish translations of Plato will no doubt continue to be the subject of detailed studies by philologists, who mostly tend to provide critiques of previous translations, and especially those by Witwicki. For readers interested in basic information about the history of Polish translations of Plato, a chronological list of Polish editions of the dialogues has been placed in the appendix.

There was no place either, in the present work, for a separate discussion of the works by the aforementioned Dąbska, or by Maria Maykowska, authors of studies and translations. The reason for this is that the publication of their most important works on Plato falls in the post-war years. The lack of separate treatment does not mean, however, that their studies have been ignored.

While researching the reception of Plato's dialogues, one must be aware of the many related issues in various fields of study. Since the reception of literary material and issues concerning some of the translations of the dialogues have been excluded, the focus is centred on the philosophical aspects of the reception of Plato in Polish thought. The essential aim is to find such influences of Plato on Polish thought that are as pure as possible and not diluted by other influences. So, the basic aim was to search for the reception of Plato himself, of Plato only, and not the reception of the diverse historical forms of Platonisms which have permeated European philosophy since the times of Plato. Tadeusz Sinko has written meaningfully about ancient influences on Romanticism: "the main components of the wonderful scent of Romanticism were so closely interwoven with Hellenism that it is impossible to distinguish where one ends and the other begins".¹¹ With this in mind, it was decided that alleged "Platonisms", such as those attributed to August Cieszkowski¹² or Adam Jerzy Czartoryski¹³, do not fall within the current study. In the case of the latter, firm conclusions can be drawn only after his entire work *On Consolation* is published

9 Cf. Mróz, 2011a.

10 Cf. Mróz, 2013.

11 Sinko, 1925: 40–41.

12 Cf. Sajdek, 2008: 163–178, *passim*; Mróz, 2009.

13 Cf. Jaworski, 1994a: 146–155.

as only scattered fragments have appeared so far. When determining whether these thinkers belonged to any particular current of Platonism, one must not overlook the extent of their knowledge or their ignorance of Plato's writings, or the frequency of their references to Plato. And it turns out that Czartoryski referred to Plato only incidentally, Cieszkowski – virtually never.

After a consideration of all the areas of extra-philosophical or dubious reception that will *not* be taken into account in our study of Plato in Poland during the period under examination, it will now be appropriate to consider what *will* be included and to provide a general outline of the content of this study. Plato's philosophical reception in the Polish milieu has been divided into three types, which basically correspond – with only a few exceptions – to three chronological stages of Plato's reception which are reflected in the three unequal parts of this book. The first stage concerns the passive reception of Platonism as a part of the wider process of the reception of contemporary philosophical currents by Polish authors who introduced the Polish philosophical milieu to the philosophy of Plato in its Kantian, Hegelian or neo-Kantian interpretations. The second stage consists of evaluations of Plato's philosophy provided by the representatives of different philosophical currents and philosophical approaches who referred directly to Plato and evaluated his philosophy from their own points of view, their philosophical positions. Their studies on Plato had essentially no effect on the content and direction of their own philosophical research. The third stage involves the implanting or integration of the Platonic material into the tissue of Polish philosophy. The authors classified into this stage used Plato's dialogues to build their own philosophical views and systems. In this stage Plato became the initial material on the basis of which these philosophers developed their own philosophical work. Plato became helpful and useful in the co-creation and co-production of works representing philosophical currents that originated in the 19th and 20th centuries. Sometimes Polish philosophers integrated Plato so deeply into their philosophical thought that explanation and understanding of their own philosophical positions were made impossible without reference to Platonic sources and inspirations. Plato's dialogues were variously processed and interpreted by these philosophers and Platonism was integrated with their philosophies. Plato thus became one of the essential inspirations for a Polish philosophical tradition, the representatives of which, sometimes *expressis verbis*, declared the ancient pedigree of their own works.

It would be pointless to assess the value of these works from the present point of view or to compare them to the present state of research on Plato.

Today's experts in ancient philosophy may find in these works both familiar ideas which are still discussed today and those which have already been rejected. If, however, this work leads to a realisation that the Polish tradition of research on Plato was richer than it is usually believed to be, its task in the area of historiography of ancient thought will have been fulfilled. When interpreting Plato, it is worth referring not just to the state of the latest research published in Western centres, but also to Poland's philosophical heritage, for such studies were also conducted, and they were often unavailable to Western readers. The basic problems faced by the contemporary reader of Plato remain largely the same as a hundred years ago. It is therefore advisable to become acquainted with past attempts to interpret Plato. Hopefully, this work will contribute to further comparative studies on Platonic traditions, and the authors discussed here will be the subject of such studies. This does not mean that recent studies of Plato's philosophy are neglected here, but they are quoted only when their authors directly refer to earlier Polish works, either critically or by adopting earlier conclusions.

Let us repeat: it is not the aim of the present study to assess critically past views and works from today's point of view. In many cases our assessment would probably turn out to be negative. Sometimes the old views on Plato consisted of opinions which are certainly false or distorted. It would be futile, however, to argue against them from the perspective of the 21st century. For the historian of Polish philosophy, the following fact is essential: these works created the image of Plato in Polish philosophy, and at the same time, they were a part of Polish intellectual history.

Given that occasionally doubts have been raised regarding the discipline affiliation of research on the reception of ancient thought in Polish philosophy, it is necessary to state unambiguously that this work belongs to the field of the historiography of Polish philosophy. The primary sources of this work consist of texts written by Polish researchers analysing an important philosophical problem, namely Plato and his dialogues. Therefore despite the name of Plato in the title of this reception study, it belongs to the historiography of Polish philosophy. The source material that has been subjected to analysis is the effect of the work of Polish historians of philosophy, philosophers and sometimes philologists who confronted the problem of Plato, Platonism and the dialogues, and who used Plato's works in their own studies.

It seems that research of this kind can be regarded as an overdue fulfilment of Twardowski's demand that building a Polish philosophical tradition should be dependent on our philosophers' knowledge of their prede-

cessors. Twardowski wrote: “We have, in fact, much richer philosophical achievements than one might think. We neither use them properly in philosophical research nor in teaching philosophy. And we do not use them because we do not know them”.¹⁴ Most likely this demand should also be applied to Polish research in the history of philosophy, including research on Plato. Not all of the results presented in older works have become outdated, and it is unlikely that problems with Plato will ever become obsolescent.

0.2 The problem of reception in studies on the history of philosophy

When one attempts to study the reception of a philosophical work, any philosophical idea or the image of a certain philosopher in the age-long development of European philosophy, one might be tempted to precede the publication of such a study with the well-known and frequently repeated maxim: *Habent sua fata libelli*. When studying Plato reception, another comment immediately comes to mind, namely the famous opinion about the history of philosophy expressed by Alfred North Whitehead, in which he refers to the history of philosophy, Plato, and the footnotes. The methodological foundation of the study of Plato’s reception has also been aptly described by a Polish scholar, Mirosława Czarnawska, who conducted research on the neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato: “Grasping Plato’s thought means almost grasping the basis of philosophy itself – and one can do this in many ways. It is in fact an encounter with thinking itself and all philosophers must constantly experience this meeting anew, individually for themselves and on their own.”¹⁵ The study of the reception of Plato must not, then, be reduced to the history of the impact of a chronologically distant philosopher on a number of later thinkers. Instead, every philosophical era, many philosophical trends and many philosophers are substantially reflected in their interpretations of Plato. Their relation to Plato may be considered as their relation to philosophy itself. Plato and his dialogues form a challenge and a task which every philosopher confronts and must continue to confront. The history of diverse interpretations of Plato is not just a history of reception, but it is the history of the answers to the questions which are posed by Plato and his legacy since he is still a con-

14 Twardowski, 1927a: 138.

15 Czarnawska, 1997: 95.

stant source of problems and inspiration. His dialogues are still the philosophers' *Bible*.¹⁶

It should also be remembered that research into Plato's reception in modern thought is a methodologically distinct task. The reception of Kant's philosophy, of Hegel's philosophy, or of any other author by their contemporaries does not involve the same complications as those which are inevitable with regard to the reception of a chronologically distant, ancient author, especially one whose name is still considered as synonymous with "philosopher". The studies already conducted on various phenomena of Plato's philosophical reception demonstrate that he should rather be treated as a complex philosophical, artistic, literary, philological and historical problem, and it was this that the authors examined in our research had to confront. Philosophers who were chronologically and intellectually closer to these authors did not present such a problem. It was not necessary to determine the basic biographical facts nor the authenticity of their writings, and there was no need to separate the layers of myth or poetry from their philosophy. They attempted to resolve the problems that beset their contemporary readers and to express the common issues of their times. In the case of Plato's reception, it was only the problems themselves that were shared by Plato and his readers since they were of a universal nature. That is why the Plato presented in this reception study is not just a thinker under reception; he is rather one of the many philosophical problems which have been tackled by modern historians of philosophy and philosophers who have sometimes had to reach far beyond philosophy itself to solve this problem.

Even when the issue of Plato's reception is reduced only to philosophical problems, it is still unique. When a less unique philosopher goes under reception, what is processed and subjected to criticism is the more or less defined image of that philosopher, a complex of distinct ideas, etc. The reception of almost any philosopher can be considered as a survey of the history of a certain philosophical idea or of a certain philosophical concept. In the case of Plato, it is a reconstruction of the answers to the questions about Plato and Platonism themselves, about the form of the very concept undergoing reception. For the reception of Plato is not a simple reception of a complex of well-defined ideas, but rather the reception of a problem, which consists of Platonism itself and of its author.

An attempt to delineate a theoretical framework for reception studies in the history of philosophy was made by Jan Garewicz, and some of his con-

16 Stróżewski, 1963: 373.

clusions are still worth considering. Stanisław Borzym referred to Garewicz's reflections in his research on the reception of Henri Bergson in Polish thought. Garewicz distinguished two layers in the reception process. The first involves merely factual reconstruction. The second layer concerns the diffusion of philosophical ideas that are capable of "making a change in a global structure, which could be referred to as philosophical awareness. This may involve individual consciousness only, when the reception of one philosopher's ideas by another philosopher is concerned; or collective consciousness, and then the transformation can be characterised as an overall change in a particular philosophical tradition".¹⁷ The present study contains a great deal of factual information which forms the basis for determining the impact of Plato on Polish philosophy. It is difficult, however, to point to a certain current of Polish thought or a philosophical tradition and decide whether it might have been in some part the result of the direct impact of Plato or whether it was simply a form of Platonism. Nevertheless, it is clear that the image of Plato held by the general public underwent a process of evolution, and this change can be regarded as a result of the activity of some of Plato's researchers. Undoubtedly, Plato's dialogues influenced the philosophical views of numerous individual researchers as well. The impact of Plato is mutual, since in the process of reception "the object under reception is transformed, even if the recipient considers himself to be a follower of the ideas and views acquired".¹⁸

It is difficult, at the outset, to answer the question about the views that were acquired in the process of Plato reception; they cannot be assumed as established or given since even such a fundamental issue as determining the set of authentic dialogues on which Plato's philosophy could be reconstructed is itself an important subject in Plato's reception. It cannot therefore be assumed that the contemporary state of knowledge on the subject of Plato's writings and philosophy, where there is, in any case, a lack of consensus among historians of philosophy, could form the basis for the assessment of past views.

For obvious reasons, any analysis of the reception of Plato must be essentially diachronic, although its synchronous aspect comes to the fore when contemporary interpretations or contemporary images of Plato go under reception. Among reception levels, Garewicz distinguished the following: "the level of direct references; the level of the conceptual apparatus; the level of the subjects undertaken and the way they were expressed;

17 Garewicz, 1979: 104–105.

18 Garewicz, 1979: 105.

the level of the main ideas. These levels are listed here by way of example, but it is by no means suggested that the study of philosophical reception must be conducted on all levels”.¹⁹ When starting a study on the reception of Plato, the first of these levels must be explored, namely the direct references. Without direct references, attempts to examine the main ideas or concepts that have their origins in the dialogues, including the area of philosophical reflection, would most likely turn into the overall history of European philosophy, or at least a large part of it. In the case of Plato and his impact, there is a very high probability of such an outcome since even in relation to the broadly understood reception of Kant in the philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries a similar danger exists. Borzym warned against such a broad understanding of reception, providing the following example: “There are some who question the original character of Bergsonism; they want to consider it, say, as a continuation of neo-Platonism, and neo-Platonism, in turn, as you know, is a reception of Platonism. Moreover Husserl and Bergson were included among the Platonists, so both of them would simply be followers of Plato. Considerations of this kind can really discourage one from dealing with the problem of reception”.²⁰ It is clear, then, that only when a firm framework limited to direct references has been established can the other reception levels, as listed by Garewicz, be examined within it. For the purposes of the present work, it is also worth noting the importance of a substantial presence of references to Plato himself, without which research on Plato’s reception would be seriously hampered.²¹

To sum up, in the light of the above methodological reflection on the study of reception, the research task of the present work consists, above all, in limiting the research area to those works in which direct, and not incidental, references to Plato can be found. Such references should at least constitute an important axis for considerations in the authors’ philosophical activity, if not the autonomous subject of their research. This research step is essentially equivalent to reproducing the factual level, by finding references to Plato. Partially, therefore, it belongs to the field of the history of the historiography of philosophy because “it is very difficult to draw a clear boundary between the position of the author who belongs to a particular reception current and that of the interpreter who is not directly com-

19 Garewicz, 1979: 106.

20 Borzym, 1984: 10.

21 Cf. Borzym, 1984: 13.

mitted”.²² It is difficult to make this distinction because the detached attitude of historians of philosophy is an illusion and reception research should explore “cool and balanced direct reactions, written intentionally from neutral positions that do not differ much in their intentions from historiography of philosophy, all the more so, because a neutral attitude is itself usually a pretence, being simply a hidden attack or defence, taken consciously or unconsciously”.²³ It was only when the area of research was limited to direct references to Plato that it was possible to elaborate the research into further layers of reception. The present study is therefore diachronic research with small synchronous exceptions which are limited to the reception and impact in the layer of particular methods or interpretations of Plato that appeared contemporaneously with the authors under discussion.

* * *

Preliminary work on the subject of Plato reception in Poland between 1800 and 1950 began with the publication in 2010 of a selection of texts.²⁴ This included shorter studies or fragments of larger works produced by Polish philosophers, historians of philosophy, philologists or poets, some of which came to light as a result of archival research. As a whole, these works represented only a small part of the broad spectrum of Polish approaches to Plato. The present study, on the other hand, was intended rather to be a synthetic work in the history of philosophy. Works of this kind are usually preceded and based on the results of monograph studies, the subject of which, in the case of research on reception of Plato should be the figures of individual researchers or histories of the reception of individual dialogues or philosophical ideas. In many areas, however, it still proved necessary to undertake basic research. Some of the researchers whose works were essential for the present study were barely mentioned in the literature, and sometimes it was difficult to determine basic biographic data, such as the dates of their births and deaths, thus necessitating archival research. There is much uncharted territory in the history of Polish philosophy. Thus, the work contains some biographical facts which were hitherto unknown. This may seem insignificant, but it should be remembered that Plato is rarely the subject of dispassionate research. Reading Plato has

22 Borzym, 1984: 10.

23 Borzym, 1984: 11.

24 Mróz, 2010.

frequently influenced the decisions and fates of scholars who displayed an emotional, personal attitude towards their subject. Plato's works aroused and still arouse emotions. This should also be seen as a justification for the numerous quotes included in the present study since it seemed important to acquaint the reader with the language that was used to talk about Plato in previous epochs.

The author wishes to thank Professor Ryszard Palacz for a series of comments regarding the subject and research methods of this work and the partial studies preceding it. Special thanks go to Professor Czesław Głombik for going to the trouble of carefully reading the entire study in Polish as a reviewer, and for his valuable remarks, thanks to which this work has not reached an unacceptable size. The author also wishes to express his gratitude to Mrs. Ewa Bielecka for her invaluable help in reading neo-Latin texts, including many which were eventually not included in the present study.

I. Passive acceptance of Plato's image

1.1 *A.I. Zabellewicz, J.K. Szaniawski, and Polish Kantianism in relation to Plato*

In 1817 Adam Ignacy Zabellewicz¹ (1784–1831) took the post of Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw, having already established a name for himself at the University as a lecturer of philosophy in the Faculty of Medicine. He headed the Chair of Philosophy from 1818 to 1823 and his works on ancient philosophy, mainly on Socrates and Plato, date from this period. The works of Zabellewicz which are discussed below are not frequently quoted in the literature on the subject. Researchers usually focus on his dissertation, in which he articulated his own philosophical and metaphysical views, while his works on ancient philosophy are often neglected.

Before its publication, Zabellewicz's study on Socrates was reported on at the meeting of the Warsaw Society of Friends of Learning in November 1819. In the report the speaker listed Socrates' merits and drew attention to the fact that a large number of studies had been devoted to the Athenian. He also remarked that the author of the work had emphasised Socrates' significance in philosophy rather than merely presenting his biography.² Zabellewicz's study on Socrates was also mentioned by Stanisław Staszic (1755–1826) in his speech at the opening of the Society's public meeting, in which he described Socrates as a symbol of sacrifice for the sake of truth and as a philosopher who had opposed the unenlightened powers in Athens, but had lost the struggle against them.³

1 Among the various versions of the spelling of the philosopher's name (including Zubelewicz, Zubellewicz) the form 'Zabellewicz' will be used. This is how he signed his most important works, and this form was also used by Władysław Tatarkiewicz. According to Józef Bieliński, in 1821 Zabellewicz began to sign his name as 'Zubelewicz' (Bieliński, 1907: 99). On Zabellewicz's works on ancient philosophy *cf.*: Mróz, 2009a, 2010c.

2 Kraushar, 1902: 318.

3 Kraushar, 1902: 329. Staszic referred once again to Zabellewicz's study on Socrates during another public meeting of the Society when they met to sum up its four-year period of activity. Staszic presented Socrates, as he had been portrayed by Zabellewicz, as a man who had tried to counteract corruption and injustice. This

Zabellewicz used the works by Plato and Xenophon as the most important primary sources for his presentation of Socrates' biography and philosophy. He informed his readers that Socrates had initially been interested in the 'natural sciences', or the philosophy of nature and the 'cosmophysics of Anaxagoras'. Zabellewicz therefore regarded the *Phaedo* as a credible source for Socrates' intellectual biography. He also considered Diotima to be a historical figure on the basis of her speech quoted by Socrates in the *Symposium*.

Socrates, as portrayed by Plato, believed that his way of doing philosophy was under the guidance and protection of God. He was not a sophist, and although he was not even a philosopher in the strict sense of the word, his influence on the history of philosophy should not be underestimated. In characterising Socratic philosophy, Zabellewicz attempted to apply Kantian terminology, writing: "it is not a question of what we can know, but what we should do, and what we should expect: in other words, questions relating to human destiny, to our obligations to ourselves and to others, and our relation to God were his main research subject."⁴ Again, it was to Kantian philosophy that Zabellewicz turned for a criterion for evaluating Socrates: "he very rightly held in contempt all speculation that led into the dark labyrinth, disrupting human comprehension and distracting man from the more important engagements of practical reason."⁵ Thus empty metaphysical speculations were alien to Socrates. In true Kantian spirit, Zabellewicz argued that some metaphysical questions could not be answered in the domain of experience, and therefore the search for them was futile: "all speculations on the origin and laws of the universe (that is on the heavenly beings, as he called them) were considered by him to be without purpose, because they aimed at things which could not be fathomed."⁶ Among these unfathomable matters Socrates included the existence of God and human immortality, which for him could not become objects of knowledge but remained objects of faith.

was, in fact, a criticism of contemporary times, which Staszic believed to be immoral, for the ethical rules given by the Creator had ceased to be observed, and people ignored their duties and rights. It seems that Staszic, a voice of the then vanishing Enlightenment, was calling for a new Socrates who could remind the moderns about „the doctrine of the eternal relations between Man and Man, between Man and external beings and the one Supreme Being, God" (Kraushar, 1902: 173).

4 Zabellewicz, 1820: 492.

5 Zabellewicz, 1820: 494.

6 Zabellewicz, 1820: 494.

For Zabellewicz, Plato was a much more important subject of research than Socrates. He reconstructed Plato's views on upbringing and education on the basis of the *Republic* and the *Laws*. Leaving aside the well-known details of Plato's educational project, let us focus on his evaluation of the project. He considered that the most important aim of Platonic pedagogy was "to arouse in children the sentiments that they would demand of themselves as adults, so that before the development of their own reasoning, children should have become accustomed to love and praise or to hate and reject that which should be loved and hated."⁷ Thus, from their earliest years, children were to form moral habits while the justification for these habits could be taught at a more mature age. This was all the more important for Plato because of his awareness that "the first impressions are the most vital and the longest-lasting, and they often affect the entire human life."⁸ The second aim postulated by Plato was to form the development of the whole person through combining the spiritual and physical elements on which human perfection was dependent. Both in his outline of Plato's pedagogy and in his dissertation directly devoted to Plato Zabellewicz passed over the details of Plato's philosophical education.

Although Zabellewicz had not succeeded in presenting Socrates' philosophical views in a systematic form, he was more successful in this respect with Plato. Surprisingly, he started his paper on Plato with laudatory remarks about those Poles whose research in philosophy had won them rank and recognition, though he did not actually use the word 'philosophy' but referred to it with the terms of Kant's transcendental philosophy, as "the ability to show the limits and conditions of [...] cognition, the discovery of laws with which the intellect complies in all its actions, and the strong conviction of what we are able to know and how we should act."⁹ The outstanding Poles in this field included Gregory of Sanok (Gregorius Sanocensis, Sanoceus), John of Głogów (Glogoviensis, Gloger), Adam Burski (Bursius). The dissertation set out to evaluate the greatness of Polish thinkers, but in order to present them in the right light, Zabellewicz felt it necessary to establish some standard measure for evaluation that could be turned into a model, an ideal of philosophical perfection on a human scale. The question of who was to occupy this honorary position was answered by Zabellewicz as follows: "When carefully analysing the history of Philosophy, which represents the most faithful image of man, when pon-

7 Zabellewicz, 1821: 328.

8 Zabellewicz, 1821: 330.

9 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 51.

dering deeply on the development and education of the intellect, which is the supreme power of the human mind, we will discover that nowhere is it higher or more efficient than in Plato himself, and today I will speak of him in the first place, in order to prepare a model with which, in the course of time, I hope to compare my compatriots, the proud followers of Plato, and I also intend to assess their merits in Philosophy, once convinced that they are not unworthy to occupy a place beside him.”¹⁰ Despite Zabellewicz's declarations, the measure he applied to evaluate individual philosophers was not in fact Plato, but Kant. As for the task of presenting and evaluating the philosophical views of selected Polish philosophers, Zabellewicz unfortunately did not live to fulfil this.

According to Zabellewicz, the key stage in Plato's life is marked by the founding of the Academy, where philosophy was taught on two levels, “higher or academic philosophy for the education of future philosophers, and popular philosophy for general intellectual and moral development, which was accessible to students of all levels.”¹¹ By higher philosophy Zabellewicz did not mean Plato's esoteric teaching, but only that he took into account two types of philosophical audience and various levels of teaching philosophy. Everyone could take advantage of Plato's dialogues, “but not everyone had the spirit of Plato. His mental acumen and his extraordinary ability to pursue profound intellectual questions, his moral purity and unrestrained pursuit of what is good and true, beautiful and noble, placed him high above all the philosophers of the ancient world.”¹²

After a critical assessment of the philosophy of his time, Plato developed the next level of his own system by undertaking epistemological issues. The power of reasoning that had its source in sensory images and, indirectly, in changeable things was the kind of ‘intelligence’ that was unable to develop unchanging notions, hence it was forced to draw on thinking itself, which was independent of the world of objects. Plato's conception of inborn concepts, said Zabellewicz, resulted from the fact that Plato could not explain the origin of concepts that did not stem from experience, adding that “Plato accepted still higher general concepts or thoughts on which all our comprehension was dependent.”¹³ These ‘thoughts’ were, of course, the ideas, which Zabellewicz goes on to explain further in an important passage articulating his interpretation of the theory of ideas: “Such

10 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 51.

11 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 52.

12 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 53.

13 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 54.

things, namely the objects corresponding to general or generic concepts, are only mental, existing not outside the intellect but within it [...]. General concepts then, [...] Plato took for the essence in things [...]. They are not objects of experience and can only be revealed by reason. In the language of Plato they are general concepts or thoughts (*ideae*), they are models according to which the things of the senses were formed. Without these ideas, neither thinking nor recognising empirical objects would be possible. In this way Plato's *ideae*, apart from their logical meaning, also had metaphysical significance, which seems to have arisen from the confusion of the logical or mental being of things with the actual or real."¹⁴ This metaphysical meaning of the idea – “the things that are considered in an absolute sense, unchangeable, necessary, not occupying space, in a word, in complete opposition to things that can be known by the senses”¹⁵ – forms Platonic ‘ideology’.

According to Zabellewicz, the unity of human cognition was guaranteed in Plato's thought by the introduction into his philosophy of God, the Supreme Mind, who formed the material world according to ideas, and granted them to the human intellect. It is in this way that human beings can get to know the world: “These very concepts were poured by God into the human souls that had been created by him, that is, he transferred to human souls the form by which the world of the senses was moulded.”¹⁶ These concepts become the objects of knowledge, when they are ‘awakened’ by sensual impressions, and then by associations, knowledge is built. Cognition of the concepts is, of course, much more important because this allows the essence of things to be learned and is independent of the senses. Of most value to Plato was the kind of cognition in which reason itself is the source of the material or content that forms knowledge. Zabellewicz, however, was doubtful about accepting reason as the sole source of general concepts, and in this regard he believed that Aristotle, who acknowledged that “by our receptiveness we are capable of creating general concepts”,¹⁷ not only differed from Plato, but even surpassed him.

Although Zabellewicz states that the division of philosophy into specific branches is to be credited to the works of later philosophers, he sees the beginnings of this in Plato's work, such as the evident germs of logic in Platonic dialectics. Going even further, Zabellewicz adds: “Plato in his the-

¹⁴ Zabellewicz, 1821a: 55–56.

¹⁵ Zabellewicz, 1821a: 55.

¹⁶ Zabellewicz, 1821a: 56.

¹⁷ Zabellewicz, 1821a: 55.

oretical philosophy intended to demonstrate *what we can know*, and in his practical philosophy the focus was on *what we should do*,¹⁸ therefore he partially even concurred with Kant with regard to the division into philosophical branches. As for the very concept of philosophy, its meaning and scope, Plato, along with Pythagoras and Aristotle, could be counted among the philosophers who contributed most significantly to this subject, but the differences among these philosophers on this point accounted for the fact that the dispute over the understanding of philosophy had continued – according to Zabellewicz – to his very times.¹⁹

Plato's ethics followed from the knowledge of the ultimate goal of philosophical cognition, from the knowledge of God and from theology, because for Plato, particular branches of philosophy were closely interwoven. In this respect Plato's philosophy seemed to the Polish scholar surprisingly up-to-date: "The notion of philosophy that Plato had may differ only in words from that of present day philosophers, and this clearly proves its great impact not only on the arts and sciences but also on practical life, on making humanity more righteous and happy."²⁰ To support the claim concerning the connection between philosophical theory and practice, Zabellewicz quoted an excerpt from the work of Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1761–1819), in which he presents the image of true philosophers, who probe the knowledge of the unchanging and eternal object, and this comes to be reflected in their high moral standards, thus distinguishing them from the majority of people.²¹

Zabellewicz then went on to justify the thesis put forward at the beginning of his study that "in no one had the human intellect proved to be higher, and in no one more efficient than in Plato."²² Among his merits, Zabellewicz mentioned the distinction between two sources of cognition, the senses and reason, drawing attention to the components of the cognition process: the subject, the object, and cognition itself. To manage the power of reasoning Plato discovered a method and rules for thinking. He also laid the foundations for metaphysics, providing its most important concepts, which were later organised by subsequent philosophers.

18 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 58. Józef Jankowski similarly assessed Plato's contribution to logic, emphasising the polemical function of dialectics: "[Socrates and Plato] contributed more to logic by criticising the Sophists, who were therefore encouraged to teach their Dialectics better" (Jankowski, 1822: 154).

19 Zabellewicz, 1970: 75.

20 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 59.

21 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 59–60; Tennemann, 1799: 279–280.

22 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 60.

Zabellewicz again referred to Kant, when describing Plato's metaphysics, stating that it "depended on [...] the strict definition of the objects of the intellect (*noumena*), distinguishing them from the things of the senses (*phaenomena*)."²³ Plato's further merits included the initiation of theodicy by recognising that the evil in the world could not have resulted from the perfection of its creator, whose actions were guided by eternal ideas. Evil, then, must have been a consequence of the existence of eternal matter and human actions. Zabellewicz related the concepts of the world, the human soul and God to the rational cosmology, psychology and theology, which were all criticised by Kant.

Although Zabellewicz believed that it was only religion as revelation that possessed the true image of God, he nevertheless appreciated that, out of all the ancient philosophers, it was Plato, who, by drawing on Anaxagoras in the field of theoretical philosophy and Socrates in the field of practical philosophy, understood God's essence in its loftiest form. "He regarded God as the most perfect and supreme being, as an unlimited and infinite being, as good and just, in a word, as the holiest Being."²⁴ His arguments in favour of the immateriality and immortality of the soul "persuade us to adore Plato, who attempted to use all his strength to shed light on the conditions on which the safety of our present life's journey and our future happiness depend."²⁵

According to Zabellewicz, aestheticians could find much of value in the dialogues. In Kantian spirit he remarked that the concept of beauty "serves us only as a precept for our aesthetic judgments,"²⁶ which should be disinterested. Plato's reflection on beauty remained closely related to ethics, for – according to Zabellewicz – this resulted from the very use of the word 'beauty', which is used to describe what is good – 'morally beautiful'. Love of beauty and the pursuit of good are therefore closely intertwined. Plato, however, put too little emphasis on the distinction between freedom of will and human rationality.

Very little space is devoted in the Warsaw professor's work to Plato's political thought, which was restricted to the statement that the unity of the state consists in subordination of all the classes to the laws and that Plato considered proper education to be the most important means of fulfilling his political ideal.

23 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 61.

24 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 62–63.

25 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 65.

26 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 65.

All things considered, Plato, as Zabellewicz concluded, turned out to have been and to remain the father and king of all philosophers, unmatched in antiquity or in later centuries. The beauty of Plato's philosophy must have reflected the beauty of Plato's soul, and therefore all research on Plato's philosophy should be source-based, selecting only those dialogues which represent it in its pure form, unchanged by later Platonists. Of his research method, Zabellewicz writes: "We have tried to present Plato's philosophy in all its purity, and that is why we have refrained from all comparisons and applications. Any desire to rectify his thoughts according to one's own views is insolent; and to distort them or to implant them with alien ideas is a crime, whereas to understand him and to know how to make use of him is true praise."²⁷ To see the extent to which this naive declaration fails to stand up to confrontation with the author's text it is sufficient to examine the Kantian terminology applied by Zabellewicz to divide Plato's philosophy into branches, not to mention the separate issue of the actual possibility of fulfilling the requirement of presenting a philosophical system from the distant past in its pure form. Zabellewicz, however, seems to have been oblivious to this.

The final assessment of Plato against the background of the history of philosophy resulted from Zabellewicz's concept of how historiography of philosophy should be pursued. In this respect the following remark by Zabellewicz is of significance: "It is not to deride the weaknesses of human reason that we study the history of philosophy, but to be able to progress more confidently by avoiding the mistakes of our predecessors. Moreover, the history of philosophy is not just a set of errors, but it also provides us with examples of exact reasoning which is worth imitating."²⁸ Thus, the history of philosophy provides the philosopher, above all, with knowledge on methods of doing philosophy itself. The history of philosophy teaches how to pursue philosophy – and how not to pursue it. "Even in Plato we can point out some deficiencies, we can regard his research as merely beautiful dreaming, but beside this dreaming we find thoughts which, in the following centuries and even in our times, have led to important discoveries in the field of human cognition and activity."²⁹

On the one hand, then, Zabellewicz's contemporaries could learn a great deal about philosophy from Plato, for he continued to inspire successive generations of philosophers, on the other hand, in assessing his great-

27 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 68.

28 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 67–68.

29 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 69.

ness, it is also necessary to make comparisons related to his own epoch, for it was the historical context that conditioned, among other things, the form of his work. In making an assessment of his work, then, both topicality and historical significance must be taken into account. On both grounds Plato was a philosophical genius. Indirectly, from the general statements outlined above in which Zabellewicz emphasises the continuing influence of Plato, a view emerges concerning the continuity of the development of philosophy.

It is worth drawing attention to the fact that, according to Zabellewicz, the Platonic ideas had, above all, epistemological significance while their metaphysical function was considered to be secondary. For the Warsaw professor, by concentrating both these functions in the ideas, Plato merely made his system more obscure.

Zabellewicz was not the only Pole to take up the problem of the theory of ideas in relation to Kant and Plato. Józef Kalasanty Szaniawski (1764–1843) stated that the very word *idea* comes from Plato. Without specifying essentially what the idea was, about the genesis of the idea he wrote that “it was a fruit of great premonitions, and it enlivened the entire philosophy of this truly heavenly genius.”³⁰ Later, however, modern philosophers ascribed to this notion the meaning of sensory images. It was Kant, Szaniawski argued, who “restored its original meaning, and brought the moderns many steps closer to the denoted object.”³¹ Later Szaniawski’s reading of Kant suggests a normative understanding of the idea, which was to serve ‘rational comprehension’ as “*indicative* and *directional* norms.”³² In another fragment describing the ideas, Szaniawski distinguishes ‘beauty’ (*pięknota*) from ‘beautiful’ (*piękność*) as an attribute, and characterises the former as follows: “it is to denote the Idea in which we can find a norm to judge every beauty of any kind. This distinction applies to the other words used to denote ideas.”³³

Szaniawski’s readers might have been under the misleading impression that Kant had restored the original meaning of the idea, that is the Platonic, and therefore metaphysical, meaning. This is how Szaniawski was understood by Stefan Harassek (1890–1952), who referred to him critically as

30 Szaniawski, 1823: 236, footnote ee.

31 Szaniawski, 1823: 236, footnote ee.

32 Szaniawski, 1823: 236.

33 Szaniawski, 1823: 237–238, footnote gg; on the basis of the above quotations, Wojciechowski regards ideas as instruments for constructing science (Wojciechowski, 1947: 117–118).

follows: "once, when referring to Kant, he ascribes to ideas the value of normative ideas only, then, he says that Kant has restored the original meaning that they had in Plato. It is obvious that these views can in no way be reconciled."³⁴

Likewise, Ludwik Kasiński attributed to Szaniawski the "indecisiveness of his opinions"³⁵ on the interpretation of Kantian ideas. He did not actually compare Szaniawski's views on the ideas in Plato and in Kant, but he pointed out that Szaniawski significantly extended the scope of the notion of the idea in critical philosophy. For according to Kasiński, Szaniawski ascribed to the ideas the possibility of their being the object of cognition, from which he concluded that Szaniawski considered them to be real beings. It is nevertheless true to say that "his views in this regard were not clearly specified: Szaniawski was undecided about the answer to the question of whether ideas have real existence or should only be attributed a normative character – as a means of systematising and bringing about closure of experience as a whole."³⁶ Szaniawski, indeed, did not take a clear and unambiguous stand in this regard. However, it is worth drawing attention to a certain degree of one-sidedness in the way he was treated by Kasiński. To support his opinion that Szaniawski lacked stability in his views and that he had attributed real being to the idea the following fragment from his *Friendly Advice* (*Rady przyjacielskie*, 1823) was quoted by Kasiński: "the intellectual *Ideas* should not *rest* in your mind, as if they were just general and *empty forms*."³⁷ In interpreting this statement Kasiński argued as follows: if ideas should not rest in the mind, they must be placed elsewhere. He did not, however, pay sufficient attention to the fact that in this advice it is the word *rest* which is underlined by Szaniawski, and not the phrase *in the mind*. And Szaniawski continues his reasoning in the following sentence: "They are to be the force that organises everything that you acquire from external sources or from your own inner sources; therefore, they should be constantly provided with elements to organise."³⁸ Kasiński overlooked this fragment. Szaniawski did not emphasise the 'place' of the idea, but the dynamic character of cognition. The normativity of the idea was underlined even more strongly in this sentence

34 Harassek, 1916: 104. It should be remarked that among his contemporaries Szaniawski was held in such high esteem that he was sometimes called "the Polish Plato", which was also noted by Harassek (Harassek, 1916: 112–113).

35 Kasiński, 1939: 74.

36 Kasiński, 1939: 74.

37 Szaniawski, 1823: 241.

38 Szaniawski, 1823: 241.

because of the emphasis on continuous intellectual exercise in order to reach autonomy of thinking, for which the ideas were the organising instruments.

The same fragment on the understanding of the ideas in Plato and in Kant that was referred to by Harassek was also commented on by Stefan Kaczmarek: “Obviously, the belief in the real existence of the idea cannot be reconciled with Kant’s views on this question.”³⁹ Kaczmarek, however, unlike Harassek, attempted to explain the underlying intention of Szaniawski’s words. According to Kaczmarek, Szaniawski had deliberately interpreted – though it would perhaps be more accurate to say that he had modified – the ideas of the soul and God metaphysically. The reasons for this were twofold. On the one hand, Szaniawski – as a critic of the materialistic aspirations of the Enlightenment – appeared to be attempting to show that critical philosophy, which had a generally unfavourable reception in Poland, was opposed to the ideas of the Enlightenment, or at least to some of them. On the other hand, he was trying to strengthen the image of critical philosophy. His statement that in Kantianism the ideas of God and the soul possess real existence was formulated in order to “make it more digestible for the reactionary masses of the Catholic nobility.”⁴⁰

Given the epoch and other works by Szaniawski, the motives ascribed to him by Kaczmarek are by all means probable, but they do not touch upon the essence of the problem because the context of Szaniawski’s comment on the ideas in Plato and Kant does not in fact require additional motives to justify it. Similarly, Harassek’s criticism of this fragment from *Friendly Advice* also misses the target. Admittedly, Szaniawski did not make himself clear, but he rather intended that Kant’s understanding of the idea restored it to the sphere of the intellect, and thus it ceased to belong to the sensory domain, where it had been located thanks to – or perhaps rather because of – the empiricists and sensualists.⁴¹ Certainly, the understanding of the *idea* in the philosophy of British empiricism was remote from its Platonic original, being merely the same word, but with a different meaning. Kant, therefore, did not so much return to the metaphysical understanding of

39 Kaczmarek, 1983: 146–147.

40 Kaczmarek, 1983: 147.

41 In one of his earlier works, where Kaczmarek discussed Szaniawski’s views somewhat more extensively, he mentioned the British empiricists in the context of the *idea* (Kaczmarek, 1961: 41), but he did not draw the present conclusions, but only emphasised the indecisiveness and ambiguity of Szaniawski’s interpretation of the theory of ideas in the philosophy of Plato and Kant (Kaczmarek, 1961: 42–43).

the idea, but rather, like Plato, he made ideas the objects of intellectual cognition, while maintaining his own position on the real existence of ideas.

Setting aside the question of whether or not Harassek was right in his criticism, Szaniawski did in fact make a connection between the understandings of the idea in Plato and Kant. On the basis of his study, *What is philosophy?*, it can be presumed that it was Szaniawski, who, prior to Zabellewicz, noticed the continuity of philosophy leading from Plato – through Descartes, Leibniz, and others – to Kant.⁴² Harassek's opinion about Szaniawski was, nevertheless, quite harsh: "he was not quite aware of the fundamental differences between Kant and his predecessors."⁴³

Zabellewicz was aware of Szaniawski's views, and considered his works to be valuable for philosophy students, for he set *Friendly Advice* as recommended reading. Szaniawski can, therefore, be considered a potential inspiration for Zabellewicz's epistemological understanding of Platonic ideas. A similar opinion to that expressed by Harassek about Szaniawski was articulated by Maurycy Straszewski (1848–1921) about Zabellewicz, whose philosophical attitude he described as essentially eclectic: "The following factors contributed to the formation of his philosophical views: Greek philosophy, Kant and English philosophy. So here again in Polish intellectual life we have a new combination of Kantianism and English influences, but on the ground gathered from the history of ancient philosophy."⁴⁴ Zabellewicz noticed, then, that in general, these philosophical positions had more in common than differences between them.

Szaniawski concerned himself with the practical philosophy of Plato, which he reconstructed, as he himself reported, on the basis of the work of Christian Garve (1742–1798). He raised Plato's political ideas to the rank of a system because "a *system* is understood as a structure in which various individual parts of any knowledge are drawn together and unified in terms of perspectives, means and rules, and only when they are accurately connected do they represent a whole."⁴⁵ Szaniawski emphasised the continuity of philosophical views from Socrates, through Plato, to Aristotle. Plato was an idealist, and as a result of his particular type of intellect: "his intellectual efficiency led him to a supreme position where he seemed somehow to see

42 Szaniawski, 1970: 59–60.

43 Harassek, 1916: 95.

44 Straszewski, 1912: 433.

45 Szaniawski, 1803: 197.

the harmony of the Creator's work."⁴⁶ That is why Plato was the author of one of the most important, or in Szaniawski's words, the most beautiful, of ethical systems that was to inspire subsequent generations. Human happiness and perfection in life could be achieved if harmony, resulting from unified goals and actions, was established in human life. Plato tried to put this perfect image into practice. His magnificent image of the state was intended to be attractive to his contemporaries since it resulted from profound knowledge of the laws of nature and its harmony, which was reflected in the structural correspondence between the human being and the state. Happiness and perfection, both for individuals and the state, lies therefore, in the same harmony of their individual parts. Like Szaniawski, Zabellewicz also expressed similar ideas about human aspirations towards perfection through harmony.

The charges of political day-dreaming which were levied by posterity against Plato's project were rejected by Szaniawski. He believed that these charges resulted from the fact that Plato "goes beyond [...] the thin sphere of the common moral and political imagination."⁴⁷ Plato acted comprehensively, or even totally. "He himself warns that this model is not to be found anywhere in reality, that it is, in fact, only an intellectual creation, comprising all the hallmarks of moral and political perfection, and indicating a great, though distant goal, the constant pursuit of which marks real progress towards perfection."⁴⁸ Szaniawski did not specify which particular aspects of the project were still valid, but recommended that single aspects of Plato's overall vision should not be assessed in isolation from each other. Instead, the spirit of Plato's politics should be analysed rather than focusing on those details which were, inevitably, offensive to readers at the beginning of the 19th century. Despite the fact that the *Republic* of Plato was "the most precious ancient gift for elevated souls",⁴⁹ it was not flawless, as had already been pointed out by Aristotle, who condemned its aristocratism and the lack of clear instructions in Plato's ethics.

The author of another study, written in the spirit of Kantianism and eclecticism and aimed at evaluating and comparing ancient and modern philosophies, was Józef Emanuel Jankowski (1790–1847), professor at the Jagiellonian University. In his references to Plato, Jankowski probably took advantage of the earlier works by Zabellewicz, and perhaps also by

46 Szaniawski, 1803: 206.

47 Szaniawski, 1803: 214.

48 Szaniawski, 1803: 214.

49 Szaniawski, 1803: 216.

Szaniawski. The goal that Jankowski set himself in his *Thesis about some Differences Appearing between Ancient Philosophy and the Philosophy of Later Centuries* was to oppose both the uncritical apologists of Greek antiquity and their opponents who glorified contemporary philosophy. He intended to compare critically both philosophical epochs and make a balanced assessment of them. Plato was, of course, included among the eminent ancient philosophers, in between Socrates and Aristotle.

Jankowski's material for comparison in contemporary philosophy was Kant's critical philosophy, though it was poorly comprehended by him and mixed with other inspirations. Jankowski believed that both ancient and modern philosophies constituted the same field of knowledge because their main subjects were Man, the world and God, though variously conceived. Pointing to the similarities between Kant's philosophy and that of ancient philosophers, Jankowski mentioned the opinion that "human reason is occupied with two kinds of objects, those that are conceived by themselves and those conceived with the aid of the senses; from the first type of action results knowledge, and from the latter opinion".⁵⁰ According to Jankowski, this distinction corresponded to *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge.

The most important difference between ancient philosophies and critical philosophy was, for Jankowski, the fact that the latter made the theory of cognition its starting point, whereas this was not true even of those Greek philosophers who dealt extensively with cognitive issues, such as Aristotle. Moreover, the Greek thinkers lacked "architectural structure and systematic coherence".⁵¹ However, the greatest difference results from the progress that has been made in the history of philosophy because "the Greeks are fortunate and original inventors; they made discoveries in all areas of Philosophy and provided a wealth of materials for all the sciences. [...] But they did not bring much to a closure, and they did not exhaust anything".⁵² On the subject of aesthetics, Jankowski merely repeated Zabellewicz's opinion. In his final remarks Jankowski fulfilled his goal and stated that: "We are indebted to the Ancient Authors for the collection of materials, whereas to the Moderns for the organisation and distribution of philosophical truths".⁵³

50 Jankowski, 1825: 253; cf. Harassek, 1916: 153.

51 Jankowski, 1825: 259.

52 Jankowski, 1825: 260.

53 Jankowski, 1825: 271.

In his thesis Jankowski repeated some opinions about Greek philosophy and about Plato that may have been partially based on Zabellewicz's earlier studies. Given the general lack of other studies on Plato in Polish, it is unlikely that Jankowski did not know the papers by the Warsaw professor. Jankowski's work, however, due to its superficial character, falls short of the standard set by Zabellewicz's studies. This may have resulted from the generally lower standards at the Jagiellonian University at that time. Straszewski claimed that, on the one hand, Jankowski was a good expert on the history of philosophy, and this opinion was articulated on the basis of his imitative work *Short Outline of Logic* (Kraków 1822); on the other hand, that his *Thesis about some Differences...* was a piece of little value.⁵⁴

Jankowski repeated some of Zabellewicz's deliberations on Greek thought, while Szaniawski, in turn, was one of the inspirations, though not the most important, for Zabellewicz's interpretations of ancient philosophy. Knowing Zabellewicz's philosophical views – as far as they can be known from his modest literary output – and the literature he read, including, the historical-philosophical work by Tennemann,⁵⁵ one can assume that, if Plato had confined himself to his conception of the ideas as “the principles of thinking which consist in combining and inferring, in other words, combining the notions which constitute the material of thinking”,⁵⁶ the final assessment of his ‘ideology’ would certainly have been much higher.

It was alleged that Tennemann assessed philosophical works in the following way: the nearer a philosophical system approached to critical philosophy, that is Kantianism, the closer it was to the truth.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, he was aware of the continuity and evolution of philosophical positions,⁵⁸ and this should be taken into account in connection with the evaluations he made. Zabellewicz also emphasised the continuity of the problems undertaken by the three most important philosophers of antiquity, Socrates –

54 Straszewski, 1912: 355–356.

55 His work is included as the last item in a list compiled by Zabellewicz “for better acquaintance with Plato's philosophy, among many others, the following works will be useful”, which was placed in a footnote (Zabellewicz, 1821a: 68, footnote 3).

56 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 55.

57 Novotný, 1977: 506.

58 Kaczmarek, 1968: 82.

Plato – Aristotle, philosophers from three different generations.⁵⁹ What is equally important, with regard to the sources for reconstructing Plato's philosophy, Zabellewicz argued that the only reliable sources were the dialogues, which he then treated uncritically. Interestingly, both Zabellewicz and Tennemann shared the view that a philosophical system is an indispensable result of doing philosophy – one cannot philosophise properly without a system, despite the difficulties entailed in this premise because of the dialogical form of Platonic writing.⁶⁰

Although Tennemann's method of examining philosophical systems from the Kantian point of view is said to have had very little influence on subsequent historians,⁶¹ its impact on the interpretation of Plato's philosophy in Poland can be observed in the studies by Zabellewicz, who is counted among the supporters and representatives of Kantianism in the history of Polish philosophy. Zabellewicz referred to his philosophical approach as 'synthetism.'⁶² This approach, articulated in the *Dissertation on Philosophy*, was, according to Harassek, essentially a repetition of the works by the German Kantian, Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770–1842).⁶³ Earlier, Henryk Struve (1840–1912) presented Zabellewicz in a similar light, though without considering his works on ancient philosophy.⁶⁴ Zabellewicz himself emphasised the influence of Krug on his work, but remarked that in his *Dissertation* he had adopted only those thoughts of Krug which "had seemed convincing."⁶⁵ Krug was, therefore, the source of Zabellewicz's views on philosophy and his lectures. If we consider Zabellewicz's understanding of the history of philosophy and his attempt to interpret Platon-

59 It is characteristic that Polish philosophers, both those inclined towards the philosophy of Kant (like Szaniawski or Zabellewicz) and those dealing with Kant's philosophy from a historical perspective, tended to link it with the philosophy of Plato and its subsequent transformations. A century later, when Polish research on Plato flourished and when Marburg neo-Kantianism and its interpretation of Platonism were known in Poland, Adam Żółtowski wrote: "critical philosophy is not at all new, but in fact very old; it is the resounding echo of Platonism after centuries and long journeys of thought" (Żółtowski, 1924: 157).

60 Tigerstedt, 1974: 65–66.

61 Tigerstedt, 1974: 68.

62 Zabellewicz, 1970: 84.

63 Harassek, 1916: 154–155; Chmielowski, 2005: 43.

64 Struve, 1911: 233; cf. Kaczmarek, 1961: 56.

65 Zabellewicz, 1821a: 57, footnote 2. In the *Dissertation* he referred to himself as a supporter of synthetism: "following the guidance of my teachers and according to my conviction – I willingly subscribe to it" (Zabellewicz, 1970: 84). This teacher must have been Krug himself, who was lecturing in Leipzig when Zabellewicz was there on a study trip.

ism, however, another author should be added as an inspiration, namely Tennemann, who also belonged to the circle of philosophers influenced by critical philosophy. The evaluation of Zabellewicz's philosophical position in the above light must result in regarding him as a Kantian and an eclectic, who drew on contemporary philosophers influenced by Kant, combining this with inspirations from ancient thought.

Zabellewicz's work is not considered to have been particularly influential and his works are evaluated as reliable rather than outstanding.⁶⁶ It is acknowledged that Józef Gołuchowski (1797–1858) made use of Zabellewicz's lectures and drew the fundamentals of his knowledge on Plato from them.⁶⁷ Straszewski, however, did not think highly of Zabellewicz's works in the history of philosophy, including, therefore, his study on Plato. He passed judgement on their value without any arguments to support his assessment, dismissing them shortly: "well-written in Polish, but in terms of content, there is nothing in them worthy of note."⁶⁸ It is interesting to consider the reasons for and validity of such harsh assessment. It may be significant that Straszewski examined Zabellewicz's works almost a century after they had been published when he had already become acquainted with the studies on Plato by Stefan Pawlicki (1839–1916) and by Lutosławski. In comparison to them, Zabellewicz's works must have seemed poor in Straszewski's eyes. Nevertheless, when the then current state of Polish philosophy, and Platonic studies (or, in fact, their absence) is taken into account as a background for the assessment of Zabellewicz's study on Plato, it turns out that it is unique for several reasons. The author provided readers with a synthetic outline of the whole of Plato's philosophy and, while interpreting Plato, he did not disguise his own philosophical views, based on Kantian philosophy. In presenting ancient material, he analysed it with the conceptual apparatus of Kantianism and assessed Plato's philosophy from the viewpoint of a historian of philosophy and a philosopher who was well-disposed to critical philosophy. All things considered, his dissertation on Plato, against the background of

66 Bieliński, 1912: 110, *cf.*: 68; Tatarkiewicz, 1971a: 147.

67 Palacz, 1999: 238. On the basis of archival sources and earlier studies on Gołuchowski, Harassek noted: "in 1817 Gołuchowski wrote an extensive thesis *On Moral Philosophy* in German, which 4 years later, in 1821, was to serve as a dissertation to obtain the degree of doctor of philosophy in Heidelberg, together with the Latin thesis *On the Republic of Plato*. Neither of these theses appeared in print" (Harassek, 1924: 6, footnote 1); then he added: "about these dissertations, we can only speculate" (Harassek, 1924: 15, footnote 3).

68 Straszewski, 1912: 435.

Polish philosophy of that time, occupies a special place. Władysław Tatarkiewicz even claimed that among Polish philosophers in the period 1800–1830 it was Zabellewicz who displayed the best skills and techniques as a historiographer of philosophy.⁶⁹

Following Andrzej Walicki, the reception of Kant in Polish philosophy can be divided into five trends: post-Enlightenment, Catholic, within the framework of political romanticism, by representatives of philosophical maximalism and, as a separate phenomenon, in the philosophy of Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński (1776–1853).⁷⁰ The representatives of the first trend, the post-Enlightenment thinkers, displayed the clearest tendency to connect Kant with Plato. Zabellewicz and Jankowski can be counted among them, although “they did not have much impact on the intellectual life of their time.”⁷¹

In assessing the problematic content of Zabellewicz's work, attention has been drawn to the application of critical philosophy as a measure for ancient philosophy. Importantly, Zabellewicz did not directly touch upon methodological issues and was uncritical of his sources, namely Plato's dialogues, accepting all the information about Socrates as reliable. The subsequent development of Polish research on Plato would not have rejected such an approach outright, but the acceptance of Plato's account of Socrates as reliable would be the result of a justified decision on the part of the researchers rather than an uncritical acceptance. The examples of Socrates and Plato were used by Zabellewicz to support the view that development in philosophy is the development of philosophical problems. This development was defined by Kant's questions, which determined the spheres of interest of reason.⁷² Socrates raised only the question: what should I do? Plato raised the remaining two.

Szaniawski and Zabellewicz, thinkers who belong to the circle of Kant's adherents in Poland,⁷³ display a tendency to connect Plato with Kant, to point out similarities between their views, or to translate Plato's ideas into

69 Tatarkiewicz, 1970a: XXI.

70 Walicki, 1976: 140.

71 Walicki, 1976: 142.

72 Kant, 1998: 677.

73 There is no room here to consider and decide whether and to what extent Szaniawski was a Kantian or an eclectic. Mirosław Żelazny opposed the views of Chmielowski, Harassek, Kasiński and Kaczmarek, who had included Szaniawski in the circle influenced by Kantianism or had accepted such a probability with certain reservations (Tatarkiewicz; Wiator, 1987: 120–121). Żelazny argued that the opinion about Szaniawski's alleged Kantianism resulted, on the one hand,

Kantian terminology.⁷⁴ Szaniawski's reflections on the very term 'idea' induced him to refer to the ideas in the philosophies of Plato and Kant. Harassek reproached him with a metaphysical interpretation of Kantian ideas of God and the soul, and this, most probably, resulted from a misunderstanding. There was also no need to justify this misunderstanding by suggesting that it was Szaniawski's desire to make critical philosophy more accessible to Catholic thinkers, as Kaczmarek did. Let us repeat, Szaniawski considered the ideas to be objects of the intellect, and not of the senses, and this – in his opinion – suffices to link the meaning of ideas in Platonism and Kantianism.

Zabellewicz acknowledged the fundamental function played by Plato's ideas in the theory of cognition. He could not reject the metaphysical aspect of the theory of ideas in the light of Plato's dialogues, but he attached much smaller significance to this aspect. Our understanding of the world is first and foremost conditioned by the ideas. He was, certainly, remote from the later neo-Kantian interpretations of Plato, but against the background of the Polish literature on Plato at that time, Zabellewicz's most significant achievement was to interpret the ideas in the sphere of epistemology, though this was most probably inspired by Krug and Tennemann.

from a falsehood he disseminated about himself, and on the other hand, from the fact that he was indeed an eclectic, whose few mentions of Kant do not permit any conclusions to be drawn about his reception of Kant. Moreover, Szaniawski had not read the original works of the Königsberg philosopher (Żelazny, 2005: 56–57). Nevertheless, he is also believed to have been the inspirer for the Polish discussion about Kant (Hinz, 1976: 128). It should also be noted that earlier authors (apart from Chmielowski) accepted Szaniawski's Kantian inspirations (or even *expressis verbis* confirmed that he had been a first-hand student of Kant, cf. Zieleniarczyk, 1924: 163), but in their works one can find lists of problematic issues on which the Pole differed from the sage of Königsberg. Szaniawski himself, however, recollected his impressions from reading Kant's works, though it is difficult to determine how credible this was (Szaniawski, 1823: 134–136; cf.: Bednarski, 1929: 16–19; Wojciechowski, 1947: 91–93). Regarding his reception of Platonism, however, it is important to note that it was in the context of Kant that Szaniawski, whose works were appreciated by Zabellewicz, mentioned Plato. In his eclecticism, therefore, there was a place for Kantianism.

- 74 The leading thinkers of the Polish Enlightenment also combined Kant with Plato, but their goal was to discredit both. Hugo Kołłątaj (1750–1812) wrote in a letter: "Kant is not as obscure as I was led to fear, but one cannot read him for long because he has crammed his teaching with terms from Plato, and even more, from the Alexandrian Platonists. [...] For Kant's teaching is an altered Platonism. Anyone who knows the views of the Academics and the Alexandrian Platonists, knows Kant, even though he awkwardly splatters mathematical arguments here and there" (Hinz, 1976: 131–132).

It can certainly be argued that Zabellewicz's study on Plato is the most important Polish work on Plato of its time. Along with his other works on ancient philosophy, it also contributes to a softening of his image as a Kantian philosopher, especially when one remembers that his most frequently read work on philosophy, which clearly shows his Kantian inspirations, was in fact a summary of a study by Krug.⁷⁵ It seems important, therefore, to highlight his ambitions in the history of philosophy, dedicated to the field of ancient philosophy, rather than his imitative *Dissertation on Philosophy*.

1.2 F. A. Kozłowski and Hegelianism

Bronisław Trentowski (1808–1869) frequently wrote about the need to create a national Polish philosophy, acknowledging that the Germans had such a philosophy. He believed that national philosophies could be created by, for example, drawing on the achievements of antiquity, 'feeding the spirit' with Greek food for thought, and producing studies in the history of philosophy. When, in 1845, Felicjan Antoni Kozłowski (1805–1870), a friend of Trentowski,⁷⁶ published his translation of three of Plato's dialogues, Trentowski made the following note: "Anyone who translates foreign philosophy into Polish is making that philosophy national. Even if we can read Greek, Latin, French and German without difficulty, nonetheless we think and feel in Polish only. Foreign thoughts clothed in Polish robes find their way more easily to the Polish soul, and they are available to the entire nation, bringing about a disconcerting reaction which unleashes our native thoughts. [...] It is English porter in Polish veins. But of course we should have Polish porter and our own champagne as well."⁷⁷

Undoubtedly the most significant achievement in the field of Plato studies in the inter-uprising period (1831–1863) – the foreign liquor for the Polish soul – was the translation and publication of the *Apology*, *Crito* and *Phaedo*, preceded by a general introduction to the whole book and by introductions to particular dialogues. In his introduction Kozłowski rightly

75 Although Wiktor Wąsik noticed the unoriginal character of the *Dissertation*, he discussed its content. He dismissed, however, the historical works by Zabellewicz in one short sentence: "therefore, he showed some interest in the history of Greek philosophy" (Wąsik, 1966: 61).

76 Wójcicki, 1871: 234; cf.: Wójcicki, 1864; Mróz, 2011a.

77 Trentowski, 1977: 279.

remarks: “Especially in philosophical works, it is the thoughts that should be translated, not the words.”⁷⁸ In justifying his choice of dialogues for translation, he underlined the importance of the *Phaedo* out of all of Plato’s legacy as the real beginning of Plato’s philosophy, for in the *Apology* and in the *Crito*, it is the original thoughts of Socrates that mostly came to the fore; these two dialogues also constituted an introduction to the most important work, that is, the *Phaedo*. All three dialogues, along with the *Euthyphro*, belonged to the first tetralogy, and were important not so much as the presentation of Plato’s own philosophy, but rather because they depicted the final dramatic moments of Socrates’ life. Following Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), Kozłowski regarded the *Apology* as having been written by Plato from memory and based on Socrates’ speech at his defence. “Nothing could be nearer to the truth than the fact that in this speech we have a faithful depiction of the defence as delivered by Socrates himself, at least insofar as the skilful memory of Plato was able to retain it, and taking into account the differences that might have occurred between the verbally improvised speech and that which was later put down in writing.”⁷⁹ The *Crito* complemented the *Apology*, and their genesis, according to Kozłowski, was identical, the *Crito* being based on Socrates’ real conversation with a friend, who advised the philosopher to take advantage of the possibility of escaping from prison.⁸⁰

The *Phaedo* was different in character. The essence of this dialogue consisted in “the strict distinction between the prevalence of reason over faith, and certainty over hope.”⁸¹ The dialogue was therefore divided into two parts. The first, which occupies about three-quarters of the dialogue, and “presents a chain of analyses and reasonings which would not be rejected

78 Kozłowski, 1845: 2. Cf. Majorkiewicz, 1852c: 121. Majorkiewicz himself raised the problem of Plato’s logic, when he was writing *A Sketch on the History of Logic* (Majorkiewicz, 1852a). It is, however, touched upon too briefly and superficially to determine Majorkiewicz’s acquaintance with Plato’s philosophy. All Kozłowski’s remarks in the few pages of the introduction, *On Translating Plato*, seem to prove that he had read the work by Józef Jeżowski (1793–1855) on the Russian translation of the *Laws*, in which Jeżowski accused the translator, В. Оболенский, of not having taken the trouble to introduce to the audience the source editions, the translations he had consulted, the criterion of selecting the dialogue to be translated *etc.* (Jeżowski, 1829). Jeżowski’s essay also contains a critical evaluation of the edition of the *Laws* (Plato, 1827), based on the first lines of the translation.

79 Kozłowski, 1845b: 185.

80 Kozłowski, 1845c.

81 Kozłowski, 1845d: 250.

even by the exactness of contemporary philosophy”⁸² while the second part, which discusses the issue of the immortality of the soul, resorts to symbols and conjectures. Both parts were enclosed within the dramatic brackets of the last moments of Socrates' life. The second part of the dialogue “is more like a hymn, a fragment of an epic poem; it is a kind of beautiful and pleasant supplement to highlight the effect of the previous arguments and to amuse the heart and imagination after reason has already been satisfied.”⁸³ Finally, Kozłowski acknowledged that, to a large extent, the *Phaedo* reflected Socrates' views.

Kozłowski's contemporaries regarded his translation as among “the best in our language, with its fluent and clear style, faithfully rendering not only the words, but reproducing all the shades of Plato's thought.”⁸⁴ It was justly evaluated as a pioneering undertaking, and the translator was regarded as deserving great credit for his translation of classical literature that had long been present in the cultures and languages of Western Europe. Kozłowski had selected dialogues which were useful from a didactic point of view, as a historical source of knowledge about Socrates. Though the actual choice was not considered by critics to be the most felicitous,⁸⁵ the translation itself stood the test of time because even at the end of the 19th century, when a larger number of translations were available, it was still commented upon as “a serious work, with a smooth style, providing a good image of the Greek original.”⁸⁶ Even today, Kozłowski's output as a translator is still considered to be valuable.⁸⁷

In 1841, when Karol Libelt (1807–1875) expressed his regret that Polish culture was somewhat impaired in comparison to German or French, he wrote: “during the Hegelian epoch the largest number of editions and translations of Plato was produced.”⁸⁸ This impairment was partially amended by Kozłowski, who was directly inspired by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) in his analysis of Plato's philosophy. It could even be said that he almost restricted himself to Hegel. Kozłowski declared that in reconstructing Plato's philosophy, apart from the works of Hegel and Tennemann, he would also make use of Plato's dialogues. This was probably the case, but it is difficult to establish unequivocally the extent to

82 Kozłowski, 1845d: 250.

83 Kozłowski, 1845d: 257.

84 Wójcicki, 1871a: 250.

85 Majorkiewicz, 1852c: 122.

86 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 280, footnote.

87 Błaszczuk, 1995: 151.

88 Libelt, 1851a: 276.

which Kozłowski was familiar with Plato's works because when referring to particular issues in specific dialogues in his bibliographic footnotes, he provided only their titles, with the exception of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, where the book numbers were added. There are also frequent instances of several dialogues being listed in a footnote to a particular sentence. His writing skills also left much to be desired, his texts lacking division into paragraphs and containing frequent repetitions.

Kozłowski's general introduction to the dialogues was, at that time, the most comprehensive Polish presentation of Plato's philosophy. Kozłowski based it on German literature, taking advantage, in particular, of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. The very beginning of the *Introduction* indicates its Hegelian inspiration: "One of the most beautiful relics from the ancient world that fate has preserved for us is undoubtedly the work of Plato. The fruit of this Greek philosopher's ingenious talent, the treasure of the wisdom of the Greeks of that time, so much worshipped by all the ancients and subsequently avidly sought after, is deservedly valued even today."⁸⁹

Kozłowski went on to discuss the history of the dialogues from the times of antiquity, mentioning several modern editions, and neo-Platonism. He used Hegelian views on Platonism, and openly stated that Plato's philosophy represented a system, thus revealing himself to be a follower of Hegel, who was a more popular and influential proponent of the view on the systematic character of Plato's philosophy than Tennemann was.⁹⁰ Moreover, on the very first pages of Kozłowski's *Introduction*, one can find entire sentences borrowed, or even copied, from Jeżowski's study, with almost identical wording, although no reference to Jeżowski's work is given.⁹¹

Kozłowski reported on the achievements of philological text criticism, brought up the didactic advantages of the dialogue form, and then, like Hegel, rejected the view on the existence of esoteric and exoteric philosophy in Platonism. Following Hegel, he argued that the fact that Plato put

89 Kozłowski, 1845a: 4. The first sentence of the above quotation in Polish sounds almost identical to that translated more than one and a half century later by Światosław Florian Nowicki (Hegel, 1996: 4). This entire paragraph on the gift of fortune which preserved Plato's dialogues and on the difficulties in comprehending them (Hegel, 1982: 5–6) was removed from its original position in the English edition of Hegel's *Lectures* (Hegel, 1894: 2) and was introduced after the presentation of Plato's biography (Hegel, 1894: 9).

90 Tigerstedt, 1974: 68; Browning, 1988: 476, 483.

91 E.g. some opinions on the genius of Schleiermacher: cf. Kozłowski, 1845a: 9, and Jeżowski, 1829: 11.

his views in the mouths of the persona in the dialogues could not be regarded as a hindrance to understanding Plato.⁹²

Kozłowski started his presentation of Plato's philosophy by praising its perfection. Plato's contribution to philosophy was briefly expressed as follows: "he was the first to define the notion, subject, scope and branches of philosophy, and their relations to each other. He was also the first to ponder on the form of philosophy. He processed specific parts of philosophy, developing many new concepts and statements, as well as evaluating those that had preceded them."⁹³ He believed that the goal of Plato's philosophy was the improvement of moral standards, which had declined in the Athens of Plato's times, as described in the subsequent pages of Kozłowski's text. He likened the significance of Platonism to the critical philosophy of Kant, and emphasised the similarities between Plato's philosophy and Christianity. He wrote: "Platonism was the point from which Hellenic wisdom began to approach the teachings of Christ, and the pagan Polytheism was purified and distilled into the teaching on the Christian Trinity."⁹⁴

Focusing primarily on Hegel and Tennemann, Kozłowski briefly compared their methodologies and the results of their research in the history of philosophy. Among the merits that stemmed from Hegel's philosophical genius, he mentioned the distinction Hegel made between the imaginative form and the essential philosophical content of the dialogues.⁹⁵ Tennemann, on the other hand, presented Plato's philosophy as a 'perfect system', which, though counter to the spirit of Platonism, nevertheless facilitated the understanding of Plato's views. Following his German exemplars, Kozłowski stated that Plato "was convinced that knowledge cannot be de-

92 Kozłowski, 1845a: 22–28; cf.: Hegel, 1894: 10 *ssq.* According to Findlay, in Hegel every philosophy, including Plato's, necessarily has an element of esotericism, and this does not result from the secret transfer of knowledge, but from the limitations of the average recipient, for whom the dialectics in the *Sophist*, *Parmenides* or *Philebus*, which is deprived of graphic elements, is essentially esoteric because of its difficulty (Findlay, 1974: 65–66).

93 Kozłowski, 1845a: 40.

94 Kozłowski, 1845a: 30. Kozłowski's considerations on the influence exerted by Platonism on the philosophy of subsequent centuries are partly a paraphrase and partly a translation from Tennemann's book (cf. Tennemann, 1799: VI–VII).

95 Nowadays, however, it is claimed that Hegel unduly separated the form from the content of Plato's philosophy in order to adapt it to the requirements of presentation based on his own system. By doing so, he overlooked the artistry of Plato's writings and thus the differences between particular dialogues (Browning, 1988: 482); Hegel was simply disturbed by what was mythical and pictorial in Plato (Gaiser, 2004a: 117).

rived from any other source than from our internal consciousness, and it is that which is unchangeable in us that should be sought after.”⁹⁶ Associated with this was the concept of learning as rediscovery as well as the view on the pre-existence of the soul. In a similar vein, Kozłowski articulated the essence of Plato’s philosophy: “it can be expressed as follows: that which is in and of itself can be learned only by pure reason, whereas by means of the senses and empirical intellect only external phenomena can be represented.”⁹⁷

Plato’s ideas were interpreted by Kozłowski transcendently as “separate from all existence; they are a reality which, being independent of anything else, is completely similar to itself, and can therefore only be comprehended by thought.”⁹⁸ The ideas were something objective, and, at the same time, specific concepts and forms of things: “human intellect, being itself a divine gift, possesses them as models of all things created by God and as the ideas of divine intellect; in other words, human souls received them from God when they were created, when they were still pure intelligences devoid of bodies.”⁹⁹ Kozłowski goes on to demonstrate the Kantian understanding of ideas as notions conditioning empirical cognition and judgments about reality: “Ideas, which give rise to the objective phenomenal being by serving them as principles, are models for all things in cognition.”¹⁰⁰ Thus the ideas are not only the formal cause of the world but they also shape cognition.

In the chapter devoted to Plato’s dialectics, Kozłowski, following Hegel, distinguished its two meanings: the Socratic ‘art of refuting the opinions of others’ and a method for discovering unity in opposite concepts. The dialectical studies, such as those on being and non-being or on pure notions, are difficult, and therefore do not always make captivating reading. They seem to be at odds with the beautiful form of the dialogues, as can be seen, for example, in the *Phaedo*, in which “the beginning and the end are very elevated, but the middle plunges into the dialectics. Just as the beautiful scenes uplift us, so the other part takes us through the thorns and thistles of metaphysics.”¹⁰¹ The dialogues are therefore demanding material for the reader. The difficulties of Plato’s dialectics, especially in the *Parmenides*, are

96 Kozłowski, 1845a: 49.

97 Kozłowski, 1845a: 49–50.

98 Kozłowski, 1845a: 52.

99 Kozłowski, 1845a: 52.

100 Kozłowski, 1845a: 53–54.

101 Kozłowski, 1845a: 57. The chapters of the *Introduction* entitled *The Dialectics* and *Philosophy of Spirit* have been recently reprinted (Mróz, 2010: 43–59). In regard

related to the accumulation of abstract metaphysical content, neologisms, lack of plot and the emphasis on the identity of all opposites, the most abstract of which is the hypothesis that unity contains multiplicity, and multiplicity contains unity.

In Kozłowski's *Introduction* a shift occurred between the titles and content of Hegel's original chapters on Plato. While the chapter on the dialectics corresponds to the content of a similar chapter in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, the subsequent chapter, entitled *Philosophy of Spirit*, contains the material from Hegel's chapter entitled *Philosophy of Nature* whereas Hegel's chapter *Philosophy of Spirit* contains an interpretation of Plato's ethics and his political philosophy.¹⁰² Kozłowski regarded the subject of the nature of God, Plato's theology, as belonging to Plato's philosophy of spirit. He stated that Plato, without negating traditional religion, gave voice to a form of monotheism.

The view of Christian writers that knowledge about the Trinity can be found in Plato's philosophy was regarded by Kozłowski to be false and founded on a misunderstanding. He did, however, acknowledge some kind of exemplarism in Plato: "the model of the world exists in God, and [...] in him is the inner image of his intellectual ideas."¹⁰³ This view was recognised by Kozłowski as natural and strikes the mind with such force that there was no need to discuss or prove it. The work of God, the perfect being, must also be perfect, even more so because He watches over it in His providence. This providence, however, does not force people to do good because they are endowed with free will. Considering the above, it is evident that Kozłowski interpreted Plato partly through the prism of Augustinianism.

Plato's concept of the soul differed fundamentally from the dominant views of his times. Following Tennemann and Hegel, Kozłowski assessed Plato's concept of the immortality of the soul as an assumption rather than an exact scientific truth, an assumption expressing the eternal working of the mind and its freedom, rather than a religious dogma. Finally, inspired by Kant, Kozłowski stated that "Plato regarded the soul's further existence as a moral state. Thus, immortality is for him the task of practical reason; and hence the great interest Plato shows in this subject, an interest which

to these 'thistles of metaphysics', it can be added that Hegel's interpretation of Plato is distinguished by making speculative thinking the focal point, as the neo-Platonists did before him (Halfwassen, 1997: 209).

102 Cf.: Hegel, 1894: 113–117.

103 Kozłowski, 1845a: 68.

could not have come from speculation alone.”¹⁰⁴ To finalise the considerations on the soul, Kozłowski summarised the arguments from the *Phaedo* for the immortality of the soul, singling out six arguments. He assessed them as having the ‘great semblance of thoroughness’, adding that, most likely, Plato himself treated them as hypotheses.

As a starting point for his reflections on Plato’s philosophy of nature, Kozłowski thought it necessary to distinguish between what Plato considered to be certain in this field and what was only probable. The view that the world originated from the free action of the highest wisdom was thought by Kozłowski to belong to the first category, whereas all the other specific issues connected with it were only probable. On the physical causes of the world in Plato’s cosmology, Kozłowski wrote: “Plato wanted to have them subjected to the highest reason so that the world as a whole could be explained as having been created purposefully. The natural causes, he says, stand beneath the highest rational cause, which acts according to notions and purposes, and which only uses these natural causes in cooperation so that the world could be assembled as a proper whole.”¹⁰⁵ The fact that Plato introduced the soul of the world and the rational cause, God, into his cosmology signifies that his focus was on purpose and harmony rather than on physical details. Kozłowski went on to summarise the story of the creation of the world from the *Timaeus*, adding, after Hegel, that this story does not contribute much to our understanding of the idea. Additionally, it represented only some probable details.

Plato’s ethics was intended as a polemic against the proponents of moral relativism and of the law of nature, the law of the stronger. Similarly, neither constituted law nor religious commandments could form the basis for a philosophically based morality. Moral law should be a natural consequence of human nature. “And since getting to know oneself is the main condition of humanity’s moral culture, then the result of this should be: what is actually proper for man as a human being? and what should man considered in this way do? and what is man capable of? This is the main goal of Philosophy.”¹⁰⁶

The form of Plato’s ethics, as Kozłowski insisted, stemmed from its close relation to politics. On the basis of the *Philebus*, the best way to live turned out to be the life which is mixed and combined, for pleasure is also a kind of good. Morality, then, is “the highest form of human perfection, that is,

104 Kozłowski, 1845a: 79.

105 Kozłowski, 1845a: 87.

106 Kozłowski, 1845a: 104.

the greatest good for humans: this truth is frequently revealed by Plato with zeal and dignity.”¹⁰⁷ Let us add that Kozłowski often interpreted the Greek δικαιοσύνη as morality.¹⁰⁸ It is the highest good. Human happiness and dignity are founded on this good and on human ‘well-being’. Regarding ethical considerations, Kozłowski also mentioned the issue of the immortality of the soul, adding the statement that immortality should be an additional moral impulse for man. In this context, he treated the immortality of the soul as beyond doubt, thus contradicting his own previous statements, articulated on the basis of the *Phaedo*, that it was only Plato's hypothesis.

“Morality, Plato says, has its foundation in the highest perfection of human beings as rational beings, that is, the most complete unity and harmony of all their powers under the rule of reason. This perfection is therefore named a virtue. A virtuous man behaves perfectly in every situation as he should.”¹⁰⁹ Deriving from ethics, politics, that is, practical or applied morality as the chapter is entitled, is the transfer of ethical principles to the organisation and government of the state. Plato's political philosophy was assessed by Kozłowski on the one hand, following Hegel, as an expression of the Greek spirit¹¹⁰ in its rejection of individualism, and on the other, following Tennemann, as the most explicitly presented moral ideal of humanity, in which it was the very idea of the state that was important, and not the details of its construction. Kozłowski was inclined to stress the analogy between man and the state, and remarked that even Plato had doubts about the possibility of fulfilling this ideal.¹¹¹ He underlined Pla-

107 Kozłowski, 1845a: 117.

108 Kozłowski further writes: “Justice (δικαιοσύνη) has a wider meaning in Plato, firstly, as morality in its entire scope; secondly, more precisely as only certain of its aspects revealed in deeds” (Kozłowski, 1845a: 131). Justice and morality are therefore inseparable from each other, and moreover, the most important message of the *Republic*, according to Hegel, is that they are also inseparable from state institutions (Findlay, 1974: 67). It is no accident that, as Gaiser remarked, Plato and Hegel faced similar accusations in this regard (Gaiser, 2004: 118).

109 Kozłowski, 1845a: 127–128.

110 Cf. Browning, 1988: 479, 484; M. J. Inwood points out that Hegel's interpretation of Plato's political philosophy consists in reading it as an exercise in description rather than in prescription (Inwood, 1984: 47–48); cf. Torzewski, 1999: 92–96.

111 One of the most important aspects of the Hegel's interpretation of the *Republic* is his objection to recognising it only as an ideal that is impossible to fulfil. Hegel believed that it expressed the perfect beauty of ethical life (Inwood, 1984: 47–48).

to's emphasis on the unity of the state and the correspondence of its virtues to those which constitute the human ideal. He also referred to several details concerning the organisation of the state, which, together with Hegel, he criticised on several counts: the individuals' inability to select the class most suited to them, the abolition of private property, the issue of marriage and the family.¹¹² Kozłowski then outlined Plato's educational system, whose goal "consists in bringing about the desire to become a good citizen of the state, able to rule according to the laws of justice and also to obey them."¹¹³ Education, 'Greek pedagogy', as Kozłowski referred to *paideia*, was therefore intended to ennoble man in body and spirit.

As a direct result of the nature of the main sources of Kozłowski's text, the image of Plato presented in his *Introduction* is the image of a systematic thinker. It is also an inconsistent image, for Kozłowski sometimes contradicted his own previous statements (such as the status of the immortality of the soul, considered to be a hypothesis at one moment and a certainty at another). This might suggest that Kozłowski did not have a single, well-thought out image of Plato's philosophy, or, on the other hand, it might demonstrate that Plato's philosophy cannot easily be subjected to systematisation and presentation.

One of Kozłowski's critics, J. Majorkiewicz, though concerned about the lack of Polish studies on Platonism, nevertheless took issue with the Hegelian image of Plato transplanted onto Polish soil by Kozłowski, arguing that Hegel "does not always justly appreciate Plato, and above all, he muddles up the threads of thought which are themselves so difficult to grasp in Plato. Instead of building a system, Plato portrayed a picture of life, which is clearly shown in the dramatic form of his writing."¹¹⁴ Hegel, according to Majorkiewicz, could not be regarded as an authority on Plato studies because his own philosophy did not allow him to comprehend the Greek thinker. Hegel's attitude to Plato is similar to that of Plato's student, Aristotle, whose interpretation of Plato was one-sided and did not attach proper significance to the emotive element in the dialogues.

In later decades, when Plato came to be studied more intensively in Poland, the work of Kozłowski was barely mentioned by, for example, Pawlicki, but it should be added that Pawlicki was not greatly interested in Polish literary output in this field. All he had to say about Kozłowski was that he "lectures on Plato's philosophy according to Hegelian concepts and

112 Cf. Inwood, 1984: 51–52.

113 Kozłowski, 1845a: 157.

114 Majorkiewicz, 1852c: 124.

categories.”¹¹⁵ Contemporary Polish translators of Plato, recalling Kozłowski's edition, ascribe to him translations of dialogues that were not included there.¹¹⁶ This shows that Kozłowski's translation has been largely forgotten, reduced to the role of an antiquarian relic, only worthy of a brief mention in the literature on Plato.

The fact that Kozłowski made use of Jeżowski's study and did not restrict himself to German authors should be positively evaluated. The way he used Jeżowski's study should, however, be condemned, for he copied a number of Jeżowski's opinions, some almost literally, without directly referring to the author¹¹⁷ although the initial parts of his *Introduction* owed much to Jeżowski's study. Despite its imitative character, the *Introduction* itself is the first such extensive and comprehensive presentation of Plato's philosophy in Polish literature. In order to provide the reader with the most essential philosophical substance of Platonism, Kozłowski based his work on the most important philosopher of that time, often referred to as philosopher *par excellence*. Nevertheless, Kozłowski cannot be counted among the group of Polish Hegelians, for he did not participate in Polish discussions about Hegel's ideas. Although Kozłowski's work was almost entirely based on Hegel, his reception of Hegel's reading of Plato was selective. One might even venture to say that philosophical issues were of little interest to Kozłowski, but he rightly felt obliged to provide his translation with a philosophical introduction. He was not, however, competent to write it himself. He therefore did so mainly on the basis of the chapter on Plato in Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, which he supplemented with the work of Tennemann. Kozłowski's work, then, was not an original text, but rather a compilation and paraphrase.

1.3 W. Tatarkiewicz and the Marburg neo-Kantianism

In 1911 Władysław Tatarkiewicz (1886–1980) published a short paper entitled *Controversy over Plato*, which, though it does not occupy a prominent

115 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 280, footnote.

116 Leopold Regner, a translator of the *Phaedrus*, states that there were three Polish translations of this dialogue, by Kozłowski, Bronikowski, and Witwicki (Regner, 2004: XXV).

117 Perhaps Majorkiewicz noticed some similarities, because in the review of Kozłowski's work he considered it appropriate to mention the study by Jeżowski, whom he considered to be an 'eminent Professor' (Majorkiewicz, 1852c: 124, footnote).

place in his legacy, cannot be overlooked in the reception of Plato in Poland. This paper indicates that Tatarkiewicz was still under the influence of the neo-Kantians after returning from Marburg, where, as he himself recalled, he had found himself quite by accident. During his studies in Berlin Tatarkiewicz attended a lecture given by Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), then a visiting lecturer, and this encouraged the young student to transfer to the *alma mater* of this professor, where he eventually wrote a doctoral thesis on Aristotle.¹¹⁸ At the time of writing his *Controversy over Plato*, he was clearly still an adherent of Marburg's interpretation of Plato, and even accepted it as his own, as witnessed by the enthusiastic statements from the final paragraph of the paper: "So we claim that, in the Platonism which is found in Plato himself, the idea is always a conceptual relation, a method, a principle. And Plato comprehended in this way is the great precursor of contemporary knowledge and philosophy; and that is why it is not only historical but also systematic interests that make us turn to him, for we can learn many lessons for today and tomorrow from Plato's works".¹¹⁹ Thus, Tatarkiewicz declared that his approach to Plato was in the spirit of Marburg neo-Kantianism. The plural form ("we") in this final paragraph of Tatarkiewicz's paper denotes the author and his Marburg teachers.

Tatarkiewicz started his paper with a critique of the Aristotelian interpretation of Plato's theory of ideas because this theory constituted the most important issue in the title controversy over Plato. Tatarkiewicz had already made a defence of Plato in his thesis on Aristotle, in which Plato was also presented through the prism of his Marburg studies. Scholars for centuries had had confidence in Aristotle's presentation of the theory of ideas, and the reason for this, as Tatarkiewicz explained, was the systematic character and precise terminology of Aristotle's exposition, "whereas in Plato the thought is scattered over a whole series of dialogues; everything here is just coming to life, sprouting, thoughts searching for expression,

118 Tatarkiewicz, 1999–2001: 186. The most comprehensive presentation of Tatarkiewicz's connections to Marburg philosophy, its professors and university can be found in chapter one of the book by Czesław Głombik (Głombik, 2005: 11–90). The problems important for the present study were also raised by that author in his previous paper (Głombik, 2001). A comparison of the two interpretations of Plato in Tatarkiewicz, in the paper *Controversy over Plato*, and in his *History of Philosophy* can be found in Mróz, 2011b.

119 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 156.

words multiplying and changing, and next to a precisely formulated statement there is a metaphor or a poetic image.”¹²⁰

The main body of Tatarkiewicz's text consists of a concise reconstruction of the Marburg interpretation of Plato's theory of ideas and the epistemological issues related to it, for this school's transcendental interpretation of the theory of ideas could be regarded as a transfer of the problem of ideas from the sphere of metaphysics to the theory of knowledge. Tatarkiewicz began with an assessment of the role of experience in scientific cognition, claiming it to be a necessary but insufficient condition for science. He based his reflection in this regard on Plato's *Phaedo*, without yet directly referring to this dialogue.

A correct interpretation of the *Phaedo*, as Tatarkiewicz continued, may be hindered by the Polish word 'hipoteza' which differs from the Greek ὑπόθεσις, and is therefore misleading. In Greek and in Plato's philosophy "it is a logical claim that is set as the principle of the research. [...] It does not denote: hypothesis, assumption, but on the contrary: the greatest certainty. The Polish word *foundation* [*podstawa*] is the most accurate translation of the Greek »ὑπόθεσις«, having the same function and exactly the same meaning as the Greek: the basic or the most certain.”¹²¹ Tatarkiewicz goes on to add: "This is Plato's fundamental method of cognition: seeking solutions to problems on the basis of logical foundations. These foundations, ideas, are in modern language the rules of logic, the basic methods of the sciences; they are the means by which regularity and reason can be rooted in the world of phenomena; they are means of cognition; we acquire knowledge in and through them – they form, then, knowledge κατ' ἐξοχήν.”¹²² In another fragment, in Kantian spirit, Tatarkiewicz came to the rescue of the Parmenidean principle of identity of thought and being: "Knowledge is, after all, knowledge about that which exists, cognition is

120 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 147. In this defence of Plato against Aristotle, Jacek Hołówka discerned Tatarkiewicz's youthful enthusiasm (Hołówka, 2000: 301–302). The paper by Hołówka, based on the text of the *Controversy over Plato*, is not a historical-philosophical attempt to comprehend it. Hołówka rather suggests reading it in the context of the literature and works on Plato by Thomas A. Szlezák and Władysław Stróżewski, and paying less attention to Marburg neo-Kantianism. He discusses the topicality of the *Controversy over Plato* and the adequacy of the ideas presented there.

121 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 150–151. Hołówka regards these considerations as a light-handed treatment of the issue of *koinonia*, which is, according to Hołówka, the 'privilege of youth' (Hołówka, 2000: 311).

122 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 151.

the cognition of being. Therefore the idea is *being*, idea as the source and essence of knowledge, its unchanging foundation, or even as knowledge itself, because the edifice of knowledge consists of a structure of logical statements and relations, *i.e.* ideas, hence the idea.”¹²³ Only in this meaning can one legitimately state that the idea is being. Later, however, in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, Plato provided a subjective understanding of the idea. Nevertheless, Tatarkiewicz’s statement, which sums up current considerations well, has not lost its significance: “Phaenomena are the problem of philosophy, not transcendent entities; however, they are only the problem, not the solution; the ideas are needed for the solution.”¹²⁴

The value of Plato’s theory of ideas does not, therefore, lie in this or that ontic status. In fact, whether the idea exists as a transcendent being or as a concept in the intellect of the subject which cognises does not essentially matter: “the idea is valued [...] by the services it renders when the phaenomena are grasped; its value is determined by its consequences: does it correspond to the problem posed by the phaenomena and is it sufficient to solve the problem?”¹²⁵

The main basis for Tatarkiewicz’s paper was the book by Paul Natorp (1854–1924), *Platos Ideenlehre* (1903), which was the only neo-Kantian work referred to in the main text of *Controversy over Plato*. Tatarkiewicz’s argument brings out the central issues of Natorp’s book. As Tatarkiewicz himself recalled, during his stay in Marburg he had not only devoted a year to reading the dialogues but had, for some time, also attended Natorp’s lectures. However, – as he wrote – “Natorp’s lectures bored me as they were monotonous and badly presented. I preferred reading this eminent scholar than listening to him.”¹²⁶ Unlike Natorp, Cohen lectured brilliantly and it was said that he even conversed with Plato during his lectures.

Tatarkiewicz referred to the problems raised by Natorp and to the dialogues which were essential for his interpretation of Plato, whose image from the pages of *Platos Ideenlehre* was nicknamed ‘Platorp’ by ‘unkind tongues’.¹²⁷ It is worth drawing attention to one or two details to convince ourselves of the careful reading and the time that the author of the *Contro-*

123 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 151.

124 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 152.

125 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 153.

126 Tatarkiewicz, 1988: 34; elsewhere about Natorp: “he used to read out his lectures in a monotonous and uninviting manner” (Tatarkiewicz, 1999–2001: 188).

127 Laks, 2004: 453.

versy over Plato must have devoted to the work *Platos Ideenlehre*, which he regarded as a great and famous book.¹²⁸

Readers of the *Phaedo* must remember the famous excerpt in which Socrates speaks about the second voyage to seek causes (δεύτερος πλοῦς, 99 d). In Tatarkiewicz's paper, however, when referring to Plato's shift to the laws of logic as the basis for knowledge, he wrote about the third journey for the truth. This inaccuracy can easily be explained by confronting this text with Natorp's book. When the Marburg philosopher discusses the disappointment with the philosophy of nature and with the theory of Anaxagoras that Plato's Socrates, or Plato himself, experienced, he enumerates the stages of Plato's research development. The first point is "the struggle with the analogies of experience, or materialism, the simplest of theories, which does not perceive any questions anywhere, considering all that is given and known as comprehensible, and all that is not given as similar to the given."¹²⁹ The philosophy of Anaxagoras and his teleologism constitute the second point. In Natorp's book point three is the proper 'second voyage'. Why does point three mark the second voyage? Natorp explained that Anaxagoras' instructions did not, in fact, provide any method, or route.¹³⁰ Tatarkiewicz, then, accepted the enumeration by Natorp, and took the number of the research stage for the number denoting the voyage.

Tatarkiewicz's paper must have been very informative for Polish readers. Very few of them knew about the neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato at that time. As a means of bringing this interpretation closer to Polish read-

128 Tatarkiewicz, 1999–2001: 187. The most comprehensive presentation in Polish literature of the interpretation of Plato in the spirit of Marburg neo-Kantianism is: Czarnawska, 1988. A synthetic comparison of the Aristotelian and Marburg interpretations can be found there in the form of a table (Czarnawska, 1988: 190–193). The topicality of the Marburg approach to Plato is articulated by Czarnawska as follows: "The difference between Aristotle's and Marburg Plato is like the difference between »to know« and »to question«" (Czarnawska, 1997: 105), Marburg approach is open and seeking.

129 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 150; cf.: "Erklärung nach den Analogien des Sinnlichen, als des gegebenen, vermeintlich verstandenen. Man meint, das gegebene zu verstehen, weil es in der Erfahrung uns geläufig ist, und denkt sich das nicht gegebene gleichartig diesem gegebenen" (Natorp, 1903: 147; cf.: Natorp, 2004: 164–165).

130 "3. Nachdem also diese große Aussicht sich – für jetzt – zerschlagen hatte, begab sich Plato auf die »zweite Ausfahrt« zur Erforschung des Grundes des Werdens (99 D). Wieso ist es die zweite? Nun, der Wink des Anaxagoras hatte ihm keinen wirklichen »Weg«, keine Methode eröffnet" (Natorp, 1903: 149).

ers, Tatarkiewicz chose *Platos Ideenlehre* as the most important work presenting the transcendental interpretation of the theory of ideas.

Controversy over Plato was considered to be a study for wider audiences that “reveals [...] Tatarkiewicz’s temperament and strong personal commitment to reconstructing the great philosophical theories.”¹³¹ Yet far from being a popularising work, this paper seems more suited to specialists who knew the problems of Platonic and Kantian philosophy. It has also been assessed as a historical-philosophical presentation of the title controversy, without providing ready-made solutions: “above all, he provided information about the Marburg school of philosophy, [...] without going beyond the limits of reporting his own Marburg experience.”¹³² Apart from providing information, however, Tatarkiewicz, adopted a particular stance on the subject by accepting the interpretation of Plato produced by his Marburg teachers. He is believed to have been virtually the first Polish author to inform the general public in Poland about the works of the Marburg philosophy centre.¹³³ It has already been remarked about the *Controversy over Plato* that “this essay is the first Polish report on the groundbreaking and large-scale research on Plato’s writings which were conducted at the turn of the 20th century in Marburg.”¹³⁴ Yet it is the chapter on Plato in Tatarkiewicz’s *History of Philosophy*, rather than the *Controversy over Plato*, that should be regarded as a work for wider audiences, for here the professional terminology has been limited to the necessary minimum and extreme interpretations moderated. In the *History of Philosophy*, a text written for a completely different purpose, Tatarkiewicz did not articulate his opinion on the topicality or anachronism of Platonism as he had done in the *Controversy over Plato*. He also refrained from judgments and confined himself to orderly, systematic presentation whereas in the *Controversy over Plato* the reader has to reckon with the theory of ideas and with a report on a new interpretation of this theory to which the author adhered. For a complete presentation of Plato’s philosophy in its entirety the chapter on Plato in Tatarkiewicz’s *History of Philosophy* is much more suited to general audiences as the aim of this text was to familiarise the reader with the most important problems of Platonism and to facilitate their comprehension.

131 Hołówka, 2000: 301.

132 Głombik, 2005: 56.

133 Głombik, 2005: 48. Prior to Tatarkiewicz, Stanisław Brzozowski (1878–1911) wrote about Cohen (Głombik, 2005: 47).

134 Parszutowicz, 2010: 14.

The opinions about the pioneering character of the *Controversy over Plato* should also be reassessed and supplemented. Though it was indeed the first Polish text to discuss the Marburg interpretation of Platonism, there were Polish researchers of Plato who were aware of this interpretation and even had their share in its origins. Natorp knew Lutosławski's monumental book, and he discussed the stylometric method and its chronological results in a series of papers. Did Natorp talk about Lutosławski's research with his young compatriot, Tatarkiewicz? This is quite possible, but nothing of this is mentioned in the memoirs of Tatarkiewicz, who in subsequent decades was not exactly one of Lutosławski's well-wishers.

Though not explicitly articulated, Tatarkiewicz's paper can be regarded as an appeal for the intensification of research on the philosophy of Plato in Poland.¹³⁵ This postulate, however, did not fall on stony ground. In a footnote Tatarkiewicz referred to Lutosławski's research, which he described as thorough, though its results did not go far enough. Lutosławski did, in fact, depart from the Aristotelian interpretation of the theory of ideas, but he did not venture as far as the neo-Kantian interpretation. It could even be said that, for linguistic reasons, the formulation of the transcendental interpretation of the theory of ideas was an easier task for Poles because "in Polish, idea does not mean, as in other languages, something involving imagination, nor is it an ordinary concept, but a directing concept, not a specific thought, but a tendency, a direction of thought, a direction that is both independent and creative. Through ideas, the notional world becomes an active factor that has its source in spiritual activity. Every concept, anything that we know, is the product or activation of an idea."¹³⁶

Treating Natorp's work as a study in the history of philosophy was considered by Bogumił Jasinowski (1883–1969) to be a methodological error. According to Jasinowski, the Marburg philosopher may have aspired to producing a historical reconstruction of Plato's work, but he also sought "for a »proper comprehension« of the central point in Plato's system, [...] for the construction of a certain whole, which, though often digressing from the »fact«, from the real thought, though sometimes spoken loudly

135 Trojanowski, 2006: 211. One cannot, however, after Trojanowski, consider the paper (Kozłowski, 2010) by Władysław Mieczysław Kozłowski (1858–1935), which was originally published two years prior to that of Tatarkiewicz, as a possible response to Tatarkiewicz's appeal (Trojanowski, 2006: 211, and in footnote 19).

136 Tatarkiewicz, 2010: 148–149.

and at other times only in a whisper, still claims its right to greater »significance«, to a »deeper« understanding of the thought.”¹³⁷ Natorp, then, did not merely reconstruct Plato’s work but corrected it according to an idealised and consistent image of his philosophy.

Tatarkiewicz’s paper is still popular today, and is sometimes regarded as a proposal for a methodological alternative to the paradigm of the Tübingen school since it does not make use of references to unspecific, unwritten doctrines, nor does it adhere to Aristotle’s metaphysical interpretation.¹³⁸

To sum up Tatarkiewicz’s position, it is evident that in his text, *Controversy over Plato*, he expressed great enthusiasm for Natorp’s work. But it should be remembered that he prepared and delivered his paper at a meeting of the Warsaw Psychological Society as early as 1910.¹³⁹ His initial enthusiasm for his Marburg teachers was, however, quite quickly abandoned, though even after four decades Tatarkiewicz recognised their work as progress: “The part played by eminent historians of philosophy consists, to a large extent, in adjusting or refuting traditional interpretations. Historians at the turn of the 20th century broke away from the metaphysical interpretation of Plato’s ideas that had been maintained for centuries.”¹⁴⁰ Even earlier, in the 1930’s, when lecturing and conducting seminars at the University of Warsaw, he recommended a more thorough acquaintance with Greek philosophy, and advised students to study Natorp’s interpretation.¹⁴¹

As for the question of defining Tatarkiewicz’s relation to the Marburg school, the prevailing opinion states that, despite his studies in Marburg and the defence of his doctoral thesis there, he was never a neo-Kantian philosopher.¹⁴² It seems, however, that this opinion needs to be re-assessed. Marburg neo-Kantians influenced Tatarkiewicz’s view on ancient philoso-

137 Jasinowski, 1929: 154.

138 Sarnowski, 2007: 29–30.

139 It took place on May 5th, 1910 (Tatarkiewicz, 2010: 147, footnote). This presentation was given a few weeks after his arrival in Warsaw with a doctoral diploma and his already dissertation published. This event was reported on in the Warsaw daily papers (Głombik, 2005: 48, footnote 103).

140 Tatarkiewicz, 1971b: 71.

141 Nowicki, 1981: 143–144, cf.: Nowicki, 1976.

142 E.g.: Palacz, 1999: 392; Głombik, 2005: 56; Głombik, 2005a: 49. There are also opinions which unfairly diminish the influence of the Marburg philosophers on Tatarkiewicz. E.g. Jacek Jadacki mentions them together with Henri Bergson, and remarks that the influence of foreign scholars on Tatarkiewicz was slight and short-lived, and Jadacki lists eight Polish philosophers as the most impor-

phy, especially on Plato, and evidence of this can be found in his thesis about Aristotle – irrespective of the reasons for which this topic was suggested to him – and in the *Controversy over Plato*. These works demonstrate that the young Tatarkiewicz assimilated the assessments and interpretations produced in Marburg. He may not have entirely adhered to these views, but he felt a close affinity to them.¹⁴³ In other words, the Marburg interpretation of Plato was, at least for some time, also Tatarkiewicz's interpretation. It can be concluded, therefore, that Tatarkiewicz did not limit himself to reporting what he had learned in the West, but he also identified with it at least to some extent.

On his return to Poland his encounter with Twardowski and the circle of his students did not affect Tatarkiewicz's image of Plato; it was only his interests that changed, for Tatarkiewicz shifted from ancient philosophy to axiology. It was not until the first volume of the *History of Philosophy* (1931) that he returned to the historiography of ancient philosophy, and thus to Plato. Marburg, however, forms the beginning of the process of Tatarkiewicz's development as a historian of philosophy: "The Marburg philosophers, rather than contributing to Tatarkiewicz's adoption of their school of philosophy, influenced the formation of Tatarkiewicz's interests in the history of philosophy and of his first research implementations in this area of philosophical studies."¹⁴⁴ Let us add that, by directing

tant philosophical inspirations for Tatarkiewicz (Jadacki, 2009: 213–214). This issue is connected with the dispute over Tatarkiewicz's alleged affiliation to the Lvov-Warsaw school. Stefan Zamecki classifies Tatarkiewicz as belonging to the school, but not as a student of Twardowski, only as an exceptional figure (Zamecki, 1977: 55). Jan Woleński (Woleński, 1985: 9) and Jadacki (Jadacki, 1998: 85–87) consider Tatarkiewicz to be a representative of the school. The arguments of this dispute have recently been compiled by Joanna Zegzuła-Nowak (Zegzuła-Nowak, 2010). Perhaps Jerzy Pelc (1924–2017) is closest to the truth, claiming that Tatarkiewicz did not belong to the school, but many of his postulates connected him to its representatives (Pelc: 1981: 7–8). The postulates were therefore similar, although their sources and areas of interest of Tatarkiewicz and the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw school were different.

143 Hołówka, 2000: 305. Hołówka adds that despite this closeness, Tatarkiewicz "demands something more from the idea" (Hołówka, 200: 305), he continues, however, to discuss this interpretation attributing it to Tatarkiewicz, he considers it 'daring' and 'ingenious', though perhaps – off the mark. Hołówka regards this paper as articulating the original research of Tatarkiewicz in the field of ancient philosophy. It has to be borne in mind, however, that Tatarkiewicz in the *Controversy over Plato* did not present his own original interpretation of Platonism, but reported on and largely adhered to the views of other scholars.

144 Głombik, 2005: 57.

Tatarkiewicz's research in the history of philosophy, his Marburg teachers were to have a lasting effect on him. Perhaps his turn to antiquity, which started in Marburg, may even have affected Tatarkiewicz's way of thinking and evaluating, as well as his method of researching the history of philosophy, a method which involved the application of the dialectical method in its Platonic sense, by categorising philosophical positions and attempting to define and analyse them critically.¹⁴⁵

145 Popiel, 1960: 8.

II. Recognition of Plato as a problem. Plato assessment and interpretations

2.1 *Plato as material to be improved according to P. Semenenko*

Polish Christian thought in the mid-19th century did not have a single image of Plato, and therefore it could not make a clear, unequivocal assessment of his philosophy from the Christian point of view. Two short exemplary texts testify to this ambivalence in assessing Plato. The first of them appeared on the pages of the *Pielgrzym* (*Pilgrim*), a journal addressed to Catholic intellectuals, where some excerpts from the works of Antoine-Eugene Genoud were published in 1844. Genoud was a French clergyman who explicitly criticised the view on the affinity between Christian thought and Plato and on the possible influence of Platonism on Christianity. The purpose of his text was clearly polemical, and among his arguments the following appeared: if Platonism had been a predecessor of Christianity, then Christian dogmas would easily have spread throughout the world, but this in fact did not happen; the pagans found Christian doctrine bizarre. Had it been more in line with Platonism, there would have been little difficulty in its being widely accepted. Evidence of the differences between the two doctrines could also be seen in their divergent ethical systems. The notion of Platonism itself was also criticised. It was pointed out that Platonism in the Academy differed from the neo-Platonism that arose in the Christian era. Admittedly there may have been some common points between Christianity and neo-Platonism, but this was only because neo-Platonists, starting with Plotinus, copied the ideas of Christian teachings. As for Platonism itself, among the Church Fathers it was only Justin and Augustine who could be considered to have known it, so bearing these arguments in mind, Genoud concluded that “it is [...] strange and even ridiculous to think that the Christians learned their own faith from idolaters.”¹

1 “Czy Chrystyanizm...”, 1844: 14. Almost half of all the philosophical texts published in the *Pilgrim* were translations from French. Jan Bogdan, the translator, was a preacher and teacher, who published sermons and prayer-books (Błachnio, 1997: 48, 71).

This short text is characteristic of the type of texts that appeared on the pages of the “Pielgrzym”, which catered for the expectations of intellectuals with an unambiguously Catholic worldview. For the editors, showing the separateness of Christian philosophy and rational philosophy seems to have been their most important goal.² Since Plato could clearly be classified as a rational philosopher, he was considered to be a secondary figure. The excerpts from Genoud were therefore published not so much to disseminate a particular image of Plato but only to show the originality of Christian thought which, unlike all other human philosophy, including Platonism, had its starting point in divine revelation.

A decade later, an article which went to the other extreme appeared in another Catholic journal, *Pamiętnik Religijno-Moralny* (*Journal of Religion and Morality*). Again, it was not an article about Plato himself, but his authority was used to strengthen Christian thought against contemporary philosophy, to improve the quality of Christian teaching and to deepen its philosophical foundations. Since Plato articulated so many thoughts that were essentially Christian, “the more embarrassing should it be for the church pulpit, which touches the most important truths of religion only superficially, or completely passes them over in silence just because they require deeper understanding and argument.”³ The paper begins by confirming that the Church Fathers were acquainted with Plato, that they referred to him, and that convergences between his philosophy and their teachings occurred. But the Church Fathers were not alone in their affinity with Plato, for “even Saint John the Evangelist meets this pious sage [=Plato] on his own ground, and his teaching about *Logos* is actually related to the notion of *Logos* in Plato, in the same way as the perfect image painted by a first-class artist relates to the image painted by a novice, or less skilled painter, who catches only the general outline of the subject.”⁴ In very broad terms, then, it can be said that Plato anticipated the Gospel and Christianity, and he solved many specific philosophical problems in the Christian spirit.

One of the problems that is highlighted in this article is Socrates’ praise of the good, beautiful and just life in the *Crito* (47d-48b), for in such a life

2 Błachnio, 1997: 43–51.

3 “Myśli chrześcijańskie w pismach Platona”, 1854: 279. Let us add, as a side note, that this paper was published with quite a large number of misprints, which are particularly glaring when it comes to the titles of Plato’s dialogues: *Entyphron* (268), *Memnon* (269), *Pheaitos* (274), and Greek words: “metampsychosis” (277) or „Stades” (278) – instead of “Hades”.

4 “Myśli chrześcijańskie w pismach Platona”, 1854: 266.

there is no fear of physical death, as this should not be at the forefront of human concern. Socrates' submission to God in the *Crito* (54d–e) or in the *Apology*, where his way of life is justified by the Delphic Oracle, was explicitly regarded as an anticipation of Christian teachings. The *Euthyphro*, in turn, was read as an encouragement to religious practices. Not everywhere, however, was Plato close to Christianity. He did not recognise, for example, that human nature was tainted by original sin. This resulted from Plato's ethical intellectualism, according to which moral deficiencies did not stem from the fall of the first parents, but essentially resulted from the shortcomings of human cognitive powers.

In the *Gorgias*, on the other hand, Socrates seemed almost to be a supporter of Christian revivalism in his distinction between good and pleasure, in his praise of the well-ordered, reasonable, decent and pious life (e.g. 504a–e), and especially in his criticism of Callicles. Socrates' final speech concerning the judgment of the dead (522d–527e) was recognised as the most important fragment in the *Gorgias*, providing evidence of similarities between Platonism and Christianity. In the *Theaetetus* (e.g. 161c–162a), Socrates' criticism of Protagorean cognitive relativism based on sensualism was interpreted on Christian grounds as a need to recognise *auctoritas* (176a–c). Similarly, his reflection on the fact that death is not evil was also considered to be a Christian sentiment, so Socrates, if he could have been a Christian, would probably have used the words of the apostle Paul: *mihi mori lucrum est*. It was, however, with regret that the author noted that Plato accepted metempsychosis, and therefore his arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul were those based on the simplicity and homogeneity of the soul, or those presenting the soul's role in directing and animating the body, as a result of which it could not be defeated by death. Pagan philosophers, then, centered their disputes around truths which were essentially Christian and even led their lives according to these truths. "The connection between Christian revelation and Plato's philosophy comes to light in the very words of this philosopher and reverberates to such an extent that it is sufficient to merely quote his main thoughts to consider him a pagan prophet of our religion".⁵

As the above texts have shown, attitudes to Plato in the inter-uprising period (1831–1863) were not in harmony, and often completely polarised opinions about him were expressed. A slightly more moderate position was taken by Feliks Kozłowski (1803–1872), an uncompromising critic of Bronisław Trentowski's thought. Indeed his book, *The Origins of Christian*

5 "Myśli chrześcijańskie w pismach Platona", 1854: 277.

Philosophy, was in fact a polemic against Trentowski's philosophy, showing that it was remote from Christian, or scholastic, philosophy, which, according to Kozłowski, was exactly what Poles needed.

Kozłowski was no doubt referring to Plato, among other philosophers, when he stated that "albeit not everything was true on the bosom of philosophy or cognition, everything was useful for philosophy"⁶. According to Kozłowski, among the benefits Plato brought to philosophy was his initiation of the speculative trend in philosophy. He was also the first to undertake metaphilosophical issues. For Kozłowski, the whole of Plato's philosophy should be judged on the basis of its moral purpose, for it is a response to the ethical questions asked by Socrates, and above all, to questions about the good, the law and the nature of morality. Plato did not fail to investigate the nature of all things, and the starting point for his philosophy was in the realm of the spirit, from which his interests in philosophy and mathematics originated.

Kozłowski claimed that, from the Christian point of view, one of the most valuable merits of Plato's philosophy was to be found in the conception of innate ideas. Equally valuable was the fact that Plato saw the purpose of philosophy within the sphere of ethics, its aim being to prevent the moral decline of his time. Philosophy as a means of improving the state of morality was one of the priorities of Polish critics of Hegelianism and German philosophy. In this regard, therefore, they could regard Plato as their ally. Kozłowski's assessment of Plato tended to avoid the superficial extremes noted in the previous articles, but he did not succeed in providing a comprehensive interpretation of Platonism.

During this period, then, the possibility of reconciling Plato with Christianity was still an open question in Polish philosophical circles. It was not until studies by Piotr Semenenko (1814–1886) appeared in print that a compromise solution was provided which was to be accepted by later writers. In the years 1859–1861 a series of Semenenko's papers was published in *Przegląd Poznański* (*Poznań Review*) under the collective title of "Philosophical Symposia" ("Biesiady filozoficzne"). At that time, Semenenko's period of youthful quests was behind him, and he had succeeded in developing a coherent philosophical worldview, or even a system of philosophy.⁷ His "Philosophical Symposia" were essentially devoted to Greek philosophy, largely to Plato, and they were also Platonic in form, for they were dialogues. The "Symposia" were unique in Semenenko's legacy, both in

6 Kozłowski, F., 1845: 146.

7 Smolikowski, 1921: 3.

terms of form and subject, so it is unfortunate that historians of philosophy have devoted so little attention to them, preferring instead to present Semenenko's philosophical views on the basis of his systematic treatises in Latin.⁸

According to Semenenko, the Polish word 'biesiada' (*symposium*) had become impoverished and limited in meaning to 'feast'. Referring to Linde's dictionary of the Polish language, he found that 'biesiada' denotes a meeting where 'both parties sit down' or 'banquet'.⁹ Following Plato, though as yet not directly mentioned, Semenenko emphasised how useful this form of writing was: "We would like to see philosophy full of life, so we have chosen a form for it which shows life at its fullest. We would like to make philosophy accessible, and it seems to us that it will be most accessible in this form. Ultimately, we would like to make it clear, obvious and convincing."¹⁰ The dialogical form can even be said to be an expression of a characteristic feature of Semenenko's train of thought, the purpose of which was to show the path that the author had travelled in order to allow the reader to experience the same.¹¹ The dialogues, as Semenenko imagined, were set in a 'Modern Babel' after the November Uprising, namely in

8 Gabryl took the "Symposia" as the basis for the reconstruction of Semenenko's philosophical views (Gabryl, 1914: 209–221), but did not devote any attention to Plato or ancient philosophy. He also briefly summarised Semenenko's philosophical views on the basis of "Symposia" in another text (Gabryl, 1913). Prior to this, Smolikowski (Smolikowski, 1904, 1904a, 1921) had drawn attention to Semenenko, whose philosophy he compared to scholastic philosophy and to Thomism. While Smolikowski limited himself to comparisons, Gabryl attempted to analyse the value of Semenenko's modifications of Scholasticism, concluding that not all of them were improvements (Gabryl, 1914: 223). "Symposia" can also be considered as the most representative of Semenenko's production as a thinker, but doing philosophy was at most a complement to his extensive activities in numerous areas (Jabłońska-Deptuła, 1966: 705). A detailed study of "Symposia" can be found in Mróz, 2009–2010.

9 Semenenko, 1859: 117. It should be added that Linde gives more examples of the use of this word, which would not have been to Semenenko's liking, namely relating 'symposium' (biesiada) to a place where 'the devil sits' ('biesz siada'; Linde, 1807: 107). Undoubtedly, however, Semenenko would have been ready to accept that the devil was involved in creating *Biesiada* by Andrzej Towiański (1799–1878), a mystic and religious reformer who influenced a significant number of Polish emigrants in France, including Mickiewicz.

10 Semenenko, 1859: 117. Gabryl supposes that the dialogical form was chosen by Semenenko for the sake of its ceremonious character (Gabryl, 1914: 210), while regarding the style of the "Symposia" as beautiful in comparison to Semenenko's other works (Gabryl, 1914: 234).

11 Kaszuba, 1985: 35.

Paris during the period of the Great Emigration. It is not insignificant to note that Semenenko's "Symposia" can, at least to some extent, be read against the background of the Resurrectionists' dispute with the author of another *Symposium*, namely with Andrzej Towiański, the 'sower of tares', as he is described in the Resurrectionists' historiography.¹²

Among the characters of the dialogue there is one who occupied a special position, depicting someone who played an extremely important role in Semenenko's biography, namely Bogdan Jański (1807–1840). On account of his virtues, Semenenko wrote: "We will therefore introduce this name into our symposia, as a central character, and take him as our guide. He will be our Socrates."¹³ In designating Jański as the Socrates of Polish emigration, Semenenko achieved another goal, which was to commemorate his teacher. At the same time, this placed him in the role of Plato. Jański himself, experiencing moments of doubts in religion and in the significance of moral action, made a note that Plato's philosophy 'uplifted him to some extent',¹⁴ which most likely meant that Platonism prepared him for higher aims. Taking on the role of Plato's Socrates, Bogdan leads the interlocutors to the proper starting point of the discussion, that is, to the definition of the concepts used. Moreover, Bogdan formulated a method of studying the history of philosophy that involved searching for the first substantial thought of each philosopher: "We will go through all the more significant philosophical systems, the older, the newer, and the latest [...]. This will be an interesting analysis, an instructive perspective. Each of these systems will be required to tell us what it set down as the first thought, as the first idea, as the beginning from which it started, and we will see clearly that this beginning was the cause of all the errors, whether inaccuracies, perversions or complete falsehoods, that every subsequent system committed."¹⁵

In the third "Symposium", Ewaryst, an expert in ancient philosophy, appears. He is introduced as follows: "He is truly a man of the old school: for him, only revered antiquity has the wisdom to judge what is healthy and the mouth to speak in comely fashion."¹⁶ Ewaryst is not uncritically attached to antiquity, which will be of importance as the dispute proceeds.

12 Cf.: Kosiński, W., 1966: 21–57, 67–84.

13 Semenenko, 1859: 118; cf.: Błachnio, 2001: 136–137.

14 Smolikowski, 1892: 6.

15 Smolikowski, 1859a: 140.

16 Semenenko, 1859b: 257.

Bogdan welcomes the new interlocutor with joy, having heard him declare: “*Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.*”¹⁷

Before the proper subject of the “Symposium” is taken up, Bogdan provides his interlocutors with a unique guide to ancient philosophy in a nutshell, which will give them an insight into the history of this philosophy and its ‘geography’: “I will give you a key to this philosophy, I will give you a map with which you will see not only the history of this philosophy, but you will recognise and see in advance the history of any other philosophy.”¹⁸ The usefulness of this tool seems all the greater since the history of philosophy appears to the interlocutors simply as the history of human erring. Bogdan then draws attention to a diagram that has been printed on the page preceding the text of “Symposium” as a kind of a genealogical tree of Greek philosophers. Let us present from this diagram the part that directly concerns Plato: after Socrates, five philosophical schools were placed between the *sceptici idei* and the sceptics of matter. From the left the schools are as follows: the Megarian, the Academy, the Lycaean, the Cynics, the Cyrenaics. The philosophical position of the Academy is described as idealistic dualism, and that of the Lycaean – as materialistic dualism. The sceptics of ideas, Arcesilaus and Carneades, and the eclectics (Cicero) were descended from Plato’s successors. Further to the left, the line of development of Platonism leads through Philo of Alexandria to the school of Plotinus, which is labelled as ‘non-intellect’ (*bezrozum*). Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus are mentioned after Plotinus.¹⁹ The failure of Plato’s successors, especially of Plotinus, ‘the mystic of ideas’, was twofold. Not only did he lead Platonism astray, but he neither understood, nor even noticed, the key historical moment in which he lived, when Christianity was becoming more influential. As a result of this oversight, his philosophy was doomed to failure.

