

PART ONE. The First World War in Angola in its Historical Context

1. Luso-German Colonial Relations before the First World War

Central Africa was supposed to be part of the Portuguese empire. This notion among Lisbon's officialdom went back to the fifteenth century, when Portugal's seafarers explored the west and the east coast of Africa. Fortresses and stone crosses (*padrões*) along both coasts marked Portugal's claims that were still being upheld well into the nineteenth century. When, in 1881, the Holy See tried to establish ecclesiastical circumscriptions that reached into Angola without involving the government in Lisbon, the latter reminded the world of the extension of its claims along Africa's western coast (from 5° 12' to 18° south latitude). Self-assuredly, the Portuguese spoke of "our rights of *patronage* over central Africa, from one coast to the other".¹

At the latest with the onset of the "scramble for Africa" this "right" was no longer accepted by other European nations. Portugal saw the fringes of its West-African possessions disputed on three sides. To the north, King Leopold's *International Congo Association*, founded in 1876 without inviting the Portuguese, had stamped out its plan for 'Central Africa'. This "prelude for a European colonial project in Africa" seemed "a studied effort to exclude" Portugal.² To the east dispute loomed with Great Britain over the Zambezi region. And to the south, a "new and dangerous neighbor", the German Empire, entered the scene in 1884.³ In order to avoid confrontations between European powers, the Berlin Conference of 1884/85 detailed principles to parcel out Africa into spheres of interest between European nations. In addition, bilateral accords were concluded subsequently on the delimitation of these spheres.⁴

1 AGCSSp 3L1.1.1, *M. de la Marine et des Colonies: Droits de Patronage du Portugal en Afrique*, 1883: 18; Schwindenhammer to C. Barnabo, 11/1864, in: *Vieira* 2012, No. 163: 621.

2 Bley 2005: 15 'Auftakt für ein gesamteuropäisches Kolonialprojekt'; *Nowell* 1947: 8f.

3 *Drechsler* 1962: 57; cf. *Koskenniemi* 2001: 122 FN 106; *Gaurier* 2014: 966-9.

4 *Bois* 2006: 19, accords: France/GB 1890, 1899; France/Italy 1900; France/Ger. 1911.

1.1 Slicing the “African Cake” – the Borders of Angola and GSWA

1.1.1 Devising International Law – the Congo-Conference 1884/5

Right from the beginning of Germany’s colonial engagement in Africa, its policy was directed against Portuguese claims. On February 26, 1884 Portugal and Great Britain concluded a treaty on their rights in the Congo region, including the right to collecting duties and to “police” the trade along the Congo and other rivers. The limits of the region were defined by the parties and Britain recognized the “sovereignty” of the King of Portugal over a coastal stretch between 5°12’ and 8° south latitude. However, the British press and most of all the continental powers were united in their opposition to this recognition of “the hitherto shadowy title of Portugal to that part” of Africa. When the German ambassador in London learned of this treaty, he warned of the negative repercussions it may have for merchants belonging to neither nation. The German consul in Luanda – lamenting Portuguese “custom systems, administration, tardiness and negligence” – spoke of serious damage to the trade in the region should the treaty be ratified. Merchants from all over Germany sent petitions to Berlin protesting against the treaty and pointing to notes of protest from French and Dutch merchants doing business in the Congo region. In April 1884, the German minister in Lisbon declared that Germany would not recognize the Anglo-Portuguese treaty for its citizens, since the treaty was bilateral and no other powers had been invited to the negotiations. Already in March the French government served a like notice. Portuguese insistence on the treaty remained futile.⁵ Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) left no doubt that Germany would not recognize Portuguese “pretensions” on the Congo region.⁶

Considering these tensions and the insufficient rules of international law “towards the effective management of the colonial scramble” Bismarck in October 1884 invited delegates of the European powers to Berlin to “create a legal and political framework” for trade and effective possession in the Congo region (and slow down British occupation of African territories). Next to the Turkish, the Portuguese delegation under Luciano Cordeiro was considered the weakest of all participants. Contemporaries repeatedly pointed out that Portugal’s “domination” in the claimed territo-

5 SBRT 6. Leg.Per. 1884/85, v. 7, Anl. No. 290 betr. Kongo-Frage: 1641f.; Reeves 1909: 109.

6 Cf. Weisung (W. v. Bismarck), 1.7.84, in *Bismarck* 2011: 249, No. 178; cf. *Stern* 1979: 405f.

ries was, “in reality, more nominal than effective.”⁷ Some even began to “openly denounce Portuguese colonial policies as inept”.⁸ The Berlin Conference ended in bitter disappointment for Portugal. A mere 150 kilometers of the southern bank of the Congo River and the Cabinda enclave, north of the Congo River mouth, were conceded to Portugal. Most of the Congo region – which was considered by the Portuguese as their sphere of influence since Diogo Cão had anchored in the mouth of the river in 1482⁹ – was ceded to King Leopold’s Congo Free State and France. Next to its humanitarian rhetoric on the “amelioration” of the Africans and the suppression of the slave trade (Article 6), the Congo Act of February 26, 1885 stipulated “essential conditions to be observed in order that new occupations on the coast of the African continent may be held to be effective” (cpt. VI.). In Article 35, the signatories “recognize[d] the obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed upon.” However, the results of the conference “made little practical difference” as the applicability of these “general formulations ... was limited to an almost meaningless minimum.” Having neither laid out a procedure for acquiring valid title to territory, nor defined the meaning of “effective occupation”, the Berlin Conference created a “hypothetical geography” as it did not deal with individual borderlines and did *not* apply to the African interior. Rather, partition “preceded both the occupation of the territories concerned and the precise determination of boundaries.” “Instead of agreeing on a rule [on the conditions of colonial sovereignty], it was [considered] better to leave conflicts to be settled by ad hoc agreements by the powers”. Nevertheless, for the Portuguese, the doctrine of “effective possession” meant that they could no longer claim territories (and exclude other powers) in the name of “historical rights”, “discoveries”, symbolic “annexations” and Papal grants. In the future, they could only deplore the fact that the “great powers ... applied [the doctrine] more rigidly to Portugal than to themselves”.¹⁰

7 AGCSSp 3L1.12a8, Barileu? (Congr. du S. Esprit, Paris) to Propagatio Fide, 12.6.83.

8 Hamilton 1975: 3; cf. Anghie 1999: 57; Rodrigues 2009: 28; Reeves 1909: 111; Axelson 1967.

9 Cf. Bley 2005; Balandier 1992: 13; Wheeler 1968: 45; 53; 41 Portugal kept the Kingdom of Congo, a ‘colonial puppet ... of Angola’ since the early 19th century; Herlin 1979.

10 Koskenniemi 2001: 106; 123-6; 148; Nowell 1947: 12; cf. Courcel 1935; Stengers 1962: 476; 485f.; Art. ‘Berlim’, in: Serrão I 1971: 337; Schwarzenberger 1957: 310 doctrine had its ori-

Also, the boundaries of Angola or GSWA were not defined in Berlin. Within the next years European powers concluded bilateral treaties attempting to define their different spheres of influence more exactly. Changing authorities have since tried to detail with ever-growing precision the course of these boundaries. However, as Sakeus Akweenda has shown, “[e]ach section of the boundaries of Namibia [and Angola, respectively] is fascinating and contains literally dozens of points of major legal interest”,¹¹ only a few of which will be analyzed in the following sections.

1.1.2 German Colonialism in Southern Africa and the Luso-German Border

Angola’s southern border had never been demarcated by the Portuguese administration.¹² The notion that Angola stretches “indefinitely southward from the mouth of the ... Congo” brought Portugal into conflict with British interests in the Cape Colony. On several occasions Great Britain had “denied that by first sailing along the coast Portugal had a claim to the territory.” The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of January 22, 1815 and a Convention of 1817 stipulated 18° south latitude as the southern limit of Portugal’s territory.¹³ Subsequently, Cape Frio, named by Diogo Cão in 1484, was considered for most of the nineteenth century to be Angola’s southernmost point. When in 1861 a captain Jones took possession of Ichaboe Island near Angra Pequena for Great Britain, the Portuguese protested, pointing to their discoveries of the fifteenth century. Such claims, however, remained illusory and “weak”; even more so, since Portugal had not concluded any treaties with African authorities in the area.¹⁴ The map attached to the Congo Act in the German parliamentary documents of 1885 had a marker on the coast at 18° south latitude indicating the limit of Portugal’s sphere.¹⁵

gins in the ‘primordial stage’ of int’l law when ‘effective control of a territory and power to defend it was the title deed’; *Hespanha* 2010: 172; *Korman* 1996: 43f.; *Wehler* 1969.

11 *Akweenda* 1997: 2; cf. *Carrington* 1960: 436; *Shipway* 2008: 20; *Anghie* 1999: 60.

12 The Commission for Colonial Cartography, responsible for mapping the borders, had only been established in Lisbon in 1883, cf. *Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa*. 2006: 121.

13 *Nowell* 1947: 1; *Bixler* 1934: 429 referring to Delagoa Bay; *Akweenda* 1997: 10; 212f.

14 *Berat* 1990: 16; 31; cf. *Alexandre* 1999: 62 ‘Carte de la Côte d’Angola’ (1846); *Clarence-Smith* 1976: 215; *Akweenda* 1997: 18; *Touval* 1966: 288.

15 SBRT 6. Leg.Per. 1884/85, v. 7: 1671, Friederichsen, Karte von Central Africa.

During most of the nineteenth century the areas between the Orange and Kunene Rivers were of little relevance for European powers. Hunters, traders, and missionaries were the first to enter the territories of Nama, Damara, Herero, and Ovambo. German missionaries in the service of the *London Missionary Society* had arrived in the territories north of the Orange River around 1805 when Heinrich Schmelen (1776–1848) followed his congregation. In 1814 they erected a station he called Bethanien on the fringes of the Namib Desert.¹⁶ Later, German traders joined English and Swedish itinerant traders who, based in Walvisbay, effected a lucrative trade in cattle, guns, and ostrich feathers with Nama and Herero. The *Rhenish Missionary Society* began to set up several mission stations in the area that was, according to the rules of international law, *terra nullius*. Economically, however, Namaland and Damaraland lost their “independence” in the 1860s to the Cape Colony with the “intense participation by Herero in the Cape trade network”. Politically, the period was characterized by the “relatively fragile position of Europeans”.¹⁷ Despite demands by merchants and Cape officials, the British government refused to place territories north of the Orange River under its “protection”. In 1878 the British Cape Colony only extended its jurisdiction over Walvis Bay and its hinterland and the islands off the coast of Damaraland (again, the Portuguese protested). This enclave was used as a victualing point for the Navy base on Saint Helena Island. It was considered the only suitable harbor between Tiger Bay and Angra Pequena.¹⁸ The limits of the Portuguese claims south of the Kunene River remained vague.

In 1883 the German merchant Adolf Lüderitz and his assistants signed “treaties” with several African chiefs according to which the latter “sold” their land to him. Much to the indignation of the governments in London and in Cape Town, Lüderitz managed, in April 1884, to receive the “protection” of the German Empire for his “acquisitions north of Orange River” (Angra Pequena).¹⁹ In the following, consuls along Africa’s west coast were surprised to find out that Consul Dr. Gustav Nachtigal was “making treaties [with African leaders] on behalf of the German Government” and that German gunboats called at ports in the region. Arriving from Angra Pequena, Nachtigal admitted to the American consul in Luanda, Robert S.

16 Cf. Kienetz 1977: 570; Dederig 1997; Trüper 2000.

17 Lau 1986: 29; Botha 2007: 11; Henrichsen 2013: 215; cf. Berat 1990: 25; Oerm. 1999: 47.

18 Berat 1990: 37; Kienetz 1977: 571; Akweenda 1997: 18; Wesseling 1999: 101-8.

19 AA to Consul Lippert, 24.4.84, in: Bismarck 2011: 131 no. 97; Lindner 2011: 67.

Newton, that “it [Angra Pegueña] seems but a poor place to establish a Colony and more resembles a desert than anything else.”²⁰

Colonial enthusiasts in Germany had tirelessly worked for years to convince the Imperial chancellor Bismarck of the “necessity” of colonial possessions. Colonies, it was said, would accommodate the masses of German emigrants, keep them under German authority and would solve the “social question”. For a long time Bismarck declined any overseas project. His aphorism of 1870 is most famous: “A colonial policy for us would be just like the silken sables of Polish noble families who have no shirts.” He considered colonies as a means of “providing sinecures for officials”. And when he finally agreed to grant German “protection” to overseas possessions, he called his change of policy a “fraud” [*Schwindel*] that he needed to win the elections in 1884.²¹ The domestic and foreign motives for “Bismarck’s sudden leap across principles and oceans troubled contemporaries and has puzzled historians ever since.”²² Despite decades of research, as one reviewer put it recently, “decrypting the primary reasons for the acquisition of German colonies seems not yet over.” Bismarck considered the German overseas possessions as a “means to an end” in order to please the colonial enthusiasts in Germany for whose votes he was vying. At the same time, he aimed at an *entente* with France by provoking the British government under Gladstone. Given the ill health of Emperor Wilhelm I, an Anglo-German crisis, which only he could solve, would have proven to the German “liberal” circles around Crown Prince Frederick that Bismarck was indispensable as Chancellor.²³

Bismarck wanted to evade the question of German “sovereignty” in Africa. He intended that the German possessions in Africa and the South Sea should not have been “colonies” proper, but instead territories under the German Emperor’s “protection” (*Schutzgebiete*) and administered privately by “British style” chartered companies. The *Reich*’s financial and legal involvement was to be kept to a minimum; a “complicated colonial administration with German civil servants ... [and] garrisons with German troops were to be avoided”.²⁴ Bismarck’s arrangement soon proved inade-

20 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 3, USC to SoS, 9.9.; 13.12.84; *Berat* 1990: 44; *Clark* 2013: 195f.

21 Quot. in: *Snyder* 1950: 436; *Herwig* 1980: 95; ‘Schwindel’ quoted in *Stengers* 1962: 487.

22 *Stern* 1979: 409; cf. *Steinberg* 2011: 418; *Jureit* 2012: 91 Debatte ‘letztlich ergebnislos’.

23 *Lappenküper* 2011 on the state of the art; cf. *Gissibl* 2011: 166 on contempor. discourse; overview in *Conrad* 2012: 22-29.

24 RK Bismarck to Emperor Wilhelm I., 19.5.84, in: *Bismarck* 2011: 166, Doc. no. 124.

quate however, and so did hopes for Africans willingly accepting German “protection”. He soon lost any interest in colonial affairs. An increase in rebellions led to the deployment of more troops. The Imperial government had to take over the administration of the *Schutzgebiete* and a colonial administration was set up, overseen since 1890 by a new section of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Department. However, it is important to bear in mind that “military conquest was neither the intention of Berlin nor of [GSWA]’s first Governor, Major Leutwein.”²⁵

The extension of Lüderitz’ possession in southwestern Africa was at first barely defined. Bismarck expected the German navy to hoist flags along the coast from “north of the Orange River, except in Walvis Bay, to the Portuguese border” that *he* located on 26° south latitude (just north of Walvisbay). As mentioned, Portugal had territorial claims up to 18° south latitude at or near Cape Frio, leaving the northern ‘shore’ of Lake Etosha and all of Ovamboland and Kaokoland within the Portuguese sphere.²⁶ However, the longer the bilateral negotiations between Lisbon and Berlin lasted in 1885/86 the more the Germans pushed the Portuguese northward. While shortly before the beginning of the Berlin Conference, the German ambassador in London still spoke of “the tract of coastland between Cape Frio and the Orange River” as being “placed under [German] protection”, other German officials showed no concern for either Portuguese rights or sensibilities. Irrespective of the custom to consider Cape Frio Angola’s southernmost point, they demanded “peremptorily” the recognition of the Kunene River as Angola’s southern border – arguing with the “objectivity” of the riverbed.²⁷ In Lisbon, this demand raised “concerns about the sovereignty of Angola’s southern border”.²⁸ Portugal had attempted to populate the areas near the Kunene River since the 1860s.²⁹ Portuguese authors left no doubt that the German claim had been made over areas which Portugal had “discovered” and claimed centuries before, dating back to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. The “indisputable old rights” over Africa’s coast had been manifested in several stone crosses (*padrões*)

25 Bley 1996: xviii; cf. *Canis* 2004: 211; 222-5; *Wagner* 2002; *Simo* 2005: 101f.

26 RK Bismarck to Caprivi, in: *Bismarck* 2011: 152, Doc. no. 113; RK Bismarck to Emperor Wilhelm I., 19.5.84, in: *ibid.*: 166, Doc. no. 124; cf. Map 13 (1885) in: *Comissão* 1997: 52.

27 *Akweenda* 1997: 17; *Drechsler* 1962: 57; cf. *Schrader/Gal.* 1896: 475; *Regalado* 2004: 14.

28 *Southern* 2007: 4; cf. *Fernandes de Oliveira* 1971: 32.

29 *Medeiros* 1977: 74, founding of Porto Alexandre in 1861; Baía dos Tigres in 1864.

erected along the coast by Bartolomeu Dias, Diogo Cão and others.³⁰ The future Governor General of Angola, José Norton de Matos (1867–1955), then a student at Coïmbra, claimed that his enmity to Germany originated from these affronts.³¹

Cape Frio seemed a location insufficiently clear on the map because it did not square with 18° south latitude, nor could a perennial river be found nearby to mark the border. The German minister in Lisbon, Richard von Schmidthals (1830–1888), therefore, pointed to the mouth of the Kunene River, more than 100 kilometers north of Cape Frio, as the starting point of the border. Further inland, Portugal's southernmost military post in Angola, Fort Humbe, at the bank of that river was then the second marker. At Humbe the course of the border would depart from that of the river and would follow the degree of latitude up to the Kavango River. The mouth of the Kunene and Fort Humbe were the only two points about whose location the parties seemed to have a "more or less realistic idea" according to their maps. In 1886, very few Europeans had ever visited the area; the maps they compiled were scarce and imprecise. Data on exact coordinates could not be expected from them. Officials in Berlin and Lisbon were well aware of their limited knowledge about the areas under negotiation. Knowing nothing about river courses or mountain ranges they felt that there was no alternative to drawing mathematical straight lines across territories that were shown on maps as "white spots" (*weiße Flecken*).³²

The Portuguese were reluctant to accept the Kunene River as the starting point for a borderline. They made several counterproposals, one of them being that instead of Humbe certain cataracts would define the point from where the border departs from the course of the river. A compromise was found once the Germans signaled their concession in terms of Portugal's plans to include Barotseland in its sphere of influence, linking Angola and Mozambique as finally stipulated in Article III of the Luso-German treaty of December 30, 1886.³³ Article I defined the borderline between Angola and GSWA as follows:

30 The *padrão* erected in 1485 by Diego Cão at Cape Cross (the remains of which were removed in 1893 to Kiel) was replaced in 1894 by a replica adorned with the original Latin and Portuguese inscriptions; at its bottom, a plate with the German coat of arms and a German inscription was added. BAB R 1001/6917: 19, Port. Envoy (Pindella) to AA (Bieberstein), 12.10.94.

31 *Casimiro* 1922: VIII; *Santos* 1978: 119; *Schneider* 2003: 39f.; *Baericke* 1981: 14 on Norton.

32 *Jureit* 2012: 98f.; cf. *Schinz* 1891.

33 *Drechsler* 1962: 57; cf. *Akweenda* 1997: 213f.; *Demhardt* 1997: 195-205.

From west to east, the Kunene River firstly forms the border, 310 kilometers “from its mouth to the cataracts that are formed by that river to the south of Humbe when crossing the range of the Serra [Hills] Canna. From this point the line shall run along the parallel of latitude to the Cubango [or Okavango] River [for 426 kilometers], and thence it shall continue along the course of the same river [for 348 kilometers] as far as Andara, which place is to remain in the German sphere of interest. From this place the boundary line will continue in a straight line, in a due easterly direction to the rapids of Catima on the Zambezi.”³⁴

Whereas it had been the custom since the seventeenth century to attach a map to international treaties concerning territories, there was none attached to the Luso-German treaty of 1886. Attesting once more to its rather provisional character, this text could barely be used for demarcations on the ground. The future would show that the weak points of the treaty were the definition of the starting points of the two straight lines. Instead of using geometrical positioning (not available in 1886), the treaty referred to two toponyms: 1. “cataracts [*Wasserfälle/cataratas*] which are formed by that [Kunene] river to the south of Humbe when crossing the range of the Serra Canna”; 2. “Andara”. The questions to be posed became soon evident: Which of the cataracts south of Humbe and where are the Canna Hills? Where (who or what) is Andara? As will be seen, answers could not easily be found; the history of this border would become very complex.³⁵

Next to the ambiguity of the definitions used in the treaty, a second characteristic of it is the resulting cut through numerous African dominions. Considering that the negotiators were not familiar with the settlement patterns of the Ovambo and other peoples, German assistant secretary of state Count Berchem conceded that “it is not our intention that territories which are ruled by one chief will in part be under Portuguese and in part under German protection”. However, contrary to Berchem’s intention, this is exactly what happened.³⁶ When this bilateral treaty established the border, “there were only partial protection treaties [with Africans ‘agreeing’ to be part of the protectorate] in the area which had been marked out.” While in some cases – when more information on the areas in question was available – European officials tried to respect existing settlement patterns or pre-colonial limits of “chieftaincies”, the Luso-German border

34 Art. 1, Treaty of 30.12.1886, in: *Reichsanzeiger* 21.7.87; cf. *Dobler* 2008: 16; *Baud* 1997.

35 *Windler* 2002: 126; *Jureit* 2012: 98f.; *Wallace* 2012: 8; cf. *Akweenda* 1997: 216.

