

Citizenship as Inclusion and Exclusion: Arguments against Religious Violence from Contemporary Pakistan

Najia Mukhtar

School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London

Abstract: Pakistani society, with its multiple Muslim orientations and small non-Muslim communities, is seeing high levels of aggression towards religious and sectarian targets. Competing understandings of Islam tend towards seeking to suppress (variously defined) religious ‘others’. The context is further complicated by an ongoing *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) insurgency, which frequently selects religiously identified targets (for instance, Christians and *Shi’ahs*).

My paper analyses the discursive responses of two contemporary Pakistani actors, the ‘moderate’ Sunni scholar, Javed Ahmed Ghamidi and the Sufi scholar, Tahir-ul-Qadri, who, operating in this socio-political context, actively critique religious violence.. Specifically, I examine their notion of citizenship, constructed from Islamic source materials such as the Qur’an, *hadith*, and *fiqh*, to guarantee religious freedoms. However, inclusive citizenship that offers protection against violence to religious difference must also exclude certain types of religious difference, in order to be practicable. Both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri argue for eliminating, through violent or coercive means, ‘terrorists’ and ‘militants’. Terrorists and militants are categorized as dissidents and rebels using the same Islamic source materials. Citizenship (in their versions of Islam) thus constitutes guarantees of protection from illegitimate violence against religious difference necessarily predicated on the legitimate violent suppression of rebel citizens.

1. *Introduction: Socio-political context, problem spaces and discursive actors*

The question of how Muslims should approach religious difference within Islam¹ and with other faith-groups has become increasingly charged amid the recent prominence of violence associated with 'Islamic' groups. Evidently, violent suppression is one way to approach religious 'others'. For instance, within Pakistan, there have been numerous attacks on minorities like the *Shi'ah*, *Ahmadi*² and Christians, as well as on those associated with the (majority³) *Sunni-Barelwi* orientation. The *Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan* (TTP)⁴ insurgency in Pakistan, which often selects religiously identified targets, has further magnified the scale of religious violence⁵. Several

1 The term 'Islam' here does not refer to a single, static discourse or set of practices. Instead, it encompasses the ambiguities, heterogeneities and fluidities within Islam as it is lived, practiced, believed, interpreted and reinterpreted by Muslims on a continuous basis.

2 The *Ahmadiyya* movement was founded in 1889 in the Indian province of Punjab by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908). *Ahmadis* have faced opposition from other Muslims, typically over the perceived messianic claims of their founder. In Pakistan, *Ahmadis* were officially declared a non-Muslim minority (despite their self-identification as Muslims) in 1974. Further constitutional ordinances were subsequently passed penalising their usage of Muslim symbols and practices.

3 Reliable statistics on the different *Sunni* orientations in Pakistan are unavailable. The website of the US public policy organization *globalsecurity.org* provides estimates suggesting that *Barelwis* comprise the significant majority, followed by the *Deobandis* and then the *Ahl-i-hadith*. This is corroborated by anecdotal and popular accounts in the media.

4 The TTP is a loose network of militant groups with ties to the Afghan *Taliban*. It emerged officially in 2007, partially as a form of resistance to the Pakistani state's complicity with NATO's anti-terrorist operations in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

5 Shehzad, Mohammad. 'Timeline of Attacks on Shi'a/Hazara Muslims in 2012-13,' 24 March 2013, <http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2013/03/timeline-of-attacks-on-Shi'ahazara-muslims-in-2012-13/>; BBC News, 'Pakistan Mosque Attacks in Lahore Kill Scores,' 29 May 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10181380> [27 August 2013]; 'Pakistan Sufi Shrine Suicide Attack Kills 41,' 3 April 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12951923> [27 August 2013]; Shafiq Butt, 'Yet Another Shrine Comes under Attack,' 26 October 2011, <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/42249> [25 September 2011]; The Guardian, 'Pakistan Church Bomb: Christians Mourn 85 Killed in Peshawar Suicide Attack,' 24 September 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12951923> [28 April 2013]; Dawn News, 'Blast Kills Six at Baba Farid's Shrine in Pakpattan,' 25 October 2010, <http://beta.dawn.com/news/575737/blast-kills-six-at-baba-farids-shrine-in-pakpattan> [27 August 2013].

other militant groups operate in Pakistan, such as the *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (Militia of *Jhangvi*⁶), which was formed in the 1990s and particularly targets the *Shi'ah* community⁷. All this interplays with a global context pre-occupied with the emergence and violent activities of high-profile 'terrorist' Muslim groups such as al-Qaida, the Taliban and the Islamic State (ISIS).

This paper probes the issue of violent responses to religious difference through the concept of 'citizenship', as understood by two self-described 'tolerant' religious actors⁸ in Pakistan – Javed Ahmad Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri. Both (ostensibly) argue against religious violence and advocate more accommodating approaches to religious difference.

Ghamidi became widely known as a 'moderate' *Sunni* scholar during the 2000s, when he aligned himself with the policy of 'Enlightened Moderation' advocated by the military government of Pervez Musharraf, which was supporting the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT)⁹. Alongside state support, a growing demand for religious programming after the deregulation of the Pakistani media in 2002, created space for 'moderate' interpretations on television. Hence, although Ghamidi and other scholars of his Islamic educational institute, al-Mawrid, did not have a wide access to traditional institutions (the mosque and *madrassa*) they became increasingly present on television. They would frequently be called upon to comment on 'true' Islamic injunctions regarding the use of violence, for instance in cases of blasphemy or *jihad*. Concerns about Muslim religious violence following 9-11 have therefore, directly propelled and shaped the

6 Named after its founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.

7 For more on the TTP, its relationship with the Afghan Taliban and with militant sectarian groups such as the *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*, see: Bergen, Peter L. / Tiedemann, Katherine. *Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders between Terror, Politics and Religion*. New York, 2013; Brown, Wahid and Rassler, Don. *Fountainhead of Jihad : The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2010*. London, 2013.

For an overview of the broader Taliban movement see: Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban the Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond*, New ed. London, 2010.

For a good discussion on militancy in Pakistan see Hussain, Zahid. 'Battling Militancy' In: *Pakistan : Beyond 'the Crisis State'*. Maleeha Lodhi (Ed.). London, 2011.

8 Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri are referred to as 'actors' because they are seen as proactively producing and speaking alternative ideas for, and about, Muslims.

9 The programme of Enlightened Moderation was premised on US foreign policy towards regulating relations between religion and state in Muslim majority countries after 9-11. See Aziz 'Making a Sovereign State: Javed Ghamidi and "Enlightened Moderation"'. *Modern Asian Studies* 45/3. 2011.

ideas regarding Islam produced and publicly disseminated by Ghamidi and other al-Mawrid scholars.

Tahir-ul-Qadri, referred to as *Shaykh*¹⁰-ul-Islam by his followers, is the leader of the transnational organisation, Minhaj-ul-Qur'an International (MQI, lit. Path of the Qur'an). MQI was established in 1981. Prior to 9-11 when sectarian violence between the *Shi'ah* and *Sunni* first erupted in Pakistan during the 1980s¹¹, Tahir-ul-Qadri actively campaigned for reconciliation and dialogue between the two communities. After 9-11 he has spoken regularly at conferences in Western countries, including the UK and US and on television, condemning 'terrorists' and advocating peace and interfaith harmony. He became globally renowned for his 'Fatwa against Terrorism and Suicide Bombings'¹² ('the Fatwa') issued in London in 2010¹³. Following this, he ran a series of 'Anti-Terror Camps' in the UK during 2010. Recently he has launched an 'Islamic Curriculum on Peace and Counter-Terrorism'¹⁴. Hence, Tahir-ul-Qadri's ideas too are significantly influenced by the preoccupation with Muslim religious violence and 'terrorism' following 9-11.