Idealistic dualism is the rejection of the unity of form and being (*jestes-two*), when “we begin with form and go to being, maintaining that form is not identical with being, in other words, that being is what really is, and form is that which is the opposite of being; being as an idea turns out to be that which always exists and is immutable, beautiful and good, while form as matter is that which passes away, shapeless by its nature, dark and

17 Semenenko, 1859b: 258.

18 Semenenko, 1859b: 260.

19 Semenenko, 1859b: 256.

evil.”²⁰ Idealistic dualism, Platonism, was therefore a negation of the real existence of the world.

Christianity had every right to use the philosophical legacy of antiquity because “all good inventions, bright ideas, sacred truths are inherently God’s property, and those to whom God gave the entire store of His truth to guard have the full right to them; I am speaking to us, to Christians, who are the owners and guardians of the divine revealed truth.”²¹ Thus Christian thought, by possessing the ultimate truth, could incorporate ancient philosophy, especially that which was consistent with revelation, and thereby was true.

Bogdan asks Ewaryst to present Platonism. The edition of the dialogues by Immanuel Bekker served as the basis for their discussion.²² Bogdan, somewhat curbing Ewaryst’s oratorical virtuosity, directs the conversation towards epistemological issues, and asks about the foundation of Plato’s thoughts. Ewaryst briefly summarises Plato’s dualism in the sphere of metaphysics and the dualistic theory of cognition as its consequence. He thought it appropriate to quote several passages from the dialogues. He selected book VII of the *Republic* and the well-known depiction of the prisoners in the cave, the most important fragment of which is the following: “*there at the end of the intellectual realm (is) the Idea of the Good, and it is barely to be seen, but when it is, it must be considered veritably for all as the cause of everything that is right and beautiful, it has created the light and its ruler (sun) in the visible (world), and in the intellectual world it is the only master, the creator of truth and reason, and it should be known to everyone who wants to act reasonably, whether in private or public.*”²³

Ewaryst answered Bogdan’s request and summarised the fragments that had just been read. He emphasised the duality mentioned at the beginning, developing the separation of opinion from knowledge, and pointing

20 Semenenko, 1859b: 263.

21 Semenenko, 1859b: 268.

22 Semenenko, 1859b: 273–274. *Platonis Dialogi graece et latine, ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri*, t. 1–8, Berolini 1816–1818. However, when quoting fragments of the dialogues in subsequent parts of the “Symposium”, Semenenko refers to Didot’s edition (*Platonis opera*, t. 1–3, Parisiis 1846–1873; Semenenko, 1859b: 278, footnote), and at the same time provides the Stephani pagination. It should be noted, however, that Didot’s edition was produced in the period between Semenenko’s stay in Paris and the time of writing the “Symposia”. Possibly, then, the interlocutors’ mention of the Bekker edition, was intended by Semenenko to add authenticity to the “Symposia”, for they referred only to the work that was at that time available.

23 Semenenko, 1859b: 277.

out Plato's terminological inconsistency and indecisiveness in this regard (γνώσις or νόησις), which he put down to Plato's difficulty in selecting words rather than to any lack of understanding of the nature of things. In the above-mentioned translations Semenenko rendered εἶδος as "form", and translated τὸ ὄν as the participle "being" (*będące*), while the title of Plato's work, apart from its traditional rendering, "Rzeczpospolita" ("Republic"), could still be found in the version: "Miastorządztwo" ("City-government").

In the most important of Ewaryst's comments there is an organised summary of the epistemological material gathered directly from the dialogues, which, for the audience's convenience, was schematically presented as follows:

"Essence (οὐσία)	= becoming (γένεσις)
comprehension (νόησις):	= opinion (δόξα):
1. knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)	= 1. belief (πίστις)
2. thinking (διάνοια)	= 2. imagining (εἰκασία)." ²⁴

After this summary of Plato's position, Bogdan, following the example of Plato's Socrates, asks Ewaryst questions. The conversation starts with the lowest level of cognition. It is established that Plato did not attach much importance to this, and introduced it, perhaps, only for the sake of symmetry. The next section raises doubts about the terminology, because belief, or faith, in the modern sense was simply revelation of the truth. Finally, the interlocutors conclude that the division made by Plato in the sphere of opinion is of no great significance in his philosophy, and that opinion in general is "*seeing and knowing visible things by human beings, but never having certainty in themselves.*"²⁵ Bogdan, however, in true Socratic style, opposes this, and in a series of short questions he leads Ewaryst to the necessity of admitting that consciousness of his own body and of its conditions is bound up with certainty, which simultaneously relates to the visible sphere, and thus contradicts the above definition of opinion. The enthusiast for antiquity, however, defends Plato, accusing the interlocutor of the desire to discuss philosophical issues using common sense (literally: peasant's reasoning). He argues that in Platonism certainty must be associated with immutability, which does not apply to any statements concerning the

24 Semenenko, 1859b: 282.

25 Semenenko, 1859b: 284.

body. To confirm this he recalls further fragments of the *Republic*, this time book V (476e–477b, 478a–e, 479c–480a), in which Plato separated opinion from knowledge (capability) and presents it as something intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, for it concerns that which is “*being together with non-being*,” which lies midway between pure being and absolute non-being.”²⁶ In the final parts of the translations the word φιλόσοφος was rendered as “wisdom-lover” (philosopher), while φιλόδοξος as “illusion-lover”, and then as “dream-spectator”.

Semenenko, as Bogdan, then goes on to radicalise Socrates’ considerations in the *Phaedo* (65a–b). In saying that the senses do not really provide immutable, certain knowledge, Socrates did not completely deny their cognitive power. Yet in Bogdan’s interpretation the conclusion is: “sensory vision is completely deceptive, [...] seeing and hearing are unreliable and uncertain senses, which do not report to us *anything reliable*, or *true*, and through them we cannot reach *any truth*.”²⁷ Ewaryst realised that Bogdan had gone further than Plato’s Socrates, and articulated certain doubts. These were dispelled by Bogdan, who excused himself with the need for haste, as he wanted to get acquainted with the whole of Plato’s philosophy.

Bogdan stated that the aesthetic aspect of Plato’s work, and also some of his deep ethical thoughts, had blinded the Christian reader to a number of his errors. Let us quote here a longer graphic fragment which reflects the doubts and evaluations peculiar to Christian thinkers who have succumbed to the charm of Plato: “In Plato there is so much that seems honourable in his thinking, so much certainty in his moral part and overall there is so much sense that it is difficult to consent to any final conclusion following from his teaching that deviates from the truth. Reading his works with affection only, but without skilful analysis and judgment, we always seem to be following a pleasant path leading to a respectable inn; and because we have our eyes closed during this journey, we do not notice the many bends and bridges, or the props and cantilevers that are all the while repairing the unsafe foundations of the road to prevent us from falling into a precipice every third or tenth step. But all such aids on the philosophical road have been borrowed from elsewhere, and are called inconsistencies; if the road were left alone in its original state we would go straight into a burrow.”²⁸

²⁶ Semenenko, 1859b: 287.

²⁷ Semenenko, 1859b: 290.

²⁸ Semenenko, 1859b: 291.

One of Bogdan's important critical arguments against Platonism is that since Plato included the material world within the cognitive sphere of opinion, then as a consequence, he excluded it from the sphere of philosophy, and thus deprived philosophy of at least half of its problems. Bogdan went on to demonstrate the contradiction in Plato's reasoning. Since it was stated that the subject of opinion was that which simultaneously is and is not, or – as Semenenko wrote – “that which is both being and non-being,”²⁹ then, by learning this, man gains knowledge of that which is, and that which is not in particular things, so both can be differentiated. If man had not been able to make such a distinction, then, as a consequence, as Bogdan argues, he would not have known that the object of knowledge is a combination of being and non-being, yet he knows this. Thus, knowledge about material objects exists, for it turns out that opinion, as understanding of being and non-being, is the knowledge of being which allows it to be distinguished from non-being. Ultimately, then, belief is knowledge, but Plato directly denies this. Plato's error, according to Bogdan, consisted in the fact that the possibility of combining being with non-being in the sphere of metaphysics was by analogy transferred to the theory of cognition, in which Plato recognised the possibility of merging, or mixing knowledge and ignorance in opinion. It was also pointed out, as another of Plato's errors, that he failed to consider the necessity that being can become the subject of knowledge “*as long as it reveals itself, and we grasp it* [...]”. Can being, even the utmost being, be the subject of any new knowledge if it does not reveal itself to us, and if we do not grasp it?”³⁰ It is necessary, then, to include the moment of revelation in philosophy, and Plato did not do this.

The highest level of knowledge is knowing “exactly and accurately.”³¹ Between this and ignorance there are other levels of cognition of varied brightness. Bogdan used Plato's terminology for them, but he gave them different meanings, making some corrections to Plato's text. Let us quote a longer passage: “*Doubt* can be defined as the degree of knowledge in which something is not known with certainty, that is, an insufficient number of signs from the object revealing itself have been grasped to know whether it is this or that, so it is actually a kind of ignorance; *opinion*, in turn is the level at which enough features have been grasped to assume that it is this object, although still not without some concern that it might be the oppo-

29 Semenenko, 1859b: 293.

30 Semenenko, 1859b: 294.

31 Semenenko, 1859b: 295.

site; *conviction* is when sufficient features seem to have been grasped for certain, but in reality it may still prove to be different; only *certainty*, and then *perfect knowledge*, when not just in words, but in reality enough signs or even all the signs with which the object reveals itself have been surely grasped. [...] All this by no means depends on a mixture of being and non-being in the object of knowledge, but on the mixture of its revelation and our perception of it, and the various degrees arising from this in the knowledge itself.”³²

Hitherto criticism of Plato had been to a large extent immanent criticism, by showing the contradictions in Plato’s philosophy. Subsequent criticism was to be conducted from Semenenko’s philosophical position. Returning to the previously outlined image of the cave, the interlocutors compare their own comprehension of the idea, as a form in the intellect, with that in Plato’s philosophy, which is a notion in the cognising subject. They conclude that in Platonism this notion is a mere shadow of the idea, while for them this form in the intellect is the thing itself. Plato, then, ‘broke’ the principle given previously by Bogdan, according to which reality is the unity of form and its being. Plato denied the world of being. The whole world, then, turns out to be a shadow, to which, due to the impossibility of recognising it as the object of knowledge, Plato attributes only opinion, as a separate power. Semenenko stressed the fundamentality of the world as the subject of philosophy, but in his view, the bond connecting the world with ideas had been broken in Platonism.

At the end of this conversation, however, Ewaryst raised doubts about the possibility of Plato making such a large number of errors of such profundity. This forced Bogdan to provide a kind of defence of Plato. In view of the number of charges against him, let us quote a longer passage, in which the role of historical limitations was emphasised as the source of Plato’s errors: “Plato’s eternal merit will be his lofty sense of morality and his profound feeling for the harmony of souls, which forced him, as if by some conjecture of a higher nature, to strike a happy medium in all his scientific and moral theories and to reach out for a certain appropriate measure; a medium and a measure that, I say, came as close as possible to the truth that cannot be discovered by intellect deprived of divine enlightenment. Ah! how heartily sorry I am that this remarkable man and his master Socrates, who by their teaching seemed to reach beauty and purity in their own conduct, fell into those sad and pitiful depravities, known only in

32 Semenenko, 1859b: 296; similarly in the summary of the discussion: Semenenko, 1859b: 305–306.

Greece, without even suspecting their sickening unseemliness, so that the latter in his speeches, and the former in his writings, mention them, and even discuss the opportunities that they seized as if these matters were common and innocent things. Good Heavens! What a sad and instructive view of what man is, even when he receives the most beautiful, the most reasonable and the noblest soul, even when he is Plato or Socrates, [...] without the help of the Saviour, and without the grace of the sanctifying God! But let us turn our eyes away from this human misery, which is even gloomier when it sits on the bright forehead of a genius [...]. So it is in the case of Plato [...], in whom I prefer to see what is beautiful, bright, healthy, great.”³³ This apology generally completes the third “Symposium”. Plato’s cosmology, theology and anthropology are postponed by the interlocutors to the next meeting, and Ewaryst promises to make an attempt to ‘rescue’ the Athenian philosopher.

The subsequent “Symposium” begins with greetings between Bogdan and Ewaryst, who had indeed come prepared with a bundle of notes and extracts from the dialogues in order to defend Plato better. The audience had not been idle either, for they had reached the conclusion that Bogdan’s criticism was possible due to Ewaryst’s agreement to recognise Plato as a dualist, and this broke the connection between knowledge and opinion, the continuity between the levels of knowledge and the connection between ideas and the world.

In order to defend Plato, Ewaryst recommended reading original philosophical texts, and not studies or interpretations. He criticised second-hand learning of philosophical systems which did not come from direct sources: “This is your principle and your practice, my self-taught pseudo-philosophers! In your opinion, it is not Plato who knows what Plato said, but the one who knows better is a Friedrich or a Wilhelm, or whatever such a know-all is called.”³⁴ Hegel’s authority as an expert on Plato was therefore absolutely rejected; he was even turned into an object of mockery after Ewaryst quoted the well-known sentence: “weiß man aber, was das Philosophische ist, so kümmert man sich um solche Ausdrücke nicht und weiß, was Platon wollte.”³⁵ Ewaryst could not refrain from ridicule: “Don’t you think it’s great? How melodiously these final words hum in my ears: *when you know what philosophy is* (it goes without saying, it is my philosophy, Hegelian: for is there any other?); when you know this, *you do not*

33 Semenenko, 1859b: 307–308.

34 Semenenko, 1860: 140.

35 Semenenko, 1860: 140–141; cf.: Hegel, 1982: 21–22.

bother about such expressions, about the most evident, the clearest expressions that were said in Plato's own most obvious words, most emphatically; then you do not have to bother about them (what a masterful expression: not to bother!); and why don't you have to bother about them? *because you know what Plato wanted*; you know on behalf of Plato himself and against Plato himself, what Plato did not know and what Plato knew differently and what he said differently. Yes, yes, you do not care, and you know! Don't you think it's just great?"³⁶ As a consequence of rejecting other philosophers' interpretations, the interlocutors also abandoned studies in the history of philosophy. They attempted to reach the philosophy of Plato that was unadulterated by interpretations.

To judge the truth of a theory of cognition two conditions were set: providing a certain object and offering a credible way of knowing it. Starting from the first issue, the objective existence of idea was confirmed: "the idea in Plato is that which is the most pre-existent; it has existence and its existence is its own; not only in the intellect, but in itself; it has the most essential reality."³⁷ To support this, a fragment of the *Timaeus* (51b–c) was quoted, in which the subject is the existence of things αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, by themselves, and in themselves. It was thus demonstrated that Plato's theory of cognition meets the first condition: it provides an object, and this is: "a form [...] invisible (to the eyes) and not subject to the other senses, it is that which is exhibited to be seen (or to be viewed) by reasoning (or by the intellect)."³⁸ On the basis of further passages from the *Timaeus* the interlocutors draw the conclusion that the being of the ideas cannot be opposed to non-being, but to the world. And that which is intermediate between them, which is the subject of the cognitive level described as διάνοια, is the third kind: χώρα. This kind is linked by Ewaryst to geometry, and this justified translating it as space.

Ewaryst focused on showing the autonomy of ideas from the world, introducing the fourth element into his reconstruction of Platonism, namely matter. Χώρα was interpreted in two ways, on the one hand as the ideal space, being the subject of geometry, on the other, as material, as the Aristotelian ὕλη πρώτη. This second meaning was supported by quotes from

36 Semenenko, 1860: 141; let us add that this passage containing Hegel's great certainty about the correctness of his own opinion still arouses the astonishment of historians (*cf.*: Tigerstedt, 1974: 69); *cf.*: "one who knows what Philosophy is, cares little for such expressions, and recognises what was Plato's true meaning" (Hegel, 1894: 21).

37 Semenenko, 1860: 149.

38 Semenenko, 1860: 149; *Timaeus* 52a.

the *Timaeus* (52d–53a, and also 51a). Quite rightly, Ewaryst expressed doubts about his distinction between these two meanings of *chora*, the semantic difference being translated by him into an ontological distinction. He concluded, however, by accepting the existence of matter, which is: “something indescribable, invisible, shapeless, inaccessible to thought and completely unresearchable by means of the intellect.”³⁹ Thus, according to his interlocutors, Plato had not been defended against the charge of dualism.

Regarding the issue of the relation between ideas and God, Ewaryst quoted a passage from the *Philebus* (30c–d), from which it results that wisdom and intellect are located in the royal soul of Zeus. Ideas, being wisdom and reason, are located in this royal and divine soul. This argument was, however, rejected, as the interlocutors came to the conclusion that the idea was independent of the intellect: “Ideas dwell beyond the human intellect, and even beyond that of Jove. They are alone in themselves, essences mixed with nothing; and the intellect, whether human or Jove’s, must look at these essences to comprehend anything and to understand anything about itself and other things.”⁴⁰

Ewaryst’s attempt to defend Plato in this regard had failed. It seems, however, that he was aware of the weakness of his argumentation because he was well acquainted with the subsequent passages from the *Timaeus*, “a kind of *Book of Genesis* in Plato’s teaching,”⁴¹ which Bogdan had recalled, and which confirmed the independent character of the idea. His interlocutors concluded that Plato had undertaken an extremely difficult task and, unfortunately, his mistake had been his failure to find the true solution to the problem of the relation between ideas and God, which, of course should be as follows: “True philosophy [...] would say that these eternal, immutable ideas belong to the very essence of God, they constitute the content of his knowledge and they are as little created by God as his own essence is created by him. You can see, then, Plato’s error in both of the following cases. When he places ideas outside God, he deprives God of the ideas, and he does not reach his aim; and again, when he claims that God creates the ideas, then he overshoots his aim, because then ideas cease to be ideas, not being eternal, and God ceases to be God, because before creating the idea he must have been without the idea. And it would be interesting to know according to what other ideas he created ideas, being previously

39 Semenenko, 1860: 160.

40 Semenenko, 1860: 166; cf.: Smolikowski, 1904a: 352.

41 Semenenko, 1860: 166.

without ideas?”⁴² Bogdan, however, tries to defend Plato by blaming all the contradictions and mistakes that had been pointed out on imperfections in terminology. Ideas, according to Plato, do not belong to the essence of God, but they are present in God’s mind and Bogdan accepted this as a valid solution to this problem. Even this departure from the truth was eventually regarded by the interlocutors as ‘lofty, noble and true’, especially considering the fact that Plato’s philosophy pre-dated the Christian era.

The existence of the object of intellectual cognition was, then, confirmed, but the question of its being cognitively accessible to human beings still remained to be discussed. In view of the fact that the ideas are not directly accessible, some means of their cognition must be indicated. Ewaryst therefore approached the topic of Plato’s dialectics, or ‘the art of discourse’. He claimed that the idea is available to be known by every human being, but this capability lies dormant, and in order to be awakened “some friend of the gods, a divine man, in other words a philosopher, or a wisdom-lover in our language,”⁴³ is required. Dialectics proved to be the ability to make use of material from all the other sciences so that a level of abstraction could be reached that is unavailable to each of the sciences individually. To define dialectics more precisely, Ewaryst described it as follows: “it is called in Greek *ἐπακτικὸς λόγος*, in Latin *inductio*, and in Polish it could be called *derivation* [*wyprowadzenie*]”.⁴⁴ Dialectics thus boiled down to inductive reasoning, which was invented, according to Aristotle’s testimony, by Socrates, and developed and refined by Plato. The debaters were not satisfied with this answer because it remained unclear how, on the basis of the material of the sensory world, the conclusions concerning that which is ideal could be formulated; after all, it had already been demonstrated that there was no connection between the sensory and mental worlds.⁴⁵ It could be assumed, therefore, that there was no correspondence between the world of things and ideas, and the recognised abstrac-

42 Semenenko, 1860: 169. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term ‘idea’ in Semenenko’s philosophical system, idea is, above all, the “the form of things in the intellect” (Kasza, 1969: 68). Criticism of Plato regarding the relation between God and ideas is also mentioned in: Piątkowski, 2004: 289.

43 Semenenko, 1860: 174.

44 Semenenko, 1860: 180.

45 Kasza, describing Semenenko’s understanding of induction, stated that Aristotle’s *epagoge* is “a transphenomenal heuristic induction which is not reasoning at all, but a non-discursive transition from a set of particulars to general content” (Kasza, 1969: 90). In the “Symposia”, by contrast, Semenenko emphasised,

tions were only the products of the intellect, and not pre-models of things. In order to defend the possibility of knowing ideas, Ewaryst introduced vision in the place of reasoning. At this point Bogdan intervened, deciding to clarify matters. He referred to the vision which Ewaryst had spoken of as intuition and considered 'gazing' (wpatrywanie) to be the best equivalent in Polish.

To explain Plato's theory of intuition, Ewaryst referred to *anamnesis*. Before it could be presented, however, some remarks about the substantial role of myth in Plato proved to be necessary since myth in Plato's work complements his philosophical considerations, and as such, has philosophical significance and meaning. The theory of pre-existence was assessed by the interlocutors as heretical and 'utter fatuousness', and became the reason for a digression critically directed against Towiański, whose idea of metempsychosis was considered by Bogdan to have come down to him from Plato, and he later added that it was: "an echo of the first tempter's voice, which penetrated through to all the first philosophers, it is to be found in the Magi's teachings, it was picked up by Plato [...]; and from Plato it was finally taken over by the Alexandrians, where the Jews encountered it and, despite their knowledge of Moses, they surreptitiously transferred it to their cabbala; and then, through various channels, it flowed through the middle ages, and today, it gushes out in various places, from under the earth, and its sources are often unknown. And now that devil has come to us."⁴⁶ While Towiański's compliance with Plato covered only the most important principles, as far as neo-Platonism was concerned, as Bogdan states, the unanimity also touches the details. Towiański, then, repeated old errors in a new guise.

Having criticised Towiański's *Symposium*, Bogdan of Semenenko's *Symposium*, returned to the topic of metempsychosis. He considered this theory to be evidence of Plato's wholly dualistic system. He confirmed its ab-

above all, that in Platonism it was impossible to cross the boundary between particulars and the idea in an inductive way, thus he denied the possibility of discursive cognition of the idea.

- 46 Semenenko, 1860: 192. The history of the dispute between the Resurrectionists on the one side and Towiański and Mickiewicz on the other is outlined in: Rutkowski, 1994, who shows the complicated path from the initial friendship between them to the final rupture and the latter's condemnation. Semenenko's polemic against Towiański was even acknowledged by Pope Pius IX (Gabryl, 1914: 207–208). For Semenenko, Towiański's *Symposium* was quite simply heretical writing (Semenenko, 2001: 99). Gabryl credited Semenenko with being 'Towiański's vanquisher' (Gabryl, 1913: 35).

surdity by providing examples from modern philosophical ideas that were compliant with Plato's ideas, such as nativism or intuitionism, but which had not been associated with metempsychosis by subsequent philosophers. Plato's theory of knowledge was, then, doomed to failure: "the real object of true knowledge are the ideas existing in themselves. They cannot be directly seen by anyone in this world, yet they cannot be known in any other way than by being seen. Plato, however, assumes that human beings were once able to see them and are therefore now able to recall them today. But this conjecture is not only unskilful but also false because in Plato's philosophy human thought does not have at its disposal any real means enabling ideas to be seen."⁴⁷ The very philosophy turned out to be inherently contradictory, for Plato indicated the ideal subject of cognition, but his theory lacked a method that would lead to it. Platonism proved to be even worse when confronted with the only true philosophical formula. Plato did not attribute real existence (jestestwo) to ideas because he did not attach them sufficiently to the only real existence, that is to God. Ideas themselves do not possess their own existence, because in that case each of them would exist and act by itself. The consequences of such a state of affairs, naturally, in accordance with the definition of true existence, as assumed by Bogdan, would be all too absurd. Bogdan regarded ideas as beings without form because in no way are they given to man; being considered as eternal, immutable and absolute, they have no form by which a human being could know them. Without granting them any form, Plato could not provide any means of knowing them.

The *Symposium* concluded with a philosophical boat as a metaphor for Plato's philosophy. The boat not only failed to bypass Scylla or Charybdis but also crashed into not just one of them, but both. For on the one hand, Plato acknowledged that the world could not be the object of knowledge, and on the other – what he indicated as the object of knowledge was something that did not exist. In this way he smashed his boat and drowned as a philosopher. Let us quote the final exchange of opinions between Ewaryst and Bogdan: "Ew. It is, however, strange: for so many centuries people have been sitting over this place where he disappeared from sight and assiduously fishing for the remains that are washed ashore after him, and they have been living on these remains for so long! The boat must have been richly loaded! / Bog. And why, Ewaryst, do you forget to add that the only thing that floated to the surface and the only thing that was turned to

47 Semenenko, 1860: 197.

human good was that which came from a truth older than Plato, from God Himself?”⁴⁸

The next “Symposium” relates in the title itself to the problems raised in Plato’s *Sophist*. Its theme was to be notions of nothingness and negation: “What is negation and what does it negate? Or to put it more simply and clearly: What is No, and what is Nothing?”⁴⁹ Further threads in the discussion point to an additional meaning of the title, for in the previous “Symposia” Hegel was considered to be a sophist, and his concept of negation was another subject for analysis.

In this “Symposium” Bogdan intended to finally crush Plato, but criticism of Plato went hand in hand with criticism of Hegel. Bogdan provides a graphic comparison of the systems of both philosophers: “I would like to compare Platonic philosophy to a beautiful, tall tree, though now cut down and devoid of roots, devoid of life; whereas Hegel’s system can be directly compared to a pile of wood cuttings. [...] Plato shows innate talent, Hegel – only art. In the former, we see a work of nature with all its irregularities, growths, hollows, decays and even rottenness, which continues to testify to its former existence, full of life circulating all through its body whereas in the latter, there are only dry cuttings, woodchips devoid of life, though admittedly they are trimmed, planed down, carved into squares and triangles, and arranged in a bizarre, but allegedly well-formed, mosaic. Plato’s philosophy is, after all, an organism, while Hegel’s is pure mechanism; in the former I admire the birth of nature, in the latter I see only the trickster’s hand.”⁵⁰ According to Bogdan, the trickster’s method was fundamentally flawed because he comprehended negation and the notion of nothingness incorrectly. Plato erred in this regard as well, but his claims were far less contradictory to reason than Hegel’s.

To prove this statement, Bogdan first had to discuss his own notion of negation and nothingness. To this end, he referred to the philosophical formula of the unity of form and existence (*ens et forma sunt unum*). Negation is their mental disconnection. Plato’s error consisted in denying form. The reason for this error was his false theory of knowledge, in which, as had already been demonstrated by the interlocutors, the world is not the

48 Semenenko, 1860: 205.

49 Semenenko, 1861: 131.

50 Semenenko, 1861: 132–133; cf.: “In structure and method Semenenko’s philosophy is similar to Hegelianism. Perhaps, however, Semenenko appreciated Hegel’s »triality« most of all” (Kaszuba, 2004: 28); this was also noted earlier by Gabryl (1913: 43); similarly, Semenenko’s concept of the ‘absolute’ originates from the philosophy of German idealism (Kaszuba, 2004: 29–30).

subject of cognition. Bogdan's view is the following: "The object of knowledge, and all knowledge, is the form of things, but this form belongs to the particular being [jesteśtwo] that is encompassed by its form; the act of knowledge is the same form of things in the intellect."⁵¹ This moderately realistic view of Aristotelian-Thomistic provenance was contrasted with the idealism and dualism of Plato, who separated forms, as defined above, from the world.

Bogdan surprised his interlocutors by saying that Plato did not quite avoid sophistry, but by ascribing to Plato an affinity with the Sophists, he did not consider this to be an allegation against the Athenian. He was after all "the best intellect and the most hostile to all that is sophistic,"⁵² but even he was 'tainted' with ignorance of the real philosophical formula. Thus, if ignorance of the proper notions of nothingness and negation is regarded as the essence of sophistry, then Plato must be classified into this intellectual current, as Bogdan defined it. However, it would certainly be wrong to put Plato on a par with Hegel in this respect. Once again, to justify his criticism of Plato, Bogdan delivered a paean in his honor: "[Plato] will always be an exceptional mind even in his perversions, [...] a noble mind whose search for truth is not just a game, but for whom the truth is always truly sacrosanct, and for whom the greatest desire is to watch its dignified nature even from afar, even from the sidelines. If he himself feels that he has not reached the truth, he would rather admit this openly, calling on others, if there are any, to teach him better, rather than proclaim himself to be infallible, as our know-alls do, who would rather marry non-intellect than learn reason and truth from those who were entrusted to guard these sanctities by God the Supreme."⁵³


Plato's fundamental 'sin', which allows him to be classified as a sophist, was his acknowledgment of non-being as being. Plato's error resulted from the fact that he used one term in a variety of meanings, confusing one with another and not distinguishing between them properly. The examples of contradictions in Plato led Semenenko to recognise Plato's art of sophistry, but not to blame him for applying sophistry *mala fide* to sow intellectual confusion.

Plato's philosophical solutions were determined to a certain extent by the harmony of his system. Below a long discussion on Plato between Bogdan and Ewaryst is presented in schematic form:

51 Semenenko, 1861: 138; cf.: Kaszuba, 2004: 23.

52 Semenenko, 1861: 150.

53 Semenenko, 1861: 152.



This presentation of the relations between concepts and their arrangement in a transparent system, “accurately prepared, logical and absolute”⁵⁷ was considered by Bogdan to be a success. But how far does this system comply with Plato’s intentions? Bogdan replies: “my above presentation of the Platonic system is not in fact his system; but it could have been if Plato had remained consistent to his adopted principles, if he had derived the consequences from them with logical strictness, and if, in short, he had not fallen victim to fortunate inconsistencies that sometimes rescue the truth.”⁵⁸ Plato’s thought, however, is not as terminologically strict as Bogdan would have wished. For Plato, truth comes before the clarity of the prospective system. If Plato had known the language of philosophy, he would have avoided all his errors because he would have been able to bring his thought to terminological clarity, and this would have allowed him to see its consequences. The above scheme shows a corrected and improved version of Plato by Semenenko, who introduced order and consistency into his system, although it must be said that it was often those very inconsistencies of Plato that proved to be of value because thanks to them, he was able to articulate a number of his most perceptive thoughts.

Although the title of the next “Symposium” did not seem to announce a Platonic theme, in fact Plato plays a huge part in it. Ewaryst, at Bogdan’s request, was to prepare a presentation of the Megarian school. The enthusi-

54 In a state of rest.

55 ‘Istnia’ also as existence.

56 Without its spatial, geometric meaning.

57 Semenenko, 1861: 177. Semenenko, perhaps, owed his desire to grasp philosophical issues in a systematic way to the influence of idealistic German philosophy, and thus to Hegel, whom he criticised (Wojcieszek, 2002: 66).

58 Semenenko, 1861: 177–178.

ast of antiquity was to show Platonism as the starting point for pantheism. Inspired by the previous “Symposia” and by Plato’s dialogues, Ewaryst produced his own dialogue entitled *The Megarian School*, which he read aloud to the audience. It was, then, a dialogue within a dialogue, a meeting and conversation of Socrates’ disciples in ancient Megara, related by a figure who had been created in the “Symposia” by a 19th century Polish philosopher.

In Ewaryst’s dialogue, one of the characters was ‘a genius of philosophy’ who carried true philosophy into the remote epoch of antiquity, where he spoke to Plato and Euclid. Out of the entire speech of the genius, all that Plato remembered was firstly that only after God descended to Earth would the truth be given to the people, and secondly that he should listen carefully to Euclid’s criticism. The latter, however, openly criticised dialectics as a useless tool: “To know about a particular thing, one must see it. This becomes clear in the cognates we use: *to see* and *to know*, or rather their identity (εἶδω, from which: ἰδεῖν to see, εἰδέναι to know). For what image can I have about a thing that I do not see? [...] Viewing the thing itself, or intuition, is the only way to knowledge.”⁵⁹ Since the only way to know the truth is through seeing, then the dialectician must be mistaken.

The second way of justifying the futility of dialectics stems from understanding it as the ‘art of syllogism’, and this, in turn, was reduced to comparing terms and deciding about their identity, which was shown by Euclid on the example of the *Barbara* type syllogism. Since each element in the syllogism contains two terms that are compared, it is necessary to know them in order to compare them. And to know them, intuition has to be applied. Equating dialectics with syllogism allowed it to be further reduced to intuition.

When dialectics had been defeated, the genius of philosophy joined the conversation, revealing himself to Euclid and criticising his ignorance of syllogism. He set forth the foundations of this theory according to Aristotle and also criticised the intuitive method because it mistakenly recognises form as independent being. Notions and forms exist in the intellect, the genius reasoned, and evidence for this can be seen in every meaningful sentence expressed about the world. Euclid, who was delighted with the philosophy revealed to him by the genius, addressed him as the “holy spirit.”⁶⁰ Together with Plato, they were impressed by this philosophical revelation. Euclid would have liked to know and remember all of it, but the

⁵⁹ Semenenko, 1862: 15.

⁶⁰ Semenenko, 1862: 20.

genius declined his request answering in a way that portrays Semenenko's attitude to pre-Christian philosophy: "This curtain which I am now dropping before you, for many long centuries will remain down for all worshipers of philosophy who pass by its temple; and though great and vital, the truth concealed behind this curtain is so simple, so clear, so accessible that it seems that anyone could guess it; yet philosophers will not discover it for many years to come. [...] they will not be able to work out what it is, they will not look upon its bright countenance, and they will not recognise that it is the only law, both of all thinking and of our entire existence. And how could they recognise it when they tend not to really look ahead, but only into themselves, into their own futile intellects? But even those who do really look will not be able to transcend their times until the time has come to see the truth in all its aspects. And yet, though they will not see the whole truth, they will have an immeasurable advantage over the others, because they will catch a glimpse of the truth and there will be no falsity in what they see. All this will happen to humiliate human reason, and especially to shame those philosophers who are arrogantly convinced that they are intellectually better than others, for it is precisely because they think they are better than others that they will prove to be inferior to others; and all the rationality they have is, in fact, bound up with what they have in common with other people. But eventually the moment will come when I will be allowed to raise this curtain, and then everything will be elucidated."⁶¹ Plato and Euclid were disappointed that they had gained so little from the revelations of the genius of philosophy. Therefore they ended their dispute, realising that neither of them had learned the truth, so they remained entrenched in their own positions. Euclid suggested that Plato should introduce Eubulides into the conversation, while he, himself, decided to withdraw. Plato responded with a similar proposal and gave the floor to Phaedo. The conversation of Eubulides and Phaedo consisted of a repetition of the arguments from the discussion of their masters, and from previous "Symposia". This device was probably intended by Semenenko to let the reader understand that the succession of ancient philosophical schools and the reproduction of their concepts would have continued if it had not been for the Revelation. The successors of the masters continued to develop the same positions, deluding their audience with false appearances of the truth.

The conversation of the young adepts of philosophy was terminated by the genius of philosophy, who ultimately revealed himself to everyone,

⁶¹ Semenenko, 1862: 21.

claiming that further discussion was futile and vain since neither of the present philosophers had been able to convince his opponent of his own arguments. Euclid desired, however, to draw the conversation to an end with some conclusion worthy of the entire discussion, involving the deity, a conclusion that could be agreed upon by all: "But there is one truth that is obvious to everyone, and the path to it is accessible to all. That truth is that the Supreme Being is the *Good*, and the path to it is *Virtue*. Friends! This is the one certainty! So here is the conclusion: let us dedicate our minds, as far as possible, to looking upon the Good itself; but above all, let us devote our lives to attaining virtue, which is the most reliable thing we have here in this world!"⁶² A valid and important conclusion results from this. Doing philosophy in good faith, not in the manner of the Sophists, still results in moral values even if the truth is unattainable under certain circumstances. And pre-Christian philosophy served to make the ancients more spiritually refined. This is how the dialogue within a dialogue, a product of Ewaryst's fantasy, himself the creation of Semenenko, comes to an end. All the participants of the "Symposium" praised Ewaryst, a former enthusiast of Plato and antiquity who, as a result of his participation in the series of "Symposia", turned into a supporter of Bogdan's philosophy.

Just as Plato placed Socrates in his dialogues, so Semenenko put Bogdan in his "Symposia". A similar role is played by the genius of philosophy in Ewaryst's dialogue. As far their roles in the dialogue are concerned, there is a fundamental difference between Bogdan, or Semenenko's Socrates, and Plato's Socrates. The latter led the interlocutors in a particular direction, whereas Bogdan mostly set forth his reasoning, though he was quite willing to be diverted by the comments of his interlocutors, who sometimes even interrupted him. Hence there is some lack of order in the "Symposia", of which the author himself was aware, saying through Bogdan that "in a conversation not everything can be arranged systematically."⁶³ As for the philosophical differences, these were evidently even more profound.

In the "Symposia" several charges are made against Plato. Even the words of approval concerning the aesthetic aspects and philosophical skill of Plato's work can, paradoxically, be regarded as an indirect charge against him because they provide a smoke screen to cover up a series of errors which thus become more difficult to discover. Other errors that were openly indicated include the contradictions in which, according to Seme-

62 Semenenko, 1862: 30–31.

63 Semenenko, 1861: 141.

nenko, Plato's philosophy became entangled by his acknowledgement that the world could not be the subject of knowledge, thus removing an important subject of philosophical reflection from the realm of philosophy. Plato's philosophy was also methodologically flawed because neither dialectics nor intuition allowed for real cognition of one of the most important subjects of knowledge.

The image of Plato presented in the "Symposia" clearly served as a platform for contemporary polemic against German philosophy. Semenenko, however, tried to present Platonism as it could be at its best. 'Best', in this case, means from the perspective of Christian thought, as can be seen, for example, in the attempt to organise the most important terms of Platonism and the relations between them within a scheme. This had the effect of destroying the lively nature of Plato's thought, but it had the advantage of bringing Platonism within a system.

Bogdan is Semenenko's *alter ego* at the time of writing the "Symposia", Ewaryst is an enthusiast of antiquity, who is nevertheless not deaf to Bogdan's arguments. In all probability Ewaryst was Semenenko at the time when he met Jański. Although he was acquainted with German philosophy, he did not let it seduce him, for it was ancient philosophy which held the greatest attraction for him.

In contrast to the *Conversations of Plato with his Disciples* by Franciszek Karpiński (1741–1825),⁶⁴ which had appeared in print half a century earlier, in Semenenko's "Symposia" the interlocutors have their own individual characters, though the reader may not be able to identify them clearly on the basis of their first names, with the exception, of course, of Bogdan (*i.e.* Jański). The dialogues in the "Symposia" are also much more dynamic and Semenenko clearly had knowledge of Plato's philosophy resulting from his reading of the dialogues, which cannot be said about Karpiński. Semenenko used the popular edition by Didot, giving its page numbers, but also adding the Stephanus pagination, though he seems to have been unaware of its origin because he merely provided the additional page numbers with the note "differently."⁶⁵ In comparison to Karpiński's late Enlightenment poetic production, the "Symposia" constitute a new quality in Polish philosophy and in Platonic literature. It is a pity therefore, that this

64 Karpiński, 1806a.

65 Semenenko, 1859b: 278, footnote, *passim*. Semenenko experienced difficulties in assembling the editions of all the dialogues. In 1859 he repeatedly asked friends in Paris to buy them and send them to him (Semenenko, 2003: 72, 85).

work met a similar fate to that of Karpiński's *Conversations*, neither of them attracting much interest from historians.

Although Semenenko himself used the dialogical form in his work, he was critical of the lack of continuity in Plato's dialogues. Subsequent dialogues did not follow on as continuations of those that came before, and he accepted different points of view, his opinions being uttered by a variety of characters who did not maintain terminological consistency. In contrast to Plato's dialogues, the "Symposia", according to their author, represented a unified whole and were to be read in the order presented. Semenenko therefore believed that he had perfected the Platonic form. It was Plato, however, who had facilitated him in pursuing his philosophical arguments, for the presentation of his own philosophical views was based on Plato's dialogues, which formed a literary and philosophical starting point for his work.

The evaluations that Semenenko put into Bogdan's mouth are almost too obvious. "Semenenko was not only a philosopher but also a theologian. Although he distinguished between both disciplines, his philosophical and theological visions complemented and conditioned each other. The keystone of both visions is the Christian God. [...] Semenenko, both in words and deeds, wants to be a Christian philosopher. Although he does not apply reasoning drawn from the Revelation to his philosophy, his work is based on this, takes it into account and draws inspiration from it."⁶⁶ When he praises Plato, pointing out that that he achieved the highest point in philosophy, he always qualifies this remark with the addition of 'as a non-Christian philosopher'. As for the question of Plato's possible influence on Christian philosophy, Semenenko's answer is essentially negative. "He regarded Scholasticism as the only true philosophy",⁶⁷ and the reason for this was that he saw it as the only true explanation of knowledge.⁶⁸ Plato's theory of knowledge, according to Semenenko, did not sufficiently explain the nature of knowledge, and even made such an explanation impossible.

In the "Symposia" Semenenko sought to achieve several goals. He wanted to settle accounts with German philosophy, especially with Hegelianism, and also with Towiański's Messianism. He therefore voiced the opinion that non-Christian philosophy was only of value in the pre-Christian period as an expression of natural human reason, being a gift from God.

⁶⁶ Kaszuba, 2005: 248.

⁶⁷ Smolikowski, 1904: 108.

⁶⁸ Kaszuba, 2004: 22.

After Christ, Christian thinkers became the depositaries of the truth. This in no way negated ancient pagan philosophy, which was then seen as a preparation for Christian philosophy. And it is only from this perspective that ancient thought can be assessed as an important achievement in the world's intellectual history. In comparison to other modern unorthodox philosophical currents, Greek philosophy was innovative and authentic, it revealed new ideas. Everything in Greek philosophy that proved to be valuable and true, that is, consistent with Christian thought, was to be found within Christian thought in a much more perfect form. Everything that Christian thought could not accept and incorporate into its system found its place in contemporary trends like Hegelianism and Towianism, which were critically assessed by Semenenko. These currents were false, "and all falsifications result from arguing against the truth, against the exclusive truth that is called Catholic."⁶⁹ For philosophy is a sphere of knowledge which clearly shows progress in its revelation of the truth. Modern philosophies, deriving from ancient ones, do not deny the significance of that which came before. This line of development, however, must necessarily include Catholic truth and scholastic philosophy. When philosophers do not take into account past human thought, they vitiate themselves,⁷⁰ and this is what Hegel and others did. For Semenenko, pre-Christian philosophy was an intellectual game revolving around the truth, but not capable of attaining it.

It seems, then, that Semenenko marked out the way for the philosophical reception of Plato by subsequent Catholic thinkers in Poland. It is this model which was, to a large extent, to be followed in the works by Pawlicki, in the part of his study in the history of philosophy devoted to Plato. For Christian thinkers, understandably, ancient thought was not of great value. Nevertheless, they remembered Plato's affinity with some Christian ideas, which made him unique against the background of his time. Pawlicki met Semenenko for the first time in 1868. At that time he had been a lecturer in Greek philosophy at the Main School of Warsaw (Szkola Główna Warszawska) for several years. As he recalled years later, they discussed Plato, among many other philosophical issues and at that time, they both came to agree that studying Plato and Aristotle had always brought great benefit to humanity and would continue to do so.⁷¹ Pawlicki and Semenenko had similar motives for taking up the subject of ancient

69 Semenenko, 1861: 147.

70 Cf.: Smolikowski, 1904: 109–110.

71 Pawlicki, 1913.

thought – their interest in Greek philosophy and the defence of the excellence of Christian thought. For Pawlicki, this motive was strengthened by Pope Leo XIII's encyclical.

Polish Christian thought in the inter-uprising era did not initially succeed in elaborating a single image of Plato nor even a method of approaching and assessing his works. Semenenko combined paeans in honor of Plato with explicit philosophical criticism. He was aware, however, that Greek philosophy, and especially Plato's philosophy, had reached the highest degree of excellence that was possible in the pre-Christian era and that the practical and moral conclusions resulting from Greek philosophy should continue to be positively assessed. As an autonomous subject, Plato seems to have been of little interest to the philosophers of the time. He tended to be used as a polemical instrument, only referred to in relation to contemporary times, critically or approvingly, and modern problems were the measure of his value.

The interpretations of Plato in the inter-uprising period can be regarded as another field of dispute between two rival groups, the supporters of Hegel's philosophy and its opponents who criticised Hegelianism and Hegelians from the Catholic position. F. A. Kozłowski, the pioneer in translating the dialogues into Polish, is counted among the former, although perhaps he did not fully realise the significance of this dispute and took advantage of Hegel's views without any bias of outlook, treating him simply as a historian of philosophy. The latter group included the *Pielgrzym (Pilgrim)* of E. Ziemięcka, F. Kozłowski and Semenenko. In fact it can even be stated that Polish discussion on the value of Plato's philosophy in the inter-uprising period was determined by the dispute over Hegel. Discussions about German philosophy thus had the side-effect of reviving interest in ancient philosophy, in Plato, and in philosophy in general.

2.2 Plato as an opponent of democracy and a precursor of socialism from the perspective of B. Limanowski

In 1869 a paper about utopias appeared in the *Weekly Review (Przegląd Tygodniowy)*. Its author, a lawyer, Gustaw Roszkowski (1847–1915), named Plato as the precursor of utopian thought. He was critical of Plato's work: "Plato's ideas were to remain forever in the world of daydreaming as a testament to the fact that the most powerful genius can become deranged by a system if, while reflecting on the most important issues of human life, instead of taking into account the existing conditions, he accepts only his

own ideas as a starting point, regardless of their practical feasibility and utility.⁷² At that time Roszkowski was preparing a doctoral thesis on the nature of property,⁷³ and he regarded the common ownership of goods as one of the cardinal sins of all utopians. The purely utopian character of Plato's project was also emphasised by the Cicero translator, Henryk Sadowski (1847–1908). In his view, Plato had not succeeded in solving any social or political problems by means of his philosophy: "Plato's republic is the purest utopia, never and nowhere to be applied, let alone realised, for its institutions, laws and ideas of social government are contrary to human nature, and as such they can never be implemented if human beings are to meet all that Nature has destined them for."⁷⁴ Plato's philosophy thus failed to achieve its intention. It was not the philosophical aspect of Plato's social philosophy that seemed false to Sadowski but the plan for its implementation. Plato's communism was the result of his ignorance of human nature, for he turned human beings into zombie-like creatures, depriving them of family bonds. "A person in Plato's state merely exists; he is born, he does not need to worry about shelter or food, or even about his wife, because all this is taken care of by the state, which, in return for these amenities, turns him into some kind of bipedal animal, stripped of his reason, his will and those fine attributes with which the spirit of Plato's philosophy breathes."⁷⁵ Such extreme and superficial opinions were not, however, the only assessments of Plato's social philosophy in the years to come. The *Republic* proved to be inspiring, and in the second half of the 19th century enjoyed great popularity among authors who read it from various perspectives.

Boleslaw Limanowski (1835–1935) took a deeper interest in Plato's political thought. He had been inspired in this respect by the lectures of professor Ludwik von Strümpell (1812–1899), which he attended as a student at the University of Dorpat in 1859, and as he himself admitted, he attended them regularly because of their many positive qualities.⁷⁶ Strümpell lectured on the subject *Die ethischen Grundlagen der politischen Oekonomie*, which included a general outline of social phenomena, and under his in-

72 Roszkowski, 1869: 226.

73 Kadler, 1971: 325.

74 Sadowski, 1873: II.

75 Sadowski, 1873: VI.

76 Limanowski, 1957: 206–207; cf.: Żechowski, 1964: 33–34. While his studies in Dorpat introduced Limanowski to the field of social reflection, which was to have a lasting effect on him, at that time he was certainly not yet a socialist (Żechowski, 1964: 21–22).

fluence young Limanowski considered taking up the social sciences. He decided to acquaint himself with the most important works dealing with this subject and his first choice fell on Plato.⁷⁷ Being intrigued by the issue of the impact that ‘socialist and communist ideas’ had exerted on the historical development of societies, Limanowski planned to present these ideas in a series of articles devoted to past political projects under the significant title of *The Dreamers*. At the same time, his main interest was still Plato, who thus became a starting-point for further extensive studies on the precursors of socialist thought, constituting at the same time the beginning of Polish research into the history of utopias.⁷⁸

In *The Dreamers* Limanowski expressed his faith in the positive role individuals play in historical progress, especially those individuals whose reflection transcends the present and goes beyond the sphere of immediate pleasures and profits. “In these sad times, there are people who cannot and do not want to come to terms with the existing state of affairs, for whom the truth has an irresistible charm, and in whose hearts love for humanity burns fiercely, – these people usually lose touch with reality and begin to dream. In contrast to the existing confusion, their imagination conjures up a blissful order that could exist in reality if people united their efforts to achieve it. This radiant ideal captures their entire being; their mind strains towards it, their heart vibrates to it with youthful enthusiasm.”⁷⁹ Plato could certainly be ranked among those thinkers who formulated such ‘driving ideas’ for historical development, thus contributing to the progress of humanity: “towering over all social dreamers stands the colossal and beautiful figure of the divine Plato. The echo of his daydreaming can be heard right down the ages up to recent times.”⁸⁰

As Limanowski emphasised, Plato had a great passion for politics, but he had an aversion to its existing forms. That was why he undertook his Sicilian journeys and political experiments. His most important field of

77 Limanowski, 1957: 206–207; in the subsequent semester, with similar diligence, Limanowski attended Strümpell’s lectures on the history of philosophy (Limanowski, 1957: 208); cf.: Kozłowski, W. M., 1902: 20–21.

78 Limanowski’s works on T. More and T. Campanella, which were published subsequently elsewhere, were intended to be a continuation of *The Dreamers* (cf.: Kadler, 1971: 199). Cf.: Limanowski, 1958: 37; Kozłowski, W. M., 1902: 49; Śliwa, 1994: 45, 50–51.

79 Limanowski, 1871: 8; cf.: Żychowski, 1971: 69–70; Handelsman, 1937: 34. On the role of ideological factors in the history of humanity according to Limanowski cf.: Żechowski, 1987: 41–42.

80 Limanowski, 1871: 9.

interest, however, was philosophy, and it was only in relation to this that he addressed political issues.⁸¹ As for the negative opinions expressed about Plato, they were briefly dismissed by Limanowski as follows: “the defects of great men fade away completely before their merits.”⁸² Plato’s merit lay in his involvement in political issues, though not actively and not as a rhetorician.

Limanowski rediscovered three main claims in Plato’s philosophy. Admittedly, it was only in later schools of philosophy that they were articulated clearly and explicitly, but in Plato they could be found at least as a ‘premonition’. These were the belief in the immutability of the laws governing the world, in the hierarchy of the world, and in the mutability of phenomena as a mere change of state, and not a change in their nature or substance. To support the latter claim Limanowski provided an example from the natural sciences, where matter, when it takes on different shapes and forms, does not perish. In addition to this, for Limanowski, the idea of inheritance, not only physical and material but also spiritual, confirmed Plato’s theory of inborn concepts.

The relation between Plato and Christianity throughout the course of history was described by Limanowski as follows: “Platonism, on account of the ideal course it set and because of its mysticism, which was reinforced by subsequent believers, prepared the ground for the acceptance of Christian teaching. It could even be said that it paved the way for the adoption of the great Christian truths, for among philosophers, Platonists were the most numerous of those who were well disposed towards the teaching of Christ.”⁸³ Plato’s influence did not end there, however, it doubled in strength during the Renaissance, and others who fell under its spell included, according to Limanowski, Leibniz, Schelling, and even Comte.

The last of a number of papers published by Limanowski in *Gazeta Literacka* (*Literary Gazette*) concludes with a mere fragment of a summary of the beginning of Book I of the *Republic*. This study was eventually finalised elsewhere, but even this unfinished summary in *Gazeta Literacka* seems to have whetted the appetite of its readers, for Limanowski mentions the attention it aroused, particularly among young people.⁸⁴ It was perhaps this expression of interest that prompted him to further elaborate on Plato’s political project.

81 Limanowski, 1871a: 9–10.

82 Limanowski, 1871b: 11.

83 Limanowski, 1871c: 9.

84 Limanowski, 1958: 37; Żychowski, 1971: 70.

Limanowski's subsequent articles on Plato were published in edited volumes. The first of these articles consisted mostly of material which had already been presented in *Gazeta Literacka* and included some criticisms of Plato's work. Socrates' claims that justice is virtue and wisdom while injustice is ineffective were considered by Limanowski to be unsatisfactory and insufficiently substantiated. Limanowski, however, did not support this assessment with detailed references to the relevant sections in the *Republic*. Socrates' 'dialectical subtleties', in turn, seemed to Limanowski to be contrary to common sense. Limanowski continued by arguing that Plato had failed to observe that a political system should stem from citizens' beliefs and that only a change in citizens' minds could bring about a political shift. Nor did Plato's view on the innate inequality between individuals gain Limanowski's support and was described by Limanowski as 'aristocratic mysticism' arising from the fact that Plato was in awe of the Spartan state and its strength, and disappointed with Athenian democracy, which had degenerated into anarchy. Limanowski devoted some passages to Book VIII, and considered the vivid outlines of the degeneration of political systems as excellently portrayed. But he was surprised by Plato's contempt for physical labor and his lack of respect for hard work and frugality, qualities which the Polish thinker considered to be important cultural virtues. He believed that Plato's attitudes must have arisen from his origins and upbringing. In general, Plato was unable to perceive the advantages of democracy, especially in its Athenian version. Limanowski summed up Plato's views on democracy as follows: "Plato, ill-disposed to democracy, did not discern any of its good points and distorted what he saw [...]. As a doctrinaire, he looked at contemporary reality through the lenses of his own system. But in fact, [...] the then democracy could not only be considered in terms of its shortcomings, for any comparison with other forms of political system reveals the superiority of democracy. Athenian democracy had distinguished itself with the greatest heroism while fighting off the Persian invaders; it had also enriched the treasury of knowledge with the most exquisite fruits of the intellect."⁸⁵ Let us add that Plato's works can undoubtedly be counted among them. He thus criticised the system to which he ultimately owed a great deal.

85 Limanowski, 1872: 116–117. Let us add that Chałasiński associates the beginning of Polish sociology with the date of publication of this paper by Limanowski (Chałasiński, 1972: 35). Although Chałasiński had noted the previous series of articles by Limanowski, *The Dreamers*, he failed to notice that this article (Limanowski, 1872) was basically a repetition of the ideas in these articles.

In another paper, which was published in the same year, Limanowski presented his final assessment of Plato's views, focusing on the sociological and educational aspects of his work. He provided a fairly credible summary of the content of the *Republic*, though he disregarded the metaphysical issues. For the most part, he assessed the Platonic project critically since it lacked precision, and its premises were chosen arbitrarily (*e.g.* the necessity for correspondence between the tripartition of the soul and of the state). The political system proposed by Plato is distinctively aristocratic, yet it was not a hereditary aristocracy, for entry into this aristocracy required perfection of the body and spirit. Limanowski commented: "If such rigour had been applied strictly to our present aristocracy, it is probable, I think, that we would be completely without an aristocracy."⁸⁶ Nor would there have been many eager candidates for an aristocracy which involved the surrender of all private property. Limanowski saw the advantage of democracy in that it did not separate the intelligentsia from the rest of society. He advocated public education, recognising that all citizens are conscious and capable of reasoning. Democracy, continued Limanowski, guaranteed the unity and freedom of citizens whereas the source of unity in Plato's political thought consisted in the supervision of the lower class by the upper, whose representatives had to be deprived of liberty.

Limanowski appreciated Plato's pioneering concepts with regard to the empowerment of women as gender difference should not constitute social difference: "In this respect Plato expresses his opinion even more openly and boldly than do the advocates of equal rights for women today."⁸⁷ Plato's eugenic guidelines from Book V were interpreted by Limanowski as the formulation of a notion of progress "in order to give rise to even better generations from the good ones,"⁸⁸ but he considered the communal life and upbringing of the guardians as unrealistic demands: "this would completely constrain personal human freedom, imposing supervision and care on nearly all of one's deeds and providing strict control of private life."⁸⁹

Limanowski also rated Plato's views on education very highly. This was partly because, in this respect, Plato's ideas had not departed from the established Greek practice of generations. As for the details, Limanowski claimed that Plato was ahead of his time, and his pedagogical ideas were only rediscovered in the 19th century since earlier centuries had lost sight

86 Limanowski, 1872a: 213.

87 Limanowski, 1872a: 215.

88 Limanowski, 1872a: 217.

89 Limanowski, 1872a: 218.

of the principle: *mens sana in corpore sano*, by which Plato meant theoretical, intellectual and practical teaching, including gymnastics, teaching through play, and coeducation. Despite Limanowski's appreciation of these innovative and pioneering ideas, the general assessment of Plato's political project was not favourable: "It does not attract us. It lacks two vital elements: freedom and love, a natural and constant source of which is the family."⁹⁰ The great merit of Plato, however, was that his project was bold. True, the effects of this boldness were not always worthy of attention, but they encouraged subsequent thinkers to make attempts at reforming society and outlining utopian projects. Plato's project was unachievable, but it does not follow from this that it was without value because in the ongoing progress of mankind "many things that were considered impossible proved to be beneficial and possible when certain conditions changed."⁹¹

The next article on Plato by Limanowski included praise for him as a thinker who had laid the foundations for a new field of studies: "Plato is for sociology what Pythagoras is for mathematics. He studied the phenomena of social life in static terms and was the first to start to study them in dynamic terms."⁹² The third book of the *Laws*, in which the origins of the development of societies and states are considered, was regarded by Limanowski as the first attempt at historiosophy.

In comparison to the *Laws*, the shortcomings of the *Republic* could be seen even more clearly by Limanowski as "the first attempt to combine efforts of imagination and intellect to shape social and political ideas. This is the first political romance."⁹³ Among the disadvantages of the system presented in the *Republic* Limanowski mentioned: the division of society into two parts: the privileged class and the more numerous subordinate remainder; destruction of the family, surveillance of almost all aspects of human life and deprivation of freedom. True, the last of these defects affected only the privileged class, but this class constituted the essence of political life in the state. All these imperfections were removed from the *Laws*, where Plato himself spoke as the Athenian. He had given up his utopian social dreams and merely desired to improve the existing Athenian system.

Despite the many changes that occurred in Plato's mind during the last years of his life, he remained a supporter of aristocracy, which he under-

90 Limanowski, 1872a: 226.

91 Limanowski, 1872a: 227.

92 Limanowski, 1875: 491. It should be noted that 'sociology' was understood by Limanowski as social philosophy (Żechowski, 1964: 166).

93 Limanowski, 1875: 491.

stood as the rule of “better men, who combined virtue and wisdom.”⁹⁴ Although Plato made some concessions, this division into better and worse classes was not removed from his social philosophy. Plato’s aristocratic views provided an opportunity for Limanowski to say a few words about the superiority of democracy over other forms of government, for he considered the abolition of social divisions and the pursuit of widespread education to be the goals of democracy. Fortunately, Plato’s attitude towards the issue of gender equality had not changed either. Among the positive changes that occurred in Plato’s philosophy, comparing the *Laws* to the *Republic*, was an appreciation of the family, although its main role was reduced to providing new citizens, and not meeting the needs of the individual. The entire state outlined in the *Laws* was compared by Limanowski to a school whose mission was to educate future citizens in morality by means of laws which encouraged moderation: “The aim of human life is not fun, nor war, but a hardworking, beautiful and virtuous life, from which flows peace and happiness. This is the opinion of the great master of antiquity.”⁹⁵

Limanowski evaluated Plato’s work in the context of his own belief in the progress of humankind, the importance of democratic values and the need to cater for all kinds of human needs, including emotional needs. This meant that his assessment of Plato, a representative of aristocratic views who did not see anything wrong in depriving people of family support, could not be entirely positive. Nevertheless, Limanowski, who observed progress not only in the history of mankind, but also in the history of utopian social ideas, yielded the palm to Plato as the creator of utopian literature and the precursor, however distant, of socialist ideas.

In assessing Limanowski’s knowledge of Plato, it is important to note that he referred to the Polish translations of the dialogues by A. Bronikowski⁹⁶ and those rendered earlier by F. A. Kozłowski. Polish translations, however, were not the only source of his knowledge of the dialogues. Although Limanowski, as he himself admitted, did not know Greek well enough to read in the original, he made use of Schleiermacher’s translations, which were recommended by his German teachers dur-

94 Limanowski, 1875: 494.

95 Limanowski, 1875: 500.

96 When quoting the *Republic*, Limanowski did not, of course, refer to the edition of the whole dialogue (Plato, 1884), which only appeared in print after Bronikowski’s death, but only to the first three books published in the gymnasium’s reports (Plato, 1862, 1864, 1866). From the fourth book onwards Limanowski used German translations.

ing his studies at Dorpat.⁹⁷ He also consulted translations by Carl Prantl. Some of Limanowski's views on Plato were drawn from Kozłowski's introduction to the dialogues, and Kozłowski was also the source of his knowledge about Hegel's interpretation of Platonism.

As already mentioned, Limanowski's first articles concerning Plato, which were published in *Gazeta Literacka*, provoked a positive response from younger readers. The subsequent paper (1872), which was mostly reconstructive in character, was also well received, but its continuation (1872a) was regarded by the public as scandalous. This was probably due to the general aversion to socialism itself at that time. The author himself, however, considered it his most important article, because it contained the greatest amount of his own critical assessment of Plato.⁹⁸

Limanowski was personally affected by his encounter with Plato, who was one of the thinkers that had brought him closer to socialist ideas as a result of his study of the history of various currents in utopian socialism.⁹⁹ The specificity of Limanowski's historical interests was described as follows: "the history of social movements [...] seemed to represent for him a search in history for his own justification for the agenda for today and tomorrow."¹⁰⁰ For Limanowski, the history of social thought was a rich source of ideas, not all of which had lost their value. It was therefore necessary to get to know them and to select those that could be applied in new conditions. Limanowski selected the ideas that interested him most from a fairly wide range of works, from Bacon, Herder, Schelling, to Śniadecki and Słowacki; there was also a place for Plato in this eclectic blend, which has even been assessed as syncretic.¹⁰¹

The motives for Limanowski's interest in the history of social and political ideas, especially in utopian socialism, can be discerned on the basis of his works on Plato, which had a "distinct philosophical and social colour,"¹⁰² and which are, unfortunately, rarely cited. Limanowski approaches Plato as a positivist, and acknowledges the progress of mankind, the ultimate aim of which is to achieve a certain socialist ideal, comprehended by Limanowski as the triumph of rationalism.¹⁰³ His work on the

97 Limanowski, 1957: 207.

98 Limanowski, 1958: 56, 90.

99 Żychowski, 1971: 16, 58; Targalski, 1972: 155; a short presentation of the personality and works of Limanowski as a socialist thinker: Romaniuk, 2009.

100 Handelsman, 1937: 32.

101 Żechowski, 1964: 101–102, 105.

102 Żechowski, 1964: 41. Contrary to Limanowski's later works in sociology.

103 Handelsman, 1937: 34–35.

history of social ideas has generally been evaluated on the basis of his studies on the works of More and Campanella, as was done by e.g. Handelsman, who was quoted above. Limanowski's earlier and scattered articles on Plato undoubtedly confirm these conclusions.

For Limanowski, Plato was an important link in the development of the idea of socialism, and one of its greatest theoreticians. He noticed the connection between justice and socialism, but did not succeed in consistently implementing this idea of justice because of the lack of equality in his project. It was only in the works of later centuries that the link between equality and justice was established.¹⁰⁴ Although Limanowski's approach to Plato, whom he considered to be an early theoretician of socialism, may be regarded as positivist, he nevertheless comprehended progress teleologically as the inevitable human drive towards the fulfillment of the socialist idea that has been passed down over the centuries.¹⁰⁵ This idea also provides the driving force for progress, especially the idea of a better tomorrow,¹⁰⁶ which, perhaps contrary to his intentions, had already been discovered by Plato. Limanowski's historical studies not only confirmed that socialism did not disrupt the continuity of historical development but that "the idea of socialism has been an essential component of human culture since antiquity."¹⁰⁷ In this context, Plato's philosophy and subsequent Renaissance thought became instruments for rejecting charges made by its opponents about the revolutionary nature and the newness of socialism and of its aspirations to break with the past. It is worth noting here, however, that if Plato's project were to be implemented, it would have to start with eliminating the existing system.

2.3 *Plato as a revolutionary from the perspective of a conservative thinker, W. Dzieduszycki*

Philosophy, especially ancient philosophy, was Wojciech Dzieduszycki's (1848–1910) everyday pabulum according to T. Sinko,¹⁰⁸ and what started as an interest in Plato and ancient thought eventually evolved into something of a 'cult of classicism', one sign of which was that Dzieduszycki be-

104 Limanowski, 1989: 473–474.

105 Cottam, 1978: 60; cf.: Żechowski, 1987: 23–24.

106 Urbankowski, 1983: 129.

107 Śliwa, 2004: 6–7.

108 Sinko, 1914.

gan to speak Greek or Latin at social meetings.¹⁰⁹ It was only after the Count-philosopher's death that his most important and most interesting work on Plato was published, but earlier, he had touched upon the subject of Plato's philosophy in lectures he delivered in Warsaw in 1880 and 1881, which were extensively covered in the press, one report noting that they were the first open public lectures on the history of philosophy in Warsaw.¹¹⁰

Dzieduszycki's popular lectures provided an outline of the history of the first philosophy, the 'science of sciences,' with the aim of presenting the development of philosophy and the stability of its outcomes throughout the course of history. Dzieduszycki took for granted that philosophy was a European invention, arguing that the peoples of the East, despite having religion and wisdom, did not produce philosophy.

In the course of the development of philosophy the Sophists appeared, "and philosophy would have prematurely run to waste in subtle arguments about the wind, if its second founder, Socrates, had not rescued it from becoming worthless."¹¹¹ Dzieduszycki described Socrates simply as a conservative, verging on the reactionary, who hated all novelties and defended old customs. It was Socrates' kind of conservatism that suited Dzieduszycki, and he referred to it with obvious liking. It is worth mentioning in passing, that he emphasised Socrates' abnegation, which revealed itself in his lack of attention to appearance, something he was not ashamed of.¹¹²

To illustrate how Dzieduszycki expounded Platonism to his non-professional audiences, let us quote a longer passage: "My forester's dog is an individual entity, and what I know about it cannot be applied to anything else without fear of error, for I am using a common, non-scientific concept of it. But when I add, that it is a hound dog, I am already gaining a general notion of it, which is approaching a more scientific concept, and if it is sufficiently accurate, then the characteristics of this notion will un-

109 Piskor, 1959: 282, 296–297.

110 "Kartka z dziejów filozofii", 1880: 185.

111 Dzieduszycki, 1880: 16.

112 Dzieduszycki was remembered by his contemporaries as a man who did not pay excessive attention to appearances. His university seminars were sometimes conducted in cafes, or in a hotel outside the walls of the Lvov university (Jakubec, 2009: 21–23). His contemporaries emphasised the 'extravagance of his dress' (Rosco-Bogdanowicz, 1959: 23). Perhaps the most scathing comments on Dzieduszycki's personality, with emphasis on his behaviour and his negligence with regard to his clothes, can be found in the memoirs of K. Chłędowski (1951: 153–155; 1951a: 278–279).

failingly become for me the common characteristics of all hounds. Above the notion of a hound dog I will find the notion of dog in general, still above, increasingly more general and higher concepts which are increasingly less sensory: predator, mammal, vertebrate, animal in general, organic being, body, being subjected to the senses, and finally, at the very top, I will reach the most general notion of Being, the solitary concept, completely abstracted and supreme, and what I can say correctly about Being will be true about everything, an absolute truth and, as Plato believed, a divine supreme truth, truth in its perfection.”¹¹³ Dzieduszycki explained that the development of the sciences was founded on Plato’s discovery of notions, but, unfortunately, he got so carried away with the correctness of his method that he steered considerations too rashly towards pure abstractions, “on the top he saw the abstracted Being and right away he wanted to comprehend this Being and, through it, the all-truth. So he spread his wings and, as he flapped them, he thought he was flying upwards, oblivious to the fact that there was insufficient air under the wings.”¹¹⁴

Dzieduszycki was critical of Plato’s philosophy, considering it to be too abstract. He believed that human beings are incapable of knowing higher notions, and that Plato had deprived the material world of beauty and truth. Plato’s philosophy, the first philosophy, was ultimately assessed by Dzieduszycki as daydreaming, from which Plato derived his “mystical physics and aesthetic theology.”¹¹⁵ Unlike Plato, Aristotle was a more ‘sober’ philosopher, who brought philosophy back to Earth, and in this respect deserved to be praised.

Less than a year later Dzieduszycki delivered another series of popular lectures in the same hall. No doubt in response to the reactions of the audience, he addressed the problems differently this time, his erudition allowing him to adapt to the expectations of the participants. He sketched in the wider social background, pointing to close links between philosophy, culture and civilisation, and highlighting the philosophers’ personal entanglements. This must have helped to win over his non-professional audience and interest them in ancient philosophy.

Dzieduszycki presented Socrates as one of the Sophists, but one who portrayed these teachers of wisdom in a very different light, namely as those who proclaimed blatant contradictions. Dzieduszycki must have tak-

113 Dzieduszycki, 1880: 16. Thanks to such examples, Dzieduszycki was able to appeal to audiences with no previous philosophical background.

114 Dzieduszycki, 1880: 20.

115 Dzieduszycki, 1880: 22.

en his examples of Socrates' criticisms of the Sophists from Plato's dialogues, especially the *Euthydemus* and *Protagoras*, for Socrates himself did not write anything, nor did he teach or claim anything. In this connection, Dzieduszycki mentioned the difficulties that are encountered by researchers of Socrates, including difficulties in distinguishing between what is Socratic and what is Platonic in the dialogues; in other words, he reported on the problems of the so-called Platonic question. Dzieduszycki expressed his admiration for Plato's works in order to encourage the audience to read the dialogues: "real masterpieces of wit, the most perfect prose models of all times, pieces that can mostly be read quite easily and with a smile on the face, but which are almost always very profound."¹¹⁶ Dzieduszycki, then, regarded the dialogues as literary fiction, but this fiction was presented with extraordinary verisimilitude; Socrates was idealised, and although he avoided articulating claims, his method of questioning required much previous intellectual effort.

Dzieduszycki did not resolve the question of whether Diotima's speech in the *Symposium* presented the ideas of Socrates or those of Plato. What was more important was its crowning beauty "not carnal beauty, but a higher spiritual beauty, beauty that is the truth, beauty that is the good, the holiest essence of beauty."¹¹⁷ This was his introduction to the theory of ideas, which constituted the key to understanding and explaining the world: "So general notions are the beauty we seek, and therefore knowing them is good, and action based on such knowledge is virtue."¹¹⁸ These ideas existed in the intellect of the universe, and Dzieduszycki emphasised their important epistemological role, for concepts modelled on the ideas were to serve as instruments for the cognition of reality. The role of teaching was to facilitate the discovery of the ideas and in this process love did not play an insignificant role; it should tame the chariot, as the human soul was depicted in the *Phaedrus*, helping it to climb out of the cave, and this in turn was to lead to his presentation of the fate of the soul, as outlined on the basis of the *Phaedo*. Continuing his eschatological considerations, based mostly on the *Phaedo*, Dzieduszycki emphasised the conservatism of Plato's teacher.

116 Dzieduszycki, 1881: 347.

117 Dzieduszycki, 1881a: 406. Dzieduszycki also referred to Plato in the context of aesthetics when articulating his thoughts about the ideal nature of beauty and sensory beauty, the latter being a mere reflection of the first, which could only approximate the ideal (Jakubec, 2009: 52).

118 Dzieduszycki, 1881a: 407.

The third talk concluded with the tragic death of Socrates, while the fourth and last talk began by showing the significance of Socrates' death in Plato's life: "he could not take pity on Socrates: he could regret having lost a beloved friend and his best teacher, but he had to believe that Socrates was better in death than in life, and he had to keep on believing that there, in eternity, the master could clearly see the truth that was hidden from the mortal eye."¹¹⁹

Dzieduszycki may have been taking into account the non-philosophical nature of his audience, when he interpreted the *Timaeus* in the Christian spirit. Let us quote a few passages: "So, in the beginning there was only God, indivisible, eternal, immutable, perfect and happy; there was no time or space – and with God was only the Word which was God. [...] In the Word there was everything that is and that could be, and the whole course of infinite times; all this was contained in the Word, and to God it was like an open book that God's eye could encompass all at once [...]. So God decided that he would create the world by means of the Word and in the image of the Word [...]. [...] therefore God the Father and the Word gave birth in eternity to the Holy Spirit, who is perfect and who embraces everything and beyond whom there is nothing; and since beyond the perfect Spirit nothing can exist, then this Holy Spirit is the only God along with the Father and the Son."¹²⁰ Dzieduszycki's text can be read almost as if it was written by one of the Church Fathers, at a time when the concept of *creatio ex nihilo* had not yet been finally established. The Demiurge and logos appear, though rather in the context of the *Gospel* of John. The concepts from the *Timaeus* are translated into the language of theology, and interpreted as the Trinity.¹²¹ Let us add that criticism of such interpretations had already appeared in Polish literature more than half a century earlier. Dzieduszycki, however, confirmed Plato's monotheism, and any possible polytheism in Plato's work was the faith in the multitude of spirits and angels, but not in divine beings in the strict sense.

It was to Plato's political philosophy that Dzieduszycki then turned his attention. In order to present it in the right light, he summarised for the audience the gradual collapse of all systems and laws at the time when the

119 Dzieduszycki, 1881b: 477.

120 Dzieduszycki, 1881b: 479.

121 Cf.: Zieliński, 2000: *passim*. Another opinion, admittedly regarding the entire philosophy of Dzieduszycki, also refers to his interpretation of Platonism: "Dzieduszycki's philosophical concepts are rooted in Aristotle's views, but they breathe the air of platonising Augustinism" (Zawojńska, 2009: 40).

whole of Greece ‘revelled in democracy’, the ‘many-headed’ system. Having presented the most important details of the political system of the *Republic* and mentioned the failure of the political experiment in Syracuse, Dzieduszycki expressed his negative opinion of all this, for “political life was not the place for Plato, the poet and thinker.”¹²² Unlike his teacher, he turned out to be a political daydreamer. His true place was as a teacher in the Academy, where he had earned the respect of those of subsequent centuries, including the speaker himself.

Dzieduszycki’s criticism of Plato’s state can be read as a condemnation of “all tendencies directed towards totalitarianisation of the state.”¹²³ It seems more likely, however, that Dzieduszycki’s criticism resulted from the fact that Plato’s project was contrary to nature (lack of family), that it was ahistorical and that it lacked feasibility, as had been shown by his Sicilian journeys. The actual details deriving from Plato’s radicalism were of little importance to Dzieduszycki, as can be seen from his failure to accuse Plato of socialism, though this charge was quite common in the literature of that time. Dzieduszycki did not take up this issue. He did not judge Plato’s political views on the basis of their totalitarianism or socialism, but on account of their incompatibility with his conservative model, according to which all radical political means had to be rejected. What was characteristic of Dzieduszycki’s lectures for his non-professional audience was his emphasis on the convergence of Plato’s cosmology with the Christian worldview and Christian theology. At the same time, he unambiguously condemned Plato’s political project.

Dzieduszycki’s most important study of ancient philosophy, including Plato, was produced when he was working as a docent (associate professor) at Lvov University from 1893 to 1895. This ambitious work was based on a series of lectures, but this time they were not addressed to more general audiences but to university students from all faculties.¹²⁴ These lectures were very successful.¹²⁵ Published posthumously as *The History of Philosophy*, the work encompassed antiquity, including Plotinus, and was divided into thirty eight lectures, seven of which were devoted exclusively to Plato, and eight concerned Aristotle.

122 Dzieduszycki, 1881b: 488.

123 Daszyk, 1993: 53.

124 Sinko, 1914.

125 Piskor, 1959: 276. On Dzieduszycki’s popularity and on his relations with students and university authorities: Piskor, 1959: 291–292.

Dzieduszycki rejected the very possibility of presenting history as an impartial rendering of facts, arguing that “a historian who refrains from passing judgment is not fulfilling his duty and demonstrates either a strange indifference towards human problems or a strange lack of confidence in his own beliefs.”¹²⁶ Such an impartial approach to history was particularly unacceptable when discussing philosophical issues because the absence of such evaluations would leave the readers without the support of the author’s opinions concerning the legitimacy, validity and historical value of the views under discussion. Ancient philosophy was not just an interesting relic to be described but was still worth discussing, for the ancients had discovered many philosophical truths which were reiterated by subsequent epochs. Dzieduszycki therefore recommended that adepts of philosophy should start their studies of philosophy from its history so that they did not end up hailing as great discoveries things that had, in fact, been discovered long ago. He also believed that knowledge of the history of philosophy, especially ancient philosophy, helped to deepen understanding of other cultural phenomena. Further, he called for greater emphasis on the genetic analysis of the history of philosophy, by which he meant a broad study related to cultural background, such as he himself had already begun in his series of lectures *Socrates and Plato*: “Even the most powerful and independent mind develops under the influence of its environment and anyone who wants to understand a philosopher has to learn the conditions in which that philosopher grew up.”¹²⁷ Extensive references to Greek religion and material culture were thus justified, for without them it would be impossible to understand the ancient geniuses.

It was the politically minded atmosphere of the city that Dzieduszycki considered to be the most important factor in Plato’s Athenian environment, but it was not high-class politics, but rather petty, crooked politicking. This discouraged Plato from engaging in politics and he decided to found the Academy in memory of Socrates. Nevertheless, the serious philosophical Platonic spirit gained the upper hand over the Socratic irony with its overcautious research and questioning. Ultimately, it was the strictly philosophical differences between the two that proved to be most significant, for Dzieduszycki, and although he observed the differences be-

126 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 5.

127 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 9. This aspect of Dzieduszycki’s method of historiography of philosophy was described by T. Zawajska as an application of the explanatory method (2008: 323–324). In the title of the section in this paper it was, however, incorrectly referred to as the ‘understanding’ method (Zawajska, 2008: 321).

tween the two Greeks even with respect to their physical build, he stressed that it was the spiritual aspects that were more profound.

The difficulties Plato's philosophical system presented to analysts as a result of the specific nature of his artistic literary production were described by Dzieduszycki as follows: "Although all of Plato's works have come down to us, it is not easy to set forth his philosophy systematically; not because it does not constitute a finished and complete system, for a more consistent thinker would be hard to find, and Plato's philosophy in its entirety is evident to anyone who has read his dialogues carefully. However, in attempting to present this philosophy concisely to speak about any particular philosophical issue, it is necessary to re-arrange its different parts and draw on many dialogues at the same time."¹²⁸ Dzieduszycki was also aware of the problem of the chronology of the dialogues, but he considered this to be ultimately insoluble.

Dzieduszycki attributed the source of Plato's polemics against sensualism to his attachment to traditional religion, which had been questioned by some philosophers, especially by the Sophists, with their emphasis on the role of sensory cognition. Plato believed that sensory cognition could not provide a constant image of reality, because its subject was variable. In keeping with his introductory declaration that he would not avoid assessing past philosophical views, Dzieduszycki even took issue with Protagoras' sensualism, claiming that the statement that man is the measure of all things was erroneous. His fundamental objection was based on the reduction of the Protagorean principle to the Berkeleyan *esse=percipi*, and he regarded making the existence of reality dependent on the subject perceiving it as contrary to common sense.

Although Dzieduszycki presented the idea of being as the most important of Plato's ideas, he also distinguished the ideas of totality, identity, difference and multiplicity, while the idea of proportion, or relation, was considered particularly important as it covered all relations between things and ideas. Building knowledge was therefore seen as organising experiential material on the basis of ideas. Ideas could also to be ordered, according to Plato, on the basis of dichotomous division, but Dzieduszycki described this as "the most mistaken procedure, random, simply childish, and surprising in such an otherwise clever thinker."¹²⁹ Further on he continued his severe criticism of Plato, though he may not have been entirely right: "He may have made mistakes and succumbed to fantastic delusions, but he

128 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 139.

129 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 156.

bequeathed to future generations a magnificent philosophical edifice, and its foundations can never be shaken and it will remain for centuries to come as a monument to an extraordinary genius. Nevertheless, when he wanted to encompass his study within a strict method, he was unable to invent anything better than his arbitrary, artificial and awkward dichotomy, and completely forgot that the natural kinds, and it was to them alone that the eternal ideas corresponded, cannot be divided from each other by means of arbitrarily and randomly selected characteristics, for no-one would get far, by, for example, dividing animals into white and non-white, and as a result, counting a white horse within one large class with a swan, and a black horse in the same class as a raven.”¹³⁰ Clearly, Dzieduszycki went too far in his criticism here because Plato, who indeed recommended dichotomous division, would never have agreed to such a grotesque application of it, for his advice, for example in the *Statesman* (262c–e), was to avoid going beyond natural kinds. In writing about the correspondence between ideas and kinds of things, Dzieduszycki seemed to be evaluating Plato in the light of Aristotelianism, especially when he drew attention to the inadequacy of ideas and natural kinds. Fortunately, these dichotomous divisions were only an ‘episode’ in Plato’s methodology. To Plato’s credit, he distinguished essential properties from accidental ones and recommended that generic classification should be conducted on the basis of the former.

Plato denied the generally accepted notion of beauty being identified with utility because, as Dzieduszycki added, a heap of manure, though useful, would not be considered beautiful. Beauty appears in objects produced by man when they correspond to their intended purpose; a man is beautiful when he has the talents and skills that meet some ideal, for example, those of an orator; whereas natural creatures are beautiful when they most perfectly fulfill the idea of their kind. Man, however, is essentially a super-sensory being, which is why he marvels at a higher beauty, beauty in harmony and mathematical proportions or in the most general scientific truths, and the whole of the sensory world reveals to him the highest idea of being. In this way, as Dzieduszycki concluded, it is from sensory beauty that man begins to reach divine beauty.

Dzieduszycki comprehended Plato’s perspective on psychology in a specific manner, reduced in essence to eudaimonology, the theory of happiness, and it is only against this background that the soul is considered. Human happiness, unlike that of animals, consists in possessing justice,

130 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 156.

δικαιοσύνη, the highest virtue, the knowledge of the perfect law. In his discussion on justice, Dzieduszycki characterised the ideal of the just man in the following words: “he should be unacknowledged, should be vilified, should be persecuted for his justice, slandered, whipped and finally delivered to a painful and shameful death.”¹³¹ It may have been Dzieduszycki’s intention that both Socrates and Jesus could be inserted within the framework of this definition of a just man.

Plato’s state is in some ways like a human being, but on a larger scale. There is also a division within it, resulting from the different functions of its individual parts. Dzieduszycki introduced his audience to the social nuances of the *Republic* step by step: “the guardians of the republic must have wives, but there is often a great danger in a wife who is unable to understand the more noble thoughts of her husband, for she may drag him down from heaven and turn him into a greedy, jealous, quarrelsome man. In order to avoid this danger, noble women should be brought up and employed as men are.”¹³² Women, after all, according to Plato, as Dzieduszycki argued, possessed the same gifts as men. If, however, the rulers had family bonds, they might become more attached to them than to the state. And this was the reason for the unusual and well-known institution in Plato’s *Republic*, known as the ‘common family.’ “Plato was aware that this could never be realised, but he desired love for a common Homeland to bring all the citizens of the republic nearer to the ideal state.”¹³³ The state as a whole was to be a reflection of justice, therefore the state could not do harm to anyone, but it was allowed to cause ‘temporary acute pain’, which was, of course, always in the interest of the common good. It would be difficult to find wise men who would be willing and able to govern in such a system. Dzieduszycki was pessimistic about such a possibility, perhaps on the basis of his own political experience: “it would perhaps be an over-bold dream to imagine that even one such sage could be found in the republic.”¹³⁴

131 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 169.

132 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 185; Dzieduszycki may have partly based his reflection on his own experience, because his marriage was described in a similar way: “Wojciech was a man of good faith, who was unable to get involved in intrigues, and if he had not had an ambitious wife, he would not have been very ambitious; but Seweryna wanted her husband to be at least a minister and she vexed him terribly that »everyone becomes something, and he is still only a deputy and a deputy«” (Chłędowski, 1951a: 278). It is worth comparing these remarks to the *Republic*, book VIII (549c-e).

133 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 185.

134 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 187.

It is worth mentioning here that Dzieduszycki was the author of a dystopian story, which was most probably written as a satire on Plato's *Republic*. In the story, the author gives an account of his train journey from Paris, where he was accompanied in the train compartment by a Dutch official, a socialist, and a female feminist. Taking this into account, it is likely that Dzieduszycki's criticism was primarily aimed at two concepts associated with Plato's *Republic*: feminism and socialism. The Dutch official, provoked by the discussion of the other passengers, began to tell a story about a new Dutch colony located in the fourth dimension of reality. Initially, his story aroused the enthusiasm of the socialist and the feminist, because, as a result of a convoluted series of incidents, the right of inheritance had been abolished in the colony, which then came to be governed by women. Many of the details of life in the colony bring to mind Plato's *Republic*, for example the common education of children, who were to become citizens of the new colony. These particular children, as it happens, had been found in the forest, in the 'pears on the willow trees' of the story's title (this idiomatic expression is best translated as *pie in the sky*, again reinforcing the satiric nature of the story). Dzieduszycki's narrative is focused on the transitional difficulties experienced by the new community and on the degeneration of the system. It was inevitable, according to Dzieduszycki, that socialism would lead to widespread neglect of public property, contempt for religion among the youngest and fittest, and together with feminism – to the abolition of the institution of the family, marriage and to general bestiality in human relations, and the loss of Christian virtues, such as compassion for the elderly. Much to the indignation of the interlocutors, and especially the feminist, it turned out in the end that common ownership led to the collapse of social institutions because of negligence and lack of long-term planning. Women's governance was reduced to the power of the young and beautiful over men. Only extreme ignorance of human nature could have led to such delusions. Yet all these effects could easily have been predicted, for "if the eternal essence of human nature is considered, then the best legislator will be the one who does not trust abstract theories, even those that seem most beautiful, and who carefully takes into account the weaknesses and passions which drive people, and which are the mainspring of human actions."¹³⁵ All this was certainly missing in Plato's *Republic*.

135 Dzieduszycki, 1908: 416. Regarding women's struggle for emancipation, Dzieduszycki recommended that girls be educated in schools run by nuns and prepared for their respective life roles as wives and mothers (*cf.*: Ciszewski, 1978:

Plato was a faithful believer in the Greek religion, but, according to Dzieduszycki, he combined it, on the one hand, with the philosophy of the Eleatics, and on the other – with the Pythagoreanism of Philolaos. In his university lectures, unlike his public talks, Dzieduszycki placed less emphasis on the similarities between the *Timaeus* and Christian theology, but he still claimed that “since God is pure perfection, then whatever he did, he did well; he married nothingness, made it fertile, and in it he begot the universe, being the image of God.”¹³⁶ Otherwise, the Lvov professor was quite critical, for example, of Plato’s inconsistency in his theory of the elements: “It is beautiful – poetic, but perhaps no one could deny that the poet here prevails over the philosopher, and that Plato was not true to himself, involuntarily returning to the cruder beliefs of previous philosophers.”¹³⁷ Physics, however, was of little significance in the whole of Plato’s views, the arguments for the immortality of the soul being of much more importance. Dzieduszycki’s criticism of Plato appeared even before he managed to reach the last lecture (XVII) which was entitled *Criticism of Plato’s Philosophy*. Referring to the arguments from the *Phaedo*, Dzieduszycki found them naive and almost sophistic. The theory of innate ideas was assessed as ‘extremely weak’ and yet it had endured in philosophy up to the times of Kant. It must be admitted that the Pole’s polemic with Plato was not too sophisticated: “Generally the only truth is that the human mind has an innate ability to learn the truth, just as the body has, for example, the innate ability to produce hair and nails, which in no way proves that the body existed beforehand and then learned to produce hair and nails.”¹³⁸

In Dzieduszycki’s view, Plato was incapable of distinguishing immortality from immutable eternity. The latter is accepted by Christianity, whereas Plato was only interested in the immortal changeability of the soul in the cycle of death and birth, in metempsychosis. More important, however, was the purpose for which Plato took up these considerations: “he felt, al-

197). Jakubec describes “Gruszki na wierzbie” (“Pears on the Willow Tree”) as an “anti-utopian literary joke” (2009: 183–184). It is certainly a humorous text, but the problems raised in it are serious, especially in the Platonic context. The philosophical and social views in “Gruszki” were convergent with those of many authors of *Przegląd Powszechny* (*General Review*), for example, the question of the relation between natural and positive law (cf.: Krajski, 2003: 49–50; Dzieduszycki, however, was surprisingly not included in this work).

136 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 196.

137 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 198.

138 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 201.

most instinctively, that the propagation of personal immortality and the personal soul's posthumous responsibility is necessary if people are to believe that the way to essential happiness is to choose virtue at the cost of material human interests."¹³⁹ Plato was, then, searching for a moral sanction, but he could not find it in philosophy because the arguments for the immortality of the soul were too weak. Ignorant of the Revelation, he had to draw on Greek religion, and on the basis of its myths he composed a vision of the posthumous destiny of souls with varying degrees of perfection.¹⁴⁰

Dzieduszycki concluded that Plato had 'debunked appearances' by demonstrating that knowledge could not be based on the disorganised material drawn from sensory cognition. Plato discovered a world beyond the physical world to which he attributed real existence, and it was the ideas that allowed knowledge about the world to be produced. Let us add here that the cognitive aspect of Plato's idea was consistently presented by Dzieduszycki as a tree of genera and species, which was very useful for embellishing his lectures with examples drawn from the natural world. In the moral sphere, the ideas were prototypes for each individual entity, determinants of perfection, goals to be pursued. Plato, then, demonstrated that human happiness transcends health or beauty and lies in the spiritual realm. All this brings Plato 'to the forefront of the heroes of thought,' and therefore any charges against him should be minimised, for they in no way diminish the values of the philosopher and his philosophy. Dzieduszycki, therefore, was aware that the critic should maintain a historical distance to the views under criticism.

139 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 202.

140 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 202–205. It is not true, then, that "Dzieduszycki looks for the key to understanding the whole of Plato's philosophy in the fact that Plato founded his philosophy on the religious tradition of the Hellenes, believing in the immortality of the soul, and that he was attempting to save this faith. At the root of Plato's teaching we can perceive a belief that human beings and the world cannot be understood without faith in a higher, divine world, and human beings can get to know this world only by means of revelation given directly by the gods" (Zawojka, 2008: 330–331). According to Dzieduszycki, Plato's philosophy allows the 'higher world' to be discovered without the need to refer to religion. Since Plato failed to prove the immortality of the soul on philosophical grounds, then the authority of religion turned out to be necessary. The main aim of arguing for the immortality of the soul was not to understand the world, but to implement the edifying tendencies that Plato had set for his philosophy, which, after all, resulted from the inspiration of Socrates.

Among the more minor charges that were levelled against Plato were those relating to the form of his philosophy. Dzieduszycki admitted that Plato frequently contradicted himself, but this stemmed from his way of articulating his thoughts. More serious contentions were expressed about the essence of Plato's philosophy, namely the theory of ideas, with Dzieduszycki claiming that in the spiritual realm Plato did not distinguish ideas from spirits and God and the soul remained abstractions, at one moment being comprehended as on a par with ideas as models, while the next moment, the ideas existed within them. In general, Plato's concept of God was unclear. Another contradictory area was that of the existence of matter. For Dzieduszycki it appeared that the idea of matter could not exist, but that matter itself existed. "Contrary to his own logical principles, Plato turns that which is not into some substance, without which he could not extricate himself from his system, and having established this matter devoid of being, beyond being, and having made it a being, he descended into incurable vagueness."¹⁴¹

All these flaws in Plato's philosophy were to weigh down like lead on the philosophies of subsequent Platonists. Nonetheless, Plato consistently transferred them to the sphere of practical philosophy. And what would the immortality of the soul be like as an idea? – asked Dzieduszycki. Moreover, experience, which was disdained by Plato, contradicted his conclusions on the leading role of reason, which, as the lecturer continued, was only an instrument engaged by the feelings to achieve their goals. "And what was much more absurd, Plato believed that some impractical sage, who was engaged in watching an intellect devoid of purpose and so abstract that it was almost devoid of substance, this sage with no knowledge either of the real world or of real feelings and human relations would be the best king, and that the nation subjected to the absolute rule of such a sage would be the happiest nation. It was this mistake that was to lead to the most dire historical accidents."¹⁴² Plato could have been forgiven for his political illusions and for one attempt at putting them into practice because they clearly must have resulted from his desire to improve human relations. But the fact that, despite their failure, Plato had refused to lose faith in his political fantasy for such a long time, was difficult to justify. Only at the end of his life, when writing the *Laws*, did he realise that the nature of history was far from ideal, yet at the time of outlining his future political project, rather than taking history into account and reckoning

141 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 210.

142 Dzieduszycki, 1914: 212–213.

with tradition, he had planned to re-build a community starting from scratch, from its very foundations. For a conservative thinker, this was something impossible to consider even in theory, not to mention the possibility of actually trying to carry it out. It was unthinkable even for an exceptional conservative like Dzieduszycki, who did not shrink from drafting visions of the future.¹⁴³ Dzieduszycki maintained that history provided an explanation for social phenomena and processes, to put it simply: *historia magistra vitae*, so it should also be used as a source for thinking about the future. This applied as much to the history of nations, indispensable for any politician, as it did to the history of philosophy, which, as Dzieduszycki had declared in his introductory lecture, was indispensable for any philosopher.¹⁴⁴

In his political philosophy, not only had Plato failed to draw sufficiently on the lessons of history, but even worse, he had even tried to prevent its development. This was certainly impossible, for social and political relations inevitably undergo changes, though these should evolve in accordance with the natural order and the maintenance of universal values. Dzieduszycki evaluated Plato's views in the light of his conservatism, a conservatism that "allowed slow, gradual change, while maintaining historical continuity and respect for tradition."¹⁴⁵

Just as Plato's political views matured over the years, so Dzieduszycki's attitude to Plato also underwent some discernible evolution. During the years that separate Dzieduszycki's public lectures from his university courses, a development can be observed in his historical and philosophical interests, and a deepening in his knowledge of Plato.¹⁴⁶ In his university lectures he succeeded, at least partially, in separating Plato from Socrates, though wherever Plato's thoughts were original and independent of Socrates, Dzieduszycki considered them to have been drawn from Pythagoreanism in the field of cosmology, while even the outline of the theory of ideas was seen to have been already present in Philolaos. Still, during his earlier open lectures he had not even attempted to separate Socrates from Plato, though he did mention the existence of a problem, but accepted that in most issues the two philosophers had to be discussed

143 Cf.: Jaskólski, 1991: 163–164.

144 Cf.: Daszyk, 1993: 33, 66–67.

145 Daszyk, 1993: 62.

146 The popular lectures can be considered as belonging to Dzieduszycki's youthful period, while the *History of philosophy* was from his professorial and mature stage (Zawojńska, 2009: 41–42).

together. In the case of Plato's original thoughts in the cosmology of the *Timaeus*, for example, Dzieduszycki still discerned Socrates' inspiration, if not in its substance, at least in the purpose it was to serve. It seems that, despite his high opinion of Plato, Dzieduszycki wanted to divest him of originality. It is worth adding here that many of the attributes of Socrates that were highlighted by Dzieduszycki were, in fact, reflections of himself, at least according to the image of Dzieduszycki that has come down to us from his contemporaries, the image of a man prone to irony, or even a prankster, critical of others and of himself.¹⁴⁷

From Dzieduszycki's reconstruction of Plato's philosophy the reader is left with the image of Plato as a traditionalist thinker in his intentions, and a revolutionary in his deeds, and it is here that the most important difference lies in his assessment of Plato and Socrates with regard to ethical and political issues. Socrates acted properly, he sought to preserve the old moral forms, while Plato, out of the same motives, created political fantasies which were not only rejected by his contemporaries but were equally unacceptable to Dzieduszycki and his contemporaries. Yet Plato was also devoted to tradition, as can be seen from his use of myths when speculation failed. Dzieduszycki's assessment of Plato's *Republic* resulted directly from his conservative views, which were in opposition to violent revolutions, especially those which disregarded tradition. The very idea of revolution denied the concept of the influence of Providence on history, to which Dzieduszycki adhered.¹⁴⁸ He considered tradition to be "the best disincentive to rapid and untested socio-political changes (revolutions)."¹⁴⁹ Dzieduszycki's philosophical views, usually labelled as neo-Messianism, were not, as was Lutosławski's neo-Messianism, connected in any way with

147 "He represented a type of a Greek sage in the style of Socrates, who walked the streets of Athens, listened to others, refuted false opinions and preached his own. Our dear Wojciech tried to apply the methods of the Greek philosopher, obviously suitably modified to the 19th century. He came from the classical world – and became its last representative, the last Socrates in Polish culture" (Piskor, 1959: 316); cf.: Daszyk, 1993: 21. Perhaps, as Daszyk assumed, it was a deliberate attempt by Dzieduszycki's to imitate Socrates by means of "extreme elitism not based on birth or property requirements, but on civic virtue, knowledge and competence. Hence the Count's understandable reluctance towards radical democracy as the rule of the ignorant and incompetent crowd" (Daszyk, 1993: 131). He was also described as a scientist and a philosopher of the 'Hellenistic type' (Łoś, 1968: 142).

148 Jaskólski, 1991: 165–165; Daszyk, 1993: 30–32.

149 Daszyk, 1993: 13–14.

Plato. His ideal of a conservative was Socrates, partly combined with Plato and depicted by him in the Socratic dialogues.

Dzieduszycki was fond of giving examples in his lectures and he was a popular lecturer. Certainly, Stefan Pawlicki's lectures, which were delivered in Kraków at more or less the same time, were much better prepared, with a broader knowledge of the subject, its problems and literature, but Dzieduszycki also had his advocates. Admittedly he was reproached for hastiness, sometimes even for dilettantism, but he was excused on account of his wide range of interests, his versatility and his many activities.¹⁵⁰

One who could not be counted among the greatest admirers of Dzieduszycki was Tadeusz Sinko (1877–1966). Having acquainted himself with Dzieduszycki's *History of Philosophy*, he voiced his disappointment at the lack of footnotes, citations and bibliographic references, but Dzieduszycki, as Sinko himself noted, preferred to commune directly with the works of the ancients rather than read commentaries. The title of the book was, then, misleading, but this was not the fault of the author. The book, in Sinko's opinion, was outdated even at the time of its publication, especially the first lectures. Regarding the chapters on Socrates and Plato, Sinko wrote: "Dzieduszycki's lectures read with great benefit. [...] they are presented vividly and originally."¹⁵¹ He claimed, however, that chapters like *Criticism of Plato's Philosophy* 'read oddly,' adding that no one could remain indifferent to them, given the fact that it was an individuality of Dzieduszycki's calibre who authored this criticism and all the opinions expressed there. They should at least arouse the interest of the historian. Let us add that Sinko most likely meant the historian of Polish, rather than of Greek thought. The interest of the historian of Greek philosophy would no doubt be aroused by Pawlicki's work, still unfinished in 1914, which Sinko described succinctly as 'philological.' Nevertheless, he thought it was worth looking into Dzieduszycki's lectures for benefit and pleasure.¹⁵² We might add that this was rather on account of the author's personality than because of the substantial value of the book. Likewise, in the review penned by Adam Zieleńczyk, it was emphasised that the book read with interest and even with benefit, though the latter was only possible in the

150 Daszyk, 1993: 13–14.

151 Sinko, 1914: 5.

152 Sinko, 1914: 5; a few years later, when Sinko edited the posthumous part of vol. 2 of Pawlicki's book, its unfinished part on Plato, he recommended two chapters from Dzieduszycki's work as supplementary reading: *Plato's Ethics and Politics* and *Plato's Religion* (Sinko, 1917, IV).

case of prepared readers,¹⁵³ those, presumably, who possessed some knowledge of the history of philosophy, which could then be supplemented with Dzieduszycki's interpretations and provide a means of assessing them properly.

In view of Sinko's criticism, the *History of Philosophy* by Dzieduszycki cannot be recognised as valuable or of great merit with regard to its content, although, the contrary position is sometimes substantiated: "thanks to its rendering of interesting information, which is absent in other works. It is also an interesting handbook on the history of philosophy from the didactic point of view, and, despite the progress in our knowledge of the history of philosophy, it is abundant in moral educational values. This is mostly due to the emphasis on the values relating to the question of wisdom."¹⁵⁴ It should be remembered, however, that this book is in fact not a handbook, for it consists of lectures delivered by Dzieduszycki two decades before it was published. At the time of its publication, it was already assessed by a competent reviewer as not meeting the requirements of the times, having no academic apparatus, and, in brief, was not very reliable. Perhaps Sinko would have rated this work much more critically, had it not been for his memory of the deceased author.

The aspect of moral education, mentioned by Zawojka, cannot, however, be seen as an indicator of the value of a book on the history of philosophy and cannot be its goal. In this respect only the conscientiousness with which the author treats the subject can be of instructive academic value. Dzieduszycki himself attributed to the teaching of philosophy a propaedeutic function, which he saw as preparing students to understand scientific findings¹⁵⁵ and not as a contribution to their moral development. When assessing Dzieduszycki's lectures today, it must, unfortunately, be concluded that their present value is almost only historical, as a testimony to the lecturing of this uncommon docent, and his now distant influence on the history of Polish philosophy. Stanisław Łoś, in his memoirs of Dzieduszycki, articulated a justified opinion on the current relevance of his studies: "Dzieduszycki's academic works have become lost in the past, for writings which originated two generations ago can only serve today as a step on the stairway leading to the summit."¹⁵⁶

153 Zielińczyk, 1914: 79.

154 Zawojka, 2008: 320; likewise Zawojka, 2009: 45–46.

155 Ciszewski, 1978: 203.

156 Łoś, 1968: 128.

It is worth adding a remark about Kazimierz Twardowski, who stayed at the Dzieduszycki estate as a private teacher to the Count's children during the years 1885–1887. This stay, his conversations with Dzieduszycki, their reading together (including the Greek authors), and their discussions were of such significance that they influenced Twardowski in his choice of study – he enrolled for philosophy.¹⁵⁷ The influence, however, was not unidirectional, because thanks to Twardowski, Dzieduszycki became interested in spiritism, both in theory and practice. Let us add that during their seances, among the visitant personalities to appear were Socrates, Plato and even Aristotle.¹⁵⁸

It should be admitted, following Michał Jaskólski, that Dzieduszycki, though often regarded as Socrates, “did not have and does not have his Plato.”¹⁵⁹ Young Twardowski did not become such a ‘Plato’. Although it was thanks to Dzieduszycki that he became interested in philosophy, it is there that the philosophical influence ended. After his university studies, Twardowski had a very different concept of philosophy. He was a professor of philosophy rather than a Greek-style philosopher; he did not inherit Dzieduszycki's passion for studying the history of philosophy, which he did not even recognise as a branch of philosophy, but as a branch of history. Until his late years, however, he retained a grateful memory of his Socrates of Jezupol. Some years after Dzieduszycki's death, Twardowski recalled that he had been a real eccentric. “Everyday contact with this man turned for me into a source of abundant learning and stimulus, and no less contributed to strengthening and deepening my attitude towards philosophy.”¹⁶⁰ Ironically, Twardowski and his students can be partly held responsible for the fact that Dzieduszycki's way of doing philosophy, his passion for the history of philosophy, and his originality, demonstrated, among other things, in his way of combining philosophy with ideology, have all faded into the past, and other trends have come to dominate in Polish philosophy.

157 Brożek, 2010: 81–87.

158 Piskor, 1959: 301–304; Łoś, 1968: 142.

159 Jaskólski, 1991: 168.

160 Twardowski, 1992: 22; it was in Jezupol, therefore in cooperation with Dzieduszycki, that Twardowski wrote his doctoral dissertation (Jadcak, 1991: 22).

2.4 Plato as a precursor of modern democracy as viewed by E. Jarra, a philosopher of law

Unlike Dzieduszycki and others, researchers of the younger generation saw advantages in Plato's political project. Among them was T. Sinko, who, while a student at the Jagiellonian University, had taken up the study of Plato's texts on the advice of S. Pawlicki. The result of Sinko's research on Plato's political conception took the form of a Latin essay on the philosopher kings and on the reception of this idea. It was a panegyric in honor of Plato, whose concept of the philosopher kings was regarded by Sinko as a star that would shine for all nations for centuries to come. "Even if the practice and experience of real life were to discredit these ideas, or at least show that their deployment provided no benefit in private or public life, still, in the future a new people will appear, who will become convinced that these *sententiae* are not at all false, and they will spare no effort in the attempt to put these ideas into practice."¹⁶¹ For Sinko, then, the impact on future generations of thinkers and, above all, on politicians was to be the criterion for judging Plato's political concept.

Plato's golden thought was incorporated into the claim, variously articulated, that states would never be happy unless philosophers ruled them. The philosopher, however, as Sinko explained, was not a theoretician devoted to contemplation, nor a literary researcher who had lost contact with the practices of everyday life. The ideal philosopher, in its Platonic sense, was outlined by Plato in the *Republic* as an exceptionally gifted man, of dependable character, well-educated, knowing the idea of the good and ultimately capable of passing on his best qualities to his successors. "Taking all this into account, we should recognise that the dictum on the rule of philosophers was not ridiculous, though it certainly deviated from the ideals of Athenian democracy. By suggesting that dreamers and ignorants be

161 Sinko, 1904: 3. On Sinko's study, cf.: Mróz, 2011: 189–190; 2012: 124–125. The study by Sinko, who appears to have inherited Pawlicki's passions for philology and antiquity, was briefly praised by Pawlicki himself in his unfinished synthesis of the history of philosophy: "a very sophisticated study written in exquisite Latin" (Pawlicki, BJ 1: 124). Sinko, the editor of the work of the deceased author, probably out of modesty, kept this flattering opinion of the great Plato expert in the manuscript, and did not include it in Pawlicki's published work. Another flattering opinion by another great philologist, S. Lisiecki, who described Sinko's study as "a historical treatise, written in Ciceronian style" (Lisiecki, APAN 1: 19) also remained in the manuscript.

removed from public office [...], Socrates provoked outrage among the people.”¹⁶²

Sinko came to the conclusion that the thought articulated by Plato had, in fact, often been implemented in the course of history when, for example, wise men, *aidoi*, and later palace philosophers accompanied their rulers to assist them in the art of good governance. Having traced the history of Plato's idea from the Academics to Nietzsche, Sinko optimistically concluded: “Plato's golden dream has never been totally fulfilled; it has often been distorted or shown to be ridiculous, and sometimes attacked. Nevertheless, it has never ceased to appear in human minds as an image of better times because the whole purpose of the idea is that although it is not observable to the senses, it nevertheless occupies the mind, providing a model for shaping human affairs. And even though human clay is too crude to reflect the divine form in full, some of its features nevertheless remain firmly embedded and can be recognised. Is it not the case that today high offices are reserved for those who can demonstrate through examination qualifications that they possess the knowledge and skills to serve? It was no more than this that Socrates, the first author of this divine thought, desired. And when kings and leaders of our times appoint those with outstanding education and merits as their palace advisers, is it not true that they fulfil Plato's desire that the government should always have wisdom as its companion and adviser.”¹⁶³ In its entirety, then, Plato's project seemed to Sinko unfulfillable because of the crudity of the clay from which humans were formed, but even its partial fulfilment, which had already taken place, was to the credit of both humankind and Plato's idea, the strength of which could be measured, according to Sinko, not so much by its implementation, but by the stimulus it provided for humanity to strive for at least partial realisation, and thus, for the improvement of humanity itself.

Like Sinko, Eugeniusz Jarra (1881–1973) saw Plato as a political thinker. It was on the basis of his dissertation on Plato that Jarra had received his Ph.D. in Lvov, but later, at Warsaw University, he had mainly devoted himself to research on the history of philosophy of law in Poland.¹⁶⁴ Jarra's book, *Plato's Idea of the State*, was to have been the first part of a great work on Plato's influence on the development of political thought. If it had been completed, it would have been an undertaking on a much grander

162 Sinko, 1904: 7–8.

163 Sinko, 1904: 55–56.

164 Kunderewicz, 1976.

scale than that fulfilled by Sinko in his *Sententiae Platonicae*. Jarra, however, did not take advantage of Sinko's work, nor did he return to his work on Plato.

Even the preface of his book left no doubt about Jarra's recognition of Plato as a universal and still relevant thinker, whose work Europe should continue to draw on: "Twenty three centuries ago, the Athenian sage, observing the sad perspective of the approaching ruin of Greece, dreamed up, from the depths of his ingenious spirit, a model by the means of which his country could be rescued. Since then, this model has continued to shine through theory and practice, and when the olive branch of peace finally flourishes over the world, when the nations return to normal life, the road that will lead to their proper development will confirm, once again, the everlasting power of Plato's Ideal."¹⁶⁵ It was Plato's critical diagnosis regarding the future of Athens, according to Jarra, that had induced him to create his impressive philosophical project. By analogy, World War I had aroused anxiety over the future shape of Europe, and Jarra drew the attention of his students and readers to Plato's work as the best possible way forward.

Plato's project in the *Republic* and *Laws* was based on three principles, each in harmony with the other: "1) the state is an educational institution, it is the citizen's nursery; 2) the state bases its education on the natural predispositions, on the inborn, so to speak, predestination of the individual; 3) general happiness will be assured if citizens are guided by nature along the road that is most appropriate for each of them."¹⁶⁶ All these principles were components of the Greek way of thinking during the period of Enlightenment in the 5th century.

Jarra drew attention to the dispute over the oversimplified, negative image of the Sophists. The dispute on how to assess the Sophists was also reflected in Polish literature, often echoing Western views. Jarra therefore compared the opposing views of S. Pawlicki and W. Lutosławski, the former holding an extremely negative opinion about the Sophists on account of their financial dealings and their moral unscrupulousness, whereas the latter emphasised the liberation of humans from the necessity of physical labour and the Sophists' contribution to the development of science and intellectual ferment. Regardless of the assessments of the Sophists' achievements by each of the Polish historians of philosophy, they both fell into

165 Jarra, 1918: preface. On the background of Jarra's work, cf.: Mróz, 2011: 190–192; 2012: 125–127.

166 Jarra, 1918: 6.

the trap of treating the Sophists as a uniform entity, rather than noticing the great differences among them.

According to Jarra, the Sophists in Plato's dialogues could be seen as a reflection of the social changes taking place in Greece, which had given rise to a search for new answers to old questions, a search for new truths, though with varying degrees of success, sometimes perhaps verging on dilettantism. In this light, Jarra felt it necessary to analyse more closely the Sophists' ideas as a possible source of Plato's political thought, an analysis based only to some extent on Plato's dialogues. Plato appeared to have, for example, certain features in common with Protagoras, who had assigned the most important role in the state to knowledge, and in turn, the state was responsible for education. The differences were, however, more numerous and they included: epistemological relativism and its consequences, individualism, usefulness as one of the value criteria of social institutions. Plato had little in common with other Sophists, and the differences were even more numerous, for example, the attitude to dilettantism and pretentious nonsense, and the acceptance of only earthly happiness and laws. In order to make these ideas repulsive to his contemporaries, for didactic purposes, Plato presented them in the dialogues in caricature fashion.

Regarding the credibility of Xenophon's image of Socrates, Jarra adopted a compromise position. Xenophon was, after all, not only a politician but also a commander, so he understood political matters from his own experience and in this respect he should be trusted. Xenophon thus became a benchmark for Plato's credibility, and only the content in Plato that was consistent with Xenophon could be regarded as a valid source of knowledge about Socrates' political thought. According to Jarra, such content could only be found in the *Apology* and the *Crito*. Socrates' contribution to Plato's political thought was the idea of basing ethics on intellectual foundations. The idea of state-run education may also, to some extent, have come from Socrates. Undoubtedly, Socrates was also the inspiration for the rational sanctioning of the law, with justice as its ultimate criterion. Above all, what distinguished Socrates from his contemporaries and at the same time linked him with Plato was the concept of the primacy of the general good, which resulted in the need to overcome egoism, and the insistence on citizens' obedience to the laws, for breaking the laws by the individual had morally negative implications for the whole community. By his strong adherence to the demand for obedience and fidelity to the law, Socrates was also pointing to those principles and criteria which were not met by Athenian democracy, for example, knowledge and, resulting from this, jus-

tice. By openly speaking against *demos*, Socrates in his teaching was anti-democratic and reformatory.

In his dissertation Jarra applied the genetic method, counting three factors among the sources of Plato's thought. The first, extensively discussed by Jarra, was the history of pre-Platonic Greek philosophy, the second, the contemporary historical background, and finally the third – Plato's individual personal characteristics. The outline of the historical context included the collapse of Athens, the degeneration of democracy and the widespread effects of self-interest. The degeneration of the system was on such a large scale that the only possible salvation was its complete transformation and reconstruction from the very foundations. Although Plato arrived at his concept by means of speculation, he selectively drew on the system he knew, and his project "bears the most remarkable features of Hellenic culture, [...] Plato was its most perfect incarnation and expressed this even in his most original productions."¹⁶⁷ It was thanks to his originality that Plato was able to leave his mark on the well-known motifs of Greek culture, transforming them into a unified metaphysical, psychological and ethical system.

It is often alleged that one of the personal factors shaping Plato's project may have been his aristocratic origins, which could have contributed to his idea of bringing the best individuals to the fore in the state. Jarra argued, however, that it was not possible to attribute traditional aristocratic beliefs to Plato, because "the foundation [of Plato's aristocracy] is not the parentage of its members, but only their capabilities and personal merits; it was possible for the individual's virtue and intellectual endowment to cross over class boundaries. The aristocratism of Plato's state is not ancestral but spiritual – a principle which Socrates had already expressed with regard to the organisation of public affairs."¹⁶⁸ If any personal factors could be taken into account as contributing to the genesis of Plato's project, then those could only include his personal powers, a combination of the skills of a sage and a poet who had come under the influence of Socrates

Whether the main subject of the *Republic* was its political system or the idea of justice was a dispute considered by Jarra to be pointless because it was not possible to present the one without the other. What was of primary importance was the goal of Plato's *Republic*: "the image of such a reform of the relation between the state and society that it would become a com-

¹⁶⁷ Jarra, 1918: 107.

¹⁶⁸ Jarra, 1918: 108.

plete expression of justice, the most perfect among the virtues.”¹⁶⁹ Jarra went on to discuss the most important issues of the dialogue. He believed that Plato made a distinction between society and the state, the latter being an ideal structure, with the lives of the ruling guardians entirely focused on the public component, whereas those who were governed remained free to develop their social interests. The ideal of the state as a whole consisted in a harmonious combination of both parts, which had never been achieved by past regimes.