36 Cit. in: *Jureit* 2012: 99; cf. *Mutua* 1995: 6; *Wright* 1999 on pre-colonial African ‘borders’.

was agreed upon using only physical features and lines of latitude. The new border thus cut the settlement areas of Ovamboland in two. By doing so, Europeans “largely de-humanized the boundaries of Africa”. Altogether 177 such “partitioned culture areas” have been listed by researchers.³⁷

Africans living in the newly established border zone had, as the geographer Georg Hartmann put it, “no idea” about the border. Contrary to what had been stated the “frontier ... [was *not*] well marked”. European visitors to Ovamboland between the Kunene and Kavango Rivers would thus find it difficult to know in which colony they were at a given location. When the Rhenish missionary August Wulhorst founded the mission station N’giva in 1891/92 he did “not ask to whom the land belonged” according to European treaties. He dealt with the African authorities (King Weyulu) and asked their permission; the same was true when the stations Omupanda, Namakunde, and Omatemba were founded.³⁸

However, colonial disputes over the course of the border were not avoided. Illegal trade in guns, alcohol, ivory, and slaves caused numerous complaints from either side about border intrusions. Most critical, however, were border incidents involving officials. The few German transgressions, to be described later, have been characterized as “reconnaissance” marches showing “a definite pattern” of “abuses”; but also German Governors in Windhoek repeatedly contacted their counterpart in Luanda due to border infringements by Portuguese troops. In both cases it seems unlikely that bad faith based on expansionist motives had triggered the border infringements. They were rather caused by the difficulty to establish an imaginary straight line “in the bush” whose starting point was unclear.³⁹ In late 1911, in the Okavango region, a Portuguese officer ordered the erection of a fort (Mucusso) south of the borderline Andara-Catima; the Germans protested accordingly. Foreign Minister Augusto de Vasconcelos (1867–1951), when asked about this incident in the Senate, declared that the error of the Portuguese officer was due to the lack of clarity over the borderline. Not completely correct with the geographic description of the disputed area, he emphasized that the incident was solved “amicably”

37 *Griffiths* 1986: 205; 209; *Bley* 1996: 6 such treaties were ‘the basis on which claims were made’; *Anghie* 1999: 59; cf. *Touval* 1966: 287; 1972: 4-11; *Hertslet* 1909 II: 703.

38 *Hartmann* 1902: 218; BAB R 1001/6640: 125, file: 51, Hochstrate, 26.4.26; NAN A.505: 1, A. Wulhorst. Chronik der Station Omupanda, 20.11.15; cf. *Esser* 1897.

39 *Cann* 2001: 149; NAN ZBU 10, A I d 3: 9, Telgr. GG to KGW, 25.7.11, ordering his troops to respect the border; ‘je vous prie aussi de faire maintenir même respect de la frontière portugaise.’

between “good neighbors”. The fort was removed and re-erected north of the border. A similar incident occurred in Ovamboland, when the Portuguese erected Fort Henrique Couceiro south of the disputed ‘borderline’ and withdrew from it. The set-up of a border commission was subsequently proposed,⁴⁰ similar to a Luso-Belgian “mixed commission” that traced the border between Belgian Congo and Angola.⁴¹

Germans and Portuguese, however, had not been able to agree on a similar commission, despite rumors to that effect since 1909. Colonial border negotiations were often exceedingly lengthy, but the Luso-German border proved of particular convolution. Already in 1894/95 negotiations about the course of the border resumed but failed. Governor (*Landeshauptmann*) Leutwein advised in 1895 that the question of settling the border with Portugal should be put off “until we have a better footing in Ovamboland”.⁴² However, the Germans made no progress on the ground. In 1901, geographer Hartmann described the area between Angra Fria and the Kunene River (Kaokoland) as “unexplored”. The Germans and Portuguese did not reach a decision on how to identify the “cataracts” of the Kunene River south of Humbe, at the point where the river breaks through Serra Cana. There were at least three cataracts south of Humbe (Kambele, Chimbombe, and Kavale). To add to the misunderstanding, the Germans confused the “cataracts” with “drifts” and they took the Hills of Calueque for the Serra Cana. Therefore, German maps either depicted the most northern (the small Kavale) Falls or Erickson Drift opposite of the Hills five miles upstream of the Kavale (or Kazembue) Falls (or rapids) as the point from where the border was to follow the parallel of latitude to the Kavanago River. The Portuguese claimed that the border starts further south downstream, 30 miles below Erickson Drift where the Kunene River breaks through the Serra Cana (which was not a hill) to form the enormous Kambele (or Ruacana) falls.⁴³

40 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 7.2.12, transl. Senate 18.1.12.

41 NARA RG 59, box 6812; 753m.55a152, US Legation Brussels to SoS, 18.10.13.

42 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/35, Portugal; 89, FML, 5.1.09; *Lindner* 2011: 101; *Vigne* 1998: 292.

43 *Hartmann* 1902: 215; *Bollig* 1998: 508; 2004: 265; cf. *Rizzo* 2012: part I; BAB R 1001/6634: 132, Report Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.1919), Ax 9 Memo All., 23.5.22. Hint-trager admitted: ‘the greater probability points to the acceptance of the 70-80 meter deep Kambele Falls and not to the unimportant northern falls’, BAB R 1001/1784: 160-2, KGW to RKA, 22.3.10, quot. in: *Jureit* 2012: 105; Map ‘Kunene von der Chikende-Drift bis zum Kambele-Wasserfall’ Max Schmidt 1909, BAB R 1001 Kart 1784b;c; Militärkarte DSW 1914; cf. *Sprigade/Moisel* 1914a.

In 1910, German colonial officials internally conceded that for “economic and political reasons” they no longer aimed at a definite settlement of the Luso-German border. GSWA needed more migrant workers from the *entire* Ovamboland; but most Ovambo lived on the Portuguese side – a definite border may have entitled the Portuguese to prevent the population to migrate to GSWA. Already in 1895 Leutwein found it “obvious that an intersection of any Ovambo tribe by the boundary is unadvantageous and has to be done away with.” Considering Portugal’s catastrophic finances, some German officials speculated about “inheriting”, purchasing and annexing at least Angola’s south. Until that time, the Germans deemed the declaration of a “neutral zone” sufficient, “so as not to pre-empt realization of their territorial ambitions to the north”.⁴⁴ In 1910, a semi-official map described the course of the border as “approximate”.⁴⁵ However, in 1912 bilateral negotiations resumed. Portugal’s Foreign Minister Vasconcelos suggested dividing the zone between the colonies. Both parties agreed finally to declare the area within the two disputed parallel lines (~15 kilometers wide, 420 long) to be a “neutral zone”. Given that the Portuguese had just set up Fort Henrique Couceiro south of the disputed line, they also agreed that no military facilities were to be erected in this zone. Both sides were aware that the land, except for the areas near the two rivers, was not worth much. By 1914 negotiations had not been completed.⁴⁶

1.1.3 Competing Neighbors – Luso-British Border Disputes 1886–1905

Long gone was the glorious past of the Portuguese seafarers, when “Portugal reigned as the undisputed economic mistress of West Africa’s coastal

44 Hintrager: ‘a common settlement of the border between Angola and GSWA is not needed for the foreseeable future, neither for economic nor political reasons’ BAB R 1001/1785: 9f., KGW to RKA, 14.5.10, in: *Jureit* 2012: 105; Leutwein quot in: *Vigne* 1998: 292; 294; *Santos* 1978: 156; *Hangula* 1991: 133f.; 1993; *Demhard* 1997: 258-262; *Wallace* 2012: 95.

45 TNA CO 1047/187, Sprigade/Moisel: Karte DSWA, Berlin 1910. The 2nd ed. (1912) did not mention the ‘approximate’ any more, it showed the abandoned Port. fort south of the border; Namakunde was located on ‘German’ territory; cf. *Sprigade/Moisel* 1914: map No. 6.

46 BAB R 1001/6638: 58, *Diário de Notícias*, 16.11.24; cf. Map 1:50,000 in: BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 60, Rio Cunene desde Cazambue ao Forte Naulila, 1925; *Akween-da* 1997: 204f.

trade”.⁴⁷ However, the Portuguese definition of Angola still included all territories between the Atlantic and Mozambique (as shown to the *Cortes* in 1886 on the “rose-colored map”). The Berlin Conference had not established any provision to the contrary. For decades, the transcontinental connection between Angola and Mozambique had been a political and economic goal of the governments in Lisbon.⁴⁸ Already in 1811, Portuguese traders had crossed the continent from Luanda to the mouth of the Zambezi River. When the (slave) trader Silva Porto and the soldier João da Silva traversed from Benguela to Mozambique, the claims were considered to be official.⁴⁹ The numerous trans-African journeys by Portuguese officials or *pombeiros* seemed to give credence to Portugal’s territorial claims.⁵⁰ Pater Charles Duparquet, one of the first Catholic missionaries traveling across southern Africa,⁵¹ reported in 1880 to the Portuguese Minister of the Colonies in a manner as if the area between Kunene, Zambesi, and Lake Ngami were under Portuguese jurisdiction.⁵² In 1883 the American Consul in Luanda, R. du Verge, on the other hand, assumed that the “Cuanza river forms the south-eastern boundary of the Portuguese province of Angola, although it is claimed by them to possess the whole country from latt. south 5 to latt. south 19.”⁵³ In 1886 Germany and France “approved the Portuguese claim for a trans-African Empire”.⁵⁴ The Portuguese justifiably disputed the ‘explorations’ of David Livingstone of Lake Nyassa, an area they had mapped in the eighteenth century.⁵⁵ In 1887, the British, however, “protested vigorously” against the Luso-German treaty of 1886, which reserved the territories between Angola and Mozambique for future acquisition by Portugal. They argued with the Berlin Act (1885) “that sovereignty could only be effective by effective occupation of the territory.” Lord Salisbury did not take into consideration the mere journeys of ‘explorers’ such as Silva Porto, Serpa Pinto or Brito

47 *Vogt* 1975: 623; cf. *Arenas* 2003: 3 on Portugal’s ‘short lived’ hegemony; *Fisch* 1984: 46.

48 *Nowell* 1982/3; *Wheeler* 1974: 581; cf. *Corrado* 2008: 11.

49 *Cornevin* 1971: 439; cf. *Birmingham* 1998: 353; *Castro Henriques* 2003: 90f.

50 AGCSSp 3L1.1.3, Durand: Voyage des Portugais d’un côté a l’autre, Meaux 1879.

51 AGCSSp 2L1.1.1, Durand: Voyage du P. Duparquet dans l’Afrique Australe, Bulletin de la Societe de Geogr., 8-9/1879: 1-36; Estabelecimento de estações civilisadoras, Lisbon 1881.

52 AGCSSp 3L1.1.3, Documents concernant les missions, App. IX: 14, Duparquet to Minister, 15.12.1880.

53 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 4: 190, USC to SoS, 10.1.83; cf. *Corrado* 2008: xv.

54 *Cana* 1915: 363; cf. *Corrado* 2008: 18 FN 20; *Homem* 1992: 283; *Schrader/G.* 1896: 462; 475, ‘l’intérieur, qu’on se habitua à regarder comme partie intégrante de l’empire’ portugais.

55 *Cooley* 1854: 267; cf. *Cuninghame* 1904: 168; *Nowell* 1947: 2f.; 5f.

Capelo or ancient ruined forts. In 1887 he asked for “sufficient strength to enable [the colonial power] to maintain order ... and control the natives” in Matabeleland and around Lake Nyassa if Britain were to recognize Portuguese sovereignty in the area.⁵⁶ For years already, Lisbon had been concerned about Britain’s appetite for its possessions, in particular along the Zambezi River and around “Lourenco Marques’ magnificent harbor”. In 1875 Delagoa Bay had been the subject of arbitration between Portugal and Great Britain where the outcome was in Lisbon’s favor. The situation was made more complex by Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902) who, through his *British South Africa Company*, had his own ideas for a British empire stretching from “Cape to Cairo”.⁵⁷

In 1885 Portugal’s territorial claims had been reduced and now the country seemed in danger of losing more of its “piece of the African cake”.⁵⁸ In Guinea, France claimed the Casamance and succeeded. For central Africa, Britain argued that Portuguese colonies at the coast could not be extended indefinitely into the African hinterland without effective occupation. Colonial tensions with London (having erupted in 1846 with regard to Angola’s northern border *south* of the mouth of the Congo River⁵⁹) culminated in the quarrel about the territories that became British Rhodesia. When London, pushed by Rhodes and missionaries, declared its “ultimatum” to Portugal in January 1890 demanding a complete withdrawal from the Shire and Mashonaland along the upper Zambezi (between Angola and Mozambique), an “incredible wave of anglophobia” swept across Portugal.⁶⁰ Despite all nationalistic excitement the government in Lisbon gave in to Salisbury’s pressure; it resigned afterwards. In comparison to Britain, Portugal was to remain an “imperial dwarf”. Having revealed “Portugal’s position as secondary imperialist power”, the humiliation of *o ultimatum* resulted in revolts that seemed to bring the Bragança monarchy to an end. The “great crisis” was aggravated by an economic downturn. In their relentless attacks on the monarchy republicans, by celebrating the “great forefathers” and their discoveries, used the opportunity to present themselves as the true heirs of a golden past that only they

56 Akweenda 1997: 218f.; Nowell 1947: 13f; Cann 2001: 145.

57 Penvenne 1996: 444; GB-Pt (1875) RIAA XXVIII: 157; Samson 2006:162; Dás. 2008: 32.

58 Léopold II to Solvyns, 17.11.77, in Stengers 1962: 490 ‘ce magnifique gâteau africain’.

59 Wheeler 1968: 46; Bontinck 1969: 107; 109; 117; cf. Anstey 1962; Corrado 2008: 10; 25.

60 Labourdette 2000: 530; 534f.; Correia/Verhoef 2009: 50f.; Homem 1992: 281; Smith 1975.

could reestablish.⁶¹ The “colonial mania” had reached the Portuguese streets, whereas it had been hitherto the domain of the “armchair geographers” of the *Lisbon Geographic Society*. Similar to other nations “colonial chauvinism” increased and Portugal “became dominated by colonial questions”⁶²; even though Angola was considered by outsiders to be “still a colony of little importance”.⁶³

After Britain and Portugal had signed conventions in 1890 and 1891 that declared the western limits of the Barotse kingdom their vaguely defined border in the Zambezi region, the dispute continued. The press in Lisbon anxiously reported on alleged British or German incursions into Angola.⁶⁴ The British equally complained about “raids ... from Portuguese territories”. In 1903, the dispute about Angola’s eastern border was referred to King Emmanuel III of Italy for arbitration.⁶⁵ The award of 1905 tried at length to define the (historical) extension of the Barotse kingdom but in the end a border was established that ran for 390 miles along astronomical lines. The King’s award left Britain with the longest part of the Zambezi River. However, officials were critical of the “arbitrary meridians” and were concerned about the trouble that would likely arise “when a native ... dominion is divided between two [European] spheres of influence.”⁶⁶ Evidently, these new borders and ‘colonies’ should not prompt one to overlook “the profound unity of the region” in historical and social terms.⁶⁷

61 *Jureit* 2012: 82 ‘imperiale Zwerge’; *Arenas* 2003: 6; *Wheeler* 1978: 39; *Ramos* 2001: 40; *Birmingham* 2011: 139f.; *Teixeira* 1990. The republican national anthem was written shortly after: ‘Heróis do mar, nobre povo /Nação valente, imortal /Levantai hoje de novo /O esplendor de Portugal! Entre as brumas da memória /Ó Pátria, sente-se a voz /Dos teus egrégios avós /... Seja o eco de uma afronta /O sinal do ressurgir...’; ‘Heroes of the sea, noble people / Brave and immortal nation /Raise once again today /The splendor of Portugal! /Among the haze of memory /Oh Fatherland, one feels the voice /Of your distinguished forefathers /... Let the echo of an offense /Be the sign for a comeback....’

62 *Smith* 1991: 499; *Birmi*. 2011: 146; *Stengers* 1962: 486; 483; cf. *Corrado* 2008: 39; 118.

63 *Schrader/Gallouédec* 1896: 476; cf. *Rodrigues* 2009: 48f.; *Livermore* 1967: 30f.

64 PA Luanda 4 (Polit.) Consul to RK Bülow, 1.7.03; *Canis* 1999: 85; *Touval* 1966: 289.

65 TNA FO 179/390: 9f., Peel: Report on Portugal and her colonial possessions, 11.1.04.

66 *RGS* 1905: 201f; *Reynolds* 1972; 242; *Fisch* 1984: 423; *Griffiths* 1986: 207; *Roque* 2003: 118.

67 *Vellut* 1980: 104.

1.2 “Medical Adviser” or “Heir”? – the Agreements of 1898 and 1913

Throughout the nineteenth century Portugal earned a reputation for its “financial disorganization”. Following the financial and political crisis of 1890⁶⁸ the country experienced “virtual financial bankruptcy . . . , and continuous budget deficits”.⁶⁹ In comparison with other western European nations, Portugal’s GNP *per capita* fell back. This “backwardness” “was perhaps as typical of the Africa she was purporting to civilize as of Europe.”⁷⁰ Among others, Portugal was highly indebted with German creditors. While Britain exerted an overall dominant economic role, in certain branches German merchants, it was claimed, gained a “preponderant” position in Portugal and its colonies.⁷¹ The country, with its protectionist policy, lacking meaningful economic growth, increasing state spending and an ever rising public debt was financially overburdened with the administration and economic *mise-en-valeur* of its colonies spread across the globe and twenty-three times the size of the metropolitan territory. In 1900, five percent of the state budget had to be spent on the overseas administration; together with defense expenses this rose to around 25 percent.⁷² Production in the colonies, on the other hand, was often still based on slave labor and foraging sectors.⁷³

In Angola complaints by foreign observers were rampant about “officials having sadly neglected their duty” and a general Portuguese “want of national enterprise”.⁷⁴ In Mozambique, the French Consul warned of the *conséquences de la déplorable administration des colonies portugaises* that could cost one day the kingdom its best overseas possessions.⁷⁵ Since 1890 rumors did not abate about the cession of Portuguese colonies to foreign powers “in exchange for financial support”.⁷⁶ Following the British *ultimatum* the Angolan journalist José de Fontes Pereira (1823–91) did

68 Esteves 2005: 311; 319f. on lack of remittances from Brazil since 1889; Wheeler 1978: 28.

69 Wheeler 1972: 175; on surpluses in the 1860s Clarence-S. 1979a: 172; Ramos 2001: 129.

70 Roberts 1986: 494; cf. Bonifácio: 1 in Mattoso 2010: ‘At the beginning of the 20th century, the Portuguese GNP per capita only amounted to 40% of the GNP per capita of the richest countries, whereas in 1850 the proportion had been 55%.’; Birmingham 2011: 141-4.

71 Penha Garcia 1918: 129; German exports were second only to GB; Esteves 2005: 319.

72 Esteves 2005: 331; Câmara 2005: 355; Roberts 1986: 495; but cf. Clarence-Smith 1985.

73 Clarence-Smith 1979a: 174; Pitcher 1991: 52; 48 on wild grown cotton; Roberts 1986: 523.

74 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS, No. 89, 2.5.1874.

75 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 23, French Consul Lourenço M. to MAE, 6.4.97.

76 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 4, USC to SoS, 13.2.92: 447 pointing to US ‘overtures’.