While religious violence is underpinned by entangled political, social and economic sub-texts, the targeting of groups and individuals identified by their religion is a consistent and significant feature. Hence my emphasis above, on the problematic question of how to treat religious difference in Islam. I address this question, and not the violence per se, in this paper. I understand both my actors as intervening in the discursive problem-space of religious difference in Islam. According to Scott, a 'problem-space' demarcates an intelligible aggregate of ideas and meanings that

10 Referring to a Muslim religious leader, particularly the leader of a Sufi community (*silsila* or *tariqa*). The spelling *shaykh* is as used in MQI's communications.

11 On the emergence of *Shi'ah-Sunni* sectarianism in Pakistan see: Abou Zahab, Mariam. 'The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,' In: Pakistan : Nationalism without a Nation. Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.). London, 2002; Nasr, S. V. R. 'Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan.' Ibid.

12 See, coverage in international media on the MQI Website, 'Fatwa on Terrorism,' <http://www.minhaj.org/english/control/Online-News/Fatwa-Against-Terrorism-Suicide-Attacks-Historical-Launching-in-London-by-Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html> [26 March 2015].

13 Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. *Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings*. London, 2010.

14 Wyatt, Caroline. 'Cleric Launches "Counter-Terrorism" Curriculum,' 23 June 2015, BBC News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33249099> [14 August 2015].

represent political and ideological stakes. It is thus ... 'very much a context of dispute, a context of rival views, a context, if you like, of knowledge and power'...¹⁵. In Pakistan, disputation over how to approach religious difference within Pakistan interlaces with a global (especially Western) narrative pregnant with concern about Muslims seeking to suppress religious difference.

In order to arrive at Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri's usage of 'citizenship' in the problem space of religious difference, I start with their interpretive methods. Producing ideas about Islam begins with a particular interpretive treatment of recognised Islamic source materials, notably the Qur'an and *hadith*¹⁶. Each actor, influenced by his particular ideological background, emphasizes particular Islamic source materials and applies a specific interpretive logic. These interpretive processes underpin actors' arguments against the violent suppression of religious difference in Islam.

From here, actors adopt rhetorical strategies to publicly deliver their arguments. This is where each agent deploys the notion of 'citizenship', imbuing it with specific and distinct meanings derived out of his particular interpretive approach. 'Citizenship' is thus understood as a rhetorical device for putting forward their case against religious violence. Paradoxically, protecting religious freedoms, or including a religiously heterogeneous populace within the folds of citizenship is predicated on excluding certain religious 'others'. The 'terrorist' is defined as a sort of religious rebel who must be eliminated from the folds of the polity. This concern with ridding the polity of terrorists is immediately relevant to the post 9-11 socio-political context, which pervades the problem-space in which my actors are embroiled.

2. Intellectual backgrounds and interpretive methods

2.1 Ghamidi

Javed Ahmad Ghamidi and several other members of his Islamic research institute, al-Mawrid, were in the early parts of their lives influenced by the

15 Scott, David. *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment*. Durham NC, 2004, p. 4.

16 A *hadith* (pl. *ahadith*) is a report of the exemplary sayings or deeds of the Prophet Muhammad.

ideas of Abu'l-'la Mawdudi (d. 1979), founder of the well-known religio-political organisation *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI – Islamic Party). Scholarship on al-Mawrid has labelled it a ‘post-Islamist’ group, following terminology used by Bayat and others¹⁷. Here, post-Islamism refers specifically to their rejection of the JI’s electoral Islamism and Mawdudi’s ideological ‘Islamic’ state. Ghamidi parted ways with the JI in 1977 and cultivated a separate intellectual identity, which he refers to as the ‘School of Shibli’ (*Dabistan-e-Shibli*)¹⁸, named after the 19th century Muslim scholar and historiographer Muhammad Shibli Nu‘mani (d. 1914)¹⁹. Shibli’s student, Hamid al-Din Farahi (d.1930), and Farahi’s disciple, Amin Ahsan Islahi (d.1997) are counted as key progenitors²⁰. Ghamidi attributes his move away from Mawdudi’s ideas, to the influence of Islahi, whom he met in 1973. Islahi had in fact been one of the JI’s founding members, but left the party following internal disagreements in 1958. In 1980, Islahi published his seminal exegesis, *Tadabbur-i-Qur’an*, which builds on Farahi’s thinking regarding internal coherence in the Qur’an²¹. Ghamidi’s emphasis, which I will elaborate below, on the Qur’an as the primary Islamic source material, is significantly premised on this work.

In so far as the process of interpreting Islam begins with *selecting* from among the corpus of Islamic source materials, Ghamidi’s ideas have a modernist bent. He disparages reliance on traditional source materials -

-
- 17 Bayat, Asef. *Post-Islamism : The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. New York, 2013; Iqtidar, Humiera. ‘Post-Islamist Strands in Pakistan: Islamist Spin-Offs and Their Contradictory Trajectories.’ In: *Post-Islamism : The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. Asef Bayat (Ed.). New York, 2013; Amin, Husnul. *From Islamism to Post-Islamism: A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan*. Rotterdam, 2010.
 - 18 ‘From Islamism to Post-Islamism: A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan.’
 - 19 Nu‘mani was a founding member of the prestigious Nadvat al-‘Ulama’ school (est. 1894) in Lucknow.
 - 20 Amin. ‘From Islamism to Post-Islamism: A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan; Iqtidar. ‘Post-Islamist Strands in Pakistan: Islamist Spin-Offs and Their Contradictory Trajectories’; Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. ‘About Javed Ahmad Ghamidi: Introduction to Mawlana Mawdudi,’ <http://www.javedahmadghamidi.com/about/view/introduction-to-mawlaanaa-mawduudi> [17 November 2014].
 - 21 Rauf, Abdul. ‘Life and Works of Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-97).’ In: *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 30/1, Jan-June 2009.

notably, *hadith* and *fiqh*²²- in favour of what he deems an intellect and reason-based evaluation of Islam, premised first and foremost on 'primary' sources, the Qur'an (and *sunnah*)²³. The exegetical works (sing. *tafsir*) of his intellectual predecessors, Farahi and Islahi, guide Ghamidi's treatment of source materials²⁴. Here, it is emphasized that the Qur'an, per the status it ascribes to itself, is the final authority and decisive standard on matters of religion (2010: 29). Both Farāhī's unfinished commentary (in Arabic) and Islahi's 9-volume exegesis (in Urdu) treat the Qur'an as a stand-alone text²⁵ and extensively examine its coherence or *nazm* (order, arrangement), believing this to have been ensured by God²⁶. Through affirming the Qur'an's structural schema al-Mawrid's scholars elucidated (what they believe to be) the only possible 'correct' meaning of Islam.

Applying some form of interpretive logic to preferred source materials (here, the Qur'an) is an obligatory next step in the process of interpretation. On the matter of religious difference, one particular aspect of al-Mawrid's Qur'anic hermeneutics is crucial. Based on their understanding of the Qur'an's internal structure and coherence, certain parts of the Qur'anic text are deemed as pertaining only to a period of perfect infor-

22 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad 'al-Mawrid Global Dawah Conference [Video File], 24 March 2012, http://www.al-mawrid.org/index.php/videos/ajax_video/al-mawrid-global-dawah-conference-24th-march-20121 [24 July 2015].