With respect to the chronology of the dialogues, Jarra considered that the *Republic* belonged to the period of the theory of ideas because the knowledge that distinguished the guardians from those that they ruled concerned the ideas. Jarra drew attention to the fact that the common ownership of property among the guardians, an idea he found topical as a means of preventing greed in government circles, had Pythagorean roots. One of the frequently neglected issues in the discussions on the *Republic*, but one that was crucial to Jarra’s interpretation, concerned the regulations of the lowest class in Plato’s state. “Public affairs are not intended for the third class; they thus retain individual property and family. Its members, as common people, are distinguished by their appetites; since, as in the human soul, the lower part must be subordinate to the higher, then, they must also submit to the rule of the selected ones, who have noble feelings and intellect.”¹⁷⁰ This class, then, was not, for example, deprived of property, since Plato “advises the guardians to ensure that neither excessive wealth nor poverty become rooted in the state.”¹⁷¹ Plato, then, having left the specific precepts concerning the lowest class to the rulers, did not need to deal with them anymore. In his political construction, they were only the substance of the state, neither forming nor co-creating the state apparatus; Plato, however, could not neglect them, nor did he treat them with aristocratic contempt. If he had done so, he would have broken the most important and fundamental principle of the perfect state: τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, to do one’s business, that which is one’s duty, because there is nothing to despise in the perfect state. While no detailed regulations were provided for the third class, and Plato left their establishment to the rulers, nevertheless, to outline their framework and to ensure the continued impact of his own concepts, he handed down an educational system that was

169 Jarra, 1918: 111.

170 Jarra, 1918: 124–125.

171 Jarra, 1918: 125.

to guarantee that “the reformer’s idea is not distorted, nor goes astray.”¹⁷² Jarra devoted a significant amount of space to the lowest class. “[Plato] could not despise their work in compliance with the τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν principle, the principle that each class should perform their functions as perfectly as possible, which was the foundation of the fourth and most important virtue of the soul and the state, justice.”¹⁷³

Doing one’s duties was a key-principle in Jarra’s interpretation of the *Republic*. The possibility for individuals to change their class was emphasised, and this allowed him to extract from Plato a message that was still relevant to modern times. Let us quote a longer passage: “Plato introduces a principle of great significance, the principle of individualisation: when people, as relatives and children of one land, come into the world, they are very similar to each other, but an imperfect nature can be born from the perfect, and vice versa; therefore, when such a case occurs, and there is a bad apple in the upper class, or an individual displaying features that raise it above its inheritance in the lower class, then in the first case, without any special favours, declassment should take place, while in the latter – social promotion should be enacted with full honours. Here, as follows from the text, Plato means that such transfers were to be carried out among young people or even children; but it was also envisioned that they could occur at a more mature age [...]. This profound reform, which placed Plato many centuries ahead of the historical development of humanity, could indeed provide his state with harmony, for it eliminated the cardinal sin of the class system, on the one hand, by preventing the waste of first-class talents, whether military, administrative or scientific, that could blossom within an industrial working class environment, and on the other, by stopping advancement based on the privilege of birth for people without personal qualifications for state-run positions. This was equivalent to the principle τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, its logical complement, and together they provided conditions for justice to materialise within the state. Thus, Plato’s state loses its aristocratic character in the common sense of the word, and could be referred to as a ‘sophocracy’.”¹⁷⁴

172 Jarra, 1918: 131. In the light of the above, W. Kornatowski’s opinion that, according to Jarra, Plato dealt with ‘the third estate’ (Kornatowski, 1950: 288), requires correction. For according to Jarra, Plato did not disdain this class, but he did not have to deal with regulations for it, having left this duty to the ruling philosophers.

173 Jarra, 1918: 126.

174 Jarra, 1918: 129; cf.: Wróblewski, 1972: 105–106; Wróblewski argues that *sophocracy* and *elite*, with some reservations and the need for further specification, are

The most important component of Plato's reform, according to Jarra, was not the elimination of property or the family, which were minor considerations, but the educational program mentioned above, which also served as a means of testing the qualifications of individuals. State-run education was intended to raise the moral standards of institutions and social life. And since education was a touchstone of the individual's value, and since the most valuable citizens could be born among the lowest class, then, as Jarra emphatically claimed, the educational system had to encompass everyone.

Jarra had much that was good to say about Plato regarding the specialised roles of citizens and its compliance with nature, and the possibility of social promotion for every individual: "More than twenty centuries ahead of the development of democracy, Plato demands that, regardless of origin or class, the individual's position in the social organism should be determined on the basis of personal skills, while all those who do not display the advantages of their class should be forcibly degraded. The aristocrat-philosopher thus solemnly declares to pay appropriate tribute to nature in this way"¹⁷⁵. Hence democracy, as the absolute equality of all the citizens without regard to their capabilities, showed itself to be contrary to the natural order, in which the skills of individuals are varied. In the light of this argumentation, gender equality was compatible with nature. Jarra emphasised that Plato's criticism of democracy did not stem from aristocratic premises, but from the incompatibility of democracy with human nature. Plato's concept of nature was rationalistic, so an empirical concept of nature could not meet the requirements of this philosopher. In this regard, according to Jarra, Plato was ahead of his epoch, and paradoxically, he even seemed to be a modern democrat, if democracy is defined as freedom of social promotion for everyone on the basis of their skills.

The whole state was to be an embodiment of the good, which was comprehended as the common good, and this was only possible through the harmony and solidarity of all individuals. This state cohesion was to be achieved through education, the purpose of which, according to Plato, was to provide an antidote to unbridled individualism, which leads to the disintegration of society. This might, quite reasonably, raise a question: Does Plato not go too far in his concern for the entire state? Could he not, in this way, annihilate the individual? Jarra had a clear answer to this: "this

the best terms to describe Plato's rule of philosophers (Wróblewski, 1972: 107).
Cf.: "the rule of learnedness – sophocracy" (Popper, 1945: 127).

¹⁷⁵ Jarra, 1918: 137.

accusation, though frequently raised, does not seem to be in accordance with Plato's intention nor with the spirit of the »Republic's« institutions. [...] it is sufficient to recall the crux of this doctrine, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, which means – to carry out the duties appropriate for a given individual, and – related to this – redeployment within the social hierarchy on the basis of personal merits. These were the decrees giving the individual the unconditional opportunity to excel and gain personal rank.”¹⁷⁶ Since Plato was primarily concerned with the entire organism, did he care about individual happiness? Jarra's answer is positive: “in the perfect state the happiness of the individual will be measured individually, but not according to arbitrariness, fantasy or the personal delusion of the individual, not according to a subjective, individual measure; but in accordance with an objective criterion for the given individual or position. Everyone is to be given what befits them, what is for them most appropriate and through which the whole will become beautiful.”¹⁷⁷ Individual happiness is always in accordance with natural predispositions and with the general purpose of the state. “So a human individual is not »sacrificed without mercy« by the Platonic state; being placed in a position in accordance with its nature, the individual is equipped with the right view of the world and can feel totally satisfied with its fate, building, at the same time, the foundations for general harmony.”¹⁷⁸

Later generations called Plato's project a utopia, an illusory fantasy. They were wrong, said Jarra, to apply the intellectual, social and cultural measures of their generation to judge an ancient social project. Plato was convinced that it was possible for his project to be implemented, and this was substantiated by his voyages to Syracuse, but as Jarra added, “the feasibility of the plan is not the only touchstone of its absolute value, and actions, being less perfect, are never able to realise the word, which is by its nature a much more perfect instrument for grasping the truth. The possibility of merely getting closer to that which, after reflection, is considered best provides sufficient testimony to its value.”¹⁷⁹

The second dialogue in Plato's political triptych was the *Statesman*. Considering that the fundamental unity of Plato's political thought took on various forms of expression, a short digression on chronology proved to be necessary. Jarra remarked that researchers on language statistics had not

176 Jarra, 1918: 144.

177 Jarra, 1918: 144–145.

178 Jarra, 1918: 145.

179 Jarra, 1918: 147.

been the first to suggest that the *Statesman* followed the *Republic*, but “those who do not only know how to suggest a particular order but also how to prove it by means of their extensive philosophical and philological studies, full of monumental scientific significance, were rightly considered the founders of the new theory. Campbell and Lutosławski stand in the first place; their decisive works have found conscientious followers in Germany, who continue to substantiate the time of creation of the »Statesman« set by the two scholars.”¹⁸⁰ While making a gesture of respect toward his compatriot, Jarra added that the philosophical content of both dialogues unambiguously testified to the sequence of the *Statesman* following the *Republic*.

The *Statesman* must have been written after Plato’s Sicilian disappointments, which, although they did not induce him to depart from his ideal political system, at least convinced him to adapt it to the requirements of reality. In contrast to the rule of sophocracy in the *Republic*, what came to the fore in the *Statesman* were its laws, resulting from the experience of the community and the knowledge of the advisers. The *Laws* were the expression of Plato’s disappointment and the powerlessness of his mature age. His lack of trust in humanity has become evident as has his belief in the supremacy of evil in the world, evil which stems from ignorance, but also from weakness of will.

While outlining his imperfect system in the *Laws*, Plato changed his attitude to private property and the family and admitted them as a necessary evil. He did not, however, abandon the principle τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν or gender equality. The rulers’ knowledge of ideas was replaced by the knowledge of practical issues. It is, however, Plato’s approach to creating the new system in the *Laws* and the method of its creation that were fundamentally different from the *Republic*: “In the ideal state, in the kingdom of wisdom, Plato indicated only the essential laws and entrusted their amplification to those into whose hands he was to place the government, namely the class of philosophers; in the less perfect state, on the other hand, he wants to ensure the durability of the foundations by means of legislation. Mistrust of human nature leads to a detailed rulebook for living, which often verges on pettiness. Νόμος is to become the ground beam and guarantee for the state; it is to regulate the citizens’ actions and thoughts and ensure by all possible means that the whole social union, without exception, adheres to the principles prescribed for it.”¹⁸¹ It becomes clear that Plato believed

180 Jarra, 1918: 150.

181 Jarra, 1918: 166.

that, thanks to adequate laws, it was possible to establish the ultimate system, permanent, immutable, and able to withstand innovation. All this was to guarantee 'glaring normalism', as Jarra called it, meaning the dominance of legal norms over customs. The laws voiced the demands of reason, the necessity of their observance was to prove to be stronger than the motives of weak people, who could not be attracted by metaphysical considerations, which are, in fact, absent from the *Laws*. Yet concealed behind the laws, the same idea lives on.

The immutable fundamental principles of Plato's political thought are still discernible in the *Laws* in the form of the ethical purpose of the state and its educational function. "In the less perfect state, having replaced the class of philosophers with a trained magistracy and ultimate knowledge with practical reason, Plato considers the rule of the latter as compatible with nature in these conditions."¹⁸² The anti-individualistic attitude of the *Republic* was also retained in the *Laws*, with its emphasis on unity and the common good, on which the good and happiness of individuals was dependent. "If it is taken into account that the state, by educating its citizens, instils in them ethical principles set by the state itself, then it must be admitted that the state will also inculcate desires corresponding to the common interest so that the citizens' notion of their well-being will harmonise with the state criteria in this regard, and therefore the whole of Plato's social and state system and the aspirations of well-educated individuals will not contradict each other."¹⁸³ By denying the relationship between happiness and the individual and his subjective aspirations, Plato merely shows that he did not base happiness on erroneous and fleeting foundations.

In the conclusions of his work Jarra quoted one sentence from the *Republic*, book VII, which was placed as a motto in Greek at the very beginning of his book: "with reference to a state and form of government, we have not altogether stated mere wishes, but such things as though difficult are yet in a certain respect possible" (540d, transl. H. Davis)¹⁸⁴. He assessed the whole of Plato's political views as a lasting acquisition for subsequent generations. Apart from one final paragraph, Jarra's work is basically devoid of a distinct conclusion, or collected results. What the author intended was rather to articulate his own positive attitude to Plato's reformatory aspirations, which he regarded as innovative, up-to-date and modern, though sometimes misunderstood.

182 Jarra, 1918: 177.

183 Jarra, 1918: 179.

184 Jarra, 1918: 180.

Jarra asserted that contemporary society was hierarchically organised and class-ridden, showing the remnants of feudalism, so for him Plato was a true democrat. He therefore interpreted Plato's project as a perfect state, not impossible in the future, governed by educated people – the best possible ideal for a future Polish democracy. The project presented in the *Republic* seemed to be a perfect goal, one that was not easy to reach, but possible. Since the *Republic* was interpreted as Plato's reaction to the political crisis in Athens, it may therefore also have been read by Jarra as a remedy for the political frictions which were eventually to lead to World War I, and, subsequently, to Poland regaining its independence. While searching for a model for the political system in his homeland, the philosopher believed that it would not be absurd to turn to some of Plato's ideas, for they matched the aspirations of a modern society, and, what is no less important, they were achievable. In view of the above, the claim that Jarra, "while presenting the development of the Plato's idea of polis, characterised it as a speculative issue, not as a real demand of a political nature"¹⁸⁵ seems unjustified.

When taking issue with totalitarian interpretations of Plato, W. Wróblewski aptly counted Jarra among the opponents of the caste interpretation of the *Republic's* political system.¹⁸⁶ Apart from this reference, it seems that Jarra's work has been underestimated, all the more so because his assessment of Plato's political project was unconditionally positive and it was also the first attempt at such an overall assessment in Polish literature. In fact, for a long time, this work was the only Polish book dealing with this subject, yet despite this, it certainly did not get the recognition it deserved, especially considering the number of studies continuing Popper's negative reading of Plato.¹⁸⁷ Let us add that among Jarra's citations were frequent references to the works of two Poles, namely to Lutosławski, including his early German study, and to Pawlicki. This provides evidence that a tradition of research on Plato was beginning to take root in the Polish milieu.

185 Trojanowski, 2006: 211, footnote 16.

186 Wróblewski, 1970: 206; remarking on the modest amount of Polish literature devoted to Plato, Wróblewski, who opposed anti-democratic and aristocratic, totalitarian and caste interpretations of Plato, had an excellent predecessor in the work of Jarra; cf.: Wróblewski, 1972: 6–7, 93. He criticised the views of Czarnecki, who in his reading of Plato did not consider Jarra's book at all (Czarnecki, 1968).

187 Wróblewski, 1970: 214.

The only vestige of reaction to Jarra's work among Plato researchers of the time is a review by Witwicki. He emphasised the predominantly reconstructive character of the book, and the large number of quotes and references to the subject literature, which sometimes, in the opinion of the reviewer, made it impossible to distinguish the author's thoughts from those of the writers to whom he referred. Witwicki, a psychologist, felt that there was insufficient psychological analysis of the various images of Socrates in the dialogues. He described the entire book as follows: "Generally speaking, the author of the book reveals great erudition and this predominates over all the other merits. At any rate, the accuracy and clarity of the analysis does not seem to me to be the greatest advantage of the book."¹⁸⁸ One advantage was, according to Witwicki, the informative value of the work, resulting from its reconstructive character.

This early study on Plato by Jarra was unique in his entire output, the subsequent period of his work consisting mainly of works in the field of history and philosophy of law, many of which, after World War II, were written in exile in England. Like Limanowski, the initial interest of a young researcher on Plato's utopian project changed in later years into scientific work in another field. In the case of Limanowski, it was social philosophy, or sociology, in Jarra's case – philosophy of law.

Sinko and Jarra present very optimistic interpretations of Plato's political ideas, which assumed the possibility of their future implementation. They regarded Plato as a political thinker ahead of his time, some of whose ideas had already been fulfilled, which was to the credit both of Plato and of more contemporary times.

Despite the author's declaration that *Plato's Idea of the State* was to be only the first part of his planned work,¹⁸⁹ Jarra discontinued his research on Plato because of a shift in his research interests. Jarra's unfinished work is considered to have been continued in a paper by Kazimierz Kosiński (1886–1970), who assessed Plato's project differently from his predecessors.¹⁹⁰ According to Kosiński, Plato simplified the vision of man, reduc-

188 Witwicki, 1920: 126.

189 Jarra, 1918: 180; the following description of the book's content cannot, then, be accepted: "He argued that the history of Plato's idea of the state is, above all, the history of the influence of Plato's thoughts on subsequent centuries" (Kuzmicz, 2008: 81), this is exactly what Jarra did not manage to prove, though at that time, he was still planning to pursue research into reception studies.

190 Witkowski, 1938: 21. It can be added that Witkowski passed his doctoral exam in philosophy with S. Pawlicki with flying colours, therefore he must have had a good knowledge of Plato (Starnawski, 2010: 127).

ing it to the sphere of politics, “Plato’s state absorbs the individual without reservations, guaranteeing them political morality, but, in exchange, depriving them of personal happiness. The individual, then, is completely identified with the state.”¹⁹¹

Sinko and Jarra constitute a certain turning point in the interests in Plato’s practical philosophy. For them, Plato is no longer primarily a moral philosopher and only as a consequence of this a political thinker, as he was for Pawlicki or later for W. Potempa. Instead, he is from the start and by choice – a politician. Moreover, it was the unclear political situation of the times and the recognition of a turning point in European history that was the reason for Jarra’s interest in Plato’s political philosophy. Sinko, on the other hand, saw the positive side of the development of modern bureaucratised European countries, which, from the Platonic perspective, seemed to satisfy Plato’s demand for government by professionals.

191 Kosiński, K., 1932: 14; *cf.*: Kornatowski, 1950: 291–292.

III. Plato interwoven within the fabric of Polish philosophy

The previous sections of this study have documented Plato's presence in Polish thought, but so far this presence had its source in the Polish reception of foreign currents or the interpretation and assessment of Plato from the standpoint of the philosophers' own philosophical positions and worldviews that were not derived from Plato. The thinkers in the present chapter also interpreted and evaluated Plato in various ways, but what they had in common was that their philosophical relation to Plato was much deeper, for these philosophers linked their philosophical reflection and academic activity so closely with their research on Plato that it is often impossible to understand their inspirations, methods or results without taking into account their Platonic source. Unlike Semenenko, Limanowski, Dzieduszycki, and Jarra, who diversely interpreted and valued Platonism, and for whom Plato was not the most important field of their research, the thinkers in the present chapter incorporated Platonic material into their own philosophising, the outcomes of which would have been entirely different if deprived of their Platonic influence. Their reflections cannot, of course, simply be considered as Platonism, but the Platonic material had, over the years, taken root, and established itself as if organically interwoven within the fabric of their work.

3.1 *Christianisation of Plato by S. Pawlicki*

J. Adamski as an advocate of using Plato for the purposes of neo-scholasticism

In a paper, whose author signed himself as 'C.', but which is believed to have been written by Jan Adamski (1841–1918), direct reference is made to Plato's dialogues in the context of the purposes of neo-scholasticism.¹ Edu-

1 Kadler, 1917: 20. The arguments for identifying 'C.' with Adamski include: his previous cooperation with the journal *Warta*; certain peculiarities of his style; the authority of K. Estreicher's conclusions. The most comprehensive study of Adamski's work is the chapter titled "Jan Adamski – a priest vis-à-vis Polish »national philosophy«" (Głombik, 1988: 211–322). Adamski's article, which is discussed here, was

cated by Galician Jesuits, Adamski had a philosophical background that was essentially scholastic, or Thomistic, and he had passed his exams in philosophy with flying colours.² He set his horizons higher, however, being intellectually attracted not only to what scholasticism could offer but also devoting a number of works to Polish Messianic philosophy. In the paper under discussion, along with the passages devoted explicitly to the substance of the *Euthyphro*, the author also made various remarks concerning the future of Poland and the Catholic Church, and the decline of moral values, as well as criticising the socialist and individualistic movements. The author also made several critical references to sophistry and German philosophy, especially Hegelianism.

The text opens with a declaration of the necessity of reviving philosophy in order to secure victory for the only true religion, *i.e.* Catholicism. According to Adamski, the value of Greek philosophy in this respect was twofold. Firstly, it formed the foundations of the edifice of Catholic theology, the magnificence of which was evident to readers and did not require any substantiation. Secondly, faith could not exist without reason, nor Christianity without a philosophy that could make a significant contribution to forging its future. Since 19th century philosophy had been discredited on account of its absolutist aspirations and its philosophical pluralism and ethical relativism,³ Adamski advocated a return to the principles of reason which were to be found in Greek philosophy, an insufficient knowledge of which prevented its full significance from being grasped. In order to overcome this gap in the knowledge of the origins of European rationalism, it was therefore necessary to study Aristotle and Plato.⁴

In his reconstruction of the most important issues in the *Euthyphro*, Adamski included his criticism of polytheism and pantheism. When Socrates showed that Euthyphro's definition of piety as that which pleases the gods was wrong because there was no unity on this issue among the gods, Adamski wrote: "Let us consider the illogical consequences of polytheism and, thereby, of pantheism. If everything is god and the world is composed of opposite things, then the abolishment of the differences between them will reveal god as full of contradictions. Thus, it is logic itself

not, however, included even in this work, the most competent work on the subject to date. Cf.: Głombik, 1985; Mróz, 2011c: 191–195.

2 Głombik, 1988: 247, 249.

3 Adamski, 1883/1884: 4577–4578. The very title of Adamski's paper is significant: "*Euthyphro*, Plato's First Dialogue, Analysed and Assessed according to the New Intellectual Movement".

4 Adamski, 1883/1884: 4585–4587.

that leads us to one God. The same logic leads us also to the personal God.”⁵ The fundamental truths of Greek and Christian thought were, therefore, compatible, and Socrates as a philosopher was aware that all knowledge must be founded on unshakable and eternal truth. Without this, as Adamski argued, the social order would fall apart. It was for this reason that philosophical and theological knowledge in the Middle Ages was developed on the basis of eternal truth, which had been impossible in the times before Christianity. Pope Leo XIII had therefore been right in announcing a return to scholasticism. Adamski added that although neither Socrates nor Plato had discovered the existence of the personal God, they had come to a recognition of ideas that could be nothing other than the perfect, original model of the creation, equivalent to the essence and existence of God, which was at the same time the criterion of truth. In this way, according to Adamski, Plato came close to the opening words of the *Gospel of John*.

Being an opponent of all revolutionary aspirations, Adamski appreciated Socrates’ attitude towards the official religion. Although Socrates was an advocate of monotheism, he restricted his radicalism to the theoretical sphere only, and did not attempt to implement it within the practical sphere because he had no intention of overthrowing the existing religion.⁶ Adamski wrote openly: “With his method Socrates testified to the *word* from eternity, residing in the human spirit and constituting the source of all knowledge, all morals and human perfection. In this way, Plato, who illustrated and perfected the method of his master in his admirable dialogues, approached the Divine kingdom that descended to earth with the *word which became flesh and dwelt among people to transform the human race into the temple of God*, and therefore this philosophy is a *preface to the Gospel*.”⁷ Thus, the *Euthyphro* became a pretext for considerations on the complex relations between ancient culture and Christianity. Adamski’s study was probably the first Polish work devoted nominally to Plato, but actually touching on the problem of the relations between Plato’s philosophy and Christianity in the context of the encyclical *Aeterni patris*.

5 Adamski, 1883/1884: 4594.

6 Adamski, 1883/1884: 4604–4606.

7 Adamski, 1883/1884: 4618.

The early works of S. Pawlicki and the development of his method in the history of philosophy

A much more important author who dealt with Plato in a similar context and with similar premises as those of Adamski, though with incomparably greater expertise, was Stefan Pawlicki. For him, Plato was much more than just one among the many ancient philosophers to be presented in a course on the history of philosophy; he was an exceptional thinker, whose legacy was still worth discussing at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Pawlicki gained a rudimentary knowledge on Plato in his gymnasium in Ostrów (Ostrów Wielkopolski), where he learned classical languages under the supervision of A. Bronikowski, a future translator of the dialogues. Nevertheless, decades later, when Pawlicki was a professor at the Jagiellonian University, he did not express a very high opinion of Bronikowski's translations.⁸ The next stage in Pawlicki's education was determined by a move to Wrocław (Breslau), and his matriculation at the university in the autumn of 1858. It was there that he developed his philological skills.⁹ An important part in his biography, which was to contribute to a transformation in his interests from philology to philosophy, was his stay in Rogalin, where he held a post as a private teacher,¹⁰ before returning to the University of Wrocław as a committed philosopher to obtain a doctoral degree in philosophy. His dissertation on Schopenhauer was given a good, and even enthusiastic reception.¹¹

Pawlicki took advantage of the prospects which opened up for him at the Main School of Warsaw, where he turned his philosophical interests to the history of ancient philosophy. He considered it impossible to do philosophy without knowing its rich history or to research the history of philosophy fruitfully without being a philosopher. The philosophers' search for truth could never be realised definitively in any particular system, but could only ever achieve partial success; yet at the same time, the truth could not be reduced to the sum of these fragmentary discoveries.¹² Appreciating the value of the creative efforts of all philosophers who had uncovered fragments of the truth, Pawlicki set out to develop a method of

8 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 279, footnote.

9 Cf.: Barycz, 1946; Głombik, 1970.

10 Miodoński, 1996: 13–24.

11 Cf.: Głombik, 1973: 63–86; Miodoński, 1996: 13–31.

12 Głombik, 1973: 115–116.

philosophising that would not waste these valuable fragments, but recover them from the past and acknowledge their worth.¹³

Pawlicki's study on Plato dating from his Warsaw period was concerned with purely biographical issues, but in it Plato's journey to Syracuse was presented from the perspective of reflections on thought and action as manifestations of the spirit. Pawlicki remarked with regret that people tend to reduce their activity to one sphere only, either theory or practice, separating each from the other. He considered this one-sidedness as the source of human errors. Pawlicki no doubt had Plato in mind when he alleged that: "It is often the case that someone devises a beautiful new political system, filling in all the details, but when it comes to implementing it, society does not know what to do with such a gift and rejects it with aversion [...]. Almost everyone who has dreamt of human happiness, spending years mulling over how to organise it, has been given a cold reception. Such people are defeated in the struggle with the difficulties their ideas encounter when they finally come up with the fruits of their meditations."¹⁴ Undoubtedly, Dion of Syracuse can be counted among these people. He, and others like him, did not err in their thinking, but in applying their ideas, for they were simply day-dreamers, "yet these dreamers often signalled the dawn of better times: what had failed for them, stood ready for later, when better materials and more eager collaborators were found."¹⁵

This early study by Pawlicki gives us a glimpse into his method, which, while focusing on the history of philosophy, provided a rich background of ancient customs and culture. By presenting philosophy and philosophers against the social background of their times and emphasising that their ideas were not detached from reality, Pawlicki made accessible to unprofessional audiences the history of philosophy in general and knowledge about Socrates and his students, especially Plato, in particular. Dion was presented as a dreamer who attempted to realise the impossible by introducing republican rule where only monarchy was possible, and this was regarded by Pawlicki as the reason for his ultimate failure. Pawlicki's study is therefore an accessible presentation of the links between philosophy and politics, emphasising the need to avoid one-sidedness in political questions, which could lead to utopianism and chaos. Even today, this study is assessed as having been "written in a captivating manner."¹⁶

13 Dembowski, 1997: 39.

14 Pawlicki, 1867: 2–3.

15 Pawlicki, 1867: 3.

16 Brzuska, 1992: 93.

In 1868, when Pawlicki failed to obtain the appointment for the position of professor in Warsaw, he began to experience serious spiritual dilemmas, and increasingly came under the influence of Catholic circles. All this, together with his acquaintance with P. Semenenko, induced Pawlicki to change his life radically and he went to Rome to join *Congregatio Resurrectionis*. This allowed Pawlicki to remain devoted to his beloved research work in the field of philosophy since the Resurrectionists regarded preaching and writing activities as their fundamental occupations. Although Pawlicki began a new stage in his life, he did not lose interest in ancient philosophy, and his interest in Plato became even more distinctive.

The direction of Pawlicki's philosophical research was not, however, unaffected by his membership of the Resurrectionists: "formerly an intellectual who presented balanced arguments and adopted a scientific approach to his research, he came to be known as an unrestrained critic of everyone and everything that originated outside Catholic sources and did not serve the Church."¹⁷ Pawlicki no longer considered philosophical problems *sub specie aeternitatis* but from the perspective of the Catholic viewpoint, for he was aware of the current threats resulting from the social situation and affecting the Church: "»Whoever is not a defender of the Church today is its enemy« – he called from Rome."¹⁸

In order to understand Pawlicki's attitude to Plato's social philosophy, it is worth noting that he did not remain indifferent to the important issues of his times, for he cooperated, with Semenenko and others on Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum novarum*, though it is difficult to determine the precise nature of their contribution to this work. Pawlicki expressed the opinion that it was the state that was the highest form of social being, and any discussion on the question of human dignity was pointless without this. He viewed justice and proper care for the lives of workers as the solution to workers' problems and recommended concrete solutions, such as the establishment of trade unions. "Although in his publications or at the lectern Pawlicki [...] criticised the doctrine of socialism, he had the courage, in the name of truth, to acknowledge the socialists' arguments and merits in their attempts to combat and eliminate social inequality."¹⁹ Pawlicki, however, was inclined toward a different remedy for the maladies of the century. He believed that it was only the moral rebirth of indi-

17 Głombik, 1973: 130–131.

18 Głombik, 1973: 194–195.

19 Mylik, 2005: 200.

viduals that would allow social tensions to be avoided.²⁰ On the other hand, “he refused to accept that the working class had any superior values, and he condemned revolutions comparing their struggle to the combat of gladiators. He also believed that the working class was lacking in patriotism, being primarily driven by class interests.”²¹ Pawlicki, however, observed that this state of affairs resulted from the conditions in which workers found themselves. His views were in harmony with the content of Plato’s *Republic*, which he subsequently related for his Polish audience: “Socrates, being convinced of the insufficient intellectual development of the working and wage earning classes, claims that it is best for them to obey the just man [...]. Such obedience is not to anyone’s detriment; on the contrary, it is of inestimable benefit to allow oneself to be guided by a divine sage [...]. The law demanding the obedience of the lower classes is, as in the case of the obedience of children, intended only for their benefit.”²²

On his return from Rome to Kraków, Pawlicki provided his Polish audience with information about the Italian editions of the dialogues translated by Ruggiero Bonghi (1826–1895). He praised these editions for their skilled translation, the quality of the research and for the commentaries, but he also recommended the introduction: “it is interesting for many reasons, but most of all because it confutes the liberal superstition that Christianity spread a veil of darkness over the world, and argues in favour of the superiority of the Christian over the pagan view. We predict that the author of such a conviction will be more and more alone among the growingly materialistic generation of the united Italy.”²³ On reading the translations by Bonghi, Pawlicki expressed his regret about the absence of Polish translations of Plato of comparable quality.²⁴ This deficiency was probably one of the reasons why Pawlicki decided to familiarise his countrymen with the personality and thought of the great Athenian.

20 Zamorska, 2007: 32–33.

21 Palacz, 1999: 262.

22 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 683.

23 Pawlicki, 1888: 173.

24 Pawlicki, 1885.

The unfinished Plato in the *History of Greek Philosophy*

Although Pawlicki did not shy away from analytic studies or contributory works, he believed that the primary goal of the historian of philosophy was synthesis,²⁵ which should encompass, if not the whole history of philosophy, then at least a period or a current in the history of philosophical thought.²⁶ It has been argued that Pawlicki was a historian-philologist,²⁷ yet philological skills, though indispensable in the work of a historian of philosophy, are not in themselves sufficient for the study of the history of philosophy: "A philologist can prepare the material for the history of philosophy, but should not write history, as Pawlicki remarked."²⁸ Nevertheless, it was the results of his meticulous philological works that were to have a significant impact on Pawlicki's historiographical writings and his research in the field of ancient philosophy.

When considering the origins of Pawlicki's *History of Greek Philosophy*, it is impossible to overlook the non-philosophical issues that influenced the method and form of this study. Firstly, Pawlicki set himself the task of filling a gap in the national literature, and in this respect, it was a pioneering work on Polish soil, both in its aim and its implementation. Secondly, this work was commissioned by the Academy of Arts and Sciences, which financed the publication of the work, but also expected certain requirements to be met regarding academic standards and adaptation to the needs of the target readership.²⁹ Thirdly, the book appeared at a time when the fate of the Chair of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University was being decided. The publication of Volume I of the *History of Greek Philosophy* was one of the factors that swung the balance in favour of Pawlicki. And this book, in turn, was related to the personal and philosophical conflict be-

25 The most complete list of Pawlicki's works on the history of philosophy, including his unpublished works, can be found in the bibliography in: Mylik, 2005: 263–286. It should be noted that a number of Pawlicki's manuscripts consist of notes on Plato's texts, preparatory notes for future printed works and for university lectures and congress papers, or for papers delivered at academic societies, cf.: Bandura & Jałbrzykowska, 1971: *passim*. Some parts of his lectures, translations and conference papers concerning Plato were published posthumously as: Pawlicki, 2013.

26 Cf.: Głombik, 1973: 254–262.

27 This is how Pawlicki and Maurycy Straszewski were described by B. Dembowski (1997: 14); more extensively on Pawlicki's method in the history of philosophy and the dispute over it, cf.: Mróz, 2008b.

28 Palacz, 1999: 260.

29 Hulewicz, 1958: 135–136.

tween Pawlicki and Lutosławski, a conflict that was to be echoed even more resoundingly in the second part of Volume II of the *History of Greek Philosophy*, in which Plato's writings were discussed.³⁰

With regard to the source of the material in Pawlicki's book that was drawn from his university lectures, it should be added that these lectures were prepared for his work at the Main School of Warsaw and were based on materials he had collected at the time of his studies in Wrocław. One of the main influences on his work at that time was Christlieb Julius Braniss (1792–1873), a student of Schleiermacher, whose lectures on the history of philosophy Pawlicki held in high esteem.³¹ There were two additional sources: original Greek texts and the work by Eduard Zeller (1814–1908).³² It is little wonder, then, that there are clear traces of the influence of Schleiermacher and Zeller on Pawlicki's conclusions regarding Plato research.

Pawlicki believed in the continuity of European culture and in the mutual influences between various genres of the arts, the sciences and the practice of everyday life, so he intended his comprehensive and erudite work to help readers not only to learn Greek philosophy, but also to broaden their horizons and develop their own views on the problems of contemporary culture.³³

The concluding chapter of Volume I of the *History of Greek Philosophy* was devoted to Socrates. It also provided an opportunity for Pawlicki to ar-

30 On the relations between Pawlicki and Lutosławski and the circumstances of their conflict cf.: Tatarkiewicz, 1971c: 207–208; Mróz, 2005: 292–322; Mróz, 2005a; Mróz 2007.

31 Pawlicki, 1890: 18.

32 Głombik, 1973: 78.

33 Cf.: “[Pawlicki] wanted to produce works on the history of philosophy that would not discourage his readers with dry, abstract argument, but would rather attract them with vivid presentations and an abundance of varied content: intellectual, emotional, aesthetic, psychological, and social in the broadest sense” (Głombik, 1973: 268); “When researching the problems of the development of civilisation, Pawlicki emphasised the influence of the natural environment and the achievements of material culture on the state of spiritual culture. He was inclined to the thesis [...] that religion, legislation, literature, and fine arts flourish on the backbone of material culture, which enriches them, and that the development of spiritual culture was dependent on the satisfaction of material needs. [...] he believed that human spiritual qualities were factors exerting a decisive influence, and religious faith in particular was indispensable. [...] Pawlicki ultimately claimed that material and spiritual cultures were different forms of civilisations that interact with each other, and the »human spirit« is the sole cause of both” (Przymusiła, 1972: 235).

ticulate some opinions about the dialogues, which he considered to be the historical source for the information about Socrates. However, unlike previous Polish scholars, who had accepted this opinion unreflectively, for Pawlicki it was a deliberate and substantiated choice. At the same time, Pawlicki treated the historical validity of the dialogues with little criticism, and his confidence in Plato is most glaring in his assessment of the Sophists, who were said to have contributed to the eclipse of the Greek spirit by annihilating traditional authorities, and to the destruction of social bonds and the discrediting of religion as a result of their cosmopolitan outlook. Pawlicki most likely saw an analogy between the situation in ancient Greece and in 19th century Poland, where positivism, evolutionism, materialism and other anti-dogmatic views of the world were beginning to triumph. The example of the Sophists became the cornerstone of Pawlicki's argument that upbringing, as long as it was based on the authority of religion, could exert an edifying influence on society and on the state.

In reconstructing Socrates' views, Pawlicki relied on the authority of Plato: "Socrates' thought was well rendered by his great disciple."³⁴ Since Socrates successfully opposed the relativism of the Sophists, he must have had a philosophical system. Plato's Socrates, according to Pawlicki, "is a daring, profound thinker, who solves the most radical and convoluted metaphysical and theological problems in an unprecedentedly unmitigated fashion, often even to the extent of disregarding the tradition and beliefs of his own nation. In a word, Plato's Socrates is as noble as Xenophon's is apparently ordinary and shallow."³⁵ In the dispute between the two images of Socrates, Plato's and Xenophon's, Pawlicki came down firmly in favour of Plato's Socrates as equivalent to the so-called historical Socrates. He refused to recognise the value of Xenophon's testimony: "Such a Socrates would not have been poisoned by the Athenians."³⁶ It was quite obvious to Pawlicki that it was Plato who conveyed the true image of Socrates and of the Sophists: "Plato is a great devotee of the truth; the characters in his dialogues give the impression of being real portraits, as far as a portrait is capable of rendering the original. Photographic exactness should not be demanded of portraits."³⁷

For Pawlicki, then, Plato's dialogues were a reliable historical source for learning about and evaluating the views of the Sophists and Socrates. His

34 Pawlicki, 1890: 369.

35 Pawlicki, 1890: 375.

36 Pawlicki, 1890: 375.

37 Pawlicki, 1890: 378.

admiration for Plato should not surprise readers, for it had already been voiced in the introduction to the chapter devoted to the Athenian, in which Ficino's words were repeated and commented on: "For whomsoever this praise appears to be exaggerated, let them attempt to erase just the one word »idea« from modern languages, and they will see how our entire spiritual culture has grown and become entwined with Platonism. [...] To confirm this truth, I will present a well-known fact: whenever we talk of Supreme Beauty, Immutable Truths, the Architect of the Universe, the Eternal Word, Divine Ideas, Transcendental Love, the Immortality of the Soul, or any other such noble subjects, the name of Plato always appears; and as long as human beings on this poor planet are interested in mysteries of this kind, they will not only continue to remember the great sage, but it may even be said that every future generation will understand him better and love him more."³⁸ As Pawlicki unambiguously stated, Plato, despite his errors, according to Pawlicki's Catholic position, has taken root in and become an integral part of European culture and Christian thought.

Pawlicki painted vivid pictures of Plato's contemporaries and other students of Socrates, as well as describing Plato's political views and his growing aversion to democracy. As for Plato's life after the death of Socrates, Pawlicki argued for the view that Plato had stayed in Megara with Euclid, who warmly welcomed disciples of Socrates. He rejected the hypotheses concerning Plato's long journeys to the East, though he accepted the possibility that Plato had stayed in Egypt and Cyrene. A visit to Egypt would not have affected Plato's philosophy deeply, because philosophy was unknown to the Egyptians, but more positive results could have accrued from his acquaintance with Archytas of Tarentum and his trips to Syracuse. The exact chronology of the journeys was unknown, yet what was most significant for Pawlicki was that by the time Plato returned from his travels, he had reached intellectual maturity: "he departed a student but he returned a master [...] and it can be stated without exaggeration that no-one had crossed the threshold into their *Meisterjahre* with a richer store of knowledge and more stable views on earthly issues and perpetual truths. He felt within himself the creativity of genius and the divine need to put into practice all the ideas that he had discovered with his spiritual eye, and that he had pondered over silently in solitary reflection or aloud in dispute with others. But from his birth he had had a theoretical disposition, which

38 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 108. John N. Findlay would probably agree with Pawlicki, because he considered all the attempts to dehellenise and deplatonise Christianity to be essentially attempts to barbarise it (Findlay, 2002: 288).

directed him [...] to live for the truth alone within a select circle of young and old companions, of loving friends devoted to philosophy.”³⁹ It was all this that was to result in the founding of the Academy, which the erudite Pawlicki described by sketching for his readers Raphael’s fresco of *The School of Athens* and Plato’s position within it: “he alone among those present points his hand to heaven as a sign that he has illuminated his research into mundane phaenomena with the light of eternal ideas, and that he has directed all the enthusiasms of the human spirit to the love of the Supreme Good, as to a goal shining afar.”⁴⁰ The Academy was intended as a place for such research. Pawlicki presented it, though on the basis of scarce source materials, as a kind of religious brotherhood, similar to the Pythagorean community, because, as he argued, this form was best-suited to Plato’s aim, as opposed to political parties or casual meetings among friends. This provided the Academy with autonomy and a number of legal benefits, such as the protection of its properties. Shortly after founding the Academy, Plato wrote the *Symposium* to commemorate the first Academic symposium.⁴¹

One of the chapters of Plato’s book was devoted to a polemic against the common image of Plato, or the more generally accepted image of the philosopher as an impractical individual, out of touch with the problems of everyday life. Pawlicki argued that Plato, in addition to being a philosopher, was also “an ethician and politician, and as such he diligently scrutinised human issues and longed with all his heart for his principles to prevail. He might have been a utopian from time to time (but which reformers were not?), but utopians, more than other people, work tirelessly for the realisation of their ideas.”⁴² Pawlicki believed that the essence of Pla-

39 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 150–151. The initial parts of the chapter devoted to Plato’s biography up to the foundation of the Academy was published as Pawlicki, 1892.

40 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 152. Pawlicki frequently supplemented historical considerations with memories and observations from his own journeys and visits to museums.

41 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 152–183; during one of his public lectures in the City Council Hall in Kraków Pawlicki presented an outline of the Academy and of Plato as a historical figure, without reference to his philosophical works (“Odczyt X. Dra Pawlickiego”, 1892). A little prior to this, M. Jeżeniński had presented the Academy to Polish readers (Jeżeniński, 1900).

42 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 183–184. Pawlicki regarded Plato as the philosopher *par excellence*, and identified allegations against him as being against philosophers in general, but he disciplined himself, writing, for example: “We are not supposed to be defending philosophers here, but only Plato” (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 207).

to's philosophy was 'reformatory ethics,' to which all other branches were subordinated, and whose ultimate goal was social revival.

Although not essential for non-professional readers, considerable space in the book was given over to the question of the authenticity and chronology of the dialogues. As Pawlicki argued, "instead of a short chapter, I should have had to write a thick volume if I were to try to summarise all that has been written, wise or unwise, by learned people concerning the *authenticity, relations and chronological order of Plato's writings*."⁴³ Given that the turn of the 20th century was a period of intense research into the chronology of the dialogues, it is not surprising that Pawlicki touched on this subject, as his book could not have been seen as a serious work if he had ignored this. For this reason, Pawlicki traced the views regarding the authenticity and chronology of the dialogues from the scholars of antiquity up to the most important contemporary English and German scholars of his time. Ultimately he adhered to the opinion that the entire catalogue of titles, as listed by Thrasyllus, should be considered authentic because the evidence against their Platonic origin, whether external or internal, was weak and doubtful. For the reader's convenience, however, Pawlicki prepared a list of essential dialogues based on Zeller.⁴⁴

The *Laws* were beyond doubt the last of Plato's dialogues, but the exact chronological sequence of all the other dialogues was not, for Pawlicki, a necessary condition for the reconstruction of Plato's views. He believed it was sufficient to establish the relation of the most important dialogues to the *Republic*. The *Timaeus* and *Critias* were considered to have followed the *Republic*, and together with the *Laws*, they all constituted the main body of Plato's philosophy. The *Republic* was preceded by the *Philebus*, *Phaedo*, *Meno* and *Gorgias*, while the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* were prior to these, the latter being considered to be a continuation of the *Theaetetus*. The

43 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 219.

44 The list encompassed, the *Protagoras*, *Phaedrus*, *Symposium*, *Gorgias*, *Theaetetus*, *Republic*, *Phaedo*, *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Parmenides*, *Cratylus*, *Laws*, *Critias*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Hippias minor* and *Euthyphro*. The figure of Thrasyllus himself and his tetralogical arrangement of the dialogues, though insignificant from the philosophical point of view, was to provide the first opportunity for Pawlicki to take issue with Lutosławski (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 223–225, note 2); earlier he had devoted a separate study to this problem (Pawlicki, 1893). Pawlicki valued Zeller for his 'decent conservatism' (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 237), but this, together with his rejection of more recent research, was to contribute eventually to Pawlicki's failure as a Plato scholar (Gajda-Krynica, 1993: 12, note 20).

most important chronological conclusions were quite remote from those presented by W. Lutosławski in his works. In his earlier lectures, Pawlicki had remarked that Plato researchers could be divided into the followers of two great systems: 1) mathematical or aprioristic; 2) historical or historical-evolutionary: “according to the first theory, Plato’s works resemble one huge edifice, the complete plan of which had been outlined in advance by Plato and then laboriously pursued throughout his life; according to the second theory, each of Plato’s works arose from his experience, so they were, in a sense, unintentional monuments to his internal development.”⁴⁵ It was the latter view that Pawlicki believed to be true.

Pawlicki’s response to the question of Plato’s first work was related to his own experience of spiritual breakthrough, namely his turn from philology to philosophy. He believed that the first dialogue stemmed from an ideological struggle in the young Plato’s mind: “having entered philosophy, Plato may have burnt his dramatic works, but it was beyond his power to stop creating. [...] Dramas of the imagination were superseded by real, personal dramas, in which, instead of tragic characters, no less tragic ideas began to accumulate in the soul of the lad. Like every true and original philosopher, he had to experience the profound upheaval and great suffering that accompanies birth, and the child of these pains, and at the same time the hope for prospective development, was the *Phaedrus*, a frail but beautiful organism, shining with a strange light, but with unskilled movements and untrained muscles. The firstborn child was premature, and hence weak, but displayed, in its beautiful features, an indelible likeness to its ingenious parent. He would later give birth to more resourceful and intelligent sons, to such as he himself had been in his prime, when he had carried away his astonished students with the power of his thoughts. Yet none of his descendants would have the adorable and genuinely youthful coquetry of the *Phaedrus*, nor his naïve but profound views. For the *Phaedrus* was the child of his first love.”⁴⁶

45 Pawlicki, BJ2: 192–193.

46 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 259; cf. a similar expression in Schleiermacher, 1919: 47. Pawlicki had expressed his opinion on the issue of the chronological priority of the *Phaedrus* before his main work on Plato saw the light of day. During the 5th Congress of Catholic Scholars in München in 1900, he delivered a lecture on the date of this dialogue. The Plato scholars who had earned Pawlicki’s approval included Schleiermacher and several of those scholars who referred to him. He was particularly critical of language statistics, attaching the greatest significance to the premises from ancient sources (Pawlicki, 1901); cf.: “Anyone who only reads the *Phaedrus* out of all the works of Plato, as long as they internalise it properly, can

For Pawlicki, the *Phaedrus* was a unique dialogue, its position in the chronological order being the factor upon which the overall image of Plato depended. On the basis of extra-textual facts, and at the same time rejecting the relation between the dialogue and Isocrates' *Encomium of Helen*, Pawlicki established that the *Phaedrus* had been written in 402 BC.⁴⁷ This dialogue provided another opportunity for a dispute with Lutosławski, who was reproached by Pawlicki for his overbearing opinions on the authors of the secondary literature. He did, however, agree, with Lutosławski that German scholars were not familiar with research done in other languages, but added: "I have ceased to marvel at this negligence or disregard since I discovered that there are even many German works that have gained little recognition in their homeland."⁴⁸

It was only after he had laid the cornerstone of his exposition on Plato, that is, after determining the priority of the *Phaedrus* as the starting point, that Pawlicki reported on the difficulties to be faced in presenting Plato's philosophy. These resulted from the nature of his work, which made it impossible to arrange a system of philosophy on the basis of the dialogues. Having at his disposal two methods for setting out Platonism to his readers, *i.e.* either summarising individual dialogues or systematically discussing Plato's views in particular areas of philosophy, Pawlicki chose to take the middle way. He analysed the most essential dialogues, but also expounded the most important parts of the system. The need to provide summaries of the dialogues was justified on the grounds of the absence of good translations into Polish,⁴⁹ but at the same time Pawlicki also attempted to reconstruct and interpret Plato's system.

Plato's turn to philosophy was a dramatic act, yet from the very beginning philosophy had revealed its erotic nature. This resulted from the na-

solve all life's problems in Platonic spirit, and in this sense, Schleiermacher's thesis that the whole of this great philosopher's system is sketched in the *Phaedrus*, can be accepted" (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 375). A lecture on the *Phaedrus* was later delivered by Pawlicki for the members of the Görres-Gesellschaft in Bonn (Bandura & Jałbrzykowska, 1971: 242).

47 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 259–274; Pawlicki also suggested 403 BC as the most probable date of this dialogue (Pawlicki, 1901, 182).

48 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 273, note 1.

49 It should be remarked that the translations of Plato which had already appeared in Polish were not Pawlicki's special subject of interest. Admittedly, he listed the names of the most important translators (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 279–280, note), but in his previous letter to Lutosławski he confessed: "Mr. [Kazimierz] Morawski has sent you a few lines about our publications on Plato – I neither know nor care much about them" (Mróz, 2005: 319).

ture of the subject to which the philosopher turned his attention, and from the necessity of carrying out his analyses in the company of others, which Plato, as one of Socrates' students, must have been accustomed to. "Plato therefore not only had the right, but also the dialectical duty to start with the idea without which the love of knowledge would be incomprehensible, and if we consider that he wrote for his companions, who were most strongly convinced of the impossibility of examining eternal truths without love for those with whom such a great task was to be fulfilled, then we will understand that it was necessary that his first work, in which he opened up the secrets of his heart and spoke out his views on human destiny, should be, at least partially, devoted to love.⁵⁰ Pawlicki considered the tale of the nature of the soul from the *Phaedrus* to be one of the most beautiful passages in Plato and he paraphrased and partially translated large parts of it.

The whole depiction of the fall of human souls, along with the outline of the road to human redemption through philosophy, which detaches spirits from mundane human affairs and reminds them of their divine origin, was described by Pawlicki as follows: "All the attributes of Plato's genius, both positive and negative, contributed to this youthful work: his lofty imagination, flying beyond the furthest stars, together with his complete lack of attention to plausibility in the details and the absence of logic in his conclusions. Yet exceptional thoughts, revealed to contemporary society by truly divine intuition and rich with meaningful consequences for posterity, lose their strength and significance in the face of flaws in their application to the great social problem."⁵¹ While Plato had indicated the path to human redemption, Pawlicki the clergyman, prevailing over Pawlicki the historian of philosophy, criticised the young Plato for denying the masses the possibility of reaching divinity since the philosophical road to redemption was not accessible to all. Human misery is ubiquitous, yet according to Plato, only the few can find their way out of it because only the few have time to practise philosophy. The elitism of Plato's idea of salvation, with its disastrous results for the greater part of humanity, could not escape Pawlicki's attention and criticism.

Further critical remarks appear when Pawlicki discusses Plato's contempt for the written word. Socrates in the *Phaedrus* says that preparing speeches and writing them down should become *psychagogy*, "the art of

50 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 282.

51 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 290.

guiding human souls by means of words,”⁵² a kind of pastoral guidance. Pawlicki, on the other hand, emphasised that the written word, especially that written by an unknown author, had none of the disadvantages of the living word, which depended on a number of subjective factors. Pawlicki, therefore, unlike Plato, recognised that it was in writing that the source of gravity and authority lay. Nevertheless, he praised Plato for drawing attention to the problem of the author’s responsibility for the word: “It should be remembered that every word, spoken or written, falls into the human soul in the form of a seed which can sprout and yield good or poor crops, depending on the conscientiousness of the seedsman, who may throw a handful of tares with the wheat.”⁵³

For Pawlicki, the youthful character of the *Phaedrus* was confirmed by Plato’s attitude to Socrates and his rather disharmonious fusion of Heraclitean, Pythagorean, Eleatic and Orphic ideas. In the footnotes Pawlicki added critical remarks concerning the conclusions drawn by Lutosławski, who had argued for the mature character of the *Phaedrus*. Pawlicki believed that linguistic criteria could not prevail over philosophical premises, and remarked that those who did research on writing style could, at best, only collect raw data, and it would be premature to treat their conclusions seriously because they were neither philosophers nor specialists in style.⁵⁴

According to Pawlicki, the content of the *Phaedrus* indicated that the popularly held view of ‘Platonic love’ as “a sentimental dream, without tangible benefits,”⁵⁵ was in fact mistaken. While it is true that, among the many kinds of love, due place was given to its lofty, essentially Platonic version, this did not in fact embrace all people, and it was this lack of compassion for individuals that Pawlicki emphasised. Plato’s theory of love also rested on another pillar, namely on the metaphilosophical claims of the *Symposium*. Pawlicki was in no doubt that this dialogue had been intended by Plato as a model for the Academic *symposia*, therefore it must have been chronologically connected with the founding of the Academy.

Taking into account his audience, Pawlicki omitted the anatomical details from his summary of Aristophanes’ speech, referring to the speech unambiguously: “it is offensive in its complete tolerance of pederasty. Our first impressions are usually very adverse and the perfunctory reader frequently regrets that so much imagination and literary artistry has been

52 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 304.

53 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 313.

54 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 298–299, note 2; 299–300, note 3.

55 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 321.

wasted on such an ugly matter. On closer inspection, however, it becomes more tolerable and in the end it is impressive.”⁵⁶ To be fair, Pawlicki did remark that these descriptions of love served a certain purpose, namely that through love the unity and harmony that humans had lost could be rediscovered. He added that in Aristophanes’ speech profound substance was disguised in the ‘coarse-convivial’ form of a farce, as befits a great comedy writer. This speech, while certainly indecent, was not immoral.

Pawlicki translated extensive passages from Diotima’s speech as it had been retold by Socrates. In comparison with all the preceding speeches, this one seemed to be a sober discussion. Pawlicki commented on the idea of immortality, conceived as the spiritual heritage of humanity: “it would seem that this idea could not have been elevated more highly at a time when so little was known about God and human destiny,”⁵⁷ but Plato’s genius, towering above his contemporaries, went even further. Another sign of this genius, for Pawlicki, was the fact that it was a woman, as the most important of the dialogue’s figures, who exposed to the assembled men their ignorance about the true essence of love.

Reading this speech was an amazing experience for Pawlicki, as it had been for other Plato scholars, including Lutosławski, though his motives may have been different: “The speech as a whole, especially in Greek, makes a great impression on the reader, overshadowing not only all of the previous speeches, but everything that the ancients had ever written on the theory of love. The amazing ideas rise so high above the level of the mentality of the times that it is not until we enter the Christian era that something similar can be found.”⁵⁸

According to Pawlicki, the introduction of the drunken Alcibiades at the end of the dialogue was an excellent stylistic device that allowed Plato to present the previously outlined theory of love in a different light. Alcibiades’ example of Socrates’ behaviour was intended to provide evidence of the validity of the theory. “The whole passage is beautiful and lofty, though modern readers may not like the graphic description of a certain temptation which Socrates was able to resist. Nevertheless, the impression of this paragraph is strong.”⁵⁹

Pawlicki admitted that he had left out everything in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* that he considered unsuitable for readers at the turn of the 20th

56 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 336.

57 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 345.

58 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 347.

59 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 350.

century. In comparing the two dialogues, he saw that in the former the road to achieving the concept of love almost inevitably involved a fall in the form of a surrender to sensual temptation, and so in order to achieve the ideal goal it was therefore necessary to break off social relations, which meant that the philosopher was unable to work for others. In the case of the *Symposium* the task advocated by Plato appeared to Pawlicki to be even more arduous, and therefore all the more worth undertaking. While analysing the *Symposium*, Pawlicki placed more emphasis on the ideal goal rather than on the path leading to it. The most significant difference between the two dialogues was the active and creative character of love on the pages of the *Symposium*, which ceased to be a kind of mania, but was instead turned into the various ways of procreation. The fact that the ideal aspect of love was in accordance with natural phenomena and that it explained sexual drive, seemed to Pawlicki to confirm its higher theoretical perfection. "And even at this highest level, where the soul unites with the idea most perfectly, its development is not yet finished, but it begins to produce truth itself, real virtue, rather than producing images and semblances of truth, as before. This is how the soul attains immortality, not by contemplating beauty, but by identification with truth and virtue through autonomous deeds."⁶⁰ Thus, in Pawlicki's interpretation, the virtuous deed forms the basis of immortality because thanks to good deeds human beings can overcome the passiveness of contemplation.

The most important issue, however, was the answer to the question concerning the validity of Plato's theory of love. For Pawlicki its lasting value, as the pursuit of immortality and the drive for procreation, lay in the fact that it explained a number of diverse phenomena, from mating among animals, through social activity, to doing philosophy. "For a Christian, however, Plato's theory is not sufficient, because even its shining veneer fails to cover up its inadequacy with regard to the development of the soul in this life and the happiness awaiting it in the future. What is most striking is, above all, that the ultimate object of love is always something, and never someone."⁶¹ Pawlicki's premises were clear. Just as the individual person, as a transient object on the path of love, is initially only a beautiful body, so the idea, being incorporeal and universal, cannot be deemed a personal object of love. "Despite the crowd, every spectator is isolated because there is no reciprocity between them and what they see. They love the ideas because they feel happy to see them, and seeing them, they derive

60 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 363.

61 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 369.

strength for further perfection. But do the ideas love them? Even if they wanted to, this would be totally improbable because they do not exist as persons. [...] they do not help, because any personal relation to them is unlikely. The spectator will be in love with his models and will live according to them, but unloved by anyone, and knowing in advance that he will never meet any reciprocity. [...] It is undoubtedly a happiness to know that one is working on one's own improvement, but this happiness would be doubled if it were accompanied by the conviction that there was someone demanding this work from us, praising and helping us with it."⁶² Pawlicki argued that at this stage of the development of Plato's thought there was no God, and human perfection was equivalent to 'ideification'. Being isolated, human beings could not count on any help, and they had to achieve salvation on their own. The position of Christians, according to Pawlicki, is much better, because it is through love that they are redeemed, and their relationship with God is a personal love, something which is absent from Plato's theory.

The Christian love of one's neighbour could not in any way be incorporated within Plato's theory. "This is a sorrowful fact, which, though it cannot be concealed, can at least be condoned."⁶³ In this sentence Pawlicki directly expressed his ambivalent attitude to Plato. For Pawlicki, the Resurrectionist, Plato's incompatibility with Christianity was a source of sorrow, for not everything in Plato's captivating work, in the work of the most perfect philosopher of antiquity, could be saved and incorporated into the Christian outlook. As if to justify having pointed out some imperfections in Plato, Pawlicki continues: "Having raised some details from Plato's views which either oppose Christian sentiments or do not completely satisfy them, I did not want to diminish any of his merits."⁶⁴ Morally, Plato far surpassed his contemporaries. His undeniable merit was that he diverted human eyes away from earthly affairs, seeking a goal to aspire to, and that goal proved to be the idea. In spite of the unavoidable errors he made due to the circumstances of his epoch, his quest for an object of love was directed towards a heavenly being. This, for Pawlicki, confirmed the value of his thought even though the object of his love was not the personal God.

Thus the method of 'scientific criticism,' to which Pawlicki subjected Plato's theory of love ultimately boiled down to showing Plato's incompat-

62 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 370. Pawlicki's emphasis on the 'vertical dimension of love' attracted the attention of W. Stróżewski (Stróżewski, 1963: 388, note 40).

63 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 372.

64 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 374.

ibility with Christian thought. Plato did not accept the personal character of the supreme object of human love, that is God, so the idea could not reciprocate this love. Nor was there a place in Plato's theory for the disinterested love of one's neighbour.

Rather than merely summarising the *Phaedo*, Plato's dialogue on the soul, Pawlicki provided a systematic lecture on Plato's views on this subject. He argued that Plato understood the soul as a source of movement. His concept of the soul was supplemented with religious dogma that spoke of the soul's eternal sin and the need for redemption, and with ideas of pre-existence and metempsychosis. The concept of the soul was developed in the *Timaeus*, and in his discussion of this dialogue Pawlicki repeatedly remarked that the creation of the world and the soul took place in time. The soul in the *Timaeus* was the pillar of cosmic harmony, with the soul joining the body, not as a punishment but as a means of actualising its harmony. "The soul, therefore, is not banished to the Earth, nor is it imprisoned in the body, as long as it faithfully fulfills its mission, and this is possible because it comes, like the biblical Adam before the fall, equipped with all the necessary spiritual and corporeal qualities."⁶⁵ The *Timaeus* therefore marked an evolution in Plato's concept of the soul. Pawlicki added the following remark concerning one of the most important premises of Plato's theory of nature: "It could be called reverse evolutionism or degeneration. Instead of starting from small, imperfect creatures germinating in the primeval silt in order to ascend to the level of birds and vertebrates, Plato puts the superlative form at the start, and derives the lower forms from it by degeneration. At first there was a man whose soul descends from heaven; and if during his lifetime he disobeys the Creator's orders, his soul at its second birth enters a female body; and when during this pilgrimage new offences are committed, he has to live in the body of a bird, a reptile or even in some lower organism. Whether this theory will be accepted by physiologists, I do not know, but they may note the interesting claim that the female is basically an imperfect version of the male."⁶⁶

Pawlicki claimed that in the whole of Plato's work the soul is always autonomous and complete, nothing is missing, but at the same time he was aware of the difficulty in understanding it as an inexhaustible source of both physical and intellectual movements. How could the soul, as an incorporeal being, move the body if there were no points of contact between them. Plato himself argued for the necessity of the union of the soul and

65 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 381.

66 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 382.

the body: "If the soul can transfer its movement onto matter and, with its presence, transform a dead lump into a living organism, then there must be a propensity in the soul to do so, and in this way its union with the body will not be something contrary to its nature, but rather a complement to it; it will not be a punishment, but a perfection."⁶⁷ Another difficulty was the question of the place of the soul in Plato's dualism. Although it did not belong to the world of ideas, it was significantly related to the idea of life; moreover, as the *Phaedo* revealed, the soul, not being an idea, was similar to an idea, to that which is "accessible only to the intellect, and not available to the senses."⁶⁸

Although Plato's conviction of the relative independence and completeness of the soul was consistent with Christianity, Pawlicki believed, in the light of the above-mentioned difficulties, that it was not until Aristotle that a theory of the soul which correctly grasped the relation between the soul and the body was produced; he invented the 'true formula' that the soul is a form of the body. Plato's theory, in contrast, destroyed the human being's unity by granting autonomy to the soul, which is contrary to experience: "According to an apt remark by St. Thomas, the soul could join and disjoin the body at will, but since this contradicts experience, then it is obviously the theory itself that must be at fault."⁶⁹ Pawlicki thus concluded that Thomas Aquinas had done the right thing by drawing on Aristotle.

Another problem that Pawlicki raised in connection with Plato's psychology was the soul's unity and its concurrent partition into its separate functions. Pawlicki considered the soul's duality, its rational and non-rational parts, to be consistent with tripartition, "in which the charioteer represents the rational part of the soul, and the horses – the non-rational part, the latter being further divided into the lustful (ἐπιθυμητικόν) and the bold or courageous (θυμοειδές)."⁷⁰ In this regard, Plato's philosophy had not changed significantly, for the essence of the myth about the chariot in the *Phaedrus* reappeared in the *Timaeus* dressed in a more scientific robe. One

67 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 390–391.

68 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 389, note 1; this is how Pawlicki rendered the Greek νοητόν, and took the opportunity to chide Schleiermacher, who rendered ἀνόητον as *unvernünftig*, while in the discussed passage of the *Phaedo* (80b) things cannot be described as unreasonable, irrational, but as inaccessible to reason. The Italian, French and English translators were praised in this regard, along with F. A. Kozłowski, who translated νοητόν as "fathomable only by thought" (Plato, 1845: 289).

69 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 392.

70 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 395.

slight modification was that the two lower parts of the soul appeared only when the soul joined the body (*Tim.* 69c–d), and as a consequence these parts were mortal. The very term “mortal soul” was, for Pawlicki, an oxymoron, which, against the background of the whole of Plato’s psychology should be regarded only as a metaphor. “The soul’s emotions, which are brought about by every fluctuation of blood circulation and heartbeat, can be called, in poetic language, the mortal part of the soul, or even the mortal soul, because they cease to exist with the final beat of this extraordinary muscle, which for centuries has been used as an apt symbol for bravery and passion, anger and love.”⁷¹ Plato’s psychology can be counted among those parts of his system where terminology had not been established, hence Pawlicki justified speaking about parts, functions, forms, as well as types or natures of the soul, for all the detailed issues connected with the soul were secondary in comparison with Plato’s conviction of its immortality.

“Of all the works of Plato, the one which shakes us to the core is the one that takes up the subject of the soul’s fate after death. It is not the subject alone that gives this work its unique power, nor is it the carefully expounded arguments that captivate our attention. After all, thousands of books »on immortality« rot in libraries, and yet even today, it is the *Phaedo* that everyone reaches for. Most books on the subject tend to consist of erudite research, while the *Phaedo* introduces us to the world of living individuals.”⁷² The actual arguments for immortality in the *Phaedo* were of little significance for the work in its entirety, and were, in fact, easy to refute, unlike Socrates’ incontestably convincing argument, which provides “the most powerful evidence, because it is based on the long, virtuous life and serene death of a martyr.”⁷³ In the *Phaedo*, far from being mere background or decoration, the setting and context against which the minute philosophical issues are presented take on the utmost importance. The first part of the *Phaedo* aroused Pawlicki’s enthusiasm, especially the contempt for carnality which is stressed there. Pawlicki commented on this as follows: “There is an almost biblical air emanating from these profound words. [...] Besides a superficial similarity, the difference in perspective will at once be obvious to any Christian. Nevertheless, it will do no harm to remind ourselves that four centuries before the great apostle of the pagans, in the fun-loving city of Athens with its easy morality, a noble pagan

71 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 400–401.

72 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 405–406.

73 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 406.

declared the necessity of giving up the world and carnality in order to acquire wisdom and eternal life.”⁷⁴

Reflecting on the literary composition of the *Phaedo*, Pawlicki concluded that if Plato had passed directly to the death of Socrates after the initial part of the dialogue, he would have produced a first-rate ethical dissertation. He preferred, however, to create a real drama. Pawlicki discerned four arguments for the immortality of the soul, or perhaps five, if Socrates' polemic was accepted as a separate argument. When considering the argument based on *anamnesis*, Pawlicki observed: “it is not difficult to [...] see that the facts referred to by Socrates can be explained without calling on the help of pre-mundane memories.”⁷⁵ These arguments were therefore weak, but Plato considered them to be necessary because he believed that the immortality of the soul must go hand in hand with its pre-existence. In overweighing the critical opinions of scholars on the value of Plato's reasoning, Pawlicki found one statement that he could not agree with, namely that Plato himself had not taken these arguments seriously. The very meticulous exposition of the arguments testified against this view, whereas the fact that they were unconvincing was a different matter. Pawlicki argued that the biblical reminiscences in the passage in which Socrates started his final narrative about the supramundane fate of the soul (107c–d), dispelled all doubts about Plato's conviction of the individual immortality of the soul: “In view of these wonderful words, which bring to mind the biblical *opera illorum sequuntur illos*, all unworthy suspicions should be silenced, for if he, who preached these words, did not believe that his personality would survive the decomposition of the body and would enter a new, more perfect existence, then he would have been little more than a mere trickster.”⁷⁶ Plato, however, could not be accused of such mystification.

Pawlicki emphasised that one of the unchanging features of the soul throughout all Plato's works was its indestructibility. The appearance of Providence watching over the creation in the *Timaeus*, did not escape his attention either. It was also in this dialogue that the creation of the soul in time was revealed. All these were elements that were consistent with Chris-

74 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 412; the *Phaedo* roused Pawlicki's enthusiasm to such an extent that in order to prepare a monograph lecture on this dialogue in the academic year 1896/97 he started to translate it, but only reached 69 d (Pawlicki, 2013: 81–92); likewise, he started, but was unable to complete, the translation of the *Gorgias* up to 451 (Pawlicki, 2013: 75–81).

75 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 412.

76 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 431.

tianity. “The closer Plato approached the end of his earthly pilgrimage, the more earnest became his investigation of the attitude of human beings towards the Deity, of the created towards their Creator. And he understood that only the Father was without beginning and ending, whereas His children and the universe, and thus human souls, originated in time.”⁷⁷

In spite of his views on the chronology of the dialogues, Pawlicki saved the passage in the *Phaedrus* (245c–246a) where the immortality of the soul is based on its self-movement to the end of his considerations on the immortality of the soul. The greatest value of this argument was that Plato applied to psychology the theory of force, animating and moving the world, a theory which had previously been introduced by the Ionians. This brilliant combination of Ionian philosophy with Orphism and Parmenidean thought was indicative of the originality of Plato’s reflections on the immortality of the soul.

Leaving his discussion on the *Phaedrus* to the final passages of his considerations on the immortality of the soul was intended by Pawlicki to serve in his polemic with Lutosławski. It was in the context of the immortality of the soul that the first reference to his book, *The Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic*, appears, along with references to numerous German, English, French and Italian works. Pawlicki criticised Lutosławski, who, on the basis of the affinity between the arguments in the *Laws* and the *Phaedrus*, argued that the latter was of a more mature character and therefore succeeded the *Phaedo*.⁷⁸ As mentioned above, Pawlicki rejected the view on the mature character of the *Phaedrus*, for he believed that linguistic criteria could never prevail over philosophical premises. He refuted Lutosławski’s views on the *Phaedrus* as a dialogue in which Plato must have had a greater sense of his own strength, for he introduced philosophers into the company of the gods.⁷⁹ Without feeling the need to provide any justification, Pawlicki also dismissed Lutosławski’s argument that Plato lacked conviction concerning the individual immortality of the soul in the *Symposium*, thus indicating its chronological precedence over the *Phaedrus*.⁸⁰

In Pawlicki’s view, it was Plato’s philosophical development that indicated that the *Phaedo* was more mature than the *Symposium*, and much more so than the *Phaedrus*. He rejected Lutosławski’s arguments that in the *Phaedo* Plato showed greater leniency with respect to the punishment of

77 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 439.

78 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 442–443, footnote 1; *cf.*: Lutosławski, 1897: 332.

79 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 355–357, footnotes; *cf.*: Lutosławski, 1898: 166.

80 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 358, footnote 2; *cf.*: Lutosławski, 1898: 164–165.

criminals, which provided evidence that the *Phaedo* must have been earlier than the *Phaedrus*, in which the penalties for the souls were more severe, and closer to those in the *Republic*. This, according to Lutosławski, testified to a deeper understanding of responsibility in human life. In the *Phaedo* (113e–114a), matri- and patricide were to be forgiven after a year.⁸¹ Pawlicki rightly accused Lutosławski of misunderstanding the text of the dialogue, in which Plato divided criminals into those whose guilt could not be redeemed, and those who could be treated for their crimes. A murder committed on parents was included in the latter category, provided that the crime occurred, for example, in anger, and was followed by remorse on the part of the culprit. If these conditions were not met, then the criminal would be classified into the first category, although the murderer of a parent was not explicitly mentioned. Thus Pawlicki rightly indicates that the criterion for judging a murderer's soul was not the type of crime, but the circumstances in which the crime was committed. "How much richer in details and more mature is the teaching in the *Phaedo*, in which deliberate crimes are distinguished from involuntary ones, in which different times of penance are designated to various violations, making relief from suffering dependent on the repentance of the sinner. What great consideration for the needs of the human heart, together with complete respect for justice!"⁸²

After his systematic exposition of Plato's psychology, Pawlicki turned to dialectics, the source of which he saw in Socrates' opposition to the eristic of the Sophists. Above all, dialectics was, for Plato, the art of asking questions, but this was not exclusive to Plato. The more exact Platonic definition of dialectics was focused on examining the nature of each thing, and on answering the question about what each thing essentially is. The dialectical procedure in the *Phaedrus* revealed itself to be twofold in nature. It was the inductive collection (ζυναρπείσθαι) of single particulars in order to find a general notion, as well as the division into kinds (κατ' εἶδη). Pawlicki argued that such a twofold concept of dialectics was, however, overestimated and wrongly elevated above Socrates' dialectics, for this would have led to a chronological conclusion that Pawlicki wanted to avoid, namely the recognition of the *Phaedrus* as a mature dialogue. Pawlicki obviously included Lutosławski among those scholars who were inclined to this opinion, criticising his younger colleague as one who 'takes delight in extreme conclusions,' and considers the dialectics of the *Phaedrus* to be simi-

81 Lutosławski, 1897: 329.

82 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 446.

lar to that of the *Sophist*. He merely dismissed this opinion as a joke, quoting Xenophon, who claimed that even Socrates applied the method of division according to kinds, and therefore the young Plato must have known this method. It should be remarked here that generally Xenophon's testimony about Socrates was denied credibility by Pawlicki, as was his knowledge of philosophy, but when Xenophon could be used by Pawlicki to take issue with Lutosławski, then he was turned into a reliable source of knowledge about the Socratic method. Apart from the synthetic and analytic method, other 'auxiliary means' of dialectical reasoning were used in the *Sophist*, the *Statesman* and the *Philebus*, among which Pawlicki listed enumeration of features, classification, distinction and the application of primary concepts, as he called them, which were not subjected to the dialectical method. These included: being, motion, rest and completeness.

Although the mathematical sciences were not included in philosophy as they did not subject their own premises to examination, they were indispensable as an introduction to philosophy. Geometry was used by Plato to show the relations between the four types of cognition (εἰκασία, πίστις, διάνοια, ἐπιστήμη). This division did not result only from his love of symmetry, but it reflected the nature of things, revealing relations between realms of reality in their correspondence to particular forms of cognition.

The research programme that Plato set out for dialectics seemed to Pawlicki extremely ambitious. "It is hard not to acknowledge the magnitude of these intentions. The task may even exceed human powers, yet is there anything greater than such an extremely difficult march, without the aid of the senses, without the support of handrails, signs or figures of any kind, a march up to invisible expanses, where the Eternal Being endures forever in the same immutability? And if it is difficult to reach this Highest Being that illuminates and animates everything that exists and can be known, then it is even more difficult to descend from this Being, on unfamiliar steps, and to find the way back to the place where the research started out."⁸³ This research proposal was in line with what Diotima recommended in the *Symposium*. The dialectical method, however, raised significant doubts, for there was no certainty that the subject of the research existed at all. In order to assess the value of dialectics, it was therefore necessary to examine first the results of the method, namely the theory of ideas. Pawlicki wrote: "it can also be assessed by its fruits. Plato believed that he owed his intellectual accomplishments to dialectics, for it is through dialectics that ideas are discovered, explained, connected and disconnected,

83 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 467.

and turned into the property of the soul. For their part, the ideas are an impulse which sets research in motion and provides a rational aim. The soul and ideas belong to each other, like light and objects. Without light, objects would be invisible, they would not exist for us; without objects, light would have nothing to illuminate, neither purpose nor reason to exist.”⁸⁴ Pawlicki understood the theory of ideas in a traditional way, within the framework of Plato’s dualism. In this context the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium* and *Phaedo* were the most important dialogues, and these were supplemented not with the secondary literature, but with Aristotle’s remarks.

In epistemological, or logical as Pawlicki put it, deliberations, the best translation of the terms εἶδος and ἰδέα into Polish was *pojęcie* (concept, notion). Understood in this way, Plato, unlike Socrates, ascribed to the ideas objective existence beyond the world of things. “Plato makes no distinction between ἰδέα, εἶδος, or even μορφή, and by means of these terms he expresses kinds, species or any other general beings, and he sometimes even takes them as logical concepts, which, however, as he comprehends them, always correspond to reality beyond the senses.”⁸⁵ There was, therefore, no justification for introducing semantic distinctions into the terminology of the theory of ideas, all the more so, as the terminology itself was not fixed and it changed depending on the context, as is always the case with Plato. In the course of time, Plato granted an existence beyond things to the Socratic ‘nature’, an independent existence, and ultimately, an existence higher than the existence of things. Pawlicki rejected interpretations of the theory of ideas which deprived them of substantial existence. The mention of this interpretative trend originating from Kant was only used as an opportunity to take issue with Lutosławski, whom he accused of inaccuracies in his discussion on the secondary literature.⁸⁶

Another hallmark of Pawlicki’s interpretation was that he regarded the ideas as the thoughts of God. He argued that the ideas do not lose their independent existence in the Divine intellect; on the contrary, their “existence in the creator’s intellect is not a subjective phenomenon [...], but it is a more complete and more perfect energy than the mundane way of existence if it is true what St. Paul says to the Athenians that »in God we live and move and have our being«. It is debatable whether Plato granted the

84 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 470.

85 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 473.

86 “Lutosławski is very well-read, but he works with an astonishing haste. He reads carelessly and ascribes to the authors opinions that, in the right context, mean something else” (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 478, footnote).

ideas an existence only in God's intellect or also outside it, but this existence is always independent of insignificant things and is placed where God and the pure souls reside, in the place beyond heaven, as the *Phaedrus* describes it."⁸⁷

In response to the question concerning the number of the ideas, Pawlicki quoted the doubts expressed in the *Parmenides*. He acknowledged that Plato's starting point was to ascribe ideas to all kinds of things, even to those less lofty, natural, or those produced by humans. Having realised the difficulties of such idealism, Plato reduced the number of ideas, and rejected, for example, the existence of the idea of relation. He did so, however, only at the end of his life in his oral teaching, but "this does not change the fact that in his writings he accepted unconditionally ideas for all concepts, including the most detached and least ostensible phenomena, and even for those belying truth and reality."⁸⁸ The world of ideas required an immanent hierarchy corresponding to the cosmic hierarchy on which it was modelled. The *Phaedrus* lacked such a hierarchy, whereas in the *Symposium*, three supreme ideas were introduced: beauty, truth and good, and in the *Phaedo*, although the problem of hierarchy was ignored, the highest position was maintained for the idea of good. A discussion of such a hierarchy was, however, presented in the *Republic*, in which the good itself was placed above being, life and truth. Nevertheless, Plato was unable to outline the entire edifice of ideas, which was supplemented in the *Sophist* with the highest types: being, rest, motion, identity and difference, although it was difficult to determine what their relation to the ideas was.

Plato did not have fixed terms to present the relations between ideas and individual entities. It was clear, however, that the ideas were always models which were reflected in particular things in a better or worse manner. Aristotle's criticism of Plato for his use of poetic metaphors in his terminology did not find favour in Pawlicki's eyes, although he admitted that Plato's terms did not explain much. Plato's ambiguity in this regard has become a breeding ground for various interpretations of the theory of ideas, including the most absurd in Pawlicki's opinion: "There are even those who see Plato as a precursor of Kant, and the ideas as general forms of human intellect, not applicable to things in themselves, but only having legitimate value within the limits of the phenomenal world."⁸⁹

87 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 478.

88 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 481; the 2nd part of vol. 2 of Pawlicki's book begins from this page, it was posthumously edited by T. Sinko.

89 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 489.

The role of the idea in human life was to set goals, both in the spheres of knowledge and morality. Let us quote a longer passage with Pawlicki's emotional description of the impact of ideas on human life: "they allow us to understand and arrange earthly matters better. In this world of mundane darkness, those who have become used to looking upon that which is truly beautiful, just and good will at once see the futility of the false delusions pursued by the majority of people, who do not know philosophy. Whosoever really loves knowledge (φιλομαθής) constantly aspires to that which really exists, and not to that which, at any moment, appears to exist for the mob [...]. The solution to social problems depends, therefore, on knowledge of the ideas, because only those who have seen them can arrange earthly matters well, unlike those who are devoted to mutable, insignificant phenomena, who, like the blind, cannot see the eternal models that should provide guidance in private and public relations."⁹⁰

The most beautiful illustration of how the ideas could influence human beings was the parable, as Pawlicki called it, of the cave. In his discussion of this, Pawlicki expressed his appreciation of Plato's narrative art and his philosophical profundity. Although Plato's allegory illustrated a means of liberation from the miserable condition that characterised the majority of the human race, Pawlicki was not convinced that this would be effective for most people. Being a priest he wrote: "Even Christianity, though it provided an extraordinary means of freeing humans from their bondage, was unable to prevent people from voluntarily returning to their old bonds or from putting on new ones."⁹¹ Later, however he adds that although Plato's idea of liberation from the shackles of physicality was very imperfect, "by connecting truth with freedom, Plato seems to have sensed what was to be fulfilled by Christ four centuries later: *veritas liberavit vos*."⁹²

The significance of the theory of ideas in the history of philosophy lay in the fact of Plato's ability to combine the efforts of his predecessors, of Heraclitus, Socrates, Parmenides and the Pythagoreans, into a unified whole, into an idealistic synthesis. Plato gave his abstract considerations a unique form which contributed to the popularity and wide circulation of his works, thus making him immortal. Little remains of the form of the theory of ideas as it was taught in the Academy by Plato in his later years. Pawlicki drew some information about the 'unwritten dogmas' from Aristotle. Among the most important modifications in the later theory of ideas

90 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 490.

91 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 492.

92 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 493.

in comparison with its version from the dialogues, he mentioned a reduction in the number of ideas, which seem to have been limited to natural kinds only, and an increase in the importance of mathematical entities by bringing them closer to the ideas. Pawlicki believed that any potential changes in Plato's views could only have occurred after writing the greater part of the dialogues, because "it is difficult to accept that the master, who wrote primarily for his students, delivered from the lectern something different from what was in his writings."⁹³

In Pawlicki's discussion of Plato's dialectics, a separate position was reserved for the *Theaetetus*, which he considered to have preceded the other dialectical works in terms of chronology. In the course of this discussion, Pawlicki's polemics with Lutosławski gained such significance that the name of the latter appeared in the table of contents. Pawlicki's first contention concerned the fragment 155 a-b, where Socrates introduced Theaetetus to three premises on which he was to base his further research. The phrase τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν occurs here. Lutosławski not only translated φάσμα as axiom but also treated the phrase ἐν ἡμῖν as granting these axioms their existence in the soul, from which he concluded that they were no longer transcendent ideas but subjective concepts.⁹⁴ This was intended to provide evidence of the growing significance of the soul in Plato's thought or his abandonment of the theory of ideas as transcendent beings. In his polemic, Pawlicki supported his argument with the term ὁμολογήματα, which appears in the next section of the dialogue, and means the statements and theses accepted by both disputants. These claims, which are adjacent to the phrase ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, 'in our soul', were interpreted by Pawlicki as follows: "these phenomena of human consciousness are some kind of universally accepted certainties, but the addition 'in us' or 'in our souls' does not yet demonstrate that Plato gave them purely subjective meaning or that he ceased to believe in the pre-existence of the soul and in these ideal beings which it had seen in its previous life."⁹⁵ Lack of reference to the theory of ideas in the *Theaetetus* was explained by Pawlicki by the fact that Socrates' interlocutor could not be counted among his close students, so he was not acquainted with the theory. For this reason Socrates did not refer to it, as he did, for example, in the *Phaedo*.

93 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 500.

94 Lutosławski, 1897: 329; for a more extensive background to Pawlicki's criticism of Lutosławski's reading of the *Theaetetus*, cf.: Mróz, 2007: 207–212.

95 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 505, footnote 1.

Another of Pawlicki's many disagreements with Lutosławski concerned the passage 185a–186a. One of Lutosławski's aims was to prove that Aristotle, respected as a logician, had, in fact, learned much from Plato. In the above-mentioned fragment, according to Lutosławski, Plato provided another version of his list of categories, in which he included being and non-being, identity and difference. Lutosławski even referred to this as the oldest list of categories, and it was only the soul that had the power to recognise them as such, by perceiving what all things had in common,⁹⁶ namely that, τὰ κοινά, or the categories, as Lutosławski preferred, were no longer considered as eternally independent entities, but they were the effect of the cognitive effort of the subject-soul. It was thus evident to Lutosławski that there was in Plato's philosophical evolution a shift of ontical predominance from the object of cognition to the subject. Pawlicki, in contrast, claimed that Plato did not distinguish metaphysical from logical principles, but merely argued, in opposition to the sensualists, that what was common to all perceptions could not be just a sensual impression, but must have come from elsewhere. And since there could not be anything in Plato like the categories in the Aristotelian sense, then it was impossible to argue that they replaced the theory of the ideas. "Lutosławski did not provide convincing evidence of this, and unfortunately, his assumption that such an important shift was furtively implemented by Plato, without withdrawing the former theory, and even that the two theories did not contradict each other, leaves the door wide open to unjustified hypotheses and we cannot follow him through that door."⁹⁷

Let us mention in passing that Pawlicki appears to have intended to write a separate essay on Lutosławski's book, as is evidenced by a preserved manuscript entitled *Criticism of Lutosławski*. This manuscript contains many charges against stylometry that are known from the pages of the *History of Greek Philosophy*, but here they are more numerous and more specific, with Pawlicki even checking Lutosławski's calculations. It seems that Pawlicki originally intended this text to be published separately, but as time passed and more and more of his objections were included in his book, these initial intention fell by the wayside. On the pages of the manuscript some positive remarks on Lutosławski can be found, but these never found their way into print. It should not surprise us that Lutosławski's praise of Plato's genius in the last pages of his book was to Pawlicki's liking, but he nevertheless regretted that in Lutosławski's interpretation

96 Lutosławski, 1897: 374.

97 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 513, footnote.

the existence of ideas was bound up with individual consciousness. Pawlicki insisted that it is “the theory of ideas that is the most important subject in the exposition of Plato’s teaching,”⁹⁸ and not, by any means, his logic or alleged spiritualism.

On account of the absence of Polish translations, Pawlicki felt justified in summarising the *Theaetetus* extensively. He argued, contrary to Lutosławski, that, unlike Aristotle, Plato had no logical theory in the *Theaetetus*.⁹⁹ The term ‘syllogism’ which appears in the dialogue “does not have any fixed meaning for Plato; it may be a simple generalisation or the gathering of details into one common concept, but it can also mean a consideration, a way of reasoning, or an implication in the most common sense.”¹⁰⁰

It was evident to Pawlicki that the *Theaetetus* had been written shortly after the foundation of the Academy. “Taking into account, however, the sport being played with growing enthusiasm by platonising philologists,”¹⁰¹ he considered it necessary to start another polemic against Lutosławski, who had placed this dialogue in Plato’s mature years, right before the *Parmenides*. Pawlicki estimated that the *Theaetetus* had been written in the years 387–385, before the *Meno* and the *Symposium*. He justified these dates on the grounds that it had been a way for Plato to express his gratitude to Euclid, whom he was believed to have stayed with in Megara after the death of Socrates, and also as a means of honouring Theaetetus, who was his friend. His snide remarks about Lutosławski were in splendid style: “And what does the latest and famous branch of Platonic philology, vocabulary statistics, have to say about this? So much effort has been made to move the *Theaetetus* to 367, and one of its most-learned representatives assures us that the exactness of his research is in no way inferior to the cer-

98 Pawlicki, BJ3: 4. This text definitely discusses Lutosławski’s English book (1897), and not his Polish study (Lutosławski, 1891) as is described in Bandura, Jałbrzykowska, 1971: 197.

99 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 518; Pawlicki did not know Bronikowski’s translation of the *Theaetetus* at that time. Only the few final pages of the unpublished manuscript testify to Pawlicki’s familiarity with this edition of the dialogue, so he must have learnt about it only in the last years of his life (Pawlicki, BJ1: 124, reverse). This also shows that Bronikowski’s translations were not well received.

100 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 519.

101 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 526; Pawlicki often expressed his contempt for statistical methods, for example about Ritter, who had recognised the importance of Lutosławski’s research, Pawlicki wrote: “as can be seen from the rich statistics of various words used by Plato, he is a diligent calculator, but a weak philosopher” (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 264, footnote 4).

tainty of the methods of the natural sciences. The matter would be then determined once and for all, and just as we trust astronomy when it tells us that Jupiter and its moons revolve on their wonderful course around the Sun, so we would also have to humbly accept the verdict of statistics on the production of the *Theaetetus* after 367.”¹⁰² In his criticism, Pawlicki seemed not to have been aware of all the complexities of the method, merely drawing attention to its arbitrariness. One serious charge against Lutosławski which would be difficult to refute was that, according to him, Plato appears to have given up writing for twelve years between the *Phaedrus* and the *Theaetetus*. The first of these received a convergence factor with the late group of the dialogues of 0.31, while the latter got 0.32. This would suggest that for twelve years there was very little change in Plato’s style. The doubts regarding these numerical factors resulted from the fact that between other pairs of dialogues, which were, for example, separated by a year, the factor difference amounted to 100 %. Pawlicki referred to the chronological conclusions of Paul Natorp, who advocated earlier dates of the *Phaedrus* and the *Theaetetus*. The most important argument against Lutosławski was the rejection of the concept of linear evolution in Plato’s style, which undermined the very core of stylometric research: “the manner of his writing is more similar to the movement of waves that rise and fall. In this case, then, there can be no possibility of vocabulary statistics serving as a chronological instrument. Plato, like every great writer, sometimes mimics unwittingly the style of the books he has read, as in the *Phaedrus*, sometimes deliberately reproduces certain manners of speaking, or even quotes passages, though seldom word for word, from the writings of various personalities who speak in the dialogues, like Gorgias, Polos, Euthydemus, Protagoras, etc. The favourite phrases and words of Socrates and his companions were undoubtedly preserved or little altered. And according to the subject and the moment of writing, he either falls into enthusiasm and lets his imagination run wild, or he conducts boring, meticulous controversies or dry logical exercises that harp on the same string; at other times, he fervently appeals to the audience’s conscience, using a delicate, delightful analysis of ethical problems. He has his own style for everything, and he is able to individualise each speaker’s manners by means of an in-

102 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 528–529; Pawlicki referred Polish audiences who were unable to read the English book by Lutosławski to a ‘pithy and very reasonable report’ (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 529, footnote 2). This was a study by Michał Jezienicki (Jezienicki, 1899), who, unlike Pawlicki, observed the advantages of the method, along with its perplexities, and appreciated its value.

credibly rich vocabulary. This style does not develop along straight or curved lines, but takes various forms in one work or even in works written simultaneously [...]. It is true that he may have formed his own style in his mature years, with rich vocabulary, and yet drab, monotonous and rigidly hieratic; nevertheless, it is impossible to determine by means of mathematical formulas how much his style developed each year, or to indicate, by means of these formulas, the chronological position of particular works. This would simply be impossible because Plato may have applied various styles of writing during the same year.”¹⁰³

Having thus dismissed statistical research, Pawlicki moved on to the *Cratylus* and the *Euthydemus*. Several examples of etymology from the former led him to the conclusion that “they were sufficient to get a grasp of Plato’s linguistics, which was not particularly scientific; in fact, it could even be regarded as a caricature of science.”¹⁰⁴ This was no great praise for Plato, especially in view of the great success of his linguistics in ancient times, its crowning achievement being the classical sentence: *lucus a non lucendo*. According to Pawlicki, Plato’s purpose was to show off and to demonstrate that learnedness in etymology does not contribute to an increase in one’s knowledge of philosophy. It is only towards the conclusion of the dialogue that Plato’s philosophy comes to the fore. “Socrates reveals in the distance the theory of ideas, without which no real knowledge is possible. For there must be some beauty, some good that does not change, some being, by means of which every particular thing is what it is.”¹⁰⁵

The *Sophist* and the *Statesman* constitute a continuation of the *Theaetetus*, though the atmosphere of these dialogues was different, having a solemn and professorial gravity. Whereas in the *Theaetetus*, the source of error could not be indicated without prior knowledge of the positive answer to the question concerning the essence of knowledge, in the *Sophist*, consenting to the non-existence of non-being would mean the impossibility of falsehood, and thus, the impossibility of defining the sophist as one whose occupation was to propagate falsehood. The purpose of the dialogue was then to explain the nature of error and the art of sophistry and to achieve this goal required going through boring, imprecise and not always useful exercises in dialectics. Pawlicki once again seized the chance to criticise Lutosławski’s interpretation, this time without even directly mentioning him by name: “There are some who have assumed that because five of

103 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 535–536.

104 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 542.

105 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 546.

the supposedly most general »kinds« are spoken about at length in the *Sophist*, Plato wanted to provide the highest categories of being, and because it was difficult to imagine these ideas connecting and disconnecting with each other in the form supramundane, immutable, immovable models, they claimed that the ideas were generally replaced by notions, which were classified according to the scientific method.”¹⁰⁶ Such presumptions, according to Pawlicki, were based on uncertain sources, because “Plato in the *Sophist* understood being as reality and »kinds« of being as ideas, for he was attempting to prove, in contradiction to past philosophers, that the real being [...] is one and multiple, sometimes a being, and sometimes a non-being, depending on the possibility or impossibility of being connected to the being’s kinds and genres.”¹⁰⁷ With regard to method and style, the *Statesman* was identical to the *Sophist*. A third work was to have been the hypothetical dialogue *Philosopher*, but it was not written because, according to Pawlicki, it would have repeated much from the two previous dialogues, since it would have touched on a subject that was simultaneously a higher type of the sophist and statesman.

Pawlicki started his discussion of the *Parmenides* with an outline of the history of the enthusiastic reception of this dialogue, from Proclus through Ficino to Hegel. The Pole himself, however, had some doubts about the great value of the dialogue. He considered it strange that “objections of essential significance had been piled up against the most important part of Plato’s teaching. Doubtless, every philosopher should take into account all the serious objections that may be set against his system, and he should also attempt to respond to them as best he can; here, however, we seek a response in vain.”¹⁰⁸ It appeared to Pawlicki even stranger that in this dialogue, “after the defeat of Socrates, which is predictable, the reader expects Parmenides to take advantage of his victory and expound his own system. [...] Meanwhile, something strange happens that deserves close attention, because it may allow us to grasp the point and the ultimate goal of the dialogue. It would appear that Parmenides was not such an uncompromising enemy of the ideas after all, but merely wanted to convince an inexperi-

106 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 566–567. Because there was no Polish translation of the *Sophist*, Pawlicki recommended an analysis of the dialogue by Jezienicki (Jezienicki, 1894). While dealing briefly with the issue of the authenticity of the dialogue (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 564), Pawlicki referred to another study by this author (Jezienicki, 1889).

107 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 567. The line of arguments on being and not being were “like pages torn out of Hegel” (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 568).

108 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 585.

enced young man of three issues: 1) that it is very difficult to refute those who do not accept the ideas; 2) that only a very capable person is able to understand that every particular thing corresponds to an idea, that is, to a kind, and also to some self-existing being; 3) that an even greater, quite astonishing intellect is required to discover this truth and be able to set it forth to others.”¹⁰⁹ In view of these facts, it came as no surprise to Pawlicki that there were serious doubts about the authenticity of the dialogue. He himself, however, took advantage of those doubts to point out the true purpose of the dialogue, which was to encourage greater intellectual effort.

As we have seen, Pawlicki did not share the general enthusiasm for this dialogue, describing it as ‘monistic delusions.’ He could not completely write off the philosophical value of the dialectic method, though discussing every subject by means of affirmation and negation, without any firm starting point for such considerations, reminded Pawlicki of “a mill that is put into motion, but has nothing to grind.”¹¹⁰ Deliberations on the One could not, essentially, produce satisfactory and lasting results, because the subject itself lacked substance. There was a ‘dialectical mist’ hanging over the dialogue, for since the One could not be regarded as a substance while its existence was under question, and thus it had to be considered as an attribute which was always associated with another substance, “discussion about the existence of the One, without specifying the thing in which and through which it exists, is a vain battle of wits.”¹¹¹ In Pawlicki’s opinion, all that could follow from such research was pantheism and panlogism, which attracted a number of thinkers who had been led astray by the *Parmenides*. One of them, the most important and certainly the best-known of them, was Hegel. It was this ambiguity and the multiplicity of possible formulations of the theory of ideas that lowered the value of Plato’s dialectics. Aristotle’s logic was free from this flaw.

In the final passages of Pawlicki’s reflections on dialectics, the problem of Plato’s logic was addressed. It was evident to Pawlicki that Plato did not possess logic in the strict Aristotelian sense, which, in the centuries to come, was to bring about its formalised, scholastic form. “If, however, we want to use Logic to refer to all the speculations on the processes of human thought, and to practical rules, explained with examples to facilitate their implementation, then it must be admitted that in Plato there are so many ways to divide and define, so many sophistic and anti-sophistic

109 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 586.

110 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 596.

111 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 598.

strategies and tricks, so many superb disclaimers and regressions, serves and returns, so many ingenious conjectures and conclusions that it all adds up to some kind of pre-Aristotelian logic.”¹¹² Pawlicki, following Zeller, concluded, however, that it would be excessive to assign a set of developed logical views to Plato in interpreting his philosophy from a modern perspective, and this would be historically inaccurate. It was in this context that Pawlicki again referred to Lutosławski’s book, which he regarded as one of the numerous manifestations of the unfair depreciation of Aristotle’s achievements. This time Pawlicki’s criticism was directed at Lutosławski’s method of expounding Platonism, and especially his opinion that a historian of philosophy could understand the philosopher’s writings better than he himself had understood them. The line of criticism was straightforward: “such a method leaves the door wide open to the most arbitrary interpretations and allows claims that were never expressed to be ascribed to Plato, especially when someone like Lutosławski is in the enviable position of being able even to gain access to the oral lectures of the philosopher, something that cannot be done by ordinary mortals. By means of this new method, supported by his equally arbitrary chronology, Lutosławski outlines for us [...] the development of Plato’s logic.”¹¹³

Pawlicki did not deny that much in Aristotle’s logic must have had its source in the teaching of the Academy, but he argued that Plato had never disconnected dialectical deliberations from metaphysics. It was thanks to Aristotle that metaphysics had been removed from dialectics, the substance of the latter being developed into a number of clear laws of thinking, without the need to refer to metaphysical intuitions. The fact that modern scholars did not adhere to this opinion, was, according to Pawlicki, due to the erroneous hypothesis put forward by W. G. Tennemann “that Platonic ideas are not supramundane beings, but simply creations of our thoughts, namely concepts.”¹¹⁴ By retaining the traditional, metaphysical Aristotelian interpretation of the theory of ideas, Aristotle’s reputation as the first logician could be salvaged.

The last parts of Plato’s philosophy that Pawlicki managed to elaborate were his political and ethical theories. Plato’s politics was always bound up with ethics, hence Pawlicki considered it most appropriate to start by discussing the *Republic*, after which he had intended to present Plato’s cos-

112 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 602.

113 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 604.

114 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 608.

mology and theology, but, unfortunately, he did not succeed in including them in the printed book.

Pawlicki found many opinions in the *Republic* that appealed to him; for example, while discussing the subject of education, he wrote: "I will pick out [...] only a few particularly apt sentences that are based on common sense. »Not only gods, but people too, hate lying«. »There is no reason for God to lie«. »God is completely straightforward and truthful in deed and word, neither changing himself, nor deceiving others."¹¹⁵ Pawlicki was also in favour of Plato's concept of preventive censorship applied to the works of immoral content.

Due to its volume and diversity of content, the *Republic* evoked ambivalent feelings. Pawlicki could not remain indifferent to morally offensive topics. The common lives of the guardians of both sexes and the empowerment of women aroused his opposition. He was even harsher when referring to the regulations concerning sex, or the killing of children born to women in their forties by starving them to death. On the other hand he expressed his praise for Plato's patriotism, for the rules of warfare, and especially for his recommendations that a distinction should be made between 'civil' wars among the Greeks themselves, and those between the Greeks and the barbarians.

Pawlicki emphasised the link Plato made between political power and philosophy. He considered the definition of the philosopher at the opening of Book VI to be one of the most beautiful passages, which was thoroughly Platonic, in the best sense of the word. Among the advantages of philosophers, the following were mentioned: "with all their hearts they love knowledge, which opens up their minds to eternal ideas; they love the truth, and as a result, they do not lie; they seek only spiritual pleasures, despising all carnal pleasures; they are abstemious, neither knowing greed nor valuing riches; they view everything in such a lofty way from on high, and with their bird's eye view they can encompass »all times and all beings,« and therefore human life has no value for them; they are not afraid of death, they know neither cowardice, shallowness nor conceit."¹¹⁶ According to this panegyric, then, they were best suited to govern. Socrates' argument that philosophers did not seize power because of the people's hatred of them, for they did not flatter the crowd, was considered by Pawlicki to be too long and poorly structured: "he harps on the same string [...]. It is very natural that philosophers remain on the sidelines because they

115 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 621.

116 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 642.

have not been invited to seize power, but it is also understandable that they are not invited because, by shunning public affairs, they do not let themselves be known or raise the public's trust. In any case, power is to be taken and no one should wait for it to be handed on a plate. And the complaints that people spoil philosophers and turn them into Sophists is worth as much as its reverse, that the Sophists spoil people. We are just going round in circles, because, one moment, the people are presented as a powerful force that can overturn everything, and the next, they are like youngsters who absorb all the teaching of the Sophists and obey them."¹¹⁷

Having gone up the steps to the exit of the cave, Pawlicki concluded: "Socrates does not doubt that the state, organised according to his programme, would be the happiest place of all, and he even believes it to be possible."¹¹⁸ It was this assumption that the project was feasible that prompted Pawlicki to embark on a criticism of the political organisation outlined by Plato. Pawlicki had no doubt that anyone who learned all the details of the *Republic* would consider it illogical. One contentious issue was the question of Plato's alleged socialism in this dialogue and this was an extremely important question for Pawlicki because a positive answer to this question would bring into doubt his reasoning and his goal, which was to conclude that Plato came as close to Christian values as was possible in classical Athens.

The answer to this question depended not only on the interpretation of the *Republic* but also on the understanding of the term 'socialism': "If we call socialism any work undertaken to improve social conditions, whether of certain underprivileged classes or of the state as a whole, then every up-standing person who contributes to such work is a socialist. And if the government carries out important social reforms, such as the emancipation of peasants or slaves, or the introduction of workers' retirement benefits or the supervision of their working conditions, then regardless of the form of such a state, some would assign to it socialist tendencies."¹¹⁹ Pawlicki further argues that since it is the state that can improve social conditions, it would be erroneous to equate this with the maximisation of state power and label it 'socialism'. On the basis of these considerations Pawlicki argued that Lutosławski was wrong to claim that Plato must have been a socialist in his mature years. According to Pawlicki, his argument was based on an incorrect definition of socialism.

117 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 643.

118 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 649.

119 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 650.

Socialism in the proper sense, says Pawlicki, refers to systems in which there is socialisation of the means of production. In this sense, Plato was not a socialist. He merely expressed certain ideas which superficially coincided with socialism. In his project there is “empowerment of women, which is written on the banners of every socialist sect; complete lack of private property, and communist co-existence as in a convent. But the central aspect of socialism is missing: production, that is, production carried out by means of joint work and common resources belonging to the entire community. Without this, there is no socialism”¹²⁰ Plato’s state will necessarily evolve in the direction of a merchant-banking or feudal-agricultural state, but it will never move towards socialism. Moreover, socialist ideology primarily focuses on the most numerous class and Plato was not interested in this class, nor did he actually devote much attention to it. Plato’s state forms a unity of the governed and the governing, who only in exceptional cases cross the limits of their own class. There is then neither socialism nor democracy in Plato’s political philosophy.

Pawlicki felt it necessary to consider the possibility of implementing such a state and turning a blind eye to Plato’s “feminist and communist fantasies.”¹²¹ Such a state had already been fulfilled in the monastic states, though, as Pawlicki added, the members of The Knights of Malta and the Teutonic Order were not great philosophers. He assumed that the essence of Plato’s *Republic* was an enlightened despotism, such as was manifested in the 19th century by the omnipotence of the state, for example in Prussia. In this regard Pawlicki recalled his experience of the Prussian policy of Germanisation: “And though not everyone will be happy with this comparison because Plato in a Prussian helmet does not conjure up a very positive impression, there is no doubt that, provided they have the necessary parliamentary majority, contemporary states, supported by powerful armies and well-trained bureaucracies, can claim their right to control freely and manage all the secrets of private and religious life, just as is the case of Prussia”¹²².

For Pawlicki, the controversial nature of Plato’s utopia resulted from the fact that “in spite of his inborn spiritual harmony he could not refrain from including a multitude of ethical and logical deviations”¹²³. Although various aspects of this utopia may have appeared controversial from the

120 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 651.

121 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 651.

122 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 654.

123 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 655.

viewpoint of later centuries, one should not lose sight of Plato's purpose, which was to bring about moral renewal in the sphere of government, for as we know, Plato did not hold Athenian democracy in high esteem. The model presented for rulers in the *Republic* was demanding, and the greater the collapse of actual politics, the more unattainable it seemed, but in order to raise the Athenian political standards Plato had to propose a radical reform plan.

Pawlicki also observed that Plato's ideal had, in a sense, been fulfilled in modern times by the professional classes of academics, clergy, doctors, lawyers, officers, writers and artists, all of whom perform a service without expecting great profits. If the *Republic* is seen as an attempt to build a society in which the leading role of administration and management of social issues was granted to a class in society that was guided by ethical motives, then the Christian countries of Europe could be said to have fulfilled this demand. In short, Plato had set a goal that could only be realised in the Christian era, when the development of democracy was able to compensate for the shortcomings of Plato's utopia. This in-depth treatment of the issue of socialism reflected Pawlicki's interest and involvement in the social issues of his time.

Pawlicki took a closer look at the problem of 'Platonic Number' (546b–d), this incomprehensible riddle, this attempt to square the circle, that drives all who try to interpret it to despair. The difficulties in understanding this passage resulted from the mystical fervour that overcame Socrates when he started to explain the complexities of this number. It involved, according to Pawlicki, too much learnedness, that brought poor fruit, and finally turned into a piece of "learned nonsense,"¹²⁴ useless for political practice.

124 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 663; in this regard Pawlicki recalled: "With my scholar-friend, [Leon] Sternbach, we toiled for several hours in an attempt to tolerably translate the entire Greek period into our own language, but our mathematical terminology being uncouth and obscure, we created something dark and ugly and were forced to relinquish our glorious intentions with great regret" (Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 661, footnote 3). Pawlicki explained that he had made this effort due to the lack of a Polish translation of this passage, claiming that Bronikowski had only published his translation of the first three books of the *Republic* in the reports of the gymnasium in Ostrów. At that time, then, he seems not to have been familiar with the 1884 publication of the whole dialogue. It was only in a manuscript which was not included in the printed edition of his book that he added: "having published the first two books of the *Republic* in 1860 and 1864 in Ostrów (gymnasium reports), [Bronikowski] published a complete translation in Poznań in 1884 under the title: »Plato's Works«, vol. III. Although this

Book X of the *Republic* was a mere supplement in Pawlicki's opinion, and the dialogue would have formed a complete whole even without it, and especially without Plato's continuation of his criticism of poetry, which he was probably forced to take up because of the need to stand up to protesting disciples defending Homer's authority. Pawlicki regarded Plato's criticism as too far-fetched, fanatical and on the verge of insanity. There could be no other possible assessment, and for the Polish reader Pawlicki compared it to banning students from reading Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz* (*Master Thaddeus*) in schools. Pawlicki defended poetry, denying that it was worthless, or that it provided only distant reflections of the truth. He added that "Plato had been brought up"¹²⁵ on Homer and it was thanks to this that Plato's dialogues, with their literary qualities, were able to exert such a deep influence on European culture.

In the final parts of the *Republic* another attempt is made to demonstrate that the soul is immortal and that there are rewards and punishments after death. "Is there, besides philosophical conjecture, any claim or testimony in this regard that is supported by tradition? A Christian relies on the words of Christ that the evil will go to eternal torment and the righteous to eternal life. But Plato did not know the *Gospel*."¹²⁶ As Homer could no longer be an authority in this field, it was Er, the son of Armenios, that replaced him. After quoting Socrates' final words in the dialogue, Pawlicki summed up the whole: "With these words Socrates concludes a great discussion about justice, which once delighted the Greeks, and is still today

volume, was much more carefully edited than both previous volumes, it failed to gain wider recognition [...]. In the previous year (1883) the *Theaetetus* by the same translator had appeared in print in Poznań. In 1879, eleven years after volume I [...], volume II of »Plato's Works«, containing the *Alcibiades*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Laches* and *Protagoras* was published in Poznań [...]. But besides this volume, there is also another volume II from 1871, including the first four books of the *Laws*, under the title: »Plato's Works«, vol. II. Apparently, the translator forgot about this when eight years later he again published the above-mentioned volume II. All these translations may be useful for philologists [...]. But Plato should be translated into well-polished, contemporary language, for he is a master of beautiful style" (Pawlicki, BJ1: 124, reverse). The fact that during his lectures at the Jagiellonian University in 1915 Pawlicki mentioned, among others, the latest translations of the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium* by Stefan Okołów proves that he had broadened his knowledge of Polish studies, and, above all, translations, which he had previously neglected (Pawlicki, BJ4: 15). Let us add that Bronisław Kašinowski's 1888 translation of the *Philebus* was known to Pawlicki and considered quite good (Pawlicki, BJ4: 15: 31–32).

125 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 704.

126 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 709.

rightly regarded as a wonderful monument to human philosophising. Despite its apparent deviations, its innumerable paradoxes, and even its very intricate arguments, this strange book holds the readers' attention as if their eyes were glued to the page, and keeps them in suspense, without a moment of weariness; and when they come to the end of it, they regret it is over."¹²⁷ By analogy, it can be assumed that many readers, having reached the final pages of Pawlicki's book, regretfully remarked that it was unfinished.

These final pages of Pawlicki's book are filled with important notes on the composition and chronological position of the *Republic*. Pawlicki took issue with all opinions questioning the unity of the dialogue. He adhered to the view that it was a complete whole, thoughtfully composed from beginning to end. He did not pay attention to arguments for the lack of unity of the *Republic* that were based on particular stylistic or philosophical features of this dialogue, but he focused on more general characteristics of all the dialogues, which were semi-philosophical and semi-literary compositions, and to Plato's writing style in general. He argued that if, from the diverse stylistic features of the various parts of any dialogue, it could be inferred that there was a lack of unity, and that it had therefore come about as a conglomerate of separate works, then, for example, the unity of the *Phaedo* would also have to be brought into question. "Plato was an artist who, for himself, and to the delight of his students, composed his works according to aesthetic principles. These require that the writer does not say everything all at once, but instead, he prepares some surprises, and, more importantly, he gradually draws substantial conclusions in the light of new arguments and against the changing background."¹²⁸ Pawlicki's explicit opinion was that the *Republic* as a whole was a masterpiece written in the period of Plato's philosophical maturity. Having founded the Academy,

127 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 718–719; while lecturing on the *Republic* decades earlier in the Faculty of Theology at the Jagiellonian University, Pawlicki made certain comments that are still highly topical: "In general, whatever errors Plato made, it is beyond doubt that his *Republic* is a colossal work in terms of both its style and the wealth of thought it contains [...] my aim is to stimulate the widest possible reading of the great works of the ancients, because it is a great misfortune that we read less and less ancient authors, and more and more books that only have an ephemeral existence, as Plato says, that is they arouse interest for a year or two, and then they are forgotten. While a book like the *Republic*, which will always be significant, generously rewards all who devote themselves to its study, and an enormous treasure of philosophical information can be extracted from it for a lifetime" (Pawlicki, BJ2: 368–369; Pawlicki, 2013: 53–54).

128 Pawlicki, 1903–1917: 725.

Plato initially devoted himself to dialectics as preparatory work, but from about 380 BC he started to lecture on political issues, which were of the greatest importance to him. Even if it is assumed that Plato continued to polish the text of the dialogue well into his late years, the main body must have been ready no later than 367.

On the very last pages of his work, Pawlicki once again focused on criticism of language statistics. His constant attempts to refute language statistics as a valid method may have been one of the reasons for his failure to complete the book. Pawlicki's decisive argument in favour of the invalidity of the method was its lack of progress since language statisticians could still not agree about their chronological results.¹²⁹ It was, then, chronological conclusions that occupied the final passages of Pawlicki's book. He confirmed the priority of the *Phaedrus*, and recalled in this respect his papers delivered at the Congress of Catholic Scholars in München in 1900. He referred to his own conclusions from earlier parts of the book, reconsidering some of them, and presenting them as merely hypothetical, as was the case with the precedence of the *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and the *Phaedo*, *Meno* and the *Gorgias* in relation to the *Republic*. Although the results of stylometry as a whole were rejected by Pawlicki, they seem to have had some effect on his views on chronology. On the basis of the final paragraphs of Pawlicki's book, however, the reader is left in some doubt about the details of the revision of his views, it being unclear which of these dialogues Pawlicki decided to move to the later period, after the *Republic*. Several pages of the manuscript of the book, which were not included in the printed text, provide more details of Pawlicki's final chronological conclusions. Let us quote them: "However, after analysing the individual dialogues, I have reduced various chronological limits and many variations to some general conclusions. For the reader's convenience, these have been presented together, and they provide, more or less, the following answer to the question of *what Plato wrote before the Republic, namely before 380*: 1) His literary work was inaugurated with the *Phaedrus*, written during Socrates' life, and soon afterwards he probably wrote the *Lysis*. This took place in 402. The *Phaedrus* resembles an outline of his future system and some fundamental thoughts from this dialogue can be found in the *Republic*. There is no doubt then, in the minds of most scholars, that the latter was preceded by the former [...]. 2) It is also certain that the *Phaedo* preceded the *Republic*, and if this is the case, then the *Meno* must have done so too, since it is referred to in the *Phaedo* [...]. 3) It is beyond all

129 Pawlicki also raised this question at an international level (Pawlicki, 1901a).

doubt that the *Symposium* was written around 385, and that it is prior to the *Phaedo*, and consequently to the *Republic* [...]. 4) As for the dialectical dialogues, I consider it to be indisputable that the *Theaetetus* was written right after the foundation of the Academy (387) and not long after the *Parmenides*. Since the *Theaetetus* precedes the *Meno* [...], as I have proved, and the latter precedes the *Phaedo*, the probable sequence of these dialogues would be as follows: the *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Meno*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Republic* [...]. The other two dialectical dialogues, the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, which are held to be a continuation of the *Theaetetus*, were produced far later.”¹³⁰ Pawlicki, however, surmised that the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, despite depicting some youthful dialectical exercises, were composed and put down in dialogical form only much later, and therefore their transfer to the period of Plato’s maturity did not disturb Pawlicki’s vision of Plato’s philosophical development, for these dialogues merely documented disputes from previous decades. Similar assumptions must have applied to the *Philebus*. Pawlicki supplemented these remarks with a conclusion on the Socratic dialogues: “the Socratic dialogues, as they are usually called, are for the most part earlier than the *Republic*, but this does not mean that Plato began his career with these works, but rather that, having opened the Academy, apart from works devoted to the profound problems of his system that were composed for advanced students, he also frequently wrote lighter, even more perfunctory pieces to satisfy the needs of his companions, for example, to grace a school ceremony, to brighten up an Academic symposium, or to elucidate some specific issue that one of his young and promising friends was particularly interested in.”¹³¹

The publication of the unfinished book in the most complete form possible was the result of the efforts of Pawlicki’s student, T. Sinko, who justified the author’s failure to complete the enterprise even though an announcement of its completion had been made a quarter of a century earlier. Among the reasons for this failure, Sinko listed Pawlicki’s disregard for the economy of the whole and his predilection for detailed philological research. Pawlicki’s attention was easily distracted from the task of completing the work as a whole, and instead devoted his time to the elaboration of a comprehensive chapter on Xenophon, ‘a little Attic bee’. Plato demanded even more of his attention, “Rev. Pawlicki became such an ardent lover of Plato that even the most comprehensive presentation of the truth and

130 Pawlicki, BJ6: 511–512.

131 Pawlicki, BJ1: 512–513.

beauty hidden in his dialogues seemed to be insufficient.”¹³² Sinko gave an account of Pawlicki’s occupation with statistical and linguistic studies, and described the work in its printed form as a mere torso. Pawlicki left behind him loose notes on the *Timaeus*, which he had been working on during his last days. In his final assessment Sinko declared that Volume I of the book appeared to be outdated, and even the exposition on Plato needed to be supplemented with the works of other authors. Nevertheless, in a posthumous remembrance of Pawlicki, his grateful student remarked that the part of his work devoted to Plato “will remain for many years as a monument not only to Polish history of philosophy but also to philology.”¹³³ Sinko, not without reason, revered Pawlicki as the greatest Polish humanist of that time and the only expert on ancient philosophy.