“not wonder that foreigners ... would try to take over Portuguese lands which are still preserved in a state of nature ... We have nothing to expect from Portugal except ... slavery ... [W]e trust neither in the good faith nor in the sincerity of the Portuguese Colonial Party, whose members are only crocodiles ... Out with them!!!”⁷⁷

After his vitriolic attack, the author, having criticized the Portuguese administration already for years, lost his employment in the civil service and was prosecuted. However, the “Portuguese have often been the severest critics of their own colonial misrule”. The account of former Overseas Minister João de Andrade Corvo (1824–90) of the colonies and their “retrograde and inefficient” administration (published between 1883 and 1887) left the impression that Portugal should abdicate its colonial heritage rather sooner than later. “Yet this is not at all what Andrade Corvo intended”.⁷⁸ Aware of the bitter reality and growing debts, his successor as Overseas Minister, Ferreira de Almeida, came up with a different solution. In 1895, he “twice introduced parliamentary motions in favour of selling some of the colonies and using the proceeds to develop the remainder.”⁷⁹

Considering these debates and the financial weakness of Portugal and given the German aspirations for *Weltpolitik*, in 1898 Britain and Germany commenced negotiations about the “hypothetical partition” of Portuguese colonies. This was part of a more encompassing dialogue on a “defensive alliance” between both powers. It was discussed whether to buy Portugal’s colonies or to take them in debt payment. Rumors about German aspirations for the Portuguese Empire were decades old.⁸⁰ For this reason Portuguese colonial administrators were not particularly Germanophile.⁸¹

For the new German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow (1849–1929) and Naval Secretary Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930) the negotiations with Britain opened a window of opportunity to prove the effectiveness of their self-assured foreign policy. They “firmly anticipated ‘a new division of the globe’”. Germany was finally to find its “place in the sun” and would inherit parts of the Portuguese empire. In London, the

77 *O Arauto Africano* (Luanda), 20.1.1890, transl. Wheeler 1969a: 16; Fernandes 2010: 92.

78 Boxer 1963: 128; 130; cf. Marques 2006: 199; Cardoso 2007: 5; Newitt 2007: 52.

79 Hammond 1969: 353; 1966; Corrado 2008: 37 on ‘selling’ debates 1860s/70s; 115-8; 172-6.

80 Rose 2011: 150f.; cf. Canis 1999: 291; Bixler 1934: 438 on rumors that Germany would want to buy Delagoa Bay (1872).

81 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal; 8, Consul L. M. to MAE, 16.1.97; Lindner 2011: 72.

British Vice-Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour (1848–1930) and the German Ambassador Paul von Hatzfeld (1831–1901) signed on August 30, 1898 two secret agreements “in connection with a possible loan to Portugal” according to which Angola and Mozambique would be administratively divided into spheres of interest between the two powers “in case of default in the payment [by Portugal] of the interest [as in 1891] or sinking fund of either loan”. Despite the underlying assumption that the disintegration of the Portuguese empire was merely a matter of time, this was never the case. Portugal came to terms with its foreign creditors in 1902. Public finances stabilized for a while and the “treaty therefore remained inoperative”.⁸²

Furthermore, just as the government in Berlin remained unable to mobilize the German economy to invest in the German colonies, German financiers could not be induced to risk capital in the Portuguese colonies. In this way, the absurd situation came into being that around 1895 British-South African capital dominated GSWA⁸³ and began also to invest in southern Angola, intended to be a German sphere of interest. Finally, the *Disconto Gesellschaft* showed interest in Angola. Led by Adolph von Hansemann (1826–1903)⁸⁴ the *Disconto Gesellschaft* was expected to counter the British dominance and to give economic meaning to Emperor William’s new *Weltpolitik*. Since the days of Georg Tams (1841 in Luanda) and “even more so since” the 1870s German “explorers” had been active in Angola. Foreign Secretary Bülow ordered the thorough exploration of the region he hoped to become German soon.⁸⁵ The Kunene-Zambezi-Expedition (1899–1900) was organized by the *Kolonialwirtschaftliches Komitee* (Berlin) in cooperation with the *Companhia de Moçâmedes* (Paris) and the *South West Africa Company* (London). This expedition tried to explore a possible railway connection from the Atlantic to the copper mines of Otavi in GSWA and possibly to the Transvaal.⁸⁶ A long dis-

82 Kennedy 1984: 158; *Gooch/Temp.* 1927: 71f., No. 90 IV; No. 91; No. 93; Esteves 2005: 311; Clarence-S. 1976: 218; Langhorne 1973: 364; Ramos 2001: 124; Winzen 2013: 197.

83 Paish 1911; *Cana* 1915: 357 SWA ‘mainly exploited by British capital’; cf. Drechsler 1996.

84 Stern 1979: 398 Hansemann was involved in colonial affairs since the Bismarck era and brother-in-law of the first head of the Colonial Dpt., H. von Kusserow (1836–1900); on Bismarck’s laments about the timidity of German capitalists (*ibid.* 412; 434); Santos 1978: 140f.

85 Pélissier 1996: 660; Winzen 2013: 236; Strandmann 2009: 290-93; cf. Heintze 2007: 378.

86 It was led by Pieter van der Kellen, who led Père Lecomte (†1908) in 1886 to the Kavango River and had family connections with the *C. de Moçâmedes* (AGCSSp 3L1.7b5, Schaller to Grizard?, 28.10.86; 3L1.16a6); Heintze 2007: 121 on botanist Hugo Baum 1903.

cussion commenced in Germany's Foreign Office, in the German legation in Lisbon and in business circles about the viability of the construction of the railway, beginning either in Baía dos Tigres or Porto Alexandre. Pointing to the lack of local trade, the geographer Siegfried Passarge (1866–1958) considered such railway premature. Hansemann, on the other hand, argued in favour of the railway and emphasized that Tiger Bay was of no relevance for Portuguese trade interests. He considered the Angolan administration financially and technically incompetent to realize the railway construction.⁸⁷

The intrigues between Hansemann and Cecil Rhodes in 1899 about the railway to Otavi ended in a diplomatic disaster. Alfred von Tattenbach (1846–1910), the German minister in Lisbon, “a typical Prussian diplomat” with a tendency to act like “a bull in a China shop” did not convince the Portuguese government to grant exclusive concessions to the Germans to run the harbor on Angolan territory and build and maintain the railway lines. The railway line would never cross the border. Instead, the Portuguese decided to finance the line themselves, but starting in Moçâmedes and routed according to their own needs. The Otavi mine was, for “national reasons” linked southwards to the less than favorable German harbor of Swakopmund. Incapable of realizing a policy of slow *pénétration pacifique* in southern Angola, Berlin had insisted on an exclusive German sphere of influence, thereby offended the Portuguese and gained nothing.⁸⁸

Portugal's government had been aware of the “uncomfortable” situation due to the Anglo-German machinations. King Dom Carlos I. (1863–1908) spoke openly with the French Minister in Lisbon about the necessity to avoid the “execution of the Anglo-German accord of 1898”.⁸⁹ He was determined to hold what was agreed on during the Congo Conference in 1885. Since the “1880s the presence of colonial affairs in public debate was wider.” Colonial enthusiasts presented colonial issues as questions of national honor.⁹⁰ Any slight to Portugal's rank was considered unacceptable. The end of Spanish rule in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines at the hands of the United States in 1898 made obvious the risks of losing an ancient empire to rising powers without considerations for legal grounds.

87 PA Lissabon 268 (Tigerbai), DKZ No. 17, 24.4.00; Memo, 18.6.00; Strandmann 2009: 293.

88 Drechsler 1962: 58f.; 67; Tschapek 2000: 251–269; cf. Schwarze 1931; Ribeiro Lopes 1933.

89 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 194a, FML to MAE, 14.6.02; *Hespanha* 2010: 172.

90 Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa 2006: 113; cf. Stengers 1962: 484; Santos 1978: 132f.

The press in Lisbon carefully watched German movements in Angola. Questioning the *Companhia de Moçâmedes, Novidades* did not hesitate to warn of an “invasion” of foreigners buying out Portuguese sovereignty with railway bonds; others deplored border infringements.⁹¹ The French Ambassador in Berlin summarized the situation: “It is an open secret that the Portuguese possessions are the object of German greed.”⁹² Also, in subsequent years, the potential cession of all of Ovamboland to GSWA was a recurring issue even among the missionaries.⁹³

Lisbon was thus eager to revive the six-hundred-year-old Luso-British alliance, the “bedrock of Portuguese diplomacy”. The Portuguese profited from the growing imperial rivalry between the British and the Germans in southern Africa.⁹⁴ Given the “general impression in England that the demands of Germany in Africa were exorbitant” and considering the ensuing war with the South African Republic, London responded favorably to the diplomacy of the “very subtle and clairvoyant Marquês de Soveral” (1851–1922), Portugal’s Ambassador in London.^[95] The alliance with Portugal was confirmed by the secret Windsor Declaration (October 14, 1899), neutralizing the Anglo-German agreement (as intended by London) and guaranteeing the integrity of Portugal and its empire, while Lisbon undertook not to permit the “passage of arms” destined to the Afrikaaner Republics and declared itself neutral in the conflict. Foreign Secretary Bülow’s secret plan to occupy Tiger Bay in case the British would take Delagoa Bay came to naught.⁹⁶ In 1903 King Edward VII officially visited Portugal and affirmed its politicians of the integrity of the Portuguese colonies.⁹⁷

The British, more diplomatically inclined than the Germans with their “aggressive plans” and having more capital at their disposal, continued to have a stronger foothold in southern Angola than the Germans. In 1902, Robert Williams secured a concession from Lisbon for the construction of

91 PA Lissabon 268, DGL to AA, *Novidades*, 6.7.00; *Diário de Notícias; Popular*, 26.10.01.

92 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 183p, French Ambassador Berlin to MAE, 9.11.01.

93 AGCSSp 3L1.11b3, Lecomte (Caconda) to TRP, 24.2.; 26.3.; 10.5.05.

94 *Birmingham* 2011: 24; 64; *Labourdette* 2000: 360-4; *Strandmann* 2009: 291; *Butler* 1989: 4: ‘The oldest treaty in force for the United Kingdom is a Treaty of Perpetual Alliance between King Richard II of England and John I, King of Portugal, dated 9th May 13[73].’

95 *Pélissier* 2000: 575 ref. Costa, F.: Portugal e a Guerra Anglo-Boer, Lisbon 1998: 91f.

96 *Gooch /Temperley* 1927: 75, No. 93, Note; 77, No. 96; 93, No. 118; *Winzen* 2013: 233-8.

97 TNA FO 179/390, Report by A. Peel on Portug. Africa, 11.1.04; *Penha Garcia* 1918: 134.

the Lobito railway to the Katanga mines.⁹⁸ Manifestly, this ran counter the German government's plans for the economic development in Angola. The *Companhia de Moçâmedes*, a Luso-French consortium sub-conceded its mining and railway building rights to British companies "linked to Cecil Rhodes".⁹⁹ After his trip to Angola in 1903, the British prospector Boyd Cuninghame announced that Angola's "natural advantages will soon be more fully exploited by British enterprise".¹⁰⁰ Economic expectations were high, if not illusory. The "Angola-Boer" Pieter van der Kellen (having family connections with the *Companhia de Moçâmedes*) was quoted by a French journal as having "found traces of gold in each handful of gravel". He spoke of a "new Witwatersrand" in the Cassinga region.¹⁰¹ The German Consul Dobritz even traveled to the Kunene area just to learn that Cuninghame had crossed into Kaokoveld in GSWA.¹⁰² As several other newspapers asked what had come out of the Anglo-German accord of 1898,¹⁰³ *Der Tag* warned about the railway track to the Katanga mines, proposed by Cuninghame: "If we do not keep a close eye on things, our GSWA will be surrounded by the British in the North as well, and thus on all sides."¹⁰⁴

Due to the dominant position Britain exerted over southern Africa, also Portugal's relations with the British had repeatedly experienced frictions in the past as could be seen from the "ultimatum" in 1890. Portugal had "become a subsidiary colonial power to England" and had to "navigate between Scylla and Charybdis";¹⁰⁵ whereas the ancient alliance was of relevance to Britain due to Portugal's Atlantic possessions, the Azores, Cape Verde and Madeira. They formed a triangle through which trade routes passed that were "a major lifeline of Britain and her Empire."¹⁰⁶ It was an "old [British] doctrine" that these islands "must never be allowed to fall into potentially hostile hands"; a doctrine to which also the Americans adhered.¹⁰⁷ The Portuguese found it difficult to trust any power on the

98 *Dáskalos* 2008: 82; MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE Delcassé, 8.12.02.

99 *Clarence-S.* 1979a: 173 'it proved an almost total economic failure'; *Alexandre* 2005: 371.

100 *Cuninghame* 1904: 167 'with the concurrence of our old-time allies the Portuguese.'

101 AGCSSp 3L1.1.2, *Gaulois*, 8.6.1903 'Au Sud-Ouest Africain'.

102 PA Luanda 5 (Lobito-Eisenbahn) German Consul Luanda to RK Bülow, 19.11.04.

103 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 222a, French Ambassador Berlin to MAE, 7.4.04.

104 PA Luanda 4 (Luanda-Politisches) *Der Tag*: 'Vorstoß der Engländer in Angola', 10.3.04.

105 *Arenas* 2003: 4; *Drechsler* 1962: 58; 68; cf. *Alexandre* 2005: 375; *Willequet* 1967.

106 *Stone* 1975: 743; cf. *Collins* 2013: 746; *Livermore* 1967: 309-313.

107 *Vincent-S.* 1974: 623; NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753b.00, Navy Dpt (FDR), 16.6.16.

African continent. Everywhere “vultures hovered nearby, waiting for the collapse of Portugal’s finances before swooping in on the country’s colonies.”¹⁰⁸ In as much as the French opposed any territorial gains for the Germans, in as much they were inclined to raise the *question de l’annexion de la Guinée portugaise*.¹⁰⁹ And the Belgians were eager to enlarge their access to the sea and to incorporate the enclave of Cabinda into their Congo colony.¹¹⁰

Once they had subdued the Herero and Nama in GSWA in a long and excruciating war (1904–1907), the Germans seemed again to be a threat to Portugal’s sovereignty over Angola. Between 1907 and 1914 Portuguese royal and republican governments were anxious to secure reaffirmations of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance to receive protection against Germany, Spain, and, increasingly, the Union of South Africa, eager to incorporate the harbor of Lourenço Marques. In these years the concept of the indivisibility of Portugal’s territory, in Europe or overseas, developed among the elite. However, following the revolution of 1910 the validity of the alliance based on treaties between monarchs seemed in question and the partition of the Portuguese empire seemed more imminent than ever. The government in Lisbon thus sent the former minister Count Penha-Garcia to Paris, Brussels, and Berlin to affirm the “will” (*volonté*) of the Portuguese nation to hold fast to the colonies and to convince the foreign public of the “progress” realized there over the last decades.¹¹¹ The Luso-Dutch skirmishes in 1911 over the border of East Timor left nobody in doubt that the Portuguese were willing to defend what they considered their “rights”.¹¹²

When he learnt about the Franco-German convention on Morocco and the Congo region (1911), most of all the swap of territories, Foreign Minister Vasconcelos was alarmed. Congratulating the French on their “triumph”, he was concerned about the German ambitions for further enlargement that would barely be limited to Belgian Congo. Vasconcelos feared that article XVI of the convention, providing for the eventuality of territorial modification, could be the prelude for a re-portioning of Africa which

108 *Meneses* 2010: 10.

109 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 30, MAE. Note sur les colonies portugaises, 30.12.12.

110 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, French Minister Brussels to MAE, 14.6.12.

111 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 31, MAE. Note sur les colonies portugaises, 30.12.12.

112 NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753.56, US Minister The Hague to SoS, 25.8.11; the dispute was settled (25.6.1914) by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (C.E.Lardy).

would be, as in 1885, to the detriment of Portugal. During a meeting with the French Minister, Vasconcelos left the impression that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance seemed to reassure him less than the German ambitions disquieted him and his nation.¹¹³

British politicians, on the other hand, had no intention to put into question the existing alliance and were satisfied with the *status quo*. The final definition of the borders between British possessions and GSWA was being arranged by several international arbitration procedures. The Walvis Bay arbitration by the Spanish lawyer Joaquin F. Prida went in favor of the British (1911). Following an agreement of 1890, new procedures about the borders along the Orange and the Tchobe River had started in 1911.¹¹⁴ In 1911, after the Agadir crisis had brought Anglo-German relations to a new low, the Colonial Secretary Lewis Harcourt (1863–1922) was, however, willing to help Germany to find “a place in the sun” and recommenced (in private) the discussions about Portugal’s colonies.¹¹⁵ Reasons for this may be found not only in the desire to improve relations with Berlin. Given the slave-like labor conditions on the plantations of São Tomé Foreign Secretary Edward Grey (1862–1933) had often expressed his “disgust at the ‘scandalous’ state of affairs in Portuguese Africa”. Further, he had doubts about the applicability of “treaties of such ancient date”. Also the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874–1965) was known for his “intense hostility to the republican regime in Portugal”.¹¹⁶ The Germans “believed themselves to have been cheated by England” since despite the agreement of 1898 they did not gain anything in return for their neutrality during the South African war.¹¹⁷ They therefore wanted to renegotiate in Germany’s favor the agreement about the future of Portugal’s colonies. At the same time, British and German politicians showed “interest in reducing the intensity of their naval competition”. Grey, Europe’s “most influential foreign minister”, stated: “For a real bargain about naval expenditure in which Germany gives up the attempt to challenge our naval superiority we might give something substantial,

113 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/8, Portugal: 198, FML to MAE, 2.12.11.

114 TNA CO 879/114/5: 3, n.5, CO (H. Lambert) to FO, 21.5.14; cf. *Carrington* 1960: 438.

115 *Langhorne* 1973: 368; cf. *Gooch/Temperley* 1930: 651, No.480; 664, No.490; 684, No.506.

116 *Vincent-Smith* 1974: 620; 623; Grey to Goschen, 29.11.1911: ‘Metternich has already said that the Germans would like a division of the Portuguese Colonies to take place as soon as possible. So should I. These colonies are worse than derelict so long as Portugal has them; they are sins of iniquity’, in *Langhorne* 1973: 369; cf. 1973b: 863f.; *Miers* 2003: 51.

117 Jagow to Lichnowsky: ‘we were duped by England’, in *Langhorne* 1973: 380;363; 1971.

but the difficulty is that cession of [Portuguese] territory can hardly from the German point of view be *in pari materia* with a naval arrangement.”¹¹⁸

This time, the officials in the German Foreign Office had learnt their lesson that shortsighted policy focusing only on domestic prestige and annexations would lead to no result. They now considered German economic penetration of Angola and Mozambique through investment and the purchase of Portuguese national loans as the corner stone of a policy that should lead *in the future* to the takeover of (parts of) the Portuguese colonies. A similar policy was pursued towards the Congo. After the Germans in 1911 through a German-French swap of colonial territories had “secured a footing on the Congo River”, Germany was “more than ever determined to connect her west and east coast possessions by means of a piece of the Congo”. Since the colony was “on the verge of bankruptcy” and since Belgians appeared rather resigned, a partition seemed not improbable, as the American Consul in Boma noticed. He recognized Britain as Germany’s main competitor. The old plans for a “Cape to Cairo railroad” through all British Territory ran “directly counter to German ambitions.” Considering the money Britain was investing in the Congo, he assumed that she had “the better chance to carry out her plan”.¹¹⁹ In Germany, on the other hand, *Mittelafrika* reaching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean was the envisioned goal. Especially the Pan-Germans (*Alldeutsche*) and other ultranationalist groups with their “half-baked” projects put pressure on the German government to follow a path to worldwide territorial expansion.¹²⁰

From the official German point of view, the Anglo-German negotiations were not a (colonial) end in and of itself, as the French ambassador in Berlin, Jules Cambon (1845–1935) assumed when he recognized a “Prussian tradition” in “sharing the spoils of a weak state”.¹²¹ Chancellor Theodor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf, Councilor Richard von Kühlmann and the Minister in Lisbon, Friedrich Rosen, hoped to use the detour of negotiations about Africa with Lewis Harcourt to find (at Portugal’s expense) common ground with Britain also in Europe. Solf was willing to see Germany as the junior partner of the British in Africa and hoped to break through the isolation of Germany within Euro-

118 Maurer 1992: 284; Grey, 29.11.1911, in Langhorne 1973: 369; Clark 2013: 266.

119 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 13, US CG Boma to SoS, 28.2.12; 10.6.12.