23 In Al-Mawrid's ontological understanding, only the Qur'an and *sunnah* (the Prophet's exemplary precedent) are sources of Islam. Both are known to Muslims through unanimity (*ijma'*) of recitation and practice and concurrence of transmission (*tawatur*) through time. See: Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction. Lahore, 2010.

24 Farahi, Hamiduddin. 'Exordium to Coherence in the Qur'an,' 2008, Al-Mawrid, http://www.hamid-uddin-farahi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=39&Itemid=67 [4 November 2015].

Islahi, Amin Ahsan. *Tadabbur-I Qur'an*. Lahore, 1985, <http://www.tadabbur-i-Qur'an.org/text-of-tadabbur-i-Qur'an/>.

For an overview of Islahi's writings see also: Rauf. *Life and Works of Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-97)*.

25 This treatment of the Qur'an is similar to that of other Indian modernists, such as Syed Ahmad Khan and Fazlur Rahman.

26 See Farahi. *Exordium to Coherence in the Qur'an*; Islahi. *Tadabbur-I Qur'an*; Mir, Mustansir. *Coherence in the Qur'an: A Study of Islahi's Concept of Nazm in Tadabbur-I Qur'an*. Indianapolis, 1986). For a summary of Al-Mawrid's most current understanding see: Ghamidi. *Islam : A Comprehensive Introduction*. pp. 53-59.

mation about the Truth (*itmam-e-hujjah*²⁷) governed by divine law (*qanun-e-risalat*). Notably, sections of the Qur'an referring to violent measures against religious difference are understood to fall in this category. Ghamidi argues that acts of retribution against religious difference occurred under divine law during the lifetime of prophets (Muhammad in this case) only after God deemed that those punished were perfectly and fully informed (about 'true' Islam).

The principle is explained also by treating components of the Qur'an referring to such retribution as pertaining only to the deviant amongst the *immediate addressees*²⁸ of the Prophet Muhammad²⁹. In contrast to Tahirul-Qadri, who, as I will show below, takes the onus of identifying the *kafir* (unbeliever, denier of Truth) upon himself, Ghamidi concludes that it was God who identified the *kuffar* (pl. of *kafir*) from amongst the immediate addressees of the Prophet and punished them through divine injunction³⁰. In post-prophetic times however, nobody is in possession of the Truth. Truth must be derived from source materials through an infinite process of critical evaluation. Hence, religious difference is unavoidable. Further it is impossible for an ordinary person to ascertain if the Truth has been conclusively communicated to others.

Finally, unlike the Qur'an, Ghamidi considers *hadith* to be a *dhanni* (non-definite) source material³¹. Most *hadith* are understood to neither have been transmitted by several people in each generation (*mutawatir*), nor are they authenticated by consensus (*ijma'*)³². This is especially pertinent in relation to blasphemy, for which punishment is mentioned in the

27 Explained further as 'communicating the truth to the extent that no one among its addressees is left with an excuse to deny it'. Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction. p. 52, note 6.

28 Those who were directly exposed to Muhammad's preaching.

29 Saleem, Shehzad. Playing God: Misreading a Divine Practice. Lahore, 2010, www.al-mawrid.org/pages/dl.php?book_id=87: p. 42.

30 Common Misconceptions About Islam. Lahore, 2010, www.al-mawrid.org/pages/dl.php?book_id=85: pp. 134-135.

31 Ghamidi. Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction. p. 60.

32 At this point the distinction between the *sunnah*, which is treated as an independent authoritative source material, and *hadith* is underscored. Contrary to the dominant notion in the traditional branches of *fiqh* (Muslim jurisprudence) as well as in South-Asian *Sunni* sub-denominational (*Deobandi*, *Ahl-i-Hadith* and *Barelwi*) doctrine, Ghamidi argues against relying on *hadith* to know the *sunnah*. Instead, the *sunnah* is restricted to very specific practical precepts, such as the rituals of prayer and pilgrimage, marriage, divorce and dietary practices. It is believed to

hadith but not in the Qur'an. In the next section I will develop how this treatment of *hadith*, coupled with Ghamidi's Qur'anic hermeneutics, are directly relevant to his discussion of 'citizenship' as a means of accommodating religious difference.

2.2 Tahir-ul-Qadri

Tahir-ul-Qadri is affiliated with the traditional *Sunni*-orientation, which is most closely associated with shrine-based religious practices. *Barelwis* claim the non-sectarian character of their interpretations by referring to themselves as *Ahl al-Sunnat wa-al-Jama'at* (people of the Prophet's way). Nevertheless, there are doctrinal disagreements with the other *Sunni* sub-denominations. For instance in *Barelwi* prophethology the Prophet Muhammad is afforded an exceptionally elevated, near super-human stature³³. Hence for Tahir-ul-Qadri the Prophet epitomises Islam, and his sayings, the *hadith* (in contrast to Ghamidi's views) capture Islam's very essence for posterity. Hence, while Tahir-ul-Qadri does also cite the Qur'an (and *fiqh*) in his writings and speeches (such as the Fatwa), the *hadith* are particularly emphasized. In Minhaj-ul-Qur'an's (MQI) *Islamic Library* website, the largest number of works (89), all penned by Tahir-ul-Qadri, sit under the topic *The Hadith*. 28 titles pertain to *The Prophet's Life and Virtues*, and 3 relate to the *Finality of Prophethood*. This is in comparison to 23 titles listed under *The Qur'an*. The volumes comprise collections of relevant *hadith*, systematised through the use of sub-headings. In some instances, details pertaining to authentication are provided, such as the chain of transmitters (*sing. isnad*). Little or no commentary is offered³⁴. Indeed, in his public addresses too, Tahir-ul-Qadri relates *hadith* always as if literally and directly.

However, the process of selecting certain *hadith* to relay (over others) and insisting that there is only one meaning of Islam to be derived from

be known in the same way as the Qur'an, through unanimity and concurrence of transmission.

33 Sanyal, Usha. *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India : Ahmed Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920*. Delhi, 1999, pp. 255-267.

34 Melchert finds the same approach amongst the ninth-century 'traditionist-jurisprudents' who, 'simply assembled collections of *hadith*, or at least, quoted large numbers of *hadith* reports'. See: Melchert, Christopher. 'Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law'. In: *Islamic Law and Society* 8/3. 2001, pp. 388-389.

them - here asserting that Islam categorically disallows coercion in matters of religious belief - in fact *constitutes* Tahir-ul-Qadri's interpretative method and logic. To illustrate, he repeatedly insists that he has conducted a comprehensive review of existing *hadith* material, and *only* found *hadith* supporting his position. Moreover, while Ghamidi critically engages (to some extent) with the ideas he disputes by arguing that certain parts of the Qur'anic text are being mistakenly interpreted as guidance for ordinary Muslim in post-prophetic times, Tahir-ul-Qadri does not seem to examine the interpretations he opposes at all, even for the purpose of demonstrating their fallacies.

Ghamidi predicates his case for opposing violence against difference by stressing human incapacity to (fully) know the Truth or identify those who knowingly deny the Truth in post-prophetic times. For him, attempting to understand Islam in a context of uncertainty naturally spawns difference. In comparison, Tahir-ul-Qadri's interpretive thinking is premised on certainty about Truth. For instance, his Fatwa quite clearly denounces 'terrorists' and 'suicide bombers' as deniers of Truth (*kafir*). While for Ghamidi, uncertainty about Truth (and hence, over identifying unbelievers) is the basis for accommodating difference, Tahir-ul-Qadri's proclaimed certainty in this very matter *also* serves to critique activists ('terrorists' and 'suicide bombers') who violently suppress difference. Prophet Muhammad is reported to have described a 'true' Muslim as somebody from whose 'hand and tongue all humanity is safe'. Two further *hadith* describe the 'true' Muslim as one who extends charity to the poor and greets other people with a salutation of peace. Moreover, the true believer (*mumin*) is one on whom people rely for the protection of their lives and property³⁵.