Other students of Pawlicki also found justifications for his failure to complete the work, one of which was his quest for academic perfection and completeness, which was illustrated by the following anecdote: “»Reverend Rector, what hinders you from publishing volume III of the History of Greek philosophy; after all, you finished it long ago and its publication has been announced, and even the royalties paid?» How can I?, was his modest answer, when in London a good thing about Aristotle has just been printed, and the bookseller has not sent it to me yet!”¹³⁴ Pawlicki’s involvement with Plato meant that he ultimately had to abandon the work on Aristotle, who was simply removed from the plan of the book. This severed the connection to the encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, which had been the reason for undertaking the work in the first place, for knowledge of Greek philosophy, with particular emphasis on Aristotle, had been intended by Pawlicki to serve as a means of understanding scholasticism. Without Aristotle, however, the history of Greek philosophy was no longer of significance for the development of neo-scholastic thought.

The theory of ideas in Pawlicki’s work was not completed. Pawlicki delayed its fullest presentation until he was ready with his discussion of the *Timaeus*. Unfortunately he did not live long enough to prepare this for print. One striking feature of Pawlicki’s work is his rejection of the Kantian interpretation of the theory of ideas in his work. This was bound up with his inherent criticism of Lutosławski’s research, which had certain points in common with the neo-Kantian vision of Plato. Pawlicki explicitly

132 Sinko, 1917: I–II.

133 Sinko, 1916: 135.

134 Misicki, 1916: 12.

stated that Plato was better understood by his disciple, Aristotle, than by the Kantians, and therefore his testimony could not be rejected.

Plato's late works in Pawlicki's manuscripts

Considering that the text of Pawlicki's book was based largely on his lectures, it is possible, at least to some extent, to reconstruct his views on the late dialogues on the basis of preserved scripts of lectures on the history of Greek philosophy that he delivered at the Faculty of Theology in the academic year 1887/88. It is likely that the content of these lectures was to have been included in subsequent chapters of the *History of Greek Philosophy* dedicated to Plato.

Concerning the *Timaeus*, Pawlicki wrote: "Of all the works of Plato, the *Timaeus* is the most obscure and most difficult to understand, but the reader's patient effort is rewarded with the discovery of extremely beautiful and profound myths here and religious and philosophical dogmas there, all bound together into a meticulous whole. This work deserves even more of our attention and diligent consideration as it is not just an outline but a complete depiction of the development of the world from initial chaos, through numerous cosmic, astronomic and geologic evolutions, to the emergence of living beings on the Earth, and ultimately to human civilisation."¹³⁵ The *Timaeus* was thus an exceptional work, unique not only in Plato's legacy but in the whole of ancient literature because, unlike cosmological works by previous philosophers, it is a completely preserved lecture on the genesis of the world.

On the basis of the *Timaeus*, it seemed clear to Pawlicki that "for Plato God and the Good always turn out to be one."¹³⁶ Plato was not concerned with proving the existence of God in a systematic way, but the classic causal or teleological proofs are included in his works. There is little doubt that he assumed the existence of a single, highest deity, and although he referred to it by various names, he was not a polytheist. Pawlicki also claimed that Plato's God must have been a personal God. "In this system, we are struck by a completely new phenomenon in Greek philosophy, i.e. by the figure of Demiurge, a personal God, a figure which was absent from earlier philosophy and which did not find favour with his successors."¹³⁷

135 Pawlicki, BJ2: 260.

136 Pawlicki, BJ2: 251.

137 Pawlicki, BJ2: 279.

Plato was, then, the original creator of the concept of a personal God, even though, as Pawlicki explicitly stated, he had no contact with Jews and did not know the *Old Testament*, or at least no traces of such knowledge could be found in the dialogues.¹³⁸ Pawlicki's interpretation of Timaeus' lecture, sees Plato approaching even closer to Christian thought.

Pawlicki assessed the *Laws* as follows: "it manifests the hand of an old and weary thinker on every page."¹³⁹ Unlike his unfinished book, Pawlicki's lectures included not only a brief presentation of this late dialogue, but also a general summary of Plato's philosophy and his significance, and it is worth presenting the main points here. Plato was more than just a student of Socrates; he was an independent thinker who had something new to say in philosophy. Despite his extraordinary capabilities, he was a man of great humility, almost never talking about himself or emphasising those thoughts in the dialogues that were really his, tending rather to attribute them to his master. In this respect he was completely different from certain German thinkers, among whom Pawlicki listed Schelling, Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer, who wrote about themselves and their lives. Plato, on the other hand, focused on the portrayal of his master in his original and autonomous style. He tried to be objective, never playing to the gallery, which might as well not have existed for him.

God was the supreme good for Plato, a father who created through love, and this, as Pawlicki added, was especially pleasing to Christians. Plato expressed many valuable opinions on the insignificance of the world, on the human soul and the proofs of its immortality, and on the effects of Providence. "Many great thoughts can be found in Plato, and this explains why he exerted an increasing influence at the time of the approach of the Christian era and when God began to prepare humankind more intensely for the reception of Christ."¹⁴⁰ Pawlicki went even further in his considerations of Plato's historiosophical role: "The more Christianity spread, the more apologetic Christian literature flourished, and the more frequent became the references to Plato in order to convince the pagans that even before Christ, lofty minds had grasped truths that were either in accordance with Christian truths or greatly similar to them."¹⁴¹

It was for this reason that people kept returning to Plato, continually referring to his dialogues, so that even when European mentality had be-

138 Pawlicki, 1890: 38–39.

139 Pawlicki, BJ2: 375.

140 Pawlicki, BJ2: 399.

141 Pawlicki, BJ2: 399.

come dominated by Aristotle, Christians still retained their sympathy for Plato. "It is beyond doubt that no other pagan philosopher uttered such lofty sentences about God and His love, about the human soul and its immortality, about the insignificant value of earthly possessions, and about the necessity for a man to have only one goal before his eyes: eternal life and the return to the land of their Heavenly Father."¹⁴² It was, therefore, an image of Plato very close to Christian thought that was presented to the students of the Faculty of Theology. Pawlicki's goal was probably to bring Plato closer to them, as Christians, so that Plato would become the subject of their own philosophy.

Reception and assessment of Pawlicki's interpretation of Plato

Pawlicki's book evoked a number of reviews, especially volume I, in which the author explicitly declared his methodological and evaluative premises. One such review by Ludwik Ćwikliński expressed unequivocal approval of Pawlicki's work: "he puts special emphasis on whether and to what extent the philosopher's moral views came close to Christianity. [...] It is natural that the author should view the world, the attitude of people to God and the results of the intellectual work of humanity from his position as a Christian, a Catholic and a priest; in fact, having such a clear and pointedly marked position is not only appropriate, but even a merit."¹⁴³ Franciszek Bizoń's review in the *Muzeum* emphasised Pawlicki's autonomy and his critical analysis of the foreign language secondary literature: "He takes auxiliary works into account scrupulously and comprehensively, but there is no hint of that specifically Polish idolatry towards grand foreign scholars."¹⁴⁴ Bizoń pointed out the novelty of the work within the Polish milieu and the Catholic viewpoint of the author. One of Pawlicki's former students in Warsaw, Piotr Chmielowski, also mentioned the merits of the work, though he believed that one of these merits, by being exaggeratedly intensified, had turned into a disadvantage: "The whole book breathes with an elevated spirit of morality."¹⁴⁵ According to Chmielowski, Pawlicki conflated different areas of knowledge, regarding philosophy above all as the art of life, and ethics as the most important branch of philosophy.

142 Pawlicki, BJ2: 400.

143 Ćwikliński, 1891: 155; cf.: Głombik, 1973: 274–275.

144 Bizoń, 1891: 121.

145 Chmielowski, 1891: 506.

As a result all philosophical views were judged from the standpoint of ethics.

Another scholar who voiced his opinion on Pawlicki's book was Henryk Struve (1840–1912), an indefatigable promoter and reviewer of Polish works on Plato. He hoped that this work would contribute to the revival of philosophical traditions in Poland, but expressed some reservations about Pawlicki's conception of philosophy, which did not pay sufficient attention to the need for criticism in the Kantian sense, as the study of the conditions of cognition. Instead, he tended to link philosophy too much with metaphysical issues and with practice and the art of life.¹⁴⁶ Struve speculated that if Pawlicki's book had been published in any of the Western European languages, it would without doubt have taken up a position next to Zeller's *opus magnum*, "whereas in our country, it will only be genuinely recognised by a few specialists."¹⁴⁷ The reviewer hoped, however, that the book would, perhaps, avoid this sad destiny thanks to its excellent, colourful style and graphic descriptions. Some years later, at a philosophical conference in Geneva in 1904, it was Pawlicki's *History...* that was the first work discussed by Struve when reporting on the current state of Polish philosophy to his Western audience. He emphasised the author's critical approach, his independence, the source-based character of the work and its captivating style. Struve also quoted Pawlicki's opinion on language statistics: "this method has, to this day, not provided reliable results and the researchers applying this method quite frequently disagree with each other. It is better, therefore, to stick to the old historical-critical method."¹⁴⁸ Regarding Pawlicki's knowledge of the secondary literature, Struve drew attention to his erudition and his critical analyses not only of German works, but also French, English and Italian, and, of course, especially of Lutosławski's book. Struve also called for Pawlicki's book to be translated into one of the Western languages. His Western audience was thus provided with an image of Pawlicki as a researcher of ancient philosophy, who based his interpretations on source texts, and was very knowledgeable about the secondary literature, but who was, nevertheless, some-

146 Today this is assessed positively, being contrary to the scientific reductionism of philosophy (Mylik, 2005: 126–127).

147 Struve, 1891: 400; when providing a short report on Pawlicki's book for German readers, Struve limited himself to highlighting only the advantages of this work (Struve, 1895: 274–276).

148 Struve, 1907: 11. Another German review of Pawlicki's book, which was written by his former student, Witold Rubczyński, was little more than a pure report on its content (Rubczyński, 1891: 318–324).

what conservative in his approach to Plato, and did not shy away from polemics when defending his own views.

A somewhat personal review of the book was written by Kazimierz Kaszewski, who claimed that Pawlicki attached too much importance to the historical and culture-forming aspect of philosophy. Kaszewski also drew attention to Pawlicki's reluctance to use Xenophon as a historical source of knowledge about Socrates, for Plato's Socrates "appears to be rather Platonised."¹⁴⁹ Finally, Kaszewski highlighted Pawlicki's erudition. He believed that Pawlicki had saved the honour of Polish science, and his work was *rara avis*, "written not only with mastery of the subject, but also in an appealing style, being not only a work of science but also of literature, and hence accessible to general audiences as well as to specialists."¹⁵⁰

In his comparison of Pawlicki's book with the work by Theodor Gomperz, Stanisław Schneider noted Pawlicki's inconsistency in not considering Xenophon to be a philosopher, thus denying historical value to his image of Socrates, yet at the same time devoting a sizeable monographic study to Xenophon as a chapter in volume II of the book. If he had not regarded Xenophon as a writer-philosopher, he should not have devoted such a prominent place to him in his book. Schneider briefly discussed the discrepancies between Pawlicki and Gomperz, including, for example, the issue of Plato's output during Socrates' life and the chronological position of the *Phaedrus*. Schneider himself tended to accept the early position of this dialogue in accordance with Pawlicki's conjecture. On the whole, he thought that Pawlicki's book could be "read for pleasure and intellectual delight. The exposition is so clear and accessible despite being thoroughly academic in character."¹⁵¹

In the light of the above laudatory remarks, Lutosławski's marginal criticism of the book seems to have been induced rather by personal conflict than by an objective, *sine ira et studio* reading of this work. While most reviewers had highlighted Pawlicki's excessive attachment to his own views, according to which he judged the works of the Greeks, Lutosławski's assessment is quite different, for he seems not to have considered Pawlicki a philosopher at all, evaluating his book as follows: "it contains, along with strange errors, many accurate and original opinions, which are valuable for the researcher, but on account of the author's evident lack of deeper philo-

149 Kaszewski, 1891: 111.

150 Kaszewski, 1891: 112.

151 Schneider, 1903: 188.

sophical beliefs, it could be harmful for unprepared minds, by producing in them a false image of philosophy as a series ineffective outbursts.”¹⁵²

As C. Głombik noted, however, it was Pawlicki’s first cousin, Teodor Pawlicki, a doctor of medicine, who outdid all the criticism of the above reviewers. In addition to being a philanthropist, this Pawlicki was also a freethinker and an atheist, and this sharpened his criticism. Let us quote a few passages from his explicit and unambiguous text. It begins with praise regarding the lucidity of the Pawlicki’s literary style, but very quickly the harsh reviewer begins to focus on the negative aspects of Pawlicki’s philosophical research: “recognising the great scientific value of these works, and bowing down to the author’s vast knowledge, I will nevertheless be so bold as to point to a negative aspect, namely a marked bias, especially in the *History of philosophy*. Admittedly, a certain degree of partiality is inevitable, because no one can be absolutely impartial [...]. Philosophy, however, is written for a meagre handful of educated people, so any bias is misplaced.”¹⁵³ He did not deny Catholic thinkers the right, or even the duty, to argue and to voice their own views and to pursue criticism, which often leads to positive outcomes, as in any discussion or debate. He could not agree, however, with presenting religious dogmas as philosophical truths, and this should have no place in rational discourse. From this point of view, all the assessments in Pawlicki’s work should be rejected, and only his erudition, style and the lucidity of the exposition remain indisputable.

There is no question, however, that Pawlicki had succeeded in realising two of his postulates for the methodology of the historiography of philosophy: to portray the history of philosophy in relation to culture and politics in the widest sense of these terms, and to demonstrate, for the benefit of the reader, the relevance of past human thought to present times, not only in the sphere of philosophy itself but also in politics, ethics and religion. Pawlicki was therefore critical of Plato’s futile metaphysical speculations, for example those in the *Parmenides*.

Considering Pawlicki’s criticisms of other core authors of the history of philosophy, his *History of Greek Philosophy* undoubtedly escaped the objections of leaving readers without answers to the philosophical questions discussed by the ancient thinkers. It could even be said that there were sometimes too many answers to such questions, especially in a work which was to be historical in character, so the charges Pawlicki made against Protestant writers of histories of philosophy could also be made against him. He

152 Lutosławski, 1902: XVIII, footnote.

153 Quote in: Głombik, 1973: 277.

did not avoid evaluations of the philosophical views of the past, and even regarded this to be one of the goals of researching the history of philosophy. Pawlicki's evaluations, however, are twofold; on the one hand, he assessed the role of given philosophers against the background of the disputes and problems of their times, and their historical position, on the other hand, he evaluated their philosophical discoveries in terms of their compatibility with Divine Revelation. The first is, beyond any doubt, a valuable intellectual task for the historian of philosophy, the second reflects Pawlicki's worldview, but also takes into account the potential interests of his readers.

Pawlicki believed that becoming a historian of philosophy involved, above all, being a philosopher, that is, having a system of philosophical views to apply for presenting and, more importantly, for assessing the views of one's predecessors: "it is difficult to pronounce a fair judgment without any guiding axiom."¹⁵⁴ Pawlicki's criterion for assessing philosophers of the past was evident: "What was important in his aims was the predominance of moral evaluation. This consists in assessing works and persons according to the conformity of their content and teachings with the principles of the Christian outlook. He placed particular emphasis on whether and to what extent the philosophers under examination came close to the findings of Christian teaching in their theoretical views and the practical consequences resulting from them, and whether they adjusted to its requirements in the example of their own lives. On the basis of such evaluations, he wanted not only to draw inferences about the moral character of individual works but also about their intellectual validity, about their purely cognitive qualities as true or false pieces of work."¹⁵⁵ Pawlicki's stance was clearly defined, and it is hard to speak of any kind of critical distance to the research subject or to his own views.¹⁵⁶ It is only perhaps in the case of the secondary literature, an extensive survey of which can be found in Pawlicki's work, that a more objective critical attitude can be found, for he believed that every philosophical doctrine contained a grain of truth, though his assessment of their truth value depended on his own philosophical views.

Although meeting Semenenko greatly affected Pawlicki's life and outlook, it seems not to have affected how he viewed Plato's philosophy. In contrast to Semenenko's "Symposia", the *History of Greek Philosophy* was

154 Pawlicki, 1890: 21.

155 Głombik, 1972: 92.

156 Such distance is ascribed to the work of Pawlicki by T. Ślipko (1996: 318).

intended as an academic textbook and a work for general audiences. Both authors, however, showed similar ambivalence in their evaluation of Plato's concepts, but Pawlicki seems to have shifted the boundary between what was sublime and close to Christianity in Plato, and what was lofty, but unacceptable for Christians. Plato, portrayed as a pre-Christian thinker, was almost incorporated into the history of Christian thought.

In his panegyric in honour of Pawlicki, T. Misicki posited that there was no one in Poland, or even in the whole world, who knew Plato or Aristotle as well as Pawlicki did. In the light of this, Misicki's comparison of Pawlicki and Lutosławski could only have been to the detriment of the latter, despite the fact that as a Plato scholar, Lutosławski undoubtedly kept pace with Pawlicki: "To what extent does Father Stefan's scholarship match up [...], to that of the great, after all, whatever else may be said of him Wincenty Lutosławski? [...] Regarding, for example, their knowledge of Greek philosophy, especially Plato's philosophy, and of Latin, Greek, Romance and Germanic languages, both are great, but Pawlicki's knowledge of all this is more genuine [...]. Lutosławski's language is almost always clear and correct, thoroughly Polish and expressive, but it lacks the poetic charm that can be found in Pawlicki. – When we begin to dissect the principles of each of the philosophers, of Lutosławski and Father Stefan, when we go more deeply into their works, what strikes us is Lutosławski's obsession and sectarianism and Father Pawlicki's consistency and Catholicism."¹⁵⁷ Lutosławski himself, despite all Pawlicki's hostile and ironic remarks, despite having been stopped by Pawlicki from taking up the Chair of Philosophy that had been promised to him by M. Straszewski, eventually, when all these issues had faded into insignificance spoke of Pawlicki with respect, acknowledging his great expertise on Plato.¹⁵⁸

When assessing the role of Pawlicki's work and his image of Plato, it is worth taking into account H. Struve's opinion. He pointed out that Pawlicki dissociated himself from new trends in philosophy, tending to favour a more traditional approach.¹⁵⁹ This was also true of his research on Plato, where, as we have seen, he adopted a conservative approach, considering such an approach to be sound since it had been confirmed by serious authorities. This is particularly evident in his chronological conclusions and in the interpretation of the theory of ideas. It also manifested itself in his unrestrained polemics against both the methods and results of contem-

157 Misicki, 1916: 27–28.

158 Trzebuchowski, 1977: 9.

159 Struve: 1911: 360.

porary research, especially against Lutosławski's research on Plato's chronology, as well as against those interpretations of the theory of ideas that had their source in Kantian thought. It should be noted, however, that Pawlicki had not managed to analyse more closely works such as P. Natorp's *Platos Ideenlehre*, which he disapproved of merely on account of their rejection of the Aristotelian understanding of the ideas as substances.

In comparison with, for example, E. Zeller, whose references to English, French or Italian studies were rather rare, Pawlicki frequently discussed, took issue with, and evaluated foreign studies. Unfortunately, his works were hardly known at all in Europe, for his accomplishments on Plato in foreign languages were limited to concise reports written in German and several lectures delivered in that language. In view of this, the opinion that "perhaps it was only Pawlicki and Lutosławski, who were recognised in Europe for their works in ancient philosophy at that time"¹⁶⁰ can only be true with regard to Lutosławski. Though not well known abroad, Pawlicki's *opus magnum* was described, in a brief but concise assessment by L. Miodoński, as follows: "an extraordinary research project which is incomparable to anything on the history of philosophy in Polish literature. It is the outcome of an entire life of philological study, profound philosophical reflection and thirty years of teaching at the Jagiellonian University. Although the author intended his work as a textbook, it cannot be said to belong to this genre in the strict sense of the word. [...] For one thing, its length in no way corresponds to the formula of the textbook. [...] Deliberation on particular aspects of ancient philosophy is accompanied by continuous discourse with contemporary interpretations. [...] The analysis of individual philosophical problems is conducted not only within the context of ancient culture, but is constantly confronted with the whole history of philosophy. [...] Only a person of extraordinary intellectual culture could have produced such a study."¹⁶¹

A distinctive hallmark of Pawlicki's approach to Plato is the almost boundless feeling of admiration he cherished for the author of the dialogues. He tried to reconcile the tolerance of ancient humanism, its absolution of human weakness and its disposition to sin with the uncompromising morality of Christianity. In this way Pawlicki became an excellent representative and inheritor of Christian humanism. "A monk who spoke

160 Mylik, 2005: 112. Mylik prepared an extensive bibliography of Pawlicki's works, but not even a single work devoted to ancient philosophy published in foreign languages can be found there.

161 Miodoński, 1999: 14.

with the same reverence about Sophocles, Plato, and Horace, as about the Saints of the Lord.”¹⁶²

Pawlicki gained a reputation in the history of theological thought as an apologist for Christianity, and for its originality and authenticity. This apologetic tendency was also manifested in his interpretation of Plato's thought. Pawlicki emphasised everything in Plato that even remotely coincided with Christian philosophy, thus justifying the view on the historical role of Plato, as the one who was to prepare the Greek world for acceptance of Christianity. Despite being fundamentally different from the Christian worldview, concepts such as: God as the Creator, Providence, the immortality and exceptionality of the soul, the vanity of the world, the need to edify human relations were presented by Pawlicki as paving the way for Christianity. Many readers were sceptical about the evaluative part of his work, but the informative layer impressed them with its erudition, with his mastery of the subject and his ability to communicate his knowledge. To sum up, Pawlicki's work had undeniable merits, but considering the rapid development of research on ancient philosophy, including Plato, both worldwide and even within Poland, it was, unfortunately, a work that came several decades too late for it to play an inspirational and culture-forming role.

Pawlicki was torn between “classics and apologetics”¹⁶³ and it was Plato who was to play an important role in his inner ideological conflict. He used Plato to fill the gap, so to speak, between pagan antiquity and the requirements of modern neo-scholasticism, for his research on Plato allowed him to reinforce Christian thought, without being forced to abandon ancient philosophy, his beloved field of study.

W. Potempa and his critical assessment of Pawlicki's Christianised Plato

With respect to Plato, Pawlicki was “nothing less than a fanatic admirer and expert,”¹⁶⁴ and his elevation of anything in ancient thought that was akin to Christianity was undoubtedly a sign of his love of antiquity, and especially of Plato. It was only in subsequent years that the dangers to faith concealed behind such an attitude to Plato became apparent. One of the critics of this image of the Athenian philosopher was Wiktor Potempa

162 Morstin, 1957: 28.

163 Palacz, 1999: 257.

164 German, 1966: 47.

(1887–1942), another expert on Plato. He was opposed to what he believed to be an over-emphasis on the links between pagan thought and Christianity. In an article, which was obviously inspired by Pawlicki's work, he expressed the need to justify Pawlicki and his delight in Plato. Having listed a number of elements connecting Christianity with Platonism, which had often been misunderstood, Potempa went on to stress all that differentiated Plato from Christianity. He concluded his paper with a direct reference to Pawlicki's work: "Despite all the similarities, Plato's teaching is remote from Christianity, but what it shares with our religion is so exalted, so beautifully uttered and so appealing to the heart that it is no wonder that this philosopher has always had numerous admirers among Christian thinkers. It was also for this reason that our late Rev. Stefan Pawlicki, a long-standing professor at the University of Kraków, became an ardent lover of Plato and devoted the greater part of his work, *The History of Greek Philosophy*, to him."¹⁶⁵

Potempa could not accept the fascination with Plato that he found in Pawlicki's work. He admitted that there was much of the content of the dialogues that could be tempting to readers, but Potempa perceived it as a threat since this alien material could be smuggled into Christian thought under the guise of a love of antiquity. It is important to note that Potempa's opinion was not just the excessive concern of a cautious priest about potential heresy, but it resulted from his long-term study of Plato. In 1912, Potempa was awarded his Ph.D. in philosophy in Wrocław (Breslau) on the basis of a dissertation on the *Phaedrus*. At his doctoral conferment ceremony on February 21st 1913 he delivered a lecture in which he compared the ethics of Plato and Aristotle. This was to mark the start of his studies in the history of philosophy. The goal of his doctoral dissertation, which Potempa regarded to be only a preliminary work, was to draw attention to the ethical element in Plato, whom he considered to be, above all, an ethicist and a social reformer. In the preface to the dissertation Potempa reported on his further research plans, which included the preparation of a longer study devoted entirely to Plato's ethics and to those parts of his philosophy that were related to it.¹⁶⁶ His presentation of Plato as an ethicist on the pages of the dissertation was based on the *Phaedrus*, but Potempa intended to expound the development of Plato's ethics prior to the composition of this dialogue.

165 Potempa, 2010: 205.

166 Potempa, 1913: III; cf.: Pawlak, 2005: 411–412.

The dissertation opens with methodological observations and considerations on how to interpret Plato. Potempa argues that the numerous studies on Plato with their diverse findings had their origin in the specificity of Plato's writing. He also remarked that contemporary researchers had devoted so much attention to issues concerning the chronology of particular dialogues that there was virtually no space left to present their philosophical substance. He therefore called on philosophers to devote more attention to the content of the dialogues. Yet even a study devoted to a single dialogue required taking into account the whole of Plato's philosophy, particularly with respect to the theory of ideas, the various interpretations of which were noted by Potempa. Having investigated the dialogues, Potempa came to the conclusion that it was ethics that was the core of Plato's philosophy, for Plato had developed the practical tendencies of Socrates' thought even further. Moreover, throughout his life Plato had been occupied with ethical and political issues which can be seen from the *Republic* and the *Laws*, which were produced at different stages of his life; his activities, like the Sicilian journeys and the founding of the Academy, seem to have resulted from similar motives. Ethical issues can be found in all the dialogues, and the *Republic* presents solutions to problems that had already been posed by Plato in the Socratic period. In the *Republic*, which Potempa tended to regard as a single, planned whole, an edifice of Plato's ethical system can be found, parts of which are scattered around in smaller works. It should be remembered that Potempa used the term ethics in the widest possible sense, which included social philosophy.¹⁶⁷

Out of all the divergent opinions on the date of the *Phaedrus*, Potempa chose to join the supporters of a late date for the composition of this dialogue, like the majority of language statisticians, including Lutosławski. He also supplemented their arguments with philosophical evidence. The fact that the division of the soul into rational and irrational parts occurs in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Republic*, while it is absent from the Socratic dialogues and even from the *Phaedo* provides evidence of the late, mature character of the *Phaedrus*. This dialogue, as Potempa believed, must have been written after the *Republic*, because before Plato could express the concept of the soul in poetic form, he first had to make it his own, in other words, it had to be completely absorbed by him, and this must have happened while writing the *Republic*. In addition to the chronological difficulties of the *Phaedrus*, its subject was also impossible to determine unambiguously. By focusing on all these essentially marginal problems, re-

167 Potempa, 1913: 1–6.

searchers had neglected the philosophical content of the *Phaedrus*, and what had been written, according to Potempa, tended to be one-sided. In his short survey of the literature, Potempa referred to Lutosławski's book, in which the author argued that researchers had failed to understand the *Phaedrus* by paying too much attention to minor details instead of focusing on the philosophical substance of the dialogue.¹⁶⁸ He failed to notice, however, that this cavil also pertained to his own work, for according to Potempa, Lutosławski's exposition of Plato suffered greatly from being made to fit his chronological premises. A similar opinion was expressed by Potempa about Natorp's interpretation of the *Phaedrus*, in which the neo-Kantianist had sought to retrieve too much logical material.¹⁶⁹

Plato saw moral perfection as the proper condition of the soul, and for him, philosophy was not just theory, but the philosophical life, or ethics. "The ethics in the *Phaedrus* begins, as in Christianity, with the admission that there is a struggle going on in the human heart, with the intellect and the higher aspirations taking up the fight against the lower urges. [...] Human beings must undertake this struggle, because it is only in this way that happiness can be achieved: here on earth and in the after-life."¹⁷⁰ Plato's ethics did not resemble the gospel of power, as Potempa called it, of Calicles or Thrasymachus, for it recommended nurturing the inner life, yet it was not a quietistic ethics abdicating all responsibility for the world. Plato in the *Phaedrus* displayed reformatory tendencies in three areas. The first of these areas was eroticism, where there was a need to guide the philosopher to overcome his love for boys and to persuade him to bring the lower parts of the soul under the control of the higher. Rhetoric was the second field that required reform, according to Plato. It was to become more like the art of medicine, requiring knowledge of the soul of the one to be persuaded to something, knowledge of the parts of the soul, and knowledge of what was righteous. According to Plato, the rhetoric of his times could not be considered an art at all because it lacked the essential feature of art, which is the truth. It did not bring its audiences closer to the truth, but even averted them from it, whereas the rhetoricians' goal should be truth alone, and in their words and deeds they should strive for divine, not human, pleasure. The final field for reform was religion. The gods in the *Phaedrus* were pure spirits, morally perfect,

168 Lutosławski, 1897: 326.

169 Potempa, 1913: 6–10.

170 Potempa, 1913: 63; cf.: Pawlak, 2005: 414. Pawlak translated some passages of Potempa's thesis into Polish.

happy, free from jealousy and they were good rulers who knew the truth, in fact, moral paragons.¹⁷¹

Finally, Potempa turned to Socrates' final prayer and its three requests, which he translated into the language of Plato's philosophy. The first was for the proper condition of the soul, based on virtue; the second – for grace, so that the soul would be supported by favourable conditions of life; the third expressed Plato's attitude to external riches, which were not despised by him, but he required only as much as was good for a reasonable man, leaving the final decision to the gods. This prayer reminded Potempa of the Sermon on the Mount (Mt 6, 33): "Seek first His Kingdom and His righteousness!"¹⁷²

Potempa, therefore, observed that Plato's ethics shared some common values with Christian ethics. There were not many of them, but they were important. The starting point for both ethical systems was the proper diagnosis of the non-homogeneous structure of the human being, then there was the need to emphasise the spiritual sphere, and finally a means for bringing harmony to the soul was to be introduced, consisting in moderation and the surrender of the lower sphere to the higher. Thus, Potempa's view, though not as enthusiastic as Pawlicki's, was undemonstratively favourable to Plato's ethics.

Potempa's dissertation was noticed abroad. Eugen Rolfes, a translator of Aristotle and also a Catholic priest, wrote a review in which he reported on the content and aims of the dissertation. He considered the whole work to have been written with great insight and erudition.¹⁷³ Some interest in the dissertation was also displayed in *Mind*, where a short, but laudatory, note was published, assessing the work as thorough and reasonable, with a useful analysis of the complex structure of the dialogue. The reviewer was particularly impressed with Potempa's emphasis on the significance of ethical teaching in the *Phaedrus* and with his unusually reasonable and balanced style of argument. Finally, the hope was expressed that the author would continue his research on Plato.¹⁷⁴

Additional evidence of Potempa's interest in the history of philosophy, and especially in Plato, is provided in the article mentioned above, in which he addressed more broadly an issue that was probably inspired by

171 Potempa, 1913: 63–67.

172 Potempa, 1913: 67–68; cf.: Pawlak, 2005: 414.

173 Rolfes, 1913: 390–391.

174 "Der Phaidros in der Entwicklung der Ethik unter [!] Reformgedanken Platons". 1914.

Pawlicki's work, and was only mentioned in the doctoral thesis, namely the similarities and differences between Plato and Christian thought. He started with the observation that Plato had exerted a significant influence on philosophy, science and European culture from antiquity to modern times. This influence had made its mark on Early Christianity, as can be seen in the writings of the Church Fathers, especially Augustine. Even in the Middle Ages, despite the domination of Aristotelianism, certain elements of Platonism were adopted, as was also true in the neo-scholastic movement. "The reason for this phenomenon is, above all, the compatibility of many beliefs of this philosopher with Christian teaching. Plato accepts the existence of God, Providence, guardian angels, the immortality of the soul, the sanction of the afterlife, and one could even say – of purgatory."¹⁷⁵

In the *Laws* Plato expounded a view of God as the foundation of morality and as the first cause of movement. The existence of ideas beyond the world was bound up with their model character, and in this respect the *ante rem* universals of Aquinas were similar. Knowledge of the ideas could only be acquired by freeing oneself from the body. "This reminds us of human misery, as St. Paul describes it, and the longing for God and the desire to be released from the body and be with Christ as soon as possible."¹⁷⁶ Christian mysticism seemed to have much in common with Plato's theory of ideas, particularly its emphasis on the strength of love, together with its condemnation of the part of human nature inclined to wrongdoing. Virtuous love, being a longing for truth and beauty, was subsequently to become longing for God. In the *Symposium* – it is worth noting here that Potempa recommended Pawlicki's analysis of this dialogue – it is said that beauty can only be discerned as a direct vision which excludes reason, and this idea was to re-emerge, via neo-Platonic thought, as the notion of ecstatic love in the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. In his dialogues Plato introduced Socrates as the model of a moral hero who "feels that he has been appointed by God to know himself and to exhort others to virtue. He himself appears to be a true pastor, stopping everyone in the market square and asking them if they have tended to their souls."¹⁷⁷ Socrates' belief in the necessity of respecting the law and not returning evil for evil was "a lofty example of obeying the law and showing forgiveness for injustice, but it was not until the sacred principles of Christ's morality that mankind was

175 Potempa, 2010: 194; cf.: Pawlak, 2005: 415.

176 Potempa, 2010: 197.

177 Potempa, 2010: 199.

to be guided to this goal.”¹⁷⁸ Plato was deeply convinced of the immortality of the soul, and its connection to the body, despite a certain similarity to the gods, “resembles original sin which we have committed through our forefathers and which, as »fomes peccati«, reveals itself in our will, inclining us to evil.”¹⁷⁹ The last common points of Platonism and Christianity were the edification of social life, the concept of virtues, and the emphasis on the absence of private property, which, though it has not yet been applied to political life, has been realised in monastic life.

So much for the similarities, some of which, on closer examination, proved to be nothing more than semblances. The source of these similarities could not have been Plato’s ostensible knowledge of the *Old Testament*, but “they can easily be explained by the origins of all truths from one source, which is God. He speaks to human beings not only by supranatural Revelation, on which faith is based, but He also manifested Himself in nature and in the voice of the conscience, that is by natural revelation. These two revelations cannot be contradictory, having originated in one source. [...] Since, however, as a consequence of original sin, the human mind is incapable of learning religious-moral truths correctly and without error by means of natural powers, then Plato could not have avoided such errors either.”¹⁸⁰

Having explained the source of similarities and errors, Potempa focused on the latter: Plato was not aware of the supranatural purpose of ethics or the conception of grace and the sacraments; and the salvation, of which he sometimes spoke, could not have been that which resulted from the death of Christ. Plato’s monotheism was not explicit, for the one God could be identified neither with the idea of the good nor with the Demiurge, who was neither omnipotent nor the highest in the hierarchy of being. Although Plato opposed anthropomorphism and strove for monotheism, he did not know the truth about God or the concept of creation out of nothing. Potempa considered the idea of metempsychosis to be incompatible not only with religion, but even with common sense. He criticised above all its consequences, namely the inability of the soul to acquire permanent happiness.

Potempa also criticised Plato’s utopia in the *Republic*, arguing that: “it contradicts not only the principles of Christian morality, but even of sound philosophy. It is an illusion to believe that it is feasible to realise

178 Potempa, 2010: 200.

179 Potempa, 2010: 201.

180 Potempa, 2010: 202; cf.: Pawlak, 2005: 415.

communism among the people in the world, for, as the example of Bolshevism demonstrates, after the abolition of private property all desire to work and strive for progress would cease. Even in monasteries, great sacrifice is required to carry out the ideal of poverty. The abolition of the family would affect children, above all, for nothing can replace the warmth that flows into their souls from their parents' love, as can be seen from the shortcomings of even the best-run orphanage. Plato argues for the abolition of marriage to raise the dignity of women, but it is the women who would be most severely affected, for they would lose the highest dignity, which is maternity. And we all can see something discrediting to our dignity in the philosopher's demand that human beings breed like animals. Finally, experience tells us that even a weak child can grow up to be a useful person, so weak or unhealthy children should not be put to death."¹⁸¹ Plato contradicted not only the principles of Christian morality, but attempts to implement some of his ideas, such as communism or the common upbringing of children, which have already been tried out and have failed.

Potempa's paper was undoubtedly erudite and rich in content, showing that he was not only an engaged Plato scholar but that he was well versed in the history of philosophy, including Christian philosophy. His opinion about Plato appears to have remained constant from the times of composing his doctoral thesis, and his paper on Plato does not address the issue of Platonism "in a more objective and critical manner,"¹⁸² as it is sometimes argued. The difference in his treatment of Platonism in the later work stems from the fact that in his earlier thesis he researched only a small part of Plato's philosophy, that is ethics, which he considered only on the basis of the *Phaedrus* and briefly in the preceding dialogues. Given the limited subject of this research work, the assessment of Plato's ethics turned out to be quite positive as it revealed some views in common with the Sermon on the Mount. When, some years later, Potempa started to study the whole of Plato's philosophy and its reception, the evaluation proved to be slightly different, not, however, on account of a change in the author's views, but rather because his research area had expanded. Although Potempa stressed that, of all the pagan thinkers, Plato most closely approached Christianity, unlike Pawlicki, he did not attribute to Plato the historiosophical mission of preparing pagans for the advent of Christ; he merely believed that the reason for the similarities between Plato and Christianity was that God

181 Potempa, 2010: 204–205.

182 Pawlak, 2005: 415.

had endowed Plato with unique capabilities. The choice of beliefs for Christians was clear, but Potempa understood that Plato could be tempting for Christians, and therefore caution was required to avoid transferring to the twentieth century Plato's obvious errors, the regrettable effects of which Potempa had already observed in social philosophy.

Soon after this paper, Potempa's *History of Philosophy* was published, being intended as a textbook for clerical students in seminaries. His methodology appears to have been similar to Pawlicki's, for in the introduction Potempa observed that most of the textbooks on the history of philosophy wrongly ignored religious, moral and social issues, and that "the absence of evaluation of the systems expounded in the textbooks may be conceptually confusing for readers."¹⁸³ Like Pawlicki, Potempa considered it impossible to understand philosophy without knowledge of its wider cultural and historical context.

According to Potempa, although the ideas had logical significance, they could not be simply reduced to logic. Referring directly to neo-Kantians and, in particular, Natorp, Potempa wrote: "in his opinion, ideas are nothing more than the laws of our intellect, and the idea of good is only the most general law. Such an understanding of Plato's teaching cannot be maintained, for the ideas have metaphysical, in addition to logical, significance."¹⁸⁴ Referring to Plato's views on God, scattered throughout the dialogues, Potempa concluded: "it must be said that, considering his times, this philosopher has an elevated notion of God and is convinced of the existence of only one God."¹⁸⁵ Potempa even quoted some passages showing parallels between the dialogues and the *Old Testament*, although he avoided drawing far-reaching conclusions from these.

Plato's politics originated from his disappointment with the actual political practices of his time. "Plato could be accused of condemning a certain faction of people to great sacrifices. But the philosopher does not heed such criticism because in his opinion individuals should sacrifice themselves for the sake of society as a whole."¹⁸⁶ Although in his teachings Plato stressed the cardinal virtues, he was too indulgent with regard to many misdemeanours against nature, such as in his theory of love; moreover, he allowed lying in politics, getting drunk, killing disabled newborns, but worst of all was his communism and the community of women. Some of

183 Potempa, 1926: V.

184 Potempa, 1926: 112–113.

185 Potempa, 1926: 122.

186 Potempa, 1926: 139.

his demands, however, have already been put into practice, such as the organisation of an army by each state, the training of clerks for the civil service and the introduction of state-run education.

What was of value for Potempa in Plato was the foundations of logic and the theory of causes, which was later developed by Aristotle and subsequently taken over by scholasticism. And it was this that essentially proved Plato's greatness. It is little wonder, then, that Potempa concluded: "The value of Plato's philosophy is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that out of his Academy came one of the greatest thinkers known in the history of philosophy, namely Aristotle."¹⁸⁷

To sum up, while Pawlicki's book was much better written, with greater mastery of the subject, and represented an important voice in the academic discussions of the time, it was Potempa who succeeded in something that Pawlicki was unable to achieve. By using Aristotle, the cornerstone of scholasticism, as the basis for assessing Plato from the Christian point of view, Potempa justified research into pagan thought in the neo-scholastic movement. Potempa's exposition of Plato did not present a complete image of the philosopher, and his discussion of the particular fields of philosophy was largely restricted to quoting excerpts from the dialogues. It therefore seems that the charge that Potempa "supplemented purely speculative questions with religious, moral and social issues that were not always closely related to philosophy"¹⁸⁸ does not seem to be accurate because such a methodological approach might have guaranteed the book a wider reception than only among the adherents of neo-Thomism.

Compared to other synthetic studies in the history of philosophy addressed to clerical students, Potempa's work proved to be outstanding in the parts devoted to ancient philosophy. In a review it was remarked that, despite his criticisms of Plato, he wrote about him *con amore*. The whole work was assessed positively as "written as impartially as possible, as they say, *sine ira et studio*."¹⁸⁹ In comparison, for example, with the book by Jan Bączek, the exposition of antiquity and of Plato falls definitely in favour of Potempa. Bączek openly admitted that his work was based mostly on secondary literature, and some parts of it had simply been translated and included in his text.¹⁹⁰

187 Potempa, 1926: 146.

188 Pawlak, 2005: 417.

189 Romanowski, 1927: 413.

190 Bączek, 1909: XIII–XIV.

Potempa, then, can to some degree be said to have completed the work of Pawlicki. He succeeded in presenting the entire philosophy of Plato, and evaluated it in the light of Christian tradition, though his evaluation was much more critical than that of Pawlicki. Potempa warned Christian readers not to delight excessively in Plato, for he could lead them astray. Only readers properly prepared for meeting Plato, that is, equipped with knowledge provided by Potempa's work, could acquaint themselves with the dialogues without fear of being seduced. Pawlicki, unfortunately, as Potempa concluded regretfully, let Plato beguile him.

3.2 Plato as the founder of the tenets of Messianism according to W. Lutosławski

When Wincenty Lutosławski (1863–1954) published his first works, he remarked that “Plato is beginning to win adherents in Poland,”¹⁹¹ evidence of which was to be found in translations of the dialogues produced by P. Świdorski, A. Maszewski and B. Kašinowski. Lutosławski himself greatly contributed to the resurgence of studies on Plato, being not only influential in Poland, but also arousing interest abroad. In the present work, in order to portray a more complete image of Lutosławski's research and his impact on Polish audiences, more frequent reference will be made to his studies in Polish, then to his less known studies in German, and finally his *opus magnum* in English.

Early preparatory studies

Lutosławski turned to philosophy thanks to his encounter with Gustav Teichmüller, who encouraged him to take up the study of ancient philosophy. In his later years, Lutosławski remembered his fascination with the personality of this teacher, whom he considered to be an expert in the history of philosophy.¹⁹² Among the books recommended by Teichmüller was Plato's *Symposium*, which had an immense ideological impact on the

191 Lutosławski, 1891: 69, footnote 121.

192 Lutosławski quoted Teichmüller's opinion of how he had discovered a golden philosophical nature in Lutosławski (Lutosławski, 1994: 102–103). Later, however, Teichmüller abandoned this opinion (Plečkaitis, 2002: 124). The biographical data in this chapter were based mostly on the following previous works: Mróz, 2005; 2005b; Biliński, 2005; Mróz, 2005a; 2007; 2008; Biliński, 2010.

young Lutosławski. As Lutosławski himself later recalled, he became convinced about the immortality of the soul, which he called ‘discovery of the self (jaźń),’¹⁹³ after reading the final parts of Diotima’s speech (210e–211d). Whether memories of later years can always be trusted is debatable, but there is no doubt that the relationship between Lutosławski’s philosophical views and Plato’s thought was to manifest itself clearly in Lutosławski’s subsequent works.

After returning from his travels around Europe, Lutosławski took Teichmüller’s advice and decided to write a dissertation on ancient philosophy as a basis for obtaining a master’s degree in philosophy, which, in turn, would give him the possibility of receiving a post at the university. Although this work is rarely referred to, it attracted the attention of foreign reviewers to the young author. The study involved an analysis of Aristotle’s philosophy of politics, followed by its comparison to Plato’s thought and the work of Niccolo Machiavelli. The comparative part was described by the author as belonging to the historiography of philosophy or to the field of the history of ideas.¹⁹⁴

Lutosławski’s starting point was the alleged opposition between the Academy and the Peripatos, which was believed to have resulted from the contradictory principles of both schools, but some scholars, including Teichmüller, undermined this view, arguing that Aristotle was largely dependent on Plato. Lutosławski’s intention was not to belittle Aristotle’s merits, but rather to demonstrate the development of philosophical concepts, which was a requirement if philosophy was to be accepted as a science. While comparing Plato and Aristotle, Lutosławski was unsparing in his disapproval of the latter’s lack of objectivity in his criticism of Plato in *Politics*. Let us refer to Lutosławski’s arguments. Aristotle accused Plato of failing to determine what caused the transformation of political systems (1316a), but Lutosławski rebuffed this charge, arguing that Plato had indirectly shown that the factor that caused transformation of political systems was the ruling class itself (*Rep.* 545c–d) and this showed that Plato and Aristotle had similar views in this regard. In the same passage of *Politics* Aristotle claimed that Plato had not determined the order in which political systems followed one another. Lutosławski considered this accusation to be poorly substantiated, resulting from Aristotle’s miscomprehension of

193 Lutosławski, 1994: 103–114. J. Skoczyński considers this discovery to be one of the two ‘private revelations’ that were experienced by Lutosławski (Skoczyński, 2005: 91–93).

194 Lutosławski, 1888: VII–VIII.

Plato, for Socrates' disciple had not intended to present the historical development of political systems; his concept of the transformation of the state was based on rational, rather than historical, grounds.¹⁹⁵

Lutosławski described some of the allegations against Plato as eristic, and concluded that Aristotle's entire criticism of Plato's political philosophy was based on spiteful motives. On comparing passages from the works of both philosophers, Lutosławski found a number of similarities between them. Although the philosophers differed, for example, with respect to the role of historical examples in their discussions on the development of political systems, with Plato avoiding them, they both started their deliberations by contrasting right and wrong forms of government. Similarly, they both regarded revolutions and coups d'états as phenomena displaying the natural order of things, and resulting from human nature rather than being merely chance events. They both considered defence and observance of the law, as well as respect for religion, as means of maintaining political systems, and Lutosławski argued that Aristotle had undoubtedly adopted this position from Plato's writings, for he took over Plato's unusual metaphoric expression, defining the gods as σύμμαχοι, allies (*Leg.* 906a), which he retained in his work (*Politics*, 1315a).¹⁹⁶ On the basis of these similarities, Lutosławski concluded that much of the teaching ascribed to Aristotle could be found scattered throughout Plato's works, where they were presented in an artistic manner, in keeping with Plato's attitude to written works, which were only intended to remind readers of views with which they were already familiar.¹⁹⁷ In short, Lutosławski argued for the great debt Aristotle owed to Plato.

Despite the fact that Aristotle was the primary subject of Lutosławski's dissertation, a considerable amount of the work was taken up with demonstrating Aristotle's dependence on Plato. Aristotle was also accused of not being impartial in his assessment of his own teacher. It seems natural then, given this background, that Lutosławski's interests should have evolved towards Plato. Decades later, Lutosławski recalled that "the master's degree dissertation revealed to me the eternal value of Plato's thought, and the dependence of Aristotle on him. I yearned to examine this dependence in the area of logic, of which Aristotle was considered to be the master and origi-

195 Lutosławski, 1888: 83–87.

196 Lutosławski, 1888: 88–94.

197 Lutosławski, 1888: 101.

nator. I therefore decided to investigate Plato's logic, which had been neglected as a consequence of great success of Aristotle's logic."¹⁹⁸

Teichmüller wrote a brief review of the dissertation, focusing primarily on the comparative part regarding Plato. He emphasised the innovative character of the work, and considered its greatest merit to be the demonstration of the dependence of Aristotle's political philosophy on the *Republic* and the *Laws*, thus denying Aristotle the status of an autonomous thinker. Teichmüller's only reservation was that Lutosławski had not explored the work of Isocrates and other writers contemporary to Plato and Aristotle. Apart from this limitation of the area of research, he assessed the findings of this part of the dissertation as useful and reliable.¹⁹⁹

Lutosławski's book was lucky to gain the attention of other foreign reviewers, who emphasised the Pole's dependence on Teichmüller in the chapter devoted to Plato,²⁰⁰ and even presented him as deriving from 'Teichmüller's school.'²⁰¹ The most comprehensive discussion of the book was rendered by Franz Susemihl, who unequivocally classified Lutosławski as one of Teichmüller's disciples, and even as one of his admirers. In an ironic attack on young people in general, and in particular, young researchers who were quick to make shameful accusations, Susemihl asked rhetorically whether Aristotle had not been too clever in making such allegations against Plato that could eventually be turned against him. Susemihl expressed serious doubts about whether Lutosławski had actually based his conclusions on his reading of the Stagirite's writings,²⁰² but he did not make any reference to Lutosławski's substantial evidence *i.e.* to his juxtaposition of a large number of parallel passages from the writings of Plato and Aristotle. To be fair, however, it must be added that Susemihl was less critical in his assessment of the remaining parts of Lutosławski's work.

Some time later, Lutosławski also published the text of the dissertation in an abridged Polish version, where he repeated his most important findings: "Aristotle shows a lack of gratitude in his references to his teacher, and instead of confessing how much he borrowed from him, he criticises Plato, imputing him with opinions he did not possess at all. Aristotle's al-

198 Lutosławski, 1994: 164.

199 Teichmüller, 1888.

200 Stämmeler, 1891.

201 Stein, 1890: 102.

202 Susemihl, 1891: 145–147. A review of Lutosławski's work was also written by Émile Durkheim, but there was little mention of Plato (Durkheim, 1889).

legations against Plato are all the more unfair in view of the fact that many of the opinions in his theory of revolution are literally copied from works of Plato that are well-known to us. [...] in almost all parts of his philosophy, Aristotle is dependent on Plato, and his chief merit lies in having systematised and supplemented Plato's ingenious thoughts. [...] Indeed his only merit is that he supplemented Plato's views on many issues and collected a great number of historical examples to support the beliefs of his master. Above all, Aristotle's work in this field, and in many others, was characterised by his ability to arrange thoughts in a systematic way, thus facilitating all scientific research and making further progress possible."²⁰³

The German dissertation by Lutosławski also aroused the interest of Polish audiences, not all of whom limited themselves to the Polish abridged version. In connection with the comparative part concerning Plato, one review expressed the view that, "a certain haste is evident at every step, which prevented the author from answering, with equal diligence, a multitude of important issues demanding solutions,"²⁰⁴ though, the actual juxtaposition of relevant passages from Plato and Aristotle was deemed to be of great value. Another extensive review, from the pages of *Biblioteka Warszawska* (*The Warsaw Library*), presented the most essential claims of the author, revealing Aristotle's philosophy of politics as "a skilful systematisation of Plato's theory, and a logical development of some of its ideas, which are supported by a rich array of historical material."²⁰⁵ The reviewer highlighted Aristotle's relation to Plato and the divergence of the two philosophers' methods of writing philosophy, adding that Lutosławski's aim was in agreement with that of other historians, that is, with "the idea of vindicating Plato."²⁰⁶ The comparative part of the book was considered to be useful and of lasting significance, while the author himself was deemed to be endowed with the talents necessary for work in the field of the history of philosophy.

Lutosławski's book, then, was noticed both at home and among foreign-language audiences. Most reviewers' attention was drawn to the part revealing Aristotle as an ungrateful disciple of Plato. Although this psychological conclusion might be considered a little far-fetched, the fact remains that there was a marked similarity between the passages chosen by Lutosławski from both authors, and the nature of Aristotle's criticism were

203 Lutosławski, 1900: 195–196.

204 Majchrowicz, 1888: 557.

205 Smolikowski, S., 1888: 474–475.

206 Smolikowski, S., 1888: 475.

noticed even by reviewers such as F. Susemihl, who questioned the Pole's conclusions. What was more significant for the subsequent development of research on Plato in Poland, however, was Lutosławski's decision to continue his studies on ancient philosophy, with particular emphasis on Plato and on his ideological impact.

In 1890, the prospect of obtaining a post at the Jagiellonian University opened up for Lutosławski, and with this in mind, he set about publishing his works at the Academy of Arts and Sciences. In 1891, the first part of the study *O logice Platona (On Plato's Logic)* appeared in print. This was an introduction to the whole work, providing his motivation for the choice of subject. Lutosławski considered a study on Plato's logic to be necessary because contemporary research had neglected this area. He intended to develop the findings presented in his master's thesis by demonstrating Aristotle's dependence on Plato, this time in the field of logic.

This, then, was to be not just a general 'vindication of Plato' as reviewers had described Lutosławski's previous work, but also of his logic, which was understood by Lutosławski as "the theory of thought and of the relation of thought to reality, truth and falsehood."²⁰⁷ This broad umbrella term allowed both ontological and epistemological issues to be included within the field of logic and therefore within Lutosławski's research on Plato's logic. The other task that the Pole set himself was "to demonstrate, first of all, the influence that Plato had exerted in the course of history, and subsequently, to determine where and why he had erred, and the extent to which his views could still be confirmed today."²⁰⁸ The aim of this historical research was thus to assess Plato's influence and the validity of his views.

This aim, however, could not be achieved without examining the sources, and this led to the issue of the authenticity and chronology of the dialogues. Lutosławski rightly saw the importance of conducting a preliminary study to determine the authenticity of the works and to examine the sources, not only for his own research on Plato's logic but also for any future research on Plato. He was aware of the innovative nature of his work on Polish soil, and he was also aware that the methods he applied could be useful for research into the texts of other authors. He remarked: "if Plato

207 Lutosławski, 1891: 3. Cf.: Mróz, 2003: 29–30. While considering Lutosławski's definition of logic, D. Piętka views its additional links with methodology and its relations to psychology and metaphysics as a 'sign of the times' (Piętka, 2006: 66–69, 85).

208 Lutosławski, 1891: 8.

had known how meticulously we would examine every detail of his text, he would have smiled ironically.”²⁰⁹

Lutosławski listed the following factors among the circumstances conducive to the preservation of the dialogues: the reverence of Plato’s disciples for their master, the fact that the Academy had persisted throughout the Hellenistic period and the positive attitude of Christian thinkers to Plato.²¹⁰ He regretted the absence of Polish translations of the dialogues as they would have contributed to the promotion of Plato in his country, and compared this situation to the abundance of Plato translations into Western languages. Lutosławski concluded: “Compared with this widespread and very well justified interest in Plato in Europe, we have lagged behind other nations.”²¹¹ He explained the paucity of translations as resulting from the lack of appreciation of Plato’s genius among Poles, but he hoped to change this state of affairs.

“After this long journey among the manuscripts and editions of Plato, before we can turn to presenting our philosopher’s logic, we still have to consider the very difficult issue of the authenticity and chronological sequence of particular dialogues, about which a very passionate discussion has been taking place among European scholars of the 19th century. We cannot remain passive witnesses to this”²¹² With this declaration, Lutosławski announced his plan to continue his research on Plato, which he succeeded in fulfilling. Although this initial work did not yet deal with philosophical issues, its informative layer of a bibliographic and compendium-like nature can still be useful even today.

This work was reviewed by Struve, who had been referred to in the work as a critic of Bronikowski’s translations of the dialogues and a promoter of

209 Lutosławski, 1891: 10.

210 The favourable attitude of Christianity to Plato’s philosophy was puzzling for Lutosławski: “The irony of fate grows before our very eyes when, after examining ancient philosophy thoroughly, we become convinced that Plato’s pantheism was far more distant from Christianity than the basically innocent and only apparently atheistic atomism of Democritus. Plato, from his philosophical standpoint, could neither assume the existence of a personal God nor the immortality of a personal soul, whereas these two main principles of Christianity are not at all insurmountably contradictory to atomism” (Lutosławski, 1891: 63, footnote 73).

211 Lutosławski, 1891: 51. Lutosławski, however, mistakenly mentioned F. Karpiński as the first translator, noting that he had translated several dialogues. He then included F. A. Kozłowski, A. Bronikowski, S. Siedlecki, P. Świdorski, A. Maszewski and B. Kašinowski in his list.

212 Lutosławski, 1891: 52.

new translations. He considered Lutosławski's book, along with the first volume of the *History of Greek Philosophy* by Pawlicki, as 'a reassuring sign' for the development of Polish studies in the history of philosophy. Struve could not have praised the young author more highly. Though yet unable to express a final opinion on the implementation of the plan outlined by Lutosławski, he stressed the source-based and erudite character of the work. Struve described the author as an independent, thorough and astute researcher.²¹³ A laudatory review was also included on the pages of the *Ateneum* journal, in which the reviewer seconded Lutosławski's concern about the lack of Polish translations of Plato.²¹⁴

Despite these enthusiastic reviews, Lutosławski's plans to lecture at the Jagiellonian University came to nothing. The Kraków publishers also abandoned the plans for the publication of the subsequent volumes of the book *O logice Platona*. With the help of Struve, one of Lutosławski's steadfast well-wishers, Lutosławski was able to publish the second part of the work on Plato's logic with the Józef Mianowski Foundation in Warsaw. In the preface to this edition Lutosławski acknowledged Struve's help, and remarked that this work was a continuation of the previous studies, which 'for various reasons' as he diplomatically put it, could not be published in Kraków, as in the case of the first volume.²¹⁵

The main substance of the second part of the work consisted of a survey of the secondary literature on Plato, with particular emphasis on those authors who had written studies of importance in the areas of Plato's logic, the chronology of the dialogues, or Aristotle's dependence on Plato. Much more important, however, were the methodological guidelines that Lutosławski drew up on the basis of the history of research on Plato. These included: the conviction of the need to refer primarily to the dialogues themselves, without placing too much confidence in the neo-Platonists or in Aristotle; the need to delineate the stages in Plato's philosophical development. Lutosławski also remarked: "Plato may also have professed to certain theories without articulating them, but their existence in his mind can be demonstrated clearly on the basis of those applications that would, in our opinion, have been impossible without knowledge of these theories."²¹⁶

213 Struve, 1891a.

214 Korotyński, 1891.

215 Lutosławski, 1892: III–IV.

216 Lutosławski, 1892: 25.

With regard to methodological issues, Lutosławski paid great attention to the structure of E. Zeller's work. Although he considered the German scholar to be "the most competent among the living experts in the history of Greek philosophy,"²¹⁷ he entered into a methodological dispute with him. Zeller's views can be summarised as follows: Plato did not produce any system of logic, so it is pointless to try to reconstruct Plato's logic as a unity abstracted from his dispersed remarks; moreover, it is a mistake to present Plato's views on the basis of contemporary philosophical analyses and concepts, for in this way Plato is attributed with ideas and opinions that he could not have known. Lutosławski contended with this, arguing that any other form applied to present Platonism would be equally arbitrary, whether based on contemporary, or any other, philosophy: "it is beyond doubt that any other arbitrary analysis of Plato will expose us to the same danger, since Plato himself did not present his philosophy in a systematic way, nor did he suggest how he would have done it. If our goal is to depart from Plato's text as little as possible, then a mere summary of his dialogues would be the best representation of Plato's philosophy."²¹⁸ Lutosławski, therefore, emphasised the significance of the original contribution of the historian of philosophy, which could be reflected even in the arrangement of the historical material. This methodological principle was particularly suitable for Plato's dialogues, for he did not do philosophy in a systematic or strictly ordered manner.

Historians of philosophy set themselves the aim of "expressing and understanding what the philosopher himself [...] thought, even though he may not always have articulated it clearly enough."²¹⁹ This is how Lutosławski comprehended the nature of research in the field of the history of philosophy; it could not just be a simple account of the subject or a summary of the text. The result of this work should consist in "the attain-

217 Lutosławski, 1892: 25.

218 Lutosławski, 1892: 26.

219 Lutosławski, 1892: 27. To support this opinion, Lutosławski recalled a passage by Kant: "I do not wish to go into any literary investigation here, in order to make out the sense which the sublime philosopher combined with his word [=idea]. I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention" (Kant 1998: 395–396); Lutosławski added that this apt thought was developed and implemented by H. Cohen in his works on Plato (Lutosławski, 1892: 60, footnote 214).

ment of an image of the psychological development of the philosopher's theory [...]. Furthermore, our goal will be to comprehend the essential substance, the actual significance, the principles and consequences of the philosopher's theory, even if the philosopher only articulated these theories incidentally or accidentally in his works.²²⁰

Nor should historians of philosophy confine themselves to stating facts but should investigate the relations between them. These facts were Plato's thoughts that are articulated in his works. Every single sentence in the dialogues is, however, problematic, and according to Lutosławski, it is the historian's responsibility to determine which of them actually represent Plato's views since he did not include himself as one of the characters in the dialogues. Only after considering all the dialogues, none of which is directly devoted to logic, though each contains some important remarks on this subject, and only after establishing the chronological relations between them will it be possible to arrange Plato's logical knowledge in a systematic way and present his psychological and philosophical development. The historian should, then, attempt to translate Plato into the language of modern philosophy, and this in turn should provide an answer to the question of the relevance of Platonism to contemporary times. Those, however, who object to this approach are driven by devotion and adoration for the masters of the past, including Plato. "We need not be constrained by the thought that Plato might have imagined his own system differently, as long as we can show that the image of his system that we produce corresponds to its essential inner substance."²²¹ Historians of philosophy should not, then, be paralysed by the fear of being charged with subjectivism, but they should be aware of it, because absolute objectivism in scientific work is only an ideal.

Lutosławski's methodological recommendations were highlighted by Władysław Mieczysław Kozłowski (1858–1935), who appreciated the 'heavy artillery of erudition' he found in this work. While supporting Lutosławski's views on the role of the historian of philosophy, he considered it fit to warn against their unrestricted application: "we fear that such an understanding of freedom in researching the subject could lead too far, and give us the Plato of poetry instead of the Plato of history."²²² One reviewer in the *Ateneum* attributed a little less significance to the second part

220 Lutosławski, 1892: 27.

221 Lutosławski, 1892: 30.

222 Kozłowski, W. M., 1892. Kozłowski provided the reader with his own recommendations concerning the aim of the work of a historian of philosophy. They

of *O logice Platona* than to the first, regarding it as essentially to be a mere historical report.²²³ In defence of Lutosławski, let us remark that the discussion of the secondary literature was merely a prelude to his methodological recommendations for his prospective research on Plato.

The second part of Lutosławski's work received another enthusiastic review from Struve. In his opinion, the value of this piece of research lay in the fact that it brought to light and reminded readers of little-known and forgotten studies. Struve appreciated, in particular, Lutosławski's reference to Bartłomiej (Bartholomeus) Keckermann for his role in enriching our knowledge of the history of Polish thought. Unlike Kozłowski, Struve drew attention to the author's attempt at critical analysis and classification of the researchers referred to in the final parts of the study. He concluded his review as follows: "if Mr. Lutosławski continues to develop the forthcoming parts of his work with the same thoroughness as he has done so far, and there is no reason to doubt this, then our literature will be enriched with a number of studies in this field that reassuringly have the potential for leaving their mark, as evidence of our active participation in solving the significant problems of modern science. The whole work will be a very valuable contribution not only to the history of Greek philosophy but also to philosophy in general, as can already be claimed for the first two parts of this work."²²⁴ Lutosławski's work was also commended by P. Chmielowski, who emphasised, in particular, the young author's skills of synthesis, writing: "any German scholar who had put so much effort into examining almost all the studies and pamphlets on Plato's logic that had appeared in print worldwide from the 15th century to 1891 would

were focused on the 'cultural' approach to the history of philosophy. At that time, this approach was being applied by Pawlicki in his research on ancient philosophy. Let us quote Kozłowski's own words: "Apart from presenting and commenting on the systems of different philosophers, the historian has another rewarding task, namely that of examining the influence of the whole environment and socio-political life on the formation of a given system and the relation of the latter to preceding systems and its influence on those to come" (Kozłowski, W. M., 1892). Let us remark that when, some years later, Kozłowski himself composed a synthetic study of the history of philosophy, he quoted Lutosławski's chronology of the dialogues, pointing out that Lutosławski was the continuator of Campbell's method (Kozłowski, W. M., 1904: 51–52).

223 Korotyński, 1892.

224 Struve, 1892: 314. Struve also reported on the content of both parts of Lutosławski's work to German audiences (Struve, 1895: 265–268).

have extended the results of these explorations into a thick volume, or even two.”²²⁵

A discussion of Lutosławski's research was published in the London journal, *The Academy*, under the prominent title of “Plato in Poland”. The discussion was based on short, 2–3-page summaries in French, published together with Lutosławski's studies in Polish in the bulletins of the Academy of Arts and Sciences in Kraków. The author of the text, Lewis Campbell (1830–1908), voiced his joy at the development of research on Plato worldwide. He was convinced that Lutosławski's works would have a similar effect on Eastern Europe to the impact that Friedrich Schleiermacher's studies on Plato had had in Germany, and Victor Cousin's in France. Campbell praised the originality and thoroughness of Lutosławski's works, and regarded his plan of future research as reasonable, considering the author himself to be the most competent person for such an undertaking. Campbell also expressed his satisfaction with the fact that all Lutosławski's studies were also to appear in German, in addition to being published in Polish, which was, of course, important for Poles.²²⁶

Despite the large number of works devoted to the issue of the chronology of the dialogues, Lutosławski could not find any that could be labelled ‘architectonic,’ *i.e.* studies that compiled the findings of all the scholars who had so far attempted to establish a chronology of the dialogues. It appeared, then, that there was a need for another compendium, which would make it possible to demonstrate the progress that had been made in the field of research on chronology. For Lutosławski, the most crucial out of all the specific chronological problems, the solution to which was of colossal significance for demonstrating Plato's philosophical development, was the position of the dialectical dialogues (the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*) along with the *Philebus*, and their chronological relations to the *Symposium* and the *Republic*, both of which presented a developed version of the theory of ideas. The view that these dialectical dialogues preceded the *Symposium* and the *Republic* had resulted from the hypothesis that Plato had stayed in Megara following Socrates' death, and had been influenced by the Megarian School, but Lutosławski regarded this view as pure fiction. Only by accepting that the dialectical dialogues occupied a late position in the overall chronology, as Lutosławski claimed, was it possible to realise the significance of the turn made by Plato in his late period of

225 Chmielowski, 1892.

226 Campbell, 1893. For a detailed list of Lutosławski's self-reports, *cf.*: Kadler, 1971: 575–576, entry 4598; Chorosińska & Zaborowski, 2000: 241–242.

literary production, which was described by Lutosławski as follows: “*This direction of thoughts towards the theory of cognition is one of the most noteworthy facts in the history of human thought, and its significance can only be compared to the critique of the pure reason by Kant.*”²²⁷ This turn was described by Lutosławski as a transition in philosophical method from poetic inspiration to rational investigations.

It was in Campbell’s introduction to the edition of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* that Lutosławski found decisive arguments that resolved the problem of chronology in accordance with his own views, and it was to Campbell that Lutosławski attributed the most important discovery in the field of the chronology of the dialogues. Campbell’s work had rarely been cited, and Lutosławski believed that the reasons for the fact that the book had been consigned to oblivion were twofold: firstly, Campbell himself had not attached much importance to his work, and secondly, the price of his edition of the dialogues had “served as a deterrent to traditionally poor German scholars.”²²⁸ One of Lutosławski’s merits, according to the English-language literature, is that he had rescued Campbell’s research from oblivion and established Campbell as the first to draw chronological conclusions from the study of Plato’s style,²²⁹ a position which had previously been ascribed to Wilhelm Dittenberger by German scholars. Concerning all previous research on the problem of chronology Lutosławski wrote the following: “although much work has been done on it, almost everything remains to be done, and this is due to the serious anarchy prevailing in the literature on this subject. Comprehensive consideration of the secondary literature is the most important principle of research in science, but this has not yet been applied by anyone in this field.”²³⁰

Lutosławski decided to examine the development of Plato’s logic on the basis of twelve dialogues from the first three tetralogies, which he considered to be the most important works for this subject. Other dialogues which were considered to be of great significance for logic were the *Republic*, the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*, but since they did not fall within these

227 Lutosławski, 1898: 34.

228 Lutosławski, 1898: 36. Lutosławski allowed himself the liberty of a little irony about the German scholarly world. Having rejected the view on the early date of composition of the *Phaedrus*, he remarked: “In Germany, due to a strange custom which allows German scholars to disregard the most exquisite research of other nations, there are still several researchers today who hold on to this old view” (Lutosławski, 1898: 177).

229 Brandwood, 1990: 3–8.

230 Lutosławski, 1898: 51–52.

tetralogies, they were not included in his research at that time. According to Lutosławski, the most essential means of determining the chronology of the dialogues were the studies on Plato's style. He was convinced of the legitimacy of their results, though he did not yet undertake such studies himself. He also believed that, like writing style, logical methods were, to some extent, applied subconsciously by Plato and other authors. Hence Lutosławski assumed that if the determination of the development of logic in the dialogues was confirmed by chronological findings of research in style, then the resultant sequence of dialogues should be considered as proven. The subsequent pages of Lutosławski's work provide discussions on particular dialogues in the order marked out by the tetralogic division, including a brief survey and evaluation of each dialogue and its logical content, together with an overview of scholarly opinions on the authenticity and chronological position of each dialogue. Lutosławski frequently provided translations of the passages in question, although his intention was not to speak for Plato in Polish to Poles.

The study "O pierwszych trzech tetralogiach" ("On the First Three Tetralogies") led Lutosławski to provisional chronological conclusions, which were to be confirmed and particularised elsewhere. The chronological order that was beginning to take shape was the following: the *Euthyphro*, *Apology* and the *Crito* were the earliest works written by Plato before he reached the age of thirty, after which the *Cratylus* was composed. After founding the Academy, Plato then wrote the *Symposium* in 385 BC, followed by the *Phaedo*, and the *Phaedrus* around 380. For the subsequent period of twelve years Plato was occupied with composing the *Theaetetus* and with reworking the *Republic*, the latter having been started much earlier. Having produced all these dialogues, Plato then composed the *Parmenides*, when already in his sixties, followed by the *Sophist*, and having reached the age of sixty-five Plato wrote the *Statesman* and the *Philebus*, while the *Timaeus*, *Critias* and the *Laws* mark the final years of his life.²³¹

In the German version of this paper, which did not include the extensive introduction or the long quotes from the dialogues, Lutosławski did not discuss in detail the results of the authors presented, nor did he subject them to criticism, limiting himself most frequently to providing the names, which were well-known to his German audience. Thus the Polish

231 Lutosławski, 1898: 183. In the German version of this work, Lutosławski specified the dates of the first three dialogues as oscillating around 399 BC; of the *Phaedrus* – before 378, and of the *Theaetetus* as close to the latter (Lutosławski, 1895/1896: 113–114).

paper contributed to advertising German research that had previously been known only to specialists in Poland, while the German version of the text familiarised German readers with English research. Lutosławski could only advertise Polish works to a limited extent; while discussing the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* he referred to the German study by Michał Jeżienicki on the late date of these two dialogues.

Zeller, a researcher of undisputed authority in Germany, wrote a review of Lutosławski's paper, for it was his methodology of the history of philosophy that had been undermined by the Pole. Zeller's name had appeared most frequently in Lutosławski's paper in the discussion on the chronological position of the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. Although Lutosławski's work did not contain a detailed presentation of the stylometric method, Zeller's review started with this subject. He discussed the general premises of the research on Plato's style and the development of his logic, and then outlined the resulting chronology, remarking that very similar results to those of Lutosławski had, for the most part, already been reached by Campbell and German language statisticians. Zeller, however, reproached the Pole for taking their hypotheses as indisputable facts, without examining them more closely. Moreover, according to Zeller, without taking into account other parts of the system besides logic, attempts to determine chronology would be one-sided and inadequate, just as the research on the periods of the development of Plato's style would be if based on single words or phrases. Nor could Zeller understand why Lutosławski had followed the tetralogic order in his discussion of individual dialogues, instead of deploying the chronological order that he himself had established, for Zeller believed that the philosophical development should be presented from the beginning to the end.²³² These demands had, however, already been met in Lutosławski's English book.

Zeller argued that if Lutosławski's had presented the dialogues in chronological order, it would immediately have become clear that it is impossible to arrange the outcomes of Plato's extremely rich and diverse literary and intellectual production in chronological order exclusively on the basis of one part of his doctrine. There were, after all, many reasons why it was difficult to determine whether a work in which a given issue had been barely touched on was earlier or later than a work in which it had been worked out in full. For example, Plato might briefly have mentioned something, anticipating that the issue was to be discussed in more detail later; or conversely, such a brief reference may have resulted from the fact

232 Zeller, 1898: 153–155.

that the issue had already been sufficiently discussed earlier, and this reference was addressed to disciples who were therefore expected to be familiar with it.²³³

Moreover, as Zeller continued, Lutosławski, apparently overwhelmed with joy at his alleged discovery, seemed not to have noticed, or perhaps even ignored, much more obvious questions. One of them was that in Plato intuition and dialectics did not form two contrary cognitive methods detached from one another; it is one and the same intellect that views the ideas and dialectically dissects and associates them. The poetic element in Plato's writings goes hand in hand with the dialectics, as was exemplified by Zeller on the basis of the *Phaedrus*. In this dialogue the dialectics and its functions appear at the same time as ecstatic worship of the supramundane ideas. According to Zeller, Lutosławski also overlooked the fact that, for Plato, formation of the concepts is based on knowledge of the ideas, the substantial nature of which was never doubted by Plato. His philosophy was a unity both in terms of its methodology and its metaphysics.²³⁴ It was therefore impossible to reconcile this position with Lutosławski's interpretation.

All this sufficed, as Zeller concluded, to justify his wish for Lutosławski to get down to more serious work on the progress of his future research, and to reveal more modesty than he had done in the paper under discussion. To prove that Lutosławski needed to master the literature more thoroughly, Zeller cited an example of an inaccurate reference to his own work. According to Lutosławski, Zeller had dated the *Sophist* in the 'Megarian period,' i.e. when Plato was about thirty, immediately after the death of Socrates.²³⁵ This was, however, not true, and Zeller claimed that readers of his work could be easily convinced of this. While it is true that, in accordance with Lutosławski's reference, there is a mention in his book of Plato's stay at Euclid's in Megara after the death of Socrates, and of his subsequent travels to Egypt, Cyrene, and around Magna Graecia including Sicily, the German scholar had been careful to add that there were contradictions and gaps in the sources that made it impossible to determine with certainty the length of Plato's stay at Euclid's, or whether Plato's subsequent journeys had started directly from Megara or had perhaps followed

233 Zeller, 1898: 155–156.

234 Zeller, 1898: 157; cf.: Frede, 2010: 86–87.

235 Zeller, 1898: 158, footnote 1; cf.: Lutosławski, 1895/1896: 89–90. Zeller was presented as an insightful researcher, but his view regarding the problem of the early date of the *Sophist* was considered to be unusual and antiquated.

his return from Megara to Athens, etc. The hypothesis that Plato's sojourn in Megara had been short was considered by Zeller most probable.²³⁶ Zeller had established the date of the composition of the *Theaetetus* around 391 BC, therefore undoubtedly after Plato's departure from Megara, and that the philosophical material in the *Sophist* was too similar to that of the *Theaetetus* to assume that the composition of this dialogue had been distant in time from the *Theaetetus*, or that both dialogues had been separated by other works. Therefore the *Sophist*, according to Zeller, saw the light of day immediately after the *Theaetetus*, before or right after the first Sicilian journey.²³⁷ Lutosławski had therefore been right in ascribing to Zeller the hypothesis about Plato's stay in Megara, but he was wrong in accrediting Zeller with the view that the *Sophist* or other dialogues had been composed there. Basically this was of little importance for Lutosławski's goals, that is, for the argument on the late character of the *Sophist*, but it did bring into question his integrity and credibility.

Zeller's evaluation of Lutosławski's studies cannot be separated from his opinion about the personality of the author. In a letter to Hermann Diels, Zeller expressed the opinion that the works of the Pole were full of self-praise and were composed in typical Slavic manner, being both careless and slovenly.²³⁸ Diels' reply was in a similar tone, adding negative comments about his meeting with Lutosławski, and about his impudence and

236 Zeller, 2006a: 402–408.

237 Zeller, 2006a: 541–546. In an appendix, which was included in the posthumous edition of Zeller's work, up-to-date results of research on Plato were provided, including the issue of chronology. It was remarked there that Zeller's conclusions were at odds with the most recent findings, for example with the assumption of later researchers that the *Phaedrus* and the *Theaetetus* had been written by the mature Plato (Hoffmann, 2006: 1052). Considering, however, the abundance of materials or the thorough mastery of the source texts, Zeller's work is still considered to be helpful even from a contemporary perspective (Horn, 2006: XI).

238 Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 151 (letter 119 of Aug. 9th, 1896). Lutosławski was aware of the background of aversion to him manifested by Zeller and by some other Germans. He repaid them in a similar tone, arguing for inferiority and partiality of German science, which was less exact, indigestible, heavy and boring, filled with superfluous quotes, intellectually distorting, ignorant of the achievements of others, frequently false and hostile to Poles, especially in comparison to the science of other nations of Western Europe or America (Lutosławski, 1912: 248–256). He also remarked: "I know excellent German philologists who considered me to be an unreliable chauvinist and broke all contact with me because of the fact that in my English work on Plato, while mentioning a brochure published in Gdańsk, I failed to refer to this Polish city as

pushiness.²³⁹ It seems that the reaction to the Pole resulted from the very reason for his visits, being most probably connected with the question about the reasons concerning the German scholars' ignorance of Campbell's results.²⁴⁰

Another review of Lutosławski's German paper was written by Campbell, who, when introducing the author, immediately announced the approximate title of his forthcoming book: *On the Logical Element in the Philosophy of Plato*.²⁴¹ Campbell confessed that he had come to the conclusion that the lack of response to his own earlier chronological results had been caused by general lack of agreement with his findings. He was therefore taken by surprise when, in 1892, he received a letter from Kazań, in which Lutosławski declared his full agreement with the conclusions Campbell had presented in the introduction to his edition of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. On the basis of this first letter, Lutosławski appeared to him to be a man of great enthusiasm, strength of intellect, independence of judgment, and practical energy, which, taking into account his youth and his love of truth, allowed Campbell to have high hopes for Lutosławski and his future academic career. He considered Lutosławski's findings concerning the *Phaedrus* to be of the greatest significance. Although there were discrepancies among scholars as to the date of composition of this dialogue, its logical content indicated its mature character, which had previously been assumed by several researchers.²⁴²

Campbell mentioned comprehensiveness as one of the merits of Lutosławski's work. He claimed that, paradoxically, Lutosławski had taken advantage of his isolation from the Western academic world and, and together with his great diligence, had succeeded in achieving a great deal. For example, he had been able to compare the results of English and German researchers, which, as Campbell remarked with regret, had not been done even by English scholars, who had been content to accept the Ger-

Dantzig" (Lutosławski, 1912: 247–248). He did not leave his Polish audience in any doubt that "Polish thought is like a renaissance and continuation of the work of the ancient Greeks" (Lutosławski, 1912: 259).

239 Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 153 (letter 120 of Aug. 23rd, 1896), 185 (letter 142 of Jul. 26th, 1896); Diels spoke of the Pole *expressis verbis* as a shameless scoundrel that you can't get rid of unless you throw him out the door, which Diels once did (Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 198 (letter 153 of Dec. 13th, 1896).

240 Burnet, 1928: 11.

241 Campbell, 1896: 40.

242 Campbell, 1896: 40–42.

man findings. He believed that Lutosławski's results would eventually be accepted by the academic community, thanks to the way he combined various methods, research on writing style and on the use of words, language statistics and the analysis of Plato's development in logic. All them, taken together, allowed him to draw integrated and certain conclusions, to which Campbell himself adhered.²⁴³

Lutosławski's countrymen were also generous with praise for him. Without actually referring to the substance of his paper, they remarked that his study must be of great scientific value since it had been published in such a prestigious journal. The editorial board of the journal deserved even greater appreciation for having accepted a paper in which German scholars' were reproached for their ignorance of the results not only of English researchers, but even of other German researchers.²⁴⁴

A comprehensive review was written by Struve, who had kept in touch with Lutosławski over the years. He confirmed Campbell's opinion regarding the prospective acceptance of Lutosławski's research results, summarising Lutosławski's achievements in three main points. The first concerned the extensive, or even comprehensive, consideration of the research of his predecessors. In this respect, Lutosławski's studies marked a breakthrough in this area. The second point highlighted by Struve was the method of determining the chronology of the dialogues, consisting of a combination of linguistic analyses and research on the development of logic. Thirdly, he had demonstrated Plato's philosophical development as a departure from the theory of ideas presented in the *Symposium*, *Phaedo* or the *Republic*, and his transition to the late period, in which Plato "views the ideas only as categories of human intellect, which provide the possibility of apprehending the world only on the basis of the precise analysis and definition of their content."²⁴⁵ Struve, thus, pointed out the many merits of Lutosławski's work, both methodological and technical, historical and philological, and historiographical and philosophical.

Opus vitae in English and Plato's philosophical development

It was not until 1897 that Lutosławski's *opus vitae*, which was initially to have been published in Polish, then in German, eventually saw the light of

243 Campbell, 1896: 42.

244 "Wincenty Lutosławski", 1895.

245 Struve, 1896: 545.

day in English. Lutosławski owed this to the efforts of Campbell, to whom the book was dedicated in gratitude for his kindness and friendship.²⁴⁶ An additional reason for dedicating the work to the Scottish researcher was that exactly three decades had passed since the publication of Campbell's edition of two of Plato's dialogues, which had been rescued from oblivion by Lutosławski. Campbell had not only helped the author to establish contact with the Longmans Publishing House, but he had even concerned himself with the English style by introducing corrections and suggesting improvements. Campbell had also helped organise some of Lutosławski's lectures, such as those addressed to members of the Oxford Philological Society, during which Lutosławski reported on the stylometric method and its results.²⁴⁷

In his research on Plato's logic, Lutosławski comprehended this subject, as mentioned above, as a fairly broad area of issues connecting problems of knowledge and being. While for many researchers the theory of ideas was assumed to be Plato's definitive answer, for Lutosławski it was only Plato's introductory answer to the question of the relation of knowledge and thought to being, with Plato, in the late period of his output, replacing the direct vision of the ideas with the classification of concepts.²⁴⁸

Chapter one, "Plato as a logician", was essentially a repetition of what Lutosławski had already conveyed to his Polish audience in both parts of his work, *On Plato's Logic*. Chapter two covered the discussion on the authenticity and chronology of the dialogues, and again, his Polish audience had already been introduced to these issues in the introduction to the

246 Lutosławski, 1897: V. Half a century later, the philosopher, while recalling the publication of this work, remarked that it indeed had a long title: *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic with an Account of Plato's Style and of the Chronology of His Writings* (Lutosławski, 1948: 68). The book was in such great demand that in 1905 the next edition appeared, and a reprint of this was published quite recently (Hildesheim 1983). It must be pointed out that the information that Lutosławski dedicated the book to his wife, Sofia Casanova Lutosławska (Marcinek, 1998: 146), is incorrect.

247 Lutosławski, 1897a. This abstract emphasises the objective character of the findings of stylometry and of the method itself, resulting from the vast amount of statistical material included. The possibility of further applications of this method to, for example, Shakespeare's works, was taken into account. Lutosławski's lecture in Oxford was the first public presentation of stylometry, his first lecture delivered in English, and he was the first Pole to present his works to the members of the Society (Lutosławski, 1897a: 285–286). For a bibliography of reports from Lutosławski's other lectures, cf.: Chorościńska & Zaborowski, 2000: 241–243.

248 Lutosławski, 1897: VII–VIII.

study “On the First Three Tetralogies”. In chapter three, Lutosławski made a detailed overview of all the studies on Plato’s style that he had used in his own research. The stylometric method, which had been developed on the basis of these studies was then discussed, together with the chronological results of the method’s application to *Corporem Platonicum*.²⁴⁹ From chapter four, the development of Plato’s views on logic is presented, divided into six main periods. From the standpoint of the history of philosophy this was the most important part of the book. The text is structured so as to allow for additional comments on authenticity and chronology to be included during the discussion of individual dialogues. In the case of twelve of the dialogues, Lutosławski repeated part of the content that Polish audiences were already familiar with from the pages of Lutosławski’s study “On the First Three Tetralogies”.²⁵⁰

In his reconstruction of the development of Plato’s views on the basis of his works, Lutosławski rightly remarked that the dialogues had not been planned as any kind of journal of philosophical investigations; they were rather the artistic embodiment of certain findings supplemented with an indication of the ideal methods by which such conclusions could be

249 Lutosławski, 1897: 64–193. In the present work, the aspects of Lutosławski’s work related to language statistics will be omitted. A considerable literature on the subject already exists, covering the details of applying the stylometric method to Plato’s dialogues, and its more general aspects. Cf.: Thesleff, 2009a: 213–230, *passim*; Brandwood, 1990: 123–135 (chapter 15: W. Lutosławski); Bigaj, 1999, 2002: 232–238; the studies by Bigaj are based on Lutosławski’s German studies and abstracts (e.g.: Meyer, 1897; Lutosławski, 1897b); Meyer’s source material was, in turn, chapter three of Lutosławski’s book (1897), being at that time in press. He advertised the publication of the whole work in German, provided that a publisher could be found (Meyer, 1897: 171, footnote 1). Bigaj attempts to demonstrate the influence of Lutosławski’s research on Werner Jaeger’s idea of the development of Aristotle’s philosophy. Cf.: Mróz, 2003: 64–88; Pawłowski, 2004; Pawłowski & Pacewicz, 2004; Pawłowski, 2008: 149–162. Pawłowski emphasises the pioneering character of Lutosławski’s linguistic achievements and their broader significance, not limited only to studies on Plato. Pawłowski also edited Lutosławski’s early work from his student period, which can be considered as heralding his future method of stylistic research: “Kritische Edition”, 2008. On this subject, cf.: Lutosławski, 1994: 118–119; Mróz, 2003: 16–17, 64; Pawłowski, 2004a; Mróz, 2007a: 78–83; Pawłowski, 2008: 155–158.

250 This reconstruction is based on both works, *i.e.* on Lutosławski, 1897, supplemented with Lutosławski, 1898, and with other texts. A presentation of Lutosławski’s interpretation of Plato’s philosophical development based only on Lutosławski, 1897, can be found in: Mróz, 2003: 89–127.

reached. The dialogues, then, did not necessarily reflect the actual path the author had taken to achieve his results.²⁵¹

During the first stage of his philosophical development, Plato was under the direct influence of Socrates, as can be seen from the fact that the dialogues representative of this period are short and mainly concerned with ethics. In the *Euthyphro*, for example, there are evident indications of Socrates' influence and a lack of any original philosophical reflection by the author. The features indicative of Socrates' influence include the application of analogy and induction in order to produce a definition of the concept under examination. It is worth noting that mere enumeration is regarded as insufficient in reaching a definition. Socrates attempts to find certain characteristic features of the defined term, *differentia specifica*, rendered by the term εἶδος (6d), which does not yet have any metaphysical significance. Similarly, another characteristic term of Plato's mature philosophy, παράδειγμα (6e), does not go beyond the scope of colloquial use. Lutosławski considered the distinction between actions and things, and between the substance and the state (10c), to be significant with regard to the development of the history of philosophy.²⁵²

The *Apology* is of a similar character. Lack of certainty about the immortality of the soul meant that this issue was left within the area of belief, and this, for Lutosławski, was a clear sign that the dialogue should be classified as early. In the *Crito*, it was the ethical value of the proposition that was decisive with regard to its truthfulness, and not logical or philosophical certainty. The emphasis on the role played by the competent individual's opinion over the majority view (47c–d) should also be noted. The arguments in the *Crito* were not yet objectively valid; better arguments, though not founded on metaphysical knowledge, determined the superiority of a given view (46b).²⁵³

In the *Charmides*, Lutosławski found a correctly structured *Cesare* syllogism (161a) and the term συλλογισάμενος (160e), though only in the meaning of a summary, a recap of previous considerations. Plato demonstrated that while knowledge itself can be the subject of knowledge, other human actions have external objects as their subjects (169b–d). In the *Laches*, Plato made an attempt to specify the subject of objective knowledge, claiming

251 Lutosławski, 1897: 220.

252 Lutosławski, 1897: 194–200; 1898: 53–60. Andrzej Jezierski was referred to among the authors who were considered by Lutosławski to have effectively resisted the view of the inauthenticity of the *Euthyphro* (Lutosławski, 1897: 198).

253 Lutosławski, 1897: 201–203; 1898: 60–64.

that only that which is not exposed to the passage of time could become such a subject (198d–e), and that such knowledge could not be possessed by the crowd, but only by a competent individual (τεχνικὸς, 185a). Lutosławski believed that Socrates as depicted in the above dialogues reflected the characteristics of the historical Socrates, including the declaration of his own ignorance and his criticism of his interlocutors' views without providing his own doctrine.²⁵⁴

The *Protagoras* was similar to these dialogues and had a polemical character. In this dialogue, Lutosławski found an important lesson in logic which demonstrated the impossibility of valid conversion of all universal affirmative propositions: 'every A is B' into 'every B is A' (350c–351b). Then, in the *Meno*, the term εἶδος (72c) appeared, though it did not yet signify 'being', but something common to many things of one kind, their common nature. *Eidos* becomes subsequently a goal to be reached by dialectical research in which reasoning is based on concepts and premises. In the *Meno*, Plato also implemented the hypothetical method used by geometers, which he transferred into the area of philosophy and comprehended as an examination of the consequences of previously accepted hypotheses and the assessment of their truthfulness on the basis of these consequences. Lutosławski believed that the view articulated in the *Meno*, about innate ideas, i.e. about the certainty of *a priori* knowledge, provided evidence of Plato's growing interest in logic, i.e. in epistemology. This allowed Plato to confirm philosophically the validity of the beliefs expressed by priests and poets regarding the immortality of the soul (86b).²⁵⁵

In the *Euthydemus*, in turn, Plato pointed out the erroneous nature of sophisms, which must have been well-known and frequently reproduced at that time as a result of the activities of the Sophists. Plato must have written the *Euthydemus* after Isocrates had opened his academy (shortly after 390 BC) as could be inferred from the very subject of the dialogue: teaching, the very possibility of teaching, and criticism of inappropriate methods of education. As for the *Gorgias*, Lutosławski considered this to be the work separating the first, Socratic, period of Plato's output from the next stage in the philosopher's development. Although the ethical subject matter in this dialogue seemed to bring it closer to the interests of Socrates, the preemptory expression of his opinions (e.g. 509a) no longer

254 Lutosławski, 1897: 203–205.

255 Lutosławski, 1897: 205–210; among the great majority of scholars who recognised that the *Meno* succeeded the *Protagoras*, Lutosławski mentioned Jan Bartunek (Lutosławski, 1897: 207, footnote 165).

matched his previous image of a doubting and questing philosopher. Plato appeared to be preaching, so he must have turned into an independent thinker.²⁵⁶

During the first years following the death of his master, Plato was mostly occupied with ethical problems, though these problems now required the prior solution of metaphysical and methodological issues. Considerations centring on individual virtues gave rise to the problem of defining virtue itself, which was closely linked by Plato to knowledge. Acknowledgement of dialectics as the most appropriate method for acquiring knowledge most probably had its source in Socratic thought. It was the dialectic method that constituted the true beginnings of logic in Plato's philosophy since the more it was applied, the more frequently problems of a logical nature requiring further investigation arose, thus making logic increasingly autonomous and universal. In Lutosławski's opinion, there was nothing that heralded the theory of ideas in the first period of Plato's philosophical development. The only potential seed of this theory could have been the discovery of irrefutable knowledge, though this was not yet linked to any metaphysical conception.²⁵⁷

The next stage in the development of Plato's philosophy, *i.e.* the emergence of the theory of ideas, was marked by a shift in his focal interests from ethics to metaphysics, the task of the latter being to explain the phenomenon of *a priori* knowledge. The first of the three dialogues constituting this stage in the evolution of Plato's thought was the *Cratylus*, a dialogue which, because it is peppered with humour, has caused many difficulties for researchers. Lutosławski discerned one of the foundations of Plato's logic, and of logic in general, in the final sentences of this dialogue. Here we find the claim that only an immutable being can be the subject of knowledge, for if knowledge changes, it cannot even be called 'knowledge.' Although Lutosławski was unable to find any direct articulation of the theory of ideas in the *Cratylus*, it was there that he found the view that, to deserve the name of knowledge, any term, being an instrument of cognition and teaching, must have as its referent a certain immutable nature, which only the dialectician was capable of reaching.²⁵⁸

In the *Symposium*, the nature of philosophy is demonstrated by revealing the role of love in attaining the truth. Lutosławski inferred from the fictional character of Diotima, who spoke about this new kind of love, that

256 Lutosławski, 1897: 210–216.

257 Lutosławski, 1897: 216–218.

258 Lutosławski, 1897: 219–233; 1898: 74–80.

this was Plato's original discovery dressed in the golden robe of poetry. Abstract ideas, being the causes of particular beings, were described in the *Symposium* as existing independently and separated from the world.²⁵⁹ It was extremely arduous to put this theory into words. The relation between the idea and the particular thing was rendered by Plato using the term μετέχειν, which is usually translated as 'participation' (211b). Characteristic terms like εἶδος or ἰδέα were not used in the *Symposium*, with Plato simply using: τὸ καλόν. To get to know the ideas, a certain kind of personal experience was necessary, some direct intuition beyond discourse, though its certainty was indisputable and allowed additional arguments for the idealistic position to be formulated. It bestowed wisdom on human beings, and lifted them above the rational knowledge that dialecticians possess.²⁶⁰

The enquiries in the *Phaedo* represent a generalisation and extension of the theory of beauty itself to all notions, which was ultimately to lead to the creation of a whole system of ideas which could be reached by the soul on the path of reasoning. Knowledge obtained in this way is much more certain than that relating to material things and obtained by means of perception, the bodily element being regarded as an obstacle in attaining knowledge. Thus, the ultimate cognition can only be attained after death (66e). The soul's existence prior to incarnation makes learning a mere re-discovery of the knowledge included in the soul, and it is material things that provide a stimulus for this rediscovery. Thanks to the independent, objective and immaterial existence of the ideal world, it is possible to acquire the knowledge that meets the criterion expressed in earlier dialogues, namely knowledge that is immutable. It is this that guarantees that this knowledge is different from beliefs. It was in the *Phaedo* for the first time that Plato explicitly articulated the need to produce and master logic, the science of thinking (90b) and to reject scepticism and the eristic of the Sophists. Two more terms are used in this dialogue to denote the relation between ideas and individual things: παρουσία – presence, and κοινωνία – communion, participation. Lutosławski inferred from this that the *Phaedo* was not composed in the late phase of Plato's output, since Plato was still experimenting with the terminology of his philosophy. In any case, Plato

259 In this respect Lutosławski considered that H. Cohen's doubts about the separate and independent existence of the ideas, which were one of the foundations of the Marburg interpretation of the theory of ideas, were justified with regard to other dialogues, but certainly not with regard to the *Symposium* (Lutosławski, 1897: 236).

260 Lutosławski, 1897: 233–244; 1898: 162–168.

did not set much store by the exactness of the terminology he used, which he himself confirmed (100d). Rather than focusing on such technical issues, it was much more important for him to provide guidelines concerning the process of reasoning, which was to consist of investigations into the logical accuracy of the hypothesis, or, in other words, the compatibility of the conclusions with the premises so as to discard erroneous conclusions in favour of those which were indisputable. It is clear that, at the time of composing the *Phaedo*, Plato believed that the philosophical theory of ideas was the most infallible of all possible hypotheses, and that human reason, under certain conditions, could discover the true nature of things.²⁶¹

The *Cratylus*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedo* were, according to Lutosławski, very close to each other both in chronology and literary style. Forming a cohesive group, they must have been composed after Plato's return from the first Sicilian journey and soon after the Academy was founded (388–387 BC). They include the formulation of Plato's original philosophical theory, which was to be further developed in his subsequent works.²⁶²

Plato's theoretical achievements prompted him to apply his newly discovered metaphysical theory to practical philosophy, having a particular interest in two of its branches: social philosophy and the theory of education and teaching. These issues were developed in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*, which form the subsequent, and third, period of Plato's output, which was referred to by Lutosławski as 'middle Platonism'. If society was to successfully undergo moral reform, then reform of political and cultural norms was necessary, and it was to this subject that the *Republic* was largely devoted. The transformation of the state therefore had to start from the processes of education and upbringing, and these issues were dealt with in the *Phaedrus*.²⁶³

Due to the length of the *Republic* and the resulting chronological issues, Lutosławski divided the entire dialogue into five parts. These are books: I, II–IV, V–VII, VIII–IX, and X. Book I of the *Republic*, in Lutosławski's opinion, was not intended to be a separate dialogue, as some scholars maintained, but an introduction to a work much larger than the previous ones. Lutosławski dated it as having been composed prior to the *Phaedo*.²⁶⁴

261 Lutosławski, 1897: 245–265; 1898: 64–74.

262 Lutosławski, 1897: 265–266.

263 Lutosławski, 1897: 267–268.

264 Lutosławski, 1897: 268–276.

Books II–IV of the *Republic* form an integral whole, in which the tripartition of soul is presented. This had some logical significance, in Lutosławski's opinion, because the division was based on the law of contradiction. By assuming the existence of contrary tendencies within one human being, Plato had to demonstrate that there were different elements in the soul corresponding to these. The law of contradiction thus had an ontological dimension. When Lutosławski mentioned the question of Plato's oral teaching in the Academy, he meant the need to explain to the disciples those issues that had not always been understood by them immediately after they had learnt about them for the first time. What had initially been delivered by Socrates in the belief that it was clear, was then explained in a different way, more easily, by means of examples (e.g. 438b–e).²⁶⁵

In the considerations of books V–VII, the theory of ideas is spoken of as an obvious, familiar doctrine, with well-known terms and attributes appearing very frequently (αὐτο καθ' αὐτο, εἶδος, ἰδέα). It was in the *Republic* that Plato drew attention for the first time to errors resulting from a misunderstanding of the similarities between ideas and things, which had not been mentioned in the *Phaedo*. The subject and foundation of the highest knowledge is the idea of good and the type of cognition corresponding to this idea is a kind of immediate experience, described by a spectrum of terms which are metaphors for viewing and touching. This highest knowledge cannot be simply taught; those searching for this knowledge can only be equipped with the necessary instruments and instructions. Lutosławski, however, denied that there was any mysticism in Plato. What he describes as the ultimate criterion of knowledge is the clarity of thought that is only accessible directly to one subject and not transmittable to others. Lutosławski argues that the language of metaphors, the elaborate rhetoric, exaggerations and myths were among the techniques used by Plato to serve the educational purpose of the dialogue.²⁶⁶

All the learning that is to be possessed by the philosopher plays only a propaedeutic role in the process of reaching the ultimate goal of learning, which is the nature of being as a single whole. Philosophers are capable of embracing this whole, and it turns them into dialecticians (537c: ὁ συνοπτικός διαλεκτικός). For Lutosławski, the most significant accomplishment of Plato's thought was the idea of one common goal of all things, combining the highest of abstract ideas with the smallest of individual

265 Lutosławski, 1897: 276–290.

266 Lutosławski, 1897: 290–296.

things. Returning to the philosophers, the happiness that they should enjoy in the state and the classification of human characters in its application to the philosophy of politics were the main focus of books VIII–IX. These books also contain fragments in which the interlocutors refer to the theory of the ideas as a doctrine they have already become acquainted with (e.g. 585c).²⁶⁷

An important modification of the doctrine of ideas occurs in Book X, where things produced by humans are granted existence as ideas. God, as the creator of the ideas, was interpreted by Lutosławski as a metaphor for the logical necessity which manifests itself in the separate existence of an idea for each kind of object. Contradictory acts of the soul were attributed to the soul's relation to the body as a transitional state. Praise for the significance of physical experiments based on measuring, counting, and weighing (602d) was to provide evidence of Plato's overcoming and synthesising contradictions between ideas and illusions and between the certainty of reason and the deceptive nature of sensory perception. The law of contradiction was for the first time recognised as a principle of thinking, whereas earlier Plato had referred to it simply as of the law of being. Having demonstrated the philosophical coherence of the ten books of the *Republic*, revealing Plato's development in the process of writing such a long work, Lutosławski put forward the thesis that this dialogue constituted an integral whole, while at the same time noting the lack of continuity in the composition of particular books. He considered the most probable chronological position of Book I to be between the *Gorgias* and the *Cratylus*, while the whole dialogue was completed after the first Sicilian journey and after a longer period of teaching in the Academy.²⁶⁸

According to Lutosławski, the *Phaedrus* was the second dialogue of the middle period, where Plato applied the metaphysical achievements of his philosophy and its methods to resolving practical issues. Lutosławski believed that the most important elements in the *Phaedrus* were the issues relating to the philosophy of education. Since he wanted to demonstrate that the view on the early date of the *Phaedrus* was unfounded, he placed particular emphasis on the continuity in the evolution of the philosopher, who developed some of his previous reflections in this dialogue. One of the features of this dialogue which Lutosławski believed could not have appeared in the early period of Plato's output was the prolongation of the period of punishments and rewards for the souls that had already been freed from

267 Lutosławski, 1897: 296–312.

268 Lutosławski, 1897: 312–325.

the influence of the body. This, for Lutosławski, provided evidence of the philosopher's inner development and his growing belief in the consequences of earthly life for the eternal existence of the soul. Other evidence of Plato's development can be seen in his portrayal of love, which was glorified in the *Symposium*, but presented in the *Phaedrus* as a kind of madness. Another clue indicating the middle position of the *Phaedrus* in the chronology of the dialogues was Plato's frequent use of *pluralis maiestaticus* in the meaning of: 'we, the philosophers'. According to Lutosławski, this was intended to identify the author with a group of his dedicated students, whom he could be sure would understand his intentions properly. The terms *ιδέα* and *εἶδος* in the *Phaedrus* (265c–d), in Lutosławski's opinion, could possibly be interpreted as pure concepts of intellect that could not be fully implemented into the objects to which they referred. He added, however, that on the basis of the *Phaedrus* they could be understood in the spirit of Kantian philosophy.²⁶⁹

Plato did not consider the subject of his teaching to be suitable for presentation in writing and in any case, oral teaching was naturally more highly valued, which may have resulted from pedestrian reasons, namely from the technical problems involved in writing and copying texts. This did not, however, imply any contempt for writing on Plato's part. Indeed, after having written so many outstanding works, in which he had proved his literary mastery, it would have been paradoxical if he had expressed a low opinion of writing. It is likely that his declarations on the incomparably greater value of oral teaching were intended to encourage and invite new students to join the Academy. Lutosławski argued that teaching a select group of students was very different from writing the dialogues, which were intended to provide preparatory study or instruction, but he did not think that the content of the lectures in the Academy differed from the ideas articulated in the dialogues. The difference lay in the form of presentation required for non-experts, which had to be captivating, full of humour and interspersed with dramatic arguments. Those who were seriously interested in philosophy did not need literary tricks; for them, a systematic lecture concerning the very essence of the doctrine was more appropriate. And this is what they were offered in the Academy by the master in person.²⁷⁰

Lutosławski admitted that there were certain features, such as the leading role of Socrates and the apparent lack of philosophical sophistication

269 Lutosławski, 1897: 326–340.

270 Lutosławski, 1897: 340–348; 1898: 168–182.

in the conversation conducted on the banks of the Ilissus, which, at first glance, seemed to indicate an early date for the *Phaedrus*. Nevertheless, he demonstrated that the *Phaedrus* bore many marks of Plato's late style and that it was philosophically related to the *Symposium*, the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. Ultimately, he accepted 379 BC as the approximate date for the composition of the *Phaedrus*.²⁷¹

The *Phaedrus*, then, along with the *Republic*, constituted the middle period of Plato's philosophical development, a time of focused, creative work for the philosopher. The years 384–378 BC, *i.e.* the period before Plato reached the age of fifty, represented a time of extremely intense work. Initially, Plato defended the independent existence of the ideas, but later, when composing the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*, it was the relations between ideas and things and the epistemological consequences of the theory that became more important for him. In the first version of the theory, the relation between general notions and individual things was most often rendered by the term μετέχειν, meaning participation, whereas in the middle period this was simply replaced by 'likeness' (μίμημα, ὁμοίωμα). Lutosławski interpreted this evolution in terminology as equivalent to an evolution in the ontological status of the idea. Having abandoned the notion of direct intuition of self-existing ideas, Plato replaced this with classification as a method of gaining insight into the ideal world. For the purpose of conducting definitions, ideas as supramundane entities were sufficient, but the task of logical and systematic classification could only be accomplished by acknowledging the existence of the ideas in the individual soul. The role of philosophers was no longer to discover ideas as objective beings, but to grant them objectivity in their own minds, which was a necessary condition for any field of learning as a system of concepts. Lutosławski described the initial form of Plato's idealism as an illusory, but necessary, stage in Plato's philosophical development and the development of humanity. Yet it was only Plato's mature understanding of the ideas that Lutosławski considered to be correct. Plato's theory of ideas evolved from a metaphysical form to a logical one, but the autonomy of the ideas as a system of independent concepts was salvaged. This system and its inherent ἀνάγκη were the foundations on which the edifice of science could be built. Lutosławski did not hesitate to compare Plato to Kant with respect to the age at which they both attempted to reform the philosophies they had known and pursued earlier. Hence, the subsequent stage in the philo-

271 Lutosławski, 1897: 348–358.

sophical development of Socrates' greatest disciple could be called 'the critical stage'.²⁷²

Having passed the age of fifty, Plato started to re-evaluate his previous doctrines. The fourth period of his philosophical development was also the first stage at which he became critical towards his own accomplishments, and this stage was referred to by Lutosławski as 'the reform of logic'. Only two dialogues, the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides*, were allocated to this period. Let us restate the most fundamental premises of Platonism prior to the reform: The ideas structured the world of phenomena. Certain philosophical skills were required to explain this world: immediate intuition of the existence of ideas and a dialectical experience that allowed the structure and hierarchy of the ideas to be discovered. Another pillar of the system was the chasm that separated ideas from things and phenomena. At first, Plato used terms that oscillated around 'presence' or 'participation', but subsequently he tended towards 'likeness', as a means of articulating the relationship between ideas and things. The superiority of the ideas over things remained unwavering, both in epistemology and ontology, although, according to Lutosławski, the separate existence of the ideas beyond the human intellect was merely a metaphorical expression for their intersubjective nature. The relation between ideas and things was rendered in Plato's philosophical anthropology as the relation between the soul and the body. The scope of his philosophy was continuously broadened, from purely ethical issues, through metaphysical abstractions, to problems of practical philosophy.

The *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides*, which were both regarded by Lutosławski as reflecting the reform of Plato's logic, display many terminological similarities. In both dialogues, a new meaning of the notion of movement appears. Κίνησις in the *Republic* was limited to spatial movement, to a change of place. In the *Theaetetus* (181b–e) and later in the *Parmenides*, this notion was generalised. Movement additionally took on the meaning of a change in quality, for both these types of movement are manifestations of change as such. This understanding of movement was common in Aristotle's writings, and this, all the more, testifies to its being a late discovery by Plato. Further evidence of Aristotle's dependence on Plato, according to Lutosławski, was the system of categories (τὰ κοινά), which, without doubt, should be attributed to Plato in the *Theaetetus* (185c and ff.), and later in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*.²⁷³

272 Lutosławski, 1897: 358–362.

273 Lutosławski, 1897: 363–370.

The goal of the conversation presented in the *Theaetetus* was the definition of knowledge. Knowledge is, above all, regarded by the interlocutors as a judgement, though it was not just a matter of laying out terms but of creating a new quality. Definition itself becomes the subject of the considerations, with Socrates emphasising that a common element should appear in it, while also taking difference into account (208b–c). In this dialogue, there is a growth in the cognitive significance of the soul, which collected within itself sensory experience, but possessed certain abilities which the senses lacked. These were, for Lutosławski, noteworthy signs of Plato's evolution and of the affiliation of the *Theaetetus* to the late period of his literary output. The dialogue's conclusion was, however, problematic, for Socrates remarked that the whole discussion had not achieved its intended goal, namely the definition of knowledge. This absence of a final conclusion was actually the distinguishing mark of Plato's work during the Socratic stage, but Lutosławski explained this away by arguing that Plato was setting out on a new departure in his thinking, and it was still too early to provide concrete solutions. Another argument for not placing the *Theaetetus* within the Socratic period was the subtlety with which he distinguished true opinion from knowledge. Plato's new path, then, consisted in replacing the ideas with categories and poetic visions with analysis, synthesis and critical precaution, while immutable identity becomes activity and passivity.²⁷⁴

There were serious doubts about the authenticity of the *Parmenides* and Lutosławski devoted much space to substantiating the inclusion of this dialogue among those under discussion, for he believed that the *Parmenides* was one of the milestones in the development of Plato's logic in the narrower sense of the term. According to Lutosławski, Plato's goal, while composing this dialogue, was to demonstrate that the more precise the terms that were applied to expound the theory of ideas, the more likely it was that difficulties would arise. Plato himself had previously admitted various possible interpretations of his doctrine, and had applied diverse terminology to explain it. Most likely, his intention in this dialogue was to respond to the arguments of students who tried to specify more precisely

274 Lutosławski, 1897: 371–400; 1898: 81–102; cf.: Mróz, 2007: 207–212. When taking issue with Zeller's view on the early date of the *Theaetetus*, Lutosławski reproached him with not knowing the whole literature on the subject, e.g. the German study by a Polish scholar, Jezienicki (Lutosławski, 1897: 385–386, footnote 248). Zeller, in fact, knew this work, but disagreed with its chronological conclusions.

the teaching of their master. The consequences of the first metaphysical version of the theory of ideas had proved to be absurd and therefore there was no better alternative but to continue on the well-worn track, evaluating theories according to the conclusions that could be drawn from them, which was in fact equivalent to practising philosophical dialectics. The character of the second part of the dialogue, with its futile considerations and lack of unambiguous statements, reminded Lutosławski of *Critique of Pure Reason*. He had frequently drawn attention to the similarities in the evolution of the doctrines of both eminent philosophers, and compared the text of the *Parmenides*, with its many contradictions, to the dialectics of pure reason and its antinomies. Lutosławski concluded that in both cases the antinomies resulted from the improper application of general concepts.²⁷⁵

The reform of logic, as Lutosławski called this stage of Plato's evolution, came about because of the difficulties that the theory of ideas had given rise to. The eternal truth, which had been viewed in ecstasy by the properly prepared philosopher, was now abandoned, and some significance was granted to sensory cognition. Instead of the previous contemplation of the ideas, the goal of philosophy was to establish and refine the system of concepts. Although the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides*, the two dialogues constituting this stage, did not provide answers to the questions posed, they proposed, by means of criticism, a certain dialectical method that was to be developed in the next stage consisting of the *Sophist*, the *Statesman* and the *Philebus*.²⁷⁶

The formal goal of the *Sophist* was to find a definition for the sophist, but the philosophical value of this dialogue goes far beyond this. It was in this dialogue, for the first time, that Plato admitted that a continuous lecture could also be a valuable teaching method (217c–218a), and in some cases was even necessary. This does not mean, however, that he completely abandoned the conversational form, though his presentation more and more began to resemble monologues interrupted by phrases assenting to the correctness of the uttered words. The acceptance of this new teaching method, which was contrary to the Socratic ideal, was for Lutosławski a sign of Plato's complete maturity and intellectual independence. For the first time, not only in Plato's works, but also in the history of science, conscious reflection on method appeared. Though it had already appeared in the earlier dialogues, it was only in the *Sophist* that the term μέθοδος, as

275 Lutosławski, 1897: 400–412; 1898: 141–153.

276 Lutosławski, 1897: 413–415.

τῶν λόγων μέθοδος (227a), took on the meaning of a method of thinking, something more than the dialectics of the *Republic*. The aim of knowledge was still to produce definitions capturing the affiliation of the *definiendum* to a more general class or genus (γένος, 235a), but the task of the method was division and classification, which could be achieved by means of analysis and synthesis. Dialectics, which had heretofore merely been the ability to pursue joint investigations or the path leading to the cognition of the Good, became a method for skilfully distinguishing between concepts and combining them into more general types. It was also in the *Sophist* that a definition of 'being', as having any disposition (δύναμις) to act or to be affected (247d–e), appeared. Such a definition was very broad, but for Lutosławski it took on an additional meaning, for it encompassed the soul that changes and can experience, and can be active or passive. The ideas were taken down from their pedestal as the only true beings, and the way was paved for the primacy of the soul. In the whole universe of being, the role of the philosopher was now to search for the structure of concepts concealed between the Scylla of predicating every term on all the others and the Charybdis of the complete separateness and independence of concepts. The philosopher's task was to investigate the interdependence of the concepts, of which 'being', 'rest', 'motion', 'identity' and 'difference' were the highest categories, as Lutosławski called them (254d–e). Non-being as a metaphysical problem, along with all the difficulties connected with it, was replaced by the logical conception of non-being as another being.²⁷⁷

In the *Statesman* the considerations on method as a division of being into types (286d–e) were continued, and the title statesman, like the sophist in the previous dialogue, merely provides the material on which dialectical skills could be practised. Among the instructions regarding the method of division (262a and ff.), dichotomy was recommended as a means of allowing the ideas to be discovered as long as it did not cross the natural kinds. The ideas were no longer transcendent entities but rather concepts that had been purified of errors during the dialectical procedure, and so they existed only in the soul.²⁷⁸

A long period of time separated the *Philebus* from the *Republic*, and this was reflected in their philosophical differences. Good in the *Republic* was the crown in the hierarchy of ideas, while in the *Philebus* it was described as a self-sufficient goal (54c), or as a union of three other ideas: beauty,

277 Lutosławski, 1897: 416–441; 1898: 103–125.

278 Lutosławski, 1897: 442–458; 1898: 125–141.

truth and proportionality-moderation (64e–65a). This last component was introduced only in the *Statesman*, which testified to the affinity of both dialogues. The quest for definitions by providing general kinds and differences was to lead to the creation of a whole hierarchical system of concepts, extending from unity to multiplicity, which would make it possible to describe, in a coherent way, the reality accessible to human beings and the nature and structure hidden within it. Since the creation of an ideal system of knowledge was limited by human imperfection, the structure of science need not reproduce the natural order exactly. Only the perfect divine being could create such an ideal system of knowledge. Further difficulties were encountered with the subject of research itself, that is, with the mutability of nature. In the *Philebus*, Plato provided a theoretical justification for the possibility of knowledge in general. This was based on the fundamental similarity between the human soul, which produces knowledge by discovering the natural order, and the world's soul, in which the human soul, which is a part of it, has its origins, just as the body is a part of the corporeal world, being the 'body' of the world (29d–30b). There must therefore be a relationship between imperfect human knowledge and the ideal knowledge that God can possess.²⁷⁹

This penultimate stage of the evolution of Plato's thought, which was referred to by Lutosławski as the 'new theory of science', represented a fundamental reformulation of his vision of dialectics. It was a natural continuation of the previous stage, in which the ontological status of the idea had changed. Having rejected the object of cognition in the form of an ideal world of self-existing eternal concepts, Plato had to reconsider his epistemological position and present a new vision of method which could be adapted to this new field of philosophical research. This method consisted primarily in emphasising the significance of division and skilful analysis in scientific thinking. Ideas, as a system of concepts, were attributed to the divine intellect. Humans could acquire this knowledge to a limited extent by means of researching the natural order and continually reflecting on the appropriacy of the method.²⁸⁰

The *Timaeus* opens the last, and most mature, period in Plato's philosophical development. Here, Lutosławski was unable to find many signs of the author's interest in logic. The idea of the Good was replaced by the good Demiurge, who is neither an impersonal order imposed upon the material chaos, nor the soul of the world. The Demiurge was good and

279 Lutosławski, 1897: 458–470; 1898: 153–162; cf.: Mróz, 2010d: 383–388.

280 Lutosławski, 1897: 470–471.

free, and provided the world with a certain form, because he intended it to be similar to him to the highest possible degree (29e). He was the best of all causes (29a), and acted purposefully, having in mind the good. For the Demiurge, the ideas were the model according to which he formed the mixture of elements. Lutosławski interpreted the ideas as existing only in the divine mind. The ultimate cause was the most important one, without which nothing could come into existence (28a). The superiority of the final cause over the mechanical co-factors stemmed from its rationality, and that was why Plato called it divine.²⁸¹

Lutosławski considered the *Critias* to be an insignificant dialogue for the development of Plato's logic. The *Laws*, however, were a different matter, though this dialogue was more a popular lecture on Plato's political doctrine than a work of philosophy. According to Lutosławski, at the end of his life, Plato attached so little importance to the theory of ideas that he ceased to mention it at all, especially when dealing with subjects that did not require direct reference to it. An increasingly significant role came to be played by the soul in late Platonism, and this became the central notion in the theory of knowledge. In the *Laws*, it was the soul that was described as a self-moving principle, predating the body. Along with its powers, that is will, reason, judgment and memory, the soul not only had temporal priority over the world but it was also the true cause of material and spiritual existence (892c–e). According to Lutosławski, Plato's metaphysical views had remained almost unchanged since the time of composing the *Sophist*. The most important modification in this area was Plato's greater emphasis on the role of God and the multitude of human souls in the world, while the status of the ideas as concepts in the intellect, in the soul, remained unchanged. Ideas, which had once been substances beyond the human intellect, now, at the end of Plato's philosophical development, came to be included into souls; and this spiritual hierarchy turned out to be the highest reality. In Plato's teaching on the soul, Lutosławski highlighted freedom and the possibility of doing evil or submitting to Providence. In this way, Plato, in Lutosławski's opinion, was to come closer to the religions of the future.²⁸²

Lutosławski's interpretation of Plato's philosophical evolution can be summarised as follows: some of the issues that troubled the founder of the Academy did not find expression in written form. Although he preferred oral teaching, he still composed dialogues, one of the reasons for which

281 Lutosławski, 1897: 472–490.

282 Lutosławski, 1897: 490–516.

was to attract new disciples of philosophy to his school. On no account should any conclusion be drawn from this about the mysterious, esoteric subject of his unwritten teachings. These lectures differed in form, difficulty and level of advancement from the protreptic dialogues, but not in content.²⁸³ Plato's literary activity was not for him an end in itself: "literature has its limits, and is not comparable to life; life, not literature, is Plato's aim [...]. We have therefore no reason to suppose that any part of his philosophy has been fully expressed in his works, though we may look at these as sufficient evidence of his thought, enabling us to acquire a fair and probable conception of his theories."²⁸⁴

Plato began his philosophical journey with ethical issues and the application of induction, and at that time he did not attach much importance to logic. It was in the *Cratylus* that the first serious question of logic was examined, namely the relation of thought to language. Then, in the *Symposium*, independently existing, immutable ideas became the subject of an almost mystical vision. The guise in which the theory of ideas was presented indicated to Lutosławski that Plato was aware of the difficulties of his own conception. "If we take the description of ideas literally, they appear to have been for Plato true substances, existing outside every consciousness. But this conception being very difficult to realise, it may be that Plato did not intend to convey it by his highly metaphorical language and that he only endeavoured to illustrate the fixity and objectivity of ideas as contrasted with the instability and subjectivity of appearances."²⁸⁵

The *Phaedo*, the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* confirm the existence of ideas beyond and in complete opposition to the material world. The reality of ideas is a perfect, true being, shaping the material reality of appearances. At the same time, Plato's interest in logic was increasing. He recommended the classification of notions and the quest for the most general and highest principles. Truth was to be found in the domain of eternal ideas whereas beliefs and opinions belonged to the world of phenomena. Coherence became the basic criterion of truth and Good – the most important of the ideas. It was at this point that a turn in Plato's philosophy occurred, and the highest kinds, categories, came to the fore in the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides* and replaced the ideas of good or beauty. These categories did not exist beyond the human mind and soul. The soul itself, as

283 Lutosławski, 1897: 517–518. The final chapter, being a conclusion of the entire book, was translated into Polish and published in Mróz, 2010: 89–95.