120 Canis 2011: 523; Ritter 1970: 109; cf. Rosen 1932: 266f. ‘alldutsche Krafthuber’ (Solf).

121 MAELC 192 CPC/CP/NS/19, Portugal: 9, French Embassy Berlin to MAE, 3.2.13.

pe. In October 1913, a new agreement was initialed that provided for a German takeover of the larger part of southern Angola and northern Mozambique not only in case Portugal would want to sell its colonies, but also in case of misrule and revolts that could harm neighboring German or British colonies. In this event the parties would seek a joint solution.¹²²

These negotiations were openly discussed in the press across Europe. In France concerns were raised about the German aspirations for “mythic” *Mittelfrika*.¹²³ The journal *Géographie* warned: “With England’s consent and owing also to our weakness, [Germany] has cast her eye on the Belgian Congo, Angola, and Spanish ... Guinea”¹²⁴ However, the Germans “seriously underestimated the sensitivity and tenacity of the Portuguese where their colonies were concerned”.¹²⁵ In 1912, the Portuguese Foreign Minister declared that Portugal would never cede territory to the Germans.¹²⁶ *O Mundo*, the mouthpiece of the republic’s strong man Afonso Costa, took comfort in “our old alliance with England”, whose Foreign Secretary Grey had expressed England’s colonial “satisfaction”. This, it was hoped, could in the future also be Germany’s guiding “principle” instead of its constant “desire” for Angola.¹²⁷ Indeed, Grey “played a double game” and “misled” the Germans on his intentions. Being strongly influenced by the “Germanophobe fraction” in the Foreign Office under Francis Bertie, Eyre Crowe, and Arthur Nicolson, Grey assured the Portuguese Foreign Minister during the ongoing negotiations that neither Britain nor Germany would want to unilaterally terminate Portugal’s colonial sovereignty. He pressed Lisbon to develop its colonies in order to consolidate its sovereignty and to accept for that end British as well as German investors.¹²⁸

The new Portuguese republican ambassador in London, Teixeira Gomes (1860–1941), questioned Britain’s “loyalty to an old ally”. His

122 *Canis* 2011: 531; cf. *Otte* 2013: 184; *Silva* 2006: 328; *Schöllgen* 1980; *Hatton* 1971.

123 *Michel* 2004: 918; cf. *Stone* 1975: 731; *Afflerbach* 2002; *Forsbach* 2003: 122.

124 ‘The backbone of her future network of railways is to be a great trans-Africa line from Dar-es-Salaam to Lobito Bay’, transl. in: *Journal of the Royal African Society* 14/53 (1914): 41. In case of a ‘necessity’ of liquidating the Portuguese Empire, France may have demanded Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, Cabinda, and part of Mozambique, cf. MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 29-39, MAE. Note sur les colonies portug., 30.12.12; 192 CPCOM/19, Portugal: 18-21, Paul Cambon (London) to MAE, 12.2.13.

125 *Vincent-Smith* 1974: 627f.; cf. AGCSSp 3L1.1.2, French paper clippings, July 1912;

126 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 31, MAE. Note sur les colonies portug., 30.12.12.

127 NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753.00/1, *O Mundo*, 4.12.11, transl in: USML to SoS, 5.12.11.

128 *Canis* 2011: 531-6 AA ‘ließ sich blenden’; cf. *Clark* 2013: 219f.; *Livermore* 1967: 323.

German counterpart, Prince Lichnowsky (1860–1928), not concealing “that Germany hoped for more than a mere development of Portuguese colonies”, told Grey in disappointment “that the position I seemed to assume was that of medical adviser to the Portuguese colonies, while what Germany contemplated was that of being the heir.” However, irrespective of the fact that the membership of the German Colonial Association (DKG) “read like a ‘Who’s Who’ of prominent figures in the German business world”,¹²⁹ the great German credit institutions were, again, hardly convinced of the economic prospects of this financial imperialism. The Luso-German Treaty of Navigation and Commerce that came into effect in June 1910¹³⁰ did not assure them. Were Angola or Mozambique promising investment objectives? The government in Berlin had to urge investors to take risks. Only with the support of the Foreign Office German banks bought in May 1914 the majority of stocks of the *Nyassa Consolidated Ltd.* (Mozambique). The purchase of Portuguese national loans secured by the customs revenues of Angola was scheduled for July. British officials, on the other hand, were hesitant to sign the proposed agreement with Germany not only because they were aware of the sensitivities of Portugal, France, and Belgium. Bearing in mind that the Germans had commenced to invest in (and stabilized) the Portuguese colonies and being aware that Britain’s German counterparts did not value non-European territory enough to make concessions with regard to Germany’s ambitious naval policy, the desirability of an Anglo-German cooperation that would expose the British as “desert[ing] their friends” seemed questionable. Thus, they demanded the publication of the new treaty together with the Windsor Treaty of 1899; a move that was intended to put pressure on the Portuguese to develop their colonies, but unacceptable to the Germans, as Portugal would have impeded German commercial expansion in the areas allocated to Germany. Furthermore, the German public would have learnt that Germany was “duped” in 1899. No formal agreement followed the negotiations of 1913.¹³¹

One historian went so far to consider “the whole negotiation ... a deliberate piece of theatre” that served but one purpose: to show the fact *that* negotiations between the two were possible.¹³² In early 1914 diplomats at-

129 Grey 13.6.13, in: *Langhorn* 1974: 366/79; *Blackbourn* 1998: 333; *Stern* 1979: 412.

130 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 720, USML to SoS, 3.10.19 treaty was suspended in 1916.

131 *Girão* 2010: 42; *Vincent-Smith* 1974: 625; cf. *Lindner* 2011: 77; *Santos* 1978: 167f.

132 *Stone* 1975: 731; *Langhorne* 1973: 387; cf. *Tschapek* 2000: 354; *Vincent-Smith* 1974:624f.

tested “to a growing sense of détente” in Anglo-German relations even without formal agreements on colonial territories or arms control.¹³³ The outbreak of the war prevented further steps in the direction of a German *Mittelafrika*. This did not prevent German contemporaries from dreaming of ‘German’ Angola as the “world’s most attractive colony”.¹³⁴

1.3 The Portuguese in Southern Angola

1.3.1 Contact, Commerce, and Colonialism in Angola, ca. 1840–1900

The notion of Portuguese inaction and idleness as expressed in many (foreign) contemporary accounts gives an incomplete impression of Angola’s administration. Governor General Calheiros e Meneses stated in 1861 “the normal condition of the administration of the colony is to make war and to prepare itself for war.” It was not one or two major battles to be fought in order to “pacify” the colony. The Portuguese, similar to other colonial powers “never ... [took] more than a single bit at a time.” “[R]arely did a year pass during the four centuries since 1575 when there was not a colonial campaign somewhere in Angola”.¹³⁵ From 1845 to 1926 alone around 180 military campaigns ravaged the colony; altogether historian René Pélissier counts 420 campaigns in the Portuguese empire during this period. No other colonial power met with such harsh resistance in Africa.¹³⁶ Portugal’s constant war efforts prove to be the exception to the rule that – due to the expenses – “only the major powers are capable of engaging regularly in [colonial] wars.” However, short-term “victories” did not necessarily result in colonization and pacification. As in any other colony, “war and peace could not be clearly distinguished” from each other.¹³⁷

Despite all their fighting, the presence of the Portuguese from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century remained mostly limited to the coastal belt. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Angola was still far from

133 *Otte* 2013: 177; cf. *Rose* 2011: 567.

134 *Reiner* 1924: 334: ‘What would Germany have made of this country if it would have been in German hands for such a long time?’, cf. *Marquardsen* 1920.

135 Quoted and translated in *Wheeler* 1969: 425; 428; *Oliver/Mathews* 1963: 454.

136 Cf. *Pélissier* 1977: 18; 20; 609; *Dias* 1981: 359; *Dianoux* 1989: 12; *Wheeler* 1967.

137 *Ravlo/Gleditsch/Do.* 2003: 528; *Kuss* 2010: 15f. on the characteristics of colonial wars.

being occupied in its entirety by the Portuguese; it was conquered and colonized only in the subsequent decades. The Portuguese thus were prevented from “reaching an effective detribalization of the hinterland”. As it has been described for the British advances into Xhosa territories in the first half of the nineteenth century, the “process of interaction” between Europeans and Africans remained central to the creation of imperial rule.¹³⁸ “Colonial encounters” were never one-sided affairs but left both parties with options, while both were seeking for advantages. The processes of accommodation between Africans and Europeans were manifold and the Portuguese were not capable of imposing their will upon their African subjects unaltered. The “creation of Angola” entailed more than a simplistic reiteration of the dichotomy of “pacification campaigns” and “wars of resistance” can present. Rather than force, trade, diplomacy, and negotiations had to be applied as the administration lacked the manpower for outright conquest and rule. The colonial states that were implemented with great pains following the “partition of Africa” were “mere skeletons fleshed out and vitalized by African political forces.”¹³⁹

In Angola’s interior for centuries the relation between Portuguese and Africans “was not so much a confrontation of cultures as an intimate, balanced commercial collaboration.”¹⁴⁰ Europeans did not necessarily act from a position of strength; rather, historians do not shy away from terms such as “African hegemony”. The question of African allies and their importance for the colonial project comes into play here too. The Portuguese colonial state, “despite its seeming antiquity, remained a series of patrimonial satrapies improvisationally run by an amalgam of settlers, renegades, and officials.” “[S]urvival and endurance” were the characteristics of the “traditional [Portuguese colonial] policy” that has also been defined as “Luso-African feudalism”.¹⁴¹ Indigenous structures of production and of authority often remained unaltered in areas Portugal penetrated. The administration upheld “a system of Portuguese commercial ‘consuls’ attached to Ovimbundu courts”.¹⁴² For decades these isolated *sertanejos* remained the only representatives of the Empire. In 1877 Governor General Albuquerque compared “colonial settlements [to] islands, lost in a limit-

138 *Corrado* 2008: 3; *Price* 2008: 1; cf. *Brunschwig* 1974: 48.

139 *Henriques* 2004: 9 ‘a criação de Angola’; *Liffé* 2007: 193; 203 similar to *Ranger* 1969: 297.

140 *Miller*, J.C.: Review, *Madeira Santos*, M.E.: *Serventia e posse*, in *JAH* 41 (2000): 503.

141 *Corrado* 2008: 20; *Henri*. 2004: 17; *Young* 1994: 152; *Wheeler* 1969: 426; *Boxer* 1963: 29.

142 *Birmingham* 1974: 194; *Ferreira*, 2011: 6; cf. *Péclard* 1999: 123; *Medeiros* 1977: 75.

less indigenous sea.” Therefore, historians have remarked that we cannot speak of a “veritable colonial situation” in those days.¹⁴³ In nineteenth century Angola, as elsewhere in Africa, “trade could not have been perceived by locals as the precursor of a new regime.”¹⁴⁴

Pre-colonial trade routes between Benguela, the slave port of southern Angola since the seventeenth century,¹⁴⁵ and Bailundo, Bié, or the Zambezi regions (Barotseland) continued to be used by Ovimbundu and others. Beginning in the eighteenth century they had pioneered a commercial system of their own with a caravan network of long-distance trade. The caravans could consist of more than a thousand porters and conducted a considerable trade in ivory, cautchouc, firearms, alcohol and slaves, often involving Luso-African itinerant traders (*funantes, pombeiros*) or officials.¹⁴⁶ In the kingdom of Kazembe transcontinental trade connections had been formed since the eighteenth century that reached the east and the west coast via Bié traders. Slaving raids and the introduction of guns proved disastrous for the affected communities at the end of the nineteenth century,¹⁴⁷ but Portuguese officials did next to nothing to protect the trading caravans.¹⁴⁸

The American Consul summarized the situation in 1885 in the “interior” (Bailundo and Bié): “although considered vasals of the Portuguese Govt., the Govt. has ... not the power to compel [the chiefs] to do as they would like”.¹⁴⁹ Irrespective of the abolition of slavery in the Portuguese Empire in 1875, the “substitution of the overseas slave trade by commerce in raw materials and cash crops” was still ongoing around 1900.¹⁵⁰ The “governors simply forgot to implement the anti-slave laws”. And Brazilian coffee growers did “their utmost to delay the abolition of slavery.”¹⁵¹ Rum (*aguardente*) and guns were the main commodities used in the slave trade and continued to be so well after the official ban on alcohol production in

143 Albuqu. transl. in *Corrado* 2008: 35; 28; 31; *Mesquitela* 1980: 512 refer. to *Pélissier* 1977.

144 *Dobler* 2014: 2 emphasizes that the ‘perspective linking trade and colonialism is certainly valid, but it offers an analysis after the fact.’; cf. *Cunha* 1900; *Heintze* 2002; 1999.

145 Cf. *Candido* 2013; *Curto* 2005: 98-100; *Alencastro* 2007: 188; 202.

146 *Bontinck* 1974; *Flint*, 1970: 76; *Reynolds* 1972: 241; *Alenc.* 2007: 200; *Corrado* 2008: 29.

147 *Wilson* 1972: 579; 582; 586f.; cf. *Ranger* 1969: 305; *Coquery-V./Moniot* 2005: 159f.; 192f.

148 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 183g, FML to MAE, 24.9.01; cf. *Vellu* 1972.

149 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 3, USC to Board of Commis. for Foreign Missions, 12.1.85.

150 *Dias* 1981: 349; cf. *Clarence-Smith* 1976: 218; 1979a: 170; *Rodrigues* 2009: 29f.

151 *Nowell* 1947: 4; *Tavares/Silveira* 2006: 111f; *dos Santos* 2002: 61; cf. *Marques* 2006.

Angola in 1910.¹⁵² High-ranking officials were often helpless against local authorities and merchants involved in these illicit trades. The former were thus more interested in covering-up any potentially discrediting information about slavery or other illicit activities than acting against them.¹⁵³

While “for much of the nineteenth century, the relationship of the Portuguese with black potentates in the interior of Angola was conditioned chiefly by the penury and consequent ... weakness of the government”,¹⁵⁴ politicians in Lisbon had attempted at implementing changes since the late 1870s. Foreign Minister Andrade Corvo initiated public works and investments in the colonies. Not least the tercentenary of the poet Luís de Camões (1524–1580) in 1880 marked a rise in a more aggressive foreign policy that included “utopian” colonial claims (culminating in the defeating *ultimatum*).¹⁵⁵ The doctrine of “effective occupation” set by the Congo-Act (1885) required at least “a skeletal grid of regional administration.”¹⁵⁶ In its entire empire, Portugal started to make “desperate attempts” to satisfy this condition and to prove to the “civilized world” its colonial “qualities”. Next to its “rights” to the colonies, based on century-old presence, the myth of Portugal’s “historical mission” and “unique colonial vocation” was to be reinvigorated in order to raise national sentiment against foreign encroachments.¹⁵⁷

1.3.2 Moçâmedes, the *Planalto*, and Portuguese Settlement Policies

A more vigorous approach towards the expansion of colonial power into the *sertão*, the hinterland of Angola, was thus felt by the African population. “Contact” was to be replaced by “colonization”. In the south of the colony it was not the implementation of colonial *rule* that was still in the process. Instead, military *conquest* was not yet accomplished before the First World War.¹⁵⁸ From a colonial perspective, southern Angola seemed

152 Dias 1981: 375f.; cf. Alexandre 2005: 373; Dáskalos 2008: 74.

153 Cf. Roque 2003: 116; Corrado 2008: 82 FN 7; Birmingham 1998: 353; 351, in 1903 Heli Chatelain observed in Caconda that officials ‘personally benefitted from it [the slave trade].’

154 Dias 1976: 253.

155 Freeland 1996: 61; Birmingham 2011: 150; cf. Rodrigues 2009: 28f.; Dáskalos 2008: 36.

156 Young 1994: 100; cf. Alexandre 2005: 370f.; Herbst 2000, cpt.2-4.

157 Mendy 2003: 41; cf. Henriques 1995: 80; Costa 1903 on ‘achievements’.

158 Pélissier 1993: 2 ‘contact n’est pas le synonyme de colonisation’; Regalado 2004: 13.

peripheral, but it gained in prominence in light of the ongoing Anglo-German negotiations. The Portuguese not only tried in general to prove their colonial effectiveness, but also attempted concretely to keep the Germans at bay in a region they had tried to include into their realm already for decades.

As it was the case with other colonial empires too, the Portuguese expanded from naval bases or trading posts along the seashore. The remote southern port town of Moçâmedes (trapped between the ocean and the desert, a fort since 1840 and a place to bring unruly functionaries “out of harm’s way”¹⁵⁹) had been the point of entry for improvised attempts of colonization with hundreds of persecuted settlers fleeing from Brazil’s major cotton-growing region, Pernambuco.¹⁶⁰ Their cotton produced in Angola was of “the first quality”, but the quantities remained small.¹⁶¹ In 1845 a second fort was erected in Huíla, located on the *planalto* beyond the desert and the escarpment. Here, “temperate climate” seemed to favor European settlement; but for decades there was “neither capital nor men” for colonial development. Before the Portuguese reached beyond the desert, contacts with Africans had been “marginal”. Few “migrant laborers from the Ovambo-Nkhumbi area” came to the coast. These contacts regularly resulted in humiliating defeats for the Portuguese. During the 1840s, two governors of the Benguela province were ambushed and captured by Africans.¹⁶² Not until 1860 the Kunene River was reached near Humbe where a fort was erected. It became a stronghold along a frontier that was characterized by trade in guns, alcohol, slaves, and ivory. In 1909 Humbe consisted “of a fort, a magistrate’s office, a store and a few huts”.¹⁶³


159 *Wheeler* 1968: 50 on Prince Nicolas of Kongo’s transfer to ‘the new village’ in 1860.

160 *Clarence-S.* 1976: 214; *Pitcher* 1991: 45 ‘cotton regime ill-planned’; *Marques* 2006: 228.

161 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS: 89, 2.5.74; TNA FO 179/390: 4, A. Peel: Report on Portugal and her colonial possessions in Africa, 11.1.04.

162 *Clarence-S.* 1976: 220; *Marques* 2006: 225; *Pélissier* 1977: 139-45; cf. *Dias* 1981: 366.

163 *Pearson* 1910: 510; cf. *Reclus* 1887: 393f.; *MPLA* 1975: 139; *Corrado* 2008: 22.



Ill. 1 “Forteresse de Humbi en 1885”, Pieter van der Kellen

Further south, the Portuguese came in contact with the Walvis Bay traders who attempted at dominating the ivory trade. One of these traders described the situation lyrically: “As dawn precedes sunrise, a kind of twilight-zone of European civilization was spreading over the interior, far in advance of real colonial power.”¹⁶⁴ As the Congo River had been the object of Stanley’s journey, in 1878 the Portuguese under Major Serpa Pinto (1846–1900) turned their attention to the regions southeastwards, to the Okavango (Cubango) and Zambezi Rivers.¹⁶⁵ Two fortresses were erected in 1886, but talk of abandonment followed suit.¹⁶⁶ With the Portuguese beginning to conquer the southern fringes of Angola to prove their “effective rule”, a new chapter of the Luso-African relations in this area was opened. By sending in soldiers where previously only traders and missionaries had entered, the Portuguese had unilaterally changed the rules of the

164 Gerald McKiernan 1879, in *Kienetz* 1977: 553; cf. *Rizzo* 2012: 40; *Wallace* 2012: 86f.

165 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS, No. 89, 24.8.77; *Oliveira Marques* 1998: 409.

166 AGCSSp 3L1.1.1, *O Reporter*, 26.4.89; *Serpa* 1881; *Rodrigues* 2009; *Fernandes* 2010: 75.

game.¹⁶⁷ Resistance to European conquest became a major political characteristic of the area.

The local population had not only to endure soldiers but also an inflow of settlers. While for centuries, the area north of the Cuanza River had almost exclusively remained Angola's only settlement district, the late nineteenth century saw the Portuguese attempting to open up the southern plateau as "a white man's country" and European settlement became part of the rationale for imperial expansion.¹⁶⁸ However, given the colony's skeletal stage of development, Portuguese immigration to Angola was limited, whereas millions settled in Brazil. In 1910, Angola had merely 12,000 European inhabitants, most of them living in Luanda or other coastal towns, amid them many *degredados*.¹⁶⁹ Until 1930, Angola "retained its image as a convict colony."¹⁷⁰ Among politicians in Lisbon the advisability as well as the possibility of settling farmers in Angola remained disputed. The search for the "ideal settler" continued in Angola just as it did in GSWA, since it "was feared that the arrival of those who could not sustain themselves would place strains on the colony's limited resources."¹⁷¹ Many of those who settled in Angola were assessed with disdain by foreign observers: Returning after thirty years, an American missionary considered them unsuited "to build up a strong colonial population. Their one effort seemed to be to bleed the native and to get as much money out of the country in a short time as possible."¹⁷² A French missionary was equally appalled: "The Portuguese do absolutely nothing for the country except exploiting it."¹⁷³

Liberal politicians in Lisbon like Sá de Bandeira (1795–1876) initially hoped settlers would produce wheat on the *planalto* for the metropolis to avoid expensive foreign imports. Due to crop failure this dream "never realized". "[E]cological crisis had aided Nyaneka resistance" to Portuguese expansion in the region. During this period Europeans were heavily dependent upon the capacity of African peasants to feed them. In 1881, 420

167 *Brunschwig* 1974: 51 'l'Européen de 1880 n'était pas le même homme que celui de 1850.'

168 *Cuninghame* 1904: 154; cf. *Birmingham* 1965; *Dáskalos* 2008: 58–65 on settlements.

169 *Labourdette* 2000: 533; *Curto* 2002: 46 on the 'white' male population: 'Luso-Brazilian convicts and army deserters sent to serve their sentence in Angola, fortune-seekers, administrative personnel, and their locally born sons'; cf. *Nogueira* 1880 on Africans.

170 *Birm.* 1982: 345; 2011: 171; *Corrado* 2008: 32; *Kienetz* 1977: 569 'deserters' in SWA.