... if someone becomes an extremist and adopts hatred, prejudice, disunity, chaos and coercion, and kills peaceful citizens as a means to preach and enforce ... [religion], his claim to be a Muslim cannot be accepted even if he

35 Tahir-ul-Qadri. Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings; 'Launching Ceremony of Fatwa against Terrorism & Suicide Bombing' [Video File], 2 March 2010, <http://www.deenislam.com/islam/flvID/3248/Fatwa-on-Suicide-Bombings-and-Terrorism-by-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-M-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html> [9 July 2015]; 'European Launch of Fatwa on Terrorism & Suicide Bombings' [Video File], 6 September 2012, <http://www.deenislam.com/islam/flvID/3478/European-Launch-of-Fatwa-on-Terrorism-Suicide-Bombings-by-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-M-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html> [9 July 2015].

appears outwardly as a devout worshipper – because the basic criterion given by the Prophet to judge true Islam is peace and security³⁶.

In sum, both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri conclude, through entirely different interpretive methods, that religious difference must not be violently suppressed. Ghamidi de-emphasises traditional source materials such as *hadith*, stressing instead the primary and stand-alone nature of the Qur'an. In contrast, Tahir-ul-Qadri's traditional *Barelwi* leanings, lead him to valorise the *hadith*. Ghamidi's interpretive logic finds that sections of the Qur'an mentioning the suppression or persecution of religious difference are to be interpreted as evidence of divine retribution limited only to a time of perfect information during the life of the Prophet Muhammad. In current times, where information about Truth is imperfect, ordinary humans do not have the capacity to identify and punish unbelievers. Tahir-ul-Qadri on the other hand, seeks to accommodate difference by identifying unbelievers. He amasses numerous *hadith* (and other source materials) to corroborate his position that 'terrorists' are unbelievers.

3. Rhetorical Strategies - Citizenship

Recall my argument above that publicly speaking actors engage in a socio-politically relevant, discursive problem-space. Thus, seeking social change by articulating and disseminating ideas about (religious difference in) Islam further involves the *rhetorical* deployment of interpretive outcomes discussed in the previous section. This involves making use of specific contentious concepts in the relevant problem-space. Here, I turn to Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri's deployment of the concept of 'citizenship'.

Following Quentin Skinner, 'rhetorical strategies' involve the use of terms that offer 'a moral evaluation' of something at the same time as describing it³⁷. For instance describing a person or action as 'religious' has normative connotations³⁸. One of the rhetorical strategies proposed by Skinner for an agent seeking ideational change, is to vary the criteria for applying an existing set of normatively positive terms. The 'aim in this

36 'Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings' p. 32.

37 Skinner, Quentin. *Visions of Politics: Regarding Method*. 1. Cambridge, 2002, p. 156.

38 Whether these are positive or negative depends on the prevailing social norms of the society in question.

case is to insist, with as much plausibility as can be mustered, that in spite of contrary appearances a number of favourable terms can be applied as apt descriptions' in this case, to the matter of religious difference³⁹. Both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri apply the concept of 'citizenship' in this way; that is, they relate (the favourable term) citizenship with religious difference in order to persuade their listeners to view the latter in a more favourable light.

Citizenship, in Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri's usage, pertains not so much to the role of the state (presently, both have no direct involvement in the Pakistani or any other state) but to how ideas about citizenship influence the behaviour of ordinary Muslims towards (perceived) 'others' in Pakistan. Broadly speaking, citizenship implies the inclusion of individuals and groups into a polity and society and the exclusion of certain others. Narratives about citizenship shape who people imagine belong in their society and on what terms. They influence also the extent of freedom granted to members of a polity to express their ideas and beliefs. In Pakistan, the nation's liberal-secular founding elite initially framed citizenship as constituting religious freedom and equal rights for all citizens regardless of religious belief⁴⁰. Subsequent governments, partly driven by an increasingly potent lobby of Muslim religious groups and parties⁴¹, propagated more majoritarian notions of citizenship, for instance in the treatment of *Ahmadi* citizens,⁴² and in the passing of laws against blasphemy in 1982 and 1986. The influential Muslim scholar-activist Mawdudi (from whose thought Ghamidi ultimately defected), also professed antipathy to the presence of deviant Muslims (who were threatened with the capital

39 Skinner. pp. 153.

40 Ali Jinnah, Muhammad. 'First Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan,' 11 August 1947, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html [31 July 2013].

41 See for instance the anti-*Ahmadi* campaigns of the JI and others in Vali Reza Nasr, Seyyed. *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-I Islami of Pakistan*. London, 1994.

42 For an analysis of the increasingly discriminatory treatment of *Ahmadis* by the judiciary see Mahmud, Tayyab. 'Freedom of Religion & Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice.' In: *Fordham International Law Journal* 19/ 40, 1995.

charge of apostasy, seen as akin to treason) as well as non-Muslims, in his ideological Islamic state⁴³.

The citizenship of those deemed as religious ‘others’ (whether Muslim or non-Muslim) is thus an important concern in the problem-space of religious difference. Drawing on their interpretations of Islamic source materials, Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri assert that religiously different others should be included in society as (somewhat) equal citizens. This is one way in which they seek to dislodge the negative majoritarian norms (partly) underpinning violence against religiously identified targets. Moreover, by excluding from citizenship, ‘terrorists’ and other militant groups that take up arms against civilians, both actors further seek to de-legitimise religious violence. Yet, there are limits; notably, blasphemers sit on the fringes of citizenship for both actors.

3.1 Citizenship as inclusion of religious difference ... with exceptions

In Ghamidi’s schema, non-Muslim citizens have complete freedom to practice their faith and build and maintain places of worship without risk of violent suppression or persecution⁴⁴. Any political agreement may be made with non-Muslim citizens in a Muslim majority state; the best example would be the agreement that the Prophet Muhammad made with the Jewish tribes of Medina when he first migrated from Meccah to Medina in 622 CE. Importantly, this is defined as a time *before* the conclusive communication of Truth.

As far as the rights of non-Muslims are concerned, any agreement can be made with them regarding their rights, keeping in view the circumstances and the various international accords one is bound with. In this regard, perhaps the best example before Muslims is the pact made by the Prophet (sws) before *itnam al-hujjah* with the Jews of Madinah ... one can see that one of its statutes clearly says that ... the Jews and the Muslims are equal citizens of this state of Madinah and therefore, the Jews will have the same rights as the Muslims have here (sic)⁴⁵.

43 Hartung, Jan-Peter. *A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam*. London, 2013.

44 Saleem. *Playing God: Misreading a Divine Practice*.

45 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. *Citizenship and the Rights of a Citizen*. 2010, http://www.javedahmadghamidi.com/meezan/view/citizenship_and_the_rights_of_a_citizen [13 July 2015].: emphasis added.

Here, Ghamidi is not drawing on his preferred source material, the Qur'an. However, he still applies his particular interpretive logic, arguing that this prophetic example *can* be used as basis of understanding citizenship today, since it occurred at a time of imperfect information.

