Antitrust Enforcement and Standard Essential Patents
Moving beyond the FRAND Commitment
Zusammenfassung
Die Arbeit diskutiert die Auswirkungen der Durchsetzung von Standard-Patenten für das Wettbewerbsrecht. Die formale Standardeinstellung hat das Potenzial, zu nahezu optimalen Investitionen in Forschung und Entwicklung und gleichzeitig zur schnellen Umsetzung innovativer Standards zu führen.
Abstract
The present thesis discusses the implications of the enforcement of standard-essential patents (SEPs) for competition law. Formal standard setting has the potential to result in near-optimal investment in research and development and at the same time in rapid implementation of innovative standards.
- 73–78 Bibliography 73–78
- Bibliography
- Books
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- Articles
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- Gupta Kirti, “The Patent Policy Debate in the High-Tech World”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 9(4): 827-858 (2013). doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nht039
- Gupta Kirti, and Mark Snyder, “Smart Phone Litigation and Standard Essential Patents” (Hoover Institution Working Group on Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Prosperity, Stanford University, Working Paper Series No. 14006, 2014). doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2492331
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- Katsoulacos Yannis, “Optimal Legal Standards for Refusals To License Intellectual Property: A Welfare-Based Analysis”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 5(2): 269-295 (2009). doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhn030
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- Kieff F. Scott and Anne Layne-Farrar, “Incentive Effects from Different Approaches to Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting Organizations.”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 9(4): 1091-1123 (2013). doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nht030
- Langus Gregor, Vilen Lipatov and Damien Neven, “Standard-Essential Patents: Who Is Really Holding Up (and When)?”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 9(2): 253-284 (2013). doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2222592
- Larouche Pierre, and Nicolo Zingales, “Injunctive Relief in Disputes Related to Standard-Essential Patents: Time for the CJEU to Set Fair and Reasonable Presumptions.”, European Competition Journal 10(3): 551-596 (2014). doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2536829
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- Layne-Farrar Anne, Gerard Llobet and Padilla George, “Preventing Patent Hold Up: An Economic Assessment of ex ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting”, AIPLA QJ 37: 445 (2009).
- Lemley Mark A., “IP and Other Regulations.”, (Stanford Law School Working Paper Series, Paper No. 476, 2015) Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2589278 doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2589278
- Merges Robert P., “The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform.”, 24 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1583 (2010).
- Milgrom Paul and Roberts John, “Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence”, 27 Journal of Economic Theory 280-312 (1982). doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-X
- Mintzer Erica S. and Munck Suzanne, “The Joint US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Patent Assertion Entities – “Follow the Money”, Antitrust Law Journal 79(2): 423-443 (2014).
- Morton Fiona M. Scott and Shapiro Carl, “Strategic Patent Acquisitions.”, Antitrust Law Journal 79(2): 463-495 (2014).
- Mossoff Adam, “Intellectual Property and Property Rights”, George Mason University Law and Economics Series. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466479 (2013). doi.org/10.4337/9781784714468
- Nagpal Pankaj, and Kalle J. Lyytinen, “Key Actors In The Mobile Telephone Industry: Feature Phone Years And The Rise Of Nokia”, Review of Business Information Systems 17(4): 171-178 (2013). doi.org/10.19030/rbis.v17i4.8239
- Popofsky Mark S. and Laufert Michael D., “Antitrust Attacks on Patent Assertion Entities”, Antitrust Law Journal 79(2): 445-462 (2014).
- Rato Miguel and Petit Nicolas, “Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: Established Standards Reconsidered?”, European Competition Journal 9(1): 1-65 (2013). doi.org/10.5235/17441056.9.1.1
- Schellingerhout Ruben and Cavicchi Piero, “Patent Ambush in Standard-Setting: the Commission accepts Commitments from Rambus to Lower Memory Chip Royalty Rates”, Competition Policy Newsletter 1: 32-36 (2010).
- Sidak J. Gregory, “Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-Setting Organizations”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 5(1): 123-188 (2009). doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhp007
- Sidak J. Gregory, “The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents.”, 104 The Georgetown Law Journal Online 48 (2015).
- Shelanski Howard, “Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual and Other Property”, Antitrust Law Journal: 369-395 (2009).
- Sherkow Jacob, “Preliminary Injunctions Post-Mayo and Myriad”, Stanford Law Review Online 67: 1-8 (2014).
- Smith Henry, “Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological Innovation”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 9(4): 1057-1089 (2013). doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nht032
- Spulber Daniel F., “How Patents Provide the Foundation of the Market for Inventions.”, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 11(2): 271–316 (2015). doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhv006
- Taylor David O., “Legislative Responses to Patent Assertion Entities.” 23 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 313 (2015).
- Torti Valerio, “IPRs, Competition and Standard Setting: In Search of a Model to Address Hold-Up”, E.C.L.R. 33(9): 387-397 (2012).
- Tsai Joanna, and Joshua D. Wright, “Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts” (July 18, 2014), forthcoming 80.1 (2014). doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2467939
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- Wu Tim, “Intellectual Property Experimentalism by Way of Competition Law”, 9 Competition Policy International 30 (2013).
- Cases
- E.U.
- Commission Decision, Google/Motorola Mobility (Case COMP/M.6381)[2012].
- Commission Decision, Samsung (Case Number AT.39939)[2014].
- Commission Decision, Motorola (Case Number AT.39985)[2014].
- Case C-85-76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG V. Commission [1979] ECR 461. (ECJ)
- Case C170/13, Huawei V. ZTE [2015]. (ECJ)
- Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG V. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG [2004] ECR I-5039.
- IPCom v Nokia [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch). (UK)
- IPCom v. Deutsche Telekom & Vodafone, Landgericht Düsseldorf Apr. 24, 2012, Case Number 4b O 274/10. (Germany)
- Case C-322/81, Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin V. Commission (Michelin I) [1983] ECR 3461. (ECJ)
- Orange Book Standard, BGH, 6 May 2009, KZR 39/06, GRUR 2009 694. (Germany)
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- U.S.
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- eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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- Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1038 (W.D.Wash. 2012).
- Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
- Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 311–313 (1982).