284 Lutosławski, 1897: 518.

285 Lutosławski, 1897: 521.

the principle of motion, became an increasingly important element in the system. The reality available to the senses, despite its illusory nature, was granted being in its becoming, being in motion, which was comprehended both as a change of place in space and a change of the state of the soul. Having criticised the theory of ideas in the *Parmenides*, Plato put forward a new theory of knowledge. Truth was no longer to be attained by means of intuition, but rather by means of discovering, through synthesis and analysis, the conceptual hierarchy. The system of ideas was thus superseded by a hierarchy of souls, which was overseen by divine providence. Ideas were turned into form, and became the benchmark for sensory reality, but their existence consisted of being discovered by humans and being reproduced in matter by the Demiurge. At the last stage of his work, Plato had already developed classifications and generalisations as methods for dividing and combining notions. He recommended the use of dichotomy, though only on condition that it did not break the natural division of reality into kinds. He also formulated recommendations concerning definitions that were very similar to those known to us from *Corpus Aristotelicum*. In the whole consistent system of notions every single class of beings, however small, had been endowed by God with its own nature, which allowed it to be distinguished from others of the same kind. Lutosławski collected further evidence to demonstrate that Plato's awareness of logic was increasing, observing that the earlier the dialogue, the more logical errors and sophistries it contained, these being largely absent in his later dialogues. For Lutosławski, Plato's most significant philosophical achievement was the recognition of spiritual reality as the driving force of change and the reason for the existence of the world in general.

Considering the entire philosophy of the founder of the Academy, Lutosławski considered him to be the forerunner of Descartes, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel. The concluding verses of his book were devoted to a eulogy in honour of Plato, explaining his exceptionality: "imagine a divine soul of the greatest power, disposing of all means in the fulfilment of a providential mission: that of showing for the first time the fixity of ideas and the infinite dignity of the human soul. What limits can be set to the intellectual progress of such a philosopher? He stands far above his great teacher, far above his great pupil, alone in his incomparable greatness, and his works are only a splendid remembrance of his living activity, the result of the least serious of his endeavours. What amount of his influence was transmitted to his pupils from generation to generation we can only guess: but for us Plato's dialogues are unique as a literary and philosophical monument, and deserve the greatest attention of all who long for metaphysical

Truth, who remain unsatisfied with the world of appearances and with the passing aims of material life.”²⁸⁶

In tracing the development of Plato’s logic, Lutosławski did not always focus on the main topics of given dialogues, attempting rather to discover the evolution of Plato’s thought among minor issues discussed in dialogues and among digressions or allusions to conclusions from previous dialogues. What was most important for Lutosławski was the evolution of Plato’s outlook, from which his own philosophical views were to stem in subsequent years. The evolutionary interpretation of Plato forms part of the wider context of the philosophical development of humanity, in which Plato played a major role, though he did not discover the ultimate stages in this evolution.

Another striking feature of Lutosławski’s book was his attempt to point out all those ideas traditionally attributed to Aristotle, the roots of which should have been sought in the works of his teacher. Among them, Lutosławski listed the origins of the theory of syllogism, the conception of moderation and proportion applied by the Stagirite in his ethics, or the theory of definition based on genus and difference.

The fact that Lutosławski referred in his work to Polish authors (Jeziernski, Bartunek, Jeziernicki) should not be overlooked, though we should be under no illusion that his English-speaking audience would have been familiar with these works, which were predominantly written in Polish. Nevertheless, Lutosławski drew attention to the existence of Polish research on Plato and emphasised the continuity of this tradition, which had hitherto been virtually ignored. The response of the community of Plato scholars to Lutosławski’s work was impressive. No other historical-philosophical study by a Polish author had ever triggered a comparable reaction.²⁸⁷ The reviewers, however, tended to focus on the method of establishing the chronology of dialogues, which Lutosławski considered to be only an introductory study to the analysis of Plato’s philosophy.

286 Lutosławski, 1897: 527.

287 Over thirty entries can be found in the list of notes and reviews prepared by J. Lutosławska (AUTH: 25–27). Even taking into account that fact that some of these entries include incorrect data or repetitions and some are only short notes in magazines, such a reaction is impressive, all the more so since the reviews were written by first-rate authors. Flattering excerpts from these reviews, some of which will be discussed below, were reprinted by Lutosławski on the final pages of the book: 1899: I–VII; and in the brochure: *Information*, 1930: 15–25.

Reaction to *Plato's Logic* in Poland

Struve, a reliable reviewer of Lutosławski's works on Plato, once again wrote a very extensive and laudatory review of this work. He agreed with Lutosławski's criticism of Zeller's methodology of the history of philosophy, emphasising the advantages of the Pole's research and supporting his decision to publish the book in English. He recognised that the work was an attempt by Lutosławski to interpret Plato's philosophical development and even to round it off as a system by suggesting refinements and enhancing its unity.²⁸⁸

In his youthful studies Struve had argued for Aristotle's superiority over Plato, particularly with respect to logic, believing that European logic could be reduced to Aristotle's logic. Acquaintance with Lutosławski's book, however, influenced Struve to change his stance, and Lutosławski's evidence encouraged him to grant Plato much greater significance, for he wrote: "It is true that Aristotle expounded his cognitive principles in a more complete and systematic form in *Organon* and *Metaphysics*, yet the substance of his logic had largely been prepared for by Plato."²⁸⁹

About the future reception of Lutosławski's research Struve wrote: "We do not hesitate to state that this work will occupy one of the prime positions in the history of Platonism for many years to come."²⁹⁰ A decade or so later, having become familiar with a number of reviews and papers that had arisen in response to Lutosławski's book, Struve presented Lutosławski's findings to the international audiences against the background of the accomplishments of Polish philosophers of the time. He reported on his countryman's studies on Plato briefly, refraining from definitive assessments: "It will only be possible to make a final judgment of this understanding of Plato's philosophy after a detailed revision of all the data used by Lutosławski for his purpose. No such judgment has yet been produced by researchers in this field."²⁹¹ In the worst case, then, the value of Lutosławski's work would consist in providing an incentive to further research on the chronology of the dialogues.

288 Struve, 1898: 353; cf.: Błachnio, 1999: 137. Prior to this, Struve published a brief note about stylometry (Struve, 1897), the source of which was a paper by P. Meyer (1897). Lutosławski (1898a) announced that Meyer's study was to be published in Polish by the Mianowski Foundation. This, however, did not happen.

289 Struve, 1898: 353.

290 Struve, 1898: 354.

291 Struve, 1907: 29.

Another Polish reviewer, who had been referred to in Lutosławski's work, was Jezienicki. Being familiar both with the problems of research on chronology and with several German reviews of Lutosławski's work, he recognised his countryman's book as a successful combination of both the philological method based on analysis of style and the philosophical method demonstrating Plato's philosophical development. He claimed: "in terms of the method and its findings it surpasses all other works that have been published in recent decades in the field of Plato's literary production."²⁹² Jezienicki acknowledged that there was something novel in Lutosławski's reasoning, which both enriched previous knowledge and provided an inspiration for further research. Apart from its numerous advantages, Jezienicki also reported on serious charges that had been made against the book by German scholars, including its lack of attention to the Pythagorean turn in Plato's late philosophy. In response to emerging critical opinions of Lutosławski's book, Jezienicki emphasised that Lutosławski had never claimed that his findings were irrefutable or completely certain. The reviewer expressed his agreement with Lutosławski's thesis that the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman* and the *Parmenides* had succeeded the *Republic*, a position which he himself had defended a decade earlier, mainly with respect to the *Sophist*. In fact, he considered this to be the most important outcome of the entire work. Jezienicki concluded his review in a similar vein to Struve, emphasising that Lutosławski's book "is the most significant of all the works that have appeared in the field of Platonic literature in recent decades, and as such, it brings true honour to the author and to Polish science."²⁹³

It was Bolesław Prus (1847–1912) who introduced Lutosławski's accomplishments to Polish audiences not acquainted with philosophical issues on a daily basis. After introducing Plato and his works, Prus drew attention to Lutosławski's exceptionality: "he is that member of humanity, that cell in the universal brain of humanity, in which an extensive and deep knowledge of Plato is held. Thus, Mr L. is one of the very few Poles who have a role to play and a duty to perform in the civilised world and that is why we have to reckon with him."²⁹⁴ It seemed that Lutosławski's academic position in the Polish philosophical community had been established once and for all, and that universities would open their doors wide for him. The reality turned out to be quite different.

292 Jezienicki, 1899: 3.

293 Jezienicki, 1899: 11.

294 Prus, 1965a: 133; cf.: Starnawski, 1998: 262.

Reaction of English and German-speaking researchers to *Plato's Logic*

Although foreign reviewers tended to express similar opinions on the groundbreaking nature of Lutosławski's work, especially regarding methodological issues, they were usually more sceptical about the details. Such was the assessment to be found, for example, in the reviews of the Scottish classics scholar, James Adam, the first of which was printed on the pages of *The Classical Review*. Adam rightly considered the publication of the book to be the fulfilment of promises made by Lutosławski to readers in a series of fragmentary reports published in various languages. While Adam was familiar with all of these, he was particularly satisfied to discover that Lutosławski had chosen English as the language for presenting the whole of his research to audiences worldwide. Based on his knowledge of ancient sources, Adam felt that Lutosławski's attempt to refute the hypothesis concerning Plato's stay in Megara had been unsuccessful, but above all, he believed that Lutosławski should not have associated the hypothesis of Plato's stay in Megara shortly after Socrates' death with the composition of the *Theaetetus* or any other dialogues. By combining the issue of the Megarian stay with the chronology of the dialogues, Lutosławski had only weakened his argument concerning chronology with this unsuccessful attempt to question established tradition. Adam did not expect experts on the current literature on Plato to be surprised with Lutosławski's chronological results, but even if they accepted this chronology, they would not agree with some of the supporting arguments. There was no evidence that Plato did not deliberately and consciously shape his writing style, and, in any case, style itself is dependent on too many indefinable factors to be presented in strict formulas.²⁹⁵

Adam also focused on the philosophical part of the Pole's book, considering it to be interesting and abounding in insightful and reasonable opinions. To provide his readers with a sample of Lutosławski's style, Adam quoted a passage from the final chapter, where a synthesis of Plato's late philosophy, the system of spiritualistic pluralism, was presented.²⁹⁶ Without commenting on this passage, Adam went on to express his objection to the allegorical interpretation of the theory of ideas in the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic* and the *Symposium*, arguing that in these dialogues the ideas were,

295 Adam, 1898: 218–221.

296 Lutosławski, 1897: 523. As noted by R. Zaborowski, Lutosławski at that time was not yet using the term 'spiritualism' to present Plato's evolution, or Plato's second philosophy (Zaborowski, 2000a: 70).

without doubt, understood as transcendent beings. As for the later period of Plato's output, Lutosławski claimed that there was no trace of the theory of ideas as supramundane entities in the dialogues composed after the *Parmenides*. Adam disagreed with this, supporting his argument with a reference to the *Timaeus* (52a), and adding that in any case, Lutosławski's claim had been contradicted by Aristotle's testimony. For Adam, Lutosławski's unsubstantiated opinion that Aristotle had not understood the teacher to whom he owed so much was unacceptable, as was Lutosławski's constant search for essential philosophical substance in marginal remarks. This showed a complete disregard for the artistry of the text of the dialogues, for their poetic nature and their mysticism. In fact, Lutosławski had left numerous detailed issues understated or unsubstantiated, so that the conclusions of his work seemed to the Scottish scholar to be inadequately and unconvincingly justified, though he admitted that this was a typical flaw in this sort of work. He ironically referred to the second part of the book as 'dogmatometry' by analogy with the term 'stylometry' from the first part. Still, he found the book interesting and suggestive because of Lutosławski's rare mastery of the secondary literature, and for these reasons, Adam concluded that the book would be of value for Plato researchers.²⁹⁷

In the second review, which was published in a philosophical journal, Adam, as a classicist, recognised the greater importance of the philological part of the book on methodology and stylometry, even though it was only an introduction to the philosophical part. Nevertheless, Adam had some doubts about Lutosławski's confidence in stylometry and its future prospects, foreseeing criticism from the academic world, where it might be questioned whether the essence of literary style could be 'weighed and measured and counted'. Ultimately, however, Adam concluded that Lutosławski's general chronological conclusions were sound, and that he had made a great contribution to Plato scholarship. Taken together, these merits had resulted in a book that would mark a breakthrough for a whole generation of researchers.²⁹⁸

Peter Meyer, who had already reported on Lutosławski's method to German readers on the basis of only one chapter of the book, wrote also a review of the whole work. He found the book somewhat disconcerting, for in his view it represented a fundamental criticism of all previous knowledge about Plato, and in some parts even a completely new presentation of

297 Adam, 1898: 221–223.

298 Adam, 1898b. Prior to this, Adam had briefly announced Lutosławski's book (Adam, 1898a).

his work. He therefore found the book difficult to assess, and somewhat offputting on account of Lutosławski's peremptory tone.²⁹⁹

In Meyer's eyes, Lutosławski's erudition, revealed in his knowledge of the secondary literature, was in complete contrast to the attitude of the great German professors who believed that nothing that had originated outside their own *milieu* was worth the trouble of reading. It demonstrated the Pole's clarity, impartiality and accuracy. His contribution was twofold; not only did he collect all the findings and works of researchers on Plato's style but also, on the basis of this data, he founded his own method of determining the chronology, known as stylometry, from which a certain vision of the development of Plato's philosophy was to emerge. Ultimately then, Meyer did not hesitate to assess Lutosławski's book as one of the most significant works, if not the most significant, in the literature on Plato in the second half of the 19th century.³⁰⁰

Another reviewer of the book was Theodor Gomperz, whom Lutosławski had met in the spring of 1895 in Vienna, where he had also become acquainted with Kazimierz Twardowski. After reading Lutosławski's book, Gomperz delivered a lecture entitled *Über neuere Platonforschung*,³⁰¹ in which the Austrian scholar emphasised the fundamental significance of chronological issues for the comprehension of Plato's work. Until very recent times, dealing with the divergent findings in Plato research had seemed to Gomperz a discouragingly insurmountable problem, and it was only in the last three decades that a promising turn in this state of affairs had begun to appear. Several researchers were associated with this change. In the first place, Campbell's name was listed, followed by others, like Constantin Ritter, and also Lutosławski, thanks to whose efforts Campbell's work had finally gained wide recognition.³⁰²

Gomperz explained that Lutosławski had been able to establish his conclusion with a higher degree of accuracy because he had based his method on diverse linguistic criteria which had previously been applied by a number of researchers independently of one another. Stylometry, then, consisted in the comprehensive application of results from researchers who had not previously been aware of each other's existence. Gomperz went on to focus on the pros and cons of stylometry. One of the drawbacks he mentioned was that the method was based on the rather bold and risky as-

299 Meyer, 1898: 803.

300 Meyer, 1898: 804–809.

301 "Sitzungsberichte", 1899: VI.

302 Gomperz, 1898: 66.

sumption that there was a consistent and gradual development in an author's literary style.³⁰³

Overall, however, Gomperz assessed the conclusions resulting from the application of stylometry to be accurate because of the extraordinary diversity of the linguistic criteria and the huge data base, which could have the effect of compensating for any individual incorrect results. The question of absolute chronology was less positively assessed, with Gomperz questioning the positions of the *Phaedrus* and the *Theaetetus*. In principle, then, he assumed Lutosławski's method and its application to be accurate, but pointed out the necessity of introducing some corrections with regard to the chronological positions of particular dialogues within their groups and the specific dates of their composition.³⁰⁴

A review of four studies in ancient philosophy was presented by Eugen Kühnemann in one paper: a book on Plato by G. Schneider, on Aristotle by H. Siebeck, C. Ritter's commentary on Plato's *Laws*, and the book by Lutosławski. Lutosławski's book took up the same amount of space in the paper as the other three works together. Kühnemann was in two minds about whether to regard this work as the most important book in the area of Platonic literature in the second half of the 19th century, but there was certainly no doubt for him that it was a book that could not be overlooked in future research. Lutosławski's knowledge of the literature was extraordinary and of great use to readers, though Lutosławski's claim that he had included all the previous works on Plato seemed to Kühnemann unlikely as this would have been an impossible undertaking. He also warned readers not to overestimate the allegedly innovative nature of this latest work. Despite Lutosławski's claim that his book represented a complete revision of all previous views on Platonism, Kühnemann, suggested that in terms of subtlety of interpretation, he surpassed neither Schleiermacher nor Zeller; in fact, he barely got close to them.³⁰⁵

303 Gomperz, 1898: 67–70.

304 Gomperz, 1898: 70–72; cf.: Apelt, 1901: 283. Having read Gomperz's review, Zeller regarded it as a kind of manifestation and panegyric (Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 210; letter 160 of June 7th, 1898). Diels echoed this view and openly described Gomperz's paper as a lucubration (Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 211; letter 161 of June 8th, 1898).

305 Kühnemann, 1900: 306–307. The spelling of Lutosławski's family name was usually troublesome for non-Polish authors. In foreign publications, it usually appears as 'Lutoslawski', while at the beginning of Kühnemann's review, and in the running title it was printed as 'Łutoslawski'.

One consequence of the order of the dialogues presented by Lutosławski was that the doctrine of the ideas was no longer to be regarded as Plato's philosophy *par excellence*, but only a transitory stage in his philosophy. According to Kühnemann, this was only ostensibly a revolutionary view because recognised scholars had long since abandoned the interpretation of the theory of ideas in the Aristotelian spirit. Lutosławski's interpretation, then, was not radically different from all previous ones. Nevertheless, although Kühnemann did not think that Lutosławski's interpretation could be considered as a finished work, he believed that an internally coherent vision of Plato's development was beginning to emerge from his chronological premises.³⁰⁶

Kühnemann was interested in Lutosławski's understanding of Plato's logic, an explanation of which was to be expected, given the title of the book. He was one of very few reviewers who reported that the scope of this term, logic, had been broadened by Lutosławski. In fact, the book was more a history of Plato's idea of science. Plato's philosophical significance lay in the fact that he investigated the foundations and potentialities of science, and it was from this that all his metaphysics and ethics stemmed. Kühnemann disagreed with Lutosławski's view that in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo* Plato had meant the objective existence of the ideas beyond individual souls, nor did he see much analogy to Kant's doctrine in Plato's subsequent evolution towards comprehending the ideas as necessary concepts, with no emphasis on their independent existence.³⁰⁷

Kühnemann felt that Lutosławski's interpretation had failed to exhaust the subject of Plato's theory of knowledge. To fulfil this task properly, an emphasis on Plato's knowledge and criticism of empiricism would be required, which was missing from the Pole's book. Kühnemann also opposed the thesis that Plato's development could be discerned from the fact that, in contrast to the middle period, the ideas in his late works were regarded as concepts in the soul, whether human or divine, which for Kühnemann was not a sign of progress. Nevertheless he found Lutosławski's overview of Plato's diverse uses of the notion of movement instructive. He rightly supposed that the spiritualist interpretation of late Platonism arose from Lutosławski's own inclination for the metaphysics of souls. In 1900, when Kühnemann's review appeared in print, Lutosławski had already published the book *Seelenmacht* (1899) in which he articulated his spiritualistic, individualist doctrine. Kühnemann did not share this view, but he

306 Kühnemann, 1900: 308.

307 Kühnemann, 1900: 308–314.

appreciated the fact that Lutosławski had posed a new problem for Plato's interpreters, namely the transfer of being from the idea to the soul.³⁰⁸

Zeller once again contributed to the discussion on the subject of Lutosławski's research. Having previously reviewed *Ueber die Echtheit, Reihenfolge...*, he now focused more generally on methods of determining the chronology of literary works on the basis of features of writing style. All these methods had one thing in common: they were founded on the assumption, which was not always stated explicitly, that if a given author created literary works over a longer period, and some of the writings displayed a convergence of certain linguistic and stylistic features that were absent from or rare in other writings, then the only explanation was that the affinity of stylistic features in these writings must have resulted from their chronological proximity. The more frequently such features occurred, the more certain the chronological conclusions of the research. Zeller decided to undertake an analysis of the frequency of punctuation in the works by David Friedrich Strauss. Since his application of language statistics to the columns of digits did not result in chronological conclusions that were in agreement with the actual chronology of Strauss' works, it was concluded that there was no connection between affinities of style and chronological proximity.³⁰⁹ Struve euphemistically referred to Zeller's experiment as 'sophisticated.'³¹⁰ While basing chronological conclusions on the punctuation of texts may be considered a rather unusual idea, the very doubts about translating affinities of style into chronological relations were not unwarranted.³¹¹

Returning to Plato, Zeller did not doubt that there were some features in the content of Plato's writings, in their style and language that resulted from the date of their composition, but there were also those that were not related to chronology. All this, however, required further research similar to that presented by Zeller himself on the example of Strauss.³¹² The very issue of chronology, and of Lutosławski's research and Zeller's polemics, were of such importance for the Polish philosophical community that K.

308 Kühnemann, 1900: 314–316.

309 Zeller, 1898a: 1–10. In this paper, Zeller did not mention any researchers of Plato's style by name.

310 Struve, 1898: 346.

311 Even today, taken as a whole, Zeller's opinion on linguistic research on the dialogues is considered discerning and worth reading (Thesleff, 2009a: 214, footnote 180).

312 Zeller, 1898a: 10–12.

Twardowski devoted two lectures to this matter in his course on the history of philosophy.³¹³

Personal factors cannot be passed over in silence in the case of Zeller and his reception of Lutosławski's work. As was indicated above, Lutosławski had not been accurate when referring to Zeller's conclusions, but this mistake had not actually affected the chronological order proposed by Zeller. Soon afterwards, when Campbell turned to German researchers with the idea of preparing a new Plato lexicon, Zeller, in a letter to Diels, regretted that this proposal had come from the English researchers, adding that he suspected that Lutosławski was involved, and this was likely to have grave consequences for the undertaking, for he was nothing but a careerist and fraudster.³¹⁴ Although Diels felt that the task of preparing such a lexicon was of vital importance, he agreed that the entire undertaking would prove to be unsuccessful "administrante Lutoslawskio."³¹⁵ Zeller reported to Diels on his letter to Campbell, in which he had mentioned the difficulties in finding a suitable person to take up the task of working on the lexicon. He had added, quite bluntly, putting aside all diplomatic conventions, that if Lutosławski were to take any part in the work on the lexicon, then he would lose all faith in the project's success.³¹⁶

Zeller also gave an account to Diels of his correspondence with Lutosławski, complaining that Lutosławski had shamelessly remarked that he did not know any modest Platonists apart from Campbell and Ueberweg. Zeller considered this to be a poor excuse in answer to his critical review.³¹⁷ Lutosławski must have thought that such a remark on the Platonists' lack of modesty would somehow excuse his boundless trust in his own methods and its results, but he merely succeeded in offending Zeller.

The correspondence between Diels and Zeller, two great personalities who had stamped their names on the historiography of ancient philosophy, leaves us with the impression that they would gladly have excluded the Pole from the research community. As to Zeller's view on the chronology of the dialogues, further development in chronology research was to confirm Lutosławski's results. Apparently, then, personal aversion took the upper hand, thus breaching the boundaries of scientific criticism.

313 Twardowski, ELV-AKT1: 9.

314 Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 184; letter 141 of July 24th, 1897.

315 Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 185; letter 142 of July 26th, 1897.

316 Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 186–187; letter 143 of Aug. 7th, 1897.

317 Diels & Usener & Zeller, 1992: 196–197; letter 152 of Dec. 11th, 1897.

Although Campbell was more modest about finding a definitive answer to the chronology of the dialogues, believing that our knowledge of Plato would forever remain fragmentary, he was, of course, an adherent of Lutosławski's chronology. He found the view that the *Phaedrus*, a dialogue so rich in philosophical content, could have preceded the *Protagoras*, or that the *Theaetetus* was earlier than the *Phaedo* completely unacceptable. Nor did he believe that Plato's stay in Megara could have had any effect on the chronology of the dialogues.³¹⁸

Independently of Zeller, Campbell conducted his own investigation into poetic texts, but whereas Zeller's examination of Strauss' writings had convinced Zeller of the lack of value of language statistics for research on chronology, Campbell was convinced of the conclusiveness of the method by his examination of Alfred Tennyson's poetry. The outcome of his considerations appeared to be that, while there could be reservations about the conclusions resulting from the study of single stylistic features, the reverse was true for conclusions based on 500 precisely calculated and classified features of style. He believed that Lutosławski had laid the foundations for new research on Plato, in which the chronology of the dialogues and the history of Plato's logic were only to constitute a framework within which Plato's development could be further elaborated. Campbell admitted that, after Lutosławski, little remained to be done with regard to Plato's theory of cognition, but other areas still required further analysis, like the development of Plato's psychology, the concept of the material world, ethics, or the change in the image of Socrates and in connection with his 'retirement', the empowerment of Plato.³¹⁹

Lutosławski replied to Zeller's paper, "Sprachstatistisches," with a paper entitled "Stylometrisches.," for as he regarded Zeller as the greatest opponent of language statistics, his comments demanded a response. Lutosławski wrote as if he were defending Campbell's findings rather than his own. He presented Zeller's method briefly as follows: having noticed some of Campbell's insignificant methodological errors, Zeller applied these erroneous research steps to completely different material and exaggerated the errors of the method to such an extent that they became particularly glaring.³²⁰

The method applied by Zeller to the works of Strauss was based on an invalid model of language statistics, and it could only have led Zeller to

318 Campbell, 1898: 36–39.

319 Campbell, 1898: 39–56.

320 Lutosławski, 1897c: 34–37.

chronological conclusions that were incompatible with the actual chronology of Strauss's texts. Lutosławski argued that stylometry did not examine only 'certain stylistic features,' but its conclusions were founded on numerous and significant features of style, and punctuation could not be counted among them.³²¹

A positive response to Lutosławski's research came from Hans Ræder, a Danish scholar, who published his works in German. He emphasised that the Pole had distinguished two philosophical systems in Plato and also that the title 'logic' had been understood by the author in a very broad sense. Ræder regarded the highlighting of two philosophies in Plato as a strong impulse for the development of further research, which could not be fruitfully carried out without taking the Pole's book into account. He admitted that not all of Lutosławski's claims could be accepted without some reservations, particularly the thesis on the late Plato's abandonment of the doctrine of self-existing ideas, which had been poorly substantiated. Moreover, he felt that Lutosławski had not paid sufficient attention to the dialogues as autonomous units when drawing up his chronology of Plato's development.³²²

In subsequent parts of Ræder's book very frequent references were made to Lutosławski's *opus vitae*, which Ræder recommended as a means of becoming acquainted with the achievements of language statistics research, for the author had not only reported on studies on this subject by others but had also drawn further conclusions from these.³²³ Another feature of style which Ræder considered to be incomparable with purely linguistic factors was the role of Socrates in the dialogues as a leader of the conversation, a listener, or a reporter. Ultimately, Ræder maintained that Lutosławski had not gone much further than his predecessors, but, in fact, the Pole had never claimed to have done so. Ræder could not accept Lutosławski's belief that he had provided a decisive and ultimate substantiation for the claims of his predecessors, and regarded this as little more than an illusion. Although Ræder could not accept the method as a whole, and its details in particular, he considered it necessary to accept the results reached by Lutosławski, since the most certain of them had already been confirmed in earlier studies. One of them was, for example, the chronology of the late group.³²⁴ With the help of Lutosławski's arguments Ræder

321 Lutosławski, 1897c: 37–41.

322 Ræder, 1905: 14–16.

323 Ræder, 1905: 31.

324 Ræder, 1905: 34–38.

supported, for example, the position of the *Cratylus* in the chronology,³²⁵ or the chronologically separate position of Book I of the *Republic* as having been composed prior to the rest of the dialogue, although it was difficult to determine its relation to the *Phaedo*.³²⁶

As for Lutosławski's rendering of Plato's logical development as his growing awareness of the laws of logic, which he had initially violated, then applied correctly and finally articulated clearly, Ræder considered this development to be much more natural and plausible than the opposing view. He warned, however, against mechanical and uncritical application of this principle because Plato could, for example, have had lapses of memory at any time, even in his mature period.³²⁷ Ræder distanced himself from Lutosławski's philosophical conclusions that the ideas in the late dialogues were only thoughts in souls, for according to the Danish scholar, the ideas became even more independent than they had been in earlier dialogues.³²⁸

The reluctance of some German authors to Lutosławski's book took strange forms. One example was the opinion expressed by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. Not only did he avoid directly mentioning Lutosławski's name but even introduced him as a man from the Baltic region of Russia who travelled all over the world claiming that he had solved the problem of chronology in one go with his own method, a method which, in Wilmanowitz's opinion, had in fact been invented and applied by others. Lutosławski was no meteor, but nothing more than a paper lantern, glowing briefly before burning out.³²⁹ Yet at the same time, Wilamowitz emphasised the accomplishments of German language statisticians such as Ritter, who, in turn, held Lutosławski in high esteem. Fortunately, not all German scholars assessed the value of Lutosławski's work on the basis of national prejudice.

Ritter stressed that the chronology of the dialogues was a topical issue that was being investigated by the most important researchers, above all Germans, but also, with extraordinary energy, as Ritter put it, by the Pole. The most essential points in the dispute over the chronology, according to Ritter, were the positions of the *Theaetetus* and the *Phaedrus*, while one of

325 Ræder, 1905: 153.

326 Ræder, 1905: 201–203.

327 Ræder, 1905: 81.

328 Ræder, 1905: 382, footnote 1.

329 Wilamowitz, 1920: 8. Attention has already been drawn to the glaring injustice of this assessment (Thesleff, 2009a: 149, footnote 3).

the key questions for philosophy was the position of the *Sophist*. There were two possible solutions to this question, and Ritter reduced the dispute to the names of two researchers. On the one hand, Zeller placed the *Sophist*, and other dialogues that did not bear any traces of the theory of ideas, prior to those that could have been referred to by Aristotle, that is, prior to the *Phaedrus*, *Symposium* and the *Republic*. On the other hand, Teichmüller supported the opposite view. According to his chronology, Aristotle's criticism of the theory of ideas was not original, but was borrowed from Plato himself. It was therefore a historical injustice to regard Plato as a herald of a poetic rather than scientific approach and a day-dreaming idealist, while Aristotle was praised as a sober and reasonable realist and critic. It was Plato himself who, in the more mature years of his manhood, had outgrown the initial, temporary phase of presenting mythically his anamnesis, metempsychosis and the world of ideas. He had overturned his own intuitions and critically purged them with the help of more exact logical instruments.³³⁰ The dispute over chronology turned out to be a dispute over the vision of Plato's development, over Plato's image, whether there was more of a poet and a visionary in him or more of a scientific thinker. At a contemporary level, the controversy over Plato was, for Ritter, also a controversy about the very essence of the methods and aims of philosophy. It was this important problem and not just the technical issues of language statistics that Ritter raised, making the issue of chronology far more important than just a matter of juggling philological details.

In his overview of the vital disputes about the reliability of language statistics, Ritter referred to Lutosławski and his latest attempt to establish a chronology. Lutosławski was following in the footsteps of Campbell, whose findings he had first brought to the attention of German scholars. At the same time, Lutosławski also believed that it was he himself who had discovered the beautiful harmony between the development of Plato's scientific method and the changes in his style. Ritter commented ironically on the reception and criticism of Lutosławski's studies among German researchers, many of whom were advocates of language statistics, yet they believed that the Pole had discredited the method itself. One recurring remark was that Lutosławski had merely followed a path that had been well-marked out in advance. Ritter found this peculiar, and not to be taken seriously, for each researcher must start from some point. The starting point may be the language criteria or the philosophical content in the dialogues,

330 Ritter, 1910a: 183–186.

but whichever is chosen as the first, the other will then also be taken into account, and the research route will already have been marked out by whatever was examined first. According to Ritter, Lutosławski presented a convincing vision of Plato's philosophical development, without limiting himself exclusively to language statistics.³³¹

In his later, extensive book on Plato, Ritter also mentioned Lutosławski's research as deserving special consideration.³³² The Pole's undisputed contribution was that he had collected and lucidly presented stylistic studies that had been scattered about in various works, and had introduced the German research community to Campbell's research. Campbell's contribution was particularly emphasised by Ritter, who remarked facetiously that German scholars had confirmed Campbell's results without even being aware of them. Although Ritter had some minor objections to the calculation method, he added that anyone who checked Lutosławski's calculations would very easily be convinced that all the linguistic observations confirmed the division of the dialogues into three groups.³³³ Ritter had some doubts, however, about the internal chronological divisions within the groups, which had been calculated by Lutosławski on the basis of fractions to two decimal places.³³⁴ Comparing Lutosławski's book with other works devoted to Plato, Ritter considered it to be one of the most significant, though he did not agree with it completely, but then neither did he agree entirely with any other books to which he referred.³³⁵ Let us remark that Lutosławski's work was the only non-German book on Ritter's list. One of the chronology researchers mentioned by Ritter was P. Natorp, whose results were thought to be odd because he opposed the attempts to put the *Theaetetus* and the *Phaedrus* after the *Republic* and the *Phaedo*.³³⁶

In this context, it becomes clear that Wilamowitz' opinion on Lutosławski mentioned above must have stemmed from his xenophobic prejudices, for Wilamowitz spoke very highly of Ritter's statistical conclusions, which he considered to be rendered with the clarity that a great stylist like

331 Ritter, 1910a: 186–191. In subsequent parts of his text, Ritter mainly took issue with Zeller's criticism of language statistics, without referring to Lutosławski. In the polemic against Zeller, Ritter subjected some writings by Goethe and even by Zeller himself to statistical and chronological investigations.

332 Ritter, 1910b: 197.

333 Ritter, 1910b: 235–236.

334 Ritter, 1910b: 261.

335 Ritter, 1910b: 283.

336 Ritter, 1910b: 254–256.

Plato deserved,³³⁷ while at the same time appearing not to notice how much good Ritter had had to say about Lutosławski's work.

In several places in his book, Ritter makes reference to Lutosławski, explicitly acknowledging his observations to be correct, for example those regarding the presumed dependence of the passage in the *Phaedrus* (269d) on Isocrates' speech; or Lutosławski's justification for the *Republic* preceding the *Statesman*.³³⁸ Ritter doubted, however, whether those dialogues which demonstrated serious infringements of the laws of reasoning had necessarily been composed earlier than those in which the knowledge of these laws was evident. Ritter maintained that these alleged infringements might merely have been ostensible errors of logic, and were intended to stimulate and attract the readers' attention. They were partly jokes and partly deliberately careless expressions, which gave the opponents of Socrates a convenient opportunity to show their own rhetorical skills.³³⁹

Lutosławski's research was discussed even in popular, non-professional magazines by prominent philosophers in America. George Santayana, for example, expounded the essence of the dispute over the chronology of the dialogues to readers not familiar with philosophy. He divided those interested in Plato into two groups: those who applied his ideas for philosophical purposes and those whose aim was to render Plato's philosophy as objectively as possible. For the second group, the issue of the authenticity and chronology of the dialogues was essential, for depending on how these issues were resolved, two possible images of Plato emerged. The contentious question was whether Plato, after starting from preliminary technical and schoolish problems, reached a poetic view of reality, or perhaps the reverse was true; after a period of youthful poetic enthusiasm, Plato may have begun to analyse his results in a critical and sober manner. The first view had

337 Wilamowitz, 1920: 8–9. Wilamowitz appeared to be prejudiced not only against the Pole, but considered philology in general to be the exclusive property of the Germans, as is evidenced by his correspondence with Diels. The latter asked Wilamowitz about potential reservations against Paul Shorey, who was being considered as an incoming candidate for an academic exchange with the Americans (Braun & Calder III & Ehlers, 1995: 275–276, letter 207 of May 7th, 1912). Wilamowitz replied that there were no special charges against the American scholar, adding, however, that he considered it to be a grotesque phenomenon that an editor of a journal from Chicago was being brought to Berlin to bring philology to the Germans! He described the entire exchange programme with Americans as a perverse institution (Braun & Calder III & Ehlers, 1995: 276, letter 208 of May 8th, 1912).

338 Ritter, 1910b: 208–209.

339 Ritter, 1910b: 228–229.

prevailed for centuries, while the latter was first articulated by Campbell ‘in an academic whisper,’ as Santayana put it. It was not until the appearance of Lutosławski’s book, whose title Santayana cited erroneously as *The Logic of Plato*, that the latter view spread widely and loudly. Santayana himself, however, supported the view on the fundamental harmony and concordance of both methods in Plato’s philosophy, thus minimising the significance of chronological research.³⁴⁰

The neo-Kantians and Lutosławski’s Plato

Lutosławski’s book was discussed in *Kantstudien* by the editor of the journal, Hans Vaihinger. He was already acquainted with Lutosławski, whom he considered to be an excellent example of the increasing internationalisation of the academic world of that time, being a native Pole who had graduated from a German-speaking university, published his first philosophical studies in German, then lectured at a Russian university, married a Spanish writer, presented his works in the French Académie des Sciences, before they finally appeared in a more extended form as a book in English.³⁴¹

Vaihinger turned to the issue that interested him most, that is to the relation between Kant’s philosophy and Lutosławski’s interpretation of the theory of ideas. In this interpretation, as rendered by Vaihinger, Plato, after the age of 50, woke up from a dogmatic slumber, and from then on he started to teach critical idealism. The links between Kant and Lutosławski’s interpretation of Plato’s philosophical development were divided by Vaihinger into three groups: formal, historical and factual. The first group concerned the parallel development of both philosophers who, at a similar age, abandoned their previous philosophical views, and turned from a period of dogmatism to criticism. Such a parallel existed, provided that it was accepted that the *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Statesman* and the *Philebus* came after the *Symposium* and the *Republic*, contrary to the erroneous views of Schleiermacher or Zeller in this regard. The historical link was Kant’s view of the theory of ideas, which he articulated in the *Critique of*

340 Santayana, 1957a: 54–63; on this paper by Santayana, cf.: Mróz, 2003: 36–37.

341 Vaihinger, 1898: 472. Vaihinger’s review and the table of contents of the journal itself clearly contradict the argumentation supporting the conclusions on the lack of influence or value of Polish research on Plato (for example: “in volume II of *Kant-Studien* [...] Vaihinger did not publish any paper, note or review. Moreover, the first three volumes of this journal were devoted exclusively to the philosophy of Kant” (Trojanowski, 2005: 88); cf.: Mróz, 2005c).

Pure Reason, where he set forth an explanations of the theory of ideas that was mitigated and better adapted to the nature of things, being devoid of pompous language and excessive expressions hypostasising the ideas.³⁴² In fact, it seemed to Kant that Plato had begun to consider the ideas as concepts of reason in the Kantian sense. Lutosławski's research confirmed Kant's view with regard to the late period of Plato's output. This led to the third link, a factual one, between Plato and Kant, which was Lutosławski's claim concerning Plato's anticipation of the doctrine of the ideas as necessary concepts of reason and his search for the sources of phenomena in *a priori* forms. Plato should thus be regarded as a distant philosophical precursor of Kant, and this was to bring about a change in the way of comprehending the history of logic and the history of philosophy. Vaihinger, reflecting on the overall assessment of Lutosławski's work, claimed that it would not be erroneous to conclude that the bold concepts of the Pole, supported by his great acuity and profound learning, had posed *die Platonische Frage* anew.³⁴³

This was not the only reaction to Lutosławski's book, which originated in the neo-Kantian milieu. Of even greater importance was the fact that *The Origin and Growth...* was read by P. Natorp. Being aware of the Marburg neo-Kantians' interest in Plato from H. Cohen's works, Lutosławski must have sent a copy of the book to Natorp with a request for an opinion on it. Natorp deferred judgement on the entire work because the amount of material accumulated in it did not allow him to make such an assessment without a thorough examination of the philological details. However, even at first glance, the Pole's book appeared to him to be better than the previous studies on the history of Plato's language. In spite of numerous interesting points, Natorp did not think that Lutosławski had outlined the subject heralded in the title, *i.e.* the history of Plato's logic. He also found some flaws of a philological nature, which he listed in a letter. In general, however, Natorp's opinion was quite favourable. In spite of some gaps in the work, Lutosławski's book was considered much better than the works of philologists, who, according to Natorp, had no knowledge of logic.³⁴⁴

342 Cf.: Kant, 1998: 396: footnote.

343 Vaihinger, 1898: 472–474.

344 Mróz, 2010d: 385. The forms of address and the tone of Natorp's letters prove that relations between both scholars went beyond the frames of conventional politeness.

Natorp decided to undertake his own stylometric research, taking Lutosławski's method as a starting point. He started out by explaining the fundamental source of error in Lutosławski's method by means of a simile. A good painter, said Natorp, would undoubtedly try to perfect his skills and techniques, and so, in the development from the earliest works to the latest, an increase in the use of ever-better artistic means could be observed. This seemed to Natorp to be a legitimate premise on which to base chronological conclusions. However, the works belonging to one period of the artist's development need not all represent the same level of accomplishment, for the artist might have put all his heart and soul into one composition, and not so much into another. For various reasons, even accidental ones, and for various purposes, the entire wealth of resources available to the artist may not have been applied to each piece of work. And this, in turn, could diminish the value of chronological conclusions. This was especially true in the case of Plato, and of the *Phaedrus* and the *Parmenides* in particular. Natorp's simile perfectly illustrated his doubts about the chronological conclusions based on the analysis of style, and so he himself invented a method that he believed could circumvent the above reservations. His aim was to refute Lutosławski's conclusions by demonstrating that the *Parmenides* was written after the *Republic* whereas the *Phaedrus* and the *Theaetetus* preceded it. Like other researchers, Natorp considered that a necessary condition for obtaining certainty in chronological studies was the preparation of a complete lexicon of the dialogues.³⁴⁵ Of particular significance for interpreting Plato's philosophical development was the *Phaedrus* and its position in the chronology and it was on this that the vision of Plato's internal evolution as a thinker depended. According to Natorp, it was in this dialogue that the dialectical method was introduced as a novelty for the first time and the first version of the theory of ideas was expounded. So along with the *Theaetetus*, it was the 'missing link' between the Socratic dialogues and the *Phaedo*.³⁴⁶

The problem of *Die platonische Frage* itself did not seem to Natorp to be the most crucial problem for science at that time. Nevertheless, Lutosławski's book touched on the problem with model clarity, making it almost generally comprehensible, and contributing significantly, as far as was pos-

345 Natorp, 1898; cf.: Mróz, 2010d: 385.

346 Lembeck, 1994: 196–200 (let us mention in passing that in this book the last name of the Polish researcher is referred to as 'Lutosławski'); Kim, 2010: 100. On the problematic dating of the *Phaedrus*, cf.: Thesleff, 2009a: 317–318. On Natorp's interpretation of Plato, cf.: Noras, 2007.

sible at that time, to its solution, though the final conclusions were still remote. Like Vaihinger, Natorp drew attention to Lutosławski's international intellectual genealogy, presenting him as a multinational writer, though of Polish origins, who prided himself in having acquired, significantly, the German method, and who, after having published many preliminary works in various languages, wrote a book in English.³⁴⁷

Natorp provided his German audience with more or less the same remarks that he had previously sent to Lutosławski: the substance of the book did not correspond to the subject heralded in the title because much more was included in it than just Plato's logic. In fact, its subject appeared to be the entire theoretical philosophy of Plato, though presented from the methodological and logical point of view. Natorp believed, however, that what was only modestly announced in the subtitle, that is research on Plato's style and the chronology of his dialogues, was, in fact, the subject of the book.³⁴⁸

Finally, Natorp focused on the philosophical part of Lutosławski's work, summarising its central thesis as the assumption that there were two radically different philosophies in Plato's work, two different views on the question of cognition. According to the first view, which was idealistic and still half poetic, what constituted the truth were the eternal and immutable ideas, which existed not only in themselves but also as given and already existing in the soul of the subject. In the second view, the psychological view which was critically prepared for in the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides*, positively expounded in the *Sophist*, and developed in the *Statesman*, the *Philebus*, the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*, Plato managed to overcome his predilection for poetic metaphors, and the foundations were provided for serious scientific criticism. This view was claimed to have some similarity to that by means of which Kant reformed metaphysics. The existing, immutable ideas were replaced by fundamental concepts of science or categories, and instead of the ideas, individual souls were regarded as beings. Lutosławski's attempt to equate Plato's late teaching with Kant's philosophy seemed to Natorp to be going too far. In support of his opinion, Natorp quoted some remarks from Lutosławski's book, in which the author himself conjectured that the poetic language of the *Symposium* was deliberately metaphoric, and thus the whole idea of the distinction between the Platonism of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedo* on the one hand and that of the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* on the other collapsed, thus confirming Na-

347 Natorp, 1898a: 347.

348 Natorp, 1898a: 347–348.

torp's belief that there was no fundamental difference between them. Another of Natorp's critical arguments was related to the *Theaetetus*, in which, according to Lutosławski, Plato's philosophical reform was first introduced. In this dialogue, however, models appear as existing in being,³⁴⁹ and Plato, as Natorp argued, never abandoned this doctrine, which can be seen in the example from the *Timaeus*.³⁵⁰

Natorp clearly distinguished between the problem of the evolution of Plato's understanding of the idea and the interpretation of Plato's late philosophy as a kind of spiritualism. He admitted that the individuality of particular souls was more emphasised in the late dialogues, but Lutosławski's interpretation seemed to attribute to Plato an affinity with monadism, and this was completely unfounded. For Natorp, the stronger emphasis on the issue of individual souls was associated with Plato's more detailed study of particular branches of philosophy, for example natural philosophy in the *Timaeus*. This development seemed to him to be quite natural, so it would be difficult to demonstrate that Plato had made a break with the past or that there had been any Kantian turn. In the end, Natorp rated the book as valuable, but its value lay not in resolving the Platonic question, but rather in encouraging further fruitful investigations into it.³⁵¹ Natorp realised the importance of the methods and conclusions of language statistics, so he himself was one of the first to be encouraged by Lutosławski's book to undertake research to develop this method.³⁵² Since his vision of Plato's development had been undermined by Lutosławski's results, he decided to challenge them,³⁵³ in other words it could be said that he wanted to beat stylometry at its own game.

Lutosławski's work influenced the direction of Natorp's research, providing evidence of the neo-Kantian's own thesis about the inspiring role of Lutosławski's book for further research on chronology. The intense ex-

349 Natorp most probably meant 176e: παραδείγματα ἐν τῷ ὄντι.

350 Natorp, 1898a: 350–351.

351 Natorp, 1898a: 352.

352 Natorp did this in a series of three papers, in which he repeated his previous theses and conducted research using the language statistics method (Natorp, 1899; 1899a; 1900). An extensive article, in which he indicated 392–390 BC as the time of composing the *Phaedrus*, after the Socratic dialogues and the *Gorgias* (Natorp, 1900a), also belongs to this series of articles on the chronology of the dialogues, in which Natorp applied external and philosophical criteria. On his chronological studies using language statistics, based on these articles, cf.: Brandwood, 1990: 136–152; Lembeck, 1994: 196–204; Mróz, 2010d: 385–386.

353 Brandwood, 1990: 136.

change of letters between the two philosophers no doubt also played its part, for as K.-H. Lembeck pointed out, in Natorp's correspondence that has come down to us the issues of dating the dialogues and language statistics only appeared in the letters from the Pole.³⁵⁴ It is also clear from this correspondence that the polemic with Lutosławski, which was, significantly, carried out by the means of language statistics, delayed Natorp's work on his own book on Plato.³⁵⁵

The problem of the relation between Plato and Kant, which appeared in Lutosławski's book, was noted in Vaihinger's review. After close examination, Natorp rejected this relation, for he considered its source to be Lutosławski's observation of the psychological similarities between two chronologically distant thinkers. There was certainly a relation between Plato and Kant, according to Natorp, but it did not consist merely of a philosophical breakthrough, as he had read it in Lutosławski's book.

Attempts had already been made to answer the question concerning the philosophical convergence between the Plato of the Marburg neo-Kantians and Lutosławski's Plato as spiritualist. Historical links between these two visions of Platonism existed, for Lutosławski knew the works of Cohen, while Natorp, though he criticised Lutosławski, appreciated the significance of his work. W. Jaworski said: "Lutosławski's method of presenting Platonism as a spiritualist and transcendental philosophy is precursory to the Marburg school, though the ultimate conclusions of his views were definitely different."³⁵⁶ It is nonetheless true that in Lutosławski's interpretation Plato departed from the theory of ideas as autonomous, supramun-

354 Lembeck, 1994: 197, footnote 14. This correspondence was quite intense particularly in the years 1895–1902, when both scholars were preparing their books on Plato. It is difficult, then, against the above background, to defend the following claim that "Natorp and his interpretation of Plato do not seem to be a good example on which to base the theses [...] about the popularity of stylometry" (Trojanowski, 2005: 89). It is, nevertheless, an indisputable fact that in Natorp's book "there was no mention of Lutosławski, and the chronology assumed by Natorp (after Lutosławski had published his results) is different from that proposed by the Polish researcher" (Trojanowski, 2005: 89). The lack of reference to Lutosławski, however, is not surprising because Natorp, according to his own declaration in the introduction to the book, deliberately avoided overwhelming the reader with the names of authors and with bibliographic entries of the works with which he had become acquainted. His intention was not to report on the abundant literature, but to lead the reader to Plato himself (Natorp, 1903: VII–VIII).

355 Mróz, 2010d: 386.

356 Jaworski, 1976: 139–140; cf.: Jaworski, 1994: 46–52.

dane substances. Like the Marburg philosophers, Lutosławski considered that Aristotle had misunderstood his master's philosophy, and had even intentionally misrepresented it to facilitate his own criticism.

While there was, indeed, a common front between the Marburg philosophers and Lutosławski with respect to the negative aspects of their interpretations, *i.e.* the criticism of Aristotle's testimony, there was a divergence with regard to the positive parts. Kant was not the most important point of reference for Lutosławski, who was more interested in metaphysical and ontological conclusions, and not in epistemological issues, which were, in turn, essential for Natorp.³⁵⁷ Following V. Politis, Natorp's interpretation can be reduced to two fundamental claims: 1) metaphysical: ideas are not substances, but laws, explanations, and 2) transcendental: the ideas belong to the intellectual sphere and, consequently, they shape reality.³⁵⁸ These claims can be related to Lutosławski's interpretation. The metaphysical claim was consistent with the Pole's interpretation of the late phase of Plato's philosophical development. He was, however, much more interested in answering the ontological questions³⁵⁹ than in the ideas themselves. For Lutosławski, the development of Plato's philosophy could not be reduced to a change in comprehending the ideas, but to diverse answers to the question of being. Since the ideas had ceased to be regarded as being, it was necessary to examine what they had become. Yet the answer to this question was, for Lutosławski, of only secondary importance, because the primary issue was to determine what replaced the ideas as being, and this was the soul. It seems that W. Tatarkiewicz, who had been influenced by his Marburg teachers, accurately described the relation between the Marburg interpretation of Plato and that of Lutosławski when he wrote about his countryman that "he studied Plato too insightfully to be unable to notice the fallacy of the common opinions on him. And yet he took a compromise position. The theory of ideas as self-existing, supramundane beings, is indeed, according to Lutosławski, Plato's view, which he overcame in the later dialogues, but which he had accepted in the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and the *Republic*."³⁶⁰ The essence of Lutosławski's understanding of Platonism can also be comprehended as the actual act of transcending ide-

357 Jaworski, 1976: 141–142.

358 Politis, 2004: 21–22.

359 Cf.: "the ontological conclusion is significant for Lutosławski in his interpretation of Platonism" (Jaworski, 1994: 50).

360 Tatarkiewicz, 2010a: 148, footnote 1.

alism that takes place on the road to spiritualism.³⁶¹ In this way, Lutosławski's Plato was to become an ideological inspiration, and a source of anthropological conclusions, and in this he differed from the Marburg Plato. "Attributing phaenomenal being to the real world was to lead Plato, in Lutosławski's view, to the acceptance of the real existence of the learning subject, or more specifically to »consciousness« (the »soul«)." ³⁶² Plato never lost his relevance, because Polish philosophy, a revived Messianism, was founded on his discoveries. And this was the direction in which Lutosławski's interpretation of Plato was to head, after *The Origin and Growth...* had been published.

Polemic with Paul Shorey

The substantive polemic between Paul Shorey, an American Plato scholar, and Lutosławski deserves a separate discussion. It was one of the most important reactions that the Pole's book evoked, touching upon minute philological issues, philosophical problems and research methodology, as well as addressing more generally the question of how to read Plato. Starting with admiration for Plato, who had influenced readers for centuries, Shorey included among those who had been inspired by Plato even those researchers who focused on the study of the frequency of the use of conjunctions or particles in Plato's dialogues. In presenting the aims that Lutosławski had set out to achieve, Shorey remarked that the book contained many interesting suggestions on Plato's logic and metaphysics, some of which he considered to be legitimate. However, Shorey also encountered faulty interpretations, as well as falsehoods or opinions that were just possible but were presented as certainties. As for stylometry itself, he referred to it as an ingenious system of manipulating the statistics of style. This opinion resulted from Shorey's general scepticism towards the rigorous mathematical treatment of material which, by its very nature, is imprecise and difficult to study, and he included writing style in this category. In addition, he argued that science triumphs by verifying hypotheses, and not by compiling them, and Lutosławski's collection of the findings of philological studies undertaken by dozens of other researchers could only be seen as a compilation.³⁶³

361 Zaborowski, 2000a: 78.

362 Jaworski, 1994: 51.

363 Shorey, 1898: 168.

As for philosophical issues, Shorey admitted that, in principle, there was no internal contradiction in the vision of Plato's development as outlined by Lutosławski, but he added that the arguments supporting such a significant turn, such a fundamental change in Plato's views, should be subjected to very careful examination. Let us mention one doubt, among those presented by Shorey, concerning Plato's awareness of logical rules. Lutosławski discerned an important lesson in logic in the *Protagoras* (350c–351b), namely the statement about the impossibility of simple reversion of the subject and predicate in universal affirmative propositions, and this, he claimed, could not have been inspired by Socrates.³⁶⁴ Commenting on this, Shorey remarked that a great deal of evidence would be required to demonstrate that Plato had not previously been aware of this impossibility of converting propositions at any time in his work, in other words, though not explicitly stated by Shorey, it would simply be impossible. However, with the help of a good memory, it was possible to find a similar expression of Plato's awareness of this fact in the *Euthyphro* (12b–c),³⁶⁵ where Socrates analysed the relation between the concepts of fear and shame, and concluded that every shame is associated with fear, but reversing the two concepts would no longer result in a true proposition. Yet the chronological position of the *Euthyphro*, according to Lutosławski, was at the very start of Plato's literary production. Lutosławski's argument that Plato was unaware of this rudimentary logical problem in the dialogues preceding the *Protagoras* does not, then, stand up to scrutiny.

Regarding the interpretation that the theory of ideas had developed towards comprehending ideas as the objects of thought in God's intellect, Shorey believed that such an interpretation, in all its Protean forms, would always be attractive to some readers of Plato, for he had accepted the instinctive realism of human speech as the basis for the philosophical language in which general concepts were spoken of. Some of Plato's readers were unable to recognise the significance of his deliberate choice. They failed to notice that there was no language that could be applied to general concepts without becoming embroiled, for example, in the one-many problem. That is why, instead of avoiding problems, Plato attempted to approach them from various positions, and so his teaching was constantly being transformed.³⁶⁶

364 Lutosławski, 1897: 205–206.

365 Shorey, 1898: 168.

366 Shorey, 1898: 168–169.

Shorey expressed another indirect criticism of Lutosławski and the supporters of the evolutionary paradigm by arguing that the more closely Plato's text is explored, the less need there is to accept a radical turn in his mature thought. In fact, very few researchers were really committed to the kind of attention to detail that would be necessary to understand exactly what Plato thought. Plato's audience should enjoy the intellectual stimulus that reading the dialogues provided.³⁶⁷ In this regard Shorey made reference to Ralph Waldo Emerson, an American transcendentalist, who seemed to be marking out a new era in approaching Plato's work, an approach that was different from Lutosławski's and different from the European tradition in general. Emerson was interested in the spiritual impact of the great Athenian on a number of outstanding individuals in the history of culture. He wrote about Plato's influence: "Out of Plato come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought. [...] every brisk young man, who says in succession fine things to each reluctant generation, [...] is some reader of Plato, translating into vernacular, wittily, his good things".³⁶⁸ Reading Plato is itself a reward and it is possible, and even necessary, to read Plato with benefit without any obligation to enquire into the historical truth about the author because this has no relevance to the real spiritual impact his text can exert on its readers. For Americans, then, a useful reading of Plato's dialogues can be achieved without the unnecessary ballast of the European tradition of philological research and all the commentaries that merely obscure what is of the greatest importance and value – Plato's message³⁶⁹.

Shorey's second important text appeared in the journal, *The Monist*. He began with the statement that it is possible to be an honest man and write bad poems, and by the same token, it is also possible to be a talented scholar and write a misleading book in support of a fanciful theory. Lutosławski was this gifted author, yet despite his unquestionable merits and talent, his book, according to Shorey, was "a tissue of fallacious reasoning, wrought on the frame of an impossible method."³⁷⁰ To prove this opinion, Shorey summoned up a number of facts which were, in his opinion, indisputable.

367 Shorey, 1898: 169.

368 Emerson, 1995: 27. According to Shorey, Emerson's essay on Plato contained more important truth about the Greek philosopher than any other text about Plato known to him (Shorey, 1938: 233).

369 Emerson's reception of ancient traditions, including Plato, has even been compared to the rediscovery of antiquity by great thinkers during the Middle Ages (Pollock, 1958: 54).

370 Shorey, 1898a: 621.

Shorey maintained that it was more probable that the *Parmenides*, the *Sophist*, the *Statesman* and the *Philebus* had been written after the *Republic* rather than before it. He admitted the existence of certain metaphysical problems which had been converted into unpleasant sophistries by shallow thinking, but Plato had devoted two or three dialogues to the analysis of these problems so as to dispose of them once and for all. He could have done this at any period of his literary output after reaching philosophical maturity. In order to prove the late date of the so-called dialectical dialogues, other evidence was therefore necessary, and Lutosławski had found this in the stylometric method. Shorey attributed great ingenuity to this method, but at the same time he spoke somewhat ironically about its scientific value.³⁷¹

Lutosławski's vision of Plato's philosophical development was considered by Shorey to be *a priori* possible, but he also thought that the interpretation to which he was inclined was equally possible. This interpretation assumed that Plato had set out the basic framework of his philosophy before reaching *akme*, and, thereafter, he had spoken of the general concepts as transcendent ideas whenever it suited the subject, rhetoric, or the mood of the moment in his writings. Shorey claimed that the opponents of this view had put words into Plato's mouth, words that he had never spoken, thus misrepresenting and erroneously interpreting passages from the dialogues to an extent that exceeded human fallibility,³⁷² and this could only have been done intentionally.

Such instances of misrepresentation in Lutosławski's work were then pointed out by Shorey. The first, and one that was fundamental to Lutosławski's interpretation of Plato's development, was a passage from the *Timaeus* (28a) where the following phrase appeared: νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιλεπτόν, the philosophical meaning of which, according to Shorey, could be reduced to the possibility of learning concepts by means of reasoning, not by means of the senses. Lutosławski, however, drew ontological conclusions from this passage, inferring that the ideas exist in the human mind, that they are included in thought.³⁷³ The American scholar added to such errors a number of other detailed observations, concluding with the remark that when interpreting such a subtle writer as Plato, there was no upper limit to the number of errors that the interpreter could make, and despite his intelligence, Lutosławski made many such errors, re-

371 Shorey, 1898a: 622–623.

372 Shorey, 1898a: 623.

373 Lutosławski, 1897: 474–477.

sulting from an invalid approach to the text and context of the dialogues. Shorey did, however, leave some room for discussion on the value of Lutosławski's method and his interpretation of Plato's development.³⁷⁴

Lutosławski did not, however, enter into a discussion pertaining to the subject matter, but instead he cited six passages extracted from the reviews of his work, all published by European scholars, including Struve. Shorey himself was regarded by Lutosławski as a representative of the American style, and this was not meant as a compliment in this case, but referred to someone who presented their own subjective opinions as asserted facts.³⁷⁵ Yet Lutosławski, himself, seems to have taken the opinions of competent judges as facts. The extracts from the reviews which he quoted did not actually refer to the work itself, but were rather words of praise for the author and the task he had undertaken. In referring to the passage from the *Timaeus* discussed above, which had been labelled by Shorey as a 'mistranslation', Lutosławski insisted that it he had never had any intention of translating any fragments; his aim had been to interpret them. The Pole also took exception to Shorey's words that he had been able to assimilate Plato so thoroughly in such a short time.³⁷⁶ Lutosławski considered the decade that had passed since the date of the publication of his dissertation on Aristotle's philosophy of politics was a sufficiently long period of time. He added that he did not expect full agreement on all the points he had made, nor did the book contain irrefutable theses, insisting that further research was required. Yet what Shorey had done was described by Lutosławski as

374 Shorey, 1898a: 623–625. Other examples of mistranslations of the dialogues referred to by Shorey did not directly affect Lutosławski's interpretation of Plato's development, but they provided evidence of inaccuracies or the inability to discern Plato's irony. Of similar significance to the above passage from the *Timaeus* is Shorey's criticism of Lutosławski's interpretation of the *Theaetetus* (155a–b), from which Lutosławski drew similar conclusions regarding the existence of propositions in the human soul, which was to testify to Plato's departure from the theory of transcendent ideas (Lutosławski, 1897: 382–383).

375 This 'Americanness' as a pejorative evaluation meant for Lutosławski a lack of thorough study together with ignorance of history, the result of which was a tolerance for all possible opinions and judgments. This is also how Lutosławski assessed William James (Lutosławski, 1994: 199–203; cf.: Mróz, 2008: 85–86; Gutowski, 2009: 158–159). Lutosławski had a very low opinion of Americans, especially about the standard of American education, and he voiced these opinions very bluntly in his correspondence ("Listy Wincentego Lutosławskiego", 1986).

376 Shorey, 1898a: 621.

slaughtering his book, on the basis of far too few accidentally selected and deliberately distorted fragments.³⁷⁷

While Shorey had left the door open for discussion, Lutosławski instead of taking this up, had hidden behind laudatory passages from the reviews of his work. In fact, an agreement between the representatives of the two opposing approaches to Plato was now well-nigh impossible, for Shorey was aware of the fact that Lutosławski had shifted the discussion from concrete matters of substance to personal matters. The American researcher was even willing to endorse all the flattery from the cited reviews, and he did not care whether the fragments referred to by Lutosławski had been mistranslated or misinterpreted. What was of utmost important for him was that he believed that Lutosławski's interpretations were wrong, and no convincing evidence had been provided to prove them correct.³⁷⁸

Shorey expressed his doubts about the significance and purpose of stylistic studies in a subsequent work, in which he presented his reservations about Lutosławski's book more extensively. Shorey opens the text with sarcastic remarks about language statistics and its supporters, considering them to be harmless eccentrics who share the same illusions about the value of the method. He himself believed that life was too short for it to be spent counting particles, being more interested in the substance of Plato's thoughts than in the chronology of his writings, the general outline of which was, in any case, known: the Socratic dialogues belonged to the early period, the *Republic* – to the mature, while the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* – to the late period. The unitarian approach was, according to Shorey, at least as probable as the evolutionary one, while the literary interpretation of Plato, though perhaps not very common, was reasonable and simple.³⁷⁹ If anything in Plato's writing did change, it could only have been the form of expression of his fundamental philosophical views. Plato intended his works to teach and entertain, rather than to draw exact conclusions. Both his characters and his philosophical ideas were subjected to artistic and

377 Lutosławski, 1898b.

378 Shorey, 1899. Even today, American researchers, when attempting to evaluate studies on the chronology of the dialogues, tend to view them as useless for reading and comprehending Plato (Howland, 1991).

379 Contemporary Plato researchers have already drawn attention to Shorey's common sense in his interpretation of Plato and the need to return to his method (Kent Sprague, 1976: 112).

dramatic transformations, and it was this that caused difficulties in grasping Platonism as a philosophical system.³⁸⁰

In this book Shorey argued with a number of Lutosławski's observations, but for the record, it should be added that Shorey's criticisms were not only directed at the Pole's book but also at other researchers, including Natorp. Among other things, Shorey accused Lutosławski of confusing the concepts of Kantian philosophy.³⁸¹ He pointed to the fallacy of the observations regarding the development of Plato's concept of movement, which he claimed had first denoted a change of place, and only later in the *Theaetetus* and subsequent dialogues did it evolve towards the more general meaning of a change of quality. Yet Shorey had found evidence that the Heraclitean πάντα ῥεῖ was explicitly discussed as a qualitative change in the *Cratylus* (439d–440a), and he believed that this use by Plato was not exceptional throughout all the periods of his work.³⁸² Moreover, all Plato's terms relating to the theory of ideas appear in the *Cratylus* (439c–d), yet for Lutosławski, Plato had not yet developed the theory of ideas as transcendent beings when the *Cratylus* was composed. Shorey thus came to the conclusion that Lutosławski's hidden agenda was to eradicate self-existing ideas completely from Platonism.³⁸³ For Shorey, then, all the chronological conclusions from the pages of *The Origin and Growth...* were of little value, for they had arisen from the fact that Lutosławski had either misinterpreted the development of Plato's concepts, or had left out inconvenient instances of them in the dialogues. Let us quote an example concerning the term δύναμις, the application of which was used by Lutosławski to

380 Shorey, 1960: 3–9; cf.: Paczkowski, 1998: 22; on Shorey's criticism of Lutosławski in Shorey, 1960, cf.: Mróz, 2003: 141–143.

381 Shorey quoted Lutosławski's claim referring to the interpretation of the *Phaedrus*: "Here ἰδέα and εἶδος are used in a meaning which is identical with the idea as conceived by Kant, a necessary concept of reason" (Lutosławski, 1897: 340). Shorey commented on this as the misapplication of Kant's term 'the idea of reason,' for only the concept, *Begriff* had been meant (Shorey, 1960: 30, footnote 193). In his claim, however, Lutosławski did not say anything more than that in the *Phaedrus* the idea was comprehended as a Kantian concept.

382 Shorey, 1960: 33, footnote 218.

383 Shorey, 1960: 33, footnote 216. John Alexander Stewart (1846–1933) raised similar charges against Lutosławski with regard to the *Euthyphro* (Stewart, 1909: 17, footnote 1), the *Meno*, the *Euthydemus* and the *Gorgias* (Stewart, 1909: 34), but he declared that for the purposes of his work the chronological order of the dialogues would be based on that of Lutosławski for convenience, on the one hand, because some order had to be adopted, and, on the other, because it seemed to be quite plausible (Stewart, 1909: 14–15).

prove that the *Phaedrus* and the *Theaetetus* had succeeded the *Republic*, for in the latter this term appeared for the first time meaning ‘ability’ (477c). Shorey, however, found an example of a similar use of this term in the *Charmides* (168c–d).³⁸⁴ As ironic evidence of Lutosławski’s argumentative strength, Shorey juxtaposed two instances of the application of the law of contradiction in the *Phaedo* (102e).³⁸⁵ In the first case this law was presented by Lutosławski as having a logical meaning, as a law of thinking, in contrast to its metaphysical application, which only appeared for the first time in the *Republic* (436b);³⁸⁶ the second time, it was presented as having a metaphysical meaning, contrary to its application in the *Republic* (602e), where for the first time its logical application was to appear.³⁸⁷ In this way Shorey demonstrated that Lutosławski was not always able to handle all the material he had collected.

Shorey never renounced his contempt for research on the language of Plato.³⁸⁸ While lecturing on the history of Platonism in modern literature, he decided not to include the subject of German literature, preferring to focus on English and French, arguing that the history of Platonism in German literature would quickly turn into a study of Platonism in German philology.³⁸⁹ Lutosławski was seen by Shorey as part of this futile trend. In his attitude to statistical research, Shorey was not alone among American scholars, some of whom have continued to react in this way to language statistics.³⁹⁰

* * *

The above survey of reviews suggests that, in some respects, Lutosławski’s book was seen as a breakthrough in the field of Platonic studies. The methodological section represents an unprecedented rise in the standard of the statistical study of Plato’s style, and all the advantages and disadvantages of previous research became more glaring in this study. Although the

384 Shorey, 1960: 49.

385 Shorey, 1960: 81.

386 Lutosławski, 1897: 277.

387 Lutosławski, 1897: 318.

388 Shorey, 1965: 59.

389 Shorey, 1938: 146.

390 William James transmitted to Lutosławski a disrespectful opinion on his research: “One of our greek professors told me he distinctly did not wish his students to be put to such unintellectual work as counting Plato’s words etc.” (James, 2000: 449, letter of Nov. 4th, 1898; cf.: Gutowski, 2009: 136).

method required further investigation, it was thought to be interesting and applicable to other areas. Some historians, however, rejected it completely because of the unsubstantiated premises on which it was based (the linear development of style, the very possibility of measuring style, the problem of whether style was consciously manipulated by the author). It was rare for critics of Lutosławski's method to distinguish between the general idea of the method of measuring style and basing chronological conclusions on these measurements from the specific method applied by Lutosławski in his stylometry. This may have resulted from the fact that, as L. Brandwood suggested, for most of the academic world the Pole's work was the first encounter with the method itself. Statistical research on style was almost identified with the name of Lutosławski.³⁹¹ Thanks to Lutosławski's research Poland's contribution was permanently included in international studies on Plato. The general tendency that prevails among the researchers of Plato's philosophy, or at least among those who adhere to the genetic-evolutionary approach, is the general acceptance of the 'Lutosławski-Ræder-Ritter' view on the chronology of the dialogues.³⁹²

As for philosophical issues, it was the evolution of Plato's theory of ideas that was considered to be of the greatest importance in Lutosławski's book. As long as Lutosławski understood ideas in the spirit of Kant's categories as *a priori* concepts which conditioned and shaped the phenomenal world, then the neo-Kantians in a certain respect saw an ally in him, but there could be no agreement between them when Lutosławski emphasised Plato's evolution towards spiritualism.

Nowadays, Lutosławski's work seems to have been forgotten. It is remembered how important it was, and that it evoked discussions and brought to the fore the issue of chronology and its consequences for presenting Plato's philosophical development. The authors of works on Plato frequently place Lutosławski in the bibliographies of their books. Basically,

391 Brandwood, 1990: 132. The application of computers for complicated stylometric calculations has not changed much and the same or similar accusations are still voiced against stylometry, e.g.: Ledger, 1989: 29–30.

392 These three names determine a certain canon of the outline of the chronological order of the dialogues which is usually accepted as one of the achievements of stylometry (Thesleff, 2009a: 150). W. Stróżewski, for example, regarded, perhaps somewhat too enthusiastically, that of all the researchers of style it was Lutosławski who developed the stylometric method "to extreme perfection" (Stróżewski, 1992: 16).

however, though his works were inspiring, in general they are no longer discussed.³⁹³

The ideological link between Plato and Messianism

The main idea of Lutosławski's book in English was prepared for his Polish audience in the form of a self-report in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* (*Philosophical Review*). Let us quote the whole text because it highlights what was of greatest importance for the author himself in his interpretation of Platonism: "In this work the author determines the order of Plato's dialogues by the means of comparison of their style and content, and then discusses the development of Plato's thought with particular emphasis on his theory of cognition. It may be concluded from these comparisons that Plato gradually transformed his original idealism and socialism into a philosophy similar to modern spiritualism, in which reality is based on a system of souls, which are guided by the Supreme personal Being."³⁹⁴ Although the book was nominally dedicated to logic, in fact, it was ideological issues that proved to be of foremost importance. Logic was reduced to an instrument that was useful for confirming the chronology, established first on the basis of style, and this, in turn, became the starting point for much wider conclusions. It was the ideological issues that became the focus of the next book on Plato by Lutosławski, this time published in Polish.

393 R. Zaborowski pointed out that, while researching contemporary non-Polish academic works, he came across both quotes and ideas from Lutosławski's output as well as a surprising ignorance of his work (Zaborowski, 2007: 65; 2006: 159–160); cf. also: Pawłowski, 2006. An article by Gwilym Ellis Lane Owen on the dating of the *Timaeus* may be considered as an attempt to re-open the discussion on some of the theses of Lutosławski and the stylometrists (Owen, 1953: 79–82; cf.: Pawlik, 2004: 53, footnote 1). Owen's paper triggered some polemical publications in defence of Lutosławski, such as the text by Kenneth M. Sayre (2005a). Seweryn Blandzi wrote on Sayre's defence of Lutosławski that he was "the only Western researcher who fully took into account Lutosławski's achievements in the field of stylometry, being his follower, while at the same time making necessary corrections to this research method" (Blandzi, 2002: 166, footnote 83). Sayre, indeed, provides a rare example of the positive re-evaluation of Lutosławski's method, but not the only one. William J. Prior defended Lutosławski much more categorically, claiming that it was only after Campbell and his followers that chaos in the field of chronology ended (Prior, 1985a: 179).

394 Lutosławski, 1898c.

The book *Platon jako twórca idealizmu* (Plato as the Creator of Idealism) was to have been published as *Platon jako twórca idealizmu i socjalizmu* (Plato as the Creator of Idealism and Socialism), but its title was shortened by Russian censors in Warsaw. This book, together with Lutosławski's other recently issued publications, was intended as a kind of inauguration of his work as a lecturer at the Jagiellonian University. During his lectures many topics were addressed by Lutosławski, including, of course, Plato, who was presented, predictably, in the light of the lecturer's recent findings. His lectures, however, were discontinued for various reasons ranging from pseudo-political to moral, and it was only at the end of his life that the philosopher was to return to his work on Plato.

The title of the book, again, promised much less than could be found in its content. The aim was to draw readers' attention to current issues, in particular to the problem of socialism, whose close relationship with idealism had, according to Lutosławski, been forgotten, while, in fact, both views, idealism and socialism, had been created by one man, namely by Plato himself. Lutosławski was not interested in socialism as an economic doctrine, or in the related question of labour. He wrote: "when we consider social struggles from a philosophical point of view, socialism will seem to be, above all, a political theory that accepts the need for maximum state power."³⁹⁵ The term 'socialism' meant for Lutosławski, then, all maximalist political doctrines which opposed anarchism. Existing states were, in his opinion, in an intermediate condition between totalitarianism and anarchism. Since echoes of Plato still reverberated here and there in political discussions, it seemed to Lutosławski a good time to ascertain the source of socialism. Lutosławski began by explaining the term 'idealism', which after Hegel had become obscure, incomprehensible and of no practical use, even though it was actually of great significance in practical life, and especially for socialism, as Lutosławski understood it. He believed that if idealism were shown to have resulted from an error, then it would also have to be admitted that socialism was also mistaken. Regardless of the outcome of such research, the relationship between economic and political issues and metaphysics would be confirmed, since idealism is a metaphysical view.

The history of metaphysics was reduced by Lutosławski to the history of the answers to the question: what really exists? Although philosophers were not unanimous in their answers to this question, their responses made it possible to recreate the sequence of the development of meta-

395 Lutosławski, 1899a: 4. In the following discussion of Lutosławski's Plato, the issues that were reiterated from his earlier works are omitted.

physics. It had its starting point in materialistic answers, the opposite view being pantheism. Idealism was classed among the anti-individualist views, and an average idealist was characterised by Lutosławski as follows: “When the idea of the good is at stake, the keen idealist does not consider personal motives: he mercilessly punishes and destroys those opposing the majesty of the good, as they are nothing more than phaenomena disturbing the existence of his Idea. [...] He values this idea higher than himself and he would prefer to destroy himself and the whole world rather than to offend the perfection of his dreamed and adored idea. In practice, the idealist is ruthless. [...] In terms of social organisation, the guiding idea for the idealist is an all-powerful state to which he is willing to entrust the direction of all personal matters of individuals.”³⁹⁶ Plato and his idealism were also like this, but, “having brought his idealism to its final consequences, he took fright and carefully retreated, only to initiate a higher world-view consistent with the results of subsequent philosophical research.”³⁹⁷ Although Plato overcame his idealism, as Lutosławski claimed, the idealists continued to exist, but they no longer deserved to be praised, for their doctrine resulted in the supremacy of the state, and this assumption was also an intrinsic part of socialism, leading to the rigorous observance of justice and the eradication of human mercy in ethics, to classicism and the criticism of romanticism in the arts, and to apriorism as opposed to empiricism in the sciences.

Metaphysics, however, progresses beyond idealism, uncovering pluralism, individualism, or the spiritualism that has been attributed to Descartes. The discovery that these actually had their roots in Plato was made in the ‘most recent research’ on Plato’s philosophy by Lutosławski himself. Since individualism was characteristic of both Christian and Polish thought, it was not surprising that the discovery of individualism in Plato should have been made by a Pole. This was achieved by demonstrating the turn in Plato’s thought, which was made possible thanks to the discovery of the proper chronology of Plato’s writings.³⁹⁸

The last and the most important chapter of Lutosławski’s book dealt with the practical application of idealism, namely socialism. Lutosławski drew particular attention to the relation between the state and the individ-

396 Lutosławski, 1899a: 6.

397 Lutosławski, 1899a: 6–7.

398 Lutosławski, 1899a: 7–14; Lutosławski promised his readers that the details of his research from *The Origin and Growth...* would be presented extensively in Polish (1899a: 12–13), but this did not happen.

ual: "The state is a compulsory association of individuals living in one country, and for Plato, the closer this association the more perfect it was. The absolute realisation of this idea of the closest unity of all individuals into one political organism necessarily led to the unconditional surrender of every citizen to the power of the state."³⁹⁹ As a consequence, citizens were deprived of their individual rights. "And for whom is such a monstrous state to exist? – an indignant reader might ask. In fact it is not for any particular person because individuals are only an illusion, and the beauty of the idea of the state is a far more important goal than individual satisfaction."⁴⁰⁰ Natural links between citizens did not exist because family ties were of no significance, and for this reason national ties did not exist either, though these were important in Lutosławski's own neo-Messianic philosophy. The state was superior to the individual on metaphysical grounds, namely, the state as an idea had more existence; it was like a mathematical formula to be applied to social relations. At the time of writing the *Republic*, mathematics was becoming more and more important in philosophy for Plato, as an introduction to dialectics.

Gender equality, fundamental to Plato's concept of the state, was also based on metaphysics: "This distinction [between the essence of things and their phaenomena] is applied with great boldness by Plato to a social question of paramount importance, namely the justification of gender equality, which was based on the mental equality of men and women. Plato was many centuries ahead of his time and he dared to speak out against the customary belief in the fundamental spiritual difference between men and women resulting from the difference of physiological phaenomenona."⁴⁰¹

Plato's intentions for his project were, according to Lutosławski, deeply moral and praiseworthy: "The pertinent observation that human relations required a complete overhaul led Plato to such extremities that he put the entire responsibility for this reconstruction on the state, rather than pinning his hopes on an increasing sense of responsibility among individuals."⁴⁰² This specific form of socialism was, next to idealism, Plato's most important philosophical discovery. He foresaw all the demands that were

399 Lutosławski, 1899a: 76 (the final chapter of this book: *The Development of Plato's Socialism and Idealism* was reprinted as chapter V: *Wincenty Lutosławski and Plato as a Socialist and Spiritualist* (1897/1899) in Mróz, 2010: 79–88.

400 Lutosławski, 1899a: 77.

401 Lutosławski, 1899a: 88.

402 Lutosławski, 1899a: 89.

to be imposed on societies by the socialism of later centuries: “compulsory state-owned schools, nationalisation of land, elimination of money dealing, gender equality, protection of the living conditions of all citizens – all these had already been planned for Plato’s ideal state.”⁴⁰³

According to Lutosławski, then, Plato was a socialist, and this was beyond doubt. Socialism, conceived as the maximisation of state power, was a natural consequence of idealism.⁴⁰⁴ Since Plato, had been an idealist for a certain period of his philosophical development, then he must also have been a socialist. Moreover, socialism was also an indispensable stage in the development of human thought, essential for the development of subsequent stages. Lutosławski, in a number of publications, consistently developed his vision of the evolution of metaphysics in the history of philosophy right up to the last years of his life, when he managed to compose a synthesis of these ideas in a typescript entitled *Metaphysics*. In this work the final sequence of views was presented as follows: materialism with a number of aspects of human-to-matter relations, idealism, pantheism, spiritualism, mysticism and ultimately – Messianism.⁴⁰⁵

Even the elapse of a period of six decades could not shake Lutosławski’s belief in the unique role of research on the history of philosophy that he had voiced in 1889, availing himself of Hegel’s thought on the necessity of learning the history of philosophy prior to doing philosophy on one’s own, so as to reiterate the philosophical development of humanity. Philosophical ontogenesis was a specific reiteration of phylogenesis.⁴⁰⁶ The history of philosophy also proved to be fundamental for understanding and practising philosophy within the framework of such a future-oriented trend as Messianism.

The task of historians of philosophy was to gather the results of former philosophers, to assess them from an up-to-date perspective, and to compare their findings with their own outcomes. It was possible for the historian of philosophy to discover in the works of these philosophers even more than they themselves had consciously articulated.⁴⁰⁷ This was undoubtedly

403 Lutosławski, 1899a: 89.

404 A similar opinion had previously been articulated in Polish by H. Sadowski, a translator of Cicero (Sadowski, 1873: IV).

405 Lutosławski, 2004: 3–93; *cf.*: Floryńska, 1976: 189–195; 1977: 162–166; Jaworski, 1985: 49–62; 1994: 34–61; Chorościńska, 2000; Mróz, 2004; 2004a: XVI–XXI; 2014: 189–195; 2007b: 298–302.

406 Lutosławski, 1900: 264–272 (first printed in Russian in 1890, then in Polish in 1892); *cf.*: Jaworski, 1994: 34–35; Tyl, 2004: 88–90.

407 Lutosławski, 1900: 270–272.

true in the case of Plato's mature spiritualism, a view that was not fully realised by the philosopher himself. Such discoveries could not be made by historians of philosophy as philologists, for their task was only to provide the material that could subsequently be processed by historians of philosophy as philosophers.⁴⁰⁸

A short article by Lutosławski published in the journal, *Eos*, can be seen as a public announcement of his abandonment of his research on Plato. In this paper the philosopher summarised his own works, acknowledging the role that his studies under Teichmüller's supervision had played. He also mentioned the difficulties rendered by the Academy of Arts and Sciences, which had, in the end, led to the publication of *The Origin and Growth...* Finally, he provided readers with the findings of this study and remarked on its reception in the international scholarly world. He concluded as follows: "I do not intend to publish on Plato any more. From the very start of my studies on Plato I have always considered a thorough knowledge about this great writer and thinker to be a mere preparatory exercise, granting me the ability to examine and articulate my own thoughts in the field of metaphysics and ethics, – therefore I am calling on all those who have devoted their lives to classical studies to continue the work already started, and I willingly offer my personal help to anyone undertaking this task. Numerous doubts still remain to be resolved, and the time spent researching Plato, communing with one of the noblest geniuses of humanity, is never wasted."⁴⁰⁹ This call for a continuation of his work can be considered to have been fulfilled, but only by one person, Lutosławski's doctoral student at Vilnius University, Benedykt Woyczyński (1895–1927).⁴¹⁰

The idea that Lutosławski treated his Plato research merely as an instrumental philosophical exercise must, however, be dispelled. At least in the initial phase, he found meaning and purpose in the study itself. Following Lutosławski's works from their beginnings, that is from the thesis written under Teichmüller's supervision in Dorpat, we can discern a certain devel-

408 Lutosławski, 1900: 279–280; cf.: Tyl, 2004: 92–93.

409 Lutosławski, 1900a: 138–139. In Lutosławski's bibliography there is also a short article on Plato's biography for a more general target audience. Some conclusions from his earlier works are repeated, for example, that for Plato, the main goal was life, not literary work. He also strongly encouraged readers to get to know the dialogues, in the original, if possible (Lutosławski, 1930). It is difficult, then, to claim that Lutosławski "in the period under discussion [=the inter-war period] was still working on his earlier research, especially on Plato" (Borzym, 1993: 281).

410 Nerczuk & Pawlak, 2000; Mróz, 2007c: 113–117; 2007a: 84–88; 2008c.

opment of his interest in Plato: They begin with a belief in Plato's superiority over Aristotle, which was initially substantiated by Lutosławski in the field of political philosophy. He then resolved to extend his conclusions to other areas of philosophy, and therefore took up the subject of logic, an area in which Aristotle's contribution had appeared to be undisputed, though, in fact, he owed much to Plato in this respect. Although Lutosławski's original intention had been to write a paper on Plato's logic, he touched upon a number of other issues, and ultimately he encompassed Plato's entire legacy in his comprehensive research. Logic began to fade into the background in comparison with his method of language statistics, stylometry, and the issues of the chronology of the dialogues, an area that was attracting the attention of international researchers at that time. Much less attention had been focused on the evolution of Plato's views, but for Lutosławski, this issue became elevated to the rank of his most important discovery. It was Plato's transition from idealism to pluralist spiritualism and his discovery of a new metaphysical concept that was ultimately to pave the way for the emergence of Christianity and later Polish Romantic Messianism, one of the dogma's of which was spiritualism. Lutosławski's research on Plato in the field of the history of philosophy was to be reflected in his own transition from historian of philosophy to a philosopher who argued in favour of the ideological function of philosophy.

"The Platonic »love of truth« and the soul's pursuit of that which is eternal and perfect was interpreted by Lutosławski as an expression of the process of human cognition."⁴¹¹ As a result of this process, it was possible to capture, in a moment of intuition, the substantial character of the soul, which was the cognitive subject itself. Jaworski quite rightly calls Lutosławski's interpretation 'existential,' by which he intended to emphasise the Messianist philosopher's search for ontological conclusions in epistemological deliberations.

It was by means of such ontological or metaphysical conclusions that Plato came to spiritualism, according to Lutosławski. And it was spiritualism, as a view claiming the existence of a multitude of souls, that was to prove to be an essential concept in the history of philosophy, first adopted by Christianity, then taken up again by modern French thought, before finally being adopted by Polish Messianism, which developed it and went beyond it. It thus became an ideological inspiration for 19th century Polish philosophy and for Lutosławski's philosophical views which stemmed

411 Jaworski, 1994: 49.

from Messianism.⁴¹² It was not only for the sake of theoretical debates on the history of philosophy that Plato's role as the source of spiritualism in the history of philosophy was important for Lutosławski, but, as Jaworski aptly remarked, "this interpretation was intended by Lutosławski to provide new ways of understanding Romantic Messianism as a synthesis of Greek and Christian thought. Here lay the specificity and originality of Lutosławski's neo-Messianism, namely its attempt to synthesise Plato's philosophy and Polish Romanticism."⁴¹³ This spiritualistically-interpreted Platonism also provided a kind of defence of individual freedom⁴¹⁴ against the designs of idealists who wanted to restrict it in favour of the idea, while Messianism could not do without the concept of individual freedom, without an activism-oriented concept of human beings.⁴¹⁵

It is possible that the following conclusion, however, is too far-reaching: "Lutosławski's concept of love as an expression of a direct relationship was modelled on Plato's *Symposium*. The difference between them results from different interpretations of the object of love. While for Plato, the ideas of beauty and good were transcendent beings, for Lutosławski these values were inherent to the human race. If, however, Plato's ideas were interpreted in the spirit of transcendentalism or spiritualism, as they had been by Lutosławski, then these differences disappear. Ideas reveal their existence as human values, on the basis of which individuals pursue actions and accept their own responsibility for implementing them."⁴¹⁶ It seems, however, that the differences are more numerous than the similarities, for Plato's contemplativism was incompatible with the activist Messianic anthropology. In addition, the concept of love in the *Symposium* was not aimed at uniting individuals, but rather secluding them in an elitist and barely transmittable experience. The direct sources of Lutosławski's concept of love should rather be sought in the Romantic tradition, which itself – and this cannot be overlooked – also drew on the works of Plato. Lutosławski

412 Cf.: Dąmbaska, 1972: 74; Mróz, 2005d; Mróz, 2007d: 313–318.

413 Jaworski, 1976: 139.

414 Jaworski, 1994: 76–77; Jaworski reflects upon this issue in the context of Bergson's philosophy.

415 Floryńska emphasises the extremely practical consequences of Messianism when she writes: "The metaphysical foundations of national Messianism – freedom and creativity of the self – applied to the project of the utopian state, lead to the denial of individual freedom" (Floryńska, 1977: 187).

416 Jaworski, 1994: 115.

himself emphasised the Romantic origin of his concept.⁴¹⁷ Similarly, his concepts of pre-existence or metempsychosis may also have been derived directly from Plato,⁴¹⁸ yet it seems at least equally probable that they were drawn from Polish Romanticism. It is obvious, nevertheless, that Lutosławski knew Plato's theory of metempsychosis, but in the period of creating his own philosophy, which was subjected to Messianism, he also subjected Plato to this current. Thus, the incorporation of metempsychosis into Lutosławski's neo-Messianic system of philosophy resulted from his adoption of Romantic Messianism.

In short, the spiritualistic interpretation of Platonism was to provide a justification for Lutosławski's neo-Messianic philosophy and to involve Plato in the vortex of the ideological disputes of that era. At the same time, S. Borzym's opinion cannot be denied: "Lutosławski's research on Plato is a peculiar example of how overt ideological commitment can go hand in hand with lasting scientific results."⁴¹⁹ Plato was not a direct inspiration for Lutosławski's neo-Messianism, but Lutosławski involved Plato in the historical-philosophical genealogy of Polish Romantic Messianism, one component of which was spiritualism, which had been discovered by this disciple of Socrates, but this discovery might not have come to light had it not been for Lutosławski's interpretation.

The mere fact that research in the history of ancient philosophy undertaken by a Pole had met with such a wide response from the international academic community is undoubtedly unique. Lutosławski regarded his Polish nationality as an asset in his work, for, not being entangled in any

417 Lutosławski, 1912: 24–25 (first printed in 1910). Floryńska, while discussing this highest level of love, does not refer to Platonic inspirations either (1976: 207–208), but points to Słowacki instead (Floryńska, 1976: 226) or to Romanticism in general (Floryńska, 1977: 180). She claims, however, that "Lutosławski's philosophy [...] did not stem from Romanticism, but only refers to it once he had formed his basic premises" (Floryńska, 1976: 179), and she continues: "Lutosławski's philosophy has a double genealogy: German metaphysics and Polish Romanticism. On the basis of the first, he articulated the foundations of his view of the world, and under the influence of the latter, he made significant corrections and ceased to acknowledge his German teachers" (Floryńska, 1976: 183); it could have been this 'double intellectual genealogy' that was pivotal in his failure as a philosopher (Palacz, 1999: 296). As Floryńska puts it: "this learned expert on Plato and inventor of stylometry has, as an independent philosopher, become little more than a »living fossil« for his contemporaries" (1977: 189).

418 This is Jaworski's proposal (1994: 89–90).

419 Borzym, 1993: 28.

European rivalries, he could treat the international secondary literature impartially and without prejudice. His broad survey of the literature in the field was unprecedented, and this was acknowledged even by the Germans themselves (e.g. Kühnemann, Vaihinger, Ritter), who were reproached by Lutosławski for not taking non-German literature into account. Nevertheless, in the assessment of the Pole's results, some arguments appeared that were not based on the merits of his works, voiced, for example, by Wilamowitz. Likewise, Zeller evaluated Lutosławski's work in the light of his origins rather than his merits. Yet in the end, the dispute between Zeller and Lutosławski on the chronological position of the *Sophist* and the resulting image of Plato was settled by researchers in favour of the Pole. On the other hand, the American, Shorey, who, as a foreigner, was belittled by Wilamowitz as Lutosławski had been, regarded Lutosławski, a former student of Teichmüller, as a representative of the German school that specialised in detailed philological research on Plato, which Shorey considered to be futile and philosophically useless.

A clear Polish accent binding research in the history of philosophy with Polish Messianism can be seen in Lutosławski's acknowledgement that it was only a Pole, as a representative of a nation of individualists, who could have discovered the individualism and pluralist spiritualism in Plato. This is how Maurycy Straszewski interpreted this, when he wrote: "Lutosławski courageously defends metaphysics and spiritual values in life in general, taking an extreme Platonic spiritualist position to defend the immateriality and immortality of our soul (it is the »soul«, not the »body and soul«, that makes a human being)."⁴²⁰ In the Polish context, it should also be remarked, following T. Sinko, that Lutosławski's research was an attempt to make up for the years of backwardness that had existed in Polish Plato research, and he was successful in this, even to the extent of immediately achieving success at an international level.⁴²¹ Unfortunately, Lutosławski's personal turbulences and his subsequent fixation with propagating the philosophy of national Messianism were to influence the reception of his research on Plato, discouraging many, especially the representatives of the younger generation of philosophers, from getting to know his achievements in this field.⁴²²

420 Straszewski, 1930: 62.

421 Sinko, 1932: 673.

422 Sometimes Lutosławski's encounters with young disciples of Twardowski during the interwar philosophical congresses resulted in personal conflicts and the exchange of offensive epithets, as happened, for example, with T. Kotarbiński

Epilogue: Plato as a remedy for the post-war situation

After World War II Lutosławski's views on Plato did not substantially change, even though half a century had elapsed since the publication of his *opus magnum*. In the papers he delivered to the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (PAU) after the war, starting in the autumn of 1945, he summed up his previous research, emphasising the originality of his contribution to the question of the chronology of the dialogues. He also expressed his regret that the strictly philosophical content of his book, revealing Plato's evolution towards spiritualism, had been largely overlooked. This view of Plato's evolution had gained particular significance in Polish thought within the context of Messianism, considered to be a natural extension and continuation of Platonism. It was this connection between Platonism and Messianism that Lutosławski stressed: "Understanding the huge difference between idealism and spiritualism is greatly facilitated by comparing the last phase of Plato's thought with the world-view of the Polish prophets who went even further, for not only did they draw on the actual being of the self but also on the classification of the selves into groups, that is the species of spirits which are known as *nations*. The recognition of the nation as a truly existing reality and the fundamental distinction between a nation on the one hand, and a tribe, a people or a race on the other, was first justified by the discovery, made by Plato in the last 20 years of his life, of the absolute reality of the self, without which ideas could not have existed."⁴²³ In this sense Polish Messianism became a continuation of Plato's intellectual heritage, a fulfilment of his 'will.'

The second of Lutosławski's speeches at PAU was focused on the chronology of the dialogues and on stylometry itself.⁴²⁴ It was not until 1948 that Lutosławski was eventually made a member of PAU, shortly before the institution ceased its activities. His studies on Plato were also rehabilitated, thanks to a positive reference written for PAU by Adam Krok-

(cf.: Mróz, 2008: 198). After many years, and shortly after Lutosławski's death, Kotarbiński noted that "his later oddities did not efface, in the memory of his colleagues, the contribution he once made to research on the chronology of Plato's works" (Kotarbiński, 1995a: 38; first printed in French in 1957). Nowadays in Poland, Lutosławski is referred to briefly as a researcher who developed Campbell's method, took issue with Zeller, and was himself criticised by Pawlicki (cf.: Dąbbska, 1972a: 74–75; Leśniak, 1993: 21–23; Gajda-Krynicka, 1993: 12, footnote 20; Pacewicz, 2004: 10–11).

423 Lutosławski, 1946: 260–261; cf. Jaworski, 1994: 61.

424 Lutosławski, 1946a.

wicz, who, probably having in mind the reports from the recent papers presented by Lutosławski, wrote about his interpretation of Plato as follows: “The very important and prolific thought of Prof. Lutosławski is usually passed over in silence and only short and superficial references to it can be found in the scientific literature [...]. Prof. Lutosławski’s claim that Plato in his later years moved from ‘idealism’ to ‘spiritualism’ is of great scientific significance. [...] The statement of Prof. Lutosławski creates a solid foundation for independent, and truly Polish, scientific research in the field of ancient philosophy.”⁴²⁵ Krokiewicz himself, while appreciating Lutosławski’s conclusions, did not accept them uncritically. In his later book, he wrote: “It seems, however, that the truth was a little different [from Lutosławski’s interpretation], and that Plato’s later ‘spiritualism’ did not *overcome* his ‘idealism’ but rather *supplemented* it.”⁴²⁶ There were, however, those who supported Lutosławski’s conclusions more wholeheartedly. Maria Maykowska expressed her astonishment that Lutosławski’s book had been ignored, for he was the only author known to her who had so brilliantly demonstrated the existence of two doctrines in Plato’s dialogues. In her own analysis of the *Laws*, she came across additional arguments for the change in Plato’s philosophical views which supported Lutosławski’s research.⁴²⁷

Despite the ambiguous reception of his work and personality among his countrymen,⁴²⁸ Lutosławski continued to function as an authority in the field of Platonic studies at an international level. This is demonstrated by his post-war correspondence with Bertrand Russell, the author of *A History of Western Philosophy*. It was only after Lutosławski had become acquainted with Russell’s synthesis of the history of philosophy that the subject of Plato appeared in their correspondence, as can be seen in a letter from Lutosławski to the Englishman. Among other things, he wrote: “Your *History* proves that we agree in our esteem of Plato. [...] I have devoted to Plato 10 years of my life (1887–1897) and I believe to know him. In your six chapters on him I did not discover a single error and I agree with everything you say. If ever you read my book on *Plato’s Logic* (Longmans 1987), you will see how after 60 he gave up his communistic utopia and his theory of

425 Zaborowski, 2004: 74.

426 Krokiewicz, 1958: 133; cf. Zaborowski, 2000a: 74–75.

427 Maykowska, 1949: 17.

428 When preparing his lectures on Greek philosophy, Henryk Elzenberg made the following note: “*The role of Lutosławski 1897 (a significant contribution, but not the author)*” (Zaborowski, 1999: 62; in a different context: Zaborowski, 2000: 72, note 1).

transcendent ideas, and came as near as possible to your logical analysis.”⁴²⁹

Russell must have valued Lutosławski’s opinion because immediately after receiving the letter, he forwarded it to his publishing house. He may have regarded the Polish researcher’s voice as particularly important precisely because it was positive about the chapters on Plato in his book, and consequently exceptional. In his autobiography, Russell quotes a letter from Max Born, written several years after the correspondence with Lutosławski, in which Born mentions the negative German reception of the image of Plato presented on the pages of *A History*....⁴³⁰

Despite Lutosławski’s flattering comments in his letter, it is difficult to identify interests shared by the two philosophers when we analyse and compare Lutosławski’s book on Plato and the chapters devoted to Plato in *A History of Western Philosophy*. Both authors set themselves different goals, leading to different ways of discussing Plato. Russell presented Plato’s views against the background of the history of philosophy. Far from seeing Platonism as a philosophical evolution towards a system of spiritualism, as Lutosławski did, he saw Plato as a philosopher who put forward many issues which were essential for the development of philosophy; yet the way in which they were resolved in the dialogues resulted, according to Russell, in a series of errors and pseudo-problems, which, he argued, had been devotedly belaboured by subsequent generations. It is hard, then, to accept Lutosławski’s praise as an unambiguous declaration of unanimity in their approaches to Plato. Admittedly, as far as the discussion on the content of the dialogues was concerned, Lutosławski could not find fault with Russell, not even with the selective treatment of the dialogues – this was not incorrect. Nor did Russell’s departure from historicism in the presentation of the philosophers, including Plato, arouse Lutosławski’s criticism. He himself, after all, regarded Plato as a thinker whose views could be useful to save Christian Europe from communism. Nevertheless, Lutosławski’s comments on Plato’s change in his political views and his abandonment of the utopia of the *Republic* in his later years must have been of secondary importance to Russell, who judged the socialist ideas in the *Republic* from a more contemporary standpoint. He wrote, for example: “in the main Plato is concerned only with the guardians, who are to be a class apart, like

429 Quote in: Mróz, 2008a: 96–96, note 33.

430 Russell, 2004: 630.

the Jesuits in old Paraguay, the ecclesiastics in the States of the Church until 1870, and the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. at the present day.”⁴³¹

When Lutosławski referred Russell to his own book on Plato, where he demonstrated Plato’s movement away from his peculiar ideal of communism and towards logical analysis, he must have been referring to the *Laws* and the late dialogues. In the discussions in the *Sophist*, according to Lutosławski, Russell could have found common goals that he shared with Plato. In particular, it was Plato’s search for an answer to the question of the method of defining concepts that was, according to Lutosławski, to bring the philosophical problems of the late Plato closer to Russell’s analytic interests.

With regard to the agreement between the two philosophers on their evaluation of Plato, then, it would appear that their positive opinions related to different aspects of Plato’s work. Russell considered Plato an important figure in the history of philosophy, mainly because of the influence he had exerted on the history of European thought, though he was critical of the effects of the influence of Platonism. Lutosławski, on the other hand, had a high regard for the Athenian as an important source of ideological inspiration.

The relevance of Plato as an ideological inspiration, understandably, became even more obvious to the Pole after World War II. In August 1948, Lutosławski ‘took part’ in the International Congress of Philosophy in Amsterdam; the participation of the Polish delegation was limited to the submission of their papers for publication. After the Congress, a report was published in *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, listing the names of the Poles whose papers had been published in the Congress materials, but Lutosławski’s name was not mentioned.⁴³²

In his Congress paper Lutosławski had not confined himself to summarising his own past achievements, but also stressed the relevance of his own interpretation of Platonism after World War II. He wrote: “This change of mind of Plato has now acquired a singular actuality in view of the conflict usually termed as between communism and democracy, which is really a conflict between communism and Christianity, christianity being the popular exposition of the modern spiritualism, called now by some

431 Russell, 1972: 109.

432 *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, 1948.

American philosophers personalism.”⁴³³ The global ideological conflict of that time, as Lutosławski comprehended it, made Plato even more relevant, because the essence of this conflict – as a transition from idealism-communism to spiritualism – had taken place centuries earlier in the writings of Plato: “Plato reached in his latest works a view of the world very much akin to Christianity. The knowledge of the way which led one of the greatest thinkers of all ages from the overwhelming domination of ideas to the recognition of souls as true Beings might help those who hesitate and are uncertain who is right. [...] We have to decide whether we prefer to be free citizens in an independent state, even at the risk of making mistakes – or passive subjects of a foreign power which determines our thoughts and actions, according to the ideal of a perfect State.”⁴³⁴ In view of these words, which could easily have been interpreted as a criticism of the Polish situation after 1945, it should come as no surprise that attempts were made to exclude Lutosławski’s paper in his homeland. For Lutosławski, Plato did not merely reflect the conflict, but also provided a remedy for it: “What happened in the soul of Plato can also happen in modern souls who now are divided by the variety of ideas into sects and parties. And such a change is the necessary condition of an organization of mankind into one whole. This can happen only by the abolition of the fanaticism of idealistic parties, and on this way no greater teacher has ever lived than Plato. If all men could become similar to the greatest thinker of all ages, they would agree in action and despise the idle strife of words.”⁴³⁵

Up to this point the philosophical content of Lutosławski’s work had been largely ignored, but according to an announcement in his Congress paper, this was about to change, for a new book was to alter the perspective and shift the centre of gravity with respect to the evaluation of his 50-year old volume. The aim of this book, as outlined in the paper, was to present the contemporary conflict of ideologies within the context of Plato’s work, and convince the reader of the superiority of Plato’s spiritualism over idealism, or, in other words, using mid-20th century terms, the superiority of Christianity over communism. By showing the relevance of this Polish interpretation of Plato, Lutosławski aimed to confirm the unique

433 Lutosławski, 1948: 70; cf.: Mróz, 2014: 195–197. The personalism of Lutosławski’s interpretation of Plato after the World War II is particularly emphasised by Zaborowski (*Prace Komisji Historii Nauki PAU*. 2007: 85). On Lutosławski’s attempts to contact American personalists after the World War II, cf.: Mróz, 2008: 247–248; 2010: 44–45.

434 Lutosławski, 1948: 71; cf. Zaborowski, 2000a: 71–73.

435 Lutosławski, 1948: 72.

place of Polish thought on the intellectual map of Europe, and, by the same token, the relevance of Messianism, whose demands still remained unfulfilled. Although some difficulties in finding an editor for his book were mentioned in the paper, a brief outline of its contents was included: "It is not written for specialists like the older book, but for the general public, anxious to find any light on the great conflict raging between East and West."⁴³⁶

The new book, entitled: *Plato's Logic. Popular Edition*, could not be described as having any great value of novelty. In a short introduction to the book, which has been preserved as a typescript, Lutosławski reiterated his well-known theses from his own research: the solution of the problem of chronology and the issue of Plato's spiritualism which had gone unnoticed by the academic world. The text itself was basically the same without the philological, statistical and linguistic parts that had previously aroused the greatest interest of the international public. In addition, all the Greek quotations which had been used quite profusely by the author in *The Origin and Growth...*, had been removed. These changes were intended to reverse the proportions in the book so as to attract the readers' attention to Plato's anticipation of a number of doctrines appearing in modern philosophy, and bring about understanding of the substantial existence of individual souls.⁴³⁷ The book, then, was hardly new, and one of Lutosławski's American correspondents, Bernard Mollenhauer, probably came nearer to the truth when, on the basis of letters from Lutosławski, he described the book as a revised version of the 1897 edition. At the same time, Mollenhauer emphasised Lutosławski's achievements, quoted his letters and stressed the originality of a reading of Plato which was, to some extent, in line with Polish Messianism.⁴³⁸

It may have seemed that Lutosławski would not return to Platonic issues after the World War II, but the political consequences of the war made it even more important for him to show the connection between his inter-

436 Lutosławski, 1948: 71.

437 Lutosławski, AN PAN-PAU1: 1.

438 Mollenhauer, 1954: 246–247; cf. Mróz, 2014: 196–197. Mollenhauer concluded his article by describing Lutosławski as the last living representative of Messianism, and thus of the Platonic tradition, unlike his contemporaries, who were inclining toward empiricism and logical positivism. Mollenhauer also mentioned Polish philosophers of the younger generation (Tarski, Chwistek, Ajdukiewicz [!]), who had turned their backs on the metaphysics of Romanticism and instead pursued symbolic logic and the philosophy of science (Mollenhauer, 1954: 250–251).

pretation of Plato and Polish Messianism. He regarded the growth of communism as a threat which could only be overcome by a careful reading of Plato's dialogues and his interpretation of them. Although his original research and conclusions remained basically the same, for he was unable to conduct new research due to age, illness and the political and economic situation in his country, they were presented from a new ideological perspective. He believed that since Plato, the creator of idealism and communism, had evolved towards spiritualism, that is towards what was to become Christianity, or personalism, then the defeat of communism within human history was also inevitable.

3.3 S. Lisiecki's 'Platonising'

Stanisław Lisiecki (1872–1960) is a little known figure in the history of Polish philosophy, though on the basis of his skills and the works he produced, he would have seemed to be predestined to occupy a leading position among the experts on ancient thought, and especially on Plato. The extent to which Lisiecki's name has slipped into oblivion can be seen from the difficulties encountered when trying to determine even the most basic facts of his biography, such as the date of his death.⁴³⁹ Much of this enigma is explained on the basis of extant correspondence, which yields the image of a man who felt a great need to share his complicated biography with someone or make "a general confession of his life."⁴⁴⁰

In a letter to Stanisław Kot, Lisiecki outlined those aspects of the story of his life that were at the root of his problems. He wrote about his work as a teacher, about the difficulties in adapting to the circumstances in Warsaw since his origins were in the Poznań region, and went on to explain: "I was unable to enter into the spirit of the education system in the Kingdom [of Poland, also known as: Congress Poland]. Before I took up teaching, I was a Catholic priest, but I entered the priesthood without a calling, so for almost twenty years I was tormented by pangs of conscience, for I felt unworthy of celebrating mass or conducting other holy sacraments at the Al-

439 For example, the following note about Lisiecki can be found: "Lisiecki Stanisław Kostka (1872–about 1920/21), Dr. theol., priest, catechist in gymnasium in Gniezno. Ordinary member [of The Poznań Society for the Advancement of Arts and Sciences] about 1916/1917–1920/1921?" (Jankowska & Król, 1982: 189); *cf.*: Błaszczyk, 2003: 50.

440 Starnawski, 2004: 20.

tar.”⁴⁴¹ On the advice of his confessor, Lisiecki eventually moved to the Protestant church, got married and began to teach Latin in a gymnasium, having qualifications to teach Latin, Religion and Hebrew on the basis of the *pro facultate docendi* exam which he had passed in Wrocław in 1905. After gaining a doctoral degree in theology in Wrocław in 1911, he worked as a private teacher in Gniezno and Hannover until the outbreak of World War I. From 1918, by then a lay person, he started teaching Latin and Greek in Rogoźno, and then in Warsaw. He described his life succinctly as *historia calamitatis*.

Published works

Lisiecki took on the task of translating Plato’s *Republic*, and conscientiously reported to Kot, the editor of the “Biblioteka Narodowa” (“National Library”) series, on the progress of his work. In May 1925, half of the dialogue was ready.⁴⁴² All Lisiecki’s endeavours, and especially his study of the *Phaedo*, which was published while he was working on the *Republic*, were to serve towards his plans for a post-doctoral degree (habilitation). The study was, however, at first rejected by the Academy of Arts and Sciences, and consequently his habilitation plans failed. Lisiecki, as he himself admitted with regret, had no other options but to teach at Wolna Wszechnica (the Free University) in Warsaw.⁴⁴³ Eventually, in 1928, Lisiecki informed Kot that he had been awarded his second Ph.D., this time in philosophy, notwithstanding his previous concerns that his age would make this impossible.⁴⁴⁴

Lisiecki’s work on the *Phaedo* was dedicated to W. Witwicki, who was described in the dedication as *interpres subtilissimus*, though Lisiecki had not always been an uncritical admirer of his translations. In his study Lisiecki highlighted Plato’s claim that the immortality of the soul was the subject of knowledge, and this knowledge could be discovered by the soul itself, which was of particular importance for the soul since virtue was derived from knowledge. Among the questions discussed in this study were the issues of the relation between the *Apology* and the *Phaedo* and the differences in their presentations of immortal happiness after death. Lisiecki

441 Lisiecki, BJ1; cf.: Lisiecki, APAN2: 2–3.

442 Lisiecki, BJ2.

443 Lisiecki, BJ3.

444 Lisiecki, BJ4.

thought that these differences could be accounted for on the basis of the different audiences that were being addressed by Socrates. Whereas in the *Apology* Socrates was addressing a non-professional public, in the *Phaedo* the interlocutors not only listened to Socrates' arguments but also "contributed to elucidating these issues and put forward their original objections"⁴⁴⁵, and so the issue of the soul's return to God came to the fore in this dialogue.

The theory of ideas, as Lisiecki argued, had its source in the Socratic search for the essence of things and in his attempts to define concepts. This was a sign that Plato was beginning to develop his master's thoughts: "The *idea* stands above the »concept«; because the concept refers to beings perceived by the senses (earth, a human being) in such a way that both the *phaenomenon* and its concept constantly remain associated in our minds, whereas the *idea* has such an autonomous existence that it constitutes a separate, real being, independent of the *phaenomena*."⁴⁴⁶ In this passage Lisiecki articulated an unambiguous interpretation of the theory of ideas: although the ideas were epistemological in origin, in Plato they took on an ontological significance.

The substance and form of Lisiecki's study resembled the so-called dispositions, that is the schemes or outlines of the dialogues that had been produced by gymnasium teachers in previous decades to help their pupils read the Greek texts. Works of this kind had ceased to appear, however, when translations of the dialogues became widespread and Greek teaching was reduced.