Tahir-ul-Qadri extols the same prophetic example, premised upon his interpretive emphasis on the exemplary deeds and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. The so-called 'Constitution of Medina'⁴⁶ negotiated by Muhammad shortly after his migration, with the Jewish tribes of Medina as well as the Christians of Najran (Syria), is frequently hailed by him as categorical evidence of the equality of rights of non-Muslim citizens under Islam. On this precedent, Tahir-ul-Qadri posits that in Islam "citizen" means all Muslims and non-Muslims, because this' (the Constitution of Medina) 'included the Jewish and Christian tribes'⁴⁷. Moreover, 'the Prophet ... stated that whoever hurts a non-Muslim citizen who is a civilian, I shall be the opponent of that Muslim ... on the Day of Judgement I will plead in favour of the non-Muslim ... who has been wronged'⁴⁸.

In so far as they both advocate the same prophetic precedent, Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri are alike. However, the latter entirely neglects to broach the matter of the inferior *dhimma* legal category that was subsequently established for non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) inhabiting the expanding Muslim empire⁴⁹. In contrast, Ghamidi's interpretive logic allows him a proper rationale for dismissing the validity of discriminatory

46 The 'Constitution of Medina' refers to agreements mediated by Mohammad between the *muhajirun* (emigrants, i.e. Muslims from Mecca) and the *ansar* (helpers: i.e. residents of Yathrib). These were negotiated after the *hijrah* (migration) of Mohammad and his followers to Yathrib (later renamed Medina) in 622. Mohammad was invited to Yathrib as an arbiter in the prolonged civil war that had started in the late 6th century between the Arab and Jewish tribes inhabiting the oasis. Scholars consider these agreements among the early efforts to mitigate the conflict in the area by establishing an accord that covered all inhabitants of the oasis into a single polity (Halabi, Awad. 'Constitution of Medina,' Oxford, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/opr/t236/e1003> [17 July 2015]).

47 Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. 'Peace for Humanity & Mawlid-Un-Nabi (Pbuh) Conference [Video File].' 3 June 2012, <http://www.deenislam.com/islam/flvID/3458/Peace-for-Humanity-Mawlid-un-Nabi-pbuh-Conference-by-Shaykh-ul-Islam-D-r-M-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html> [13 July 2015]: mins 21:28-21:42

48 'European Launch of Fatwa on Terrorism & Suicide Bombings [Video File]': mins 45:15-45:36.

49 The second caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 644 C.E.) is noted for establishing the formal contract of protection that offered a recognised legal status for protected

dhimma arrangement in current times. By treating the initial agreement made by the Prophet Muhammad with Jews and Christians in Medina, as occurring before the condition of perfect information, Ghamidi can argue that subsequent conflicts with non-Muslims and their eventual relegation to an inferior status, occurred only later under divine injunction, after the establishment of perfect information. In any case, since perfect information does not exist in post-prophetic times, treating non-Muslim citizens as *dhimmi* is no longer a valid practice⁵⁰.

Following the same interpretive approach, al-Mawrid's scholars are also explicit in their denial of any sectarian basis of differentiation between Muslim citizens. Firstly, under imperfect information it is not possible for any Muslim to conclusively identify other Muslims as 'false' in their understanding of Islam. Moreover, they argue that the Qur'anic chapter (*surah*) called *Tawbah* (Repentance) offers clear guidance on how to approach intra-Muslim difference. The *surah* required the polytheists of Arabia to repent from disbelief, be diligent in prayer and give the mandatory charity (*zakat*)⁵¹. Al-Mawrid's argument - premised on their interpretive logic - is that if polytheists during a prophetic period of perfect information were to be killed only if they did not repent, and were asked only to pray and pay *zakat* as evidence of their belief. Hence, there can be no further obligations on Muslim citizens to demonstrate their Muslim faith. In other words, sectarian bases of differentiation cannot be valid identifiers of 'true' and 'false' Muslims.

...after fulfilling these conditions ...They are like brothers and, therefore, possess the same legal rights. There is no question of any discrimination between them whatsoever in Islam. The Qur'an has used the words ... 'then [they are] your brethren in religion'. The word 'the religion' obviously means Islam and the words 'then [they are] your brethren' are directed at the Companions ... of the Prophet ..., who are told that if these people fulfil these

minorities under Muslim rule (*dhimmi*). However, this covenant established also certain restrictions on their religious practices and required non-Muslims to pay a protection tax (*jizya*) and differentiate themselves from their Muslim superiors.

- 50 Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, 'Islami Rayasat May Aqliyat Ka Tasawur [Approaching Minorities in an Islamic State] [Video File],' 20 September 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gwQYcjVwWfo> [15 July 2015].: mins 2:00-4:30.
- 51 *Zakat* constitutes one of Islam's five pillars, and constitutes a religious obligation for Muslims with the financial means to give a certain percentage of their wealth annually towards charity.

three conditions, they will be equal in citizenship status to the Companions ... No distinction will exist between the two in the eyes of the law⁵².

Tahir-ul-Qadri distinguishes his own *Barelwi* sub-denomination on the basis of their love for the Prophet Muhammad. As I will show below with respect to the issues of blasphemy and apostasy, any violation of this love is cause for suspending the citizenship protections of offenders. This position is in contrast to that of Ghamidi. Nevertheless, leaving blasphemers and apostates aside, Tahir-ul-Qadri does not say that *Barelwis* must have a higher citizenship status than other Muslims. His argument for peaceful co-existence between Muslims rests mostly on the aforementioned Prophetic example. He treats this as equivalent to the modern day notion of nation, stressing that after migrating to Medina, Muhammad brought together all the Muslim migrants from Meccah and Muslim inhabitants of Medina under a common bond of 'Brotherhood' that superseded ethnic and tribal (and by extension, sectarian) affiliations⁵³.

On apostasy however, Tahir-ul-Qadri says very little; in my interview with him he largely avoids answering the question of how apostasy should be penalized⁵⁴. Elsewhere, he tends to conflate apostasy and blasphemy⁵⁵. The latter, for Tahir-ul-Qadri pushes one out of the folds of citizenship. Following his *Barelwi* orientation, love and respect for Prophet Muhammad defines faith; blasphemy (particularly, disrespect to Muhammad) is thus defiance against the core of faith. The *Ahmadis* are a case in point; even as citizens, they have foregone their rights to practice their faith freely because their perceived tenets regarding the prophetic status of their founder, lead them towards committing blasphemy (and apostasy)⁵⁶. In-

52 'Citizenship and the Rights of a Citizen'.

53 Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. 'Islam a Blend of Moderation and Modernism - Tahir-Ul-Qadri [Video File],' 16 June 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SOzk8JvAK0 [13 July 2015].

54 Interview with Najia Mukhtar, 25 October 2013..

55 In a lecture about his role in the creation of Pakistan's blasphemy laws, he explains that *Hanafi* jurisprudence tends to treat blasphemy and apostasy in the same category of crime. See: 'Gustakh-E-Rasool Ki Saza (Blasphemy Law) Ki Historical Background by Dr Tahir Ul Qadri (the Historical Background to the Blasphemy Law by Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri) [Video File],' 17 October 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1203&v=yey-44Rc98k> [13 July 2015].

56 In several public addresses Tahir-ul-Qadri strongly criticizes the founder of the religion for claiming prophetic status. In his view, this erroneously undermines the

deed, Tahir-ul-Qadri even concedes that, in the final analysis, the blasphemer (and apostate) should suffer the death penalty⁵⁷.