171 *Smith* 1974: 655, *Smith* 1991: 502; cf. *Pimenta* 2008: 71; on GSWA *Kundrus*, 2003: 44.

172 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 18.10.19: 6 (Thomas Woodside).

173 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Goepf (Bailundo) to Pascal?, 9.12.02 (excerpts).

Afrikaaners were granted permission to settle in Humpata, near Huíla. Arriving with their ox wagons from the South African Republic the *thirst-land trekkers* played an important role in the establishment of Portuguese rule on the *planalto*. The “white dogs, as [the Africans] call them”¹⁷⁴, “quell[ed] the native opposition” and managed to drive the Nyaneka off “much of the best land by the mid-1880s”¹⁷⁵ However, the Portuguese, similar to the colonial officials of GSWA, began to worry about their “sense of independence”. Rumors about “Boer conspiracies” to “proclaim a small republic” found their way into the press, alleging joint efforts of Afrikaaners and Kwanyama against Portuguese rule.¹⁷⁶ One officer demanded to oblige the Afrikaaners to speak Portuguese and to do military service in the Portuguese army.¹⁷⁷ (An “exodus” of Afrikaaners commenced around 1910 and after 1928, most of the 2,500 “Angola-Boers” were resettled in SWA¹⁷⁸).

Following the Congo Conference and attempts by the central government to set up a more effective colonial administration, this new policy was felt even in Angola’s remoter parts. A few kilometers north of Huíla and Humpata, Lubango (renamed Sá da Bandeira) was founded by emigrants from Madeira. The intention was to populate Angola with Portuguese in order to “nationalize” the colony. In 1901 Sá da Bandeira became the administrative center of the *planalto* (Huíla Province), where around 3,000 Europeans, soldiers and settlers, lived. A British observer considered the “absence of railways and ... cheap transport” to be the “great obstacles” to further development.¹⁷⁹ In 1905 the construction of a railway across the desert from Moçâmedes to Sá da Bandeira began. Much to the disappointment of foreign investors, eager for concessions, the government decided to finance the railway itself.¹⁸⁰ In June 1909 seventy miles were constructed.¹⁸¹

174 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 3, USC to SoS, 18.11.81, 250 were women/children.

175 Clarence-S. 1979a: 171; Dias 1981: 366f; cf. Pélissier 1969, 76; Cuninghame 1904: 156.

176 TNA FO 367/18: 644, BML to FO, 12.5.06, exc. *O Seculo* 6.5.06 on J. Pienaar; *Birming-ham* 1998: 352; *Botha* 2007: 12 ‘ambivalent attitude’ of Ger. officials towards Afrikaaners.

177 AHM/Div/2/2/37/55, Pimento to Chefe do Estado Mj, 24.9.15; Pélissier 1977: 502.

178 Pearson 1910: 507f.; NARA RG 59, MF 705, roll 28, 853m00/19 USC Luanda to SoS, 12.7.28; *Stassen* 2011: 124-33; *Silvester/Wallace/Hayes* 1998:11f.

179 TNA FO 179/390: 4, Peel: Report on Portugal and her colonial possessions, 11.1.04.

180 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 1.6.06, credit of 1,500 Contos granted.

181 *Stone* 1956: 323; *Alexandre* 2005: 372; *Pearson* 1910: 505, railway completed in 1923.

All of this was not more than a “colonial nucleus”. Attempts to occupy territories beyond the Kunene River were ill starred. Intentions of policy-makers stood often in sharp contrast with the performance of their agents. As in the future, “military colonization” remained a “persistent but often frustrated plan” in Angola.¹⁸² The garrison of Humbe was decimated during uprisings by the Nkhumbi, who had previously “forb[idden] the entry of Portuguese traders into their lands.” Further Portuguese attempts to push forward in southern Angola were met with harsh resistance in 1891 and 1897. The Portuguese gained nothing more than “a partial and very insecure victory”. The “garrison in Humbe was practically impotent.” For years officials did not exercise jurisdiction outside the walls of their fortresses.¹⁸³

1.3.3 *Além-Cunene* – Military and Missionary Perspectives, 1900–1914

The political aim of imperial consolidation by effective colonial rule in all territories claimed by Portugal was incommensurate with any form of native sovereignty. Effective rule was tantamount to control over Africans. This would enable the colonial state to demand African obedience, labor, and tax payments. However, it turned out that before these aims could be achieved, the territories to be ruled had to be conquered first.

Portuguese military campaigns beyond the Kunene River have comprehensively been analyzed by historian René Pélissier. Two characteristics of these campaigns are particularly striking: the ferocity with which one campaign after another was waged against the local population; and the enormous human and financial resources the Portuguese monarchy and the republic were willing to sacrifice for an area that would furnish no immediate economic return. Since the 1860s, colonial forces had tried to gain influence in the Kunene region, but only after 1907 their status – acquired by conquest, not by treaties – seemed (to themselves) more or less secured.¹⁸⁴

Within the same period, a second force emanating from Europe attempted to implant itself in the region: Missionaries. From 1870, arriving from the south (Walvis Bay and the Cape Colony), Finnish Lutheran mis-

182 *Wheeler* 1969: 435 referring to plans of colonial reformers of the 1960s.

183 *Clarence-Smith/Moorsom* 1975: 371; 375; cf. *Roque* 2003: 122.

184 Cf. *Pélissier* 1969: 114f.; 2004: 213f.; *Korman* 1996: 41; 65; *Vandervort* 1998.

sionaries began to evangelize in Ovamboland (Ondonga). In line with a global trend, Roman Catholic missionaries (Spiritans) followed suit. The Apostolic Prefecture Cimbebasia (reaching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Orange and Zambesi Rivers) was established in 1879, headed by Charles Duparquet (1830–1888), who had visited Kwanyama King Shipandeka the same year.¹⁸⁵ His missionaries from France and Portugal set up the Prefecture of Cubango (Gallangue, 1879) and the mission district of Cunene (Huila, 1881). As one missionary journal put it, Spiritans followed the Portuguese flag.¹⁸⁶ When they attempted to outpace military occupation, their success was limited. After all: “Missionaries were guests who invited themselves” and they stayed longer than rules of hospitality would have allowed; worse, they challenged traditions, authority, and social hierarchies. Conflicts were predictable. A mission station (St. Michel) founded among Kwanyama by Father Duparquet in 1884, had to be abandoned in early 1885 when political turmoil after the death of King Namhadi led to the destruction of the station and the killing of two missionaries.¹⁸⁷ This was considered a tragedy also because “80,000 souls were abandoned to Lutherans”.¹⁸⁸ Even though “[r]elations between Catholics and Protestants were not hostile” in Angola, the more or less open competition between the Spiritans and the Lutherans remained a political factum well beyond 1915.¹⁸⁹ In 1891 also *German* Lutherans (Rhenish Mission) began to set up stations on both sides of the colonial border among the eight Ovambo groups.¹⁹⁰

The missionaries facilitated the contact with the colonial state greatly. After years of work they gained trust and exercised considerable influence over Ovambo societies. The missionaries’ descriptions of the struggles taking place in the region are an important complement to the administrative sources. At the same time, missionaries acted and reacted in their own

185 Peltola 2002: 46; AGCSSp 3L1.1.3, Doc. conc. les missions, App. IX: 14, Duparquet to Min of Colonies, 15.12.80; App. XII: 23, Decreto Apostolico, 3.7.79; Duparquet 1953.

186 AGCSSp 3L1.1.2, *Congregação Esp. Santo* 1901; Boucher 1933: 160; Osterhammel 2011: 1262; cf. Gray 2012: 153f. on colonialism-mission relation; Prudhomme 2004: 67f.

187 Osterhammel 2011: 1266; AGCSSp 3L1.11a1, Keiling: Compte-Rendu, 29.6.10; cf. Hayes 1993: 96; Wallace 2012: 93; Oermann 1999: 220f.; Santos 1993; Koren 1982.

188 AGCSSp 3L1.7b5, Lecomte (Humbe) to Grizard, 1.4.85; Gibson in Estermann 1976: X.

189 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Propag. Fide, 9.9.14; 9.9.16; Birmingham 1998: 348.

190 Cf. Wulforth 1904; Ovambo territory was politically divided into eight Kingdoms: Ondonga (South), Uukwanyama (north), Uukwambi (center), Ongandjera, Ombalantu, Uukwaluudhi, Uukolongadhi/Eunda, Ondombondola (west); each forming distinct language groups.

right, just as the Africans and their authorities whom they wanted to convert to Christianity. The missionary correspondence also illustrates how their work was interwoven with the violent establishment of the colonial state penetrating the region from the west. But most of all the military and missionary history of *além-Cunene* attests to the dominance of African actors.

When the Kwanyama expelled the Spiritans after the death of King Namhadi in 1885, Portugal's colonial administration was not in a position to intervene. For the next thirty years, the Kwanyama, the most populous of the Ovambo kingdoms would be considered among the most persistent challengers of Portuguese domination. Already in 1893 – after Artur de Paiva had attempted to occupy the area between the Kunene and Okavango Rivers – it was known in Lisbon that the people of Ovamboland were not only pastoralists but also well-armed. The Kwanyama were singled-out as “bellicose people”, possessing a regular cavalry. The guns they used, no doubt was allowed, originated from “foreign merchants” from south of the Kunene River. German administrators, on the other hand, “pressure[d]” the Portuguese “to intensify their supervision of the arms trade”.¹⁹¹ This was achieved only to a limited extend. When in 1896 the Portuguese asked King Weyulu for permission to erect a fort in Kwanyama to tighten control and prevent “a German invasion,” he refused. Given the raids of the Kwanyama against their neighbors, “lack of security” remained most of all a threat to missionaries. The Spiritan station among Kwanyama, (re-)established by Père Lecomte in 1900,¹⁹² had to be evacuated in early 1904 after missionary D. Duarte was killed. The Spiritans counted on a Portuguese expedition before the station could be reopened, but to no avail. Lecomte warned Nande (the future King) that his raids against neighbors must end or the government would turn against him.¹⁹³ However, the Kwanyama incursions northwards into the Caconda district did not abate. Over the following years, killed soldiers, sacked villages, stolen cattle (and at times kidnapped missionaries) proved the impotence of the Portuguese army.¹⁹⁴ The latter barely found the time to recover

191 AGCSSp 3L1.1.1, *SGL* 1893: 36; *Rizzo* 2012: 41; cf. *Reclus* 1887: 416; *Siiskonen* 1990: 156f.

192 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Cardinal, 9.9.16; *Piolet* 1902 506; *MPLA* 1975: 146.

193 AGCSSp 3L1.16a6, Lecomte: A travers la Haute-Cimbébasie, *Missions Cath.* (1899): 583.

194 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Blanc (Caconda) to Faugere, 6.2.; 8.4.; 24.12.04.; 10.6.05; 29.5.06.

from “the great colonial war” crushing the kingdom of Bailundo (1902–03), which had ravaged the central district of Benguela.¹⁹⁵

Despite the ongoing raids in Ovamboland, the Governor General “insisted” on the founding of a new station, hoping for the ‘civilizing power’ of Christianity. It was established by Lecomte in July 1904 while a military expedition to end Kwanyama raids was being prepared. Lecomte found himself “perfectly received” by the Kwanyama and everything seemed “calm”. The Kwanyama “counted on the missionaries to solve the matter amiably” and prevent the Portuguese from unleashing their war machine.¹⁹⁶ Germany’s minister in Lisbon, Tattenbach, assumed that the Alsatian missionaries were “used” by the Portuguese “against our penetration towards the Kunene River.” Given the raids, for the Portuguese administration it seemed clear that the Kwanyama needed to be “pacified”.¹⁹⁷

The Kwanyama kingdom was located 100 kilometers to the east of the Kunene River. A number of other “tribal areas” had to be traversed before it could be reached. Finally, in September 1904, a Portuguese army of over 1,000 men led by Captain João de Aguiar took off to occupy the region. The attempt was ill-fated. While trying to cross the Kunene River at Pembe Drift south of Humbe, the Cuamato (Ombandja) attacked Aguiar. The ensuing battle of September 25 resulted in the Cuamato’s “great victory”. More than 300 Portuguese were killed. This “catastrophe” created a “state of overexcitement” and spared the Kwanyama a military confrontation with Aguiar.¹⁹⁸ It not only became the starting point for a Portuguese “Ovambo complex” and a long campaign in southern Angola that contributed to the further deterioration of Portugal’s public finances.¹⁹⁹ The “disaster of Pembe” also aligns with a “series of financial, colonial, and

195 *Birmingham* 1988: 100; PA Luanda 4 (Politisches) Otto Peters to Consul Luanda, 20.6.02.

196 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4; 11b3, Lecomte (Kwanyama) to TRP, 12.7.04; 20.8.04; 6.9.04; 24.10.04.

197 BAB R 1001/6912: 90, German Minister Lisbon to RK v. Bülow, 9.9.04.

198 AGCSSp 3L1.12a9, Superieur J.M. Antunes (Huila) to Cardinal Prefet Gotti, 6.1.05. ‘Cuamato’ is a corrupted Portuguese version of ‘Kwamatwi’ (meaning ‘those who have ears’, ‘those who have accurate information about the enemy movements’ or ‘those who are alertful’). The reference to the people of Mbadja as ‘ova-Kwamatwi’ was made first by Kwanyama during their cattle raids against them prior to the arrival of the Portuguese. I am grateful to Phil ya Nangoloh for this explanation; cf. *Lecomte* 1902.

199 *Pélissier* 1969: 73f.; 2004: 210f.; *Southern* 2007: 4f.; *Siis*. 1994: 78; *Medeiros*, 1977: 69.

political disasters” since the 1890s, culminating in the assassination of King Carlos I. in 1908.²⁰⁰

Still in fairly recent literature it is claimed that the African victory at Pembe Drift, a “second Adua”, was possible only because “Kwanyama” (meaning Cuamato) had “received support [in “wip(ing) out a large Portuguese force”] from Germans in South West Africa who hoped to seize southern Angola from the Portuguese.”²⁰¹ Whereas these “hopes” – as we have seen – were a historic reality, no such “support” can be discerned from the sources. On the contrary, there had been talks of joint efforts of Portuguese and German troops against the African “robbers”.²⁰² The Portuguese hoped for German support that would result at the same time in Berlin’s recognition of Portuguese sovereignty over southern Angola, thus “paralyzing” the execution of the Anglo-German accord of 1898.²⁰³ While Portugal had lost an important part of its colonial army at Pembe, a German colonial army of 6,000 men was being built up against the Herero. The Portuguese government had originally aimed at having an equally strong force available in case of any eventuality. If Herero had escaped to Angola and the German troops pursued them, the lacking Portuguese “effective occupation” should not be an excuse for any potential German occupation of southern Angola. Instead, Portugal wished once more to show permanent presence in the entire area to prove its sovereignty.²⁰⁴

However, both plans came to nothing: the campaign against the “revolting” Cuamato and Kwanyama failed before the negotiations with the Germans on joint military operations could be concluded. The French minister in Lisbon de Cernay compared the colonial military efforts of the Portuguese and the Germans in the area directly. He concluded from the German “victory” at Waterberg (August 1904) against the Ovaherero and the Portuguese defeat at Pembe Drift that the “roles are [now] inverted”. The Portuguese had pointed to the German colonial “inexperience” and their own *grande habitude des affaires coloniales*, but then saw themselves humiliated by Africans. The defeat made it evident that they could not withstand any German attempt to occupy southern Angola; a fear – “irrational” as it may have been – that reigned in the Ministries of War and Colonies

200 Vincent-S. 1974: 621; cf. Wheeler 1972: 173f.; 188; Regalado 2004: 15; Wallace 2012: 98.

201 Roberts 1986: 521; Pélissier 1977: 451f.; 2004: 207f. on Pembe Drift, ‘un second Adowa’

202 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Blanc (Caconda) to Faugère, 24.10.; 9.8.04; Lecomte to Pascal, 5.5.04.

203 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 222d, FML to MAE, 18.5; 11.6.04.

204 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 225b, FML to MAE, 6.9.04; cf. Pool 1979.

in Lisbon in late 1904.²⁰⁵ Within the Portuguese administration the French military attaché observed a general *méfiance* (distrust) vis-à-vis the Germans.²⁰⁶

Despite the setback in 1904, the Portuguese pushed eastwards. But only in late 1906 did expeditions along the Kunene become more successful. The British, well informed as ever, had even discussed the question with the Portuguese government as to whether or not to send a military attaché to accompany the Portuguese troops against the Kwanyama. However, the Portuguese did not plan for one particular “punitive expedition”, but, as the Foreign Minister explained, “[t]he plan of action will be a gradual occupation of the Cuanhama country”.²⁰⁷ Seeing an existential threat coming closer, the Kwanyama under King Nande (reigned 1904–1911) tried to come to terms with the Portuguese; the raids abated.²⁰⁸ Finally, in October 1907 Major José A. Alves Roçadas (1865–1926) succeeded in defeating the Cuamato, “immortalizing himself” in the annals of official Portuguese historiography.²⁰⁹ After this “magnificent revanche” Father Lecomte hoped fervently that Roçadas would continue his expedition to the Kwanyama (where Lecomte was waiting in the mission station for two months); since “without European occupation” nothing “solid” could be achieved in “this turbulent country”. He assumed that King Nande would declare his submission to the Portuguese. But no submission took place; “native treaties” no longer played a role. Much to the disappointment of the missionary, the Portuguese army (being bound in a campaign in Guinea-Bissau throughout 1908) did not reach out to the Kwanyama. However, he hoped that once the Germans would advance from the south, the Portuguese would be forced to occupy the region “beforehand” (*avant*).²¹⁰

The Germans, on the other hand, observing closely the situation near their colonial border, came to a different conclusion. When the Portuguese already spoke of the “urgent necessity to garrison the [southern most end of the] Kavango” River,²¹¹ German officials had not even been to Ovamboland. There was no overall structure of colonial control. German offi-

205 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 225c, FML to MAE, 11.10.04; *Pélissier* 2004: 211.

206 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portug: 227a, Lt.Col. Cornulier to Min. de la Guerre, 20.11.04.

207 TNA FO 367/17: 224, War O. to FO, 16.2.06; 258, BML to FO, 19.9.06; cf. *Costa* 1906.

208 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Blanc (Caconda) to Faugere, 4.11.; 14.11.06 (excerpts).

209 *GEPB* 1936, vol 2, Art. ‘Angola’: 663; cf. *Roçadas* 1910; 1908a,b,c; *Regalado* 2004: 66f.

210 AGCSSp 3L1.11b4, Lecomte to TRP, 15.9.07; 17.10.07; 24.11.07; *Koskenniemi* 2001: 141.

211 AGCSSp 3L1.1.1, *SGL* Missões de Angola, 1893: 37 M. de Albuquerque was present.

cials never exercised formal jurisdiction over Ovambo polities. The region was considered unfit for white settlement, too distant from any German harbor or railway head, and the Ovambo neither posed a threat to German rule in Hereroland nor did they raid GSWA. Not until 1899 the district chief of Outjo, Lieutenant Victor Franke (1866–1936) visited as the first German officer the kingdom of Ondonga. He was received by King Kambonde and discussed the illicit trade in weapons from Angola to Hereroland, the securing of the border to Angola, and the sending of migrant workers to work on German farms and railway sites. But Franke did not obtain any “treaty of friendship” or the permission to set up a German fort.

When in June 1901 German soldiers approached the Portuguese border and crossed into Angola to visit the Lutheran mission station N’giva in the Kwanayama area, this caused uproar in the colony and metropolis. Father Lecomte, who was visiting a nearby Catholic station, faced the Germans and asked them what they were looking for in Portuguese territory. The German Captain Kliefoth (1862–1905) responded that part of Kwanyama belonged to GSWA, but Lecomte emphasized that N’giva was north of the border. Despite their intention to travel up to the Portuguese Fort Humbe, Kliefoth withdrew southwards. Lecomte credited himself with having won a victory over the Germans for Portugal and the Catholic mission – “much to the satisfaction of the natives”.²¹² Following this German border violation, the Portuguese press made the affair internationally known, accusing the Germans of having “dark intentions”. The French consul in Lisbon saw the German attempt to penetrate into the Humbe area in connection with the exploration of the railway track from Porto Alexandre. Also France’s ambassador in Berlin diagnosed German attempts to extend their *sphère d’action* northwards into an area that they hoped would one day become German. Germany’s semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, however, denied any hidden agenda and refused to see any border violation.²¹³ In 1903 attacks on “German colonists” in the Okavango border area did not result in a major campaign. And also later on German pol-

212 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Lecomte (Huila) to Rooney, 17.7.01; cf. Zollmann 2010a: 98; Alexandrowicz 1973 on ‘treaties’ with Africans

213 Peltola 2002: 162; MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 183m, FML to MAE, 29.9.01; 183p, Emb. Berlin to MAE, 9.11.01; Stals 1972: 19f.; Siisk. 1990: 174; Rizzo 2012: 63.

icy towards the region was characterized by hesitation. From 1899 to 1908 merely seven “peaceful expeditions” were sent to Ovamboland.²¹⁴

The colonial state in the making often consisted of not more than a loose network of forts. Following the victories of Major Roçadas in 1906/7 and his successor as Huíla district governor, Major João de Almeida, a string of forts was set up in the new military district east of the Kunene River, commencing with Fort Roçadas (October 1906),²¹⁵ the “base for any future operation on the left bank”. The appalling conditions in these make-shift strongholds can be sensed from the following report about this fort that

“has a commanding position on a high chalk cliff overhanging the [Kunene] river. Until recently it has been the frontier fort; as such it has witnessed many hard-fought engagements between the Portuguese and the warlike Ovambo tribes ... The vicinity of the fort is extremely unhealthy – a condition largely due to the utter neglect of the most elementary sanitary precautions. That no improvement in these matters had yet been effected was proven by the presence of the decomposing body of an ox and other organic refuse within a short distance of the walls of the fort. The mortality among white troops stationed there has been so great that it will in future be occupied only by native soldiers.”