From a philosophical point of view, it was another of Lisiecki's books, *Plato's Doctrine of the Pre-Being of the Soul*, that proved to be much more important because it focused on problems concerning the soul and its pre-existence. In Plato's philosophy, the foundation of the soul's pre-existence, of its pre-being, was, according to Lisiecki, the soul's contact with the ideas. In his discussion of the theory of ideas, he quoted an extensive passage from Diotima's speech in W. Lutosławski's translation, adding a personal note, in which he emphasised the Biblical overtones of this passage: "It is worth living, says Plato, if it is possible to see Eternal Beauty even here on Earth. This happiness surpasses all other values. While observing and admiring beauty in earthly *phaenomena*, human beings feel them-

445 Lisiecki, 1927: 30. I. Dąbska, probably mistakenly, attributed this work to A. Żółtowski (Dąbska, 1972: 83), but then she also listed it in Lisiecki's bibliography (Dąbska, 1972: 85).

446 Lisiecki, 1927: 33.

selves to be drawn to beautiful deeds, that is, to virtue, and when this virtue is born and carefully nurtured in them, then the summit of perfection will have been reached because God will find delight in them. – It can be said that Diotima's speech is a veritable Song of Songs, for its incomparable charm awakens a yearning to see the idea of Beauty; and this yearning for eternal Beauty is inherent in human beings, leading them to true virtue and true happiness."⁴⁴⁷

The classics' scholar reproached Plato for turning the ideas into spiritual beings, for "having reached this point in his speculation, Plato encounters the human spirit, and contrives an analogy between these spiritual ideas and the human spirit, making the following deduction: the ideas exert the same influence on matter and on phaenomena as the human spirit exerts on the body, but the ideas have their autonomous existence independent of the phaenomena to such an extent that, due to their influence, reflections, copies, and imitations of the ideas are produced in the physical world."⁴⁴⁸ Just as Plato had been reproached for this in his own times, so Lisiecki pointed out the impossibility of establishing a relation between ideas and things or demonstrating the way in which the former act on the latter. Ultimately, Lisiecki acknowledged that the source of the theory of ideas was inspiration, and in the words of Mickiewicz he asked: "What are these moments of inspiration? Thanks to them the spirit is elevated to a *higher* land. [...] For a man of good faith, inspiration will always provide *proof of the existence of the invisible and mysterious world*, of a being that is accepted as a dogma by a Christian, and must be acknowledged as a logical necessity by a *genuine philosopher*."⁴⁴⁹

Lisiecki attempted to defend Plato, arguing that the Athenian must have felt it necessary that all purposefulness be bound up with thinking, and this in turn became an inspiration for the theory of ideas as objects of thought, thus guaranteeing the world order. Using an analogy from the field of neurology, Lisiecki argued that since even 20th century scientific research had been unable to understand the brain and its relations with human consciousness, then it could be concluded, in agreement with Plato, that "the *soul* retains its autonomy and independence of action from the body and its organs, that it is something separate and distinct and that the

447 Lisiecki, 1927a: 18.

448 Lisiecki, 1927a: 22.

449 Mickiewicz, 1893: 116–117; the emphasis by Lisiecki (1927a: 25).

dignity of its mission surpasses the predispositions of all the bodily organs."⁴⁵⁰

The very existence of human knowledge was both a consequence and an expression of the pre-existence of the soul. Lisiecki found evidence in favour of the soul's pre-existence in the practice of teaching, when schoolchildren were able to give correct answers to questions when guided by a skilful teacher. In the *Phaedo* it was demonstrated that the soul must have acquired knowledge of the ideas, such as the idea of equality, before being united with the body, and later recalled them. In his discussion of *anamnesis* on the basis of the *Phaedo*, Lisiecki added his own comments. He assumed that the acquaintance with the ideas that human beings brought into the world with them would not, in itself, be sufficient to develop knowledge, nor could this knowledge be developed by an individual in isolation, for such an individual's knowledge would be limited to sensory experience: "to develop spiritual susceptibility, the vital influence of *human beings* was necessary because concepts, as the common heritage of humankind, are passed down by adults to the younger generation."⁴⁵¹ Plato's conclusions seemed questionable to Lisiecki on this matter, but he nevertheless defended Plato, remarking that in fact, the germ of knowledge to be produced by an adult could have lain hidden in the soul since childhood, although at that time it was not yet in a discernible form. Thus, Plato's fundamental conclusion on the eternal existence of the ideas and on human acquaintance with them even before the moment of birth had not been disproved.

Lisiecki found the same merit in the theory of learning as recollection as had already been recognised by the ancients, namely it could provide an explanation for the diversity of people's innate capabilities. Nevertheless, this remained in the realm of conjectures and guesswork, and Lisiecki believed that the arguments for the validity of *anamnesis* were founded on vague premises, such as the undefined way in which things participate in ideas and, consequently, the way in which the ideas are recalled after their presence in things has been discovered. Moreover, as Lisiecki continued, gaining knowledge of the ideas is not merely a matter of recollection, for this knowledge was simply procured by the soul prior to the merger with the body, in other words the soul learnt the ideas, just as human beings subsequently learn about the world. In fact, it would do no harm to reject the whole theory of *anamnesis* because what the theory explained could be

450 Lisiecki, 1927a: 25.

451 Lisiecki, 1927a: 52.

better explained by assuming the human predisposition to produce general concepts. Lisiecki, however, admitted that Plato was right to some degree regarding the theory of *anamnesis* and innate knowledge, for he considered it to be true that “human beings cannot learn anything that has not already existed in them as an *innate tendency* in a certain direction.”⁴⁵² It was therefore the task of the teacher to guide his learners in discovering their innate ability to undertake intellectual effort, and this had been perfectly illustrated by Socrates, who had been glad to hear the critical arguments against his own reasoning that were formulated by Cebes and Simias in the *Phaedo*.

The last chapter of Lisiecki’s work was devoted to the theory of the cyclical course of life and death. He accused Socrates of the *petitio principii* fallacy in the *Phaedo*, for Socrates implicated the soul in the argument based on the course of nature. Socrates gave no explicit definition of the soul, referring to it only, for example, as existing separately and independently, in which case the soul’s rebirth from death would be difficult and futile, since it could not be subjected to death at all. Ultimately, Lisiecki, while taking issue with Plato, accepted his reasoning as the first part of the argument for the immortality of the soul, though with some reservations: “life cannot awake from death, life outflows rather from the living element, *omne vivum ex vivo*.”⁴⁵³ The very principle of generation from opposites appeared to threaten the goal of the dialogue rather than substantiate it: “therefore we must die first to have the possibility of being born! This contradiction is even more glaring since it is the aim of the *Phaedo* to prove the immortality of the soul, which does not follow from the claim that everything arises from its opposite.”⁴⁵⁴

Lisiecki described Plato’s theory of the fall of the human soul and its incarnation in animals as a theory of descent, as a reversed Darwinism, and ultimately found it unacceptable: “human beings can debase themselves, can fall to a lower moral level than that of animals, yet by their own means they can neither turn back the wheel of time, which constantly rolls forward, nor make it run backwards, just as they cannot return to their moth-

452 Lisiecki, 1927a: 59.

453 Lisiecki, 1927a: 78; this sentence is followed by the footnote: “a claim derived from experience” (Lisiecki, 1927a: 78, footnote 1). Chapter 4 and the concluding section of Lisiecki’s work were reprinted in Mróz, 2010: 219–239.

454 Lisiecki, 1927a: 78; cf.: Siwek, 1937: 72–73. The argument from opposites was criticised by Siwek as a vague analogy; he marvelled at the fact that the divine Plato could have considered this argument seriously.

ers' wombs."⁴⁵⁵ The human soul cannot live in an animal's body, for it would then be impossible for it to improve itself, because unlike human beings, animals have not displayed any evidence of progress in the course of history. Plato's doctrine, therefore, according to Lisiecki, encompassed both reincarnation, that is repeated incarnations of the human soul, and metempsychosis, that is incarnations into animal bodies.⁴⁵⁶

Reflecting on the possibility of reincarnation, Lisiecki admitted that one of the arguments in favour of this theory was the fact that, for most people, it was difficult, or even impossible, to discover the truth in just one lifetime. The task that Plato set for human beings was too demanding for most people, very few of whom could devote themselves to philosophy. Lisiecki concluded from this that reincarnation would allow souls a longer period of time to pursue the task set by Plato, during numerous incarnations, while the body would only be the instrument of the soul on its path to perfection. What was problematic, however, was the question of what it was that actually underwent reincarnation in human beings. "It is the spiritual *principium* that is reborn in human beings; the human self is reborn, the human *Ego*, this inner human which is indeed an immortal being, capable of thinking and drawing conclusions, which is endowed with intellect, memory, intuition, and volition to decide and a vivid imagination; and this inner human aspires to divinity."⁴⁵⁷ This human component strives for perfection and tames the body. Lisiecki described this component as a certain type, character, nature, whose present identity was ephemeral.

Lisiecki wrote enthusiastically about this human spiritual development that was facilitated by reincarnation: "It is that human self, that type, that nature, that is reborn, animating human organisms in successive reincarnations, while remaining always the same; in successive reincarnations it then animates a variety of people living at that time, and accumulates in itself the experiences that it has acquired throughout its earthly lives, and collects their rich treasure of knowledge and wisdom, thus gaining copious fruit from these experiences which it incorporates into its own immortal being until after a lapse of many incarnations and as their glorious result, a human being perfect in every respect eventually emerges. Only after its last

455 Lisiecki, 1927a: 94.

456 Siwek also emphasised the distinction between reincarnation and metempsychosis and the rejection of the latter by the supporters of the former (Siwek, 1937: 20–21).

457 Lisiecki, 1927a: 97–98.

pilgrimage will such a human being eventually enter the sanctuary that has been predestined for those souls that have been ennobled and have become well-balanced after numerous reincarnations. This is the human mission on earth – to prepare to be connected with God, and in this regard we can without demur accept Plato's teaching on reincarnation as an expression of his lofty views on the soul's purification from earthly accretions, and especially when we take into account his true faith in the merciful rule of *Providence*.⁴⁵⁸ Lisiecki, then, while rejecting the possibility of being incarnated into animals, *i.e.* metempsychosis, accepted reincarnation. He did so all the more willingly since reincarnation explained the diversity of human fortunes and initial life conditions, taking away their apparent injustice and granting them significance as the consequences of previous lives and the results of Providential actions. Reincarnation, then, and not single lives, was an argument in favour of the justice of Divine sentences, its purpose being to bring people closer to God.

Lisiecki did not attempt to settle the dispute on the compatibility of reincarnation with Christianity, but on the basis of a passage from the *Gospel* of John (9, 1), he demonstrated that belief in reincarnation was common in the times of Christ, whose advent was announced by John the Baptist, who, in turn, was considered to be the incarnation of Elijah. To explain the question asked by Jesus' disciples regarding a man who had been born blind: "Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?" Lisiecki commented: "What are they asking about? They are asking whether he must suffer now for his parents' sins, or the sins he himself committed in a former period of his existence, for this unfortunate man came into the world blind. Regardless of Christ's answer, the question itself, in this sad case, proves that belief in reincarnation, must have flourished in those times."⁴⁵⁹

In his work, Lisiecki frequently voiced his own views, as can be seen not only in the conclusion of the book, where the author's *credo* was articulated, but also in numerous exclamation marks throughout the text. Let us refer to the conclusion in which Cicero is mentioned: "All things considered, regarding the present issue, we are not willing to commit ourselves to the dictum: *Amicus meus Plato, sed magis amica veritas*, that was composed on the basis of the *Phaedo* 91. We would rather share the delight of Cicero, who considered the teaching of the Athenian Sage to be so venerable that he declared that even if someone were to produce another, more credible

458 Lisiecki, 1927a: 98–99.

459 Lisiecki, 1927a: 104.

philosophical system, he would rather be mistaken as long as he could remain in the company of Plato than learn the truth in the company of other scholars: *Errare mehercule malo cum Platone quam cum istis vera sentire*.⁴⁶⁰ Lisiecki, thus, appears to have been a confirmed Platonist who did not assess the Athenian sage from the point of view of any particular philosophical school or religion. He accepted many of Plato's theses and his criticism of Plato was articulated from what might be called a common sense position. Lisiecki was not interested in evaluating Platonism from the Christian standpoint, as had been done by Pawlicki, whom, Lisiecki, *nota bene*, as an apostate from Catholicism, did not quote at all. He treated Plato as a thinker who was still relevant and with whom one could take issue, for he posed many stimulating problems that still required explanation. Some of Plato's theories were still worth accepting even in the 20th century, including reincarnation, which was popular among Polish researchers, both Lutosławski and Sinko being advocates of this belief. Let us add that Ryszard Ganszyniec (1888–1958) read Lisiecki's study and regarded it as "very original, independent and daring."⁴⁶¹ Lisiecki referred to other Polish philosophers in his work, sometimes advising his readers to consult Dzieduszycki's lectures, or referring to the Polish works by Lutosławski, with whom he sometimes took issue on minor questions, or picking up errors in Witwicki's translations, for which he blamed the printers rather than the translator himself.

Lisiecki's reflections on the problem of reincarnation, which were directly based on the works of Plato, went unnoticed by the most important critic of this idea, Paweł Siwek (1893–1986). Siwek, who regarded reincarnation as nothing more than a scientific misconception,⁴⁶² originally came across the idea by accident,⁴⁶³ but later devoted some significant works to it. Siwek's polemics were targeted at the contemporary currents of the time, such as theosophy, anthroposophy, occultism and Lutosławski's version of Messianism. He associated the popularity of the doctrine of reincarnation with the spiritual void that, despite the progress of civilisation, accompanied the human race, a void that Western culture was no longer able to fill. At first then, Siwek did not pay any attention to the Platonic sources of reincarnation, but in his later, and much broader, work devoted to reincarnation, though some of his earlier thoughts were reiterated, he

460 Lisiecki, 1927a: 108.

461 Lisiecki, BJ5.

462 Siwek, 1935: 5.

463 Kwiatkowski, 1988: 37–38.

devoted a separate subsection to Plato, focusing in particular on the arguments from *anamnesis*, or reminiscences or memories as he called them, with reference to the *Meno*. He pointed out a contradiction in Plato's theory (overlooked by Lisiecki): Plato argued that human beings had forgotten their previous lives at the start of their subsequent incarnations, yet this, Siwek argued, was not compatible with the argument from *anamnesis*, which was based on the very memories of what the soul had learned earlier. Siwek seems not to have noticed that the knowledge learnt by the soul was not acquired during previous incarnations but during its existence when separate from the body, for he argued: "If the junction of the soul with the body causes the details of our previous lives to fade into oblivion, then Plato's theory of the inborn »ideas« that we had once viewed in the other world, loses its foundation; for they should have been forgotten as well."⁴⁶⁴ Siwek, in his criticism of Plato, referred to the arguments by Augustine and other Church Fathers, yet he ignored a significant contemporary Polish voice in favour of the topicality of Plato's theory that had been expressed by Lisiecki. If he had referred to this, his study would have had greater objectivity. It is difficult to provide unequivocal reasons for the lack of references to Lisiecki's work, but the complicated history of the latter's relations with the Church could have been one of them.

The only dialogue translated by Lisiecki to appear in print was the *Republic*, which was published in 1928. Lisiecki's introduction to this work, consisting mainly of a summary of the dialogue, had as its starting point a question concerning the central theme of the dialogue, an issue that had been regarded by E. Jarra to be of secondary importance, or at any rate, insignificant for the content and value of the dialogue. Lisiecki, however, attempted to determine the fundamental subject of the work, suggesting, on the one hand, that it was the essence of justice and on the other, Plato's political project itself. Eventually, he inclined to a compromise solution, stressing that both topics were inextricably bound up together in Plato, and philosophy itself was no match for either of them, so Plato proposed that it was necessary "to believe steadfastly in the existence of the city of God, where the concept of the highest Good is implemented"⁴⁶⁵, in other words, the perfect state. Faith was therefore *conditio sine qua non* for further detailed considerations.

It seemed to Lisiecki that, in the period when the *Republic* was being composed, Plato had, to some degree, come to accept human weaknesses

464 Siwek, 1937: 102.

465 Lisiecki, 1928: XXII.

as a result of his maturity and his acquaintance with life and human affairs. Lisiecki considered the dialogue itself to be uniformly and harmoniously composed, having at its foundations the fundamental Platonic principle of “*parallelism* between the government and the life of the individual.”⁴⁶⁶

In his interpretation of the *Republic*, Lisiecki, unlike Jarra, took the position that the barriers between particular classes were insurmountable. He also emphasised Plato's understanding of the conflict between the ideal project and reality: “The sage demonstrates that in general reality always remains far behind the ideal, so it is necessary to be content with founding a state that, in any given conditions, would come as close as possible to the ideal of justice,”⁴⁶⁷ thus, “the state [...] is not an unattainable ideal; it will indeed come true.”⁴⁶⁸ The condition for establishing such a state was based on the role played by genuine philosophy, in other words the rulers had to be acquainted with metaphysics. The philosophers' task in establishing this Platonic form of government was described by Lisiecki as that of winning over the present rulers to the idea of pursuing philosophy.

After discussing the levels of knowledge of being, Plato felt it necessary to draw attention to the various fields of the soul's activity, including the arts. Although Plato did not hold the arts in high esteem, he did not consider them to be completely useless, for “insofar as they are reasonable, they can be used to awaken in us noble ideas and sentiments, and thus they may become an excellent resource for moral education.”⁴⁶⁹ Education, which was understood as the development of moral virtue, was in itself a reward, but it was only the arguments for the immortality of the soul, presented at the end of the *Republic*, that guaranteed a reward in the afterlife, and thus the existence of a supernatural order that shaped the future fate of the soul. Lisiecki found Plato's reasoning in the *Republic* imprecise, barely supplementing the arguments from the pages of the *Phaedo*. In both dialogues Plato resorted to myths because the immortal soul's posthumous fate could no longer be a matter of purely philosophical enquiry. These myths were closely related to political thought, for “true lovers of wisdom, guardians of the perfect state, are not meant to live lonely, contemplative lives, but they should descend from the luminous land, which is philosophy, into the dark cave, that is, to mundane conditions,

466 Lisiecki, 1928: XXI.

467 Lisiecki, 1928: XXIX.

468 Lisiecki, 1928: XXIX.

469 Lisiecki, 1928: LIII.

where their confrères are imprisoned, and should sacrifice themselves for the good of the latter. Their souls, having freed themselves from their bodies and tasted heavenly joys for a thousand years, must again return to earth: for they should either raise the spirits of the human race or become themselves even more perfect by experiencing the struggles and sufferings of human life. This is intended as a test for *better* souls.”⁴⁷⁰ The doctrine of reincarnation and the immortality of the soul were intended to provide an incentive for moral improvement, which would allow the soul at a certain stage to make a conscious choice concerning its future fate.

A dialogue as lengthy as the *Republic* could not, of course, have been written in a short period of time, yet it was a uniform work, completed after the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*, when the author was over fifty, but had not yet undertaken his second Sicilian journey. The *Republic* was an extraordinary work, for as Lisiecki wrote, emphasising Plato’s political motives, which were considered by the philologist to be of primary importance, “it breathes with the freshness of a youthful, exuberant soul that is not concerned whether or not it is possible to implement his idea. The author must therefore have started to structure the material early, producing his smaller pieces during breaks from this work. The *Republic* is the outcome of a long-term, toilsome work, and the fruit of investigations that were considered by Plato to be his most essential task.”⁴⁷¹

According to Lisiecki, the *Republic* possessed certain universal and eternal values. Before considering these, however, he warned that: “many ideas developed in the *Republic*, in spite of the logical foundations on which they rest, must, regrettably, be considered to be unfulfillable. What an arbitrary construct of state relations it is, incompatible with the laws of nature!”⁴⁷² The obstacles that made Plato’s project unattainable, such as prohibiting the guardians from owning private property and, consequently, depriving the state of equality and uniformity, were considered by Lisiecki to be its greatest disadvantage.

Apart from these obstacles, the *Republic* contains many lofty principles, including government by philosophers, the need for acquiring knowledge, the immortality of souls and punishment for injustice. “These are only some of the many slogans that have not lost any of their strength during

470 Lisiecki, 1928: LVII; cf.: Kornatowski, 1950: 286. This author frequently referred to Lisiecki’s translation in his presentation of Plato’s idea of the state.

471 Lisiecki, 1928: LX.

472 Lisiecki, 1928: LX. On Lisiecki’s conclusions against the background of other interpreters of the *Republic*, cf.: Mróz, 2011: 192–193; 2012: 127.

their twenty-three-century march throughout the world. They have become assimilated and revitalised within the soul of humanity. Plato's *Republic*, though unfulfillable on earth, nevertheless exists as he himself claimed, »in the Heavens«, namely in the world of ideas »for all those who want to see them, and who seeing them want to shape their souls on this model«.»⁴⁷³ From the perspective of his own historical situation, Lisiecki did not believe that Plato's project was feasible, though he pointed out that the most important of the above-mentioned ideas from the *Republic* had already taken root in the soul of humanity, and these ideas, though not essentially political, nevertheless constituted the greatest value of the work.

Lisiecki's emphasis on the gap between the limitations of real life and the perfection of the ideal can be viewed as a reflection of his own disappointment with the realities of an independent country that had not lived up to his expectations and was a far cry from the ideal that had been longed for before World War I. It is interesting to note that a general change in the interpretation of the *Republic* can be observed in the inter-war period. Greater emphasis was placed on the eternal values of this dialogue, and on the evolution of Plato's political vision towards a compromise between the ideal project and reality. Such an assessment differed from the enthusiasm for the *Republic* that had been presented over a decade earlier by Jarra.

Manuscripts

Possibly encouraged by the publication of the *Republic*, Lisiecki set to work on further translations with great verve, which allowed him to escape from the harsh realities and problems encountered at the Free University in Warsaw. As early as 1932, he informed Kot that all completed translations had been sent to Sinko, who had advertised them rather unremarkably by announcing that "an expert on Plato, *Stanisław Lisiecki*, who translated the *Republic* and supplemented it with introduction and commentaries [...], is waiting for a prospective publisher for other translations he has completed."⁴⁷⁴ In one of his letters Lisiecki confessed: "I have an obsessive ambition, while I still have the strength, to translate all of Plato's dia-

473 Lisiecki, 1928: LXIV.

474 Sinko, 1932: 611; Lisiecki, probably out of modesty, did not think he deserved the title of an expert on Plato (Lisiecki, APAN3: 1).

logues, and to do so in the form of classical editions like those of Stallbaum.⁴⁷⁵ These were not empty declarations.

Lisiecki's plan to provide Poles with classic standard editions and translations of Plato's works was, on all accounts, ambitious and laudable. It was generally agreed that A. Bronikowski's translations were unreadable and needed to be replaced by texts which were both faithful to the original and at the same time clear and comprehensible for readers without any knowledge of Greek. Lisiecki's work met these requirements. By his reference to Stallbaum, Lisiecki had implied that Polish literature was more than a century behind in the field of producing texts to familiarise the general public with Plato's dialogues. Had his translations appeared half a century earlier, they would undoubtedly have been successful, but in the inter-war period he already had a serious rival, who had instantly monopolised the Polish Plato translation industry, setting himself different goals that were in line with the expectations of the general public. The translator in question was, of course, Witwicki. According to Józef Birkenmajer, it was a stroke of great luck for Greek philosophers that their texts had fallen into the hands of such professional translators as Lisiecki and Witwicki. Birkenmajer had found Bronikowski's translation of the *Republic* simply awful, and against this background, Lisiecki's production appeared to be correct and comprehensible.⁴⁷⁶

Lisiecki was certainly aware of the misfortune of having to undertake his research on the margins of academia and the feelings of isolation this entailed. Nevertheless, the claim made by Starnawski that Lisiecki was an unbalanced man is difficult to accept.⁴⁷⁷ Much of the blame for the situation must go to Kot, who had not acted in Lisiecki's best interests by avoiding Lisiecki's company and not returning his manuscripts.⁴⁷⁸ It is not surprising, then, that Lisiecki began to lose hope of ever publishing his manuscripts, all the more so since Sinko had shattered these hopes. Yet for Lisiecki, producing translations brought meaning to his life, even though his work was to remain unpublished.⁴⁷⁹ What is of particular significance is that the image that emerges from his studies on the substance of the dialogues that were to accompany the translations is of a Plato scholar whose

475 Lisiecki, BJ6.

476 Birkenmajer, 1935: 20–21.

477 Starnawski, 2004: 20.

478 Lisiecki, BJ7.

479 Lisiecki, APAN4: 7.

interests were not limited only to reincarnation or political and ideological issues.

Among the translations produced by Lisiecki is the *Meno*. The introduction to the translation of this dialogue opens with a philosophical issue, that is, the meaning of true belief or right opinion, which, though significantly differing from knowledge, can, as the dialogue demonstrates, replace knowledge in the sphere of praxis because of its divine inspiration. In the *Meno*, Plato abandoned his ideals and the excessive demands he had made concerning knowledge: "while previously, in his adolescent zeal he wanted to consider knowledge as the exclusive norm or rule for human deeds, now he accepts, with some regret, that one would not go far in this world with such a demanding requirement. Often it is necessary to be content with instinctive action, which can be equally effective in everyday life."⁴⁸⁰ Thus, Plato's views on the value of opinion evolved, and from this assumption Lisiecki drew the conclusion that the *Meno* must have succeeded the *Gorgias*, after 395 BC, taking issue with Lutosławski's opinion on this matter. One of the crucial aspects of the *Meno* was that it was in this very dialogue that, for the first time, learning was identified with recalling.

The *Cratylus* was of a completely different character, and touched upon the question of the possibility of discovering the nature of things in the words that name them. For Lisiecki, it was not the linguistic controversy on the origins of language that was of greatest significance in this dialogue, but Plato's claim that the notion was of incomparably greater value than the word itself. The *Cratylus* was the first attempt in history to conduct research on language, yet it had to be preceded by a study of concepts themselves and the relations between them. The philosophical content of this dialogue, particularly the characterisation of the theory of ideas as the subject of Socrates' dreams (439c–d), provides evidence that this dialogue was written at an early date. In this regard Lisiecki was in agreement with Lutosławski, whose opinions had been questioned by his critics. In the conclusion to the summary of the dialogue, Lisiecki remarked on the terminology of the theory of ideas, and wrote: "If we talk about Beauty or Good or about »something that has a real being« (τὸ ὄν), then we have in mind that which is *unchangeable* and *remains* eternally, in other words, we have the *ideas* of Beauty or Good in mind, and not a beautiful object or a good person."⁴⁸¹ As far as Lutosławski was concerned, let us add that Lisiecki did not provide a bibliography of secondary literature, but instead, re-

480 Lisiecki, APAN5: 5.

481 Lisiecki, APAN6: 11.

ferred the reader directly to his countryman's book, and limited himself to supplementing it with a few German-language works. He concluded with the following statement: "I would like to mention that these authors highly commend W. Lutosławski's work."⁴⁸²

The extensive introduction to the translation of the *Philebus* begins with a claim about the essentially ethical nature of Plato's philosophical production, and ethics is not only the main theme of this dialogue, but permeates the whole of his philosophy. The *Philebus* had most in common with the *Republic*, in which Lisiecki's particular attention had been attracted to the allegory of the cave, depicting the relation between the Good and the world. What is presented as an image in the *Republic*, has been turned into the central theme of the *Philebus*, providing evidence that it must have been composed later than the *Republic*. In the introduction to the *Philebus* Lisiecki discussed the issue of the relation between God and the Good without ruling out their possible identity. The method used in this dialogue was different from that in the *Republic*, in which Plato's quest for knowledge is presented, while in the *Philebus* Plato introduced the idea of right opinions: "when following the development of Plato's mind, we can see that in the course of time he learnt to put forward »right opinions« whenever *knowledge* seemed to him to be unattainable."⁴⁸³

Lisiecki reflected upon the question of the credibility of the image of Socrates depicted on the pages of the *Philebus*. He concluded that, although certain essentially Socratic features are present in the *Philebus*, the fact that Socrates has been deprived of his well-known irony, may suggest that Plato wanted to portray himself as the lecturer in the Academy. At any rate the views expressed in this dialogue were certainly thoroughly Platonic, and, as Lisiecki argued, Socrates would not have agreed to granting pleasures any traits of good, nor was he familiar with the doctrine of ideas.

Pilate's question, "What is truth?," became the starting point for Lisiecki's discussion of the *Theaetetus* in relation to the fundamental problem of Plato's philosophy, that is, the concept of knowledge. The aim of the dialogue was "to square, as far as possible, the contradictions inherent in various systems by subordinating their claims to a higher and more comprehensive one, thus granting each of these systems some part in the truth, rather than ridiculing or condemning them, even if they were expressions of scepticism and subjectivism. In this way, a positive, rather than a nega-

482 Lisiecki, APAN6: 11. This was not completely true, for among the authors listed were the names of Natorp and Wilamowitz.

483 Lisiecki, APAN7: 7.

tive, result could be achieved by rational *criticism*.”⁴⁸⁴ Plato's focus on knowledge was bound up with the need to re-evaluate the views of his predecessors. The *Theaetetus* therefore appeared to be a critical dialogue, an attempt to start a fundamental philosophy that demonstrated degrees of cognition, and criticism of the intellectual faculties (the name of Kant, however, did not appear in Lisiecki's introduction). The position of this dialogue could then be seen as an 'antechamber' to the dialectical works. Although the main aim of the dialogue, the definition of knowledge, was not achieved, the dialogue was not restricted to polemic on this subject, and a number of issues were incidentally resolved, including right opinion and its relation to knowledge, and the acknowledgement of sensory cognition as a step leading to higher types of cognition. All this made the *Theaetetus* an important dialogue, not only among Plato's works but also in the general history of philosophy.

Lisiecki also pitted his wits against a dialogue that had aroused a great deal of controversy and its authenticity had even been questioned. The dialogue in question was, of course, the *Parmenides*, a dialogue which had not attracted much attention in Poland. Most Polish authors who discussed Plato's *Parmenides* tended to confine themselves to the first part of the dialogue, the second part being dismissed with only a few remarks. An example of this can be found in a paper by Adam Żółtowski, where apart from valuable general observations on researching Platonism, it included praise of Lutosławski's studies on chronology and a reiteration of his conclusions on the affinity between some of the claims of the late works of Plato and those of Kant. Yet, Żółtowski did not have much to say about the second part of the dialogue: “the main part of the dialogue is filled with the type of exercises that indeed must have taken place in the Academy and were criticised for their futility.”⁴⁸⁵

Lisiecki observed one exception to this general lack of attention in Poland to the *Parmenides*, and that was Lutosławski, whose defence of the genuine character of the dialogue was considered by Lisiecki to be sufficient to dispel all doubts. In fact, he was so aware of the significance of the second part of the dialogue, the actual philosophical dialogue, that he almost passed the introductory part over in silence. The main dialogue was further subdivided into two more parts, the first of which developed the doctrine of ideas, their relation to things, and the resulting difficulties in-

484 Lisiecki, APAN8: 2, *verso*.

485 Żółtowski, 2010: 218.

volved, while the second part presented the contradictions arising from the ideas of being and unity.

Plato had a profound veneration for Parmenides and his conception of being, and this accounted for the way in which he presented his criticism of its consequences: "Plato would not himself reproach Parmenides for the contradictions entailed in his doctrine, but had him work out the consequences of his teaching for himself and reveal the evident contradictions, and, at the same time, think out how these problems might be solved."⁴⁸⁶ Interestingly, the *Parmenides* was the first dialogue in which Socrates was deprived of the leading role in the conversation.

In his reflection on the possible sources of the criticism of the theory of ideas in the *Parmenides*, Lisiecki came to the conclusion that the objections might have come from Aristotle, who may first have articulated them verbally during his residence in the Academy, and subsequently, feeling that they had been insufficiently refuted, repeated them in his texts, including *Metaphysics*. Lisiecki again referred to Lutosławski in support of this opinion. Another more plausible source of the criticism, according to Lisiecki, was that it could also have come from the Megarian school. If the Megarian arguments against the theory of ideas were widely known among the philosophers of that time, this would both confirm the authenticity of the *Parmenides* and call into doubt the claims of plagiarism against Aristotle. Yet Lisiecki raised another difficulty, for he supposed that if these objections had indeed been invented by Aristotle, then this dialogue must have been composed much later than it was believed, for the Stagirite was not born until Plato was in his forties. The period of Aristotle's adolescence before joining the Academy should be added to this, and then the necessary time for him to learn about Plato's theory, so that it would have been very unlikely that Plato, having composed the *Parmenides*, could also have subsequently written the *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Cratylus* and the *Laws*.

Irrespective of the origins of the criticism of the theory of ideas, much more important was the observation that since Plato did not directly respond to the criticism in the *Parmenides*, then he must have regarded it as warranted. The consequences of the criticism were formulated by Lisiecki as follows: "If the concepts of unity and multiplicity are *inseparable*, then we cannot consider the *idea*, in relation to particular things, as a *unity*, and still at the same time demand that the world of ideas be completely separate from the earthly world. And if the *ideas* are to be *unities* and the things

486 Lisiecki, APAN9: 6, *verso*.

that participate in them are to be multiplicities, then Plato's previous view, namely that the only true reality is located in the ideas, must fall, and is no longer tenable as is *unity without* multiplicity; consequently, if [...] unity has the property of being able to emerge and perish, then the ideas cannot be eternal and immutable. The doctrine developed in the *Rep.*, that only the ideas are a matter of *knowledge*, while things are a matter of opinion, is also no longer tenable."⁴⁸⁷ Plato, therefore, was compelled to change his views on the ideas, because "the doctrine of ideas, when strict unity is at stake, results in an unjustified disparity between the world of ideas and the world of the senses."⁴⁸⁸

Having quoted a number of contradictory views on the aim, content and results of the dialogue that had persisted since ancient times, Lisiecki concluded that all the difficulties that had been raised stemmed from the fact that Plato had addressed this dialogue to the disciples of the Academy. The dialogue, then, must be even more troublesome for contemporary readers, so, as Lisiecki added, anyone who is able to read the whole dialogue, following the notes and explanations, "can truly claim to be *Platonis amantissimus*."⁴⁸⁹

Lisiecki's introduction to the *Sophist* begins with a description of the Sophistic movement and Plato's struggle against the Sophists. Plato's most powerful weapon in this struggle was the dialectics presented in this dialogue. It was not an easy task to take issue with the Sophists because their arguments were not deprived of strictly philosophical elements. Moreover, there were also elements of sophistry in the Socratic method, which had played a part in the charges against Socrates and his subsequent death. When discussing the dialogue itself, Lisiecki noted its peculiarities, including the fact that the leading role was entrusted to the Visitor from Elea. The reason for this was the dialectical nature of the dialogue and the fact that Socrates mainly focused on ethics, so he was not qualified to be a critic of Eleatic philosophy. Lisiecki believed, however, that if the dialogue that was to have been devoted to the philosopher, after the one devoted to the politician, had come into existence, then the leading role would certainly have fallen to Socrates. Since the deployment of the principles of Eleatic philosophy in the *Sophist* was one of the methods of questioning this philosophy, it seemed appropriate to Plato that the leading part be granted to a certain ideal Eleatic, of unknown name, though in fact, all the

487 Lisiecki, APAN9: 16–16, *verso*.

488 Lisiecki, APAN9: 17.

489 Lisiecki, APAN9: 19, *verso*.

statements expressed by this Eleatic undoubtedly belonged to Plato. For Lisiecki, the dialectical investigations in the dialogue were of the greatest importance, though formally they appeared to be mere digressions from the main topic. "Just when the enquiry into the nature of Sophistry is in full swing, a separate *digression*, emerging from the enquiry, is interjected into the discussion. This not only consumes more than half of the entire dialogue [...], but also contains such serious material that it could in fact be called the *kernel* of the dialogue, while the quest for a definition of Sophistry – is merely the *shell*. [...] the digression includes profound enquiries into *non-being*, while the remaining part contains a colourful description of the quest for the *Sophist*. [...] Just as the shell encloses the kernel completely on every side so that it can only be found when the shell is crushed or shattered, so in the dialogue, the amusing description of the hunt for the Sophist acts as a protective covering for the deeply concealed philosophical thought that is organically connected to it."⁴⁹⁰

The Polish translator did not have a very high opinion of the literary qualities of the *Sophist*: "No dramatic vigour, language that is extremely abstract and dull, while the thoughts are one moment rendered in such a terse manner that it is difficult to find them, and at other times, on the contrary, they are so rambling that they give the impression of a struggle between the form and a profoundly pondering spirit. The keen interest of the general public is unlikely to be aroused by such qualities."⁴⁹¹ It is clear, then, that the substance of the dialogue must have been intended only for advanced disciples in the Academy.

Lisiecki did not suggest any date for the composition of the *Sophist*, for he was unable to find sufficient clues in the text itself. He was, however, aware of the vast discrepancies that prevailed among researchers, some of whom placed the dialogue in the nineties while others in the sixties of the 4th century BC.

A translation of the *Timaeus* can also be found in Lisiecki's legacy, with an introduction that opens with remarks on the reception of the dialogue among neo-Platonists. The translator set himself the task of finding a negative answer to the question of whether Plato could have been regarded as a predecessor of the natural scientists of the 19th century. To answer this question Lisiecki reflected upon three aspects of the dialogue. The first was to consider the extent of Plato's knowledge about nature presented in the *Timaeus*. According to Lisiecki, this subject was only incidentally dealt

490 Lisiecki, APAN10: 7, *verso*-8.

491 Lisiecki, APAN10: 15.

with in the dialogue, and the level of botanic, zoological and geographic knowledge of the times far exceeded any of the comments in the *Timaeus*.

Secondly, it was a mistake to assume that the *Timaeus* was a work primarily devoted to natural philosophy. "If Plato had intended to expound the whole of his philosophy of nature systematically, then he would certainly not have considered the following two issues to be superfluous: first, since the structure of the world is related to space and time, he would have had to demonstrate the significance these concepts had for him and the position and role they played in this structure; secondly, since previous philosophers had discussed the origins of the universe, he would certainly have indicated the bias that had been expressed in previous views."⁴⁹² Plato, however, did none of the above.

Thirdly, much to the disappointment of its prospective readers, the *Timaeus* did not include anything about the development of the teaching on the dominion of moral ideas over the universe, or about the drive of reality to implement these ideas, both of which could have been expected after reading the *Phaedo* or the *Republic*. In fact "the greatest part of the dialogue is taken up with highlighting the doctrine of the elements, of their mutual relations and their antagonisms, which reveal themselves in the same way in nature as in the human body: everywhere the natural aspect of the life of both the universe and the human being comes to the fore, while the idea of the Good and its blessed influence appears only in the description of human nature."⁴⁹³

Plato then, did not intend to provide a description of nature in the *Timaeus*, especially since he did not value empirical research and did not want to present the world of phenomena to his audience. According to Lisiecki, Plato preferred to demonstrate that "even in the sphere of constant mutability and relentless necessity, the rule of divine reason and the dominion of the idea of the Good are manifested."⁴⁹⁴ The originality of Plato's theory and the Eleatic theory of the universe was that they highlighted the opposition between the true being and the world of becoming, and this was most glaringly obvious in the case of human beings. Plato's focus on the human being as a microcosm indicated that "philosophy of nature does indeed have ethical and teleological overtones, especially in view of the fact that the human being appears here to be the central point of the universe, both as a reflection of a higher order of being and, at the

492 Lisiecki, APAN11: 2, *verso*.

493 Lisiecki, APAN11: 2, *verso*-3.

494 Lisiecki, APAN11: 3.

same time, a prototype for lower beings.”⁴⁹⁵ And this came about because of the idea of the Good.

Finally, Lisiecki summarised the central idea of the dialogue as follows: “It is in the universe, and in particular in human nature, that the conflict of hostile elements is manifested. The magnanimous mediator in this conflict is the idea of the Good = the Lord. It is according to this idea of the Good that the universe and human beings are moulded. All creatures turn to it and attempt to become similar to it, expecting in this way to achieve the nearest possible degree of perfection and happiness.”⁴⁹⁶ The entire dialogue appeared Lisiecki to be a poetic depiction rather than a philosophical work, a cosmogonic epic rather than a lecture. The contradictions in the *Timaeus* that were listed by Lisiecki included the claim that time emerged only after the creation of the skies, whereas it was also asserted in the dialogue that matter, before being formed by the Demiurge, had been in constant movement, but this would be impossible prior to the emergence of time. Such contradictions, as the translator hastened to add, had been explained by Plato himself, who acknowledged that his arguments could only be granted the status of probability, for his goal was to “produce an image that would render the essential truth by the most faithful and most accessible means,”⁴⁹⁷ and myth turned out to be the best medium for this. The philosophical thoughts that emerged from this myth and were articulated by the Pythagorean, Timaeus, were nevertheless Plato’s intellectual property.

Even the difficulties in comprehending and unambiguously interpreting the *Timaeus* could not perturb Lisiecki’s adoration for Plato. He encouraged potential readers to get acquainted with the dialogue, exhorting them as follows: “Do you want to spare your head the trouble and give in to ugly sloth? You will find out from this text that your head is a reflection of the universe, teeming with life, and that it was given power over your body.”⁴⁹⁸ Evidence of the significance of this dialogue can be found in Cicero’s delight in the *Timaeus*. It was also with this dialogue in his hand that Plato was portrayed in the *School of Athens* by Santi.

The *Laws* were also translated by Lisiecki, and, as in the case of the *Timaeus*, the interpretative framework for his discussion was the opposition between the ideal and reality and between ideas and things. From the

495 Lisiecki, APAN11: 3, *verso*.

496 Lisiecki, APAN11: 4.

497 Lisiecki, APAN11: 4, *verso*.

498 Lisiecki, APAN11: 6.

idea of the Good presented in the *Republic* Plato descended to the world of phenomena in the *Laws* and abandoned dialectics. The translator described the author's aim in the *Laws* as follows: "instead of essential truth there is only probability, and instead of the true and highest knowledge that was demanded of the governors of the state in the *Republic*, he confines himself to cognition that is based on mathematical calculations and which neither bears the same certainty nor reveals itself in such lucidity as the higher knowledge required of the governors of the state. We will, thus, become acquainted with a new aspect of Plato's mind: he will demonstrate to us the relation of the real being to the phenomenon of »becoming«, for he will discuss the origins of legislation, and this relation can neither be examined by means of dialectics nor enhanced with precise philosophical terms."⁴⁹⁹

Lisiecki pointed out that, in fact, it was the views of the elderly Plato that the Athenian Stranger expressed in the dialogue. The setting of the conversation is Crete, and this can be justified on the basis of Plato's earlier disappointments in Sicily, where he had been unable to implement his idea of the perfect state. It would have been difficult to find a more appropriate state than Crete or one that was closer to reality, for it was the actual legislation of this island that Plato used, and, of no less importance, it was here that Zeus was born. The form of the work itself clearly indicated that it had been penned by an elderly author, for the dramatic and dialogic features left much to be desired, yet neither the style nor the absence of dialectical deliberations could call into question the authenticity of the *Laws*, "even in the most diffuse parts of this work, it is never the shoddy pen of some disciple or follower of Plato [...]; the figure that emerges is rather that of an aged master, losing his strength, yet bravely wrestling with difficulties to cram the rich content of the phenomenal world into one piece of work, and on numerous occasions demonstrating the beauty of his artistic skills."⁵⁰⁰ In antiquity the authenticity of the *Laws* had not been doubted. Likewise, Lisiecki rejected the philological evidence on the profound difference in style between this and all other dialogues; nor did he give credit to the philosophical arguments in favour of the dialogue's lack of authenticity. Lisiecki believed that Aristotle's authority was decisive proof of the genuine character of the *Laws*, arguing that Philip of Opus "could

499 Lisiecki, APAN12: 3.

500 Lisiecki, APAN12: 10–10, *verso*.

not have fooled Aristotle, who, at a glance, would have distinguished pure Platonic gold from a shiny counterfeit coin.”⁵⁰¹

At the end of his discussion of this dialogue, Lisiecki turned his attention to home ground, mentioning that the *Laws* had not been translated into Polish. He must, then, have been unaware of Bronikowski’s translation of the first four books of this dialogue, which had appeared in print in 1871. Let us mention in passing that Lisiecki used his translation of the *Laws* as material for philological classes (comparative exercises using source and target texts) in his teaching at the Free University.

After World War II, Lisiecki attempted to step up his cooperation with the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) in order to gain access to Warsaw’s academic libraries since his apartment had been demolished and his rich book collection stolen by the Germans during the war.⁵⁰²

In 1957, at the end of his life, Lisiecki returned to the problems of Plato’s social philosophy in a work entitled *The Structure of Plato’s State*. This study contained an erudite introduction on Greek literature of the classical period and on philosophy, and reiterated in part some of the author’s thoughts from the introduction to the translation of the *Republic*. It was not published, which should not come as a surprise, since Lisiecki repeatedly drew attention to Plato’s criticism of materialism and emphasised the spiritual aspects of Plato’s political project: “the question of the citizens’ souls should be of the utmost importance to the governing Philosopher [...]. Thus, it is the duty of the Philosopher-King to examine the spiritual dispositions of his subjects and give them just orders or admonishments accordingly. In this way, the principles of psychology observed by the Philosopher-King will become a blessing for the whole community.”⁵⁰³ Lisiecki also confirmed his previously articulated views on the feasibility of Plato’s project. The study was not completely ready for publication, the manuscript including loose notes and the author’s digressions. In the bibliography of Lisiecki’s works there is also a lengthy monographic book: *Plato – Life and Works*, the manuscript of which had been handed over to T. Kotarbiński and subsequently destroyed during the war.⁵⁰⁴

In his works Lisiecki frequently referred to the achievements of other Polish scholars. He also repeatedly used Biblical citations and included them in his narrative, though they were rather loosely associated with the

501 Lisiecki, APAN12: 16.

502 Lisiecki, APAN13: 2.

503 Lisiecki, APAN1: 15.

504 Lisiecki, APAN2: 3.

subject of his works on Plato. In this way, he may have been expressing his worldview, thus letting his audience, and particularly prospective publishers, know that his leaving the clergy did not mean a break with Christian faith and tradition.

Although Lisiecki acknowledged the validity of the premises of stylometry, it was the substance of the dialogues that was of paramount importance for him in determining their chronology. In his works, and particularly in the introductions to the late dialogues, the image of Plato's philosophy that is depicted is, above all, that of dualism. Plato appears as a philosopher who, after a period of idealism, after consolidating and developing this view, later gave his attention to its further consequences. This does not mean, however, that he subsequently abandoned idealism, but that he was rather more aware of its difficulties. While the ideas continued to play the most important role in his philosophy, he began to deal with other aspects of reality in his works. In the *Meno*, the true opinion was legitimated; in the *Philebus*, while still having the highest Good in mind, he began to emphasise the role of the kind of ethics that seemed most relevant to him, namely ethics that could make the majority of humanity happy. In the *Timaeus*, he elaborated on the structure and origin of the world as a possible result of the existence of the idea, while in the *Laws*, a more feasible political system was presented, the goal of which was still, as in the *Republic*, human well-being.

The works by Lisiecki presented above indisputably lead us to the following conclusion: Although his expertise was in no way inferior to that of Pawlicki or Lutosławski, Lisiecki's name was eliminated from the list of Polish Plato scholars. It appears to have been moral factors, and hence factors of secondary importance, that determined Lisiecki's absence from academia in the interwar period in Poland, and consequently from contemporary Polish discussions on the history of philosophy. As an apostate from Catholicism, this man, with a rich and complex biography, was not given the chance to use his capabilities properly and pursue research and teaching in Poland in the interwar years, despite his great knowledge, diligence and achievements. His translations were passed over in silence – Sinko alone remarked on them – while even abroad, information about his unpublished works was available.⁵⁰⁵

505 Novotný, 1977: 593.

3.4 W. Witwicki's alliance with Plato

Comparing Władysław Witwicki (1878–1948) to other Polish philosophers with respect to their achievements in the field of Plato research, Izydora Dąmbska claimed that: “neither Lutosławski nor Pawlicki did as much for knowledge of Plato in Poland as Władysław Witwicki did.”⁵⁰⁶ Witwicki's work was similarly assessed by Mieczysław Wallis, who ranked his translations among the best in Poland in general. He wrote: “despite Lutosławski's research on Plato's style and Zieliński's on Greek religion, general knowledge about Plato, and love and enthusiasm for Greek wisdom and Greek beauty were still something rather rare and exceptional in Poland. That is why Witwicki's contribution seems to have been even greater, for he made available to Polish readers most of Plato's dialogues in beautiful translations.”⁵⁰⁷ Witwicki's translations and commentaries of Plato's dialogues are undoubtedly his greatest contribution to research in the history of philosophy. According to Andrzej Nowicki (1919–2011), the forty-four years that Witwicki devoted to the study of Plato made him, “the best Polish expert on Plato.”⁵⁰⁸ Another comparison was ventured by Stanisław Witkowski, a classics scholar: “There was no-one else in Poland who knew Plato as well as Witwicki; it is obvious that, even though I am a philologist by profession, I do not know Plato as well as my friend Witwicki, but I would go so far as to suggest that he may have known Plato even better than the excellent philosopher from Kraków, Rev. Prof. Stefan Pawlicki.”⁵⁰⁹ More recent opinions of Witwicki's works in this field have been less unequivocal, but some of the negative opinions seem, at least partly, to have stemmed from a misunderstanding of his goals and the intellectual context of his times. It should be also borne in mind that translations were just one of Witwicki's manifold intellectual, academic and artistic activities related to his image of Plato.

506 Dąmbska, 1972: 76. Dąmbska considered these three scholars to have been much more than just doxographers, but rather continuators of Plato's work (Dąmbska, 1972: 73).

507 Wallis, 1975: 19.

508 Nowicki, 1982: 9.

509 Witkowski, 2013: 88. Nowicki announced that the manuscript of Witkowski's text had been lost (Nowicki, 1982: 25); fortunately, it survived.

The literary origins of his work

It was during his gymnasium education that Witwicki became familiar with the *Apology* and the *Euthyphro*, and in his mature years he recalled his encounter with the latter as a kind of ideological revelation. Before receiving his Ph.D. he had read the *Theaetetus*, the *Symposium*, and the *Gorgias* purely for pleasure, with no intention of translating or publishing these dialogues.⁵¹⁰ It was only in subsequent years, after obtaining his Ph.D. and postdoctoral degrees, neither of which was in any way connected with Plato, that Witwicki began the adventure with this great thinker that was to have far-reaching consequences for Polish literature.

What first prompted Witwicki to take up Plato seriously? According to Dąbbska, "it was at the time of his intense contact with Twardowski that Witwicki started his lifetime work on translating Plato's dialogues."⁵¹¹ Yet although Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938) reinforced Witwicki's interests, the initial incentive did not come from the Twardowski circle. In fact, it was Witwicki's departure from Lvov and the Twardowski circle that marked the start of this long journey with translation: "The first translations of Plato were read aloud by Witwicki to his colleagues after his return from a trip to Leipzig [...]. These were extensive summaries of the dialogues, sometimes verging on literal translation. Twardowski listened to them and encouraged Witwicki to read his rendering of the »Symposium« at the first scientific meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society. [...] Then [Leopold] Staff [1878–1957] came on the scene and arranged to have it published by Połoniecki as a literal translation. That was the beginning. And when Witwicki was working on the translation of the »Phaedrus« during World War I and again read it to a circle of colleagues, Twardowski suggested that he should present Poland with the whole of Plato. Witwicki obeyed this call. And that is how the first complete Polish translation of Plato's dialogues began in Lvov."⁵¹² Let us supplement Dąbbska's account with the fact that, on hearing the first more extensive samples

510 "U polskiego tłumacza Platona", 1926.

511 Dąbbska, 1948: 19.

512 Dąbbska, 1948: 19. Witwicki's letter written in Leipzig to Twardowski (Jun. 14th, 1902) provides evidence that it was Twardowski who recommended that he should read the *Symposium*. Witwicki wrote to him: "I was thrilled by the form of the Symposium, and I read the speeches of Aristophanes, Socrates and Alcibiades with a flush on my cheeks. I summarised all of them in detail and could simply not resist translating most of these speeches. This dialogue is wonderful" (Rzepa, 1991: 99). Witwicki's initiation into Plato translation was there-

of Witwicki's translations, the audience was struck by the topicality of Plato's considerations,⁵¹³ especially when rendered in modern language. "From the very first sentences of the dialogue the audience was completely spellbound. [...] the content of the dialogue was neither musty nor remote or alien to the assembled company. It appealed to their minds, to their hearts, by the straightforward contemporary language, and it began to ring in the souls of the audience with its own deeply experienced emotion."⁵¹⁴ It soon became customary for Witwicki to read the dialogues aloud to his friends as a means of familiarising them with the dialogues.⁵¹⁵

The initial difficulties that Witwicki encountered in his work as a translator soon turned into enthusiasm. Aptly, Plato's *Symposium* was intended as the inaugural volume of the book series "Symposion", but there were delays due to financial difficulties even prior to the publication of the first title. It should be mentioned that Staff, editor-in-chief of the series, had been Witwicki's friend since their university years, for both had participated in the activities of the Academic Reading Hall (Czytelnia Akademicka)

fore the outcome of an internal impulse resulting from his delight over the *Symposium*. Years later, in a letter to Twardowski (May 20th, 1922) Witwicki recalled that his first reading of the *Gorgias* had taken place in Leipzig (Jadcza, 1997: 34). The reading of the *Symposium* during the first scientific meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society, as Dąbbska noted, took place on February 24th, 1904 (Jadcza, 1999: 32). Yet it was only after the first and second editions of the *Symposium* had been sold out and the *Phaedrus* and subsequent dialogues had been completed that, "Twardowski laid his hand on the young scholar's shoulder and said: »You should present Poland with the whole of Plato«" (Jeżewska, 1957: 6–7). According to A. Nowicki's memoirs, Witwicki was to say that L. Staff had outright ordered the translation of the *Symposium* (Nowicki, 1983: 100), and this was believed to have happened immediately after the memorable presentation which was attended by Staff (Skurjat, 1997: 154–155). The fact that Wilhelm Wundt, whom Witwicki met in Leipzig, was quite well versed in studies on Plato and was aware of Lutosławski's findings (Morstin, 1957: 53), may also have had some significance.

513 "U polskiego tłumacza Platona", 1926.

514 Jeżewska, 1957a: 6. The report from this meeting that was published in the *Philosophical Review* (*Przegląd Filozoficzny*) was brief and dry and did not render the emotions of the audience ("Z posiedzeń", 1904). T. Rzepa regarded this public reading in 1904 as the 'official' inauguration of Witwicki's affair with Plato, whereas the earlier meetings with Plato, in the gymnasium or during Witwicki's stay in Leipzig, were 'unofficial' (Rzepa, 1991: 99).

515 Cf.: Parandowski, 1974: 482; Wallis, 1975: 17.

and its literary and philosophical societies, with Twardowski as President of the latter.⁵¹⁶

In order to understand the background against which Witwicki's translations began to appear in print, it is necessary to understand something of the editorial guidelines for the whole series. It was not a philosophical series, nor did it intend to publish only the works of ancient masters. The intentions and goals of the series were outlined in an extensive prospectus, some important passages of which are quoted below to shed light on the literary and broadly cultural context in which the *Symposium* appeared: "The library of »Symposion«, named after a symbol of Hellenic culture borrowed from the title of Plato's work, will encompass, in a number of volumes, a selection of writings by leading authors and pioneers of European culture, providing artistic translations and skilful selections of essential excerpts from the immortal masterpieces of antiquity, the Renaissance, the age of humanism, the Enlightenment and contemporary times. The task of the »Symposion« library is to act as a mediator in lively and close communion between its broad spectrum of readers and the world of lofty, bold and elevated ideas that constitute the vital substance and foundations of modern mentality."⁵¹⁷ The aim of the series, then, was to promote works by important authors. According to an announcement on the pages of the first title in the series, subsequent authors were to include Montaigne, Leopardi, Diderot and Goethe, whose works were to be presented to readers in translations that would enable them to assimilate the ideological content. It was further declared that the works that were to be selected were those that were of the greatest significance in the authors' legacy and that had exerted the greatest impact on posterity. It was explicitly stated that the series had no academic ambitions: "»Symposion« library is not a publisher devoted to research philosophy in the strict sense of the term, and theoretical, intellectual systems are not within its scope."⁵¹⁸ The quality of the translations of the selected works was a substantial issue and was referred to, along with Plato's *Symposium* and ancient culture in general, in the conclusion of the prospectus: "»Symposion« library does not intend to satisfy purely intellectual interests, [...] its purpose is, through translations entrusted to *first-class literary professionals*, to facilitate access to those works that appeal to the mind, heart and senses of its readers, and to

516 Staff, 1966: 105–106 (letter 58 of Jan. 4th, 1908 to Ostap Ortwin); cf.: Maciejewska, 1965: 13–15, 57–62; Nowicki, 1982: 15–16.

517 Quoted after: Staff, 1966: 118.

518 Quoted after: Staff, 1966: 118.

those in whom a more and more perceptible *perfect ideal of the complete human being* is gradually taking shape from one century to another.”⁵¹⁹

The *Symposium* in Witwicki’s translation was to meet all the above literary and ethical requirements of the “Symposion” series. The outcome of his efforts was to be primarily a literary and artistic piece that would appeal to a broad spectrum of readers. The aim was to raise general knowledge of the literary classics and to highlight the ethical ideals that, according to the neo-Hellenistic models, should be sought for in antiquity. Witwicki’s inspiration for his Plato translations should therefore be seen in his urge to satisfy the literary and, even more, the cultural needs of Polish audiences rather than the need to provide access to philosophical matters, which were, in this case, of secondary importance. On account of their literary character, the translations that Witwicki published in the early years of the 20th century may be considered as part of the trend to produce translations within the Young Poland movement, such as the numerous Polish editions of F. Nietzsche’s works that appeared at that time, including those rendered by Staff. Translation was regarded as “a duty towards national culture, an achievement equal to original production because of the special dispositions and skills it required.”⁵²⁰

The *Symposium* as the inauguration of his work as a translator

Since the book series edited by Staff and Witwicki’s work as a translator both commenced with the *Symposium*, this dialogue is of particular importance in understanding Witwicki’s work in its entirety. It is worth taking a closer look at the introduction to this dialogue, though it is very well-known, as are Witwicki’s introductions and commentaries to other dialogues. It opens with a declaration that can be regarded as the translator’s methodological *credo*, to which he remained faithful during his long career as a translator: “It is impossible to read Plato’s »Symposium« with benefit and pleasure without prior knowledge, or at least a general outline, of the history of the intellectual movement that provides a background to the emergence of this work; it is impossible to extract much from this work and enjoy all its charms without at least a nodding acquaintance with the people who speak in it, the community to which they belong, the relations

519 Staff, 1966: 119.

520 Hutnikiewicz, 1997: 391.

that connect them.”⁵²¹ Witwicki explicitly described the addressees of his work: “I am not concerned here with philologists, who have the Greek text available to them, but with intelligent people who are interested in ancient life, though philology is alien to them.”⁵²²

The introduction to the dialogue sets out to “sketch the psychological profiles of the main character in the Symposium, Socrates, and the author, Plato.”⁵²³ The exceptional figure of the young Socrates was depicted by Witwicki as follows: “a hefty lad with a huge head, bulging eyes, and a hoof-like nose over thick lips. He was not pretty, but as healthy as a young centaur and nothing could harm him. Talented and intelligent beyond his years, and a bit of a smart alec.”⁵²⁴ Socrates was an individual who went his own way, not caring about his reputation. He was a difficult participant in discussions, for he felt superior to those around him and devoted himself to self-improvement, which could be seen in his constant questioning of matters of religion and ethics that were mindlessly taken for granted by others. Witwicki imagined one of Socrates’ internal monologues, in which he opposed relativism and defended ethical intellectualism: “you are all stupid and not worth much, despite your libraries, fine garments, and your influence on the debating crowd. Sometimes you can argue for hours but cannot come to any agreement or understanding, for one of you uses a word in one meaning, while another uses the same word with a completely different meaning. You must establish the meanings of words: agree once and for all what »good« means, what »courageous« means, what »just« means, what »pious« means, what »beauty« means, what »elo-cution« means, and you will see at once that everything will cease to »be in flux«, an agreement will be reached at once, and it will be seen that not all of you are right and wise, but only the one who knows and can define and grasp the meanings of words. This is what reason is all about. This is what human value means. People are bad not because of ill-will – this is what he thought while looking indulgently at the spruced up crooks and usurers – but they are bad because of their foolishness.”⁵²⁵

521 Witwicki, 1909: 1; *cf.*: Jeżewska, 1948: 459.

522 Witwicki, 1909: 39.

523 Witwicki, 1909: 38.

524 Witwicki, 1909: 14. On the descriptions of Socrates’ appearance as an application of the principles of psychoanalysis, interpreting Socrates’ interest in the intellectual world as compensation for his physical shortcomings, *cf.*: Rzepa, 2002: 94–97.

525 Witwicki, 1909: 18–19. T. Rzepa regards Witwicki’s psychological reconstruction of Socrates’ personality as the first psychobiography ever (Rzepa, 1991: 73–

The psychological portrait of young Plato went as follows: "He was like a delicate plant that was sensitive to all too rough touch. Hence, strange yearnings and sorrows came over him from time to time: a need to weep on someone's breast, a desire for invisible, lofty things, dreams of better worlds or of more perfect people, who differed from those loud-mouthed politicians in Athens."⁵²⁶ The longings of this sensitive young man were to be fulfilled by his encounter with Socrates. Witwicki thought it likely that the victories Socrates had won in the disputes he conducted in dialogues such as the *Euthyphro* and the *Gorgias* must have made a deep impression on the young Plato. This suggests that the translator believed that the discussions rendered in these dialogues had in fact taken place, or at least an approximate version of them. Likewise, he treated the *Symposium*, at least to some extent, as historical truth. Witwicki argued that Plato could not bear the thought that Socrates might fade into oblivion and therefore he used his artistic talents to immortalise his master. For Witwicki, the graphic image of Socrates depicted in the early dialogues was essentially consistent with historical truth, but even if Plato's Socrates had been no more than a figment of the imagination, such a fictitious character would still have been worth studying.

Witwicki supposed that Plato's conversations with Socrates may have been the impulse for the creation of the theory of ideas, but the theory itself was Plato's original concept. "Plato almost *saw* beauty, almost touched it, he sensed that it *existed*, and it *existed* to a greater extent than sensory and transitory objects. He felt that he dwelt in a better, higher, eternal and abstract world, and that he almost communed with eternal, abstract beings that could neither be grasped by hand nor glimpsed by mortal eyes."⁵²⁷ Initially, then, the ideas were just vague intuitions because they had their origin in Plato's mystical raptures, with ideas as their object.

74), and "the most »finished« outcome produced as a result of implementing the method of psychological interpretation" (Rzepa, 2002: 81). Witwicki drew up this psychobiography, despite the fact that he himself claimed that "one should not submit to interpretation the work produced by those people towards whom we hold clearly negative or positive emotional attitudes" (Rzepa, 1991: 95), and it is beyond doubt that he was not emotionally indifferent to Socrates. Producing psychological biographies was considered by Jan Woleński to be the most important application of Witwicki's psychological method (Woleński, 1999: 148).

526 Witwicki, 1909: 30.

527 Witwicki, 1909: 34. "Witwicki searched for the genesis of the theory of ideas in the non-logical states of Plato's soul" (Skurjat, 1997: 159).

While describing the background to the *Symposium*, Witwicki indirectly provided the reader with critical remarks about his contemporary times, and this type of criticism was to become the hallmark of his commentaries to the dialogues, including those published after World War II. For example, he describes the guests of Agathon, who were not interested in watching dancers or listening to flutists, "because such »Variété« was neither suitable entertainment for civilised people nor in good taste. In the company of more intelligent guests, and of course, those were not too numerous then as now, they preferred to amuse themselves with conversation over a goblet of wine."⁵²⁸

The structure of the whole book, the entire edition of the *Symposium*, was intended to reflect the order in which the readers should familiarise themselves with the text. Witwicki put particular emphasis on this apparent banality. The concluding comments were to be read after the dialogue itself, not instead of it as a summary. Moreover, Witwicki stressed that his comments were not intended to be of use to classics scholars. In his evaluation of the whole dialogue, Witwicki wrote: "the structure of the Symposium must be given musical terms,"⁵²⁹ for he considered this dialogue to be primarily an artistic and literary work that was not composed of parts, but of three acts, an intermezza and an ending. He extracted the layers of irony from the *Symposium* and attempted to tone down the sensitive moral issues: "In keeping with our contemporary relations and feelings, let's just replace the concept of a »young boy« with that of a »young woman« [...] in the speech and thoughts of Pausanias, and then this speech will reflect the creed of modern civilised people with regard to these matters."⁵³⁰ Witwicki also attempted to bring the persons of the dialogues closer to Poles by comparing them to well-known figures in Polish cultural tradition. For example, when describing Alcibiades, he wrote: "there was something of Kmicic in him, only in a different age when there were different relations, in a different culture."⁵³¹

528 Witwicki, 1909: 42.

529 Witwicki, 1909a: 131.

530 Witwicki, 1909a: 141. Witwicki, justifying Socrates to his readers, wrote elsewhere: "If it is difficult for us to identify with the homosexual atmosphere of the company that we see here, we should imagine that Charmides is a girl, full of charm in figure and behaviour, and then the experiences and relationships described here will become understandable" (Witwicki, 1937a: 65).

531 Witwicki, 1909a: 154. Kmicic was a fictional character in the *Trilogy* by Henryk Sienkiewicz. He appeared to be a man of contradictions, being patriotic and heroic, yet unpredictable and dangerous. He underwent a transformation, at

The *Symposium* was for Witwicki, above all, a psychological portrait, in which a multitude of characters was rendered in first-rate literary form. He did not consider the central question of the dialogue to be the theory of ideas itself, but rather the origins of the theory. On the one hand, it was composed of Socrates' reflections, on the other, Plato's personal experiences. Witwicki did not avoid making references to his own contemporary times and emphasised the topicality of the issues and of Plato's thoughts in the *Symposium*.

The first edition of the *Symposium* was out of print within a few months, and when the second edition appeared in the following year, it enjoyed similar success. Some years later, with his characteristic self-irony, Witwicki explained the reasons for this success: "The booksellers say that pious and indecent books sell best, and the »Symposium« had as its subtitle »Dialogue about Love«, and also it was not expensive."⁵³² The success of the dialogue was not a joke, and as Jan Parandowski discovered to his cost, it was no laughing matter either, for when in 1919 he searched for a copy of this dialogue, he could not find one in any of the bookshops in Lvov. Eventually he managed to find a single copy in an antiquarian bookstore but at such an astronomical price that he was forced to use a library copy, about which he wrote: "the degree of wear and tear spoke meaningfully of the number of people that had had it in their hands."⁵³³ When the third edition of the *Symposium* was published in 1921, its success could be explained not only because of the beautiful and faithful rendering by the translator, but also on account of the increasing enthusiasm for antiquity as a close spiritual source of contemporary culture.⁵³⁴

Although Adam Zieleńczyk (1880–1943) did not directly refer to the then freshly printed edition of the *Symposium* in his paper, *On Platonic Love*, it is clear both from the subject and his approach to the subject that there is some relation between his text and Witwicki's work. The paper may provide evidence of some exchange of views between Zieleńczyk and Witwicki, for they were both students of Wilhelm Wundt. The subject and the time of the publication do not appear to have been purely a matter of coincidence. The passages referred to from the *Symposium*, or *Biesiada*, as Zieleńczyk traditionally referred to the dialogue, did not come from the

first considered to be a traitor, he eventually became a hero; depicted as a typical representative of the Polish nobility of the 17th century.

532 "U polskiego tłumacza Platona", 1926.

533 Parandowski, 1960a: 114.

534 Seliga, 1924: 275.

latest translation. Assuming that the contents of the dialogue were generally well-known, Zielenćzyk started his paper by expressing his belief in the great value of the psychological method for resolving the issue of intellectual property concerning the thoughts that Socrates expressed in Plato's *Symposium*. Philological studies could not determine their Socratic or Platonic provenance: "One has to identify with these ancient persons, think, progress and suffer with them, and only then try to develop a view on Socrates and Plato as human beings on the basis of the general psychological motives guiding the lives of individuals both in the past and in the present."⁵³⁵ Thus, at a time when the publication of Witwicki's *Symposium* was hot off the press, Zielenćzyk was already suggesting psychological research on the texts of the dialogues as a method of discovering historical truth about philosophers.

A response to the translation of the *Symposium* from literary circles came in the form of an essay, *Platonic Love*, by Bolesław Leśmian (1877–1937), who expressed his appreciation of Witwicki's work. He summarised the general level of knowledge of Platonism as follows: "Every more or less educated person knows that Plato once taught us about the »eternal ideas«. These abstract notions, instead of creating emptiness, fill with eternal substance and make concrete the essence of the universe, whose species and genre are thus characterised by reality and indestructability."⁵³⁶ Remarks on Witwicki's work were expressed by Leśmian, to some degree, incidentally. He regarded the introduction to be 'beautiful in style,' while the translation was assessed as follows: "Witwicki in his perfect translation preserved all the pure gold of the original and even managed to reflect the magic simplicity and naiveté of the Greek syntax."⁵³⁷

The Lvov series of translations

In 1917, almost a decade after the *Symposium*, another dialogue translated by Witwicki was ready to be published.⁵³⁸ It was another literary masterpiece, in which significant issues of Platonism were raised, though they

535 Zielenćzyk, 1909: 63. This paper was actually published in 1909, but it was signed in March 1908 (Zielenćzyk, 1909: 74), as if Zielenćzyk especially wanted to emphasise the priority of his text over Witwicki's work.

536 Leśmian, 1959a: 426.

537 Leśmian, 1959a: 431.

538 Jeżewska, 1958: 5. The division into the "Lvov series" and the "Warsaw series" was borrowed from the paper by Tadeusz Kobierzycki (1999: 45). Indeed,

were somehow voiced on the margins of the main thread of the conversation. The dialogue in question was the *Phaedrus*, which had probably been prepared by Witwicki for the “Symposion”, but ultimately it was not included in the series. The translator decided to enrich the dialogue artistically with his own sketches, depicting scenes from the dialogue or from Socrates’ tales (e.g. about the chariot and the steeds). Such drawings were to become a permanent addition to Witwicki’s editions of Plato.⁵³⁹ It was clear from the drawings and the fact that some of the copies of the book were printed on exclusive handmade paper imported from Japan that this edition was not intended as a book for academic or gymnasium use, but rather as an adornment for home libraries. Although Witwicki’s inspiration for his first translation of Plato may have had its origin elsewhere, it was the influence of Twardowski, as Witwicki recalled years later, that had convinced him to continue his work on Plato and to translate the *Phaedrus*.⁵⁴⁰ This suggests that Twardowski must have had some knowledge of the disputes provoked by this dialogue, probably because he had kept up to date with his knowledge of historical and philosophical issues regarding Plato through his correspondence with, for instance, W. Lutosławski.⁵⁴¹

Witwicki described the title character of the dialogue with an irony worthy of Socrates: “he is essentially a good boy: he is quick to agree and most frequently he gets the impression that the last speaker was the one who spoke best. When left alone to examine his conscience, he feels a hopeless emptiness in his mind and soul, for actually, he does not really understand anything about those things that the others are engaged in professional-

Witwicki’s translations before World War II consisted of two series separated by a long break. It should be noted, however, that Lvov was indicated as the place of publication only for the first two dialogues (the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*), while all the other dialogues included in the Lvov series bore Lvov–Warsaw as their place of publication. It also seems that the *Symposium* occupies such a special position in Plato’s legacy and among Witwicki’s translations that it can be treated separately.

539 It should be noted that the first edition of the *Symposium* was published in a different graphic design from that of the *Phaedrus*; it was not enriched with sketches, contrary to claims formulated on the basis of subsequent editions (e.g. Rybowska, 1996: 164). Readers interested in a closer analysis of the sketches from Witwicki’s editions should consult the works of A. Nowicki: 1978a (the chapter of this book titled “Socrates on the paintings of Anselm Feuerbach and the drawings of Władysław Witwicki” is a modified and expanded version of the paper: Nowicki, 1977); 1983a: 522–530; 1983: 174–181; 1989.

540 “U polskiego tłumacza Platona”, 1926.

541 Cf.: Mróz, 2008d: 581.

ly.”⁵⁴² So, Phaedrus is naive and has little understanding of the subject, whereas with Socrates, it is quite the reverse: a self-conscious artist who “thinks clearly without ever tiring. He is a strange specimen: a born orator, an orator by nature, and although he did not study anywhere, he claims that all virtue can be learned.”⁵⁴³

The comments and annotations accompanying Witwicki's translations underwent significant transformation and evolution in the initial period of his work on Plato. While the comments to the *Symposium* consisted, in the most part, of unstructured comments which merely supplemented the introduction, in the case of the *Phaedrus* Witwicki applied a different procedure, which he consistently adhered to in his subsequent editions. This consisted in commenting on the dialogues chapter by chapter. His summaries of the central threads of the dialogue and his analyses of the argument rarely resembled the dispositions, or guidelines to the dialogues, that were prepared by teachers in Austrian gymnasiums at that time, for he did not shy away from personal comments or psychological implications. Given the fact that he recommended reading the dialogues aloud, it is not surprising that he saw the purpose of his commentaries, as he described it a few years later, as: “a script-like task: they attempt not only to explain the whole thing, but to provide the colours, tones and emphases of individual paragraphs.”⁵⁴⁴ This suggests that he treated his translations of the dialogues as stage works, prepared in cooperation with Plato.

It was against the setting of the countryside outside Athens that Socrates undertook to instruct Phaedrus, turning him away from the mere appearances of knowledge by guiding his interests in the direction of ethical and psychological research. The speech by Lysias and his views on love that are referred to in the dialogue were adapted by Witwicki to the realities of 20th century circumstances, and presented as a life maxim expressing indifference to love as the basis for choosing a spouse: “do not pick and choose for too long, suffice it that he is not a drunkard or a gambler; all this love business is just poetry!”⁵⁴⁵ This was not the only aspect of the topicality of the *Phaedrus*. Witwicki was concerned about the upbringing of young people in Poland at that time, and claimed that “if Plato were alive today and read

542 Witwicki, 1918: 20.

543 Witwicki, 1918: 21.

544 Witwicki, 1920a: 12. The second edition of this set of the dialogues (Plato, 1923) was not noted in the bibliography prepared by Nowicki (1982: 132). The post-war edition (Plato, 1958a) is therefore the third edition, not the second.

545 Witwicki, 1918a: 135.

what was written about literature or visual arts, if he listened to the readings during Lent and glanced through the homework assigned to young people, he would publish the *Phaedrus* anew.”⁵⁴⁶ These words were rightly interpreted as Witwicki’s declaration of the enduring value of Plato’s work, which should not merely be subjected to one-sided philological or philosophical analyses, but read with the sensitivity of contemporary humanity.⁵⁴⁷

Based on Socrates’ speech in the dialogue, Witwicki attributed a kind of Voltairianism to Plato. The term appears to have had at least a double meaning here. On the one hand, through the words of Socrates, Plato illustrated that it was possible for substantial philosophical claims to be presented in impeccable literary form, reaching out to the truth with the aid of beautiful words. On the other hand, Plato articulated his scepticism about religion, which attempts to touch the untouchable and to investigate spheres that cannot be researched. Plato was critical of anthropomorphism in religion, but he tolerated it, for he believed that “the ethical good that is symbolised by the gods is not merely the illusion of an individual opinion or the result of relative, subjective judgment, but is something real.”⁵⁴⁸

For Witwicki, Plato’s proof of the immortality of the soul had not been intended by Plato to be fully established or taken too seriously, for he believed that Plato had avoided the fundamental error made by medieval and, in part, modern philosophy, which, as in the case of the Anselmian proof of the existence of God, erroneously accepted as knowledge what was, in fact, an expression of faith. Witwicki assessed the considerations in the *Phaedrus* as ‘epistemological poetry’, whose form did not take away from their philosophical value. Underlying Plato’s use of the language of poetry, allegories and metaphors, abstract knowledge was concealed. Plato’s metaphors were not the knowledge itself, yet they reflected more insightful considerations.

Another important topic of the dialogue was the question of words, speech, and writing for dealing with political and ethical issues. Witwicki argued that Plato had much in common with the Sophists, whom he partly vindicated by separating the wheat from the chaff.⁵⁴⁹ What distinguished Plato from the Sophists was his agenda for true rhetoric, created to

546 Witwicki, 1918a: 138.

547 Parandowski, 1960a: 118.

548 Witwicki, 1918a: 183.

549 Cf.: Skurjat, 1997: 161.

guide the soul. In this programme, apart from highlighting the importance of the natural sciences, dialectical skills and inborn talent, the emphasis on psychological education was considered by the translator to be of particular relevance. Even more valid and appealing for Witwicki was the need for self-improvement, and of friendship based on mutual encouragement on the path to self-perfection.

There is no doubt that Plato was a talented writer. In his reflections on the epilogue to the dialogue, Witwicki clearly understood the dilemmas of a writer who was completing his work and releasing it into the world. Let us quote a longer passage: "we are witnessing the moment when Plato has completed the *Phaedrus*. We can almost feel his pulse. The scroll of papyrus lies before him, strewn with rows of black, Greek letters. They start to appear to him like seeds, in which he has bequeathed something of his own soul; he does not want to, nor can he, lock his soul up in these seeds. He regrets letting go of the scroll, which is filled with personal keepsakes and incomplete arguments, with dreams, memories, laughter, bile, with all the traces of a rich inner life. He can see it in the hands of a dull, distant reader, can hear the pedantic words of future critics, in the face of whom his beloved child will be silent, defenceless, and mute. He sees as in a bad dream, how this scroll filled with writing will be copied and will roll down to those for whom it is necessary and those for whom it is not, thus giving rise to more and more new miscomprehensions. He regrets throwing it to the blunt teeth of an incompetent crowd."⁵⁵⁰ Witwicki must have sympathised with the feelings that Plato expressed here, and it must have been for this reason that no traces of the dispute concerning the chronological position of the *Phaedrus* can be found in his work, for he considered the philological aspect of this dispute in particular to be an expression of dull and pedantic criticism.

Witwicki sent out the copies of the dialogues to his teachers, for example to Twardowski, and also to former students, like Parandowski. The latter, having just read the *Phaedrus*, was enthusiastic about the translation method applied by his former teacher. He wrote: "In Witwicki's rendering Plato is alive today and he speaks to us in a language that is intelligible to us, full of strength, flexibility and vital fluid."⁵⁵¹ Schleiermacher's translations seemed somewhat lame in comparison to such work.

Polish audiences did not have to wait long for subsequent translations and commentaries, and according to personal records, younger readers ea-

⁵⁵⁰ Witwicki, 1918a: 183–184.

⁵⁵¹ Parandowski, 1960a: 118.

gerly awaited subsequent volumes of Witwicki's Plato translations.⁵⁵² In 1920, a volume was published containing three of the most willingly and frequently read dialogues, the *Euthyphro*, *Apology* and the *Crito*, which were also used as texts for teaching Greek. Each of the dialogues was supplemented with an introduction and a commentary following the now well-known formula that had first been tried out in the *Phaedrus*.

With the appearance of the *Euthyphro*, Witwicki, like many other commentators, took the opportunity to direct some scathing remarks at the title character of the dialogue: "He is so naive that he takes quite literally, as dogmas, all the legends and parables about the gods that were treated as fantasy by all the more intelligent Greeks of the time. He is so dull that he cannot see the difficulties and nonsense that would result from his official religion if he could only give it a thought. He is so crude and coarse, and devoid of the *natural* finer feelings of what is right and wrong, that he even takes his own father to court."⁵⁵³

Euthyphro was a good example of a fanatic, whose views were based on ignorance, and at the same time he was a typical representative of the standards of the general public. Witwicki must have judged many of his contemporaries in a similar vein, for he encountered such examples of superficial religiosity. He remembered religious education in his gymnasium years as rote learning of formulas which were sometimes contradictory to or incompatible with the experience and considerations of young people who were at that time beginning to develop their own views. These young people were, however, effectively deterred from questioning dogmas under threat of exclusion from school. It was against this background that Witwicki first encountered the *Euthyphro*, as he later recalled: "It fell into my hands, as a compulsory text at school, this discussion about piety between Socrates and a priest, and Socrates' defence when he appeared in court on charges of impiety. The vivid language, the real, live people who speak and have faces and gestures, though they have to be dug out from the pages of a dictionary. Still, it was worth it. That was when Plato got to me for the first time."⁵⁵⁴ In this opinion Witwicki may have been expressing his disappointment with religion, or at least the superficial religiosity that had been inculcated in him since childhood, which focused on the false appearances of piety. In his mature years he depicted this in his answers to an opinion survey on the loss of religious belief. The *Euthyphro*

552 Rzepa, 1991: 205.

553 Witwicki, 1920a: 5–6.

554 "U polskiego tłumacza Platona", 1926.

proved to be one of the incentives for him to produce a secular ethics, independent of religion.⁵⁵⁵

Witwicki considered this dialogue to be one of the simplest, with commentaries and explanations being essentially redundant. The purpose of the dialogue was to reflect on religious and ethical issues, knowledge of which was to contribute to the moral improvement of citizens. While translating the *Euthyphro*, Witwicki must have been motivated by a similar goal to that of Plato when composing the dialogue, for the translator encouraged individual reflection: "While reading this book, which is over two thousand years old, it is worth making an attempt to transfer our attention from the text to contemporary times and to ask ourselves whether and to what extent it is different now. In some respects this dialogue has not lost its relevance today."⁵⁵⁶

In his introduction to the *Apology* Witwicki presented the commonly held image of Socrates. It was not positive, for "Socrates was not good at »living with people«, especially those who were stupid."⁵⁵⁷ It was his rational consistency and his disregard for what others thought of him that, together with political motives, was to result in his final indictment. The similarity between the deaths of Socrates and of Jesus did not escape Witwicki's attention. "Within the moral atmosphere of the time the initial words of Socrates glow with an unusual light. On the one hand, they reflect the naivety of an apolitical man, on the other, they are reminiscent of the scene of an investigation which took place 430 years later, between Jesus and Pilate. This was also a political trial on a charge of alleged impiety, and the defendant in this investigation also stood up for the truth. Both of them fell at their outposts."⁵⁵⁸

Witwicki believed that Plato's text largely reflected the course of authentic historical facts. Like S. Pawlicki before him, he assessed the credibility of Plato's depiction of the persons in the dialogues as follows: "This is not a photograph, but a portrait produced by an artist aspiring to realism."⁵⁵⁹ There is no doubt that Socrates' bitterness and his conviction of his superi-

555 Nowicki, 1980. Cf.: Skurjat, 1980: 21–22; Nowicki, 1982: 76–79; Jedynak, 1988: 36–37; Jadczyk, 1989: 193.

556 Witwicki, 1920a: 8.

557 Witwicki, 1920b: 71.

558 Witwicki, 1920c: 133–134. When discussing the *Crito*, Witwicki did not fail to remark that the apostles, and also Luther, had not hesitated to flee from or deceive their opponents to avoid unnecessary death. This differentiated them from Socrates (Witwicki, 1920e: 192; cf.: Skurjat, 1997: 158).

559 Witwicki, 1920b: 79.

ority and innocence were real. Any possible additions that Plato may have made to Socrates' speech were the result of his reverence for the words of his master.

The text of the *Apology* was preceded by Witwicki's introduction, but this time it was not a typical translator's preface to his interpretations, but a literary introduction which he called a 'prelude,' and which was intended to provide something which seemed to be missing from Plato's dialogue. Plato's text begins directly with the words delivered by Socrates after the absent speeches of the prosecutors. Witwicki described their conspiracy and the impression that the words of accusation must have made on the audience, and Socrates' reflection on them. The final sentences of this prelude introduce Socrates to the stage: "He begins to sense this well-planned intrigue; he sees that the audience is prejudiced against him. But now the time has come for him to speak; he stands up and begins."⁵⁶⁰ This prelude was unique in Witwicki's translation work. He took the liberty of including it not just out of the need to introduce the readers to Socrates' speech but more importantly out of a feeling of affinity for the Greek philosopher in his love of Truth and the courage to accept its consequences. In a letter to Kazimiera Jeżewska, Witwicki compared himself to Socrates, declaring: "Human beings should be ready to accept even the unpleasant consequences of their profound beliefs. I demand it from myself and from others to have the civil courage to proclaim the truth. This is what we are called on to do. During my gymnasium and university years I myself wrote, spoke and did things that I considered to be good and proper, even though I was fully aware of how much I could lose by doing so. And I accepted this loss without hesitation."⁵⁶¹

The *Crito* lacked the realism of the *Apology*, and in Witwicki's opinion the collection of all the arguments that might have been articulated by students and friends in favour of Socrates' escape from the prison was a mere figment of Plato's imagination. Socrates, despite his contempt for the judges, respected the sentence, which was a consequence of his own actions. Witwicki particularly emphasised this consequence and the drama of the whole situation: "He has gone too far and put too much effort into maintaining his lofty spiritual position; the only way out for him was death; he must grin and bear it with a semblance of equanimity."⁵⁶² His

560 Witwicki, 1920b: 83. At this moment Witwicki was speaking like a novelist (Rzeuska, 1969: 325–326).

561 Jeżewska, 1958a: 5–6.

562 Witwicki, 1920d: 156.

apparent reconciliation with the sentence was a consequence of the high standards he had set himself in the process of self-improvement: "He had succeeded to some extent in his work on self-perfection; but to succeed completely he had to cease to be human."⁵⁶³

The reaction of the reading public to this collection of three translations was positive, the more so because reading Witwicki's Socrates was a far cry from the torment they had experienced learning Greek at school. The expressiveness of Witwicki's language was emphasised: "From beneath the millennial dust a flesh-and-blood human being is revealed before our eyes and speaks in a way that is now clear and simple, now clever and colourful, sometimes even bawdy manner; this is not some pompous mummy that was poured out from the brain of an ossified and narrow-minded classicist."⁵⁶⁴ The Socrates that Witwicki dug out of the grammatical complexities of the Greek captivated readers who had been accustomed to see Plato as the author of material used in language teaching. This Plato was worth recommending as intellectual stimulus for young people. Even those philologists who had been criticised by Witwicki's enthusiasts had a high regard for his translations, with only minor reservations of a philological nature.⁵⁶⁵

The next dialogues translated by Witwicki were devoted to disputes between Socrates and the Sophists. The doubts that had been expressed concerning the genuine character of the *Hippias Minor* were not shared by the translator. For Witwicki, the dialogue provided an example of the kind of intellectual pranks that Socrates played on the sophist. Witwicki interpreted the dispute between Socrates and Hippias as Plato's internal struggle, evidence of which was to be found in the final phrases of the dialogue. The essence of this dispute can be boiled down to the following question: "Whom should I value more: an intelligent man who is always aware of what he is doing and why he is doing it, no matter what he does; or one who is unintelligent and irresponsible, who does not know what he is doing, no matter whether he is doing something wrong or bringing off something good. At its very core this question is not just a prank, nor is the answer just a joke, though it appears to be playful like the expression: It is better to lose something with the wise than to find it with the stupid."⁵⁶⁶ Among the convictions that Plato shared with the Sophists, was the vener-

⁵⁶³ Witwicki, 1920e: 185.

⁵⁶⁴ Machniewicz, 1920: 6.

⁵⁶⁵ Pluciński, 1923: 360–361.

⁵⁶⁶ Witwicki, 1921: 51–52.

ation of outstandingly talented personalities, yet Plato's system of values was definitely different, for it was rooted in transcendence. Nevertheless, as Witwicki repeatedly remarked, Plato did not present his belief in the existence of the ideas and in the immortality of the soul in a peremptory fashion that left no room for doubts.

For Witwicki, it was the fact that the question was raised about the firm foundation of ethics that made this dialogue topical. Referring to his own experience, he wrote: "then as now, ethics is most frequently based on myths and legends. This is, however, extremely fragile material that will not stand up to the questioning of open minds; it usually cracks and crumbles very early, as soon as people stop repeating mindlessly what has been crammed into their minds as children, and begin to really think about what they see and read. Then they are ethically out of their depths, and if they adhere to anything at all, it will be convention, public opinion, if there is any [...]. A great deal of pessimism emerges from the problem that there is no other foundation for moral principles but myth and legend for young children and gullible people."⁵⁶⁷ The *Hippias Minor* was to become a call for the audience to make an attempt to establish secular moral norms founded on 'social instinct.'

The *Hippias Major* did not make such demands. Hippias himself, and others like him, were necessary to Socrates "to provide him with material for reflection; they speak the same language as he does, but they cannot see the premises they use. And it may be that the truth lies entangled somewhere in these premises."⁵⁶⁸ Socrates' familiarity with Hippias, and even his mockery of the sophist, was absent from the *Hippias Minor*, and this allowed Witwicki to suppose that the *Hippias Major* had been composed as the second of the two dialogues,⁵⁶⁹ although there were no indications in the text that could permit him to draw firm chronological conclusions. The reservations about the authenticity of this dialogue did not seem convincing to Witwicki, and after all, it was not the authorship, but the value

567 Witwicki, 1921: 58–59; cf.: Jadczak, 1989: 197.

568 Witwicki, 1921a: 143.

569 K. Skurjat argued that this reasoning was evidence that Witwicki applied psychological analyses to determine the chronology of the dialogues (Skurjat, 1997: 162). It seems, however, that this was a one-off or marginal measure rather than his usual practice.

of the work that was of paramount importance,⁵⁷⁰ and it was in both *Hippiases* that Plato attempted to settle accounts with the Sophists.

This edition of the three dialogues, that is, both *Hippiases* and the *Ion*, was again received enthusiastically by J. Parandowski. He highlighted Witwicki's ability to extract every smile and gesture from under the dead tangle of letters, "and here I have a living human in front of me, instead of a book."⁵⁷¹ The fact that these dialogues did not belong to the main core of Plato's philosophical legacy did not diminish his pleasure in reading them, for here, Plato transformed himself into a Molière-like satirist. In a similar vein, Parandowski concluded his review with a hint of his own irony by remarking that, while it would be appropriate to include a conventional platitude about Witwicki's great merit, courtesy and literary conventions must recede into the background in view of what the reviewer regarded as the most important achievement of the translator, namely his ability to stimulate his audience, including the reviewer himself, to independent thinking.

Not all the readers shared the unmitigated enthusiasm of Parandowski's assessments. Artur Rapaport, a philologist, teacher and editor of original Greek texts of the dialogues intended as teaching aids, wrote an extensive and collective review of all Witwicki's available Plato translations, excluding the *Symposium*, which was the only dialogue not published by the Książnica-Atlas publishing house. Rapaport, who published his works there too, differed from Witwicki in that that he valued Xenophon's image of Socrates more than Plato's rendering of his master.

The eight dialogues published by Witwicki represented a serious literary achievement that could be treated together for the purposes of the review. Rapaport was quite well versed in Polish translation, enabling him to make comparisons with other translations, so he was not surprised by the success of Witwicki's books and their subsequent reprints. Among their disadvantages he listed the lack of Stephani pagination and the absence of information concerning the original edition that had been used by the translator. Another problem concerned the introductions and commentaries, which, according to Rapaport, were not suitably academic, but merely of a popular nature, which suggested that Witwicki had not taken his work seriously. One particularly glaring deficiency noted by Rapaport

570 "Even if the Hippias Major was not genuine, its author must have fully absorbed the Socrates of the Symposium, and borrowed some writing skills from Plato" (Witwicki, 1921a: 143).

571 Parandowski, 1960b: 123.

was the absence of any academic discussion of the historical character of the *Apology*, as well as the departure from the typical format of gymnasium commentaries, the so-called ‘dispositions’ of the dialogues, which was especially important for Rapaport as a teacher.

Nevertheless, the *Phaedrus* in Rapaport’s review met with nothing but praise. The publication of a second edition provided evidence of the need to continue the work of popularising classical philology and our heritage from ancient civilizations, especially in the splendid form reproduced by Witwicki. Rapaport wrote: “Witwicki works on the assumption that it is possible to preserve the Greek atmosphere and the character of Plato’s literary talent without violating the Polish language [...]. Moreover, the translator not only provides us with the opportunity to experience those feelings that have hitherto been reserved exclusively for those who read Greek, and very few of those, but he also guides us to the land of Plato’s thought.”⁵⁷² Thanks to Witwicki’s work, philologists could enhance their knowledge of Plato’s philosophy and philosophy in general, while philosophers could discover his artistic, comic and dramatic skills.

The dialogues that Witwicki translated next were philosophically more weighty. The *Gorgias*, published a year after both *Hippiases*, was said by Witwicki, quoting Wilamowitz, to have been composed during the lifetime of its title sophist and no later than during the ten years following the death of Socrates. The image of Gorgias presented in this dialogue did not seem to the translator to be a faithful representation of this sophist, being used by Plato to expound the views of the majority, as well as being “useful to take the second voice to Socrates in his song about an ideal orator who knows what is good and what is bad and consequently does not want to do anything wrong.”⁵⁷³ But what was most important in the dialogue was that “regardless of whether readers finally agreed or disagreed with the author, they should at any rate admit that Plato had perturbed them with this book and forced them to think. It was this that was at stake, more than the letters of the text.”⁵⁷⁴

Witwicki treated the debate on rhetoric, the main topic of the dialogue, as Plato’s reckoning with the youthful dreams that he had finally renounced after the death of Socrates. Of greatest relevance for the translator, however, were the ethical issues: “a battle is being fought between two opposing views of life and its value, of good and evil, and to this day nei-

572 Rapaport, 1922: 227.

573 Witwicki, 1922a: 163–164.

574 Witwicki, 1922a: 224.

ther of the two contradictory positions has waned. Hence, Socrates' discussions with the people of »this world«, will be listened to attentively and it will not be possible for anyone who is engaged in developing their own views on the values of life and pursuing truth in this field to avoid becoming personally engaged.”⁵⁷⁵ Socrates was, then, a man who was not of this world, an idealised model of the true philosopher, and it is possible that Witwicki felt himself to be his Polish disciple.

The attitudes to life that Socrates' interlocutors represented have remained topical, particularly because of Plato's frank and vivid portrayal of these characters. Plato was able to achieve this not only because he had observed such discussions but also, in Witwicki's view, because of the inner struggle taking place in his own soul, for “he carried within himself both Socrates' opponent and his own.”⁵⁷⁶ The most dangerous opponent in the *Gorgias* was not, however, Gorgias himself but Callicles, whose words were to become engraved on the minds of future readers, including, according to Witwicki, even Nietzsche. Witwicki himself may have been influenced by Callicles' views, leading him “to reflect on the broadly defined struggle to predominate over one's environment and on the factors conditioning such domination, as well as its effects.”⁵⁷⁷

575 Witwicki, 1922: 3.

576 Witwicki, 1922: 4. Witwicki's overemphasis on the possibility that Plato's views were expressed in the dialogues by opponents of Socrates and by other characters was criticised by B. Woyczyński (2000: 16, footnote 33).

577 Rzepa, 1990: 222. Nowicki (1982: 72) also drew attention to Callicles as an inspiration for Witwicki's theory of 'cratism' (kratyzm). Witwicki himself mentioned Plato, Hobbes and Nietzsche among the sources for his theory (cf.: Rzepa, 1991: 70–71). Having examined the links between Witwicki's theory of cratism and Plato, Rzepa claims: “the above presentation of some elements of the theory of cratism in Witwicki's considerations on ambition clearly indicates their profound relation to Plato's thought” (1990: 224), and to the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* in particular. It seems, however, that it would be more precise to say that there are links between this theory and the texts of the dialogues, but not necessarily with Plato's philosophy, because not all the opinions voiced by the characters in the dialogues were Plato's beliefs. The position represented by Callicles, as was emphasised by Witwicki, was subject to criticism from Plato, though he did not consider it to be groundless. It should also be remarked that Witwicki's work on his translation of the *Republic* started decades after his dissertation on ambition was composed (1907), whereas he had read the *Gorgias* before his doctorate. There are, perhaps, unquestionable similarities between some views from the pages of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* and Witwicki's thought, but the *Republic* could not have been a direct inspiration for his theory. Let us mention in passing that his theory was not in any way inspired by the psychology of the Lvov school or Twardowski (Rzepa, 1998: 54–55, 88).

Of particular importance and current relevance for Witwicki was Socrates' criticism of the role of rhetoricians, or politicians in general, in a democratic system; being ignorant themselves, they attempted to guide similarly ignorant people. As Witwicki aptly puts it: "It is a case of the blind leading the blind. It is this, and nothing else, that is demonstrated by Socrates. In these political gatherings, one cunning and shameless fool is exerting an influence on a crowd of naive fools. And yet, to the great misfortune of all, such people are endowed with power, though the only prerequisite for such positions of power should be knowledge. An accurate accusation [...]. And not at all outdated."⁵⁷⁸

Witwicki's harsh criticism spared no-one, not even Plato. For example, he embarked on criticism of the reasoning used by Socrates when he attempted to convince Polus that when a dictator does harm to others, he is not doing what he wants to do (468c–469b). Witwicki wrote: "There is some kind of hokus pokus going on here: why this sudden impotence among all bad people? What is it that paralyses them so much? Perhaps it is some kind of logical draught; for unnoticed, the author has opened the window to fantasies and he is looking through it at the other world."⁵⁷⁹ Witwicki felt that perhaps his criticism of Plato had gone too far, for in a letter to Twardowski he wrote: "I am glad that the Gorgias and the commentaries speak with my voice, but there is a shadow of doubt in my mind about my comments on Socrates. Wasn't I talking nonsense when I accused him of logical inaccuracies?"⁵⁸⁰ This anxiety may have resulted from the fact that Witwicki was greatly under the influence of Socrates, who was always presented in Witwicki's commentaries as a kind of timeless and eternal being. When, for example, he condemns violence, it is because he "is reminded of his own death only too well."⁵⁸¹ Although Socrates drank the hemlock, he continues to debate with the Sophists in the land of shadows that he described in the *Apology* and in the *Phaedo*.

578 Witwicki, 1922a: 170. The literal translation of the proverb, which opens this quote would be the following: "Martin was taught by Martin who was himself stupid as a swine".

579 Witwicki, 1922a: 182; cf. Skurjat, 1997: 159–160.

580 Jadczak, 1997: 34. Some years later, however, despite these doubts, Witwicki put down in a letter to Dąmbaska the following declaration: "I reveal myself completely in the commentaries, for let Plato's lustre reverberate from all of me with my head and heart. I judge, I look not only at what he said and how he said it, but I also look at whether he was right or not, and whether I enjoy it or not" (Dąmbaska, 1949: 268).

581 Witwicki, 1922a: 182.

When Polus was defeated in his discussion with Socrates, Witwicki suggested several possible ways of withdrawing from the apparent acceptance of Socrates' conclusions; apparent acceptance, for Polus "is not a man who has been convinced, but a man who has been surprised and driven into a corner."⁵⁸² Witwicki considered it peculiar that Socrates-Plato draws the conclusion that being subjected to just punishment is beautiful and good, for though unpleasant, it is useful (476e–477a). He comments on this as follows: "After all, no human eye will ever be able to see this benefit, this good, that is said to lie in a cruel death or punishment by mutilation, even though it has been prescribed by some law, and is therefore apparently just."⁵⁸³

Fortunately Witwicki was always mindful of Plato's sense of humour. Otherwise, he would have been unable to accept Socrates' argument that it is necessary to voluntarily seek punishment for one's own good and the good of one's beloved, and as a consequence, no punishment should be sought for injustice caused by one's enemies (480a–481b). Since punishment was the cure for the disease, administering punishment was equivalent to doing good. The consequences of this view could only be interpreted with a modicum of humour: "the words of this chapter may have been responsible for lighting the fire under the feet of heretics or »sorcerers« at the stake, but only at the hands of those who had forgotten how to smile and could not see the serene smile on Plato's face."⁵⁸⁴

In the dispute between Socrates and Callicles, an expert on social relations, Witwicki's attention was particularly drawn to the fragment in which the philosopher argued that since good and evil are contradictory terms, then they cannot both be attributed to one person at the same time. The case of suffering and pleasure was different, for the latter cannot always be identified with good (495c–497a). Witwicki rejected the argument that good and evil could not be found in one person at the same time, as well as Socrates' subsequent reasoning. He accused Plato of hypostasing concepts, that is, ascribing them substantial existence, but here he felt the need to justify himself by referring to another authority, who was much closer to him, for he wrote to Twardowski: "Plato's Socrates frequently takes words for things or features, or in other words, he believes that wherever there are two words, there are two objects, and where there is a new word, there is a new thing (perhaps only a »categorematic word«). I can

582 Witwicki, 1922a: 189.

583 Witwicki, 1922a: 190.

584 Witwicki, 1922a: 190.

agree with him that where there is a categorematic word, there is also a meaning, some *essentia*, *aliquid*, something – yet not necessarily: *existens*, a real object! You probably cannot remember this, but once, in your ante-room on Gołębia Street while putting on your coat, you taught me how to make this distinction. It definitely seems to me that in the *Gorgias* Socrates got led astray with the issue »good is not: pleasure« though it sounds very impressive in his words [...]. [...] it seems to me that Socrates was mistaken. Plato tends to get carried away by words.”⁵⁸⁵ The conversation with Twardowski, well-remembered by his disciple, Witwicki, had nothing to do with Plato, but it had made such an impression on the student that it came to his mind while reading the *Gorgias*. For the sake of his audience, however, the translator based his criticism of Plato on simple examples. Since good people are good because they have good in them (498d), then Socrates “might as well think that whoever has strawberries is strawberry-like and those who have children are child-like.”⁵⁸⁶ Socrates’ reasoning, which Witwicki compared to magic tricks, resulted from the ambiguity of the term *παρουσία*, which signified for Plato the relation between an idea and an object.

Language therefore, could give rise to philosophical error, but it was in other similarly ambiguous phrases that the moral message of the dialogue was concealed, for Witwicki explained that εὖ πράττειν signified doing good and being in a state of welfare, hence happiness resulted from just and good acts. “Blessed are those who have indeed learnt from their Greek lessons not to separate these.”⁵⁸⁷

The *Gorgias* was another dialogue that found favour with Parandowski. He emphasised the richness of its philosophical content and the impossibility of determining Plato’s own views: “Each of Plato’s longer dialogues seems to contain a whole philosophy, and these philosophies are sometimes so different that it would be wrong to make references like: »Plato says«, without specifying in which dialogue and in what circumstances.”⁵⁸⁸ Parandowski devoted much of his text to Callicles and his views on the

585 Jadczak, 1997: 34.

586 Witwicki, 1922a: 206; J. Parandowski considered such reasoning to be an example of extremely loose logic and as “Witwicki’s logical quarrel with Plato” (1960c: 136).

587 Witwicki, 1922a: 212; Witwicki may have wanted to add: “those who learned it in their young years when they learned Greek in the gymnasia, those for whom Greek did not become a nightmare and who succeeded to learn more than just grammar.”

588 Parandowski, 1960c: 133.

world, life, people, and philosophy. In his dithyrambs in honour of Plato as a philosopher and writer, he seemed to have forgotten about the translator and his contribution. It is only in the conclusion of the review that he recalled: "when I spoke of Plato, did I not mean the translator as well? After all, everything I quoted was in his rendering and not even once did I feel the need to consult the original. Could there be any greater praise for a translator?"⁵⁸⁹

The dialogue that followed both the *Hippiases* and the *Gorgias* was also named after a representative of the Sophists, that is, Protagoras. In his commentary to this dialogue, as was the case in his discussions on the two *Hippiases*, Witwicki drew attention to a common goal that Socrates shared with the Sophists, namely the development of virtue. Witwicki found in the *Protagoras* remarks on democracy that were still relevant: "the rules of Athenian democracy would be justifiable in an *ideal* society consisting of *ideal* people – but in any existing society they are unacceptable."⁵⁹⁰ All the deficiencies of politics stemmed from imperfections in human nature. It was also in the *Protagoras* that the idea of penalty as a corrective and deterrent measure appears, and this met with Witwicki's approval, being considered as progress in relation to the *Gorgias*, in which penalty was viewed as expiation.

After the publication of the *Protagoras*, an extensive and detailed review of Witwicki's translations appeared, penned by Stanisław Pilch. Having at his disposal a significant corpus of dialogues rendered by one translator, Pilch was able to articulate several general remarks. He noted the absence of bibliographies in all these volumes, and bluntly reproached Witwicki for not using the secondary literature. He also remarked on the lack of Stephani pagination, but absolved Witwicki for this, arguing that other translations did not have it either, which in fact, was not entirely true. Although he demonstrated that Witwicki's translations occasionally lacked philological accuracy, he saw in Witwicki and his translations an ally in the struggle of classics scholars to maintain classical culture and languages as the basis for school education, to promote knowledge of antiquity, and to encourage readers to get to know and deepen their knowledge of classical languages. The review of the translations of the dialogues provided an opportunity for Pilch to express his own escapist desires. He wrote: "readers eagerly pick up the book and are grateful to the translator for carrying their thoughts to the land of Greek beauty, to the world of Platonic ideas,

589 Parandowski, 1960c: 138.

590 Witwicki, 1923: 124.

away from the drabness of everyday life, where more and more bleak clouds are gathering in the sky above.”⁵⁹¹ Witwicki also saw his passion for antiquity and his deepening familiarity with Plato as an antidote to the realities of life in interwar Poland. Pilch seems to have understood the intentions that Witwicki revealed in one of his letters about the motives for his creativity: “And my thought while writing has always been this: to take away unnecessary pain and to increase human joy and serenity.”⁵⁹²

The *Phaedo*, released two years after the *Protagoras*, provided evidence of the gradual transition of Witwicki’s focus from dialogues of primarily artistic and literary value, through those devoted to the Sophists, and finally to works in which Plato articulated his own mature and original views. The *Phaedo* appeared to Witwicki to be “a conversation not among academics, but among young people, full of enthusiasm, who had become completely caught up in the spirit of Pythagoreanism.”⁵⁹³ Witwicki dated the composition of this dialogue within Plato’s mature years, after he had become acquainted with the Pythagorean doctrine in Italy, and when the theory of ideas had already been developed. Witwicki did not find the philosophical content of the *Phaedo* or its literary robe particularly attractive, but it was not this that constituted the value of the dialogue as a whole: “At the beginning and the end of the dialogue a graphic image of Socrates’ last moments and his death is revealed before our eyes, while the middle consists of Plato’s own reflections on death and the immortality of the soul, and of his own ascetic inclinations, but voiced by Socrates. His arguments forcefully attempt to persuade readers to believe in existence beyond the grave, yet they are far from obvious and can only convince those who are already convinced.”⁵⁹⁴ The graphic depictions in the dialogue, and the evidence of a deep personal relationship between *Phaedo* and Socrates, with Socrates stroking the young *Phaedo*’s hair (89a–b), gave Witwicki reason to believe that Plato had not been telling the truth when he informed the reader that he had not been present at the death of Socrates: “such a vivid reminiscence of this caress could only have been taken from personal memories.”⁵⁹⁵

Witwicki commented on the passage introducing the second voyage (99d–100a) as follows: “Here Plato admits to the psychological origins of

591 Pilch, 1923: 121.

592 Rzepa, 1987: 131.

593 Witwicki, 1925: 15.

594 Witwicki, 1925: 16–17.

595 Witwicki, 1925a: 164.

Platonism.”⁵⁹⁶ Whereas λόγος in this passage had been rendered by Witwicki's predecessors as ‘reason’ or ‘thinking,’ Witwicki, aware of the translation difficulties, justified his choice of ‘word’ by arguing for the purely verbal nature of Plato's philosophy: “he gives us sonorous and fragrant *words* instead of substantial answers, and he is often under the illusion that he has established some law or fact, when in fact, he has only forced Socrates to extort a particular *phrase* from his interlocutor.”⁵⁹⁷ The following comment may also refer to the fragment under discussion: “When Plato was at the stage of composing the *Phaedo*, he had a predilection for this type of verbal operation, which gave him the illusion of researching facts, reality or that which exists, when in actual fact, he was doing no more than replacing an adjective with a noun.”⁵⁹⁸ This key point in the autobiography of Socrates and indeed of Plato was, for Witwicki, the reason for Plato's philosophical failure. “Here lay his error and his »tragic fault«. The laws according to which the phaenomena occur and the formulas for their causal relations will not be discovered by anyone who has their eyes and ears closed.”⁵⁹⁹

The thesis on the necessity of relying on God's will with regard to the time of one's death, which was used in the dialogue to justify the prohibition of suicide, was reduced by Witwicki *ad absurdum* and rejected. Witwicki was willing to permit suicide in exceptional and rare circumstances, such as in the case of torture or incurable diseases, for if we are to be consistent with God's will, then treatment during illness should also be refused. The philosophical flaws in the dialogue were, however, justified by the circumstances, for as Witwicki poetically remarked: “On this day with no tomorrow, Socrates grasps all the means available to him, to create, despite everything, some vision of tomorrow for himself and for others.”⁶⁰⁰

The core of the dialogue, that is, the argument for the immortality of the soul, which was later to provide a link between Plato and Christian thought, was seen by Witwicki as mere mythology. As for Plato's contempt for the physical aspect of human fertility, Witwicki put this down to Socrates's and Plato's ‘pederasty.’ He was also sceptical about the apology for asceticism, for he considered this to be the barbarisation of life, and ex-

596 Witwicki, 1925a: 175.

597 Witwicki, 1925a: 176.

598 Witwicki, 1925a: 150–151.

599 Witwicki, 1925a: 167.

600 Witwicki, 1925a: 153.

plained Socrates' pursuit of asceticism as an attempt to pat himself on the back for his own shortcomings. Witwicki believed that a much better prescription for life was the moderation pursued by the Pythagoreans. The contempt for the body that was expressed by Plato, who was born into an aristocratic family, could only be accounted for by some secret of his mental life or the influence of someone else. Witwicki described this philosophy of life as "a hopeless plan. A dire path leading to the desert, to a barren, tormented idleness in a blaze of holiness,"⁶⁰¹ and could not agree with a doctrine that impoverished human beings cognitively and emotionally, and whose contemplative nature deprived them of humanity. In his commentaries he contrasted this with his own activism resulting from the need to repair the world.⁶⁰²

Witwicki regretted that humankind had failed to erase similar views in the course of human development: "The sad, humiliating concept of human beings as »impure« by nature, which is derived from primitive superstition, has been maintained to this day and is fuelled by religions, which have various methods and symbolic practices for »purifying« humans permanently or when required."⁶⁰³ The criticism of faith and religious institutions in these passages, aroused strong opposition from Witwicki's sister, Helena, who was the Mother Superior in the Convent of the Sisters of Charity in Przeworsk. The siblings carried on a dispute by mail, with Helena briefly, but categorically, admonishing her brother: "Do not make any more commentaries to your translations, and it would be best to burn all that nonsense and withdraw it."⁶⁰⁴ He replied that it would be easier for him to cut off his finger, if his sister needed such a sacrifice, than to lie. Although the siblings fell out over these ideological issues, they eventually succeeded in bringing their dispute to an end, thanks to Witwicki's humour, expressed in long letters embellished with his drawings. One of these drawings portrayed his sister, with her face hidden under a coif, performing the act of Christianising pagan souls by scrubbing them with holy water. Witwicki himself appeared in one of the drawings, arm in arm with his master, Plato, who was carrying a scroll and watching the nun. The following dialogue passes between them: "Master: Who is that woman? I

601 Witwicki, 1925a: 161–162; *cf.*: Jadczyk, 1982: 72–73. Witwicki's expression of his disapproval of the humiliating acts carried out in certain religious practices was explained by K. Skurjat as resulting from his responsibility as a teacher (Skurjat, 1977: 86); *cf.*: Jadczyk, 1988: 48.

602 *Cf.*: Borowiecka, 1974: 109–110.

603 Witwicki, 1925a: 148.

604 Jeżewska, 1958c: 5.

guess from her peculiar dress that she must be a kind of priestess. Translator: Master, that is my sister. She speaks about divine issues. Let us be careful though, for she speaks a different language and misunderstandings may easily arise.”⁶⁰⁵

Witwicki could be merciless about religion, but he did not spare Plato either, criticising his inconsistencies, such as his claim that true knowledge cannot be achieved in life: “Since this proposition was articulated by Plato during his life, he could not advertise it as absolutely true.”⁶⁰⁶ Witwicki supposed that the passages advocating intellectual motives for philosophers’ actions may have inspired Kant when composing his *Critique of Practical Reason*, while the concept of *anamnesis* may have been the inspiration for the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas. Prior to all these modern philosophical systems, however, the *Phaedo* had made its impact on Aristotle, who mitigated much of the strict implications of this dialogue with his ethics of moderation, while an ethical programme contrary to that of Plato could be found in *Colas Breugnon*. Witwicki wrote about Plato: “he seeks to make the human intellect more sterile, by cutting it off from significant sources of knowledge, which are the sensory perceptions, and he aspires to impoverish human hearts, by forbidding them to love and suffer as living beings usually love and suffer. [...] This breathes death into life.”⁶⁰⁷ Scholasticism also inherited its focus on the purely verbal sphere from Plato, who “marked out the way for scholasticism by averting his eyes from facts and directing his thoughts exclusively to deduction from preconceived assumptions and reducing the role of the curious intellect to that of analysing *words, phrases* and verbal constructions.”⁶⁰⁸ Witwicki’s negative attitude to the Polish analytical philosophy that was emerging before his eyes may have stemmed from the same premises, for not far below he wrote: “A system of propositions that is free from contradictions [...] does not satisfy human cognitive needs. Whoever asks about the true nature of reality, and *why* it is like this here and like that there, is not merely concerned with what words should be said or written so that everything that is said or written is written or spoken in accordance with accepted rules of writing and speaking and free from contradictions. What he cares about is

605 Jezewska, 1958c: 8; a qualitatively better reproduction of this drawing was printed in: Nowicki: 1983: 39.

606 Witwicki, 1925a: 147.

607 Witwicki, 1925a: 162.

608 Witwicki, 1925a: 176.

that this writing or speaking should not be idle talk for the sake of talking.”⁶⁰⁹

The final and decisive argument for the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo* was considered by Witwicki to be an antecedent of Anselm of Canterbury’s *ratio*, the so-called ontological argument, which was ironically summarised by the Polish scholar as follows: “God really exists, because by the word God we mean the most perfect being in the sense that He really exists, not to mention His other virtues.”⁶¹⁰ Witwicki was also critical of Plato’s reasoning that opposites come into being from one another. Taking into account his readers, he expressed his criticism graphically as follows: “A broken bottle comes from a whole one, yet the latter cannot be made of the first.”⁶¹¹ Yet the only justification for the concept of *anamnesis* was that learning may sometimes seem to be similar to recalling.

According to Witwicki, the position adopted by Simmias with regard to the immortality of the soul was very modern. He emphasised the difficulties encountered in investigating posthumous life (85b–d) and the need to accept provisional and plausible answers. When Witwicki himself, at the conclusion of his commentary to the *Phaedo*, attempted to answer the question of immortality, he said only that this was a great unknown and the only way to acquire some knowledge on this subject was to drive oneself to death. In life, the only certain position is not to resign oneself to excluding any of the possible answers. So, what were the *Phaedo*’s arguments for? “Socrates merely dreamt them up so as to calm himself and give value to his final hours.”⁶¹² Therefore, these arguments should neither be taken as fixed nor treated as dogmas. At the same time, dreams of immortality should not be cast out from human minds, though the issue lies beyond the sphere of scientific enquiry.⁶¹³

Witwicki presented the figure of Socrates within the well-known framework of Jesus’ passion and death. The Greek philosopher did not, of course, emulate Christ, not only because he preceded him in history, but because he managed to achieve more, for he was able to defend himself against his downfall in three ways. Firstly, by making jokes he avoided the temptation to indulge in excessive pathos; secondly, he rejected the temptation to prolong his time with his friends by recommending that the exe-

609 Witwicki, 1925a: 179.

610 Witwicki, 1925a: 181.

611 Witwicki, 1925a: 155.

612 Witwicki, 1925a: 184.

613 Cf.: Borowiecka, 1974: 95; Jadczak, 1978: 62.

cution should not be delayed; and finally, by keeping his friends from weeping, he avoided common laments and thus he himself was able to remain tranquil. The falls of Christ and of Socrates were different in nature, but Witwicki deliberately juxtaposed them to provide the reader with an example of an ethical model worthy of following, an example of the human pursuit of perfection that did not originate in Christian culture. Although Witwicki emphasised the doubtful nature of *Phaedo*'s conclusions, which the author of the dialogue himself had been aware of, at the same time he pointed to a model of humanism that dispensed with the sanction of transcendence.