This is not the case for Ghamidi. By treating *hadith* as a source material whose interpretation (and validity) needs to be verified with reference to the Qur'an, Ghamidi can criticize the use of coercion or violence against (alleged) blasphemers. He stresses that while the Qur'an mentions incidents of blasphemy against the Prophet, it does not state that offenders were punished⁵⁸. Nonetheless, according to several *hadith*, the Prophet Muhammad did order capital punishment against blasphemers. This proves problematic for Tahir-ul-Qadri who in his privileging of the *hadith* cannot refute the injunctions contained therein. For Ghamidi however, if a *hadith* is at disjoints with the Qur'an, the latter takes precedence. Moreover, he can argue that the punishments against blasphemy mentioned in such *hadith* occurred by divine command under prophetic law; this was not punishment for blasphemy per se, but for denying the Prophet Muhammad's message after its conclusive communication.

Still, blasphemy and citizenship are not *fully* reconciled in Ghamidi's understanding. Given that Truth is indeterminate in post-prophetic times, Ghamidi tends to argue broadly for freedom of speech, including citizens' freedom for different faiths to proselytize different faiths in a Muslim state. However he recognises that no satisfactory way has been established to reconcile the right to freedom of religious expression with the religious sensitivities of other citizens⁵⁹. So he also suggests that citizens should avoid disrespecting the revered personalities of any faith. Furthermore, *Ahmadis* present an anomaly. Most of al-Mawrid's scholars are critical of

fundamental Muslim belief that there will be no more prophets after Mohammad See: 'Hidayah (Guidance) Camp, Toronto - Questions by Qadiani Ahmadi and Answers by Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri [Video File],' 2005, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AznTyFBrZLo> [13 July 2015]; 'Truth About Ahmadiyya / Qadianism and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad: Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri Part 1 [Video File],' 3 March 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S7usnxzIYOk> [13 July 2015].

57 Note that Tahir-ul-Qadri is hesitant to express his agreement with the use of the death penalty for blasphemy, particularly in front of Western audiences. This was evidenced a public lecture in Copenhagen when he was directly questioned on whether he agreed with the use of capital punishment against blasphemers. See: 'European Launch of Fatwa on Terrorism & Suicide Bombings [Video File]'.

58 Ghamidi. 'Founder of al-Mawrid.'

59 'Z', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 11 September 2012, Skype interview; 'M', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 17 October 2012, Personal interview.

the (perceived) blatancy of their rejection of the finality of Muhammad's prophethood and their self-segregation from the rest of the Muslim community⁶⁰. It seems then, that Ghamidi is inflexible about who may self-identify as a Muslim; the religious freedom of the *Ahmadis* is curtailed to this extent. Still, unlike for Tahir-ul-Qadri, the *Ahmadis*, as far as Ghamidi is concerned, are not apostates or blasphemers. They would enjoy the rights of any other non-Muslim citizen.

3.2 *Citizenship as exclusion – the rebel citizen*

Blasphemers, apostates and *Ahmadis* may sit at the outer fringes of the religious freedoms afforded to equal citizens. Yet even Tahir-ul-Qadri who does not dispute the use of capital punishment against such deviation from 'true' Islam, is muted in publicly stating this. Not so for one particular category of religious other, whose exclusion is loudly advocated: the (non-state) individual or group that takes up arms, notably against civilians. Both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri consider this to be a form of rebellion. The exclusion (from citizenship) of the rebel *makes citizenship possible* on the terms described above, since if rebels are not eliminated from the polity, they seek to physically eliminate 'other' citizens at their discretion. In the Fatwa for instance, an extensive discussion on rebellion (chapters 8-17) follows immediately after the discussion on citizenship rights (chapters 3-7), implying that the existence of the latter is underpinned by the elimination of the former.

The contemporary context of political violence in Muslim societies has revived classical debates about what constitutes rebellion versus legitimate armed action (armed *jihad*) or even legitimate protest. For instance, the use of violence against civilians is critical to both my actors' understandings of rebellion. However, in 2013 and 2014 Tahir-ul-Qadri himself led a mass protest against the alleged corruption and tyranny of the Pakistani state. He passionately (and always with reference to myriad *hadith*), de-

60 'Z', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 24 September 2012, Skype interview; 'M', 'al-Mawrid Scholar.' 'U', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 18 October 2012, Personal interview; Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. 'Qadiyani, Are They Infidels or Non-Muslims?' [15 July 2015].

scribes this form of dissidence as a religious duty for all Muslims⁶¹. It falls outside the fold of the rebellion he so harshly denounces, because it adopts *legal and constitutional* means⁶². Ghamidi, on the other hand, stresses that it is not a religious requirement to rise up in any form, even against a despotic government⁶³. This position is in keeping with his own intellectual evolution away from the political activism espoused by the JI. Nevertheless, Ghamidi agrees with Tahir-ul-Qadri that if a group chooses constitutional and non-violent means of protest, then this is not a rebellion.

Of course, the problem-space in which Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri are currently intervening is one where Muslim religious violence perpetrated by various so-called ‘terrorist’ groups is central. Responding to this socio-political context, both actors seek to designate ‘terrorists’ and militants as rebels in the Islamic sense. Both mention Al-Qaida, the Taliban (and more recently) ISIS, as falling under the rebel category. For instance there is extensive discussion of rebellion in the Fatwa wherein Tahir-ul-Qadri simply conflates ‘terrorists’ and ‘suicide bombers’ with all other rebels. He identifies contemporary perpetrators of terrorist acts with the extreme version of rebellion associated with the Kharijites (Ar: *Khawarij*, sing. *Khariji*). This was a Muslim opposition group that emerged during, and fought against, the government of the fourth Muslim caliph, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661 CE)⁶⁴. Tahir-ul-Qadri does not offer a rigorous account of the factors that led to the emergence of the Kharijite rebellion; rather, he uses these events in Muslim history to symbolise and reinforce his assertion that the contemporary terrorists are in fact a continuation of the Kharijites⁶⁵:

-
- 61 Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. ‘Dr Tahir Ul Qadri Addresses Juma-Tul-Wida: Promoting Peace, Interfaith Dialogue & Human Welfare - Itikaf City 2013 [Video File],’ 2 August 2013, <http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/23318/MQI-promoting-peace-interfaith-dialogue-amp-agenda-of-human-welfare-Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadri-addresses-Juma-tul-Wida.html> [17 July 2015].
- 62 Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings. p. 212.
- 63 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. ‘Muslim Revivalist Movements (6) Present Situation of the Muslim Ummah [Video File],’ January 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bq8gjjwB2r04> [17 July 2015].
- 64 In Arabic, al-Khawarij (pl. of Khariji) means those who secede or exit the community.
- 65 It should be noted that Tahir-ul-Qadri is not alone in linking the Kharijites with contemporary Muslim movements, particularly those considered to be ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’. For instance see: Kenney. *Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt*. Oxford, 2006.; Salem. *Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij*. Baltimore, 1956.

It would be interesting to know that there are more than 100 *ahadith* on the subject ... The Holy Prophet said that ... at least more than twenty times, they (the Kharijites) will emerge. He said that the last group of Kharijite terrorists will be a part of the army of the anti-Christ ... [sic]⁶⁶.