Hardship was worse for the African population during the “campaigns” even in those regions already ‘pacified’ as was witnessed by the botanist Pearson, who visited Fort Roçadas in May 1909, when “operations” were “in progress”. On his way from Humpata he noticed “few natives”

“... along the transport roads. Their absence from the vicinity of the road is no doubt due, in some part, to the demand made upon them for food and other commodities by an impoverished and disorderly soldiery on their way to the front, and to the dislike for compulsory service as labourers or carriers, which is still enforced very much as it was in 1854, when it was described in the Golungo Alto District by Livingstone.”²¹⁶

214 TNA FO 179/390, Report by Mr. A. Peel on Portug. Africa, 11.1.04; *Shiremo* 2011; BAB R 1001/2183: 69 (77), KGW to RKA, 21.11.08 ‘friedliche Expeditionen in das Ovamboland’.

215 *Regalado* 2004: 21 Ft. Roçadas, Ft. Aucongo, Ft. Damaquero, Ft. Dom Luis de Braganca, Ft. Nalu[sh]eque [Eduardo Marques], Ft. Henrique Couceiro; cf. *Singelmann* 1911; *Hennig* 1920: 114.


216 *Pearson* 1910: 509; TNA FO 367/17: 252;268, BML, 3.9.; 12.12.06; *Pélissier* 1977: 473.



Ill. 2 *“Forts im Ovambolande”*, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911



Ill. 3 *Construction of a Portuguese fort*, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911



Ill. 4 “Forts im Ovambolande”, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911



Ill. 5 “Forts im Ovambolande”, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911

Beginning in mid-1909 a 500 men-strong expedition led by João de Almeida resulted in the military occupation of the northern bank of the Okavango River. “Within a mere two months a series of [five] military posts was being established in the territory of each of the five Kavango tribes, each in the immediate vicinity of the respective *Hompa*’s [Chief] residence”, the most important of which was Fort Cuangar near the villages of the Kwangali ruler Himarua. Almeida knew that the most formidable enemy was still to surmount: the “independent” Kwanyama kingdom. He thus not only augmented the forts in the south from 13 to over 20, but he also encircled Oukwanyama territory from three sides. The Portuguese invested heavily in materials and manpower. Still, it has been estimated that by 1910 no more than a tenth of Angola as it is defined today was under Portuguese control.²¹⁷ Southern Angola’s border region stood out, however. While the “myth of the ‘thin white line’” in colonial Africa was cultivated by contemporaries arguing the “sparseness of an official European presence across colonial territories” demonstrated “the consent of colonial subjects”, after 1910 there were no “lone District Officers” in southern Angola.²¹⁸

A territory of around 30.000 square miles was guarded by over 20 forts being staffed with several hundred men. In 1911, this made it one of the most densely developed networks of military facilities in colonial Africa (irrespective of the question what earth walls could protect in the age of modern artillery). Interestingly, the German traveler Carl Singelmann was not only given access to these forts in 1911, but he was also permitted to take pictures of the military installations and the extension works. In the absence of a “natural frontier” between the Kunene and the Okavango Rivers a double if not triple line of fortresses protected the Huila Plateau in order to come closer to the vision of a bounded and unified colony. The ancient dilemma of (colonial) rule – that it became weaker the more distant it was from the ruler – was to be brought to an ‘end’: colonial rule should be omnipresent in the territory. Evidently, the immense expenses incurred to this end were not exclusively explained by Portugal’s respect for the unconquered Kwanyama. It was most of all a military form of what historian Fritz Stern called “preemptive imperialism: expand in order to

217 Eckl 2004: 189; 2004a: 77; Clarence-S./M. 1975: 375; Almeida 1912; Sousa [⁻¹⁹³⁵]: 8.

218 Shipway 2008: 26 ‘at the heart of the myth is the lone district officer’ in his remote station.

forestall others.”²¹⁹ Spiritan missionary Louis Keiling assumed that the Portuguese would stay in the south “in order to stop the German advance – otherwise we would lose the current Kwanyama mission”²²⁰

However, the Portuguese still overestimated their colonial neighbor. The Germans remained cautious when it came to including Ovamboland and its neighboring regions into GSWA. The experience of the Portuguese troops at Pembe Drift in 1904 taught the Germans the lesson not to provoke any of the Kings and to refrain from military conflict. Nevertheless, rumors about German intentions abounded. In May 1904, after Ondonga King Nehale Mpingana (1884–1908) had unsuccessfully attempted to raid the German Fort Namutoni, it was falsely claimed “that the Germans have occupied Ondonga”, south of Kwanyama.²²¹ The threat of the “loss” of Ovamboland by approaching Germans was yet again invoked by Catholic missionaries, Portuguese officials and newspapers.²²² However, the opposite seemed to be the intention of the authorities in GSWA. Some researchers go so far as to claim that Ovamboland “was left untouched by German Imperialism”.²²³ German administrators attempted to distance affairs in their colony from those in Ovamboland: Given the ongoing war in the south of GSWA, in a decree of January 25, 1906 Governor Friedrich von Lindequist (1862–1945) banned all trade in alcohol, weapons and other war materials with “Ovamboland” (as defined by the German administration) *and* the entry into the region for any “non-resident” (meaning European). The administration wanted to avoid conflicts between Africans and Germans over trading goods or land possession, as it had happened in Hereroland. In 1907, police protection had been confined to the central and southern parts of GSWA within the reach of railway lines and main roads. Within the “police zone”, where most Africans were dispossessed and farmland was allotted to settlers after 1907, “whites were left ‘mas-

219 *Stern* 1979: 400; *Baericke* 1981: 23 Portuguese forts ‘did not have the least military value’; cf. *Freiburger Zeitung*, No. 59, 29.2.1912: 1 (Abendausgabe) report on a talk in Freiburg given by ‘Consul Carl Singelmann, Braunschweig’ about German interests in the Portuguese empire, where he presented his pictures. ‘Besonders interessant waren auch die Vorführungen der Forts, die die Portugiesen in Angola gegen die wilden Stämme der Ovambo errichtet haben.’; cf. *Singelmann* 1911; Singelmann in: *DKZ* 28 (1911): 709; Singelmann in *Borchardt* 1912: 5f.

220 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Keiling (Caconda) to TRP, 10.10.08. (excerpts); cf. *Hennig* 1920: 114.

221 *Großer Generalstab* 1908; *Wallace* 2012: 99-102; AGCSSp 3L1.11b3, Lecomte (Catoco-Cubango) to TRP, 25.5.04; cf. BAB R 1001/6912: 89, DGL to v. Bülow, 9.9.04.

222 AGCSSp 3L1.11b4, Keiling (Caconda) to TRP, 10.11.08; cf. *Diário de Notícias* 20.1.10.

223 *Gewald* 2003a: 300; however, migrant labor ‘touched’ Ovamboland cf. *McKittrick* 2002.

ters”.²²⁴ The officers of the police stations along this internal borderline (Okaukwejo, Namutoni, and Tsumeb) had to control the prohibition of access to Ovamboland. In March 1914, the parliament in Berlin passed a resolution demanding to exclude future “white settlement in Ovamboland”.²²⁵ The “ambivalence of colonial policies”, marked by the “racist fantasies of omnipotence” but also by the demands of “modern bureaucratic rule” including calls for restraint and criticism of colonialism, manifests itself in the policies of creating a new spatial order by this geographic division.²²⁶

Being well aware of the military planning in Angola, GSWA’s Deputy Governor Oskar Hintrager warned against any military action in Ovamboland. In 1910, he knew the Portuguese were organizing an expedition against the Kwanyama and was concerned that “Chief Nande, who is well aware of his affiliation to two states, [will] use this state of affairs to his advantage in that he moves his *Werft* to our area and from here sends his own people against the Portuguese.” This would have led to unpleasant complications and could have forced Germany to take action, resulting in possibly warlike action. “However, this must be avoided at all costs up on the border.”²²⁷ In Portugal, in the meantime, political factions were arguing about the “necessity” to militarily occupy Kwanyama territory. *Diário de Notícias* considered this a task “not to be delayed”, while others pointed to the exorbitant costs incurred hitherto in Angola. As Africans elsewhere in contested colonial borderlands, Ovambo and Nkhumbi retained the possibility of playing the colonial powers off against each other to secure better terms. The Kwanyama were visited by rival groups of Portuguese and German officials, who used “all kinds of blandishments to entice labor into their economies.”²²⁸

While for Germans the conquest and taxation of Ovamboland were out of the question, they attempted to win influence ‘diplomatically’ by using missionary channels. The Portuguese victories over the Cuamato in 1907 and the Evale in 1912 made other kings more responsive to German offers. Much to the chagrin of the Portuguese, in June 1908 Captain Franke

224 Miescher 2012: 44-51; Bley 1996: xix; cf. Dobler 2014: 19; Werner 1993: 140.

225 *Der Südwestbote*, 11. Jg. No. 36, 25.3.14: 1 (Telegramme).

226 Bley 1996 Introduction: 6; cf. Miescher 2012: 54f.

227 BAB R 1001/1785: 9f, KGW to RKA, 14.5.10, in: Jureit 2012: 107f.; cf. Rizzo 2012: 98.

228 Clarence-S./M. 1975: 379; Dederling 2006: 276 on the ability to ‘negotiate hegemony’; BAB R 1001/2183: 270, DGL to Bethmann-H., 28.1.10 quot. *Diário de Notícias* 20.1.10.

traveled for the second time to Ondonga. He convinced, in cooperation with Finnish and German missionaries, King Kambonde (~1865–1909, reigned 1884–1909) and Uukuambi King Iipumbu ya Tshilongo, (~1873–1959, 1907–1932) to “sign” “treaties of protection”. They had indeed requested protection – from the Portuguese. (At the occasion, a picture was taken of Franke that would later lead to much discussion.) In a proto-colonial tradition Kambonde and Iipumbu understood Franke’s treaties to be concluded among equals that would not imply renunciation of their sovereignty in Ovamboland. Franke, however, interpreted the documents as a declaration of submission to the German Emperor and thus to the German colonial administration. When Franke moved on to Kwanyama territory, the Spiritan Father Génie informed a Portuguese officer, so he could counter the German influence by meeting the *soba* (King Nande) and Franke.²²⁹ In 1909 Captain Kurt Streitwolf (1871–1954), the future “native commissioner” of GSWA, entered Ovamboland to convince the chiefs to send more workers south, but a German station was never erected in Ovamboland. Merely, in 1909 surveyor Görgens was allowed to work in Ondonga to clarify on which colonial territory the Ovambo kingdoms were located. Attempts to create a Luso-German border commission failed for reasons described above. Finally, given the number of Portuguese forts, the Germans decided to have at least one police station on the border. A small post was erected in Kuring Kuru, east of Ovamboland at the Okavango River opposite Fort Cuangar. However, “[c]ontrary to the Portuguese forts, the establishment of [this] police station ... in 1910 was a mere symbolic gesture which entailed no practical political consequences.” Much to the regret of traders, the German administration also attempted in the Okavango region to ensure “that no ammunition and alcohol” would be delivered to Africans.²³⁰

The Portuguese were inclined to make 1914 the decisive year and to finally subdue the Kwanyama. The end of fighting in the area after the occupation of Cuamato (1907) and Evale (1912) was ceasefire at best. The Portuguese profited from this greatly.

229 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Blanc (Caconda) to TRP, 8.8.08; cf. Baericke 1981: 22.

230 Eirola 1992: 237f.; Peltola 2002: 183f.; Keene 2012: 490; Eckl 2004: 209; 2004a: 202-212; BAB R 1001/2193: 176 BA G’fontein to KGW, 23.10.12 on control of route to Okavango.



Ill. 6 Railway construction in southern Angola, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911

Not only could the military resources be refilled; but most of all, the railway tracks from Moçâmedes were extended beyond the desert and the escarpment. The new King of Kwanyama, Mandume, on the other hand, did not have these means available. Not only did he see the geographical barrier shrinking between him and Portugal's harbor; in addition, since 1911 his people had had to endure drought and famine.

1.3.4 Famine, Labor, and Taxation in Southern Angola

For the people of southern Angola the military onslaughts of the Portuguese were matched by ecological disaster. The *rinderpest*, having devastated the herds of southern Africa since 1896, reached Ovamboland in 1897 and

“possibly destroy[ed] over ninety per cent of the herds in southern, central and eastern parts of [Angola] by 1899. The effects of rinderpest were aggra-

vated in 1898 by locust invasions”, followed by a “major epidemic of small-pox. It apparently began in Bié in 1901, and was spread to all parts of Angola by Ovimbundu porters. ... the 1900s and 1910s were marked by an almost uninterrupted sequence of drought, flood and locust plague. The worst effects were experienced in the south ...”.²³¹

By 1905 all Ovambo polities were considerably weakened by these disasters. The Portuguese offensive 1905-07 to avenge the defeat of 1904 could hardly be resisted. With their “chain of forts” close to the Kunene River the colonial administration hoped to “put an end to raiding” activities of the Ovambo and Nkhumbi who had repeatedly attacked the Ngangela and Ovimbundu further north “to recoup their losses.” In 1908, famine broke out. It led to the shipment of tons of grain by the German and Portuguese governments to convince more Ovambo to work in their economies. Following the visit of Major Franke, the Germans were particularly successful in this. The tendency of young men to seek work elsewhere was increased by the continuing drought. In 1909 missionaries reported yet another famine among the Kwanyama up to Caconda.²³² As the deadly cycle of floods, droughts, and locusts continued, Germans sent more supplies. Hunting was no longer an option, “large game [had] almost disappeared”.²³³ In “1911 people were again dying of hunger”. Levels of violence increased; families broke up, the resulting tragedies are still being remembered in recent Namibian memoirs; “women were abandoning their children”. In late 1914 the rains failed for the third year in succession. People left their homesteads for good in search of food and work elsewhere.²³⁴

231 Dias 1981: 374; cf. Echenberg 2001: 41; Mack 1970: 210f.

232 Clarence-Smith/Moorsom 1975: 375; AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Blanc (Caconda) to TRP, 10.3.09.

233 Pearson 1910: 509; cf. AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cuanhama) to TRP, 29.10.11; 22.11.11.

234 Gewald 2003: 217; Ndeikwila 2014: 1f. ‘My father was born in 1911 at Oshihenye village near Outapi [Ombalantu district] during the year known in my village as the *Year of the Aangandjera Famine*. ... some Aambalantu and Aangandjera warriors went to raid cattle from Ehinga [Naulila] village in Ombandja ... and came back with a large herd of cattle. ... [However], the Aambalantu warriors conspired among themselves and savagely turned against the unsuspecting Aangandjera warriors. Scores of Aangandjera were killed ... [t]he Aambalantu took the whole herd of cattle for themselves. ... As a result of that famine there were only a few people of my father’s age who survived.’; cf. McKittrick 2002: 160f; Iliffe 2007: 215 on African rain patterns 1850–1920.

Lack of a viable labor force was considered “a grave problem ... for Angola as a whole.”²³⁵ In areas where they had been introduced, the forced labor system as well as the tax system of Angola was considered not only by German visitors as extremely tough. British humanitarians severely criticized Portuguese labor policies. In light of H. Nevinson’s book “A Modern Slavery”, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey personally inserted into a letter to the Legation in Lisbon that “with regard to the methods of recruiting in Angola, the effect on public opinion would be very prejudicial”. A few days before he had received information from Luanda that the “condition may be described as worse than stated by H.W. Nevinson.”²³⁶ Some historians have called this critique a concerted “Anglo-German campaign ... to prepare public opinion for the imminent partition of the Portuguese Empire.” However, American missionaries were equally appalled by the heavy taxation and forced labor.²³⁷ Modern research has summarized “the principles of the old days” on São Tomé Island as having “consisted in working to death as many Africans as possible, whilst paying them the strict minimum, or nothing at all.”²³⁸ Whereas these “accusations tended to rally Portuguese political groups around ideas of national honor”, even opposition members “denounced the government [in parliament] ... for being too harsh in charging the ‘hut tax’ in Angola, which had led to a recent wave of revolt.”²³⁹ The *dizimo* (tithe tax) had been levied since the eighteenth century in the northern *presídios* of Angola; its oppressive effects were well known. Forced labor for public works was decreed in 1899 for the entire Empire as a substitute for slavery. The law was based on the “deeply ingrained feeling that Africans were lazy and would not work without compulsion”.²⁴⁰

While the “direct taxation of Africans was completely abolished between 1896 and 1907”²⁴¹, the enormous costs of “effective” occupation, military campaigns, and the building of railways had to be incurred. Therefore, the hut tax (*imposto da palhota*) was introduced in remoter parts of Angola in 1907. In colonial Africa taxes were seen as “a ‘sacra-

235 Whittlesey 1924: 119; cf. Cadbury 1910.

236 TNA FO 367/18: 292, Cadbury to Grey, 10.12.06; 296, FO to BML, 29.12.06; cf. Birmi. 2011: 147; Miers 2003: 49 on São Tomé; Bontinck 1969: 116; Duffy 1967; Higgs 2012.

237 Dáskalos 2008: 182; NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 18.10.19: 6.

238 Pélissier 2000: 581.

239 Wheeler 1978: 97; Meneses 1998: 88 (Tamagnini Barb., 6.6.17); cf. Dáskalos 2008: 69.

240 Smith 1991: 505; cf. Pitcher 1991: 56f.; Almeida-Topor 2010: 44; Corrado 2008: 10.

241 Clarence-Smith 1979a: 174 referring to GG Paiva Couceiro; cf. Dáskalos 2008: 34; 37; 46.

ment of submission” that served at the same time as “an ‘educational’ measure” to drive Africans into the cash economy.²⁴² In Angola, thousands were forced to seek work in the plantations, fisheries or infrastructural works.²⁴³ However, “it was not till the republican revolution of 1910 that these measures were enforced systematically.” And the republic’s “greatest proconsul, Norton de Matos,” faced with a dramatic decline in revenues after the collapse of rubber prices in 1913, continued to justify neo-slavery as a means of modernizing the infrastructure even though he aimed at a “completely free, market-driven labor regime”.²⁴⁴ In 1913, the “encouraging” picture the “Keynesian *avant la lettre*” drew of Portugal’s ongoing *oeuvre civilisatrice* was backed up by the tightening of the tax system. Speaking against German plans for a repartition of Africa (to the detriment of Portugal) that would only disturb his modernizing efforts, Norton de Matos assessed the colony’s occupation to be “effective”. To a French naval officer he predicted that the ongoing military campaigns would from now on be replaced by mere “police operations”.²⁴⁵ Soon facts would prove him wrong. “In colonial matters the republic was far from liberal”. In São Salvador near the Congo River, the tax collection caused an “uprising”. In December, Norton personally had to lead 300 men to quell the “revolt”.²⁴⁶ The British missionary Boskell was detained for “giving assistance to the natives”.²⁴⁷ Eager for more (financial) autonomy for his colony, Norton de Matos “became increasingly dictatorial”.²⁴⁸ Contemporaries accused him of having acted ruthlessly.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, the labor and tax systems invited for corruption and “minor officials were often accused of abuses”.²⁵⁰

Under the catchword “development” Norton de Matos further tightened the tax system in 1914: Africans were now pressed to pay their taxes in cattle to diminish their herds. Considering the high esteem of cattle among

242 Iliffe 2007: 203; cf. Almeida-Topor 2010: 38f.

243 Clarence-Smith/Moorsom 1975: 377; cf. Roberts 1986: 498; Heywood 1987: 357f.

244 In the late 19th century rubber had substituted revenues incurred through slave trade. Wild rubber accounted for 77% of Angola’s exports in 1910, Clarence-S. 1979a: 176; Heywood 1987: 357, 86% of exp. in 1903; Newitt 2007: 54; Alexandre 2005: 374; Dáskalos 2008: 67.