Once again, it was classics scholars, and not philosophers, who directed their attention to the *Phaedo* in Witwicki's rendering. Ignacy Wieniewski did not conceal his enthusiasm for the translator's work, remarking on its important promotional and culture-forming value. He was not, however uncritical, but after dealing with some critical aspects he added: "Having pointed out the »sunspots«, we will no longer delay our raptures of well-deserved praise for another beautiful and accurate translation by Witwicki. We can only say that when he renders Plato in the way he does, this Polish philosopher and Hellenist makes a great contribution not only to literature and art but also to society. May he complete his task."⁶¹⁴

An insightful review of the *Phaedo* was written by Władysław Chodaczek, a Greek language lecturer at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov. He considered Plato's works to be a cure for materialism, one of the diseases of modern times which resulted in an almost general lack of sensitivity to spiritual values. It was to the few who managed to hold on to these values that Witwicki addressed his productions, which, as Chodaczek rightly supposed, were intended for non-professional audiences. While the translations themselves were highly rated as among the best translations of ancient literature for disseminating Plato's work more widely among Poles, the translator's commentaries were assessed negatively. Chodaczek, who was well acquainted with the realities of gymnasium teaching, considered the commentaries unsuitable as teaching resources in work with young people, for Witwicki showed little understanding or tolerance of some of Plato's theories that were somewhat remote from the development of the natural sciences in the 20th century. Chodaczek also considered it a mistake to draw attention to Plato's 'pederastic' inclinations. Additionally he claimed that "the value of the commentaries is in no way enhanced by the too numerous, and quite trite, sallies against vari-

614 Wieniewski, 1925.

ous »mythologies« or »holy mysteries« of the Catholic Church.”⁶¹⁵ In the conclusion of his review, Chodaczek stated that no responsible teacher should recommend these commentaries for the still unformed minds of young people.

At the turn of the 1930s, Witwicki’s reputation as a Plato translator was already well established, having published eleven dialogues, some of which had even run to several editions. The most popular of them, the *Symposium*, reached its fourth edition in 1924. There was therefore a demand for presenting the translator himself, together with his translation techniques and his reflections on the dialogues, to his ever increasing reading public. To satisfy this demand, an interview with Witwicki appeared on the first page of one of the issues of *Wiadomości Literackie* (*Literary News*) in 1926.

Witwicki’s responses in this interview shed light on the process involved in the creation of his works, and help explain how he comprehended them. He described the body of his published volumes as follows: “a great deal of Platonic poetry and a great deal of my scholarly work. Not the other way around.”⁶¹⁶ This important statement, which was particularly emphasised by Witwicki, was an expression of his view that his work could be seen more as literary than philosophical or academic, and this, in turn, resulted from the particular character of Plato’s writing. He also made it clear that his work was primarily guided by the need to be faithful to the original, thus putting himself in second place. However, since, as he himself declared, the priority in translation work was to render the substance of the original, it is quite likely that he agreed with much of Plato’s considerations, and therefore he may have failed to notice how much of his own personality, of his manner of expression, was transferred to his Plato.

In the interview, Witwicki revealed how he worked. Since it was impossible to render dialogues like other, more static, literary texts, his translations went far beyond the text. He said: “while reading, I can see the figures in the dialogue and hear them talking, in Polish of course; otherwise I would not understand them.”⁶¹⁷

Another significant sentence appears later in the interview: “In Plato [...] it is people of today who are speaking, only they are dressed in different costumes.”⁶¹⁸ A particularly pronounced example of this was Callicles in the *Gorgias*, “a very intelligent modern man, and the issue he discusses is

615 Chodaczek, 1926: 82.

616 “U polskiego tłumacza Platona”, 1926.

617 “U polskiego tłumacza Platona”, 1926.

618 “U polskiego tłumacza Platona”, 1926.

not outdated at all.”⁶¹⁹ Thus, Witwicki argued that it was still possible to hold a dialogue with the ancients, a conversation with Plato and the characters in his works, considering problems that were still valid, stimulating and as yet unsolved. People of the 20th century should not feel superior to the ancients, because the development of civilisation and culture has not affected the fundamental problems of humanity but has only reduced the time available for free and leisurely deliberation on these problems. Renaissance thinkers believed that it was possible to communicate over the centuries and “this allowed them to emerge from a state of general obscurity and moral savagery.”⁶²⁰ The only barrier to learning about and understanding antiquity, in Witwicki's eyes, was the increasing ignorance of classical languages, which he regretted. Little did he know that this situation was to further deteriorate after World War II.⁶²¹

It seems that it was only Witwicki's translations of Plato that succeeded in arousing admiration and respect for the Greek philosopher among younger audiences, thus encouraging a wider range of readers to broaden their knowledge of antiquity. Translations of this type represented “a compelling reproduction of the output of one artist's mentality by another artist; it could enthrall every living person, filling them with joy or awe, sadness or hope and imbuing them with wonder. The dynamic substance of the original is reflected in an autonomous production: though it is rendered in native Polish, something of the original language is also retained.”⁶²²

The Warsaw series of translations

University duties and work on psychology kept Witwicki from his translation, and it was not until a decade after the publication of the 1926 interview that had marked the closure of a certain stage in his work on Plato that subsequent translations of the dialogues appeared. In the mid thirties

619 “U polskiego tłumacza Platona”, 1926.

620 “U polskiego tłumacza Platona”, 1926.

621 At the dawn of the interwar period, classical scholars were under the illusion that in the independent Poland the great model of classical gymnasia that had operated in Galicia would spread throughout the country (Witkowski, 1919: 353). Reality quickly dispelled such hopes, and the teaching hours devoted to ancient languages were gradually reduced, much to the disappointment of classics teachers.

622 Popławski, 1927: 216.

new editions of the dialogues began to pour out, this time published in the series “Biblioteka Filozoficzna Klasyków” (“Philosophical Library of the Classics”), founded much earlier by H. Struve, who had already included other translations of Plato in the series.

The *Meno* was the first dialogue to appear after the interval and it can therefore be considered as the inauguration of the ‘Warsaw series’ of Witwicki’s translations of Plato, after the previous ‘Lvov series.’⁶²³ According to the translator, the main goal and significance of the dialogue was “to demonstrate the importance of *clear* thinking that is free from contradictions, and this is not only intellectually valuable but also a moral value for all humanity. Learn, think and try to be wise and you will be better indeed.”⁶²⁴

Witwicki felt the need to comment on the Polish translation of the term ἀρετή. Its rendering as a single word in Polish gave rise to difficulties in interpretation, which could be misleading for unprofessional audiences. Let us quote a longer passage: “In past centuries *arete* was translated as »cnota« [≈virtue], and this was an appropriate translation in the days when people here spoke about horses of great virtue, and cordages were similarly referred to as having virtue. Nowadays the meaning of the word virtue has undergone a change, and we speak of virtues only in connection with the lives of saints or in humorous references to a maiden’s virtue; exceptionally, in obituaries, we read about civil virtues. No-one, however, would praise a great politician, an excellent bank manager, a social activist, or a lawyer by saying that they are virtuous or have great virtue for conducting themselves properly, accomplishing great works or being praiseworthy in every respect. In that case, they would be described as laudable or very *dzielny* [≈efficient, courageous, resourceful], but not virtuous. [...] Throughout this dialogue they are not talking about virtue and goodness or about good and virtuous people, but about bravery and about brave, praiseworthy, better and truly better people. Today it would therefore be misleading for the readers to write that Greek philosophers were always discussing, or teaching about, virtue.”⁶²⁵

623 Kobierzycki, 1999: 45.

624 Witwicki, 1935: 8.

625 Witwicki, 1935a: 73–74; it is significant to note that long after Witwicki, P. Siwek, a clergyman, consistently rendered ἀρετή as “cnota” in his translation of the *Meno* (Plato, 1991). L. Regner did likewise when translating the *Protagoras*, and this marks a departure from ‘dzielność’ in favour of ‘cnota’ (cf.: Nerczuk, 1997: 279), which, in fact, represents a return to older ways of translating. Józef Maria Bocheński, when referring to the doubts surrounding the rendering the

Witwicki pointed out that philosophers of later centuries had attached too much importance to theories about which Plato had expressed some reservations, or which he had presented with a smile hidden between the lines. The concept of innate knowledge was taken seriously by Descartes and Leibniz, while *metempsychosis* and *anamnesis* “were treated by Plato himself as a bold flight of fancy, not as a reality that he had discovered and believed in or would have given to others to believe in”⁶²⁶

Witwicki interpreted Plato's requirement that knowledge should be linked to moral improvement as a belief in the need to produce a science of ethics. Witwicki considered this to be ‘too rosy’ since he himself put greater emphasis on the significance of human nature, social instinct and upbringing.⁶²⁷ Yet this did not mean that the need to create a non-religious ethics that could become a guide for higher natures should be abandoned. Indeed, Witwicki concluded that the system of ethics based on rational premises that Socrates and Plato had started to create should be continued.

In her review of the translation of the *Meno*, I. Dąmbska, a philosopher with interests in antiquity, emphasised the suitability of the work for schoolchildren and particularly for teachers and tutors “who tend to ask themselves, especially at times when they feel their efforts are in vain, whether virtue can be taught”⁶²⁸ She had no hesitation in describing

Latin word ‘virtus’ as ‘cnota’, remarked on Witwicki's ‘dzielność’ and recalled Jacek Woroniecki, who claimed that he “liked Witwicki and used to say about his Plato that it had been produced by an »intelligent rogue«” (Bocheński, 1994: 62). It should be added here that the noun ‘cnota’ and adjective (*m, f, n*) ‘cnotliwy, cnotliwa, cnotliwe’ usually means virginity, celibacy or sometimes abstinence, while ‘dzielność’ and ‘dzielny, dzielna, dzielne’ can refer to a much wider range of ethical actions, for ‘cnota’ is associated rather with the passive nature of keeping virginity or abstinence while ‘dzielność’ is connected with ‘działanie’=action and stresses the righteous character of moral actions. It is little wonder, then, that Witwicki preferred the latter term. Admittedly, in academic philosophical debates virtue is rendered as ‘cnota’, and this does not give rise to question, but it should be remembered that Witwicki intended to disseminate his productions as widely as possible, and hence it was necessary to adjust the terminology to the needs of unprofessional audiences.

626 Witwicki, 1935a: 84. Cf.: “Those who see in Plato only the anointed sage from Raphael's painting, gazing at the sky, do not know much about his sense of humour. Witwicki was able to uncover this side of Plato and demonstrate how it adorns Plato's writings and protects them from undue pathos” (Dąmbska, 1949: 267).

627 Cf.: Jadczak, 1989: 181–182, 196–197.

628 Dąmbska, 1936: 333.

Witwicki's translations of Plato as an act of divine providence, attributing to them a beauty that was fourfold: "the beauty of their educational character, the beauty of the perfect harmony between the translation and the original, the beauty of the academic and practical values of the commentaries, and finally, the beauty of the classical language and the editing of the volumes"⁶²⁹

In the following year the *Theaetetus* appeared in print, a dialogue which the translator classified as belonging to the middle period in the development of Platonism.⁶³⁰ In Witwicki's eyes, the depiction of the Socratic art of midwifery was one of 'Plato's clever little jokes'. Plato, as an aristocrat, might easily have belittled the profession of Socrates' mother, but instead, he proudly highlighted it with a smile, seeing it as an advantage and a resource to be used in his philosophising. Witwicki, however, could not accept the commonly repeated view that Socrates did not assert anything, but merely asked questions, which was for Witwicki clearly untrue, especially since some of the premises in Socrates' discussion with Theaetetus were articulated in such an imperious form that he seems to be 'forcing them' on his interlocutor.

Witwicki reduced Plato's defeat of Protagoras to its political implications, for these were of the utmost importance to Plato: "he personally hated the democrats with all the force of his aristocratic family tradition."⁶³¹ Witwicki, however, took exception to the view that Plato's contempt for democracy was equivalent to a proud capitalist looking down on his workers.

The *Theaetetus* as a whole did not seem to Witwicki to be a finished work. He would probably have agreed with the opinion of A. Nowicki that "when the *Theaetetus* is interpreted, attention should be paid not only to what is being said, but *how it is uttered*, to the degree of intellectual and emotional involvement."⁶³² Many deliberations in the dialogue, including those regarding the nature of error, appeared to Witwicki to be doubtful. Like Plato himself, he articulated these doubts very graphically. For example, as an experienced psychologist, he could not accept Socrates' view that it was impossible for one human being to hold contradictory opinions on one subject, and he supported his claim with the following examples: "The number of self-contradictory judgments that can easily be held simultane-

629 Dąbska, 1936: 334.

630 Witwicki, 1936: 5.

631 Witwicki, 1936a: 182.

632 Nowicki, 1983: 283.

ously can be seen in the case of the pious family of a poor man who had been buried from the Warsaw mortuary after surgery a few years earlier, but his intestines had been put into jars and kept in the hospital. His relatives visited the hospital management a few days after the burial with a request to have his intestines taken to the cemetery and put into the grave of the dead man, for he had paid them visits in their dreams and asked them to return his intestines – for without them he would be unable to go before God for the last judgment. It is clear, then, that these people believed that this man was dead and yet asked and had needs, that at one and the same time he was in the grave and by the beds of his family, that his invisible soul was visible, that the last judgment should be attended with one's intestines, but without leaving the grave, yet the cousins could be visited and a request made to them even without intestines.”⁶³³

Since Socrates attributed his view on knowledge as ‘true judgement in an exact account’ (201d–202d) to an unspecified person in an undefined past, Witwicki concluded that it must have been Plato who produced this idea, a measure similar to inserting Diotima's speech into the *Symposium*. Witwicki considered his Polish rendering of the Greek δόξα ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου as ‘true judgment in an exact account’ as a particularly apt translation, partly due to the properties of the Polish language, for the phrase ‘exact account,’ especially in comparison to German and English translations, made Plato's thought accessible to Polish readers. In view of the fact that Ionian philosophers were accused of inaccuracy, the following claim assumed increasing significance: “this »exact account« was to appear later, for example, as a definition per genus proximum et differentiam specificam and as other things besides. Plato thinks that there are some components of knowledge that cannot be defined by specifying a large category and its distinguishing characteristics, they can only be named.”⁶³⁴ Witwicki interpreted Plato's theory of knowledge as his striving for the refine-

633 Witwicki, 1936a: 195–196. This quotation exemplifies Witwicki's view that religious sentiments drive people to intellectual desensitisation and logical paralysis (cf.: Skurjat, 1977: 89).

634 Witwicki, 1936a: 205–206. “Knowledge is a true judgment, but in a strict account” (202c; Plato, 1936: 132). Henryk Elzenberg, who translated a short passage of the *Theaetetus* (201e–202d) three decades later, wrote: “knowledge is a true opinion combined with comprehension (wiedza to mniemanie prawdziwe połączone ze zrozumieniem)” (Elzenberg, 1995a: 344). He drew particular attention to the phrase ‘μετὰ λόγου,’ and in his discussion of other possible translations, he did not even mention Witwicki's version (Elzenberg, 1995a: 344, footnote 10), for he was very critical of Witwicki's methods. S. Blandzi, on the other

ment of knowledge. Although it was Aristotle who was later to give it its lasting form, the original inspiration came from Socrates.

The *Theaetetus* closed with criticism of the conclusions reached in the dialogue, which Witwicki did not consider either necessary or justified, though it was an expression of the author's self-criticism and a warning to other thinkers that literature cannot be a source or measure of scientific accuracy. In Witwicki's eyes, these conclusions of the *Theaetetus* were still relevant, especially since the intellectual confusion in Athens was reminiscent of his own times, when "literary culture continues to teach tolerance to terminological ambiguity, to perceive profundity in contradictions and fuzziness, to blend dreams and reality, thus creating states that are on the border between reality and dream, and to play with words in a charming and commendable way."⁶³⁵

Witwicki's *Theaetetus* was reviewed by Tadeusz Zieliński, who showed his appreciation for the work, being delighted to see a subsequent work of Plato made accessible to Polish audiences, this time an esoteric work and one of the most challenging of the dialogues. Zieliński was, however, dissatisfied with Witwicki's translation of the title of the dialogue as *Teajtet*, preferring the older version: *Teetet*. He argued with a touch of humour and irony, that "introducing the Greek diphthong *ai* into the Polish language was non-aesthetic and non-pedagogical."⁶³⁶ It was, however, a technical question that Zieliński considered to be the greatest deficiency of this edition of the *Theaetetus*, namely the lack of Stephani pagination, which meant that readers were prevented from quickly comparing the translation with the original text. Nevertheless, taking into account the difficulties of the *Theaetetus* and of Plato's style, Zieliński assessed the whole translation and commentaries by Witwicki very positively.

hand, referred to Witwicki's doubts and treated them as encouragement to seek better translations. He wrote: "I consider »true opinion with a reference (*sc.* to reality) [mniemanie prawdziwe z odniesieniem (*sc.* do rzeczywistości)]« as the only acceptable translation of the above formula, which brings to an end the endless disputes on this subject" (Blandzi, 2002: 64). J. Gajda-Krynicka also took issue with Witwicki's rendering of *δόξα* as 'judgment' and *λόγος* as 'sentence' in the *Sophist* (Gajda-Krynicka, 1993: 95–96, footnote 301; 2003: 119, footnote 41). Moreover, Gajda-Krynicka was also critical of Witwicki's translation of the word *ὀρθός* as 'true' instead of 'right' or 'correct' in the *Meno* (Gajda-Krynicka, 2003: 112, footnote 27).

635 Witwicki, 1936a: 211.

636 Zieliński, 1936: 180.

Literary circles also reacted to the *Theaetetus*, using the dialogue as a pre-text for reflecting on readership, especially of philosophical texts, and on the style of philosophical studies. Kazimierz Bleszyński suggested sarcastically that providing financial rewards for all voluntary readers of Plato in Poland would not entail significant expenses, but at the same time he managed to slip in a number of accurate observations on the reception of Witwicki's recent translation works. Bleszyński claimed that, with the exception of university students preparing for exams, reading the classics was basically not an occupation that attracted large audiences. In these conditions, it was unlikely that the translator could count on a wide group of readers, and his work on Plato could only be explained by some inner compulsion; yet his translation method resulted in good and very good outcomes, with only minor flaws. Bleszyński highlighted the positive aspects of Witwicki's style. Since he himself worked on translations from foreign literature, he was able to compare French, German and, as he called it, Witwicki (in Polish: 'francuski', 'niemiecki' and 'witwicki') translations. Only in the last of these was the text presented with humour and without undue pathos. On behalf of literature lovers, Bleszyński expressed his approval of such presentations of Plato, though he realised that philologists and lovers of antiquity might have some reservations: "Plato and Socrates would also have preferred this translation to those that were all buttoned up and well-pressed like trousers. Yet, those who are not men of letters [...] may, and often do, feel offended, especially in view of their ideas about the »majesty of the sages«." ⁶³⁷ Bleszyński expressed similar enthusiasm for the translator's commentaries: "He is on familiar terms with his cronies, Plato and his Socrates, as if he were in a cafe, smoking a pipe with his perhaps slightly younger colleague-professors, from time to time jokingly encouraging them: »piece of cake«, »nothing to worry about« etc. All this is a far cry from the accepted traditions in the world of the Majesty of Knowledge, Truth and Learning at the University," ⁶³⁸ and this should provide an even greater incentive to read Plato.

Very soon Witwicki's *Theaetetus* became compulsory reading in philosophy classes at the University of Warsaw. The class in question was not, however, a specialist seminar devoted to Plato, but a philosophical pro-seminar conducted by Bohdan Kieszkowski, an assistant of W. Tatarkiewicz in the academic year 1937/38. During his classes he focused

637 Bleszyński, 1936. The title of this review, "Pour qu'on lise Platon," was borrowed from the book by Émile Faguet.

638 Bleszyński, 1936.

on philosophical problems arising from the content of the dialogue, and not on the historical aspects of the text, though the Greek text was present “as a higher authority that could be referred to in the case of interpretative disputes resulting from some ambiguity or vagueness in the Polish translation.”⁶³⁹ According to Nowicki, one of the participants in this seminar, the discussions revolved around metaphilosophical problems, the nature of philosophy and the relation between the content and form of a thought and the human being who produced it. Witwicki’s psychological method of researching the history of philosophy came to the fore in these discussions, based on his commentaries to the *Theaetetus*. Nowicki insisted that it was impossible to separate the philosophical substance of Plato’s philosophy from its form, that is, from the literary robe of the dialogue, an important function of the latter being to demonstrate the process of searching for and reaching the truth. The path followed in this search is always that of a particular philosopher, because “there is no such thing as no man’s thoughts. Thoughts always belong to a particular person, they are developed in a specific historical situation by means of a specific research process,”⁶⁴⁰ and it was for this reason that the psychological background took on particular significance.

In the following year two subsequent dialogues, the *Charmides* and the *Lysis*, appeared in print. While commenting upon the first of them, Witwicki took the opportunity for a digression on the brilliant psychological intuitions of the Greeks, who, by using the ambiguous term σοφροσύνη, “proved [...] to have discerned a common background between moderation, self-control, prudence, peace and equanimity.”⁶⁴¹ The considerations in the *Charmides*, like those in the previously published *Meno*, inspired the translator to reflect on the relation between knowledge and happiness and between knowledge and the moral well-being of humanity. Witwicki’s conclusions were not optimistic: “if textbooks on the theory of values and scientific ethics were printed and distributed for free to millions of people, would this be sufficient to improve people and their lives? Even if the dissemination of such works was allowed, and they were allowed to cross borders, and even if these works were really of great value, isn’t it more likely that they would be utilised for barricades and firewood, or even for nitrocellulose if need be?”⁶⁴²

639 Nowicki, 1983: 277; 1981: 285–287.

640 Nowicki, 1983: 280.

641 Witwicki, 1937: 12.

642 Witwicki, 1937a: 97; cf.: Głombik, 1982: 8–9; Jadczyk, 1988: 51; 1989: 178.

A review of this edition of the two dialogues was written by T. Sinko. Although he pointed out certain misuses of vocabulary, such as the replacement of 'pedagogue' with 'private tutor' (literally "guwerner" – male form of governess), he concluded that "the translator's 'polonisms' never change the meaning of the original, and even enhance it, enlivening the conversation to such an extent that it becomes a philosophical drama that would be suitable for staging even today, or at any rate as a recitation, especially in the form of a radio drama."⁶⁴³

While Witwicki's translation of the *Symposium* had inaugurated the Lvov series, "Symposion", the translation of the *Laches*, in turn, appeared as the opening volume of the Psychological Section of the Military Knowledge Society's publication series. This was, of course, justified by the topic of the dialogue and its relevance, for it was devoted to "a clear account of bravery, the principal virtue of a soldier. [...] The dialogue provides an account of military matters and military bravery for soldiers."⁶⁴⁴ The very fact that the work of an ancient philosopher was published in a military publication undoubtedly demonstrated that Witwicki's translations were gaining increasing attention among wider audiences. Just as the "Symposion" series was intended to provide cultural and ethical enhancement for the general reading public, a similar ethical goal was attached to the *Laches*, which was primarily to serve for the professional development of soldiers.

The setting of the *Laches* was seen by Witwicki as truly farcical: "two poor sons of heroes have a pedagogical council with generals in a charlatan's booth,"⁶⁴⁵ but at the same time he warned the reader: "let no one think that Plato is not speaking seriously when there is a smile on his face. Only stupid people stop thinking when they laugh, and such people should not read Plato."⁶⁴⁶ For T. Rzepa, this warning was nothing more than an obvious case of manipulation.⁶⁴⁷ Certainly, Witwicki was appealing to the vanity of his audience who, as readers of the dialogues, could boost their self-importance with regard to both their intelligence and their sense of humour. At the same time, it should be noted, that there was nothing unwarranted in appealing to the audience's sense of humour, for there is plenty of wit in Plato's works, though perhaps not as much as

643 Sinko, 1937: 451.

644 Plato, 1937a: 2.

645 Witwicki, 1937d: 8.

646 Witwicki, 1937d: 8.

647 Rzepa, 2002: 90.

Witwicki found in them, but still, it is certainly present and important, so even if Witwicki was playing to his audience, it was not unjustified. It must also be remembered that Witwicki's purpose was to enlarge the circle of people reading his work, and in this way to deepen interest in ancient philosophy, and especially Plato, among Poles, and this goal was, and still is, invaluable.

While translating this dialogue, Witwicki took into account his target audience emphasising that the need to be courageous was also a spiritual disposition, and therefore should be distinguished from the inborn predisposition for fierceness in fighting that is observed in animals. The bravery of the soldier should not be restricted to this. As long as bravery, as contempt for danger, is seen against the background of its ethical motives, then this view of bravery should not, as the translator added, be shelved in 'academic archives' or seen as obsolete.⁶⁴⁸

T. Sinko took Witwicki's rendering of the *Laches* as an opportunity to express his opinion about Witwicki's translation as a whole. He considered him to be "the best Polish translator of Plato, the Boy of Plato, who was just as original as Boy in his »Introductions« and »Analyses« or »Commentaries«, though perhaps more capricious."⁶⁴⁹ According to Sinko, Witwicki did not just translate the dialogues, but seemed to act like a director, so his commentaries could be read like stage directions concerning the pace and rhythm of each subsequent scene.

In the *Philebus*, which was published in 1938, relevant ethical issues came to the fore. This book was the last translation of a complete dialogue to appear before the outbreak of World War II and the last to be published during Witwicki's lifetime. He saw the *Philebus* as a monologue in which Socrates developed Plato's thoughts and also conducted a kind of examination of conscience concerning Plato's own life choices. In the *Philebus*, unlike the *Phaedrus*, Plato "still vividly remembers the emotions and frenzies of his early years, and though he no longer has any desire for them, he is still able to describe them."⁶⁵⁰ This dialogue, as Witwicki presumed, had been intended for the students of the Academy, evidence of which was to

648 Witwicki, 1937e: 88–89; cf.: Jadczyk, 1988: 48.

649 Sinko, 1937a: 451. Sinko is referring here to Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński (1874–1941), who was a diligent, productive and popular translator of French literature into Polish, including the philosophical works of, for example, Montaigne, Descartes and Pascal. Boy-Żeleński, a gynaecologist and paediatrician by profession, was also an ardent liberal and anti-clerical writer, who was critical of the Polish tradition of Romanticism, and a propagator of gender equality and birth control.

650 Witwicki, 1938: 7.

be found in the frequent repetitions, recapitulations and the inclusion of a summary. For contemporary readers, Witwicki described the immutable value of the dialogue's substance as follows: "it will stimulate the thinking of those who have an interest in the problems of life's values and in having a life plan. It should not be read as newspapers are read, for it requires re-reading and attentive listening to exactly what this curious man is saying and how he says it; and he speaks... as if he had never died."⁶⁵¹

In Witwicki's eyes, Plato's theory of science made him almost a positivist, especially for example, in his demand that "one of the conditions for judging whether a piece of research is scientific or not should be the scientific application of number, measure and weight. Anything else is just rubbish."⁶⁵² As a psychologist, Witwicki could not agree with this, calling to mind Aristotle's demand for maintaining the highest possible level of accuracy in any given research field. Witwicki added, as a disciple of Twardowski: "the unambiguous use of established terminology and correct reasoning should be the fundamental requirements for each research discipline."⁶⁵³

In the *Philebus* Plato organises a contest, in which the interlocutors are the jury, before whom "the figures of Reason and Pleasure compete for the victor's palm."⁶⁵⁴ The resolution of this peculiar competition and the defence of human reason results from the acknowledgement of the role of reason in the world and from Plato's belief that the human being is a microcosm. Plato referred to a life devoted to reason, the life of an apathetic, or passionless, scholar, as divine, but Witwicki added that Plato "does not seem to have been enthusiastic about this kind of life."⁶⁵⁵ Plato appears to

651 Witwicki, 1938a: 160.

652 Witwicki, 1938a: 156.

653 Witwicki, 1938a: 157; cf.: Rzepa, 1991: 88, 160–161. Witwicki's attempts to refine terminology in his commentaries to the dialogues were for J. Woleński an argument in favour of the translator's affiliation to the Lvov-Warsaw school (Woleński, 1999: 146–147). It should be noted, however, that these attempts constitute only a small part of all the commentaries. Moreover, Witwicki criticised Twardowski's excessive pursuit of exactness, writing in one of his letters to his son: "I regret that Twardowski did not compose talks, but only dissertations of exemplary exactness. [...] After all, Russell himself eventually came to his senses and started to write in human language, instead of symbols. And it even made sense." (Rzepa, 1986: 230). Even though he was aware that it was in contradiction to Twardowski's views, Witwicki granted philosophy an important ideological function (Rzepa, 1986: 231); cf.: Widomski, 1996: 41.

654 Witwicki, 1938a: 126.

655 Witwicki, 1938a: 138.

have been further from asceticism than might have been assumed, as is confirmed in the final considerations of this dialogue, which are reminiscent of Aristotle's ethics of moderation: "in the life of an intelligent human being there should be no shortage of any pleasure, nor is there any reason to exclude pleasures that do not harm health or waste human energy in a foolish way. The philosopher need not die for the world or torment his body. He should only live intelligently. The most important thing in the make up of our lives is to maintain measure and proportion among the different components of life and avoid all forms of excess."⁶⁵⁶

Like previous productions of Witwicki, this last Plato translation of the interwar period was reviewed by T. Sinko. He could not praise this translation highly enough, describing it as excellent, especially in comparison with B. Kašinowski's translation, which had appeared half a century earlier. What weighed particularly in Witwicki's favour was his experience as a translator, as well as his careful reflection on Plato's philosophy. Sinko described Witwicki's productions as 'synthetic,' which probably appertained to the fact that they contrasted sharply with the meticulous philological renderings. Although a classics scholar himself, Sinko was familiar with philosophical issues and he appreciated Witwicki's philosophical deliberations in his commentaries, which were "conceived by the author as an attempt to bring Plato's thoughts up to date, thus stimulating the reader to »cooperate« with him."⁶⁵⁷ Sinko's words can be regarded as an accurate summing up of Witwicki's translation work.

Philosophical *symmachy*

After Witwicki's death, Parandowski provided a summary of the discussions on his work, and evaluated his translations against the background of previous Polish translations. Let us quote a longer passage: "people used to bridle at Witwicki's use of terms from modern philosophy, politics or economics, as they sometimes sounded glaringly anachronistic. Although I believe he did go to excesses in this, I think he can be forgiven on account of the great contribution he made to introducing Plato to a broad spectrum of readers in our country, where the Athenian philosopher had never been a guest before."⁶⁵⁸ In his *Introduction* to the *Euthyphro* Witwicki articulated

656 Witwicki, 1938a: 158.

657 Sinko, 1938: 137.

658 Parandowski, 1974: 481.

some guidelines on how to read Plato's dialogues. This was in 1920, when translations of the most important and philosophically most difficult dialogues had not yet appeared in print. The translator warned his readers that they should not expect to encounter literary dissertations in the dialogues, so they should not be offended by the colloquial tone of the language or the commonplace vocabulary. Witwicki recommended the ancient practice of reading the text aloud: "The stylistic characteristics of the dialogues only come to the fore when someone who is aware of this and takes it into account *reads* the words in the text *aloud* or rather *speaks* them out with natural, colloquial accents and pauses. If they are read silently, or even aloud, but in the way a newspaper, or the Lord's Prayer or even a flowing essay is read, then all the colour of the language will be lost, and completely inexplicable difficulties and harshness of style will be encountered, and then the reader will curse the translator, if not the author himself. But there is nothing we can do about this. The words of Plato's dialogues are like the notes in musical scores and have to be played with the living word; only then can we commune with the poet's work."⁶⁵⁹ And these works, in turn, are "a vivid reflection not only of his thoughts, but also his feelings and disposition."⁶⁶⁰ Witwicki derived great satisfaction from hearing about attempts to read out or stage the dialogues, for instance, by students during their seminar meetings.⁶⁶¹

Witwicki encouraged the pursuit of philosophy, for he had found such an incentive in the dialogues themselves. In fact, it was very much in harmony with Plato's intentions that the issues he discussed should be brought up to date and adapted to the language of different audiences so that Plato's dialogue and the philosophical search that had begun in ancient Athens could be continued, for example, in 20th century Poland. This was facilitated by the fact that Witwicki's productions were outstanding in comparison with the translations of other ancient or medieval philosophers that were available in Poland at that time, and were generally considered to be excellent.⁶⁶²

The *Protagoras* was interpreted by Witwicki as a dialogue that was, in fact, an inner conversation going on in Plato's mind: "he divides his own thoughts up among the interlocutors and in this way, he leads readers up the garden path, suggesting that Socrates is debating with Protagoras, or

659 Witwicki, 1920a: 11; cf.: Pilch, 1923: 116–117; Wallis, 1975: 20.

660 Witwicki, 1936a: 183–184.

661 Rzepa, 2002: 90.

662 Sobociński, 1936: 118.

with someone else, when in fact, he is arguing with himself. This might also explain why Socrates' opponents frequently speak such good sense. It is worth considering the dialogue from this point of view, and we will see that, in several places, where the discussion, though difficult to comprehend as a dispute between two individuals, can be suitably explained as a monologue divided into two persons only for the sake of dramatic staging purposes."⁶⁶³ Dialogue, after all, whether oral or written, was a pedagogical tool by means of which individual reflection could most easily be encouraged.

Witwicki not only encouraged his readers to pursue philosophy, but he also gave serious consideration to philosophical issues raised by Plato. Plato's theory of ideas did not meet with Witwicki's approval; in fact, quite the contrary. Witwicki interpreted the ideas as transcendent entities, thus making it easy to demonstrate the difficulties of such a concept, as Aristotle had demonstrated before him. Witwicki briefly outlined the theory itself as follows: "Plato established the principle that every feature results from a noun derived from the same root source as the name of the feature."⁶⁶⁴ This was the 'grammatical ontology' that was to have detrimental consequences for generations to come. If Plato had been aware of this, "he might have flinched, for he was a goodhearted man, though he liked to jest."⁶⁶⁵

Not all Plato's readers, however, had a sense of humour that would allow them to interpret the philosopher's intentions appropriately. In his commentary to the *Theaetetus*, Witwicki wrote about fallacies that reflected misunderstandings of Platonism: "It is empty Platonism to say that wise people are wise with wisdom; this is nothing more than a play on words, with only a semblance of information content. Anyone who knows this much about wisdom and wise people, in fact, knows nothing about them at all, and is only able to convert adjectives into nouns. And if, by replacing an adjective with a noun, they also got the impression that some previously unknown existence had been discovered, then they would clearly be a Platonist, but a gravely mistaken Platonist. It is good to remember this whenever we read about various -isms and -nesses, wherever they are

663 Witwicki, 1923: 130–131; cf.: Dąmbska, 1949: 267; Skurjat, 1997: 160.

664 Witwicki, 1925a: 151.

665 Witwicki, 1925a: 151; "Plato takes delight in considering neutra" (Witwicki, 1937b: 104), that is, the neuter nouns denoting the ideas. Elsewhere, concerning the *Philebus*: "a process of thinking by means of words – without taking into account the facts to which these words relate. Plato repeatedly does this." (Witwicki, 1938a: 156).

found.”⁶⁶⁶ Let us quote another longer passage about the erroneous nature of the theory of ideas and its subsequent baleful fate: “Plato had such a vivid and religious imagination that abstract nouns seemed to him to be the names of entities, as if they were people of great power, even though this inevitably led to various difficulties, contradictions and obscurities. This tendency was not exclusive to Plato and did not die with him. It was taken over by the Christian teaching about God. God’s knowledge of His own essence, God’s thought or wisdom, is worshipped by Christians in the person known as the Son of God, and they talk about his birth and adventures, treating God’s love of His own wisdom as a person and the only thing they dispute about is whether this person is derived from one or from two previous persons, with whom it is to constitute the one and only unique being. After all, this was the question that lay behind the Byzantine massacres and was the flagship pretext for the haidamaka rebellions. And no-one really understood what the question or the answers were about; they were never accurately understood, for these questions arose in an unenlightened milieu, which had heard some distant rumours of Platonism [...] and at that time it was dangerous to think too clearly and loudly. Only certain phrases, incomprehensible sentences called the »mysteries of faith« were worshipped and their inviolability was preserved by the smoke of burning stakes that brought an end to the thinking of those who thought and protested too loudly”⁶⁶⁷

In Witwicki’s view, the theory of ideas articulated in the dialogues, with all Plato’s reservations, was a certain intellectual proposition, worth discussing, but not to be taken as a dogma. It was only in centuries to come that philosophers began to err in this respect by stripping the theory of the literary and artistic refinement that guaranteed that this erroneous approach would be avoided. Taken out of its context, which was sometimes humorous, Plato’s theory was suitably justified and taken at face value, and this was to exert a great influence on subsequent generations of philosophers. The consequences of the theory of ideas proved to be fatal not only for philosophers but also for Christianity, which also adopted the theory. This, however, was not Plato’s intention and he cannot be blamed for this.

Since Witwicki was of the opinion that metempsychosis, anamnesis or the very existence of the ideas could not be convincingly supported by argument, he emphasised, in his commentaries to the dialogues, all Socrates’ statements which expressed the hypothetical nature of these concepts, or

666 Witwicki, 1936a: 155–156.

667 Witwicki, 1925a: 172–173.

which contained a hint of self-irony and scepticism, and particularly those which were based on myths. To a large extent, this approach may have stemmed from Witwicki's identification with Socrates, with Plato's Socrates, and ultimately with Plato himself. The translator did not believe that such incredible theories could be professed seriously. He argued against the concept of innate knowledge, though he admitted that human beings possess a social instinct, and that therefore it was possible that innate factors took part in personality formation.⁶⁶⁸

Witwicki did not suspect Plato of dogmatism: "he is neither a doctrine nor a fanatic; he is always ready to discuss his beliefs, even those that he felt were revelations."⁶⁶⁹ This accounts for the unique dialogical form of his work. Witwicki commented on the *Theaetetus*, for example, as follows: "For someone who is searching for ultimate conclusions and wants to find out exactly what Plato actually claims and what his final aim is, reading this dialogue may be unbearable. Yet for someone who has free time and wants to listen to how Plato's thoughts emerge, swarm, stagger, fight and drag him in various directions, it makes for fascinating reading. He writes as if he has completely forgotten about the reader and is talking to himself."⁶⁷⁰ The same is true of the *Philebus*: "he does not care much whether or not the audience gets his jokes or sees the author's smile – it is rather a conversation with himself that was noted down in the heat of the moment when the thoughts came to his mind, with no deletions or corrections."⁶⁷¹

Witwicki's commentaries show that it was Plato's contribution to ethics that he regarded as the most important aspect of his work, though not so much the ethical guidelines as the method and general direction. "The fact that at the dawn of our culture Socrates and Plato were instructing on how to subject blind faith and the irrational voice of the heart to the analysis and guidance of the intellect is their greatest contribution to the development of Humanity in Europe."⁶⁷²

Witwicki reminded his readers of the necessity of constantly taking pains to enter into discussion with Plato. He rarely provided explanations of philological issues in his commentaries to the dialogues, preferring rather to reflect on the validity or topicality of the problems raised in the

668 Rzepa, 1991: 149; 1998: 82–83.

669 Witwicki, 1937c: 166.

670 Witwicki, 1936a: 189. In his correspondence, Witwicki emphasised that the genuine philosophical research in this dialogue testified to Plato's own creative intellectual work (Jeżewska, 1959: 5).

671 Witwicki, 1938a: 143.

672 Witwicki, 1935a: 97.

dialogues, and describing the purpose of these comments as follows: "One of the aims of these interpretations was to stimulate the reader to co-operate with Plato, and together with him to seek the truth about the issues being discussed. For this reason, at every step the reader encounters the question: is it true what Socrates is saying here? This is not intended as a polemic against Plato, but as a symmachy with him. His thoughts are too much alive and valuable to be treated merely like respectable philosophical relics – they deserve to be taken into account today, asking ourselves whether, even after two thousand years, they are still valid. Only then do they really come to life."⁶⁷³ Witwicki, then, did not so much comment on Plato's findings, but rather acted as a comrade-in-arms, fighting at his side. He demanded the same of his audience – to have the courage to think and to face the challenge of important, topical problems. The reader was therefore to become an ally of Plato, the dialogues and of Witwicki himself. This research alliance, in true Socratic style, did not consist in accepting unconditionally the results given, but in undertaking corresponding efforts in pursuit of the path towards truth. By taking issue with Plato, by questioning not only the arguments of the Greek philosopher but his own interpretations as well, Witwicki stimulated his readers to do likewise. According to K. Skurjat, all Witwicki's philosophical work can thus be considered unfinished in the sense that it encouraged readers to start their own independent thinking.⁶⁷⁴

This independent activity on the part of the learner came about as a result of a kind of spiritual fertilisation, by "actively disquieting young people intellectually."⁶⁷⁵ The popular works Witwicki wrote for young people also took the form of dialogues or conversations. Having spent decades in the company of Socrates and Plato, Witwicki had acquired the ability to conduct and commit to paper such conversations "that could fertilise the thoughts of others, thus facilitating the birth of new thoughts. It was Plato's Socrates that had provided him with the exemplar for conducting such talks."⁶⁷⁶ It is therefore impossible to think of Witwicki as a teacher without taking into account Plato's teacher, Socrates, who demonstrated all the above features of this specific philosophical didactics. Witwicki's translations of the dialogues were thus an extension of his didactic work, of So-

673 Witwicki, 1938a: 125, footnote.

674 Skurjat, 1980: 23.

675 Dąmbska, 1949: 266.

676 Dąmbska, 1949: 266; cf.: Rzepa, 1989: 625; 1991: 176–179, 209.

cratic midwifery, examples of which Witwicki had experienced during his own studies under Twardowski.⁶⁷⁷

Witwicki tended to treat the dialogues and the problems they raised monadically, that is, his analysis of each dialogue constituted a complete whole. There is no comprehensive interpretation of Plato in Witwicki's works nor does he provide an outline of the philosopher's evolution. In his comments to individual dialogues, however, there are many opinions referring to Platonism as a specific philosophical system.

Witwicki's method of historical-philosophical research on Plato is often labelled as psychological and the translator himself as a psychologist working on the dialogues. This aspect of Witwicki's work was emphasised by A. Nowicki, who drew particular attention to the translator's commentaries to the *Symposium* and the *Protagoras*, which, like Witwicki's other works in the field of the history of philosophy, "were written by a psychologist and thus they focus on the psychological analysis of philosophical texts."⁶⁷⁸ This psychological analysis assumed that human nature is, to a certain extent, immutable, so the characters from the dialogues were presented as personalities close to the hearts of 20th century Polish readers. It was by bringing Plato's characters closer to the readers and updating the problems they discussed that Witwicki achieved one of the main aims of his com-

677 R. Jadczyk saw in the figures of Socrates and Plato a model of discursive thinking typical of the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw school, who strove for clarity of concepts and simplicity in their approach to research problems (Jadczyk, 1989a: 651; cf.: T. Rzepa, 1998: 134–135). In his comparison of the teaching styles of Twardowski and Witwicki, Kotarbiński emphasised the advantages of the latter, though he remarked that it was the methods of his Lvov teacher that personally suited him better. He wrote: "Witwicki's passion in his teaching was to fight the gibberish, the chaos of words and thoughts, the verbosity that was as empty as a mountain of soap bubbles; to hound out the humbug and the pseudo-wisdom of doing theory by means of sophisticated symbolism that was incomprehensible even to its own distributors... And again we are reminded of his beloved Socrates, who must have been his main master, for Twardowski showed no signs of that kind of polemical or satirical audacity in his teaching, though I must say that I prefer Twardowski's style to the cutting and ironic style of Witwicki's dialogue. Yet it is hard not to admit that this was an excellent way of lashing out at the obtuseness that was attempting to take over. The whip was wielded by Witwicki, a great master of teaching how not to babble just anything. He cared for words, coined definitions, structured strong and concise sentences and cultivated language to fight verbosity and talk that tries to replace communion with things and conceal reality in a smokescreen of words with vague meanings" (Kotarbiński, 1970: 81). Cf.: Jadczyk, 1984: 14.

678 Nowicki, 1982: 100; cf.: Nowicki, 1983: 209.

mentaries, which was to bring out the affinity and validity of the problems raised by Plato to contemporary times.

While it is true that Witwicki did indeed stress the importance of reconstructing the characters of the dialogues, it should also be noted that he did not restrict his intellectual instruments to psychology. His psychological approach to the texts did not exclude the historical-philosophical context, for "he did not question the autonomy of the history of philosophy as a science, nor did he want to replace it with psychology; he merely stressed that human beings are not exclusively »thinking« beings, and as a result the history of philosophy cannot be limited to the history of »pure« thoughts, but should demonstrate how these thoughts are related to emotions, passions, and intense feelings."⁶⁷⁹ The translator was therefore aware of the genetic method that he employed, that is, a method that aimed to explain the origins or the geneses of philosophers' doctrines, and psychological considerations were a specific type, or a complement to this method, for psychology itself could be applied universally to all the humanities that investigate human creations, or could at least be an important auxiliary tool.⁶⁸⁰

"Witwicki believed that the fundamental task of anyone who pursues philosophy of culture was to learn about human experiences by analysing the things that objectified human consciousness."⁶⁸¹ Witwicki's investigations would not have been legitimate or even possible without the assumption that this singular, literary and philosophical text – and the dialogues can be classified as such – could be subjected to psychological analysis, and that far-reaching conclusions about the author could be drawn from it. "Virtually any psychological creation that has any kind of permanence can be treated as a psychological document that can be subjected to interpretation."⁶⁸² It was therefore on the basis of Plato's creations, his literary works, that Plato himself became the subject of Witwicki's investiga-

679 Skurjat, 1997: 155. "If we accept that there are multiple networks of relations between the psychological and the cultural, then we must consider the psychological approach to the history of philosophy to be well-founded" (Skurjat, 1997: 165). It seems that only the cautious, hypothetical character of this valid opinion should be rejected, all the more so since Witwicki's attitude was not reductionist, that is, he did not intend to reduce the history of philosophy to psychological analyses.

680 Cf.: Rzepa, 1998: 143–144.

681 Skurjat, 1997: 152.

682 Rzepa, 2000: 241; 2002: 61. This was a more general thesis taken over by Witwicki from Twardowski. Cf.: Nowicki, 1988.

tions.⁶⁸³ “Witwicki’s central thesis was the following: the psychologist interprets the outcomes (of human activities) as signs of the subjective world. In terms of the methodology of psychology, this was, in fact, a kind of methodological compromise between subjectivism (introspectivism) and objectivism (behaviourism).”⁶⁸⁴ For obvious reasons, neither introspection nor behaviourism were suitable methods for researching Plato. As Witwicki wrote in one of his letters, texts and books “constitute an extension of the author’s body,”⁶⁸⁵ and while reading, translating and commenting on the dialogues, he was, in fact, searching for this ‘body’ of Plato.

It was as a psychologist that Witwicki studied Plato’s relationship with Socrates, and years later, his own personal relationship with Plato was, in turn, analysed by another psychologist, T. Rzepa. She hypothesised that Witwicki’s repeated emphasis on the exceptional nature of his connection with Plato could be attributed to his arrogance, for Witwicki identified himself as an exceptional person, who had a monopoly on interpreting Plato, thus invalidating any criticism of his translations and interpretations. In fact, to put it mildly, he did not take kindly to any such criticism. As Rzepa noted ironically, “since Plato »had spoken out« again, choosing Witwicki, an excellent medium, as his means of communication, then who could deny either the aptness of Plato’s »choice« of this particular person, who was, after all, comprehensively prepared for translation work, or the close affinity of the Polish scholar’s translations of the dialogues to the original, since he had, after all, carefully followed the »instructions« given by the author himself.”⁶⁸⁶ There is no doubt that the desire to enhance both his own self-importance and the importance of his method and results were plausible motives for Witwicki’s behaviour, but Witwicki was prepared for such allegations.

In view of the relationship with Plato that Witwicki had created for himself, it does not seem unreasonable to ask the following questions: “Which of Witwicki’s faithful readers would fail to believe the translator’s words that define Socrates’ style of communication? Which of them would reject the vivid colloquialisms that they themselves were well-grounded in, that they used every day and that they could at last understand?”⁶⁸⁷ It seems quite reasonable that the non-professional public were impressed by

683 Cf.: Rzepa, 1991: 101–102, 119–120, 165–167; 1999: 127–128.

684 Woleński, 1999: 148.

685 Witwicki, 1989: 41.

686 Rzepa, 2002: 83.

687 Rzepa, 2002: 89.

the work undertaken by the translator, a recognised and respected university professor who wrote so volubly in his role as an evocative guide to the universe of Plato's dialogues. It is little wonder then, that the general public succumbed to his declarations. It is worth noting, however, that while most readers did not have sufficient means to verify the faithfulness of his translations, the first-rate classic scholars who published positive and even enthusiastic reviews of his translations of the dialogues were less likely to be so easily lured by his suggestive declarations.

Digression: Witwicki's Plato and the Lvov-Warsaw school

Witwicki's translations of Plato are considered to be a product of the Lvov-Warsaw school. According to J. Woleński, "when one reads these translations, supplemented with the translator's epic commentary, it is not clear what should be admired more – the content or the language of the translation, produced, after all, by a professor of psychology."⁶⁸⁸ Bearing in mind the original inspiration for these translations, which were intended as literary, and even artistic, works for the general public, and not initially considered in terms of their role in promoting philosophy, it seems unlikely that Twardowski can be credited with their inception. Certainly, Twardowski's encouragement may have strengthened Witwicki in his belief in the validity of the task, but it is unlikely that he provided the incentive to undertake it. At the same time, it should be noted that Twardowski encouraged his protégés, colleagues and students to undertake initiatives in many areas, including those outside the field of philosophy.

688 Woleński, 1985: 33. Woleński added in a footnote: "This is one of the few »single-person« translations of Plato's dialogues. I am indebted to professor Dąmbska for the information that among Witwicki's »predecessors«, Marsilio Ficino (Latin translation) and Schleiermacher (German translation) can certainly be included" (1985: 33, footnote 45). Dąmbska undoubtedly was an advocate of the translations by Witwicki, who rendered into Polish more dialogues than any other Polish translator, but she failed to mention that an earlier translator, A. Bronikowski, published almost as many dialogues during his lifetime. The fact that, in her work, Dąmbska listed only somewhat more than half of the dialogues published by the latter accounts for the impressive difference in the numbers of the dialogues claimed to have been translated by Witwicki and by Bronikowski (Dąmbska, 1972: 81). Moreover, none of the above-mentioned translators interpreted the entire *corpus Platonicum*. This was pointed out to Woleński with regard to Ficino and Schleiermacher by J. J. Jadacki (Jadacki, 1986: 223).

Woleński's opinion that "expertise and emphasis on the role of the history of philosophy can be considered a hallmark of the Lvov-Warsaw school, distinguishing it from other philosophical schools,"⁶⁸⁹ should be counterbalanced with the fact that Twardowski did not actually consider the history of philosophy to be a branch of the philosophical sciences. According to the founder of this school, historiography of philosophy was a subfield of history and not of philosophy. He believed that there was no harm in philosophers knowing the history of their research area, but when they pursue the history of philosophy professionally, they do so as historians. Twardowski admitted that there was a much closer connection between the history of philosophy and philosophy itself than, for example, between the history of mathematics and mathematics, but he openly declared: "When we speak of the non-philosophical sciences that every philosopher should know in depth, we must not forget about the history of philosophy, which, being a branch of history, is not a philosophical science."⁶⁹⁰ Interestingly, the history of philosophy was the last to be mentioned on Twardowski's list of non-philosophical sciences. From the perspective of the Lvov-Warsaw school, then, Witwicki's translations, though important for Polish culture in general, were of little significance to philosophy, in contrast to studies by, for example, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz or Kotarbiński.

A similar position to that of Woleński was held by Anna Drabarek, who referred to Ajdukiewicz's book, *Główne kierunki filozofii* (*Main Trends of Philosophy*), as a significant work in the field of the history of philosophy.⁶⁹¹ This work, however, is not a study of the history of philosophy, but rather a synthetic, problem-based discussion of philosophy in the form of a textbook, including a selection of philosophical texts from various eras,

689 Woleński, 1985: 33. Woleński regarded Tatarkiewicz and Stefan Swieżawski, who devoted themselves mainly to the history of philosophy, as the most outstanding examples of the 'philosophers of this school' (1985: 33); yet, in fact, they were only loosely connected with the school and their research in the history of philosophy did not result from their contacts with Twardowski or with other representatives of his school. Marek Rembierz also emphasised Swieżawski's connections with the school, but referred to them as one of the aspects of Swieżawski's position as a 'philosopher on the fringe' (Rembierz, 1999: 223). Marian Kurdziałek, in turn, in his discussion on Swieżawski's philosophical position, barely mentioned his Lvov inspirations (Kurdziałek, 1996: 35–45).

690 Twardowski, 1927b: 196. It cannot, then, be reasonably claimed that "Twardowski considered the history of philosophy to be one of the philosophical disciplines" (Słomski, 2008a: 13).

691 Drabarek, 2004: 45.

some of which were translated by the author himself. Ajdukiewicz himself declared that historical-philosophical considerations were, for him, of secondary importance in the composition of the book.⁶⁹² In Ajdukiewicz's rendering Plato's metaphysical idealism and extreme rationalism were highlighted, thus his image of the Athenian philosopher did not seem to have resulted from profound historical research.

Somewhat more of a historical verve can be observed in the work of Tadeusz Czeżowski, first delivered as lectures on the idea of causality in Vilnius in the years 1930–1931, and later published. In this small work Czeżowski made a distinction between issues of metaphysical and idealistic causality in the theory of knowledge. Metaphysical causality attributed a nexus of cause and effect, as an objectively existing relation, to nature, whereas idealistic causality considered that the cause-and-effect nexus existed in the sphere of phenomena, of thinking about the world, and not in the world itself. In his analyses of ancient philosophy, Czeżowski did not go beyond the first notion of causality. He devoted about one-fifth of this book to Plato, discussing the causality of ideas as follows: "Thus ideas can be the causes of phenomena only in the sense that they present goals that can be implemented in the phenomena, and the phenomena arise ac-

692 Ajdukiewicz, 1923: V. Let us add that in the selection of texts that was included in the book, there were two short passages from the dialogues. The first from the *Republic* (514a–517b) translated by Ajdukiewicz and Marian Golias (Ajdukiewicz, 1923: 119–122), and the second – from the *Symposium* (209e–212b) in Witwicki's translation (Ajdukiewicz, 1923: 261–263), though the 'love for boys' phrase (211b) was omitted, for Ajdukiewicz's book was also intended to be used as supplementary reading in gymnasia. The first fragment selected from Plato was intended to exemplify epistemological rationalism, and the second – metaphysical idealism. Ajdukiewicz assessed Plato's influence for future centuries as follows: "Plato turned out to be the father of rationalism, but mysticism could also be drawn from his writings. Kant's great system and the works that are derived from it have remained under the influence of Plato. Together with elements that gave rise to the mystical system of Plotinus and the elements that influenced the development of Christian theology, there are in his writings valuable thoughts of purely scientific merit, in the field of logic, or psychology or even mathematics. As for his sociological views, Plato is considered to be the first socialist, yet he was an aristocrat. There is almost no realm of thought nor era in which Plato's influence could not be shown. From the contemporary point of view Plato's arguments may seem to be very inaccurate, but despite this, readers have much to gain from reading his works, which can inspire numerous ideas and create a truly elevated atmosphere" (1923: 123). Ajdukiewicz, then, assessed Plato's influence as great, though not unambiguously so, for he denied the scientific character of Plato's philosophy while emphasising its poetic elements.

cording to these goals. The ultimate aim is the good considered in the most abstract way, thus the highest idea is the idea of the good.”⁶⁹³ Czeżowski thus described the causality of the ideas in Aristotle’s terms, stressing its purposeful nature. He also mentioned material causality, and Plato’s combination of final and material causations, according to Czeżowski, stemmed from the Pythagorean theory of oppositions, and the form of the world resulted from Plato’s acceptance of determinism, as in Democritus. Each thing had a cause in the form of an idea, and an anti-cause which limited and obstructed the former. As for the causality resulting from the actions of the Demiurge, Czeżowski did not even mention this.

Czeżowski’s presentation of Plato in his lectures consisted in abstracting the problem of causation, which was then discussed only to a limited extent. He did not attempt to resolve the disputes over Plato, but rather systematised the issue of causality for didactic purposes. Besides, Czeżowski was very critical of his own learning in the history of philosophy; when he applied for the chair of philosophy at the Stefan Batory University in Vilnius, he wrote in his letter to W. Lutosławski that his preparation in the history of philosophy was weak.⁶⁹⁴ Although T. Kotarbiński thought highly of the method and clarity of Czeżowski’s works, he was critical of Czeżowski’s competence as a historian of philosophy. Paradoxically however, he regarded this as an advantage, which had resulted from Czeżowski’s philosophical formation within the Lvov school!⁶⁹⁵ A. Drabarek also referred to this work by Czeżowski as evidence of his synthetic approach to the problems of the history of philosophy.⁶⁹⁶ The booklet is, however, little more than a record of his lectures, in which one philosophical issue was discussed as interpreted by several ancient philosophers. This was done in a problem-structured form, yet was very scanty in terms of historical content. In fact, this work is rather marginal in Czeżowski’s legacy, and it is not even mentioned by those authors who researched his work during his Vilnius period.⁶⁹⁷ It is also worth remarking that Czeżowski had a similar

693 Czeżowski, 1933: 29. As far as the presentation of Plato is concerned, this text, with only a few extensions, was included in the study published after World War II (Czeżowski, 2004: 23–29).

694 Cf.: Mróz, 2007c: 112; 2008: 200.

695 Wasilewski, 2002: 42; Mróz, 2007c: 112–113; 2008: 201.

696 Drabarek, 2004: 45–46.

697 Jadczak, 1991a; 1992 (Jadczak merely mentions the title of the lectures on which Czeżowski’s published work was based: Jadczak, 1992: 188); Wachowiak, 1997; Jadczak, 1997: 126–135; Wasilewski, 2002.

understanding of the role and method of the humanities, including history and the history of philosophy, as that of Twardowski.⁶⁹⁸

What, then, were the views on Plato expressed by Twardowski? During his university lectures he demonstrated a good knowledge of the history of philosophy,⁶⁹⁹ but he was not generally known to the reading public as a historian of philosophy. He was not a productive author in this field, but although he had only limited competence in the philosophy of the Middle Ages,⁷⁰⁰ he published a book for non-professional audiences entitled *O filozofii średniowiecznej wykładów sześć* (*Six Lectures on Medieval Philosophy*). This was Twardowski's largest independent work in the history of philosophy. Its publication soon triggered extreme opinions, including objections both of a scientific and ideological nature.⁷⁰¹ While it is true that the author demonstrated in this work his didactic talent for making philosophy accessible to the general public, this is not sufficient for him to be considered a historian of philosophy, one who contributes new findings to this field of research or even reports on the latest results of foreign investigations.⁷⁰²

While discussing the relation between ancient and medieval philosophies, Twardowski devoted several paragraphs to Plato, who was presented in a traditional way as the first to attempt to produce a philosophical system. Above all, Twardowski highlighted Plato's dualism and idealism: "Thus there are two worlds: one is sensory, and the other is a perfect, ideal world; the first exists separately from the other, just as a mirror image is separated from the object that is reflected in it."⁷⁰³ Twardowski mentioned Plato's theory of knowledge and the concept of anamnesis, but only incidentally were references made to anthropological elements.

Twardowski lectured on the history of philosophy at Lvov University, including lectures on ancient thought and monograph courses on Plato and Aristotle, during which he reported, for example, on Lutosławski's research and Zeller's subsequent polemic with him. The notes on which Twardowski based his lectures for various courses devoted to Greek philosophy suggest that he taught students a traditional, extremely dualistic, though apparently straightforward and well-ordered image of Plato's phi-

698 Zamecki, 1997: 166–172; Łukasiewicz, 2002: 130–135.

699 Borzym, 1993: 264.

700 Palacz, 1999: 316.

701 Jadczyk, 1991: 18–19; 1994.

702 Palacz, 2005: 190–193.

703 Twardowski, 1910: 7.

losophy: “Thus here we clearly have two worlds: the world of ideas and the empirical world. Further oppositions follow from this: Reason – perception, notion – imagination, objective subject knowledge – subjective opinions, plausible knowledge. The world of ideas and the empirical world – both have their specific instruments of cognition, and both are subject to different perspectives. These dichotomies go hand in hand with a clearly expressed evaluation of them: a) The world of ideas has full existence, while the empirical world only has reality to a certain extent [...]; the world of ideas is at the same time b) a perfect world; after all, the ideas are prototypes for all empirical things, they are something perfect, complete in themselves and unchangeable. We get to know these ideas, or ideals, as a theory, or we try to turn them aesthetically into a sensual robe, or in practice, we wish to implement them into our life. And since only the ideas are perfect beings, then human beings yearn for them, because they always yearn for that which is better and more perfect.”⁷⁰⁴ Twardowski quoted passages of the *Timaeus* in Greek to demonstrate another area of dualism in Plato’s physics, according to which the world and every object was formed as the combination of an ideal factor and matter, with the divine constructor of the world, the Demiurge, as the mediating factor.

In his discussion on Plato’s concept of the soul, Twardowski pointed to its connection with ethics and social philosophy. He related how Plato presented different solutions to the problem of the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedrus* and in the *Phaedo*. In the former, immortality was an ethical postulate, while in the latter, it was founded on reasoning, and, less significantly, on myths. Twardowski provided a critical reconstruction of Plato’s arguments, noting that the argument based on the unity of the soul was “either inconsistent, or only took into account its rational part.”⁷⁰⁵ Bearing in mind the difficulty of the subject, Twardowski assessed Plato’s whole argumentation as follows: “To what extent these proofs and arguments convince us is a separate problem. *Dubitare licet*. We must also face up to the enormity of the task and the deficiencies of the human intellect. It is easy to demonstrate that the arguments are false. Neither the first one nor the second nor the third can stand up to logical criticism. [...] From all our efforts on this subject, it is probably best to draw on the lesson that was learned in physics from the endeavours to construct *perpetuum mobile*. It is an impossible task. In the same way, it is unlikely that anything will be proved here. Neither *pro*, nor *contra*. There are more questions that cannot

704 Twardowski, ELV-AKT1: 10.

705 Twardowski, ELV-AKT1: 23.

be solved by scientific measures than those that can. *Non liquet*. In this case, knowledge must be replaced by faith.”⁷⁰⁶

In Twardowski's view, Plato inherited from Socrates his interest in ethics and it is therefore ethics that should be regarded as the core of Plato's philosophy. He extended the meaning of ethics from the individual to the social sphere, and after abandoning the asceticism of the *Phaedo*, he recommended in the *Philebus* that moderation, measure and harmony should become the basis for the structure of the state. The parallelism of the soul and the state went hand in hand with the application of ethics to the social realm, and this was particularly emphasised by Twardowski. About the structure of the state he wrote: “the classes are not castes in the Egyptian or Indian sense, and adequately gifted individuals from the third estate can be accepted into the second and then proceed to the first. The individuals of the third estate can have their own families and can own private property, unlike the two remaining classes. Notwithstanding this comparative freedom, the citizens of the third estate must submit completely to the aim of the State as a whole – after all, the guiding principle is that there must be *homonoia*, equanimity, unanimity and common aspirations among all the citizens in order to serve the State as a whole. The State is a unity like the human body; like the limbs of the body, the citizens must serve this whole.”⁷⁰⁷

Concerning Plato's position as to the possibility of implementing his project, Twardowski believed that “this is not a utopia in Plato's mind, but a real outline for a future state. There is ample evidence for this.”⁷⁰⁸ Twardowski himself considered that “Plato's state is thoroughly aristocratic by nature, and yet it has the character of enlightened, rational despotism.”⁷⁰⁹ There is evidence from the *Statesman* and the *Laws* that as time passes “Plato lowers his sights and the level of his demands.”⁷¹⁰ As Plato grew older,

706 Twardowski, ELV-AKT2: 117. The word “faith” was written above “science” which had been crossed out. Let us add that, some years earlier, during the Vienna period, when Twardowski was dealing with the problem of the immortality of the soul, he wrote that Plato had basically resolved this issue, for he had drawn the correct conclusions from his premises, e.g. from pre-existence (Twardowski, 2009: 34; 2009a: 46).

707 Twardowski, ELV-AKT3: 87.

708 Twardowski, ELV-AKT3: 89. In spite of the fact that this last sentence had been crossed out by Twardowski, the following parts of his text contain the evidence mentioned by him, such as the method proposed by Plato to start the new state.

709 Twardowski, ELV-AKT3: 90.

710 Twardowski, ELV-AKT3: 93.

his ethical intellectualism weakened, and perhaps, as Twardowski added, he began to equate numbers with ideas. It could be concluded, then, that there was no single philosophy in Plato, even with regard to the fundamental problem of Platonism, that is, the theory of ideas. Interpretation of Plato was further complicated by the artistic nature of his dialogues. Nevertheless, in his assessment of Plato as a whole, Twardowski did not conceal his admiration: "Of all the philosophers it is Plato who shows himself to be the most complete incarnation of the »idea« of the philosopher, *i.e.* a man whose interests were at the same time scientific-theoretical, life-practical, artistic and religious. Science, religion, art and life – it is within the centre of all of these that philosophy lies, and these are the four axes around which Plato revolves."⁷¹¹ For this reason Plato as a philosophical individual was incomparable to other philosophers, and his influence on subsequent philosophers was also incomparably greater than that of any other.

In his lectures devoted to Plato and Aristotle, Twardowski comprehensively reproduced the content of the dialogues, including those of questionable authenticity, and extensively paraphrased the myths contained in them. In these lectures which were delivered during the academic year 1905/1906, traces of references to the *Phaedo* in F. Kozłowski's translation can be found.⁷¹² As can be demonstrated by the notes to these lectures, the Lvov philosopher made use mainly of handbooks by German historians of philosophy, such as F. Ueberweg, the Austrian, T. Gomperz, or the Dane, H. Ræder.⁷¹³

Students attending Twardowski's lectures were thus provided with a fairly reliable, well-structured image of Plato's philosophy,⁷¹⁴ most of the content of these lectures being composed of very extensive summaries of the substance of the dialogues, based on German textbooks, which were sometimes the source of the original texts cited by Twardowski. The fact that Twardowski devoted the major part of his 1906 lectures to extensive summarising of the dialogues can be justified by the fact that Witwicki's dialogues had not yet appeared. Twardowski admitted the universal character of many of the issues discussed by Plato and he attempted to relate them to the current state of knowledge among contemporary audiences.

711 Twardowski, ELV-AKT3: 97.

712 Twardowski, ELV-AKT2: 115.

713 Twardowski, ELV-AKT3: 76; ELV-AKT2: *passim*.

714 Cf. laudatory words on Twardowski's lectures on the history of ancient thought: Dąmbska, 1935: V.

Let us repeat: Plato was a subject of interest for Twardowski as an academic teacher, hence German historical-philosophical synthetic studies sufficed for this purpose. He supplemented this source with information on the secondary literature on Plato and on the dialogues, which he received in his correspondence with Lutosławski, who indicated specific *loci* in the dialogues to answer Twardowski's questions.⁷¹⁵

* * *

It can be said, then, that the interest in Plato shown by Witwicki in his translations and commentaries, was unique in the whole culture of the interwar period. The exceptional nature of his work can be discerned most clearly against the background of the entire corpus of works by Twardowski and his disciples. What was distinctive about Witwicki's work should not just be seen in the context of the alleged or overemphasised particular interests of the Lvov-Warsaw school in the history of philosophy, which, as we have seen, can be called into question, but in the fact that Witwicki alone, of all the researchers of the school, focused on the history of philosophy itself. Unlike the works of other disciples of Twardowski, Witwicki's translations of Plato should be evaluated on the basis of the effect they had on disseminating knowledge about Plato, which was related to the literary, and not strictly philosophical, nature of his work.⁷¹⁶ Among the reviewers of Witwicki's translations prior to World War II, there were almost no philosophers (Dąbbska was an exception in this regard); it was philologists and classic scholars that prevailed, or occasionally those among them, like Sinko, who shared more profound interests in philosophy. This is suggested in a letter in which Witwicki reported to Twardowski on the relations in the Warsaw milieu: "Łukasiewicz glances at the *Gorgias* with a pretentious smile, full of innocent bliss, as if it were a volume of Sherlock Holmes, to which he eagerly devotes a few moments when he is free from his serious and truly significant studies on the most accurate interpretation of three-valued logic. Leśniewski does not read it at all, he only puts it on the shelf to have the full set. I do not often see Kotarbiński, but after all, I

715 Mróz, 2008d: 581.

716 This is confirmed in the article by Woleński, who set out to present Witwicki as a philosopher of the Lvov-Warsaw school (Woleński, 1999: 150), but merely mentioned his works on Plato; similarly, these works were only marginally taken into account by Dariusz Barbaszyński in his summary of Witwicki's philosophical achievements (Barbaszyński, 2003: 79).

prefer to hear Leśniewski himself rather than hear the same thing from Kotarbiński.⁷¹⁷ Witwicki, then, had less contact with the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw school than with other translators, writers, and philologists, such as Sinko or Lisiecki, whose translation suggestions he considered helpful. He had a high regard for Twardowski, yet he clearly distanced himself from Twardowski's followers and from other representatives of his school. It was, perhaps, his admiration and respect for Twardowski that was the most important factor connecting Witwicki with the philosophers of his school.⁷¹⁸

Fortunately, Witwicki was popular with his students and he could not complain about poor attendance. Among his students at the University of Warsaw, there was a large group that shared his sceptical attitude to his colleagues: "these young students of the history of philosophy, who were hungry for knowledge and extremely demanding, made fun of the »symbols«, that is, the minimalistic-formalistic »Warsaw logistics«, which we were said to be famed for throughout the world."⁷¹⁹ Those among his students and university associates who respected his work and personality gave him the nickname 'Socrates',⁷²⁰ which pleased him and gave him satisfaction. His seminar was compared to Plato's Academy.⁷²¹

The development of Witwicki's work on the dialogues can be summarised into the following sequence of events: his ideological fascination with Plato, resulting from his deepening religious crisis as a young gymnasium student – his reading of Plato during his scholarly stay in Germany – the positive response from his associates in Lvov to his rendering of the fragments of the *Symposium* – his cooperation with Staff, the editor of the "Symposium" series – Twardowski's encouragement for Witwicki to continue his work and to aim at translating all of the dialogues – the success of his productions with a wide range of readers.

717 Letter of May 20th, 1922 (Jadczyk, 1997: 34). Woleński's claim should be taken cautiously when he argued in favour of Witwicki's affiliation to the Lvov-Warsaw school on the basis of the statement that Witwicki was "on friendly terms" with the three philosophers mentioned in this quote (Woleński, 1999: 145).

718 Cf.: Rzepa, 1986: 228.

719 Micińska-Kenarowa, 2003: 245–246. Similarly, Kotarbiński remembered Witwicki as a master of the concrete (1970a: 81–82). In these accounts Witwicki seems to be adhering to Twardowski's criticism of 'symbolomania' and 'pragmatophobia'.

720 Rzepa, 2002: 87.

721 Kulik, 1989: 149.

Witwicki was able to secure for himself a permanent and unique position in the history of Polish philosophy and literature. He achieved this not just as a translator but rather as an original author, for as Parandowski described the reception of Witwicki's dialogues: "It has simply become customary to talk about every new volume of this Polish Plato as about an original work recently published. And rightly so, for it was only thanks to Witwicki that Plato was brought to Poland and it is not difficult to imagine the impression this writer makes on the minds of all those who, for the first time, lay their hands on his work, with its exquisite packaging of good, robust Polish: it is a revelation and at the same time it sows the seeds of thoughts that are surprisingly fresh and, one might say, topical, if this word did not describe things that were banal and common."⁷²²

Witwicki's editions of Plato were not intended for academic use, being published without any form of critical, philological apparatus. There was no Stephani pagination, for example, but it was only after World War II, when familiarity with classical languages was becoming increasingly rare, that his editions of Plato were consistently supplemented with this pagination, providing a helpful aid for Plato scholars.⁷²³ Witwicki intended his translations to be produced in the best possible form for promoting and disseminating Plato's work. Parandowski described his impressions from reading these translations as follows: "I have always read them with great pleasure. This may sound trivial but it is quite justified. Witwicki's translations were sought after by what he himself described as wide circles (as his original rendering of Plato's *hoi polloi* [=the many, the masses]), but among philologists and those who knew Plato in the original, they gave rise to various reservations, and sometimes even aversion."⁷²⁴ Thus Witwicki achieved in Poland what Plato had failed to do in Athens. The 'wide circles,' the many, οἱ πολλοί, became acquainted with philosophy thanks to Witwicki's accessible language, and when difficulties appeared, they were explained in the commentaries. Through Witwicki, an encounter with Plato was made possible, for he "consciously reduced the distance between the creators and the recipients of learning. Philosophers in his rendering

722 Parandowski, 1960c: 132.

723 When in 1984 Juliusz Domański articulated his critical remarks on Witwicki's translations of the dialogues, he did so as a classics scholar whose first encounter with Plato's dialogues was reading the original Greek text, not a translation, and this was rare at that time (Domański, 1984; 3; an expanded and more moderate version of this text appeared as: Domański, 1999); cf.: Pacewicz, 2006: 225.

724 Parandowski, 1974: 481; cf.: Błachowski, 1948: 75.

were not »lofty ideal figures,« but living people who directly addressed the reader.”⁷²⁵

Commenting on the philosophical works of past centuries, Twardowski stated: “great philosophical systems bear a certain analogy to works of art.”⁷²⁶ The philosophy of the past did in fact have much in common with art, and in this respect there was some correspondence between Plato and Witwicki. This was revealed in the very language used by Witwicki, which was assessed by philologists as “distinguishing itself with vivid, graphic Polish that gives some idea of the splendour of the original.”⁷²⁷ In evaluating Witwicki’s translations, Lisiecki, one of Witwicki’s contemporaries and also a translator of Plato into Polish, repeated an opinion that was current in literary and philological circles, “that his translations combine artistry of form with philosophical and philological accuracy, and this artistry extends into the commentaries, which lead the reader to the very heart of the ancient Greek world.”⁷²⁸ Lisiecki added that Witwicki had not so much handed over or presented his work, but had regaled his audience with his translations.

In his reading of the dialogues Witwicki was able to discern in Plato a personal conflict, one that he himself was not unfamiliar with, and this brought Plato even closer to the translator. In his commentaries Witwicki touched on this conflict when remarking on issues of philosophy of culture, and in particular when referring to the relation between the sciences and the arts. This conflict can be expressed in Plato’s terms as a clash between beauty and truth in artistic and scientific endeavours.⁷²⁹ Dąmbska was probably right when she discerned in Witwicki the ‘blessed blending’⁷³⁰ of an artistic spirit in a thinker’s mind. The analogy with Plato seemed obvious in this regard. In order to translate, comment and famil-

725 Skurjat, 1997: 152. Several times during the interwar period these “wide circles” had the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the language of Witwicki’s translations by means of a series of live radio broadcasts that were based on the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito* and the *Phaedo*. The radio drama attracted non-professionals and professors, as can be seen from the unprecedented response, the station being inundated with letters from a wide range of listeners. The role of Socrates was played by first-rate actors of the time: Aleksander Zelwerowicz and Stefan Jaracz.

726 Twardowski, 1927c: 173; cf.: Woźniczka, 1999: 158–159.

727 Sinko, 1932: 611.

728 Lisiecki, 1928: LXVII.

729 Cf.: Nowicki, 1982: 51–53; Rzepa, 1988: 755. This paper is a collection of interesting memories about Witwicki.

730 Dąmbska, 1975: 14; cf.: Dąmbska, 1949: 267.

iarise readers with Plato as well as he did, Witwicki himself had to be a first-rate poet.⁷³¹

Besides the pursuit of philosophy through artistic means, another aspect of spiritual communion between Plato and Witwicki was their adoration for Socrates, who was, along with Plato, "brought to life by Witwicki so substantively that it seemed as if he himself had actually conducted long discussions with them and had known them at close quarters when they were alive."⁷³² Plato and Socrates not only spoke to Poles in Witwicki's language but it seemed as if they also co-created Witwicki himself, with the intellectual predispositions necessary to work fruitfully on the dialogues. In this connection, an apt question was framed by Nowicki: "What was it that happened when Plato and Witwicki met? Did Witwicki become Witwicki because he encountered Plato, or was it rather that, because he was Witwicki, he was able to discover the sources of energy in Plato's dialogues?"⁷³³ I. Dąmbska believed that Witwicki had discovered the true Plato, and he was able to convey this true image in his commentaries thanks to his erudition, his philological and historical competence and his psychologism. In answer to the question: Who was the Plato whose image was moulded for Polish readers by Witwicki? Dąmbska answered briefly: "He was himself."⁷³⁴

Witwicki was simply perceived by his contemporaries as a modern Socrates: "he was never to be parted from Plato for the rest of his life, and in conversations and discussions he frequently imitated Plato's Socrates, probably unintentionally."⁷³⁵ In a similar vein, Wallis wrote: "one cannot help feeling that Witwicki himself [...] created in himself, in his imagination, an ideal figure of himself which had certain features of Plato's Socrates, and he »acted out« this character, more or less consciously, before other people."⁷³⁶ It would also be quite reasonable to reverse this view, for perhaps Plato's Socrates in Witwicki's translations was an expression of the translator's thoughts and personality. If someone had become acquainted with the translations before they met the translator, they might have had the impression that Witwicki was imitating Socrates, but it was, after all, his Socrates.

731 Rzeuska, 1969: 324; cf.: Rybowska, 1996: 164–165.

732 *Filozof-Korzyniewska*, APAN1: 74.

733 Nowicki, 1983: 245.

734 Dąmbska, 1972: 77.

735 Kreutz, APAN1: 24.

736 Wallis, 1975: 22.

In the case of Witwicki and his image of Socrates, then, the Polish reader is dealing with a unique complex synthesis, for in the process of translating the text, the translator cooperates with the author, Plato, in creating the central character of the work, *i.e.* Socrates. But Socrates himself had already been created by Plato, and it is impossible to distinguish between the original Socratic features and those added by Plato. At the same time, Witwicki was creating Socrates for a specific Polish audience, and therefore it is natural that he highlighted those features that were spiritually akin to him, and subsequently sought to attain the ideal that he had produced. Having created Socrates, he aspired to reproduce this Socrates in himself, as a contemporary Socrates.

In her reconstruction of Witwicki's image of Socrates, K. Skurjat quite rightly drew attention to those features that had been highlighted by the translator in his commentaries: his rationalism, his encouragement of independent thinking and resulting from this, the courage to propagate the truth. However, she may have gone too far in her claim that "Witwicki took the view that a reliable image of Socrates was conveyed only by one source – Plato's writings."⁷³⁷ While it is true that Witwicki based the reproduction of Socrates in his translations on Plato, at the same time he was aware of, and appreciated, Plato's literary talents, and therefore understood that Plato's Socrates could not be regarded as identical to the historical Socrates.⁷³⁸ Plato's Socrates was an ideal on several counts; he was useful as a didactic tool, as well as being attractive as a paragon of philosophical and human perfection. Even if this Socrates had merely been a literary character created by Plato, he would still have been a valuable subject of interest for philosophers. He was a timeless, universal figure, who condemned acts of violence and did so, according to Witwicki, thanks to the memory of his own death, which had resulted from the tyranny of democracy.

Socrates should definitely be distinguished from Plato. Witwicki felt an almost uncritical admiration for Socrates, irrespective of whether he was a real character or a literary creation, but when necessary, he was critical of Plato, though he valued him as a writer, poet and philosopher, and at the very least, as the author of the great image of Socrates.

737 Skurjat, 1997: 156.

738 T. Rzepa did not always distinguish sufficiently between the image of Socrates and that of Plato in Witwicki's writings, and as a result she took Witwicki's remarks on Plato as characteristics of Socrates. *Cf.*: Witwicki's observations on Plato's poetic and scientific inclinations (Witwicki, 1948: 9) were taken as an expression of Socrates' internal conflicts (Rzepa, 2002: 102).

Epilogue: Plato as jointly responsible for World War II and the post-war situation

The years after the outbreak of World War II constituted the fourth and final stage of Witwicki's biography, according to Nowicki's periodisation. During that period he completed the translation of six dialogues and the majority of the *Laws*. In one of his letters of 1946 he wrote about his works: "they are left rotting in a closet [...]. Everything lies idle, awaiting paper, publishers, and future readers of the *Opera Posthuma*."⁷³⁹ Fate, however, was not as unkind to Witwicki as he had presumed. Towards the end of his life, his study on Plato appeared in print, and around mid-1949 (though the edition was dated 1948), his translation of the *Republic* was published posthumously.⁷⁴⁰

Witwicki's book on Plato, entitled *Plato as an Educationalist*, was rightly assessed by Błachowski as "a work that is not large, but very useful,"⁷⁴¹ its greatest merit being the vivid outline of the Athenian political system and philosophical movements. The first part of this small book consisted of Plato's biography, set within the context of the political situation of the time and presented in a guise suitable for the general public. The author, for instance, did not shy away from colloquial titbits like the following: "Plato was not attracted to the lassies, but brave men delighted him."⁷⁴² Bearing in mind the goal of his work, however, Witwicki foregrounded Plato's thirst for knowledge and education, and only later presented his aristocratism and his aversion to democracy.

It was only as a writer, and not as an active politician, that Plato fulfilled his political dreams. His political project was thus intended to be a future utopia. What had been a hazy and indefinite future for Plato, however, became a contemporary reality for Witwicki, and he did not approve of it:

739 Nowicki, 1982: 22. Rzepa regards this final chapter of Witwicki's work as completely different from all the previous stages (Rzepa, 1991:171–172).

740 In an article in memory of Witwicki, which was published in 1949 by Dąbska, the *Republic* and other dialogues are listed as part of Witwicki's unpublished legacy (Dąbska, 1949: 263, note; 267).

741 Błachowski, 1948: 76.

742 Witwicki, 1947: 7. Some parts of this work and of Witwicki's introduction to the first edition of the *Republic* (1948) have recently been reprinted (Mróz, 2010: 267–283). It is important to remark that in all the later reprints of the *Republic*, which were based on the second edition (1958), some of Witwicki's opinions had been removed. On Witwicki's assessment of Plato's political project cf. Mróz, 2011: 189–190; Mróz, 2012: 127–129.

“Plato was not given any opportunity to organise a state, nor did he influence the fate of any. His dreams of an ideal state were only to some extent realised in the structures of the Christian Church, and it was not until over two thousand years later that a second realisation of his vision appeared, when totalitarian states began to multiply in twentieth century Europe. Fortunately, Plato did not live to see them. If he had, he would probably have burnt his masterpiece on political government, together with his dialogue titled the *Statesman*. This would have been a pity, because Plato’s writings are beautiful, and the implementation of poetic visions inevitably brings disappointments, and not just in this particular case.”⁷⁴³ Witwicki believed that at the core of Plato’s project was a lack of feasibility, and all attempts to implement it had distorted Plato’s intentions and were therefore doomed to failure. Above all, these attempts had only taken external institutions into consideration, leaving out the most important aspect of Plato’s political ideas, namely the need to improve and perfect human beings.

From Witwicki’s book, the general public could learn about Plato’s theory of ideas in its traditional form: “A real, unchanging object, corresponding to some general name, is called a form in the works of Plato, in Greek *eidos* or *idea*.”⁷⁴⁴ At the same time, *idea* was a concept that produced knowledge: “Comparing any items that are similar to each other in some respect, that is, objects of one kind, we distinguish on the one hand, between thinking that is concerned with what the items have in common, what can be attributed to them all, and on the other hand, what is immaterial and can be grasped only by the process of thought, and named by a general term. This is *idea*.”⁷⁴⁵

While ideas can be the subject of exact knowledge, not all the issues that Plato touched on were described with similar clarity. Witwicki, like Plato, did not deny that opinions had certain cognitive functions, but he bluntly described the content of the *Phaedo* as beautiful fairy tales, and these were a mere attempt at approaching knowledge. Concerning inexact methods for researching reality he said: “even metaphoric phrases, poetic images and myths can bring us closer to knowledge in some field where reality is

743 Witwicki, 1947: 26. It is worth drawing attention to the fact that, starting from this work by Witwicki, the title of Plato’s *Politeia* is consistently translated into Polish as the *State* (*Państwo*), for he argued that the *Republic* (*Rzeczpospolita*) was inadequate (Witwicki, 1947: 50).

744 Witwicki, 1947: 30.

745 Witwicki, 1947: 30.

obscure or hardly accessible, and we are not capable of gaining knowledge of a given area.”⁷⁴⁶

Witwicki reconstructed Plato's opinions on the soul, reincarnation, anamnesis and the theory of 'advantages' ('zalety', as Witwicki translated *arete* at that time). He also outlined Plato's political project, which he considered escapist, comparing it to a large monastery, a concentration camp, a prison and a totalitarian state. There is little doubt that the political situation in Poland at that time was an extremely important factor influencing his assessment of the content of the *Republic*. Shortly before his death Witwicki stated: "Many of Plato's political thoughts and dreams have come to fulfilment in twentieth century Europe, where totalitarian states are being formed, state education and military training for boys and girls are becoming a reality, women have gained equal rights and freedom of speech and freedom of the press have been limited. European states, one after another, have ceased to be communities of free individuals and become large institutions of rational breeding and exploitation of ethnic groups at the hands of armed committees. Not everything in these states has gone as Plato intended. [...] The state, in his view, was to have been a kind of holy order of knights under the governance of a carefully educated and tested intellectual elite, just like the Church in the Middle Ages or in the Jesuit republic in Paraguay. Nevertheless, the desire to bind people together in a kind of beehive or termite hill, in a close unity in which the individual has its place only as an instrument of the whole, has its origins in Plato.”⁷⁴⁷

Plato's theory of education was outlined against the background of his philosophy of politics, the two being closely related. Witwicki emphasised the role of nationalisation, standardisation and obligatory education, which he considered to be almost visionary postulates. He tried to justify the far-reaching unification of citizens and the suppression of individuality resulting from the standardised course of education in terms of the need to preserve the unity of the state – “in this respect Plato is a fossilised conservative.”⁷⁴⁸ Once again, however, it was not Plato's idea that was criticised, but its consequences and subsequent realisations: “It is known how eagerly

746 Witwicki, 1947: 32.

747 Witwicki, 1947: 36–37; cf. Jadczyk, 1982: 73–74.

748 Witwicki, 1947: 39; “First of all, there must be order and the framework must remain intact. Individualists have to conform” (Witwicki, 1947: 39).

the totalitarian states of the 20th century put this thought into practice. By doing so, they were trying to create and to establish 'nations'.⁷⁴⁹

Witwicki devoted a considerable amount of space to discussion of the role of gymnastics and music in education. He emphasised themes which have proved to be topical, such as gender equality or the necessity of applying personality tests, which "have been used by certain religious orders since the 17th century, as well as by 20th century psycho-technicians who have put great effort into conceiving the most expedient tests, that is short personality tests, the results of which are easily quantifiable and therefore can be used to distinguish between better and worse characters. The task has proved to be extremely difficult. The idea itself comes from Plato."⁷⁵⁰ Witwicki did not share Plato's conviction that only the most exact sciences, the deductive sciences, could contribute to intellectual training. And what seemed even worse to Witwicki was the fact that this biased view had not lost its supporters, because "the same can also be heard today from the mouths of pedagogues who are unable to see in the humanities and natural sciences such educative material as in logarithms, trigonometry or fourth degree equations."⁷⁵¹ Witwicki claimed that it was impossible to form the whole person without the contribution of humanistic, literary and artistic elements.

Plato was the father of the heuristic teaching method, which was taken over from Socrates. Its application, as well as the goal of making learning closer to play and arousing in children thinking and a passion for learning, met with Witwicki's enthusiasm. He noticed, however, a contradiction between these teaching methods and the recommendations for the censorship of certain types of reading and the standardisation of young minds. Children who were raised according to Plato's recommendations, Witwicki argued, would not constitute suitable material for any subsequent taming of their personalities or for being crammed into the fixed framework of Platonic education, because "stimulated thought cannot easily be kept within the confines prescribed ex officio, for it is not used to being limited to imitating compulsory patterns. A state that wants to avoid changes in its political system and its citizens' customs at all costs cannot allow the awak-

749 Witwicki, 1947: 39.

750 Witwicki, 1947: 40. Witwicki's reluctance to express mental phenomena quantitatively was emphasised by Stachowski, 1989: 603–604; and his negative attitude towards such tests was discussed by Rzepa, 1991: 97.

751 Witwicki, 1947: 43.

ening of independent thought, which could become capable of criticism and the desire for reform.”⁷⁵²

Witwicki was aware that there were institutions functioning within modern societies whose origins could be traced back to Plato's thought, though they were not inspired by a careful reading of the dialogues. The following fragment from the last pages of his book illustrates how Witwicki encouraged readers to discover the Platonic sources of the political institutions surrounding them: “it can be seen [...] how, even without knowing it, everyone today adheres to Plato's principles, by, for example, sending their children to public schools, where they are required to take subjects like arithmetic, music, gymnastics, outdoor games, as well as literature that has been carefully abridged and censored; or by encouraging children to read the Bible, censored into carefully selected excerpts, or to serve at masses and vespers; or by enrolling them in organisations like the scouts or military training groups. Teachers at school bend over backwards to turn learning into play and to conduct classes according to the heuristic method. Psycho-technicians design personality and intelligence tests to analyse children's potential. Then the daughter goes on to study at a technical university, while the son graduates in law at the university, but they both end up working as civil servants and reading only government papers. [...] Similarly, the government, even unknowingly, follows in Plato's footsteps when it takes into its own hands the private and intellectual lives of its citizens, as happened and is still happening in absolute political systems – whether enlightened or less enlightened. A considerable part of modern culture in Europe has grown from the seeds planted by Plato. That is why it is worth becoming more familiar with his writings.”⁷⁵³ Witwicki concluded his introductory text with a call to readers to acquaint themselves with the second, more extensive part of the book, which included a selection of fragments mainly from the *Republic* and the *Laws*. He added some remarks on the reception of Plato's thoughts in Poland, and in this

752 Witwicki, 1947: 44. While discussing the educational role of wine and the issue of abstinence, Witwicki took the opportunity to make ironic remarks about the *Eleusis* association and its founder, Lutosławski, as a ‘late follower’ of Plato. Neither after nor before the war did he consider it appropriate to refer to the Platonic studies of his compatriot. The reason for Witwicki's antipathy towards Lutosławski resulted from their ideological differences, but Witwicki perhaps also perceived Lutosławski as a rival for the position of the most important Polish expert on Plato.

753 Witwicki, 1947: 49–50.

he was greatly helped by Dąmbska, who also provided assistance with other parts of the book.⁷⁵⁴

This short book on Plato was the culmination of Witwicki's many years of studies on Plato. It was intended for a general audience and this goal took precedence over the author's academic ambitions. As a result, the book presented a rather shallow image of Plato and the author did not display his usual erudition, being far below the standards of Witwicki's commentaries on the dialogues. In it, however, Witwicki had the opportunity to voice his attitude to Plato's political ideas and their relation to the political situation in post-war Poland, as well as to twentieth-century totalitarian states and some church institutions. While Plato could be excused for his ideas because he had not put any of them into practice, though he had tried, unsuccessfully, to influence political life in Syracuse, his dubious followers, contemporaries of Witwicki, could not take advantage of a similar justification.

In his assessment of Plato and his 'contribution' to twentieth-century totalitarian ideologies, Witwicki – in contrast to Bertrand Russell and Karl R. Popper – was unable to criticise communism directly. The same approach is noticeable in the introduction and commentary to Plato's *Republic*, where, apart from some critical and ironic remarks about politics, Witwicki also focused on Plato's metaphysics.

The *Republic*, like all the dialogues published after World War II, with the exception of the *Timaeus* in 1951, used Stephani pagination. Witwicki began work on the translation of the *Republic* even before the outbreak of the war. On April 24th, 1939, during the meeting of the Philosophical Society in Warsaw, he presented a completed translation of Book X, under the Polish title: *Rzeczpospolita* (the *Republic*).⁷⁵⁵ Witwicki finished the first version of his commentaries to the *Republic* in the last days of August 1939.⁷⁵⁶ Yet all this effort might have been in vain, for although Witwicki managed to escape from the capital during the Warsaw Uprising, finding shelter in Konstancin, his manuscript of the *Republic* remained in the basement of his home in Warsaw. Witwicki believed that it had been burnt during the

754 In a letter to his son, Witwicki wrote about Dąmbska's help: "She sent me some books, gave summaries of others, collected bibliographical data and information about Plato in Poland. She also sent me her work on Plato, which I used" (Bober, 1989: 128).

755 Nowicki, 1983: 122–123.

756 Jeżewska, 1958b: 5–6. The letters of Witwicki to Jeżewska, quoted in this introduction, testify to the fact that before World War II Witwicki referred to this dialogue as the *Republic* (*Rzeczpospolita*).

destruction of the city by the Germans, but at the end of the war he received a package from Warsaw containing the manuscript and a short anonymous note: "An admirer of Plato sends regards from the burnt, but ever-living, city of Warsaw."⁷⁵⁷ This unknown admirer of Plato should therefore be given much of the credit for saving a translation of great importance for Polish philosophy.

The introduction to Plato's *opus magnum* opened with the translator's well-known reflection on the unsystematic character of Platonic philosophy, which made it difficult to ascertain Plato's actual opinion. Consequently, it was necessary to assume that the dialogues reflected the author's internal struggle: "it is evident that this man was never indifferent about what he wrote; his thoughts have a passionate, vibrant emotional foundation, showing that he cared deeply about what he was writing. He tends to get carried away by his emotions, leading to digressions, which spoil his line of argument."⁷⁵⁸ In this internal dispute, no views were considered by Plato to be completely unfounded or unworthy of attention, even those that no-one would seriously attribute to Plato, like the statements of Thrasymachus in the *Republic* or of Callicles, earlier in the *Gorgias*.

For Witwicki, then, the dialogues reflect the unfettered course of Plato's thought, which, though as yet un-crystallised and hazy, was, as a result, even more stimulating for the reader's own thinking. Plato was not a university professor, he did not write textbooks: "he does not lecture at the lectern and he rarely provides a set of ready-made statements; usually he thinks aloud and tests out ideas, inviting the reader into his thinking workshop, where he presents a work just begun and openly reveals the process of his research. This is a very attractive way of presenting his thoughts, bringing the reader closer to them, and it is likely to have better effects than a systematic lecture."⁷⁵⁹ According to Witwicki, on approaching the dialogues, readers should be prepared to engage their own intellectual effort; otherwise, Plato's works will leave no permanent or valuable trace on their minds.

The themes of the *Republic* include a definition of the ideal model of humanity and of the ideal political system, an indication of what is right and just, and the answer to the question of whether such aims are worth pursu-

757 Jeżewska, 1948: 460. Wallis reported that the manuscript had been saved at great risk of life by Jeżewska herself (Wallis, 1975:17). The history of various copies of the manuscript of the *Republic* was presented by her in: Jeżewska, 1958b: 6–7.

758 Witwicki, 1948: 5.

759 Witwicki, 1948: 6.

ing. For the benefit of the readers of the dialogues, Witwicki broadened the Polish concept of *justice* (*sprawiedliwość*), which was usually used in its legal context: "The ancient »just man« is what a »decent person« is today, upright, as is proper, as one ought to be, a good character, »an exemplary man«. »Justice« will then be assumed to be: »a correct state«, proper, orderly, an internal harmony."⁷⁶⁰ This concept of justice was applied to the individual as well as to the entire state.

Witwicki was strongly critical of Plato's project. He believed that Plato's contempt for democracy resulted from his aristocratic viewpoint, which had been reinforced by the death of Socrates. As a psychologist, Witwicki saw the *Republic* as evidence of an internal dialogue between Plato, the poet, and Plato, the seeker for truth. Earlier, in the *Lysis*, Witwicki had remarked that "Plato likes to speak with a touch of humour about his own inspired moments – he does not like the poet within, especially when he is seeking for truth."⁷⁶¹ In the *Republic*, however, both faces of Plato were allowed to emerge, "his struggle here concerning the influence of poetry on human souls – is a struggle with his conscience."⁷⁶²

On the subject of equal rights for men and women advocated by Plato, Witwicki again used his psychological background to analyse Plato's attitude, explaining that Plato "did not react to girls' charms and he did not love any woman. This was also reflected in his thoughts on how to organise male-female relations in the future society. Dry and pedantic thoughts. A homosexual as an organiser of marriages and romances. He was always interested in the most talented boys, the most outstanding people and those who were most refined."⁷⁶³

Witwicki's subsequent opinions on Plato's political project were even more severe: "Human individuals exist for the sake of institutions. It's all about good institutions and not about the happiness of each individual person. Hence his ideal state resembles a large monastery, a prison, a concentration camp or a totalitarian state. Hence projects of harsh, strict censorship, the use of lies in politics and ruthless constraints even in the most private aspects of life, even if individuals were to choke in these fetters. It is a very modern view. But his demands to hand over the power in the state to philosophers, namely people with the highest education, this is not, as

760 Witwicki, 1948: 7.

761 Witwicki, 1937c: 169.

762 Witwicki, 1948: 9.

763 Witwicki, 1948: 10.

you know, a modern requirement.”⁷⁶⁴ Interestingly, the two last sentences of this quote were removed in all subsequent editions of Witwicki's *Republic*, when he could no longer object. Before the war Witwicki had ironically described attempts to defend unprofessionalism and amateurishness in education as ‘very modern’ thought.⁷⁶⁵ Modernity then, and especially its post-war version, was not a positive term for Witwicki.

In describing Plato's project as a great monastery, a concentration camp and a totalitarian state, Witwicki saw the *Republic* as the work of an escapist who could not stand Athenian democracy. Witwicki's opinion is similar to that of other critics of Plato at the time, and the source of their dissatisfaction with Plato's project was the same: World War II and its consequences. Yet despite the seriousness of the criticism of the political systems, Witwicki did not seem to have lost his sense of humour, for in the introduction to the dialogue, there was an important sentence describing Plato's writing: “Plato is usually playing games while writing. He is smiling. This should never be forgotten while reading.”⁷⁶⁶ A similar sentence could also be used to describe the tone of Witwicki's commentaries

Book I of the *Republic* was considered by Witwicki to be a conversation conducted by Plato with himself, searching for answers to the question of justice and claiming that there was some confusion in the way it was commonly understood. In the commentaries Witwicki paid particular attention to all the statements of the participants of this initial conversation which, in the later course of the dialogue, were further developed, such as Plato's distaste for money-grubbing and greed. Witwicki emphasised the humorous features of the dialogue too. The whole of book VIII, discussing the degeneration of political systems, was treated by the translator as a display of Plato's sense of humour. He therefore did not think it necessary – though many commentators did – to look for the size of the mysterious number (546a–d), which was necessary for eugenic calculations. Likewise, the calculations that resulted in the statement that the king experiences true pleasure 729 times more than the despot (587e) were regarded by Witwicki as a pure prank.⁷⁶⁷

764 Witwicki, 1948: 11; cf. Witwicki, 1958: 15. To disturb his readers, Witwicki subsequently added on the subject of censorship that “anyone who was not a member of the government could not know for certain to what extent Plato's principle is applied by governments today” (Witwicki, 1948a: 343–344).

765 Witwicki, 1937e: 75.

766 Witwicki, 1948: 12.

767 Witwicki, 1948b: 305 ff., 326–328. In book VIII Witwicki treated the criticism of Athenian democracy seriously, as well as the beginnings of the criticism of the

Plato must have been embittered when writing the *Republic*, because – as Witwicki stated – the very question about the existence of true rulers, that is, those who care for those whom they rule, must have been asked by Plato with a “sad smile,”⁷⁶⁸ for in fact, he was unable to name any and he viewed the politics of the time as a relation between cattle and cattle herders. In subsequent parts of the commentary Witwicki added that these thoughts had not lost their relevance in current times.

The mental experiment with the ring of Gyges myth (359c–360d) was described by Witwicki as of little value, because its result depended on the optimism or pessimism of the experimenter. He himself was ready to defend a moderately optimistic view: “Everyone knows people who are honest – not just out of fear of being caught. Watches and teaspoons do not get lost in every company when the lights go out for a quarter of an hour.”⁷⁶⁹

Although, as we have seen, Plato makes use of myths in his dialogues, he also proposed that there should be censorship of myths and even of children’s stories in his ideal state. Witwicki commented on this as follows: “It is difficult to imagine the execution of such censorship and the prosecution of crimes of this type in practice, particularly in home education. Nevertheless, today we have censorship of reading primers, so we are somehow meeting Plato’s requirement – though not on the grounds of truth and falsehood.”⁷⁷⁰ The translator highlighted here the apparent compliance with Plato’s call for censorship in the contemporary political system. The same means was applied, but it was manipulation rather than separation of truth from falsehood that was the goal. Witwicki, however, accepted the validity of Plato’s stance on censorship, adding that, fortunately, children do not attach much significance to reading and stories, just as there is no need to remove the contradictions from religious beliefs because they do not seem to be an impediment for believers.

dictatorship that was experienced by Plato in Syracuse. According to Stachowski, Witwicki’s belief that these calculations were a mere prank showed his lack of understanding of Plato’s idea of measurement, resulting from the translator’s lack of passion for music, and this “actually closed for Witwicki the path to understanding the significance of Plato’s idea of measurement in the social sciences and, consequently, to measuring the intensity of the mental act” (Stachowski, 1989: 604).

768 Witwicki, 1948a: 308.

769 Witwicki, 1948a: 321–322.

770 Witwicki, 1948a: 333.

When writing his earlier book, *Plato as an Educationalist*, Witwicki had questioned the possibility of intellectually stimulating young people and encouraging their criticism on the one hand, and preserving their respect for tradition on the other. Of course, the tradition in question was the new tradition that was to be implemented with Plato's project. According to this line of thinking, Plato himself would have been forced to censor some parts of his own work, where he had advocated the need for censorship. Otherwise, his authority would have been undermined since he was calling for revision of the current tradition. The whole issue seemed to the translator to be extremely difficult and it was probably impossible "to arouse criticism in young people, to make them sensitive to the contradictions and vileness hidden in written and spoken texts, yet, at the same time, to maintain their naive attitude to traditional views, and to protect them from thinking and discussing these issues in an objective way until the age of thirty."⁷⁷¹

In addition to censorship, Plato also called for abolishing art as an inappropriate means of educating young minds, more especially as it was frequently misapplied. These remarks seemed to Witwicki to be particularly relevant to contemporary Polish culture.⁷⁷² Considerations about art in general were for Plato another opportunity for squaring up with himself as an artist. "Poetry should not be taken as learning – Plato is absolutely right here, but there is no reason either to renounce it or to forbid others cultivating it."⁷⁷³ The reason for this, Witwicki added, was that poetry is one of our basic human needs. The human need for fantasy was, in turn, satisfied by the final myth of the dialogue, while at the same time quenching the human desire for bringing human souls to justice.

As for music, Plato's precise guidelines, and especially those concerning its impact on the young, might have appeared to Witwicki's contemporary readers as rather conservative, especially when compared to Plato's other

771 Witwicki, 1948b: 299.

772 "Apparently, not much has changed in this respect since the time of Plato. After all, in our country the many »learn« about the beginnings of Christianity from *Quo Vadis*, about the times of Louis XIV from Dumas, about the Cossack wars from *With Fire and Sword*, about the November Uprising from Wyspiański, about the January Uprising from Grottger and about love and about what is good and bad – from the novels of manners. Today, as two thousand years ago, artists play the role of irresponsible and undereducated teachers for anyone who reads or watches them without consulting scholarly literature" (Witwicki, 1948b: 335).

773 Witwicki, 1948b: 339.

revolutionary ideas. Witwicki hastened to point out, however, just how important Plato's directives had become for contemporary society: "just let us remind ourselves of how scrupulously the Church, for example, has adhered to its style of music over the centuries; or consider the significance of the atmosphere surrounding the post-war wave of Jazz, which was eventually banned in totalitarian countries."⁷⁷⁴

Plato's apparent conservatism, illustrated in the above examples, could only be put into practice after some kind of upheaval had been implemented, bringing about a total change in political relations. Witwicki described this as "conservatism starting from tomorrow."⁷⁷⁵ If this anticipated tomorrow were actually to transpire, there would need to be some 'clearing of the ground,' a subtle and innocuous sounding term which involved human material being treated as a substrate for the future state. For Witwicki, the ostensible innocence of this procedure had been exposed by contemporary political systems. He wrote: "Today we are all too familiar with this ground clearing and we know that it is not a pumice stone that the political reformers use for this purpose, but a guillotine, or some other more innovative mechanism. Character-shaping involving the erasure of certain features and the instilment of others that are considered by the reformers to be ideal was not only achieved by means of schools, newspapers and the radio. Prisons were also very helpful, as were concentration camps and secluded islands. The quickest way to paint such pictures of the ideal human character was with the brush of terror, though the results were not always the most permanent."⁷⁷⁶ This comment was cited by Jadczyk in 1982, in his attempt to bring Witwicki back to the attention of philosophical circles, despite his well-known anti-totalitarian and anti-communist views. Ignoring the anti-Soviet significance of Witwicki's text, Jadczyk wrote: "the scholar is clearly reacting here to the phenomena of terror and fascism which accompanied state totalitarianism. This statement clearly testifies to the fact that Witwicki was unable to ignore the a-humanitarian trends that overwhelmed some countries and social strata in the interwar period."⁷⁷⁷

Another feature of Plato's state was to be the importance of exterior signs of unity among citizens, such as the compulsory use of titles, *e.g.* 'fellow-citizen.' No real unity, however, could be born of this. The practice

774 Witwicki, 1948a: 360. The remark on banning jazz was removed from later editions of the book.

775 Witwicki, 1948a: 360–361.

776 Witwicki, 1948b: 272.

777 Jadczyk, 1982: 73.

was also adopted by the Soviet satellite states in Witwicki's lifetime, but the use of exterior forms alone, e.g. 'comrade,' proved to be misconceived and did not lead to the projected goal: "we have seen how totalitarian states, following the example of the Church, introduced conventional formulaic patriotic greetings by word and gesture, and this was somehow considered sufficient, because in collective life, since no one can see what is happening in another person's soul anyway, even completely empty and sham forms are of great significance."⁷⁷⁸ Suppressing individuality in public life inevitably led to a reaction in the last remaining traces of private life, in one of its few spheres that are beyond the control of the state, namely in dreams. One of Freud's main ideas therefore turned out to have its ostensible source in Book IX of Plato's *Republic*. According to Witwicki, however, both Plato and Freud were mistaken.⁷⁷⁹

Plato believed that the intellectual elite should be made responsible for state government, representing a kind of knightly order guarding the state. This appealed to Witwicki more and more, especially as the political realities surrounding him became increasingly remote from this. Nevertheless, conferring on the state, or any other community, the possibility of achieving happiness was, for Witwicki, an illusion. "Those who desire the happiness of the whole and abandon the happiness of classes and human individuals are doctrinaires, who are, in fact, indifferent to human happiness or unhappiness; they only care about bringing their visionary organisation into existence, even if it is to no one's satisfaction."⁷⁸⁰ By not setting itself the aim of bringing happiness to individuals, the political system of Witwicki's day seemed to be pursuing Plato's illusory goal. In Witwicki's opinion, some happiness, however, could result from Plato's concept of justice: "First of all, there has to be some assurance that everyone does one's own – that is what justice is – and some happiness will follow as a consequence. Those who force happiness on the whole can be a threat to the happiness of particular individuals and classes."⁷⁸¹ In the subsequent parts of his commentaries concerning the happiness of the rulers, Witwicki added ironically: "They will be really happy as long as they don't suddenly take it into their heads to look for personal happiness on their own ac-

778 Witwicki, 1948a: 382.

779 About the influence of Plato's thought and psychoanalysis on Witwicki's concept of personality cf. Rzepa, 1991: 149–150.

780 Witwicki, 1948a: 358.

781 Witwicki, 1948a: 358–359; cf.: 364.

count and in their own way. Otherwise, they'll have a paradise on earth."⁷⁸²

Plato's conception of justice gave Witwicki the opportunity to voice his opinion about Plato's psychological make-up and to level criticism at the idea of Christian justice. He argued that the way Plato advertised his conception of justice revealed his "schizothymic disposition – close to autism. Introversion. The cult of his own soul – taking others into consideration only as of secondary importance – as a means, not as an aim."⁷⁸³ Likewise, treating people as a means to achieve one's own goals in order to attain the salvation of one's soul was seen by Witwicki to be a serious objection to Christianity, "an ethical ideal – fulfilling God's will and searching for one's own salvation in this way. Serving people is just a means to that end. A Christian only loves his neighbour – if indeed he does love him – to fulfil God's commandment, and not for the sake of the fellow human himself, and the Christian does good to his neighbour, because he seeks his own salvation."⁷⁸⁴ Faith, thus, deprived man of a healthy moral faculty.⁷⁸⁵

The abolition of the traditional institution of the family did not meet with Witwicki's enthusiasm. He criticised Plato severely, and considered his homosexuality to be the source of such ideas: "He apparently does not understand how a man can bind himself permanently to one woman, since there are so many of them, and for him personally, all of them are devoid of all charm. [...] Access to women can be gained with tickets by drawing lots. He cannot see at all what he has to offer young people: such a dog's life, so superficial, empty, shallow, miserable, sad, with occasional intercourse. [...] And he treats people just like sheep that can be mated and separated. He displays no respect and no consideration for this aspect of the human soul. [...] He manifested [...] a schizothymic indifference and utter disregard for those emotions of the human heart which we can respect."⁷⁸⁶ Witwicki, however, warned the reader not to misunderstand the Platonic phrase, 'community of women,' as consent for debauchery. Plato's goal was to adjust this sphere of human life according to natural and geometrical recommendations. The author of the *Republic* did not seek to destroy the family, but, in fact, to extend it, which was to result in the unity, solidarity and cohesion of the state organism. It did not occur to

782 Witwicki, 1948a: 382–383.

783 Witwicki, 1948a: 370; cf. Skurjat, 1997: 163–164.

784 Witwicki, 1948a: 370.

785 Jadczak, 1989: 194.

786 Witwicki, 1948a: 378–378.

Plato, as a cold man without feelings, who did not comprehend family ties, that he was planning to deprive people of an important sphere of human life.

Among the character traits of the philosophers that Witwicki particularly highlighted was their interest in the sciences and enlightenment: "Plato has in mind such intellectualists who have eyes, ears and minds open"⁷⁸⁷ and – of course – have knowledge and are able to use abstract concepts. And these character traits continued to be relevant, especially when articulated by Witwicki in modern language: "These philosophers of Plato are simply talented people who are passionate about solid, scientific work. Plato would rather have seen such heads at the reins of states than writers, journalists or amateurs with half-baked educations and fuzzy heads."⁷⁸⁸ The philosophers that Plato meant were neither real figures nor the objects of derision in Athens; they were – like Plato's entire state – an exemplary model or ideal.

Forcing philosophers to wield power when they have no desire for it, seemed to Witwicki only to confirm the "unreal, dreamy character of Plato's reasoning and [...] his ruthlessness towards the individual human being. The greatest intellect need not, after all, go hand in hand with administrative talents."⁷⁸⁹ Likewise, Witwicki criticised Plato's idea of the predominance of mathematical abilities over other scientific abilities. He saw in Plato the source of overloaded teaching programmes and excessive emphasis on mathematics exams. He wrote: "Plato is a great optimist when he thinks that people capable of calculus are capable of all other subjects of learning. We know very well today cases of child prodigies and phenomenal calculators, who are, however, extremely limited in every other field. Nor has it been possible to verify in any way that learning calculus can have an impact on the minds of people who are dull by nature. And yet today more mathematics is required in exams than most of the candidates will ever need."⁷⁹⁰ Nevertheless, Witwicki agreed with Plato's argument that the state should support the pursuit of abstract and theoretical, and therefore impractical, sciences.

787 Witwicki, 1948a: 386. This ideal of the philosopher who was fit to be a ruler was presented by Jadczak simply as the ideal of a man of culture; he emphasised its universality and timeliness (Jadczak, 1982: 75–76).

788 Witwicki, 1948a: 392.

789 Witwicki, 1948b: 290–291.

790 Witwicki, 1948b: 292–293.

As to the feasibility of the ideal state outlined by Plato, Witwicki believed that even the author of the *Republic* had no certainty in this regard. “Plato indicates only the recommended direction and does not attach significance to the details of practical implementation.”⁷⁹¹ The translator has, however, repeatedly noted that if any aspects of Plato’s project have been successfully realised, then they involve at most, small details, detached from and devoid of the Platonic spirit. The same remark could also be applied to the ideal type of philosopher. Witwicki added, showing some solidarity with Plato in this respect, that “it is difficult to believe that any system – even the most ideal – could in any way overcome the savagery of human hearts. Such things are healed slowly and not by political upheavals. So the only advice is: do your own thing and do not lose hope.”⁷⁹²

In considering the ways of attaining the Good, around which Plato’s philosophical reflection revolved and which was to be the subject of cognition for the true philosopher, Witwicki indicated a complex of various philosophical sciences: “Plato’s Good turns out to be the same thing as being and reality, so it might be a kind of ontology, or descriptive metaphysics, or even logic grasped in a particular way.”⁷⁹³ Moreover, in the emotional sphere, the Good was to replace the Greek pantheon and become identical with God. The statement that the Sun is a child of the Good (506d–e), was, for Witwicki, vaguely reminiscent of the prologue to the Gospel of John. Yet the translator justified Plato’s language on account of his emotional attitude to his subject: “Plato says quite simple things, but he gets carried away by emotions, and metaphors are born one after another, as a result of which it gets misty and God appears behind this cloud – in the shape of the sun.”⁷⁹⁴

It was from Plato’s ability to translate philosophical problems into images, which Witwicki called ‘visual passion,’ that the image of the cave was born in the opening to Book VII. Witwicki suspected that this image may have come to Plato as he sat at sunset observing the prisoners working in the quarries of Syracuse. “Sometimes vivid metaphors present themselves to visual personality types through nature in the form of tangible objects, while at other times specific objects with metaphorical meaning are created by the visual personalities themselves through dreams, in words and

791 Witwicki, 1948a: 385.

792 Witwicki, 1948b: 269.

793 Witwicki, 1948b: 275; “Logic comprehended ontologically and metaphysics under the name of dialectics” (Witwicki, 1948b: 297).

794 Witwicki, 1948b: 278.

pictorial phrases, or in pictures.”⁷⁹⁵ If this were not so, then the painting, *Frenzy (Szal)*, by Władysław Podkowiński would only depict an unsuccessful horseback ride.

Although Plato was not a philosopher who avoided pictorial comparisons, myths or allegories, at the same time he considered abstract, dialectical thinking to be the supreme form of scientific knowledge about reality, and not its shadows or apparitions. Witwicki criticised this position, or to be more precise, its one-sidedness and subsequent distortions: “This is a mistaken position. It is possible to think unpictorially yet confusingly, and one can think precisely and clearly without losing sight of the images of things. There is nothing easier than to lose sight of facts and the material of sensory perceptions while under the the impression that the pinnacle of the world of thought has been reached, when, in actual fact, the words are just rolling off the tongue or onto paper, yet contact with reality has been lost instead of being achieved. This is what is known in education as the spectre of verbiage, which can also be found in the philosophical phraseology practised in some schools of philosophy in the past and even today.”⁷⁹⁶ It is possible that Witwicki was referring here to the constant object of his contempt: scholastic philosophy and contemporary analytical trends in philosophy, and thus directly to his university colleagues. Fortunately, Plato did not apply this abstract, dialectical thinking consistently and thanks to this, thanks to pictures, examples and metaphors, his works were better understood.