For his part, Ghamidi's public discussion of rebellion also mainly occurs with reference to 'terrorism', notably the current *Tehrik-e-taliban-Pakistan* (TTP), insurgency in Pakistan. Often he distinguishes the conditions of legitimacy for armed *jihad* (war) from those of rebellion. Armed *jihad* by non-state actors such as the TTP, unless following stringent conditions of legitimacy, is seen as an act that warrants the elimination of the perpetrator from citizenship. For instance he argues that, following the injunctions of the Qur'anic chapter entitled *Shura*, armed rebellion against a democratically elected government is entirely unacceptable in Islam, for it represents rebellion against the directives of the Qur'an and against the people who have elected the government⁶⁷. Rebellion can only be fathomed as permissible against an entirely despotic (*istibdadi*) form of government that has established itself on the force of coercive capacity alone. Further conditions of permissibility include that the rebels should form an organised group that have control over some territory (however small) from where they launch operations. They should also be representing a majority of people in undertaking armed rebellion against a despotic government. Hence, the TTP's call for *jihad* against the Pakistani state and people cannot be justified since they do not represent the people of Pakistan⁶⁸. Ghamidi argues that if these conditions are not met the rebels are understood as act simply as a mob⁶⁹. He argues that the Qur'an considers this to be *fasad*, defined (by him) as threatening the lives, property and honour of civilians by violent means. *Fasad* disturbs social order and weakens the condition under which the rights and protections of citizenship can be afforded to Muslim and non-Muslim citizens⁷⁰. Essentially, such a rebellion, if it persists and cannot be resolved through political means, must be

66 Tahir-ul-Qadri. 'Launching Ceremony of Fatwa against Terrorism & Suicide Bombing' [Video File]': mins 6:06-1:03, videos 6-7

67 Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. 'Armed Revolt against the Government [Video File],' 27 September 2013, [17 July 2015].

68 'Z', interview by Najia Mukhtar, 3 September 2012, Skype interview.

69 Ghamidi, 'Armed Revolt. [Video File]' Shehzad Saleem, 'Armed Rebellion - Some Misconceptions About Islam,' 21 September 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Idg1PIT8Weg> [17 July 2015].

70 Ghamidi, 'Armed Revolt. [Video File]'.

crushed by the authority of the state and its perpetrators eliminated from citizenship as per the injunctions of the Qur'an stated in the chapter entitled *Al-Ma'idah* (The Table Spread; 5:33-34)⁷¹.

Tahir-ul-Qadri makes a similar distinction. 'Terrorism' is not the same as war, which can only be declared by the state, and as a defensive measure. Moreover, war should not comprise acts of violence against civilians and outside the context of a battlefield⁷². Hence 'terrorists' are not waging a just or legitimate resistance. They must be eliminated from citizenship in order to ensure the continuing citizenship of others. Further there is little room for diplomacy. Prophetic sayings and juristic opinions on the matter show that terrorist-rebels ultimately have to be weeded out and entirely eliminated from the polity (by putting to death)⁷³.

4. Conclusion

All in all, both agents, acting in a socio-political context of increased Muslim religious violence, actively participate in the contentious problem space of religious difference in Islam. In speaking their ideas, they deploy rhetorical strategies that entail the use of evaluative-descriptive terms such as 'citizenship' to shift negative social norms and perceptions of religious difference in society. Both Ghamidi and Tahir-ul-Qadri infuse citizenship with meanings that include religious difference within its folds. The specific meanings that each agent gives to citizenship are premised on his particular interpretive methodologies and findings. Tahir-ul-Qadri follows his *Barelwi* leanings in wishing to model citizenship on (his interpretation of) the example of the Prophet, notably of the political accords that the Prophet Muhammad devised between Muslims, Christians and Jews after his migration to Medina. Ghamidi privileges the Qur'an over other traditionally emphasized source materials (notably *hadith*). His interpretive logic designates parts of the Qur'anic text that refer to penalties against religious difference (blasphemers, apostates, non-Muslims) to pertain only

71 'Punishment for Rebellion [Video File],' 11 December 2013, <http://www.javedahmadghamidi.com/videos/view/punishment-for-rebellion> [17 July 2015].

72 Tahir-ul-Qadri, 'European Launch of Fatwa on Terrorism & Suicide Bombings [Video File]', mins:19:20-22:14

73 'Launching Ceremony of Fatwa against Terrorism & Suicide Bombing [Video File]'.

to a prophetic period of perfect information about Truth. In post-prophetic times of imperfect information, he thus condemns the violent suppression, or inferior treatment of religiously different citizens (Muslims and non-Muslim). He also commends the example of the Prophet Muhammad's political alliance with Jews and Christians, arguing that this was forged outside the period of perfect information and is thus applicable as a model for contemporary arrangements with non-Muslim citizens.

However, there are caveats. Particularly for Tahir-ul-Qadri, there are limits to religious freedom; specifically there is no respite for blasphemy or apostasy. Even if he has not advocated their killing, it would seem that *Ahmadis* fall into this blasphemy-apostasy mire and are thus pushed beyond the limits of citizenship. Ghamidi too shows some sensitivity to the issue of blasphemy, arguing that although ideally citizens should have complete freedom of expression, they should abstain from disrespecting the revered personalities of different faiths. There are further majoritarian aspects to Ghamidi's thinking on citizenship such as his acceptance of the official excommunication of *Ahmadis* from the folds of Islam.

Finally, inclusive citizenship of religious difference is equally a matter of (violent) exclusion of certain types of difference. In a context of heightened concern about Muslim religious violence, it is 'terrorists' and militants who must be excluded. The citizenship rights (notably religious freedoms) of a religiously heterogeneous populace can only be possible through the elimination (from the polity) of groups that take up arms against the state and society. Tahir-ul-Qadri labels them as a continuation of the historical Kharijites. Ghamidi likens their actions to the Qur'anic crime of *fasad*. The presence of rebels in the folds of citizenship makes the continuing citizenship of religious difference impracticable. In this way the rebel's illegitimate violence against religious difference must be curtailed through the use of legitimate violence to eliminate 'terrorists' and rebels.

Bibliography

'M'. 'Al-Mawrid Scholar.' Interviewed by Najia Mukhtar (17 October 2012).

'U'. 'Al-Mawrid Scholar.' Interviewed by Najia Mukhtar (18 October 2012).

'Z'. 'Al-Mawrid Scholar.' Interviewed by Najia Mukhtar (3 September 2012).

----. 'Al-Mawrid Scholar.' Interviewed by Najia Mukhtar (24 September 2012).

----. 'Al-Mawrid Scholar.' Interviewed by Najia Mukhtar (11 September 2012).

- Abou Zahab, Mariam. 'The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan.' In: *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*. Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.). London,, 2002, p.352.
- Amin, Husnul. 'From Islamism to Post-Islamism: A Study of a New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan.' Rotterdam, 2010.
- Aziz, Sadaf. 'Making a Sovereign State: Javed Ghamidi and "Enlightened Moderation"'. *Modern Asian Studies*. 2011, 45/3, pp. 597-629.
- Bayat, Asef. 'Post-Islamism : The Changing Faces of Political Islam.' New York, NY: Oxford University Press'. 2013.
- BBC News. 'Pakistan Mosque Attacks in Lahore Kill Scores.' <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10181380> [Accessed 27 August 2013].
- . 'Pakistan Sufi Shrine Suicide Attack Kills 41.' <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12951923> [Accessed 27 August 2013].
- Bergen, Peter L., and Katherine Tiedemann. *Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders between Terror, Politics and Religion*. New York, 2013.
- Brown, Vahid, and Rassler, Don. 'Fountainhead of Jihad : The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2010.' London, 2013.
- Butt, Shafiq. 'Yet Another Shrine Comes under Attack.' <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/42249> [Accessed 25 September 2011].
- Dawn News. 'Blast Kills Six at Baba Farid's Shrine in Pakpattan.' <http://beta.dawn.com/news/575737/blast-kills-six-at-baba-farids-shrine-in-pakpattan> [Accessed 27 August 2013].
- Farahi, Hamiduddin. 'Exordium to Coherence in the Qur'an.' *Al-Mawrid*, http://www.hamid-uddin-farahi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=39&Itemid=67 [Accessed 4 November 2015].
- Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad. 'About Javed Ahmad Ghamidi: Introduction to Mawlānā Mawdūdī.' <http://www.javedahmadghamidi.com/about/view/introduction-to-mawla-anaa-mawduudii> [Accessed 17 November 2014].
- . 'Al-Mawrid Global Dawah Conference [Video File].' http://www.al-mawrid.org/index.php/videos/ajax_video/al-mawrid-global-dawah-conference-24th-march-20121 [Accessed 24 July 2015].
- . 'Armed Revolt against the Government [Video File].' [Accessed 17 July 2015].
- . 'Citizenship and the Rights of a Citizen.' http://www.javedahmadghamidi.com/mezan/view/citizenship_and_the_rights_of_a_citizen [Accessed 13 July 2015].
- . 'Founder of Al-Mawrid.' Interviewed by Najia Mukhtar (7 July 2015).
- . 'Islami Rayasat May Aqliyat Ka Tasawur [Approaching Minorities in an Islamic State] [Video File].' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gwQYcjVwWfo> [Accessed 15 July 2015].
- . 'Muslim Revivalist Movements (6) Present Situation of the Muslim Ummah [Video File].' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bq8gjwB2r04> [Accessed 17 July 2015].
- . 'Punishment for Rebellion [Video File].' <http://www.javedahmadghamidi.com/videos/view/punishment-for-rebellion> [Accessed 17 July 2015].