245 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 130, Lecoq to M. Marine, 2.9.13; Dáskalos 2008: 21; 55.

246 Birm. 2011: 157; MAELC CPC/NS/9, Portugal: 188, FML, 20.2.14; Norton 2001: 202.

247 NARA RG 59, MF 705, roll 28, 853m00 USC Boma to SoS, 11.3.14

248 Roberts 1986: 499; 521; cf. Newitt 2007: 53-5; Oliveira 1998: 561; Wheeler 1978a.

249 Clarence-Smith 1976: 221f; cf. 1979a: 168; Guimarães 1923: 21f.; Mendy 2003: 43.

250 Smith 1974: 659; cf. Capella 1977; Schaper 2012: 368 on the hut tax in Cameroon.

many people of Angola, this policy likely caused uproar.²⁵¹ Vying for a balanced budget and additional labor force, he hoped to force Africans into the colonial economy. With the end of the caravan trade, people of the central districts were expected to make a living of either commercial agriculture (corn) or to seek work in the plantations. Those living in the south were to be employed on plantations, at fisheries, or public works.²⁵² However, the development of Angola's colonial economy remained rudimentary. The social changes it caused were, on the other hand, tragic for many of the people affected.

1.4 New Friends? – Luso-German Trade and the Study Commission

When King Dom Carlos I was assassinated in February 1908, the German Parliament expressed its condolences to a “befriended nation”. The revolution of October 5, 1910 led to the downfall of the Bragança-Coburgs, a “caricature of a parliamentary monarchy à l’anglaise”.²⁵³ However, the new republican regime, short of “any foundational consensus” and bringing together an “explosive combination of factors: weak governments, commitment to economic and social reform, planning misconceptions”, was unable to alleviate Portugal’s political and social challenges (illiteracy stood at ~80 per cent). Assumptions fed by positivism and/or partly socialist thought “that progress would feed itself” and related hopes for an “era of peace, of prosperity and of justice” that would halt the “decline” of the “first world power” were soon disappointed. Among the Portuguese elites the old sense of “national failure” became widespread once more.²⁵⁴

In German political circles and the press the Portuguese republic made no favorable impression. Republican leaders complained about the German “chill” towards the republic and the *complaisances pour les émigrés portugais*; even German support for royalist plots was assumed. The German government was hesitant to receive a new Portuguese minister after the revolution, as it had not yet recognized the republican government.

251 BAB R 1001/6640: 97, Dr. Vageler, excerpt: ‘Die Bahnfrage auf dem Planalto’, 15.7.19; Norton 2001: 184; Medeiros 1977: 74; Dias 1976: 263.

252 Péclard 1999: 123f.; Birmingham 1978: 536; Pössinger 1973: 31f.; Dias 1981: 370.

253 SBRT 12. L.P. 93.Sess., 3.2.08: 2835; Labourdette 2000: 529; Wheeler 1978: 44; Livermore 1967: 319.

254 Madur. 2010: 648; 657; Vincent-S. 1974: 621; Wheeler 1972: 173; 194; Arenas 2003: 4; 12.

This policy cost the government in Berlin the last sympathies of Prime Minister Bernardino Machado (1851–1944).²⁵⁵ Furthermore, it was known in Lisbon that the Deputy, Pan-German, and former Governor of German East Africa, General Eduard von Liebert, had called the Portuguese the “savages of Europe” incapable of colonizing and bound to cede their corrupted colonies to the Germans. Implicitly, he thereby alluded to the Portuguese’s somewhat awkward standing, described by later generations as being “simultaneously semi colonizers and semi colonized (this can be said in relation to Brazil but also to England).”²⁵⁶

The Luso-German relations regarding the colonies were characterized on the Portuguese side by mistrust of German territorial pretensions, and on the German side by disdain for the Portuguese (colonial) administration, considered to be inefficient and corrupt.²⁵⁷ German colonial officials carefully considered almost every policy change or legal reform in the British or French colonies. They were willing to “learn” from the more experienced colonizers, but for them Portugal was not among those – stereotyping was rampant. German visitors to Angola complained that Angola still “belongs to the dark continent thanks to the 300-year-*Unkultur* of the Portuguese.” The first republican minister in Berlin, Sidónio Pais (1872–1918) worked hard not only to counter the Anglo-German rapprochement about Angola, but also to create a more favorable impression of the Portuguese colonial enterprise. In early 1913, Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow (1863–1935), when discussing the future of the Portuguese colonies with Pais, flatly denied the existence of any agreement with Great Britain.²⁵⁸

255 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 27.3.11; cf. *Wheeler* 1978: 64; 71.

256 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 7.2.12; *Arenas* 2003: xxi; 17; Portuguese ministers emphasized that Liebert did not speak as an official. He ‘represented an officer type hitherto unknown in traditional Prussian army circles – the general as popular orator and political functionary, who was wooed by political groups because of his high social prestige, and who impressed mass meetings with frowning remarks about civilian failure in the foreign office even more than by hollow patriotic pathos. At bottom he knew nothing about politics.’ *Ritter* 1970: 109; cf. *Blackbourn* 1998: 431; *Martin-M.* 2008: 8 on Spain.

257 Cf. *Silva* 2006: 310; allegations of corruption were ‘common enough’; *Curto* 2005: 113; *Rodrigues* 2009: 37; *Marques* 2006: 198; *Smith* 1991: 510; 1974: 658f.; *Dias* 1976: 253; 258; *Clarence-S.* 1976: 216; 222; *Osterhammel* 2003: 70 ‘the Belgians had the best reputation in Africa, and the often inept and corrupt Portuguese administrators had the worst’.

258 *Lindner* 2011: 55 on the ‘Topos des Lernens’; NAN A.529 n.1: 3, O. Busch: Studienreise... nach Angola [~12/14]; *Samara* 2004: 52f.; 152; *Silva* 2006: 318; *Reiner* 1924: 333.

While the Monarchy's approach to Portugal's colonies was "strictly mercantilist" and Brazil had for centuries remained "Angola's traditional economic partner, customer, banker, shipper, and food-supplier", the republican government "preached a closer relationship" between the colony and Lisbon.²⁵⁹ Now it was up to the republicans to prove their more efficient colonial policy. Considering that Angola "lurched from one crisis to the next in a constant state near bankruptcy"²⁶⁰ and thus caused a drain on the public finances, the metropolitan government was eager to find means of investment to make the colony profitable. Prime Minister Afonso Costa, the "greatest of the republican leaders", considered a balanced budget to be the "cornerstone" on the republic's "path [to] international respectability".²⁶¹ His generation of politicians was characterized by "a new spirit of realism". They believed in "a more rational exploitation of the colonies in the interest of Portugal".²⁶² In light of the Anglo-German negotiations Lisbon aimed at "emphasizing the genuine unanimity of Portuguese feelings against the alienation under any guise whatever of any colonial territory".²⁶³

However, since the days of Sá de Bandeira's attempts at reforming the Empire, the implementation of new policies had been hampered by the "poor State finances, the backwardness of the country's economic infrastructure, and the constant political struggles".²⁶⁴ In 1879, Historian Joaquim de Oliveira Martins deplored: "The conquests [the colonies] are now tainted by the infamous brand of slavery and are a symbol of idleness, corruption and syphilis."²⁶⁵ The American consul, Robert S. Newton, when reporting about Angola's first railway construction site, spoke with disdain of "[t]he useless and extravagant manner in which money has been squandered".²⁶⁶ Given the "persistence of the plundering mentality" among Angola's colonial elite and considering that "Portuguese capital

259 Pitcher 1991: 56; 62; cf. Alexandre 2005: 364; Birmingham 2011: 146; 1982: 343.

260 Birmingham 1974: 196: 'profits...came less from colonial enterprise, than from commercial links with the markets of the surrounding kingdoms of the Bakongo, the Imbangala, the Lunda, the Chokwe, the Ovambo'; Corrado 2008: 27; cf. Dáskalos 2008: 131f.

261 Birmingham 2011: 153; Meneses 2010: 36, in 1913 Costa claimed a 'budget surplus of £117.000'.

262 Smith 1991: 499; Clarence-Smith 1979a: 167; 176; cf. Alexandre 2005: 366; 371f.

263 Vincent-Smith 1974: 624; cf. Corrado 2008: 120; Guevara 2006.

264 Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa 2006: 111; cf. Alexandre 2005: 366.

265 J. Oliveira Martins 1879, transl. in Corrado 2008: 116.

266 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 3, USC to SoS, 9.4.79; v. 4, USC to SoS, 15.11.88 45 km of the Luanda-Ambaca line were inaugurated on 31.10.88; Marques 2006: 220; Norton 2001: 176.

was notoriously reluctant to involve itself in [colonial] grassroots projects”,²⁶⁷ as already contemporaries remarked,²⁶⁸ foreign investment was now considered by many an instrument to improve the situation. This in turn would strengthen Portuguese sovereignty over its colonies. Portugal’s colonial trade increased considerably during the decade prior to the war. The base for the success was laid already in 1892 with a new protective tariff law privileging Portuguese exports to Africa and requiring all African exports to third countries to be re-exported via Portugal. From 1904 to 1913 Portugal imported goods valued at around 600,000,000 dollars from its colonies and exported merchandise valued at around 300,000,000 dollars to the colonies. This “enormous difference ... created a balance of trade in favor of Portugal” that surpassed all profits of previous decades.²⁶⁹

Despite disdain and mistrust between Germany and Portugal, commercial and political cooperation was possible. German exports to Portugal had more than doubled from 1898 to 1908, when a new treaty of commerce was signed. Germany was among the most important trading partners of Portugal, accounting for more than 35 per cent of its total exports (Germany’s exports to Portugal accounted for less than ½ per cent of its exports).²⁷⁰ When the Anglo-German negotiations on the Portuguese Empire recommenced, the Germans, with certain suddenness, also began to court the Portuguese. In January 1912 the German gunboat *Panther* visited Lisbon. It was the first foreign man-o-war to visit the republic and it was warmly greeted by several ministers. Foreign Minister Vasconcelos spoke of a Luso-German “flirt”. And when asked in the Senate about Portugal’s relations with Germany in light of the “colonial question”, he responded that they were “excellent”. A short while later, the gunboat *Eber* visited Luanda.²⁷¹ German officials were eager to secure railway and other concessions in southern Angola and thus sought closer connections with the Portuguese once they realized that this policy seemed the only way to enter the Angolan market. In August 1912, the American minister in Lisbon

267 *Corrado* 2008: 4; *Smith* 1991: 502; cf. *Marques* 2006: 195; *Alexandre* 2005: 372f.; *Smith* 1974: 656; *Roberts* 1986: 495 Portugal’s colonial trade was only 7-10 per cent of her foreign trade (1905-26).

268 TNA FO 179/390: 10, Peel: Report on Portugal and her colonial possessions, 11.1.04.

269 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 179: 631, USCG to SoS, 25.4.21: 5566; *Corrado* 2008: 40; *Wheeler* 1978: 29.

270 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/35, Portugal: 106; 80, French Embassy Berlin to MAE, 8.12.08.

271 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 7.2.12; *Manz* 2012: 199; 213.

assumed that the present government had no more friends (among foreign powers), with the “possible exception of Germany, which, under a show of friendship, is improving every opportunity of fishing in the troubled waters.”²⁷²

The results of the Luso-German “flirt” were soon to be felt in Africa. Germany had been represented in Angola already since the 1880s by (local) commercial agents. For years, the Portuguese businessman Eduardo Prazeres catered for German sailors or business interests in Luanda. In August 1907 the Vice-Governor of GSWA (1902–07), Hans Tecklenburg took over the German consulate in Luanda. Tecklenburg did not stay long and was relocated to Boma in Belgian Congo.²⁷³ Prazeres was reappointed. However, since not only the political but also Germany’s commercial interests in Angola grew, the post in Luanda was again elevated into a consulate in December 1913. For the first time it was headed by a career-diplomat. This was later interpreted as proof of Germany’s less-than-subtle *pénétration pacifique* to execute its annexation designs. Consul Dr. Ernst Eisenlohr (1882–1958) arrived from the German embassy in London. He reported to the legation in Lisbon under Friedrich Rosen (1856–1935), and oversaw Vice Consul Heym in Benguela and Vice Consul Georg Schöss in Moçâmedes, the agent of the *Deutsche Ostafrika Linie*.²⁷⁴

In January 1914, the *Deutsche Ost-Afrika Linie* inaugurated a direct connection from Europe to Lobito and Moçâmedes, but also from the ports in GSWA, Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund to Angola.²⁷⁵ In Lisbon, Friedrich Rosen worked hard to convince Afonso Costa to admit German investments in Angola. In a sort of “last-minute panic” the German government pressed German investors to get active in Angola to prove that Germany was willing to take responsibility for its “sphere of influence”. It is said this “diplomatic and financial offensive” was intended “to weaken Portugal’s hand in Africa”; but in a long-term perspective the investments made under the premises of an expansionist foreign policy favored Portu-

272 NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753.00/2, USML to SoS, 26.8.12.

273 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 5, German Consul Luanda to USCG Boma, 27.8.08. It can be assumed that the post (in charge of Angola, Belgian, French Kongo) was not a promotion for the hard-line administrator who oversaw the Governorate during the Herero-/Nama-War.

274 PA Luanda 1, betr. Einrichtung, AA to Eisenlohr, London, 10.11.13; AA to Consul Luanda, 13.12.13; Consul to AA, 23.12.13; 24.1.14; DGL to Consul, 3.7.14; *Cann* 2001: 147.

275 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 146, transl. *Tägliche Rundschau*, 12.11.13.

gal and Great Britain more than Germany.²⁷⁶ Until mid-1914, however, the German efforts to commercially penetrate Angola paid off:

“[A] German line of freight and passenger steamers made regular calls at Luanda, Lobito and other ports, and, owing largely to its assistance, German export firms at Hamburg and Bremen had built up an important trade in Angola. All the merchandise that would benefit by the 20 per cent reduction in customs duties if arriving in Portuguese vessels was transhipped, and other goods such as machinery, were sent direct in the German steamers. Another factor highly favorable to the German trade was the excellent system of local representation in the principal towns of Angola. At Luanda, for instance, ... there were no less than five representatives of German export houses ... Excessively liberal credits were allowed on all orders, but this system was proven to be a failure in 1912 when the rubber crisis caused financial difficulties throughout the Colony and some of the German firms, suffering severe losses, were forced to exercise more caution in granting credit. The German trade, however, still increased, and, during the year 1913, it is estimated that more than one-half of the nationalized imports [imports originating in foreign countries, then imported to metropolitan Portugal, duty paid thereon, and finally re-exported to Angola] were of German manufacture and probably at least 50 per cent of the foreign trade imports arriving in foreign vessels.” Germany was also “the greatest ultimate market for Angolan products.”²⁷⁷

Similar to Angola the Germans were involved in the commerce of Mozambique, which they “penetrated slowly, *sans éclat* but surely”.²⁷⁸ The success of German business in the Portuguese dominions was also said to be due to Portuguese language education offered by a number of German business schools.²⁷⁹ The opening up of the Angolan market was also supported by Germans in GSWA. In 1912 the businessman Heinrich Ziegler of Lüderitzbucht, who had traveled widely in Angola and was convinced of its potential for farmers and miners, set up the *Angola Bund* with public support. The British Consul to GSWA, Muller, wrote to his Foreign Secretary Grey that the “purpose” of the *Angola Bund* “is to awaken interest in GSWA for the annexation of Portuguese Angola.”²⁸⁰ Also the French noted with interest that Ziegler declared Angola to be a necessary “territorial complement” to GSWA most of all because of the future harbor in Baía dos Tigres. The *Bund* thus promoted the purchase of “unoccupied government land and making it available as farming areas to German,

276 MAELC 192 CPCOM/19, Portugal: 338, FML, 16.3.14; *Canis* 2011: 535; *Cann* 2001: 146.

277 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 610, USC Boma, Report on Trade of Angola, 9.9.15.

278 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 115, French Consul Lourenço Mar. to MAE, 16.5.13.

279 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 6.12.19; cf. *Tschapek* 2000: 355f.

280 Muller to FO, 11.12.12, in *Vincent-S.* 1974: 628; cf. *Samson* 2013: 41; *Cann* 2001: 149.

Boer and Portuguese settlers on easy financial terms.”²⁸¹ In the following two years, the number of German immigrants to Angola increased indeed. They partly arrived from GSWA, but most were destitute and looked for work. The German consuls were not pleased by these new arrivals.²⁸²

At first, Portuguese comments about the foundation of the *Bund* were rather sober: For the *Jornal de Comercio* Germany’s expansionist intentions seemed evident and it was equally evident that Portugal had to stay in charge of its colony. Thus, on Portuguese territory the railway connecting the German copper mines of Otavi with the harbor of Porto Alexandre had to be built and operated by the Portuguese.²⁸³ However, watching Germany’s growing success in peacefully penetrating Angola many Portuguese politicians soon expressed their concern. In mid-1914 Portuguese foreign policy “gravitated around the colonial question”. The new Foreign Minister, Alfredo Freire de Andrade, a former Governor of Mozambique (1906–10) and previously Colonial Minister, was an ardent adherent to Portugal’s alliance with Great Britain.²⁸⁴ He was alarmed that Portugal “would wake up one day and find that to all intent and purposes Angola had become a German possession.” Also the new Governor General of Angola, Major José Norton de Matos was convinced that the “Germans had aims in Angola which went well beyond economic penetration”. He prohibited Portuguese from joining the *Angola Bund*. In early 1913, after reading Friedrich von Bernhardi’s book *Germany and the next War* (1911) he – so he remembered later – predicted in a letter to the Minister of Colonies that in a future war Angola and Mozambique would be among the first victims of German aggression. Firm in his anti-German sentiments, he urged for preparations.²⁸⁵ To counter the growing German presence, Norton de Matos asked for a French diplomat in Luanda (in 1913, only Great Britain maintained a consul of career in Luanda, Mr. Herbert Hall Hall) since France’s incumbent consular agent, Léon Appert, represented a German trading house.²⁸⁶ The French Minister in Lisbon respond-

281 MAELC 192 CPCOM/19, Portugal: 32-6 MAE to Sénateur Gervais, 21.4.13; *Southern* 2007: 5.

282 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.I) VK Benguela to German Consulate Luanda, 2.9.14: ‘That which came from GSWA to Lobito can neither contribute to giving prominence to German names nor to serving our interests’; cf. *Manz* 2012: 199; *Stassen* 2011: 81.

283 MAELC 192 CPC/CP/NS/19, Portugal: 13, FML to MAE, 5.2.13.

284 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Portugal: 86, Daeschner to MAE, 29.5.14.

285 *Vincent-Smith* 1974: 628; *Baericke* 1981: 19; *Dáskalos* 208: 182; *Norton* 2001: 183f.; 207.

286 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 131, Lieutn. Lecoq to Minstre de la Marine, 2.9.13.

ed it was “too late” to counter the German dominance, since Angola was considered by the Germans as one of the “most precious elements of their future colonial empire.”²⁸⁷ Given the German success, Norton de Matos was also against opening Angola for (more) international trade. Instead, “an ultra protective custom tariff favoring both the goods imported from Portugal and the Portuguese merchant marine” was upheld; irrespective of the fact that this was “a burden upon the merchants of Angola” since they had to import almost all goods from foreign countries.²⁸⁸ The difficulties were aggravated by the fact that “the steamship line [*Empreza Nacional de Navegação*] and the state railways are notoriously mismanaged and have presented an opportunity all too generally used of disposing of those having political claims on the government.”²⁸⁹

On the other hand, there were politicians in Lisbon who acknowledged that foreign, including German, capital could well be used as a means to develop Angola without “denationalizing” the colony. Whereas the competitive element of colonialism is indisputable, also a sense of “cooperation” among colonial powers had developed in Europe that focused on the exchange of expertise and transfer of knowledge. The task of “civilizing” Africa began to be understood as a common European project as formulated by the *Institut Colonial International* founded in Brussels in 1894.²⁹⁰

Hitherto, the Anglo-German treaty of 1898 had deterred “the Portuguese from seeking loans [abroad] or granting concessions”. As a result, credit for commercial purposes had almost been non-existent in Angola. While it was a common feat of African colonies that “public investment during that period was small, and private capital influx even smaller”²⁹¹, the financial situation of Angola was at the brink of collapse. The press in Angola did not hesitate to criticize the “military bureaucracy” of the new republic that had caused an annual deficit of 4,000 Contos.²⁹² Some politicians “privately admitted that the best solution would be for Portugal to sell her colonies.” The “currency was unstable”; inflation remained a constant threat.²⁹³

287 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 30.11.13.

288 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 610, USC Boma, Report on Trade of Angola, 9.9.15.

289 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 169: 877, USML to SoS, 17.10.19.

290 Lindner 2011: 86f; 97; cf. Trotha 2004; on ‘civilization’ Bowden 2005; 2009; Pauka 2013.

291 Vincent-Smith 1974: 620; Young 1994: 136.

292 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/8, Portugal: 174, FML to MAE, 14.11.11.