Soon after its publication in 1948, Witwicki's *Republic* ended up on the censor's desk, with some of the copies presumably confiscated and banned from circulation. The censors must have read Witwicki's comments carefully, and claimed that the summaries of the dialogues were “supplemented by observations that are either completely irrelevant, or explicitly harmful or vague.”⁷⁹⁷ Similarly negative opinions were expressed about Witwicki's comments on the relation between Plato's political ideas and the political situation in Poland, which were considered by the censors to be “harmful muddle-headedness, or based on an idealistic and reactionary view of the world.”⁷⁹⁸ The book was classified as harmful and in 1949 its re-release was to have been banned; the fact that it did, in fact, see the light

795 Witwicki, 1948b: 286.

796 Witwicki, 1948b: 296.

797 Zaborowski, 1997: 94. Facsimiles of the documents of the censors are reprinted there.

798 Zaborowski, 1997: 94.

of day resulted from an oversight on the part of the Office of Censorship, for according to the censor, Witwicki's opinions represented the apotheosis of fascism and elitism, capitalism and idealism – and all these ideological trends were hostile to the new People's Republic of Poland. Another of Witwicki's ideological errors was the fact that he considered the effects of Marxism and fascism to be equivalent. The censor's attention was particularly drawn to the line listing a series of dictators – Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin – of whom “one was the editor of a minor newspaper, another – a painter, and the other – a theologian, but none of them had undergone a decent course in how to govern a state.”⁷⁹⁹ While the censor's ideology was no doubt irreproachable, his knowledge about Plato's writing was less than perfect, for Witwicki was accused of an error concerning the time of the conversation depicted in the *Republic*, which had taken place in the years before Plato was born, and such a chronology was unacceptable for the censor.

Witwicki's fascination with Plato remained with him right up to his last days. Despite serious eye problems, he worked on his translation of the *Laws*, which he was, unfortunately, unable to complete before his death,⁸⁰⁰ though seven books were published as an attachment to the second edition of the *Republic*.⁸⁰¹ The translation of this dialogue occupied the last years of Witwicki's life, but the work was increasingly slow because failing eyesight compelled him to rely on assistance, and this resulted in fatigue and impatience.

As had been the case with Lutosławski, Witwicki's political criticism failed to play a major role in the post-war period. Nevertheless, Witwicki's translations have continued to exert an influence on Polish readership. Even today, for the majority of Polish readers of Plato, it is in the language of Witwicki that Socrates first speaks to them. The dialogues that were published posthumously had often been stripped of Witwicki's comments, or the language had been edited, and in general their reception was not positive. This may have resulted from the fact that the translator himself was critical of the late works of Plato, such as the *Sophist*, *Timaeus*, and especially the *Parmenides*, the content of which did not seem to be in keeping with the image of Plato that Witwicki had developed over the years. His disregard for the dry, metaphysical considerations, which he regarded

799 Witwicki, 1948b: 311.

800 Nowicki, 1978: 13–14.

801 Platon, 1958b: II, 265–586.

as empty and devoid of essential content, and perhaps just Plato's jokes, met with criticism from later translators.⁸⁰²

After World War II, it was Witwicki's translations that became the subject of criticism. For example, when preparing the edition of Witwicki's *Euthydemus* for publication, Elzenberg criticised the translation and even interfered in the text left by Witwicki, and introduced a number of amendments.⁸⁰³ Later, Domański, a philologist and classics scholar, critically analysed Witwicki's method of translation, focusing on the *Phaedo* in two of his papers. He appreciated Witwicki's work, but not uncritically. Initially, Domański even proposed that the translations should be re-published in a revised edition, but he later abandoned this idea, highlighting at the same time the important popularising aspects of Witwicki's work.⁸⁰⁴ In a similar vein, Marian Wesoły suggested that the dialogues in Witwicki's translation and with his commentaries, which form a unique work, should be supplemented with new essays presenting the contemporary state of research on Plato, without interfering with the tissue of Witwicki's text.⁸⁰⁵ It

802 Paczkowski, referring to Witwicki's introduction to the *Parmenides*, wrote: "It is still quite a common practice to juxtapose »Plato-the thinker« and »Plato-the poet«: the artist full of inspired visions who was the founder of the Academy and who »got lost« and »confused« when he tried to grasp these visions unambiguously and systematically" (Paczkowski, 1998: 7). The consequence of this approach to Plato is regarding Platonism as an internally contradictory and confused theory, and then reducing the dialogues to artistic works. Witwicki – indeed – in the case of the *Parmenides* in particular, strongly underlined the literary, humorous character of the dialogue, but it seems that, in his general attitude to Plato, he did not lose sight of the philosophical substance of most dialogues. Special emphasis was put on the co-existence, albeit not without disagreements, of Plato-the thinker and Plato-the poet. In his criticism of the deliberations in the *Parmenides*, Witwicki did not avoid expressions that were extremely negative in tone: "Darkness around, dullness around"; "This is grinding sawdust" (Witwicki, 1961: 134). Another translator opposed such assessments as displaying incomprehension of the dialogue (Górniak, 1985: 38, 43–46; cf. Gogacz, 1958: 19–20). Bołtuć saw Witwicki's interpretation of the *Parmenides* as belonging to the trend that considers this dialogue as insignificant for Plato's metaphysics (Bołtuć, 1984: 22). Although Bołtuć assesses this interpretation as being only of historical significance, he added that in order to understand Witwicki, it is important to note that it perfectly accords with his overall image of Plato as an artist and a teacher.

803 Elzenberg, 1957; cf. Hostyński, 1999: 255–257; Hostyński, 1999a: 336; Zegzuła-Nowak, 2011: 250.

804 Domański, 1984; an extended and revised version of this paper appeared in print as Domański, 1999.

805 Wesoły, 2007: 309.

is clear, then, that while Witwicki's translations are treated as a significant contribution to Polish culture, the need for their re-evaluation and the encouragement of endeavours to translate the dialogues anew is emphasised.⁸⁰⁶

Even if classicists continue to add to the list of Witwicki's errors, this will in no way belittle the protreptic function of his translations. Polish readers who wish to explore ancient legacy usually begin their acquaintance with Plato in language that is often over a century old, as is the case of the *Symposium*. This has brought some positive effects. "Witwicki's translational works have caused the Dialogues to take root in Polish intellectual life, contributing actively and permanently over the years to Polish philosophical culture, bringing generations of Poles closer to ancient Hellas, teaching them to understand its thoughts, to admire the works it has bequeathed, and to love its spiritual beauty."⁸⁰⁷ Let us quote one more opinion: "The old translations by Władysław Witwicki, though their linguistic style may jar somewhat on modern readers, have become accepted in the Polish language, and essentially they fully reflect Plato's philosophical intuitions".⁸⁰⁸ Even if subsequent translators will seek to change and modernise the language, it will be difficult to completely eradicate thinking about the dialogues in the language of Witwicki, which has not only continued to be popular and widely accepted, but is also not without undeniable merits.

What part, then, can Witwicki's translations of Plato's dialogues play today? Certainly, they are an excellent resource for popularising antiquity, philosophy in general and Plato in particular. In this role they have already shown themselves to be useful in various ways. They may serve as a starting point for studies on Plato, and they will also provide an indispensable source for future translators of Plato to consult when making their own attempts at translation. They will not, however, become autonomous material for professional studies on Plato, but it should be remembered that they were not intended as such by the translator. Could any translation, however perfect, play such a role? The answer will certainly be negative, and Plato scholars will point here to the original text, with ever more perfect editions being produced by subsequent generations of classicists. For Witwicki's translations, then, the protreptic and propaedeutic function remains, for no such comprehensive Polish translation of the dialogues has

806 Krawczuk, 1984.

807 Głombik, 1981: 43.

808 Sochoń, 1996: 5.

ever been created that would quantitatively and qualitatively surpass Witwicki's work.

One can legitimately ask whether the image of Plato as a man of letters, and sometimes even as a comic writer, which has taken permanent roots in the minds of readers because of Witwicki's translations, did not gain popularity due to the oversimplification of certain problems. Since it was possible to treat large parts of the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*, and even the entire *Parmenides*, as a joke, then the content which was meant to be taken seriously was of a much lighter calibre than the mathematical considerations in the *Timaeus* or the abstractions of the *Parmenides*. This is, perhaps, the price we must pay for effective popularisation. In Witwicki's defence, attention should be drawn to the fact that he began his translational works with dialogues which were literary masterpieces, the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, and on the basis of these works he developed an image of Plato primarily as an artist who, in addition, was endowed with a sense of humour. Having formed this image of Plato, Witwicki continued to interpret the later dialogues in accordance with the image of Plato that he had developed earlier. This Plato could not have been unfailingly serious when composing the *Parmenides*.

Polish readers of Plato are in constant need of new and better translations of the dialogues. It seems, however, that Witwicki's translation is such a unique phenomenon in Polish philosophical culture that any form of tampering with the text, such as improvements, corrections or stylistic touch-ups, would be regarded as an attempt to deprive them of their original stamp. The translations of Nietzsche's works, which come from the same period as Witwicki's output or even earlier, are still widely read and reprinted, but they are neither improved nor modernised – new ones are produced. Plato's dialogues should undergo the same process. Polish Plato admirers appear not to be aware of other translations of the dialogues that were published in the past, and many of the recent translations do not meet the audience's expectations and do not stand comparison with Witwicki's productions.⁸⁰⁹ Witwicki's work will continue to be a benchmark for subsequent Polish translations of Plato, and most reviews of each

809 E.g. Rybowska assessed Zwolski's translations and comments extremely negatively while those by Legutko were assessed positively: "Contemporary audiences cannot be satisfied with grammatical explanations only and scantily provided realities; one wishes to receive Plato's texts in all dimensions: philological-literary, historical, hermeneutic" (Rybowska, 1996: 164; cf. Żelazny, J., 2004: 97; Regner, 1997).

new translation of the dialogues contain references to Witwicki. In his review of a translation of the *Symposium* by Edward Zwolski, Leopold Regner, for instance, expresses his appreciation for the role played by Witwicki and his translations, which “rendered enormous services to Polish culture, because thanks to their light and clear language they brought Polish intellectuals of the present century closer to the thought of Socrates and Plato, though for various reasons they did not fully meet the needs of the academic community. In addition, the language of Witwicki’s translations and the language of today have drifted apart. For these reasons, new translations of Plato would not only be beneficial but absolutely necessary”.⁸¹⁰ It seems that the best solution is to leave Witwicki’s exceptional and monumental work in its original form, and to encourage classicists and philosophers to undertake further attempts at translating Plato’s work. It would also be expedient to publish forgotten translations which have never been published or which are now out of print.

3.5 *Plato as a mathematician and a logician*

It was not until the interwar period that Plato as a mathematician became of particular interest to Polish researchers. Before that time August Tabulski (1842–after 1898) published a dissertation in Leipzig on the influence of mathematics on philosophers from antiquity to modern times. In this dissertation Tabulski argued that Plato had liberated Pythagoreanism from its one-sided identification of philosophy with mathematics, though he made mathematics the basis for pursuing all philosophy. It was from the Pythagoreans that Plato borrowed the concept of ideal numbers, and his dialectics had its origins in their doctrines.⁸¹¹

Polish researchers in the interwar period undertook research on much more detailed issues than was the case in Tabulski’s work, and most probably they did not even know of the existence of his dissertation. Marian Auerbach (1882–1941), for example, took as a starting point for his paper the no entry ban for those who had not learned geometry which is believed to have been inscribed at the entrance to Plato’s Academy. The aim of Auerbach’s text was to demonstrate that Plato and his successors at the Academy regarded mathematics as a propaedeutic for philosophical studies. Their adoration for mathematics stemmed from the Socratic inspira-

810 Regner, 1995: 95.

811 Tabulski, 1868: 11–13.

tion to seek out definitions, exact examples of which had been discovered by Plato in mathematics. Auerbach argued that it was futile to search for evidence of Plato's mathematical knowledge in the majority of the dialogues, for their exoteric nature meant that nothing could be included in them that would significantly exceed the cognitive abilities of general audiences. It could not therefore be claimed that Plato was ignorant of the Pythagorean theorem on the basis of the fact that it was not directly subjected to discussion in the dialogues. Plato's knowledge of mathematics and his contribution to this field went beyond the content of the dialogues. Even the discussion on the theory of solid figures in the *Timaeus* was not considered to be a suitable foundation for gauging the extent of Plato's mathematical knowledge, for Auerbach believed that this discussion was more about mysticism than mathematics. Likewise, he considered the mathematical aspects of the theory of ideas as being more concerned with ontology, although the theory of ideas itself, in Auerbach's view, could not have originated without mathematics, the objects of which Plato believed to be incorporeal and abstract beings – just like the ideas. According to Auerbach, Plato must have dealt with problems of contemporary mathematics and geometry, such as the problem of doubling the cube (the Delian problem). Among Plato's contributions to the field of mathematics Auerbach mentioned that he was believed to have introduced the analytic (regressive) proof into mathematics. This consisted in recognising a judgment as true, provided that it was possible to draw from it conclusions whose truth value had already been confirmed in some other way. Moreover, the dialogues contained a number of definitions that have become widely accepted in mathematics, such as defining the surface of a solid figure as its limit (*Meno*, 76a). It was Plato who introduced the deductive method to geometry although in arithmetic he still had to use induction *i.e.* a process of trial and error, in his search for the number of factors of 5040, providing the correct answer (59) and accurately claiming that all the numbers from 1 to 10 were among them (*Laws*, 737e–738b). His contribution to mathematics was not limited to his own research, but included his encouragement of his disciples to investigate mathematical problems. Without this, as Auerbach concluded, the *Elements* by Euclid would not have become such a model of accuracy and clarity, for “it was Plato who had laid the foundations for the construction of the *Elements* by basing the teaching in his school on the mathematical sciences, by proposing problems and seeking out the right people to solve them, and by attracting

the best mathematicians to his school.”⁸¹² Hence, in addition to Plato’s autonomous research and his influence on the investigations of his disciples, the Greek philosopher should also be credited with the emphasis that came to be placed on the need to teach mathematics in later centuries.

Z. Jordan and the methods of the Lvov school applied to Plato

The work by Auerbach did not come up with any original findings, being rather a presentation of *status quaestionis* in the field of Plato’s attitude to mathematics. What had been merely mentioned by Auerbach was considered in detail in the work of Zbigniew Jordan (1911–1977), the most significant Polish researcher on the mathematical aspects of Plato’s work. His doctoral thesis was on the subject of Plato, though, as it later transpired, ancient philosophy was to become rather the exception than the rule in his subsequent research. For Jordan, and especially for the supervisor of his dissertation, it was not so much Plato that was the subject of his historical-philosophical research as Plato’s works, which provided suitable philosophical material for testing the use of analytical methods in philosophy, and this, in turn, was to lead to significant conclusions for the history of science. Jordan’s supervisor, Zygmunt Zawirski (1882–1948), was not a specialist in the field of ancient philosophy, his main field of research being the philosophy of science and methodological and logical issues. During the period of his work in Poznań, Jordan and F. Zeidler were counted among Zawirski’s most outstanding students.⁸¹³

During the Third Congress of Philosophy in Kraków in 1936, Jordan delivered a paper in which he presented the main theses of his dissertation. At that time he was still working towards his Ph.D. under the supervision of Zawirski. In his paper Jordan argued that although the axiomatic system was developed by Euclid, the axiomatic method itself must have been discovered earlier, and he believed that Plato had been the first to discover this method. This conclusion was reached on the basis of Jordan’s analyses of source texts by Plato and subsequent authors. In the *Republic* (book VI) he found a turning point in Plato’s work, which clearly marked a separation between what Plato had borrowed from his predecessors and what represented his own, original ideas: “The *Republic* appears to be the final stage of years of long reflection on the foundations and structure of mathe-

812 Auerbach, 1932: 56.

813 Jadacki, 1993: 81.

matics.”⁸¹⁴ This claim was additionally confirmed by the rapid development of mathematics after Plato. The abstract from the Congress collection, published in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* (*Review of Philosophy*), thus provides only limited insight into the doctoral thesis.

Another extensive article by Jordan, which was probably written as a *parergon* during the preparation for his doctoral dissertation, was a lengthy study concerning some minor issues in Plato’s early works. In this paper Jordan reported on the views of previous researchers concerning the position and significance of Plato’s early dialogues within his entire legacy. The authors referred to by Jordan only granted these dialogues artistic value and denied their philosophical character, claiming that their goal had been to commemorate Plato’s master (U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, J. Stenzel). Jordan said that “one particularly telling remark was that perhaps of no other great artist could it be said with equal validity that his works of art were created by suffering,”⁸¹⁵ which in Plato’s case was his sorrow following the death of Socrates. The consequence of this approach to Plato’s youthful works was that it eliminated the possibility of providing any logical interpretation of his work or any interpretation other than the irrational and artistic, and the whole philosophical content of these works, as Jordan argued, was reduced to Plato’s acceptance of the teaching of Socrates, which had not been rooted in any philosophical system.

The weak point of this interpretation, as Jordan continued, was that Plato was pictured as a commentator with literary talent, who merely related Socrates’ opinions, and so it was the psychological background to Plato’s literary production that was highlighted. Jordan argued that this view of Plato may have had some validity with reference to the philosopher’s early period of work, but it is no longer tenable with regard to the dialogues that have a higher degree of philosophical substance. The greatest mistake was the consistent application of this interpretation to the whole of Plato’s legacy, and especially to the dialectical dialogues. Yet even with regard to the earlier dialogues, it seemed to Jordan psychologically improbable that such an outstanding writer, who eventually far surpassed his master, should be reduced to the role of a reporter. After all, Plato had not concealed his doubts about Socrates’ ethical stance, which he articulated, for example, in the *Gorgias*.

814 Jordan, 1936: 402; cf.: Konstańczak, 2010: 37–38.

815 Jordan, 1937: 171. Although Jordan availed himself of Witwicki’s translations, he preferred to use the old title of the *Symposium* (*Biesiada*) instead of the one introduced by Witwicki (*Uczta*).

Having considered these difficulties, Jordan formulated his own methodological procedure, which consisted of two points: firstly, to treat the early dialogues separately, and secondly, within this corpus of Plato's youthful works, not to separate ethical issues from logical matters. Jordan attempted to extract philosophical substance from these dialogues, to discover the relations between them and to demonstrate Plato's quest for the systematisation of knowledge. For Jordan, Socrates' fundamental thesis in the Socratic dialogues was the statement that "no one is deliberately evil,"⁸¹⁶ and based on this the identification of virtue with knowledge and the conviction that virtue could be taught. Plato, however, seemed to be doubtful about this and therefore he decided to investigate the type of knowledge that could be identified with virtue and the problem of knowledge itself. No action taken to achieve a goal could forego knowledge, thus it was impossible to live a virtuous and happy life without knowledge of the good, which was the most meaningful subject of human knowledge.

The problem of knowledge itself led to enquiry into methods of acquiring knowledge, the more so since Socrates' method had proved to be inadequate as a means of answering the question about the good. The method of defining, consisting in providing a range or enumerating designata of the given term, was contrasted, in the *Euthyphro*, with definition by providing the essence of the given concept. Application of the latter method made it possible to discern the relations between the concepts that form a hierarchical structure. "It was the discovery of the conceptual world that gave rise to Plato's dialectics."⁸¹⁷

In his early dialogues, Plato also presented the criteria that had to be met by the subject of knowledge. In contrasting the concepts of τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη, he attributed eternity, necessity and universality to the latter. In the *Gorgias* Plato had already articulated a view that was to be deepened and developed in subsequent works: "*Knowledge is [...] a system of theorems structured by means of a logical relation of implication.*"⁸¹⁸ Socrates was not even aware of these problems. It was only in the mature period of the development of Plato's philosophy that the solution to the problem of knowledge made it possible to resolve the ethical problems that had been formulated by Socrates.

This article was intended as a presentation of the 'prehistory' of Plato's method. Jordan argued that it was justified to seek the source of Plato's

816 Jordan, 1937: 176.

817 Jordan, 1937: 184.

818 Jordan, 1937: 189.

original philosophical ideas in the Socratic dialogues. He demonstrated that even at the commencement of his writing Plato was already a philosopher who, by drawing on Socrates' thoughts, subjected them to increasingly more critical reflection. It was this initial development of Plato's methodological consciousness that was ultimately to lead to far-reaching consequences for the deductive sciences.

The next preliminary work by Jordan was more related to the main subject of his doctoral thesis, for it was probably the full version of the text of his paper that was delivered at the Congress in Kraków. It was published in *Przegląd Filozoficzny* and it announced his forthcoming book. Jordan argued that Plato's contribution to mathematics could only be of a formal nature, *i.e.* he was the first methodologist in mathematics, and it was his discoveries that made it possible for later developments in mathematics to reach the form of an axiomatised system. Accepting the opinion of ancient authors that it was Plato who had developed the analytical method, Jordan explained the method as follows: "*it is a special case of the regressive train of reasoning*, that is, a search for reasons for the theorem that is to be proven among the theorems that have already been proven."⁸¹⁹ The conscious application of this method required prior knowledge of a certain set of theorems that could form the material for the method's application, and this inevitably led to the discovery of relations between theorems and, as a consequence, to the discovery of those theorems that can be accepted without proof – axioms. "*A creative intellect capable of generalisations can, in this way, naturally proceed from analytical method to axiomatic method*, for without an established system of axioms from which each theorem of a given system follows, the regressive course of reasoning would have to go on for eternity."⁸²⁰ Presumably, then, Plato, together with his students in the Academy, worked on the axiomatisation of mathematics.

Jordan found arguments in support of his conclusions in the *Phaedo* and in the *Republic*. In the first (101c–e) he came across the progressive method, a train of reasoning from premises to consequences, which was contrasted with the regressive method, a search for premises and arguments. In the second dialogue Jordan found a formulation of the axiomatic method: "This procedure, hitherto unknown to mathematicians, does not search for other ὑποθέσεις for a given ὑποθέσεις that would logically follow from the first, but [...] it searches for unprovable, ultimate argu-

819 Jordan, 1937a: 63–64.

820 Jordan, 1937a: 64; *cf.*: Dembiński, 2003: 61–62.

ments from which each $\acute{\upsilon}\pi\omicron\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\varsigma$ follows.”⁸²¹ In this way, Plato distinguished the concept of premise from the ultimate premise. Jordan’s argumentation in favour of Plato’s discovery of the axiomatic method was further reinforced by evidence of the rapid development of post-Platonic mathematics and the methodology of science in general, especially the contributions of Euclid and Aristotle.

It was only when Jordan’s research on Plato was already at an advanced stage that he contacted Lutosławski, sending a letter which was suitably courteous for a doctoral student addressing a professor of established reputation. Jordan enclosed his article from *Przegląd Filozoficzny* and asked for comments.⁸²² Lutosławski sent his comments and asked if Jordan was acquainted with his *Plato’s Logic*. Jordan replied truthfully that he was not, but he promised to read it in future.⁸²³ Regardless of the nature of Lutosławski’s comments, it was too late for Jordan to implement them, for the book had already gone to press, and after its publication he never returned to researching Plato. It appears, then, that sending his paper to Lutosławski was a gesture of courtesy rather than a request for substantial help.

Jordan selected a quotation from the *Phaedrus* (274a–b) as the motto for his *opus magnum* on Plato: “But it is noble to strive after noble objects, no matter what happens to us” (transl. H. N. Fowler). In this way the young researcher voiced the modesty of someone who, uncertain of the final outcome, nevertheless considered the very undertaking of a difficult task to be sufficient to justify his efforts.

In the introductory remarks to his dissertation Jordan emphasised the philosophical, and not just the mathematical, significance of his work by emphasising the close relation between mathematics and philosophical rationalism and the quest of the rationalists to produce *mathesis universalis*, which they considered to be a deductive system. Mathematics was considered to be a model for the deductive sciences by all rationalists from Descartes, through Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz, to Kant. In the history of philosophy, rationalistic systems continued to be influenced by contemporary developments in mathematics, and Platonism was just one example of this relation. Jordan’s aim in his work was twofold. Firstly he intended to provide evidence of Plato’s contribution to mathematics and secondly to show how mathematics influenced the formation of Platon-

821 Jordan, 1937a: 65.

822 Jordan, AN PAN-PAU1.

823 Jordan, AN PAN-PAU2.

ism. According to Jordan, Plato was not a mathematician, for his contributions to this field were rather of a methodological nature. Attributing the solution of the Delian problem to Plato, merely on the basis of his acquaintance with the problem, was considered by Jordan to be extremely unlikely, even though this view had been maintained in the later tradition of Platonism. At the same time, this myth would never have arisen if Plato had done no mathematics at all.

On the basis of the dialogues and the subsequent Platonic tradition Jordan formulated the hypothesis that “*no great mathematical discovery was alien to Plato; moreover, being ahead of many of his contemporaries in mathematics, he was able to evaluate their significance and importance, to convince those who were reluctant and to encourage those who were creative to make new efforts.*”⁸²⁴ Thanks to this, the Academy became a place for the study of mathematics,⁸²⁵ a place where stereometry was created, with Plato himself taking on the role of a mentor for the mathematicians who worked in the Academy. Plato admired mathematics and regarded it as the key to solving many philosophical problems, as can be seen in the *Republic* or in the *Timaeus*. Having reflected on the subject and method of mathematics, Plato became the first philosopher of mathematics and methodologist of the deductive system, and the first to discover the axiomatic method. “This discovery opened Plato’s eyes to the broad prospect of systematising individual sciences and philosophy,”⁸²⁶ thus producing *mathesis universalis* based on methodological integrity.

Jordan attempted to discuss Plato’s views in a systematic order. He began with Plato’s concept of mathematics, which he considered to have been developed in opposition to the views of Plato’s contemporaries. Plato emphasised the practical benefits of mathematics, which he distinguished from theoretical research on various areas of mathematics. This distinction must have been unclear, especially in the humanities-oriented times of Plato, for he was the first to identify the actual subject of mathematics, a subject which went beyond the common application of arithmetic or geometry to practical problems. Having learnt mathematics himself, he had seen, when working on the *Republic*, how practising mathematics could be helpful for stimulating, developing and improving proficiency in thinking. This made mathematics a necessary introduction to philosophy.

824 Jordan, 1937b: 8–9; cf.: Dembiński, 2003: 52–53,56; 2004: 159–160.

825 Cf.: Dembiński, 2010: 16–17.

826 Jordan, 1937b: 16.

According to Jordan, Plato's classification of the mathematical sciences, based on Pythagoras, (arithmetic, geometry as planimetry and stereometry, astronomy, music), placed emphasis on their formal integrity and the diversity of their degrees of abstraction. Plato, however, did not share the Pythagorean number mysticism. Numbers for Plato were not subjects of sensory experience, but of reasoning. Thus, he clearly distinguished number itself from its corresponding object, that is, the set. Prior knowledge of a number was a necessary condition for recognising the corresponding set: "the number of elements in any particular set is not given in experience, but by the agency of number, which was acquired in pure thinking."⁸²⁷

On the basis of the dialogues and Aristotle's testimony, Jordan claimed that it may have been Plato who introduced the concept of number as a limited multitude of monads, *i.e.* absolutely indivisible unities, different from geometric quantities, whether horizontal or spatial. Expressing this in more modern language, Jordan explained that the number was for Plato "a class of so and so many monads. [...] according to Plato's view, the number is a class whose elements are certain abstract individuals – monads."⁸²⁸ The modus of existence of the number, however, was not unambiguously determined in the dialogues. It cannot therefore be claimed on the basis of the dialogues whether number is interpreted as a necessary form of thinking about objects, existing only in the human intellect, or as a transcendent foundation, existing beyond the intellect. It could be conjectured, as Jordan did on the basis of Aristotle's authority, that in the mature period of his work Plato inclined towards the latter, that is, he recognised the existence of ideal numbers, as belonging, in a sense, to separate species, autonomous, *i.e.* not transformable into one another, for example, by adding a unit. They were therefore somewhat reminiscent of the ideal geometrical objects. In this case, a problem arose concerning the basis on which to predicate the integrity or independence of individual numbers. In other words, the question was about how a number, being a plurality, could also be a unitary element. "For Plato, the concept of *év* included a feature of unity in the sense that it is attributed to related objects, and speaking more

827 Jordan, 1937b: 80; *cf.*: Dembiński, 2003: 64; 2010: 85. It was Jordan's deliberations outlined below, concerning the genesis and nature of mathematical notions that J. Widomski considered to be the most topical aspect of the whole dissertation (Widomski, 1996: 13).

828 Jordan, 1937b: 80; *cf.*: Widomski, 1996: 26; Dembiński, 2004: 169–171; Śleziński, 2009: 205; 2011: 44.

abstractly, to relations as such.”⁸²⁹ The number, thus, was understood as a relation, or a class of relations, no longer a plain mathematical number.⁸³⁰

Plato’s general theory of knowledge was related to the problem of mathematical knowledge. Geometricians, in his view, only ostensibly dealt with visible figures. Jordan argued that Plato’s concept of geometrical objects was closely related to the research conducted in the Academy by Teudios of Magnesia, who deprived objects of geometry of their sensory features: “no space-time object is a line, a surface, or a circle, for among the space-time objects there is none that would be a length with no width, or something that has only length and width, and does not have any thickness.”⁸³¹ Imperfect sensory objects could not therefore be the objects of research in geometry. Furthermore, Plato attributed immutability, identity *etc.* to these ideal objects of geometry, and since he had described all the ideal objects of philosophy in the same way, he made geometrical studies more philosophical, and this, in turn, was intended to improve mathematics.

Plato’s answer to the question of the modus of existence of geometric objects excluded the possibility of constructing these objects or proving their existence. “According to Plato, geometrical structures and figures are directly accessible to the mathematician’s intuition and are determined by means of the features that the mathematician »sees« and »watches« [...] when he reflects on the subject of his research. By such »seeing« a geometric object is discovered – for one can speak here only of discovery, not of construction – and the mathematician becomes convinced of its existence. Finally, such »seeing« reveals geometrical structures and figures as μία τις ιδέα ἀμέριστος, as irreducible to others, and as those that cannot be broken down into simpler elements and therefore as inconstruable.”⁸³² Intuition was a primary experience that allowed further research of geometric structures or further deductions. Logical analyses alone could not bring the researcher closer to seeing these ideal structures. Plato’s position, thus, was ontology-oriented: “content acquired by intuition (νόησις), which is the starting point for deductive reasoning (διάνοια), is a knowledge of ideal geometric structures that have objective existence.”⁸³³ Jordan thought that the introduction of

829 Jordan, 1937b: 96. B. Dembiński underlined the validity of Jordan’s interpretation (Dembiński, 2004: 172–173), cf.: Dembiński, 2010: 91–92, 175–177.

830 B. Dembiński, citing Jordan, used the term ‘cliché’ to describe the ideal number of which each mathematical number was only a reflection (Dembiński, 2003: 83; 2010: 89).

831 Jordan, 1937b: 105; cf.: Dembiński, 2003: 69–70, 74, 91; 2004: 171.

832 Jordan, 1937b: 113–114; cf.: Dembiński, 2004: 171–172.

833 Jordan, 1937b: 116.

the concept of intellectual intuition (intellektuelle Anschauung) in the interpretation of Platonism by neo-Kantians did not explain anything, for it was, in fact, a great unknown. He preferred to search for explanations in the dialogues in the synonymous use of the terms *ιδέα* and *εἶδος*, as well as *σχήμα* and *τύπος*. The latter pair meant “something like »shape«, »figure«, »form«, to signify either the external appearance or internal structure of objects.”⁸³⁴ Jordan continued: “what we call abstractions were for Plato always something to look at. Plato attained the heights of artistry and theoretical visionary experience thanks to his extraordinary talent for connecting the forms of the visible world with objects that can only be thought of.”⁸³⁵ It was from this talent that Plato’s language arose, for he was capable of expressing the highest abstractions by means of terminology that was associated with the visual sphere of cognition.

The thesis of epistemological dualism, inspired by mathematical considerations, was articulated by Plato in the *Phaedo*, and it was justified by demonstrating that knowledge included elements that were underivable from experience: “the concept of equality (*αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*) is one thing and objects that are equal (*τὰ ἴσα*) is quite another thing,”⁸³⁶ for the first is “imperceptible (*οὐχ ὁρατά*), invisible (*ἀειδῆ*), accessible only to reflective thought.”⁸³⁷ Jordan was aware that the theory of ideas could be interpreted in various ways, but provided that a relativistic position was taken on them, *i.e.* that the interpretation was chosen depending on the context in which the ideas appeared in the dialogues, he considered only two interpretations to be correct. He called the first interpretation realistic, and the second – idealistic. The first was that “we recognise specific objects by comparing them with their eternal transcendent models that are seen intellectually,”⁸³⁸ the second emphasised Plato’s awareness of the metaphorical nature of the theory of ideas, in which ideas were reduced to general concepts. In this way, Jordan adopted an intermediate position that did not conclusively settle the issue.

The part played by the ideas in the process of cognition was characterised by Jordan in relation to the Kantian context, attributing to intellect a synthetic function. The theory of learning as recollection was accordingly

834 Jordan, 1937b: 123.

835 Jordan, 1937b: 124.

836 Jordan, 1937b: 129; *cf.*: Śleziński, 2003: 139–140. Śleziński accepts Jordan’s findings in many issues.

837 Jordan, 1937b: 130; *cf.*: Dembiński, 2004: 155–156.

838 Jordan, 1937b: 131, footnote.

“a psychological-cognitive attempt to explain some observations on the formal structure of mathematical knowledge.”⁸³⁹ Anamnesis was, then, not necessary for the substantiation of Plato’s apriorism, yet it was indispensable when Plato intended to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. The theory of anamnesis itself did not explain *a priori* knowledge, but was actually founded on it. In Jordan’s view, it was mathematical considerations that were the source of this theory, and not religious or mystical ecstasy, or psychological analyses.

The subsequent part of Jordan’s work was devoted to the problems that had been previously announced in his talk at the Congress of Philosophy and in his two papers in the *Review of Philosophy*. Let us repeat, that, according to Jordan, Plato had discovered the analytical method as a method of seeking premises, which he had transformed into an axiomatic method and then, most probably, applied at the Academy, while researching mathematical problems with his disciples. Comparing the various meanings of the term ὑπόθεσις that he encountered in the dialogues up to and including the *Republic*, Jordan identified two of them: a definition and a premise. In the final parts of Book VI (510c–511c) he found a distinction between ὑπόθεσις as a premise and ἀρχή as the first, that is, the ultimate premise: “the procedure ἐπ’ ἀρχήν is a quest for a system of principal theorems such that all ὑποθέσεις logically follow from them, so that any mathematical proposition, not being an axiom, can be completely deduced from the axioms, and as a consequence, any premise of any proof turns out to be either an axiom or a theorem resulting from the axioms.”⁸⁴⁰ There was no doubt in Jordan’s mind that the method defined above was indeed an axiomatic method. The fact that Aristotle’s methodology differed greatly in degree of formalisation from the pre-Platonic methodologies was, for Jordan, the most fundamental argument that Plato must have been the obvious intermediate link between them. The influence of Plato on Aristotle was particularly evident in terminology.

Considerations on Plato’s discovery of the axiomatic method ultimately led to the main topic, from a philosophical standpoint, in Jordan’s work. In his discussion of the role of this method in philosophy Jordan wrote: “When it is transferred to the field of philosophical considerations, the axiomatic method becomes a great programme. If we assume that the formal structure of mathematical cognition is characteristic of each field of cognition, then we can set about axiomatising philosophy as some scientia uni-

839 Jordan, 1937b: 141.

840 Jordan, 1937b: 181–182; cf.: Dembiński, 2010: 186–187.

versalis, to discover its »principal theorems« and »primary concepts«. To this end, by »analysis« of the theorems of individual sciences, that is, by seeking their premises, we should regress (or »ascend«, »move up«, as Plato says) from the consequences to the premises, until we reach something that has no premises whatsoever, and does not require any proof or substantiation.”⁸⁴¹ And Plato went on to implement this programme, which was demonstrated in the *Phaedo* and in the *Republic*.

The *Phaedo* for Jordan attested to Plato’s settling of accounts with the methods of the philosophy of nature and with sophistry, or to be more precise, with their lack of method. On the basis of fragment 101d–e, for example, Jordan described the method postulated by Plato as the acceptance of those premises (ὑποθέσεις) that seem most certain, with the intention of drawing further conclusions from them. It was therefore necessary to seek further validation of the premises themselves by means of a method that leads from them to their premises so as ultimately to find their ἀρχαί. Thus it is in the *Phaedo* that there is evidence of Plato’s transition from the mathematical application of the axiomatic method to its more general, philosophical, all-scientific application.⁸⁴²

The *Republic*, in turn, presents an analysis of the mathematical sciences and a description of dialectics. “Contrary to the mathematician, the dialectic does not assume ὑποθέσεις as principal theorems (ἀρχάς), but accepts them as actual hypotheses, as »supports and steps«, and in the search for their premises he discovers the premise of all theorems, which does not require any proof.”⁸⁴³

The premises necessary for individual sciences are taken as not requiring proofs, as obvious. It was, however, different in the case of philosophy. Jordan sketched the differences between philosophy and other sciences as follows: “*Individual sciences* accept ὑποθέσεις as propositions that cannot be proven in a given system, *dialectics* derives the ὑποθέσεις of individual sciences from their few common unprovable principles.”⁸⁴⁴ The difference between philosophy and mathematics was that the mathematician proceeded from the accepted premises to their consequences, while the philosopher-dialectician sought the ultimate validation for the premises. Both mathematicians and dialecticians used premises as their starting point, but then their paths diverged. The former, using a progressive de-

841 Jordan, 1937b: 187–188.

842 Cf.: Dembiński, 2004: 62–64.

843 Jordan, 1937b: 196; cf.: Dembiński, 2004: 66–67.

844 Jordan, 1937b: 199.

ductive process, aimed for that which was more specific, while the latter aimed for the more general. “*Plato considers dialectics to be a study of the foundations of individual sciences [...], reducing their ὑποθέσεις to ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος, and thus structuring and erecting a uniform system of knowledge.*”⁸⁴⁵ The dialectician must, according to Plato, observe connections among all sciences in the search for the highest principles, and it is this that makes philosophy superior to the sciences. There was no doubt that it was an extremely difficult programme, as can be seen especially in Book VII of the *Republic*, where although Socrates speaks with great enthusiasm of dialectics, he presents very little substantial information about it, in contrast to the individual sciences.

The subsequent development of Plato’s methodology in the dialectical dialogues had no direct connection to mathematics, though συναγωγή and διαίρεσις demonstrated a formal similarity to regressive and progressive methods. Jordan claimed that the more Plato departed from the mathematical source of his methodology, the further he drifted away from the intended ideal of universal science.

Jordan devoted the final chapter of his book to the *Timaeus*, where he pointed to the influence that the mathematical sciences exerted on Plato in the natural sciences rather than in the field of methodology. Developments in the mathematical sciences convinced Plato that mathematics was the key to solving the riddles of nature. Whereas at the time of composing the *Republic* Plato had been convinced that the most valuable aspect of the abstract subject of mathematical sciences was that they diverted the intellect from sensory objects, in the *Timaeus* he came up with the idea of applying mathematics to the natural sciences. Jordan focused on Plato’s astronomy and his considerations of matter. He admitted that it was not an easy task, because in the *Timaeus* “it is extremely difficult to distinguish between conscious fiction, empirical physics and philosophical speculation,”⁸⁴⁶ and what is more, even in the introduction to the dialogue, a declaration is made concerning the hypothetical nature of the considerations that are to follow (29c–d), for their subject is not the world of everlasting ideas. The natural world, thus, became the subject of philosophical research – and in accordance with the enquiries in the *Sophist* – it is seen as having existence, and as both acting and being acted upon (247d–e).

Plato had accepted the immobility of the Earth as the centre of the universe when he was working on the *Phaedo* (108e–109a). In the *Timaeus*,

845 Jordan, 1937b: 200.

846 Jordan, 1937b: 208–209.

however, he refrained from detailed considerations regarding the motions of celestial bodies (40d) because he wanted to describe them with some constant, eternal law of motion, and this was impossible at that time. Jordan argued that Philolaus' system, which assumed a moving Earth, was later than that of the *Timaeus*, and therefore the allegations claiming that Plato had again immobilised the Earth, contributing to a regress in astronomy, were false.

Jordan dismissed the hypotheses about the pre-Platonic origins of the concept of the Earth's motion, for in the dialogues by Heraclides Ponticus, a member of the Academy, these hypotheses were uttered by the Pythagoreans, Hicetas and Ecphantus, whom Jordan considered to be only fictional characters and to perform the same role as the Pythagorean Timaeus in Plato's dialogue. These characters in Heraclides, however, were for Jordan evidence that relativity of motion was known to the disciples of the Academy. It was only after this discovery that the system of Philolaus could have arisen. Moreover, the Earth's immobility and its central position in the universe had been articulated in the *Phaedo*, while in the *Laws* the Athenian reported on a new system of astronomy, indicating that he had learned about this when no longer a young man, and therefore it must have been a recent discovery. Hence, as Jordan concluded, the system attributed to Philolaus may have originated in the period between the composition of the *Phaedo* and the *Laws*, at the time when the mature Plato was pursuing mathematical and astronomical research with his disciples in the Academy, that is, around the middle of the 4th century BC. This hypothesis was further confirmed by all the doubts concerning the Pythagorean school.

Jordan argued that this new system of astronomy was not a consequence of mythical-metaphysical speculations based on the belief in the significance of fire, as had been supposed by Aristotle in relation to the system of Philolaus (*De caelo*, 293a–b), but rather resulted from the discovery of relativity of motion, from the rejection of the belief in the distinguished position of the Earth among the celestial bodies, and from the acceptance of infinitism as the natural antithesis to the theory of the finite universe, for finitism had given rise to a number of difficulties, such as the question of what existed outside the limits of the cosmic sphere. Infinitism was also a consequence of mathematical methods that went beyond the domain of sensory experience, assuming, for example, the existence of infinite straight lines.

According to Jordan, Plato, in his mature years, inclined towards Philolaus' astronomical system. It should be added here that in Jordan's text the

abbreviation “*tzw.*,” meaning “so-called,” always preceded the name of this system to stress that it was historically impossible that the Pythagorean Philolaus could have invented it. Jordan found one sentence from the *Timaeus* that was of particular importance for his interpretation of Plato’s gravitation towards this system. This sentence states that it is the Earth that is the maker of day and night (40c), which meant, for Jordan, that the Earth’s circumvolution around the central fire caused diurnal changes. Plato must also have been aware of the relativity of directions in the universe (62c–d). “*Thus, in the Timaeus we can already find traces of how Plato’s views on astronomy were influenced by the »pyrocentric« system (which might be referred to as the so-called Philolaus’ system).*”⁸⁴⁷ This influence proved to be even more profound in the *Laws*, for from the following fragment: “the quickest of the stars is wrongly opined to be the slowest, and vice versa” (822a; transl. by R.G. Bury) Jordan conjectured that this marked a move away from traditional astronomy, which assumed the immobility of the slowest Earth, and this was replaced in Plato’s views with a theory of the Earth’s motion around the centre of the universe. For Jordan, this corresponded to Plato’s view of the ideal structure of the universe, in which the irregularity of the motions of planets as observed from the Earth was only a φαινομένη ἀνωμαλία.

Plato consistently sought to mathematise the natural sciences and, according to Jordan, this demonstrated that he could still be regarded as a valid thinker even today. The development of sciences during his lifetime, however, invalidated the postulates that he had formulated in the *Republic* and his *a priori* hypotheses in astronomy had to be rejected. Hence, in the *Timaeus* Plato added experience as a criterion of the truth. He did not see it as a plain sensation, but included it in a complex that consisted of perceptions, observations and reasoning. Experience, understood in this way, was used, for instance, to formulate the thesis that the foundation of the phenomena, its substance, persists, while its accidents may alter. This thesis could be reached by means of reasoning, “but at the same time it is a ὑπόθεσις which cannot be reached by the intellect without experience; for it is only the »variety« provided by experience that steers the mind toward the existence of the homogeneous reservoir (ὑποδοχή) of all phenomena, whose particular states of concentration create the diverse and ever changing reality given in experience.”⁸⁴⁸

847 Jordan, 1937b: 238.

848 Jordan, 1937b: 244.

The fact that Plato presented his atomism in terms of geometry rather than philosophy of nature was seen by Jordan as a manifestation of Plato's increasing Pythagoreanism. Perhaps, as Jordan believed, Pythagoreanism also had an aesthetic dimension for Plato, but this motive could not have been a deciding factor. Matter in Plato's philosophy, the 'third kind', was to some extent dematerialised, and proved to be both lasting and indefinite: "Υποδοχή of all the phenomena does not and cannot possess any of the sensory qualities that we attribute to the objects of experience."⁸⁴⁹ The problem with interpreting this 'third kind', Plato's matter, was solved by Jordan in the following way: "it is a space filled with substance, in other words – a substance that can only be characterised by spatial properties."⁸⁵⁰ As a result of this, it can be considered the condition and foundation for the existence of empirical variety.

Movement and changeability turned out to be essential states of matter, but more importantly, they were no longer treated in the *Timaeus* as inaccessible to cognition. Changeability was vindicated and qualitative changes could be explained by means of quantitative changes. Although Plato was not inclined to accept the existence of the vacuum, he assumed, in contrast to the Eleatics but in keeping with Anaxagoras, that real and not just apparent movement was possible. Plato made use of geometry to demonstrate how the four substantial elements come into being and undergo changes. In particular, Plato used Theaetetus' discovery of the five solids, known as the Platonic solids, and his demonstration that no other regular polyhedrons existed. "Plato writes the *Timaeus* under the immediate impression and inspiration of the work of his great disciple."⁸⁵¹ Instead of accepting these solids as they were, however, Plato started to construe them from triangles, and this, in Jordan's view, provided evidence of his desire to retain the methods of geometry by following a synthetic process from the simple to the complex. Two-dimensional triangles, however, had to be considered as spatial structures, for they had to be solids, given that matter was to be spatial. Thus a contradiction arose from Plato's acceptance of the geometric genesis of the elements while at the same time maintaining the spatiali-

849 Jordan, 1937b: 261.

850 Jordan, 1937b: 261.

851 Jordan, 1937b: 275. Jordan's findings in this regard are still considered valid (cf.: Dembiński, 2003: 46–47), likewise, his general conclusion on Plato's discovery of the axiomatic method (Dembiński, 2003: 58; 2004: 61). The final three paragraphs of Jordan's book (1937b: 263–288) were reprinted as chapter 16: *Zbigniew Jordan and Plato's attempt to mathematise Greek natural sciences* in Mróz, 2010: 241–257.

ty of matter. Jordan added that Plato seems not to have noticed this difficulty.⁸⁵² For Plato, conceding to the physical, atomistic theory was the price he had to pay for expressing qualitative changes in quantitative categories. Jordan claimed that the whole of Plato's physics was "*geometry transferred to the sensory world*. As Heraclitus proclaimed, invisible harmony is more valuable than visible harmony. The truth of these words of Heraclitus was revealed to Plato when he realised the possibility of applying mathematics to physics."⁸⁵³ This invisible harmony consisted in the existence of an immutable foundation for the phenomenal world. The subjective perception of fire, or of any other element, was thus explained by geometrical causes, that is, by its corresponding solid.

Mathematisation of the natural sciences allowed Plato see the gap between his and other contemporary theories of nature. This was due to mathematics and to the impact mathematics had on Plato's methodology. The connection between mathematics and the development of Plato's thought was summarised by Jordan in the concluding paragraphs of his work: "*There are two different orientations in the dialogues of Plato. The first of them started with the ideal nature of the objects of mathematical cognition and then developed gnoseology and ontology. The second set itself the task of validating the natural sciences by means of philosophy based on mathematics. Both orientations have one element in common – a theory of method that originated from mathematics. This makes the divergence of both orientations less evident and striking. At the same time, however, the firm principles of Plato's methodology prove that his theory of method was independent of his evolving gnoseological and ontological theses. Its historical role and its imprescriptible topicality comes from this.*"⁸⁵⁴

The above resumé of Jordan's doctoral thesis demonstrates that his work was an example of a new methodological approach to historical-philosophical issues. What results from this is a vision of Plato as a methodologist and mathematician, a rationalist smitten by the idea of a universal science that could come into existence on the basis of methodological unity. Jordan modernised the discourse on Plato that was current at that time in Polish academic circles. In his quest to extract the method-

852 Cf.: Dembiński, 2004: 150–151.

853 Jordan, 1937b: 282. Jordan's precise analyses can be contrasted with the earlier work of Jerzy Nadolny, for whom the text of the *Timaeus* was a source of almost mystical ecstasy, confirmed by his own experience and interpreted as a means of understanding the cosmic harmony emanating from the Greek spirit (Nadolny, 1934: 225–227; cf.: Dembiński, 2004: 158–159).

854 Jordan, 1937b: 287–288; cf.: Konstańczak, 2010: 38–39.

ological issues related to the deductive sciences that were to be found within the rich and varied content of the dialogues, he was able to refine Plato's philosophy. He admitted, though, that philosophy in general stemmed from a metaphysical uneasiness that was an expression of the desire to possess rational knowledge, but what was of the utmost importance in Plato's thought was that he indicated the method that could be used to satisfy this desire.⁸⁵⁵ The origin of this method was Plato's devotion to mathematics. Jordan highlighted not only the influence that Pythagoreanism and mathematics exerted on Plato, but also the impact that research in the Academy had on the development of the cosmological system that was known to later generations as Philolaus' astronomical system.

Jordan's work can be regarded as the first study on Platonism in the spirit of the Lvov-Warsaw school, for he was "a disciple and efflorescence of the school."⁸⁵⁶ The work is even classified among studies in the history of logic.⁸⁵⁷ Among the factors that determine his affiliation to the school the following can be mentioned: the subject of the book, bordering on the history of philosophy, philosophy of science, logic and mathematics, as well as Jordan's methodological approach and his commitment to the greatest possible clarity of discussion in his treatment of the subject. The image of Plato that emerges in Jordan's dissertation is not a complete image, but Jordan's goal was not to present a general discussion of Platonism. Jordan's Plato – Plato as a mathematician, methodologist and logician – was the best possible reflection of Plato that could have arisen from the Plato-related interests within the Lvov-Warsaw school, that is, if it can be said that its representatives were at all interested in Plato. No other similar presentations of Plato can be found in the work of the school. The studies by Twardowski, Ajdukiewicz and Czeżowski, were rudimentary in character, while Witwicki, as we have seen, occupies a specific position in his own right. It would, perhaps, only be a slight exaggeration to claim that Jordan's dissertation on Plato was in some respects analogous to Jan Łukasiewicz's earlier work on the principle of contradiction in Aristotle, because it was based on similar premises, such as the view of the fundamental historical integrity (for Jordan it was a methodological integrity) of the field of research and the need to apply modern conceptual apparatus to historical texts.⁸⁵⁸

855 Jordan, 1937b: 201–202.

856 Terlecki, 1980: 107.

857 Woleński, 1985: 177; cf.: Lejewski, 1987: 167–168.

858 Cf.: Woleński, 1987: XI–XII.

Like most Plato scholars and readers, Jordan emphasised the topicality of Plato's thought, but what was unique in Jordan's case was that Plato's topicality went far beyond the sphere of ideologies, for this was an area that was of no interest to Jordan in his research on Plato.

A review of Jordan's work was undertaken by Henryk Jakubanis (1879–1949), who was well-known for his interest in Plato. Jakubanis' attention was immediately drawn to the graphic layout of the book and its research apparatus, with indexes, tables, and above all, references to the dialogues in the form of one- or two-character abbreviations. "These modern graphic and technical elements are in keeping with the subject of the book, which is characteristic of contemporary, scientifically-oriented works."⁸⁵⁹ After providing an extensive summary of the dissertation, Jakubanis chose to focus on those significant details of the work that were, in his view, relevant to the current disputes on Plato, even though they were of lesser importance for the main goal of the work. One of these was Jordan's "relativistic" approach to the theory of ideas. On the basis of Jordan's references to P. Natorp, Jakubanis assumed that he must have been in favour of the Marburg interpretation.

Jakubanis accepted Jordan's conclusions that Plato had discovered the axiomatic method. Concerning the concluding chapter he wrote that "it contains a number of theses that are for the most part boldly and graphically formulated, yet generally they do not deviate much from the traditional interpretation of Plato, which always emphasised the powerful increase in Pythagorean influences and mathematical elements in the development of Plato's thought in the later, effete epoch of his life."⁸⁶⁰ What Jakubanis, however, seems not to have noticed was the fact that scholars usually emphasised the influence of Pythagoreanism on Plato in the mysti-

859 Jakubanis, 1938: 422. H. Elzenberg, for example, took a negative view of Jordan's language. He was provoked by Jordan's dishonest and non-objective reporting of philosophers' views, namely by the following phrase: "the statements of those philosophers who asserted the existence of intellectual intuitions only allow us to draw a conclusion on the alleged existence of some representations that directly, though not visually (not by means of the senses), represent a certain class of objects. This is obviously an insufficient description" (Jordan, 1937a: 122). Elzenberg noted it down as an example of 'cunning tactics' in a polemic with someone else's views, for it was for him "undermining someone else's thought in the very course of recounting it" (Elzenberg, 2002: 285); *cf.*: Zegzuła-Nowak, 2011: 251.

860 Jakubanis, 1938: 424.

cal realm, whereas Jordan was concerned with something quite different when he discussed Pythagorean influences on Plato.

It was not the reviewer's intention to call into question the content of the book, for he praised it for its copiousness and diversity. His aim was rather to point to Jordan's 'academic genealogy' and his method. For Jakubanis, Plato's legacy was immortal, but "this did not mean that any of its content, established once and for all and abstracted from a cross section of its actual existence, should be rigorously protected from destruction or cemented usque ad infinitum. Instead, its dynamic development process should be prolonged endlessly to *extend its life*. The substance of Platonism displays to each new epoch a different homogeneous side of its multilateral nature, revealing new deposits of content that shine with a new light hitherto unnoticed."⁸⁶¹ Jakubanis' illustration of the immortality of Platonism was thus reminiscent of the solids from the *Timaieus*. Jakubanis justified the contemporary interest in Plato as a mathematician on the grounds of the developments in the mathematical and natural sciences that could be observed in the first half of the 20th century. Another stimulus that must have drawn the attention of researchers to the mature Plato was the publication of studies on the young Aristotle by Werner Jaeger.

Jakubanis did not share Jordan's certainty that Plato's example provided confirmation of the dependence of rationalist philosophies on the state of mathematics, nor that Plato could be lined up with rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz or Kant. Jakubanis argued that it was difficult to see in Plato a typical example of rationalism. The difficulties in interpreting Plato's dialogues resulted from the wealth of material they contained, from the differences and contradictions between particular dialogues, and from their artistic form. "Each dialogue appears to be a separate universe in itself, a certain intrinsic philosophical, scientific and artistic unity, unique, inimitable and one of a kind, like all genuine works of art."⁸⁶² It is difficult, as Jakubanis continued, to find evidence for purely abstract theses in such material. This did not, however, detract from the value of Jordan's work, for according to the reviewer, it met the requirements of modern scholarly works, "nevertheless, the spiritual figure of the thinker that emerges from the erudite, interesting and often vivid pages of this work gives the general impression of an artificial scheme rather than a living person: a totally »mathematised« Plato!"⁸⁶³ The exclusive focus on

861 Jakubanis, 1938: 425.

862 Jakubanis, 1938: 426.

863 Jakubanis, 1938: 427.

the mathematical origins of Platonism was the Achilles' heel of the entire book. For Jakubanis, the image of Plato portrayed by Jordan was psychologically impossible and contradictory to the facts and to Plato's life, so rich, productive, and full of internal struggles. Other criticisms of Jordan's work included scanty references to other philosophical and cultural trends contemporary to Plato and a failure to take into account the process of his evolution towards Pythagoreanism. "This non-Socratic Plato is not an authentic Plato, or at any rate he is not a complete Plato."⁸⁶⁴ It should be remarked, however, in Jordan's defence, that a comprehensive interpretation of Plato was not his goal. Nonetheless, Jakubanis concluded his review with praise, saying that this valuable book, despite its one-sidedness, "from time to time, from beneath the abstract research armour – platonice sonat."⁸⁶⁵

What was significant in this review was that the reviewer was clearly able to discern both the formal and thematic novelty of this book in comparison with other Polish studies on Plato at that time. Yet Jakubanis' review also shows that historians of philosophy were not yet ready to accept this innovative way of treating the well-known historical and philosophical material. The book also reflected Jordan's personality and the way he delivered his lectures in a similarly well-structured, formalised and precise manner.⁸⁶⁶ It is possible to hypothesise that, had it not been for the war, this work might have been the initial step in the development of a new trend in Polish studies on Plato. This was not to be, however, and at the time of writing the review, Jakubanis could not have predicted Jordan's future fate.

Researching mathematical threads in ancient philosophy, and in particular in Plato, could reasonably be regarded, as was suggested by S. Borzym,⁸⁶⁷ as the implementation of the strong encouragement to undertake such research expressed by M. Massonius in his review of Tatarkiewicz's *History of philosophy*. In Jordan's case, however, the inspiration undoubtedly came from his supervisor, a disciple of Twardowski, since "composing a doctoral thesis under the supervision of the head of the Department of Theory and Methodology of Sciences at the University of Poznań determined the exact research area that could be undertaken by Jordan. Undoubtedly, it was Zawirski himself who inspired his young doc-

⁸⁶⁴ Jakubanis, 1938: 427.

⁸⁶⁵ Jakubanis, 1938: 428.

⁸⁶⁶ Iwańska, 1980.

⁸⁶⁷ Borzym, 1993: 284.

toral student to investigate the axiomatic method in philosophy.”⁸⁶⁸ This method had been the subject of Zawirski’s habilitation thesis, which was a novelty in Polish philosophy at that time, and Zawirski himself is considered to be an outstanding “precursor of subsequent methodological analyses of historical material; a pioneer (in our country) of the axiomatisation of empirical theories.”⁸⁶⁹ It was, perhaps, only Ajdukiewicz who could compete with Zawirski in terms of their expertise in the philosophy of physics.⁸⁷⁰

While the methodological and thematic area of Jordan’s dissertation was related to, and may have even resulted from, his supervisor’s interests, it must have been the doctoral student’s own idea to transfer contemporary methods and problems to the field of ancient thought, because “Zawirski is only a historian of science to the extent that it is necessary for him to be so, that is, he is not a researcher who aims primarily to establish past views, their genealogies or the relations between their authors, but a philosopher who wants to get to the roots of modern theories.”⁸⁷¹ On the other hand, even though he focused on one problem exclusively, Jordan turned to ancient times as a historian, his goal being to examine relations and mutual influences between philosophy and mathematics, philosophy and astronomy. The existence of these relations is likely to have been pointed out to Jordan by his supervisor, Zawirski, who believed that “new scientific theories stimulate new considerations in the logic and semantics of the theory of science.”⁸⁷²

Jordan provided an example in support of theses that he had adopted from Zawirski’s works, such as the thesis concerning the existence of significant links between the progress of logical methods in mathematics and the state and development of natural sciences based on mathematics.⁸⁷³ Jordan’s analyses of Plato’s solids and the difficulties related to their subject matter classification as geometry or physics seem to echo Zawirski’s words: “geometry as a science of the spatial properties of bodies is already natural science! And midway between one and the other stands what is usually called geometry, a geometry that desires to be something more than pure mathematical analysis and does not want to be physics any

868 Konstańczak, 2010: 37.

869 Jadacki, 1993a; *cf.*: Więckowski, 1993: 92.

870 Zamecki, 1977: 78.

871 Heller, 2007: 284.

872 Śleziński, 2007: 354.

873 Zawirski, 1923: 525.

more, but a science of ideal spatial structures, where physical bodies are disregarded, but their spatiality is not.”⁸⁷⁴ But Jordan himself, as we have said, should be credited with the original idea of researching ancient thought, because his supervisor, Zawirski, barely mentioned Euclid, and did not mention Plato at all in his account of the development of the axiomatic method, for he was primarily interested in contemporary science and philosophy from Kant onwards. Jakubanis claimed that Jordan had been overhasty in putting Plato on the same footing as rationalist philosophers like Leibniz and Kant. Yet Zawirski had earlier outlined a similar line of the development of metaphysics by dividing metaphysical systems into immanent and transcendent systems, with Platonism belonging to the latter group, along with the philosophies of Leibniz and Kant.⁸⁷⁵ Zawirski thought that the deductive method was a fulfilment of the dreams of past metaphysicians, who had sought to integrate all scientific knowledge by reducing it to a small number of axioms.⁸⁷⁶

Jordan’s doctoral thesis demonstrated his outstanding technique and skills, and he was later ranked among the most significant figures in Polish research on Plato, together with Lutosławski and Witwicki.⁸⁷⁷ Importantly, Jordan’s research has gained recognition among Polish scholars even today, being referred to when attempts are made to recreate Plato’s late doctrines. The issues themselves have not lost their relevance either, as can be seen in the works of Bogdan Dembiński, while Roman Murawski has also directly confirmed the topicality of Jordan’s work.⁸⁷⁸

Years later, Jordan published a book in the Netherlands, in which he set out to familiarise Western audiences with Polish philosophy of the period 1918–1958. In it he included another motto from Plato (*Gorgias*, 482b–c) in Walter Hamilton’s translation.⁸⁷⁹ Unlike the previous motto from the *Phaedrus*, this was no longer an expression of the modesty of a doctoral student in the face a huge task, but demonstrated Jordan’s maturity and research independence. The motto may also have been an attempt to justify

874 Zawirski, 1924: 18; cf.: Piesko, 2007: 323; Śleziński, 2007: 366.

875 Zawirski, 1924a: 136–137.

876 Cf.: Piesko, 2004: 73; Śleziński, 2007: 364.

877 Terlecki, 1980: 106.

878 Murawski, 2011: 201.

879 Jordan, 1963: VII: „Yet, I think, my good sir, that it would be better for me to have a musical instrument or a chorus which I was directing in discord and out of tune, better that the mass of mankind should disagree with me and contradict me than that I, a single individual, should be out of harmony with myself and contradict myself”; cf.: Konstańczak, 2010: 39.

the fact that he had remained in exile, emphasising his need to be in harmony with his own conscience. Since he did not want to accept British citizenship, he could not visit his homeland. He did not return to Plato, either. His publications on Polish philosophy included Polish Marxism, to which he devoted separate and lengthy studies, though these were not undertaken out of passion for the subject, but for more mundane reasons. The financial support and scholarships he received for such work were essential for living in exile.⁸⁸⁰

Plato as a starting point for B. Bornstein's speculative philosophy

Although Benedykt Bornstein's (1880–1948) interests in the history of philosophy included Kant, who was, after all, the subject of his dissertation, he preferred to devote his attention to thinkers "of great speculative flair,"⁸⁸¹ such as Spinoza, or Plato, whom he referred to as a Pythagorean. Bornstein was working on Plato at the same time as Jordan, but although both focused on similar problems and sometimes arrived at similar conclusions, they did not refer to each other's works.

Before composing his most important work in the field of Plato studies, Bornstein had commented on the great Athenian in his earlier papers. Among his comments we can find remarks on the subject of Plato that outline the more general background to his reflection: "Plato's genius consisted in his discovery of the world of ideas and the world of logic for the human race. This world, according to the most profound convictions of its discoverer, is a paragon of structure, a uniform whole, a system in which each element has a strictly determined position. If this is indeed the case, if each concept occupies a strictly determined position in this world, then this world should be thought of by analogy to the spatial world, it should be ordered in »logical space«, in »intellectual space« (νοητός τόπος). Plato did not tell us, and could not tell us, what the structure of this logical space that reflects the structure of the logical world was like: the world of ideas that he had just discovered was still too mysterious, too little known to fathom its structure completely, or to be able to distribute its elements systematically in space. It is this question, contained in the spirit rather

880 Andrzejewski, 1980.

881 Wąsik, 1948: 446.

than the letter of Plato's system, that we now hope to solve"⁸⁸² These words undoubtedly demonstrate that it was Plato's philosophical idealism that was fundamental to Bornstein's own considerations, but this was merely the starting point, because Bornstein, though he shared Plato's pursuit of philosophical synthesis, was a philosopher of the 20th century in the full sense of the word. "He saw himself as the inheritor of the idealistic tradition initiated by Plato. The doctrine of the Greek sage was for him a perfect example of the synthesis of metaphysics and mathematics that was to be his goal throughout his entire lifetime."⁸⁸³

In his later works, having familiarised himself with the ancient testimonies regarding Plato's unwritten teaching, and above all, with those of Aristotle, Bornstein made an attempt to demonstrate that Socrates' disciple had had a lot more to say about the structure of extra-sensory reality than could be inferred from the dialogues alone. However, as Krzysztof Śleziński, a researcher of Bornstein's work, warned, too much hope should not be placed on the method he applied as a means of achieving a better or more distinct image of Platonism, "we should not [...] expect that this instrument, the system of geometric logic, will allow us to explain in detail or establish an accurate interpretation of Plato's philosophical doctrine."⁸⁸⁴

Bornstein believed that one of the tasks deriving from Plato's philosophy was the necessity of providing some higher substantiation for the order of the world of ideas. Since "the world of ideas is, in Plato's view, what introduces unity and orderliness into the phenomenal realm, then this world, first and foremost, must itself have been segmented and well-ordered."⁸⁸⁵ The principle for structuring ideas must have been some number-based higher order, confined between the principles of *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*, the finite and the indefinite. These principles had been introduced in the *Philebus* (16c–d), a dialogue dedicated to pleasure, the nature of which was seen as being based on moderation, with the two opposing principles being the causes of the existence of the world and of the various unities of ideas. This meant "that these principles should not be understood only from the point of view of ordinary quantitative arithmetic, but

882 Bornstein, 1926: 173; cf.: Obolevitch, 2007: 582. Despite the title of the volume, *Krakowska filozofia przyrody w okresie międzywojennym* (*Cracovian Philosophy of Nature in the Interwar Period*), in which this paper was published, Bornstein did not have much in common with Kraków; he was mainly associated with Warsaw, and briefly with Lvov and Łódź.

883 Obolevitch, 2007: 577.

884 Śleziński, 2009: 202.

885 Bornstein, 1938: 529; cf.: Obolevitch, 2007: 577–579.

that we are dealing here with a profound concept of some other kind of arithmetic, a qualitative arithmetic.”⁸⁸⁶ This qualitative doctrine of numbers was developed by Plato in his unwritten teaching and in his famous lecture *On the Good*, and this connection between ethical and mathematical issues, as Bornstein continued, did not escape the attention of the ancients.

As time passed, Plato increasingly coupled ideas and numbers, “number now no longer corresponds to an idea, but it is an idea itself.”⁸⁸⁷ Idea-number, however, had to be stripped of its quantitative, arithmetic character, and to become “something remarkably qualitative, individual, figure-like; it can no longer be derived from the preceding number by adding a unit.”⁸⁸⁸ The set of ideas-numbers was limited by Plato to ten, and they were to be the prototypes for all subsequent numbers. This introduced order into the sphere of the ideal world, for the number of ideas was clearly defined, and they, in turn, could be derived from the ultimate principles, from the one (ἓν) and the indefinite two (δυνάς ἀόριστος). “The first principle here represents a formal, organising, and defining factor, while the second represents a passive element, indefinite in itself, that can be specified in this or that direction only by the one, towards the ‘great and small’ (μέγα καὶ μικρόν) or more arithmetically, the ‘many and few’ (πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον).”⁸⁸⁹ The two principles were the fundament from which the ten categories, “the first types of the world of ideas,”⁸⁹⁰ were derived by Plato. Deduction, deriving the ten categories from two principles, must have been a difficult task, which Bornstein did not attempt to recreate, describing this sphere of Plato’s philosophy as an arithmetic of quality, an algebra of concepts, a science of a high degree of abstraction. Up to this point, Bornstein’s outline was basically in agreement with Jordan’s corresponding considerations.

“Plato, the founder of logic in Europe, also anticipated mathematical logic in the form of arithmetical logic, leading directly to algebraic logic.”⁸⁹¹ This conclusion resulted from the similarity, highlighted by Born-

886 Bornstein, 1938: 529.

887 Bornstein, 1938: 530.

888 Bornstein, 1938: 530; “Philosophy researches the qualitative aspect of the world and if it were not possible to find a qualitative aspect of mathematics, then mathematical philosophy would be impossible. Consequently, mathematical philosophy would be *contradictio in adiecto*” (Kmiciek, 2002: 91).

889 Bornstein, 1938: 531; cf.: Śleziński, 2009: 205–206.

890 Bornstein, 1938: 532.

891 Bornstein, 1938: 532–533; cf.: Śleziński, 2009: 215.

stein, between the two highest principles and the basic terms of logic: logical one and zero, positivity and negativity.

According to the *Epinomis* and to Aristotle's account of Plato's unwritten teaching, ideal representations of spatial quantities, ideal geometric figures, existed in the world of ideas. The parallel character of ideas-numbers and ideas-geometric figures was translated into the parallel character of the principles constituting both of them. The one and the indefinite two corresponded to a point (or line) and to an indefinite spatial substrate. The ten ideal numbers matched the ten ideal figures. The ideal numbers were not reducible to each other or to arithmetic numbers while the ideal figures lacked the features of size and number.⁸⁹²

The origins of the theory of ideal arithmetic-geometric parallelism could be sought in the dialogues, and not exclusively in the late ones but even in the *Republic*, in the very concept of the idea: "the idea, after all, as εἶδος, was already a form and thus it led, as if by itself, to the world of shapes *par excellence*, to the world of space and geometry."⁸⁹³ Moreover, in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus*, Plato spoke of the world of ideas as of some kind of place.⁸⁹⁴ On the basis of the *Epinomis*, Bornstein observed that raising the subsequent powers of two was evidence of the unravelling of the concept of genus into species by means of dichotomous partitions, and this, at the same time, corresponded to 'unfolding' a point into a straight line, and then into a plane and a solid.⁸⁹⁵ All this was, for Bornstein, evidence that the germs of Plato's mature unwritten teaching had already been embedded in and developed from his earlier work, its very essence, that is, the concept of the idea. The parallelism, discussed above, was also attributed to Pythagorean thought, and Plato, according to Bornstein, was, after all, a Pythagorean.

The subsequent development of the logic founded on Plato can be credited to Aristotle and the scholastics, who "took an easier way"⁸⁹⁶ and did not continue the Platonic tendency to combine logic with mathematics, and as a result, Aristotelian logic lacked the lucidity of the mathematical sciences. It was not until Leibniz that logic was taken up in accordance with Plato's postulates. The theoretical foundation for geometrical logic

892 Cf.: Śleziński, 2009: 207–208.

893 Bornstein, 1938: 535.

894 Cf.: Świderek, 2002: 83; Śleziński, 2009: 209–210.

895 Cf.: Świderek, 2002: 25–26; Obolevitch, 2007: 580–581; Śleziński, 2009: 210–211.

896 Olszewski, 1998: 95.

that Plato had provided was also developed by Bornstein. The Platonic foundation remained unchanged, including the parallelism between arithmetic and geometry and the abstraction from the quantitative aspect of geometrical objects, which were considered to be spatial qualities and their number was limited. What Bornstein elaborated further, and furnished with special diagrams to strengthen his arguments, was a highly abstract construction, quite distant in its implementation from Plato's original thoughts.

Bornstein's arguments met with criticism. Juliusz Krzyżanowski rejected the very idea of attributing to Plato more profound interests in logic, or any quest for or formulation of the laws of thinking. In his opinion, Platonism consisted of a complex of ontological and epistemological problems. Nor did he consider it appropriate to recreate the final phase of Plato's philosophical development on the basis of Aristotle's writings. Krzyżanowski regarded Aristotle's testimony as 'pitiful to read' because what emerged from it was a rather vague image of the last, Pythagorean stage of Plato's development. It could not be considered reliable on account of the differences between the two great Greek thinkers, exemplifying a clash of two different views of the world and even of different mental structures. Krzyżanowski admitted, though, that Bornstein had accurately reproduced those of Plato's thoughts that had Pythagorean origins, yet the conclusions drawn from them were at least doubtful. Krzyżanowski did not agree with the identification of the ten ideas-numbers with the highest categories; it was too far-fetched for him. He also thought that Bornstein had been overhasty in making a transition from arithmetic to algebra in his conclusions, for "algebra of logic begins when and only when we not only have symbolism but when operations (*calculus*) on these symbols are initiated."⁸⁹⁷ Krzyżanowski could not consent to identifying Plato's two principles with the one and zero, which, in his opinion, was merely tokenistic and reminiscent of "deriving *lucus a non lucendo*."⁸⁹⁸

Krzyżanowski admitted that Plato, in keeping with the aspirations of his predecessors in philosophy, had indeed aimed to reduce the multiplicity of principles to the smallest possible number. The ideas helped to explain the manifold phenomena in the sensory world. It was, however, necessary to take the next step and to explain the multitude of ideas, and the adoption of the two principles served this purpose: "Plato's answer is a kind of transposition of the previous solution in a different dimension: the ideas 'origi-

897 Krzyżanowski, 1939: 87.

898 Krzyżanowski, 1939: 87.

nate' from the fission of the one itself in the 'ideal' matter."⁸⁹⁹ Δὐὰς ὁρίστος should therefore be treated as *principium individuationis* and could not, therefore, be identified with logical zero.⁹⁰⁰

Krzyżanowski also had doubts about considering the ideas-geometric figures to be closely related to and parallelly derived from ideal numbers, for he thought it was sufficient to define them as geometrical forms of the phenomenal world. What Krzyżanowski considered noteworthy in Bornstein's paper was the emphasis on the relation between the exponentiation of two and dichotomous partition. However, he doubted the Platonic origins of this idea, as having Pythagorean roots and being formulated in the pseudo-Platonic *Epinomis*. Krzyżanowski preferred to discuss the ideas from Plato's late teaching, which were available mainly in indirect sources, against the background of pre-Platonic philosophy and trends that were current in Plato's time, rather than as anticipations of distant and abstract concepts of the 20th century: "numerical symbolism is not an algebraic or arithmetic formulation of relations among concepts, but a Pythagorean belief in the significance of translating qualities into quantities."⁹⁰¹ There was too much uncertainty regarding the sources themselves and the conclusions drawn from them to substantiate the presumed contribution of Plato to the logic of geometry.

Some of the contentious issues in this polemic resulted from terminological divergences between the critic and the author under criticism, such as the concept of category. Bornstein claimed that Krzyżanowski understood this in line with the Aristotelian tradition, while he himself meant "only logical categories (or arithmetic-ideal), the highest units of the logical world, the most general concepts."⁹⁰² Bornstein believed that the reviewer had not understood his train of thought. The situation was even worse with the problem of the identification of logical zero with the indefinite two. Krzyżanowski would have been right, as Bornstein continued, if zero had been understood extensionally, yet in Bornstein's reasoning zero was understood purely in terms of intensionality. He argued: "logical zero, the poorest, undetermined, indefinite logical meaning is a principle and possibility (potentiality) of a multitude of elements, and primarily of two opposing elements."⁹⁰³ Since the indefinite two was a condition for

899 Krzyżanowski, 1939: 87.

900 Cf.: Obolevitch, 2007: 579.

901 Krzyżanowski, 1939: 89.

902 Bornstein, 1939: 90; cf.: Śleziński, 2009: 208.

903 Bornstein, 1939: 93; cf.: Kmiecik, 2002: 93; Śleziński, 2009: 213–214.

the ‘great and small’, then nothing stood in the way of identifying it with logical zero.⁹⁰⁴

Krzyżanowski questioned the parallel character of ideas-numbers and ideas-geometric figures, and this forced Bornstein to reiterate briefly the whole of his argumentation, starting with the meaning of the term εἶδος. He did not change his opinion. In addition, he pointed out a contradiction in the review. Krzyżanowski had denied the existence of the calculus of algebraic symbols in Plato, as if unaware that unfolding the dichotomous partition was such an operation. This was related to the next issue, that is, the questionable credibility of the sources on which Bornstein’s considerations on dichotomous partition were based. He replied that even if the text had not been composed by Plato himself, the doctrine included there presented the views of scholars of the oldest Academy, which had been inspired by the founder himself.

In Krzyżanowski’s eyes, Plato’s considerations merely represented the ontological symbolism inherited from the Pythagoreans. Bornstein did not deny Plato’s ontological goals, but he remarked: “there is no discrepancy or exclusion, nor can there be, between Plato’s unquestionable ontologism and his equally unquestionable tendency to give logic a mathematical character. Plato, had, after all, just called logic into existence, and he wanted to turn it into both an exact, qualitative-mathematical instrument of philosophy and a method for ontological, metaphysical and physical cognition.”⁹⁰⁵ These Platonic beliefs were, in fact, very much in line with those of Bornstein himself, and, with minor objections, can be referred to as ‘homomorphism’, a view granting the aprioristic laws of geometry parallel existence in the real world.⁹⁰⁶

This polemic did not result in any rapprochement between the two scholars. To some extent, it was terminological ambiguities that lay at the root of their differences. Bornstein had, indeed, construed a highly abstract structure on the basis of indirect evidence about Plato. Krzyżanowski had drawn attention to the fragile foundations of this construction. Although he also attributed Pythagorean tendencies to Plato, he interpreted them as a natural continuation of the development of Greek philosophy at that time and could not agree to such far-reaching interpretations of Plato’s ontological ideas.

904 Cf.: Obolevitch, 2007: 579–580.

905 Bornstein, 1939: 100; cf.: Kmieciak, 2002: 97–98.

906 Kmieciak, 2002: 85; cf.: Śleziński, 2009: 208–209.

While both Zawirski and Jordan believed that Plato and Leibniz were united in their desire to establish some *mathesis universalis* based on the deductive method, Bornstein actually set himself the goal of implementing this postulate,⁹⁰⁷ believing that mathematics in accordance with ancient tradition was an auxiliary discipline of philosophy.⁹⁰⁸ Mathematics was to be a tool to aid him in the pursuit of his supreme philosophical goal, which was outlined by W. Wąsik as follows: “he and his predecessors, after all, want to find some ultimate principle, from which it would be possible to extrapolate, in an exact and consistent manner, the entire architecture of the world in all its details.”⁹⁰⁹ It has been said that “in the 1930s, Bornstein undoubtedly contributed to popularising Plato’s thoughts, and especially the metamathematical considerations of the Greek philosopher,”⁹¹⁰ but it is difficult to agree with this conclusion, for Bornstein’s works were too hermetic to be classified as popular works on Plato’s philosophy. In addition, due to historical circumstances, he did not return to this topic and his papers on Plato were the last to be published before World War II. During the war Bornstein was imprisoned by Germans for over three months, and later he devoted his energy to underground teaching. In 1945 he moved to Łódź, to a newly established university that had inherited the traditions of Bornstein’s pre-war *alma mater*, the Free University of Warsaw, but he published very little in Łódź and preferred to spend his last days developing his own ideas rather than commenting on ancient philosophers. To some extent Jordan’s research on Plato met a similar fate.

It can also be claimed, with regard to Krzyżanowski’s criticism, that there were too many questionable issues in Bornstein’s re-creation of Plato’s views for his articles to be considered an effective means of disseminating Plato’s philosophy. It must be admitted, however, that before Bornstein’s studies probably “no one [...] had indicated more clearly the distinction between ordinary mathematics and qualitative mathematics in the philosophy of Plato.”⁹¹¹ And perhaps more importantly there is, at least to some extent, a fundamental agreement between the metaphysical concepts of Bornstein and Plato (at least Bornstein’s interpretation of Plato). Bornstein emphasised the qualitative nature of points, straight lines, *etc.*, and accepted the two highest metaphysical principles. One of them, logical zero,

907 Kmieciak, 2002: 97.

908 Cf.: Obolevitch, 2007: 583.

909 Wąsik, 1948: 447.

910 Obolevitch, 2007: 586.

911 Śleziński, 2009: 212.

displayed similarities to Plato's dyad, the indefinite two, as the principle of multiplicity and potentiality. Bornstein, thus, appeared to be a continuator of Plato's philosophy, remaining as he himself declared, within Plato's intellectual sphere, but going beyond its substance. For Bornstein, by combining abstract mathematical and logical considerations with the foundations of metaphysics, Plato had become the starting point for a long line of philosophers, with himself as the final link.

* * *

Auerbach, Jordan and Bornstein represent three different stages in approaching the mathematical aspects of Plato's works. Auerbach's study merely called attention to the autonomous nature of these issues, while Jordan focused on them systematically and analytically, treating the relation between mathematics and philosophy that exists in Platonism as an exemplification of a consistent pattern that is inherent to the history of science, namely the thesis of the dependence of philosophy on the current state of mathematics. Moreover, Jordan argued that Plato had discovered the ideal method in mathematics, which he then refined in the field of philosophy, remaining under the influence of his own metamathematical reflections while subsequently developing his philosophy of the natural sciences. Bornstein, on the other hand, found the starting point for his own philosophical speculation in Plato's late production and maintained that Plato had anticipated the abstract constructions of qualitative geometry. He considered Plato to be a distant predecessor of his own way of thinking. Bornstein, therefore, pursued his own philosophy on the basis of Plato's late doctrines, rather than merely interpreting Plato's thoughts.

Conclusions

The above historical reconstruction of Polish philosophical research on Plato over a period of one and half centuries allows us to formulate several conclusions. First of all, it is important to note that neither a common Polish image of Plato nor a common Polish interpretation of Platonism was ever produced. The efforts of most researchers were scattered and as a result, it was impossible for any lasting school of research on Plato to be created. Nevertheless, those who studied Plato were outstanding individuals, and therefore in their confrontation with the dialogues they left their individual stamp on their interpretations. This was possible because of the multifarious content of the dialogues, which allowed each author to find motifs consistent with their own views, or those with which they could easily take issue. The relationship between the philosophical views of Plato scholars and their interpretations of Plato is often reciprocal, for the philosophical attitude of modern authors affects their interpretation of Plato, and at the same time their reading of Plato has an impact on various dimensions of their own philosophical thinking. This mutual impact is particularly evident in the works of the authors who were discussed in the third part of the book. Pawlicki turned Plato into a symbol of unspoiled ancient beauty, simply by supplementing Platonism with Christian thought to create the perfect essence of European culture. Lutosławski revered Plato as the predecessor of his own neo-Messianic philosophy. Lisiecki *expressis verbis* declared himself to be a Platonist, while Witwicki strongly identified himself with the vision of Plato he had created as simultaneously both scientist and artist. Both Jordan and Bornstein deemed Plato's interest in mathematics to be a distant precursor of their own research in various fields.

Our research into the subject of Plato's reception in Poland has revealed that many works devoted to Plato still remain in the form of manuscripts, though they constitute important evidence of the extent to which Polish scholars were acquainted with the dialogues. Some of these works, for example those of Lisiecki, have almost completely fallen into oblivion, while others, like Pawlicki's extensive manuscript legacy, in which numerous texts on Plato are included, are seldom consulted by historians of philosophy. It seems that this also reflects the situation as far as other areas in the history of Polish philosophy are concerned.

In summarising the findings of the particular parts of this work, we can claim that the reception of Plato sometimes ran parallel to Western currents then penetrating Polish philosophy. This was undoubtedly the case in Zabellewicz's work on Plato, which can be regarded as an instance of Polish reception of Kantianism in the field of Platonic studies. Similarly, F. A. Kozłowski's introduction to his translations of three dialogues clearly bears the hallmark of Hegelianism. These works, produced in the first half of the 19th century, are derivative studies, being almost entirely dependent on German philosophy. The contribution of these authors was therefore restricted to the transference of Plato's philosophy to Polish soil. However, as time went by and interest in the philosophies of Kant and Hegel began to wear off, giving rise to anti-Hegelian trends in the second half of the 19th century, the Plato studies of Zabellewicz and Kozłowski no longer attracted attention. Nevertheless, a closer examination of Zabellewicz's works calls for a re-assessment of his reputation as an eclectic Kantian philosopher. One dimension of his reflections that has usually been neglected is the ambitious, though unfulfilled, plan he outlined for studies in the history of philosophy.

Tatarkiewicz, though chronologically distant from Zabellewicz and Kozłowski, owed his interest in Plato to his influential teachers from Marburg and their interpretation of Platonism. Their neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato was Tatarkiewicz's initial frame of reference in Platonic studies, and he enthusiastically reported on this to Polish readers. This justifies classifying his study on Platonism within the same reception type as works composed in the first half of the 19th century. He later abandoned the one-sidedness of the Marburg interpretation of Plato when he started to prepare his *History of Philosophy*. There is no doubt that the requirements of the genre of academic handbook resulted in a more schematic treatment of Plato in volume I of Tatarkiewicz's book, bringing it more in line with other handbooks on ancient philosophy. At the same time, it should be emphasised that Tatarkiewicz's interest in Plato, ancient thought and the history of philosophy in general was inspired by the years he spent in Marburg, which is sometimes unfairly marginalised.

The second half of the 19th century moved the reception of Plato into another dimension, no longer directly bound up with specific philosophical currents then dominant in Europe. Scholars of this type confronted Plato with their own philosophical views and, while reading Plato's dialogues, they evaluated his philosophy from their own philosophical standpoint. They recognised the obvious fact that Plato was a philosopher who could not be overlooked, but also, and more importantly, that it was pre-

cisely because of his greatness that he had become a problematic thinker. Plato came to be seen as an ambiguous philosopher, and given the broad scope of his philosophical legacy, his works underwent a widespread and diverse reception process, ranging from criticism to enthusiasm. The main aspects of his work that were targeted were the ethical and political issues.

One of the reception currents that was firmly embedded in Polish philosophical disputes comprised works on Plato created by Catholic thinkers, who initially presented various approaches to Platonism, sometimes radically diverse. It took some time for them to develop a widely accepted framework for thinking about ancient, pagan philosophy, with particular emphasis on Plato. After this initial period, when Catholic authors merely noticed the problem of Plato's accordance with Christianity, they subsequently started to express a more balanced attitude to Plato, as did, for example, F. Kozłowski and Semenenko in their pioneering works. The most important issue for them, then, became the connection between Platonism and Christian thought. Although it proved difficult to reach a unanimous evaluation of Plato, a number of issues were judged positively, such as the concept of innate knowledge or the belief in ethics as the purpose of philosophy in general. On the other hand, Plato's idea of pre-existence and his exclusion of the phenomenal world from the area of philosophical knowledge were not assessed positively. While some Platonic concepts underwent criticism, it was noted that many of his ideas were sophisticated and close to Christianity in spirit, though they had been formed in the pre-Christian era. In this way Christian thinkers justified their interest in the pagan author.

As far as his political thought was concerned, Plato became an inspiration for the socialism of Limanowski while simultaneously being criticised as a revolutionary ideologist from the conservative position of Dzieduszycki. A little later, at the beginning of the 20th century, Plato's political project met with the enthusiastic reception of Sinko and Jarra, who assessed *Politeia* from the viewpoint of the needs of a future independent Poland. Their search for the answer to questions about the shape of the future Polish state could be found in Plato, who seemed to Jarra to be a precursor of modern democracy founded on sophocracy, where someone's place in the social hierarchy depended solely on their merits.

The next stage and type of reception of Platonism in Polish philosophy begins at the turn of the 20th century. Scholars of this stage were familiar with Western studies on Plato and sometimes even influenced these studies. They still assessed Plato's dialogues, but what distinguishes these scholars from their predecessors is the fact that the dialogues constitute the

source and material for their own works in philosophy. While in the earlier stages of reception Plato did not essentially affect the philosophical reflections of the authors under consideration, the third stage is distinct from the preceding ones because the researchers integrated the Platonic material into their own reflections. In fact, without taking into account their meeting with Plato, which sometimes extended over half a century, it might be impossible to understand the origins of their thoughts or their intellectual biographies. It can therefore be claimed that, starting with the late 19th century, Plato began to take roots in the fabric of Polish philosophy, and recognised philosophers incorporated substantial and multidimensional elements of Plato's dialogues into their own works.

Christian philosophers found grounds and justification for taking up studies on ancient philosophy in the encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, since Thomism and its historical context could not be understood without Aristotle, and Aristotle in turn, could only be presented correctly in the context of Plato's philosophy. The first impulse to research Plato within neo-scholasticism came from Adamski, but it was Pawlicki who was the most important author of this current. In the early stages, his works on Plato concerned only biographical and historical issues, but in his mature, though unfinished, synthetic study on the history of Greek philosophy Plato occupied the most important place. The impressive study on the philosophy of Plato produced by Pawlicki, in part available only as a manuscript, bears testimony to his erudition and insightful knowledge of the subject, but many of Pawlicki's conclusions, especially those that were directly critical of Lutosławski's works, such as his criticism of stylometry or his adherence to the chronological precedence of the *Phaedrus*, were subsequently refuted. In his interpretation of Plato, Pawlicki emphasised, above all, those ideas that brought Plato closer to Christian thought. These included the polemic against relativism, recognition of the purposefulness of the world, the existence of its wise and good creator, the emphasis on the primacy of the spiritual realm in human nature and on the need to improve individuals as members of society. Pawlicki did not agree with the claim that Plato was a socialist; he criticised, but also tried to justify, Plato for several issues in the dialogues that were of dubious moral value and were difficult for Pawlicki's contemporaries to accept. Pawlicki's work is the most comprehensive – yet the most favourable – presentation of Plato's philosophy to originate within the Polish neo-scholastic movement. Pawlicki did not disguise his enormous enthusiasm for Plato, so it is not surprising that a decade after his death a study was published in which its author, Potempa, provided a synthetic and concise revision of Pawlicki's

enthusiastic Christian approach to Plato. He expressed a warning for any future Christian readers, discouraging them from following Pawlicki's exuberance for Plato since Plato's spiritual proximity to Christian thought was only apparent and could be misleading.

A separate and unique position in the history of Polish reception of Plato is occupied by Lutosławski, who proved to be influential by publishing his studies both in his homeland and also, or perhaps even primarily, in the English- and German-speaking academic world. Unlike other Polish Plato researchers, such as Pawlicki or Jezienicki, who only incidentally announced their results in Western languages, for the most part in German, Lutosławski made a point of publishing his works in English, German and French. Having begun his research on Plato from rudimentary historical works on the history of manuscripts and editions and studies on Plato's dialogues, Lutosławski then took up the problem of the chronology of the dialogues. When he announced his results to the international public, he proposed both a complex method of linguistic statistics and the solution to the problem of the chronology of the dialogues based on this method. The legitimacy of the method, its premises and results were internationally discussed and continue to be discussed to this day. *Stylometry*, as he called his method, was rejected by some, while others accused its author of plagiarism, and still others modified the method and used their modified versions to refute Lutosławski's chronological findings. Most scholars, however, accepted its most general conclusions, thus indirectly also confirming the efforts of many of Lutosławski's predecessors whose works had contributed to the development of his method. Lutosławski's inclusion and acknowledgement of their work on such an unprecedented scale was to play a part in bringing about a rapprochement between Plato scholars in German- and English-speaking academic circles. In the light of his erudition in this work, many scholars came to realise their own ignorance of the achievements of their predecessors. Although, for his Western critics, the chronology of the dialogues provided by Lutosławski was an autonomous and crucial issue, for Lutosławski himself, it became merely the foundation of his own philosophical thought, which also drew on the Polish Romantic tradition. Lutosławski's interpretation of the late dialogues as evidence of Plato's spiritualism became an argument for the ancient roots of Polish philosophy and, in particular, 19th century Polish Messianism as a spiritualistic conception, thus confirming the universal nature of Messianism, as well as the historical continuity of philosophical tradition from Plato to the philosophy of Polish Messianism and Lutosławski's neo-Messianism. In his philological and historical studies, Lutosławski inter-

preted Platonism as an evolution from idealism to spiritualism and provided an analogical, evolutionary interpretation of the development of Plato's theory of ideas as the transition from transcendent entities in the mature dialogues to concepts in mind in the late works of Plato. The only field of Plato's reception in which Lutosławski did not participate was the translation of the dialogues, with the exception of some short passages. His work, as a whole, represented an attempt to introduce Polish historians of philosophy to international discussions on Plato, but unfortunately, in this respect he did not find creative followers in Poland. Nevertheless, he sought to transfer his passion for Plato to the next generation of researchers and to educate his successors. The outbreak of World War II seemed to Lutosławski to provide a confirmation of his vision of Plato's philosophy as a distant precursor of modern spiritualism, thus also confirming Messianism and personalism, or more generally, Christianity. For Lutosławski, Plato, the philosopher, who had travelled the long road from communism and idealism to spiritualism, thus creating the foundations for personalism and Christian thought, was seen as a remedy for the problems of totalitarianism and communism with which Europe was at that time afflicted.

One scholar who has been almost totally forgotten in Polish philosophical culture is Lisiecki. Even in his own times Polish audiences were only aware of his translation of the *Republic*, his studies on Plato's *Phaedo* and on the concept of the pre-existence of souls. Lisiecki did not share the enthusiasm that some researchers expressed for Plato's political philosophy prior to World War I. He was disappointed by the economic conditions in independent Poland after the war, and Plato's political project did not seem to him to be achievable at all. Because of his complicated biography, Lisiecki was relegated to the margins of academic life in interwar Catholic Poland, though his diligence and skills should have predestined him to take up an academic position. He considered himself to be a Platonist, published on Platonic issues, and translated dialogues, but most of his work remained unpublished, which is regrettable, because his works could have competed with those of Witwicki. It was Plato that was the main subject of Lisiecki's works and research interests, yet his extensive monograph book on Plato was, unfortunately, never published, for the manuscript was destroyed during World War II.

Plato also became the main subject of interest for Witwicki, a philosopher, psychologist, translator and artist, whose systematic work on the translation of Plato's dialogues stemmed from literary premises, with the aim of making Plato available to the general public. Witwicki is unique in the reception of Plato in Poland because of his versatility, being influential

as a translator, commentator and promoter of Plato's work. His method of explaining the texts of Plato's dialogues was based on psychological analyses, which endeavoured to find the sources of Plato's ideas in his biography, in his reconstructed psyche, in his type of sensitivity, and finally in his homosexuality. Witwicki deliberately used his commentaries to the dialogues to point out the relevance of Plato's works to modern times, thus transforming them into an instrument for criticising negative aspects of Christianity, modern philosophy, or simply – human stupidity. He compared the irrationality of religion to the rationalism of philosophy, and took the side of the latter. He compared the empty verbosity of analytic philosophy and philosophy of language to the colourful philosophy that touches on the most essential problems of human life, and again, of course, he took the side of the latter. While criticising Plato, Witwicki took advantage of the opportunity to express his own views on science, ethics and art, and indeed the image of Plato produced by Witwicki is primarily the image of an artist and thinker, a poet and philosopher, who, while attempting to reconcile his own conflicting aspirations, produced work that was excellent in terms of both art and philosophy. This image of Plato dovetailed with Witwicki's own psyche. In fact, it was ideological considerations that provided the first incentive for Witwicki to focus his interests on Plato; then came his intense reading of Plato during his stay in Germany, and finally Staff's encouragement for him to translate the *Symposium*, encouragement which was in the following years reinforced by Twardowski, who had been Witwicki's teacher. His interest in Plato was not, however, shared by Twardowski's other disciples, who treated Witwicki's Platonic works as literature rather than philosophy. The image of Plato created by Witwicki cannot, therefore, be seen as a product of the Lvov-Warsaw school, but as the work of an isolated scholar whose creative individuality went far beyond the typical set of interests of the representatives of this school. Witwicki's reading of Plato was affected by World War II, but unlike Lutosławski, he did not regard Plato as a remedy for what had happened in 20th century Europe, but tended to blame Plato for the disasters of war and totalitarianism. According to Witwicki, Plato was to some extent responsible for the appearance of oppressive state institutions modelled on the institutions of the *Republic*, but in Plato's favour, Witwicki added that these institutions had been the inevitable outcome of Plato's holistic vision of man and society, which Witwicki tried to justify. The application of Plato's social and political institutions in post-war Poland lacked Plato's universal vision, and without any attempt to improve human beings their results were extremely negative. It is interesting to ob-

serve how the extreme experience of war and the political conditions in post-war Poland resulted in two conflicting assessments of Plato's philosophical and political heritage, produced by the two most eminent Polish experts on Plato, Lutosławski and Witwicki.

It was only at the end of the interwar period in Poland that a current of research on Plato appeared that was not based on ideological premises and did not even touch upon Plato's philosophical outlook or ideology. Since this current was marginal, *ipso facto* the important role of the ideological factor in Polish philosophy is confirmed. The philosophical studies in question were focused on Plato's mathematics and logic and the most prominent representative of these studies was Jordan. Jordan did not consider Plato to be a mathematician, but he confirmed that Plato had extensive knowledge of the mathematics of his time. His interest in Plato was indirectly affected by Twardowski's influence on Polish philosophy, for Jordan's supervisor, Zawirski, had written his doctoral thesis under Twardowski's supervision. Jordan owed the methodological aspects of his thesis, as well as the theoretical premises concerning the relationship between the natural and formal sciences in their historical development, to Zawirski. This theoretical framework was applied by Jordan to the field of ancient thought, resulting in the thesis that the discovery of the axiomatic method could be ascribed to Plato. Plato's mathematical reflections were also developed by Bornstein on the basis of indirect testimonies. He sought the foundation of his own original and abstract philosophical and metaphysical constructions in his reinterpretation of Plato's unwritten teaching.

As has been indicated, with time Polish studies on Plato became increasingly autonomous, as did the discussions about Plato held in Polish academic circles. Although the dispute concerning different Christian approaches to Plato had been quickly replaced by a relatively homogeneous position in which arguments for and against Plato's compatibility with Christian thought were balanced, other contentious issues were not so easily settled. These include, above all, the argument about Plato between Pawlicki and Lutosławski, with its personal and ideological undertones. This concerned issues related to the chronology of the dialogues and the overall vision of Platonism, as well as more specific problems, including, Plato's alleged socialism. On the one hand, Lutosławski had appropriated Plato for the Polish Messianic tradition, and transformed him into a distant precursor of that tradition; on the other, Pawlicki presented Plato as a moral thinker close to Christianity. Other disputes of less importance were triggered by the reviews of the works of Tatarkiewicz, Bornstein, and a number of less-known authors. These disputes concerned chronological is-

sues, the presence of mystical elements in the works of Plato, or the possibility of basing knowledge about Platonism on indirect sources. Sometimes the disputes on Plato were only exemplifications of broader underlying issues, such as the dispute over the methodology of the history of philosophy between Pawlicki and Lutosławski or the metaphilosophical issues disputed between Witwicki and other representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw school, especially concerning the social and ideological functions of philosophy and whether it should have such functions at all. Plato's works were also material for non-philosophical disputes, such as those concerning the method of translating ancient texts (between Bronikowski, Witwicki and others).

Plato in Polish reception appears to have been plagued by unfulfilled projects and it seems that some kind of fate weighed heavily on Platonic studies in Poland. None of Plato's translators, neither Bronikowski, nor Lisiecki, nor Witwicki, was able to translate all of his legacy, though all of them declared such an intention. Lisiecki, the greatest rival of Witwicki in the field of translation, was rejected by Polish academia on non-scientific grounds, despite his talent, hard work and the style of his translations which would have attracted readers even today; moreover, his lengthy monograph on Plato was destroyed by the Germans during the war. Zabellewicz's study on Plato, which was intended to provide a philosophical benchmark for Polish philosophers, was only partly fulfilled. Woyczyński's doctoral thesis on Plato, written under the supervision of Lutosławski and defended in Vilnius, proved to be his swan song, though it was to have been the starting point for his subsequent Platonic studies. Pawlicki was unable to complete his synthetic work on Greek philosophy, managing only to get as far as the lengthy chapter on Plato, which he left unfinished. Although Plato was Pawlicki's greatest philosophical passion, it was also because of the charm of Plato and the author's polemical zeal that his book on Greek philosophy was never completed. Jarra, having written his Ph.D. thesis on the social and political philosophy of Plato, declared his intention of conducting further research on this subject, but after World War I he took a position at the Faculty of Law at the University of Warsaw and thereafter published works on the history of philosophy of law, never to return to Plato again. Both Jordan and Bornstein, philosophers who had drawn attention to mathematical issues in the dialogues before World War II, also had plans for further research, but they were unable to continue their studies after the war. Bornstein died in 1948 and Jordan remained in Great Britain as a political exile, still researching philoso-

phy, but, for reasons beyond his control, never returning to his Platonic studies.

As for the validity or topicality of the studies considered in this research, it must be admitted that only a few names are still cited as a source of sustainable results. These include Lutosławski's stylometric research, which, despite the criticism it has received, still presents synthetically and viably the results of research conducted by generations of scholars who preceded him. Lutosławski's work not only proved to be a reliable source for the reconstruction of the 19th century dispute on the chronology of the dialogues, but the results of his method are still treated as a starting point for further research or as an argument for specific chronological solutions, though the ongoing dispute about the validity and significance of the method itself continues. It is worth noting, however, that he is more frequently referred to by foreign authors than by those from Poland. Another relevant and constantly cited work, but only in Poland, is Jordan's dissertation. Polish contemporary authors of works on Plato's late philosophy, or those studying the history of the philosophy of mathematics, still refer to Jordan's results and confirm their validity. In yet another sphere of influence, it is the works of Witwicki that have proved to be without parallel, though Poles are not always aware of the widespread impact that his translations and commentaries have had on them. Due to changes in the education system after World War II, Plato ceased to speak to his readers in his original language. Instead, the reading public received the easily digestible translations by Witwicki, decorated with drawings, enriched with comments presenting Plato as an up-to-date philosopher, though perhaps the popular image of Plato that was presented was a little too simplified. Regardless of how Witwicki's Plato is assessed, his impact should not be underestimated. At the beginning of the 21st century it is quite unlikely that anyone in Poland (if anywhere) begins their meeting with Plato from reading the *Apology* or the *Euthyphro* in Greek, which was natural a century ago. Even professional scholars, who research ancient philosophy and study the original Greek texts, will still have the arguments of Socrates as they were rendered into Polish by Witwicki at the back of their minds. On the one hand, the wide circulation of his translations has helped to popularise the dialogues themselves to an extent previously unknown in Polish culture, and this is obviously significant; on the other hand, Witwicki, as the author who introduces Polish audiences to the world of Plato's dialogues, has come to monopolise Plato in Poland. It is only specialists who reach further and deeper. The small number of new translations that have

appeared, some of which are of debatable quality and usefulness, has not changed this situation significantly.

As for the significance of research on Plato's reception in Poland, it seems that, above all, by charting its development over a period of a century and a half, a rarely explored area of the history of native Polish thought has been revealed. One of the results of this work is that it has called for the inclusion and preservation, within the sphere of the history of Polish philosophy, of authors who were little-known or even forgotten, or unknown as philosophers, promoters or historians of philosophy, such as Zabellewicz, Semenenko, Limanowski, Potempa and Lisiecki, or those who belonged to the group of gymnasia teachers. These were people for whom Plato was simply their subject of interest, or whose expertise allowed them to introduce Plato into the philosophical interests of their times. For some Polish philosophers, Plato was an integral part of doing philosophy, often historically oriented, as was the case with Pawlicki, Lutosławski, Witwicki, and Bornstein. Without considering the direct influence from Plato, understanding their philosophical positions would be difficult, if not impossible. Plato's works were also one of the starting points for scholars who decided to focus on areas unrelated or indirectly related to his legacy, as in the case of Limanowski's studies on sociology and social philosophy, Jarra's interests in the philosophy of law, or Tatarkiewicz's devotion to the general history of philosophy. Research on Plato's reception in Poland has also made it possible to supplement or modify some persisting misconceptions about important and less important figures of Polish philosophy. These include the view on Zabellewicz as an eclectic philosopher, the rejection of the influence Lutosławski's work exerted on Western researchers, the disregard for Tatarkiewicz's Marburg inspirations, or the recognition of Witwicki's translation work as an outcome of the Lvov-Warsaw school.

Finally, it is worth asking another question: is the above review of Polish works on Plato over a period of one and a half centuries helpful in understanding Plato better? The answer to this question will not be unambiguous. It is impossible to expect readers at the beginning of the 21st century to accept any of the presented images of Plato as the only solution or final answer. At the same time, contemporary scholars may find in this account a reflection of current discussions on approaches to Plato and ways of treating his dialogues. It is also possible that the method of division and classification of various phenomena used in this work on Plato's reception in Polish philosophy may prove useful in other fields of reception in the history of philosophy.

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Appendix: Chronological list of Polish translations of Plato's dialogues

Only those editions of the whole dialogues, or at least extensive parts of them, that were produced up to 1950 are included here, with the exception of some later publications of Witwicki.

1845:

Apology, Crito, Phaedo, F. A. Kozłowski (*Dzieła. 1. Apologia czyli Obrona Sokratesa, 2. Kriton, 3. Phedon czyli O nieśmiertelności duszy*, Warszawa: S. Orgelbrand).

1857:

Menexenus, A. Bronikowski (*Menexenos*, in: *Pokłosie. Zbieranka literacka*, vol. V (1856), Poznań: L. Merzbach, pp. 129–158).

Ion, A. Bronikowski (*Jon czyli Rhapsodika*, „Czas. Dodatek Miesięczny” vol. II, 6, iss. 2, p. 337–353).

1858:

Phaedrus, Symposium, Hippias Major, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Ion, Menexenus, A. Bronikowski (*Dzieła*, vol. I, Poznań: L. Merzbach: *Fedros czyli Wymowa, Biesiada czyli Mowy o miłości, Hippiasz większy czyli Piękno, Lysis czyli Przyjaciele, Charmides czyli Roztropność, Euthyfron czyli Pobożność, Jon czyli Rhapsodika, Menexenos*).

Theaetetus, A. Bronikowski (*Theaetetos czyli Co jest Wiedza (ἐπιστήμη)*, Ostrowo).

1860:

Crito, A. Bronikowski (*Kriton czyli Posłuszeństwo Prawom*, „Jahresbericht Königlichen Katholischen Gymnasiums zu Ostrowo” vol. 15, pp. 5–15).

1862:

Republic I, A. Bronikowski (*Rzeczpospolita czyli co jest sprawiedliwość. Rozmowa pierwsza*, „Jahresbericht Königlichen Katholischen Gymnasiums zu Ostrowo” vol. 17, pp. 3–22).

1864:

Republic II, A. Bronikowski (*Rzeczpospolita czyli co jest sprawiedliwość. Rozmowa druga*, „Jahresbericht Königlichen Katholischen Gymnasiums zu Ostrowo” vol. 19, pp. 3–20).

1866:

Republic III, A. Bronikowski (*Rzeczpospolita czyli co jest sprawiedliwość. Rozmowa trzecia*, „Jahresbericht Königlichen Katholischen Gymnasiums zu Ostrowo” vol. 21, pp. 3–24).

1869:

Phaedo ch. I–XIII, F. K. Sempniński (*Fedon czyli Sokrates umierający*, „Jahresbericht des Königlichen Gymnasiums zu Schrimm” vol. IV, pp. VI–XIX).

1871:

Laws I–IV, A. Bronikowski (*Dzieła*, vol. II, part 1, Poznań: W. Decker).

1878:

Protagoras, tłum. A. Bronikowski, (*Protagoras*, Poznań; in parts in various issues of „Warta”, vol. 4, 1877/1878).

Phaedrus ch. XXV–XXXVII, T. Malinowski (in: T. Malinowski, *O mytach Platonińskich*, „Sprawozdanie Dyrekcji C. K. Realnego i Wyższego Gimnazjum w Wadowicach” pp. 13–25).

1879:

Alcibiades I, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Laches*, *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*, A. Bronikowski (*Dzieła*, vol. II, Poznań: J. K. Żupański: *Alkibiades czyli Jak się zabierać do sprawowania rzeczy publicznych*, *Gorgias czyli Wymowa*, *Menon czyli Skąd powstaje w ludziach cnota*, *Laches czyli Męstwo*, *Euthydemus czyli Drobnostkowicze*, *Protagoras*).

Gorgias, S. Siedlecki (*Gorgias*, Kraków: Fundusz ś.p. Towarnickiego).

1880:

Crito, K. Kaszewski (*Kryton. O obowiązku względem własnego sumienia i praw społecznych*, in: *Wypisy z autorów starożytnych dla użytku młodzieży*, ed. K. Kaszewski, Warszawa: K. Kowalewski, pp. 141–161).

Laches, *Apology*, *Crito*, S. Siedlecki (*Laches*, *Apologia*, *Kryton*, Kraków: Czas; *Laches* was also published separately).

1881:

Protagoras, *Euthyphro*, S. Siedlecki (*Protagoras*, *Eutyfron*, Kraków: Czas).

1883:

Theaetetus, A. Bronikowski (*Theaetetus czyli Co jest Wiedza (ἐπιστήμη)*, Poznań (in parts in various issues of „Warta” vol. 10/11, 1883–1884).

1884:

Republic, A. Bronikowski (posthumously, *Dzieła*, vol. 3, Poznań: A. Czartowski).

1885:

Apology, A. Maszewski (*Obrona Sokratesa*, Warszawa: E. Wende).

1888:

Philebus, B. Kašinowski (*Fileb. Dyalog o rozkoszy*, Warszawa: E. Wende).

Meno, P. Świdorski (*Menon*, "Sprawozdanie Dyrekcji C. K. Gimnazjum w Stanisławowie", pp. 3–32).

1895:

Apology, A. Maszewski (*Obrona Sokratesa (Apologia)*), in: *Antologia grecka*, ed. H. Zatycki, Lwów: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, pp. 365–391; 1st ed.: 1885)

Crito, S. Siedlecki (*Kryton (Kriton)*), in: *Antologia grecka*, pp. 392–403; 1st ed.: 1880).

Phaedo, F. A. Kozłowski (*Fedon (O nieśmiertelności duszy)*), in: *Antologia grecka*, pp. 404–448; 1st ed.: 1845).

1898:

Apology, A. Maszewski (*Obrona Sokratesa*, Warszawa: E. Wende; 1st ed.: 1885; 2nd ed.: 1895).

Symposium (172a–199b), J. Biela (*Biesiada*, „Sprawozdanie Dyrekcji C. K. Wyższego Gimnazjum w Drohobycz”, pp. 3–37).

1899:

Symposium (199c–223d), J. Biela (*Biesiada (Dokończenie)*, „Sprawozdanie Dyrekcji C. K. Wyższego Gimnazjum w Drohobycz”, pp. 3–32).

1907:

Phaedo, S. Okołów (*Fedon. Dyalog o nieśmiertelności duszy*, Warszawa: E. Wende).

1909:

Symposium, S. Okołów (*Biesiada (Symposion). Dyalog o miłości*, Warszawa: E. Wende).

Symposium, W. Witwicki (*Uczta. Dyalog o miłości*, Lwów: B. Połoniecki).

1910:

Apology, Crito, S. Siedlecki (*Apologia, Kryton*, Kraków; 1st ed. of the whole collection: 1880; 2nd ed. of the *Crito*: 1895).

Symposium, W. Witwicki (*Uczta. Dyalog o miłości*, Lwów: B. Połoniecki; 1st ed.: 1909).

1918:

Phaedrus, W. Witwicki (*Fajdros*, Lwów: Książnica Polska).

1920:

Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, W. Witwicki (*Eutyfron, Obrona Sokratesa, Kriton*, Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica Polska).

1921:

Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Ion, W. Witwicki (*Hippjusz mniejszy, Hippjusz większy, Ijon*, Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica Polska).

Symposium, W. Witwicki (*Uczta. Dialog o miłości*, Lwów–Warszawa: B. Połoniecki; 1st ed.: 1909; 2nd ed.: 1910).

1922:

Phaedrus, W. Witwicki (*Fajdros*, Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica Polska; 1st ed.: 1918).

Gorgias, W. Witwicki (*Gorgjasz*, Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica Polska).

1923:

Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, W. Witwicki (*Eutyfron, Obrona Sokratesa, Kriton*, Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica Polska; 1st ed.: 1920).

Protagoras, W. Witwicki (*Protagoras*, Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica Polska).

1925:

Phaedo, W. Witwicki (*Fedon*, Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica–Atlas).

1928:

Republic, S. Lisiecki (*Rzeczpospolita*, Kraków: PAU).

1929:

Apology, W. Witwicki (*Obrona Sokratesa*, Lwów–Warszawa: Książnica–Atlas; as part of a collection with *Euthyphro* and *Crito*: 1st ed.: 1920; 2nd ed.: 1923).

1934:

Euthyphro, W. Witwicki (*Eutyfron*, Lwów: PTF [Polish Philosophical Society]; as part of a collection with *Apology* and *Crito*: 1st ed.: 1920; 2nd ed.: 1923).

1935:

Meno, W. Witwicki (*Menon*, Warszawa: WTF [Warsaw Philosophical Society]).

1936:

Theaetetus, W. Witwicki (*Teajtet*, Warszawa: WTF).

1937:

Charmides, Lysis, W. Witwicki (*Charmides, Lizys*, Warszawa: WTF).

Laches, W. Witwicki (*Laches*, Warszawa: Sekcja Psychologiczna przy Zarządzie Głównym Towarzystwa Wiedzy Wojskowej [Psychological Section of the Military Knowledge Society]).

1938:

Philebus, W. Witwicki (*Fileb*, Warszawa: WTF).

Letters, Maria Maykowska (*Listy*, Warszawa: Kasa im. Mianowskiego).

1944:

Euthyphro, J. M. Bocheński (*Eutyfron*, Edinburgh: Składnica Księgarska).

1947:

Laws I–III (fragments), *Republic* III (fragments), W. Witwicki (in: W. Witwicki, *Platon jako pedagog*, Warszawa: Nasza Księgarnia, pp. 55–126).

1948:

Republic, W. Witwicki (*Państwo*, 2 vols., Warszawa: Wiedza).

1951:

Timaeus, *Critias*, W. Witwicki (*Timaios. Kritias*, Warszawa: Ministerstwo Szkół Wyższych i Nauki, Ministerstwo Kultury i Sztuki).

1956:

Sophist, *Statesman*, W. Witwicki (*Sofista. Polityk*, Warszawa: PWN).

1957:

Euthydemus, W. Witwicki (*Eutydem*, Warszawa: PWN).

1958:

Republic, *Laws* I–VII, W. Witwicki (*Państwo*, z dodaniem siedmiu ksiąg *Praw*, 2 vols., Warszawa: PWN; 1st ed. of the *Republic*: 1948).

1961:

Parmenides, W. Witwicki (*Parmenides*, Warszawa: PWN).

In the late fifties PWN (Polish Academic Publishers) reedited Witwicki's translations. These are still available and popular. Revisions of them have also been published recently by Marek Derewiecki. In postwar years M. Maykowska was still active in the field of translation (*Laws*) as well as other scholars of the older generation: P. Siwek (*Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*) and L. Regner (*Protagoras*, *Phaedrus*). Three dialogues were translated by E. Zwolski (*Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Philebus*) and the *Parmenides* by J. Górniak. In recent years many new translators have begun to publish their works, though none was able to translate more dialogues than R. Legutko's four dialogues (*Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Phaedo*). Z. Brzostowska and W. Stefański produced their different versions of the *Cratylus*, and K. Tuszyńska-

Maciejewska *Menexenus*, but many scholars of the younger generations have only started to make their first attempts at presenting Plato's works to the Polish reading public: J. Sowa (*Lysis*), A. Chorościńska (*Ion*), E. Osek (*Lysis*), A. Serafin (*Symposium*), M. Bizoń (*Hippias Minor*), but the most demanding task of them all was undertaken by D. Zygmuntowicz (*Laws*).