- . 'Qadiyani, Are They Infidels or Non-Muslims?' [Accessed 15 July 2015].
- . 'Islam: A Comprehensive Introduction.' Lahore, 2010.
- Halabi, Awad. 'Constitution of Medina.' Oxford, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/opr/t236/e1003> [Accessed 17 July 2015].
- Hartung, Jan-Peter. *A System of Life: Mawdudi and the Ideologisation of Islam*. London, 2013.
- Hussain, Zahid. 'Battling Militancy.' In: *Pakistan : Beyond 'the Crisis State'*. Maleeha Lodhi (Ed.). xxv, London, 2011, p.391.
- Iqtidar, Humeira. 'Post-Islamist Strands in Pakistan: Islamist Spin-Offs and Their Contradictory Trajectories.' In: *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. Asef Bayat (Ed.). xiv, New York, 2013, p.351.
- Islahi, Amin Ahsan. *Tadabbur-I Qur'an*. Lahore, 1985. <http://www.tadabbur-i-Qur'an.org/text-of-tadabbur-i-Qur'an/>.
- Jinnah, Muhammad Ali 'First Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.' http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html [Accessed 31 July 2013].
- Kenney, Jeffrey T. *Muslim Rebels : Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt*. Oxford, 2006.
- Mahmud, Tayyab. 'Freedom of Religion & Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice.' *Fordham International Law Journal* 19/40, 1995.
- Melchert, Christopher. 'Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law.' *Islamic Law and Society* 8/3, 2001, pp.383-406.
- Mir, Mustansir. *Coherence in the Qur'an: A Study of Islahi's Concept of Nazm in Tadabbur-I Qur'an* [in English]. Indianapolis, 1986.
- MQI Website. 'Fatwa on Terrorism.' <http://www.minhaj.org/english/control/Online-News/Fatwa-Against-Terrorism-Suicide-Attacks-Historical-Launching-in-London-by-Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html> [Accessed 26 March 2015].
- Nasr, S. V. R. 'Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan.' In: *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*. Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.). London, 2002, p.352.
- . *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-I Islami of Pakistan*. London, 1994.
- Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban the Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond*. New ed. London, 2010.
- Rauf, Abdul. 'Life and Works of Mawlana Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-97).' In: *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* 30/1, Jan-June 2009 (2009), pp.183-219.
- Saleem, Shehzad. 'Armed Rebellion - Some Misconceptions About Islam.' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Idg1PIT8Weg> [Accessed 17 July 2015].
- . *Common Misconceptions About Islam*. Lahore., 2010. http://www.al-mawrid.org/pages/dl.php?book_id=85.
- . *Playing God: Misreading a Divine Practice*. Lahore, 2010. http://www.al-mawrid.org/pages/dl.php?book_id=87.
- Salem, Elie Adib. *Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawārij*. Baltimore, 1956.

- Sanyal, Usha. *Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmed Riza Khan Bareilwi and His Movement, 1870-1920*. Delhi, 1999.
- Scott, David. *Conscripts of Modernity : The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment*. Durham, N.C., 2004.
- Shehzad, Muhammad. 'Timeline of Attacks on Shi'a/Hazara Muslims in 2012-13.' <http://www.newsline magazine.com/2013/03/timeline-of-attacks-on-Shi'ahazara-muslims-in-2012-13/>.
- Skinner, Quentin. *Visions of Politics*. Volume 1: Regarding Method. 3 vols. Cambridge, 2002.
- Tahir-ul-Qadri, Muhammad. 'Dr Tahir Ul Qadri Addresses Juma-Tul-Wida: Promoting Peace, Interfaith Dialogue & Human Welfare - Itikaf City 2013 [Video File].' <http://www.minhaj.org/english/tid/23318/MQI-promoting-peace-interfaith-dialogue-amp-agenda-of-human-welfare-Dr-Tahir-ul-Qadri-addresses-Juma-tul-Wida.html> [Accessed 17 July 2015].
- . 'European Launch of Fatwa on Terrorism & Suicide Bombings [Video File].' <http://www.deenislam.com/islam/flvID/3478/European-Launch-of-Fatwa-on-Terrorism-Suicide-Bombings-by-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-M-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html> [Accessed 9 July 2015].
- . *Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings [in Text in English with passages in Arabic]*. London, 2010.
- . 'Founder of Minhaj-Ul-Qur'an International (Mqi).' Interviewed by Najia Mukhtar (25 October 2013).
- . 'Gustakh-E-Rasool Ki Saza (Blasphemy Law) Ki Historical Background by Dr Tahir Ul Qadri (the Historical Background to the Blasphemy Law by Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri) [Video File].' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=1203&v=yey-44Rc98k> [Accessed 13 July 2015].
- . 'Hidayah (Guidance) Camp, Toronto - Questions by Qadiani Ahmadi and Answers by Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri [Video File].' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AznTyFBrZLo> [Accessed 13 July 2015].
- . 'Islam a Blend of Moderation and Modernism - Tahir-Ul-Qadri [Video File].' https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_SOzk8JvAK0 [Accessed 13 July 2015].
- . 'Launching Ceremony of Fatwa against Terrorism & Suicide Bombing [Video File].' <http://www.deenislam.com/islam/flvID/3248/Fatwa-on-Suicide-Bombings-and-Terrorism--by-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-M-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html> [Accessed 9 July 2015].
- . 'Peace for Humanity & Mawlid-Un-Nabi (Pbuh) Conference [Video File].' <http://www.deenislam.com/islam/flvID/3458/Peace-for-Humanity-Mawlid-un-Nabi-pbuh-Conference-by-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-M-Tahir-ul-Qadri.html> [Accessed 13 July 2015].
- . 'Truth About Ahmadiyya / Qadianism and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad: Dr Tahir-Ul-Qadri Part 1 [Video File].' <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S7usnxZIYOk> [Accessed 13 July 2015].

The Guardian. 'Pakistan Church Bomb: Christians Mourn 85 Killed in Peshawar Suicide Attack.' <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12951923> [Accessed 28 April 2013].

Wyatt, Caroline. 'Cleric Launches 'Counter-Terrorism' Curriculum.' BBC News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33249099> [Accessed 14 August 2015].