293 Smith 1974: 657; cf. Roberts 1986: 494; Reiner 1924: 334.

While excluding any cession of territorial sovereignty, the government confirmed its acceptance of foreign-financed railways in its colonies in 1912.²⁹⁴ In Angola the two railway lines from Luanda and Benguela were to be extended up to the copper mines of Katanga in Belgian Congo. Furthermore, the southern-most Moçâmedes railway was planned to be built via Lubango up to the Kunene River. Financed with public funds, 176 kilometers had been completed in late 1914.²⁹⁵ However, for strategic reasons the old plan to reach GSWA and to connect it to the Otavi Railway scheduled to be built through Ovamboland by German engineers was put on hold. The German authorities, on the other hand, continued to push for the construction of this line.²⁹⁶ Altogether, more than 2,000 km of railway were planned. Prime Minister Machado, recognizing “no immediate danger” emanating from the Anglo-German negotiations, confirmed in March 1914 that his government was “ready to open up Angola” for foreign investors. In July 1914, a decree was published “authorizing the Portuguese government to contract a loan of 8,000,000 escudos for developing” Angola by investing in infrastructure and agriculture.²⁹⁷ With a law on the financial autonomy of the colonies, such amounts could be borrowed from (foreign) lenders. The accompanying report to Parliament drew a grim picture of the colony’s financial situation, the works of Norton de Matos and his policy to oppose opening the colony to more international trade.²⁹⁸ The French Colonial Minister, Albert Lebrun (1871–1950), warned his colleague in the Foreign Ministry, Gaston Doumergue (1863–1937), Portugal’s new loan policy would help the Germans in their policy of peaceful penetration, commencing with commercial exploitation and ending with

294 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 31, MAE. Note sur les Colonies Portug., 30.12.12.

295 *Dáskalos* 2008: 78–84; NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 165: 850, Communication, 29.5.18. In 1914 there were ‘540 kilometers of state railroads [Malanje; Moçâmedes] and 901 kilometers of private railroads [Ambaca; Benguela] in Angola’; cf. *Lemos* 1929: 73; *Tschapek* 2000: 361–84.

296 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 148, transl. *Post*, 12.11.13; cf. *Tschapek* 2000: 396.

297 MAELC 192 CPC/CP/NS/19, Portugal: 308, FML to MAE, 7.3.14; NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 851, USML to SoS, 22.7.14. The government estimated the costs for the railway to exceed 20,000 Contos (90 Million Marks). Altogether, a credit of 40,000 Contos (180 Million Marks) was considered necessary to upgrade the harbors, roads, railways and to improve the administration (*Südwestbote*, Jg. 11, No. 75, 24.6.1914: 2, ref. to *Kölnische Zeitung*); *Dáskalos* 2008: 133; 10 *reis* were equivalent to 1 *centavo*: 1,000 *reis* or 1 *milreis* equal to 1 *escudo*. 1,000 *escudo* equal to 1 *conto*. *Reis* and *milreis* were eliminated when the republic was proclaimed.

298 *Vincent-Smith* 1974: 628.

annexation. In the interest of France, Lebrun deemed it wise for the “Paris market” to play a role too.²⁹⁹

In order to attract German investors, the *German* government ordered the thorough exploration of southern Angola. After heavy pressure from the Foreign and Colonial Offices in Berlin “to create German interests in Angola” the *Warburg Bank* convinced in early 1914 other reluctant German banks, *Krupp* as well as investors from Portugal and Belgium to found a company (*Überseestudiensyndicat*) with the aim to study the technical and economic potential of the southern railway that had been under discussion by then for 15 years. As it was the case in Germany’s own colonial empire that proved to be an almost complete economic failure since the government paid more in subsidies to the colonial budgets than it received from colonial revenues, also the penetration of Angola was neither caused by nor based on private financial interests; it was a purely state-run policy. The Foreign Office remained heavily involved in the setting up of the *Überseestudiensyndicat* and sent a representative to its first meeting in February 1914. He urged to act quickly in Angola. It was agreed that an expedition should be sent to investigate the future railway track. Internally, it was admitted that the expedition was sent for “purely political reasons”.³⁰⁰

The expedition was set up immediately. It was called *Comissão luso-alemão des estudos de Caminho de Ferro do Sul de Angola*. Formally a private enterprise³⁰¹ without “official German character”, it could count on the support of a few Portuguese politicians, especially the Minister of Colonies, Alfredo Lisboa de Lima (1867–1935), and Sidonio Pais in Berlin.³⁰² The expedition was assigned to investigate the course of the rail track and other investment opportunities like mining and farming, both depending on the railway. Until that time Moçâmedes had “never really prospered as a trading center. It was too close to Benguela, and communications with the interior were hampered by the twin obstacles of the desert and the abrupt face of the escarpment.”³⁰³ Also in Angola³⁰⁴ hopes ran high that “wild lands [could be] tamed into productive estates” by running

299 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 189, Fr. Minister of Colonies to MAE, 20.2.14.

300 *Canis* 2011: 534; *Gissibl* 2011: 159f; cf. *Tschapek* 2000: 384-411; *Rosen* 1932: 253-9.

301 On English-Portuguese joint commissions (*commissões mixtas*) cf. *Wheeler* 1974: 582.

302 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Remark Consulate Luanda, ~19.10.14; cf. *Silva* 2006: 340.

303 *Clarence-Smith* 1976: 215; cf. *Santos* 1978: 187-90.

304 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS, No. 89, 2.5.74 ‘what a wonderful reformation’.

rail lines across Africa. Colonial imagination assumed that the “mere whistle of the locomotive would beckon the traffic necessary for amortization of the capital costs.” However, excruciating natural obstacles, difficult labor conscription and doubtful commercial prospects stood at odds with these “visions”.³⁰⁵

The German part of the group was led by the engineer Dr. A. Schubert; further German members were the engineer Thurner, the geologist and agronomist Dr. Paul Vageler (1882–1963) and the three surveyors, Curt Hempel, Claren and Rudolph Klemoscheg.³⁰⁶ The Portuguese party was headed by the former Governor General of Angola, Colonel Manuel M. Coelho (1857–1943) (the immediate predecessor of Norton de Matos)³⁰⁷ and Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos R.M. de Faria e Maia (c. 1870–1942), an engineer who had already been involved in colonial settlement schemes for years. It does not appear that the Portuguese had to be “intimidated by Germany” to agree to the commission, as was later claimed. Before their departure to Angola, the German members were warmly welcomed in April 1914 in Lisbon by Prime Minister Machado and Minister Lisboa de Lima. Both politicians expressed their hopes for a close cooperation between the neighboring colonies and underlined common colonial interests.³⁰⁸ Those more critical of the German undertakings considered the colonial minister naive. In Lisbon speculations about German intentions were “heightened” at the time. Diplomatic circles spoke of Germany’s “*de facto* preponderance” in Angola.³⁰⁹ The German government knew about these fears. When the commission was on its way to Luanda, Consul Eisenlohr was ordered not to join their expedition. Confidentially, the Foreign Office explained that the *Studienyndicat* had caused “concern” in Portugal. Allegedly, Norton de Matos, who arrived in Lisbon too in April 1914, “was taken by complete surprise” when he learnt of the group. An

305 Young 1994: 134f; positive *Iliffe* 2007: 211 railways cut transport costs by 90–95 percent.

306 BAB R 1001/6634: 157, Vageler to KGW, ~11/1914, Ax 11 Memo Allem., 23.5.22.

307 The American Minister reported about M. Coelho, after he became Prime Minister in 1921 following a military coup: Coelho is ‘little known. He ... held the position of Governor General of Angola where he is reported to have shown himself absolutely inefficient. He was leader in the first revolutionary revolt against the Monarchy in 1891, was discharged from the army and exiled for five years’. NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 175: 800, USML to SoS, 22.10.21.

308 BAB R 1001/6634: 80f., Report of Schubert, Ax 1 tMemo All., 23.5.22; *Cann* 2001: 147.

309 *Vincent-S.* 1974: 629; *Rosen* 1932: 147 ‘Mistrust with respect to German ambitions in A.’

“attentive reader of the international press”, he was perfectly aware of the Anglo-German accord of 1913 about the division of Portugal’s Empire.³¹⁰

In the following months the Germans “began hacking their way through the Angolan bush ... while innocently assisted by compliant Portuguese district commissioners following Lisboa de Lima’s instruction.”³¹¹ The Portuguese colonists in Angola considered the expedition with suspicion and the two Portuguese officers deplored that they were deemed by their compatriots to be “traitors”.³¹² Rumors spread in Angola about the Germans closing in on the colony also technically. In May 1914, it was claimed that the railhead of the German Ovamboland railway (being still in its *planning* phase and never going beyond Outjo) had reached Kwanyama territory were “the Germans” maintained nine Protestant mission stations.³¹³

On the other hand, not only the German government had plans for the future. Also the Portuguese had high hopes for Angola. As the German Colonial Office’s expert on agriculture, Vageler was asked by the Portuguese to investigate the possibility of populating the *planalto* with up to 100,000 colonists.³¹⁴ Since the 1850s it had been considered attractive “because of its plentiful supplies of ivory and because its temperate climate was well-suited for white settlement.”³¹⁵ In 1902 the geographer Georg Hartmann assumed the fact “unquestionable” that the area of Humbe and Ovamboland would – one day – be of “great economic value.” However, after months of travel across the area the head of the Study Commission Schubert expressed his conviction that the establishment of the commission was based on wrong assumptions of the value of *southern* Angola. He was “very disappointed about the country” and could see no potential for settlements.³¹⁶ When later geographers spoke of the area to the east of the Chela Range as “the finest corn-producing area in Angola”, they all agreed that further south, near the Kunene River the territory,

310 PA Luanda 1, AA to Consul, 25.2.; Telgr. AA, 1.5.14; Norton 2001: 203; Cann 2001: 147; *Daskalos* 2008: 183.

311 *Southern* 2007: 6, referring to *Leal* 1966: 308.

312 BAB R 1001/6634: 83, Report of A.Schubert, Annex 1 to Memo Allem., 23.5.22; BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 12, testimony of General Norton de Matos, 5.5.26.

313 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling to TRP, 19.5.14 ‘Allons vois ce que fera la républic.’

314 BAB R 1001/6640: 73 extra-file: 3f., protocol stenographique Dr. Vageler, 12.10.25.

315 *Clarence-Smith* 1976: 215; *Mora* 1940: 585 before WWI ~12,000 Europeans lived in Angola; cf. *Oliveira Marques* 1998: 558.

316 *Hartmann* 1902: 229; PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schubert, 3.9.14; *Medeiros* 1977: 69.

“rolling and barren, would seem to be of little use, agriculturally or pastorally.”³¹⁷ Soon, this would be a theater of war.

2. *The First World War in Angola and GSWA*

2.1 The Outbreak of the War and its Impact on GSWA and Angola

The military defensibility of the German colonies was not only debated early on; it was doubted by many decision makers. For this reason, Chief of Staff Count Waldersee hoped in 1889 that Germany would soon rid itself of the overseas possession just acquired. Most famous is the question Chancellor Leo von Caprivi put to Governor Eduard von Liebert, who had recently returned from GEA: “But how will you defend East Africa against England?” The course of the First World War would prove Caprivi’s skepticism right. After all, already in 1891 it was decided by Emperor William II. “that GSWA could be sacrificed to maintain GEA” in case of war.³¹⁸

On August 2 and 3, 1914 Germany’s Colonial Secretary, Wilhelm Solf sent wireless messages to the colonies: “Calm the settlers. There is no danger of war in the colonies.” The anglophile Solf soon recognized that this was an illusion. After the war, he was heavily criticized for his “naivete”. In private, however, Solf allegedly considered the war already lost for Germany by August 4.³¹⁹ Ironically, some German politicians and French pacifists alike assumed that (southern) Africa would remain neutral territory due to provisions of the Berlin Act of 1885 that, in fact, mentioned merely that colonial “territories ... may be” considered neutral. However, such “precautions proved useless”³²⁰ since the Allies decided to attack German colonies for several reasons: the occupation would close their ports to the German navy and allow better control of the oceans; the German wireless stations could be disrupted; Germany’s breach of Belgian neutrality made the claim of Africa’s neutrality according to the Berlin Act less convincing and had repercussions on Belgian Congo; also, the ex-

317 *Wells* 1940: 558f.; *Miller* 1982: 17 ‘zone of sandy soils and unstable climate’.

318 Quoted in *Ritter* 1970: 110; *Samson* 2013: 30; cf. *Herwig* 1980: 97f.; *Michels* 2006: 165.

319 *Vietsch* 1961: 135; 137; *Brunschwig* 1957: 178f.; *Hintrager* 1955: 190; *Wolff* 1984: 69 (# 5: 10.8.14); Klöckner in: *Kolonialkriegerb.* 1924: 58; *Doß* 1977: 191; *Förster* 2012: 190.

320 *Cooper* 1991: 371 referring to Fr. Passy; *Förster* 2012: 191.

clusion of Germany from Africa and colonial expansion developed into an Allied war aim; the occupied German colonies would be useful as a bargaining tool during peace negotiations; finally, South Africa was “keen” to incorporate GSWA into the Union.³²¹ As a first step, Britain used its maritime supremacy to prevent ships from reaching German colonial harbors. The Royal Navy sealed off the entrances to the North Sea. The German colonies were left to economic starvation. The blockade proved the German assumption right that the “colonies must be defended in the North Sea”, allegedly “England’s weak point”.³²² This defense failed, however.

GSWA’s agriculture was incapable of producing sufficient food to sustain 14,000 Europeans. In the mostly arid or semi-arid country cereals or fruit and vegetables were grown in insufficient quantities.³²³ Storage capacities were limited. And barely any provisions were made to feed the Europeans for an extended period of time without constant supply from Germany and neighboring British South Africa.

GSWA’s Governor Theodor Seitz (1863–1949) – not as much an anglophile as Solf – assumed that his colony would be involved in the war rather sooner than later. On August 2 he asked the police to compile lists of Russians and Britons. Those trying to agitate Africans against German rule were to be apprehended immediately. When on August 5 Britain’s entry into the war became known in GSWA,³²⁴ rumors spread that also Portugal had declared war on Germany. Haunted by the possibility of an attack from all sides, Seitz asked via wireless message the Colonial Office in Berlin about the relations with Portugal. On August 8, he received the answer that there was no war with Portugal. This was correct, yet it told him only half of the truth.

When Great Britain entered the war on August 4, 1914 after the German invasion of Belgium and France, the Portuguese parliament decided in a stormy session by a close margin *not* to join the war on Britain’s side. Anti-German sentiments seemed widespread.³²⁵ For fear of Spain entering

321 Michel 2004: 920; cf. Samson 2006: 29; 2013: 40; Bühner 2011: 359.

322 Tirpitz to Büchsel, 29.7.99, in: Kennedy 1984: 6; cf. Herwig 1980: 148f.; Seitz 1920: 1.

323 This was a difference to GEA where farmers were able to produce foodstuff, *DOAZ*, Jg.17, no.28, 3.4.15 ‘DOA und der Weltkrieg’: ‘Covering the food requirements for both European and the indigenous populations is permanently assured, for everything that one needs for daily life is being delivered from the [colony] and in more than adequate amounts.’ This was overstated, famine hit GEA. On the Allied blockade Stevenson 2004: 199f.

324 NAN BOM 34, GA 5, KGW to BA Omaruru, 2.8. 14; Hennig 1920: 3.

325 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Portugal: 121, FML Daeschner to MAE Delcassé, 8.12.14.

the war on the German side if its Iberian rival joined the Allies and concerned with Portugal's "demands for more [colonial] territory" after the war, Britain "applied diplomatic pressure upon Bernardino Machado's government not to become belligerent". However, Portugal was asked to *not* explicitly declare its neutrality. In 1912 the Admiralty War Staff in London had defined what Britain should expect from Portugal in time of war: Portugal should be "a neutral sufficiently strong to make her neutrality respected, whose ports were free to the British mercantile marine but denied to the warships of the enemy." It was doubted whether the Portuguese could open their own front in Africa and sustain it against the Germans.³²⁶

On August 5, Britain's minister to Portugal, Lancelot Carnegie (1861–1933), reaffirmed the Luso-British alliance and a few weeks later, Portugal was given the assurance of British defense support in case of a German attack on Portuguese possessions.³²⁷ Portugal's government "declared [on August 7] that she was quite prepared as the ally of Great Britain to give every assistance".³²⁸ Portugal kept its ports open to allied war ships; artillery pieces were sent to Britain and France. On August 12 a Luso-British treaty of Commerce was concluded. The next day Britain requested authorization for the passage of British troops across Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia. There, the Portuguese were asked for "assistance" by the British against troops from GEA. On August 18 Foreign Minister Freire de Andrade spoke of Portugal's *neutralidade condicional*. In September, Portugal's minister in London, Teixeira Gomes, informed Eyre Crowe about the authorization of British troops to traverse Mozambique. In early October, following the German atrocities in Belgium and France, a committee headed by the republic's first President, Teófilo Braga (1843–1924), and composed of "the academies of science, the schools of higher learning, the scientific, literary and artistic communities, the Masons, the Press, the Anti-German League, the agricultural, industrial, commercial and labour associations and other groups dedicated to Portugal's success and advancement", presented the French and Belgian ministers in Lisbon

"with their most vehement, indignant and solemn protest at the heinous crimes that have been committed in Belgium and in France, particularly at the

326 Stone 1975: 730; 732; cf. Samson 2006: 40; *Hespanha* 2010: 172; *Livermore* 1967: 324.

327 *Diário do Governo*, Decreto n.729, n.133, 4.8.14: 636; 27.8.14; *Castro Brandão* 2002: 278.

328 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 820, USML to SoS, 24.11.14; *Silva* 2006: 347.

destruction of the library of the Catholic University of Louvain and of the cathedral at Rheims, crimes that will forever defile the Prussians before the incorruptible court of history.”

Given these anti-German resentments among the elites, on November 23 Congress authorized President Manuel José de Arriaga (1840–1917) to intervene militarily in the war on Britain’s side if deemed necessary.³²⁹ All these steps did not remain unnoticed by Germany’s Minister Rosen. In October, he filed a formal protest against Lisbon’s hostile attitude. Nevertheless, in November yet another Luso-British Convention declared operative the Treaties of Alliance.³³⁰

Considering the German pretensions on Portugal’s colonies, the government was anxious to protect these territories. It decided on August 12 to reinforce the colonial troops with men from Portugal. A decree was issued to send forces to Angola and Mozambique and a special appropriation (*crédito extraordinário*) of 1,000,000 escudos (\$950,000) for war material was granted to the Ministry of War under General Pereira de Eça.³³¹ Two weeks later, a first border skirmish between German and Portuguese border posts occurred in Maziua, Mozambique. On August 24 a German official shot a Portuguese guard in the wrong assumption that there was war between both countries. The German government later apologized for this incident.

In GSWA the mobilization of the Schutztruppe was ordered on August 8, and simultaneously Governor Seitz prohibited the export of weapons, livestock, and foodstuffs from GSWA.³³² The decisive question for him was from where food could be imported. Its harbors sealed by the British Navy and GSWA being surrounded by three British colonies, only neutral Portuguese Angola seemed to offer any possibility. From the German steamer *Adelaide* (having “escaped” to Luanda) Consul Eisenlohr (being informed about the German mobilization) immediately sent an encrypted telegram to Swakopmund asking Seitz whether he should procure food-

329 *Girão* 2010: 44f.; *Silva* 2006: 348; *Penha Garcia* 1918: 130f.; O protesto de Portugal contra os vandalismos alemães, entregue aos senhores ministros da Bélgica e da França em 4 de Outubro de 1914, Lisboa 1914, transl. www.cphrc.org/index.php/documents/firstrepublic/463-1914-10-04-german-vandals [14.10.2014]; cf. *Wheeler* 1978: 106.

330 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, SGL to MNE, 16.10.14; cf. *Samson* 2013: 59; *Castro Br.* 2002: 279.

331 *Girão* 2010: 44; NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 134: 800, USC General to SoS, 18.8.14.

332 *Morlang* 1998: 43; *Stals* 1968: 186; *Eckenbrecher* 1940: 170. Seitz scheduled in June 1914 a military exercise for September, *Südwestbote*, Jg. 11, no. 75, 24.6.1914: 2.

stuff and coal for GSWA in Angola.³³³ Seitz requested Eisenlohr the next day “to buy as much foodstuff as possible” and to send it over land if ships would not accept load to GSWA. He hoped that Eisenlohr would come to an agreement with the Governor General Norton in Luanda.³³⁴ Eisenlohr tried to convince the agent of a Portuguese steamer to stop in Swakopmund. However, the Portuguese telegram asking for permission in Lisbon to do so was not allowed to pass the British telegraph station in Lagos, Nigeria.³³⁵ Also telegrams from Luanda to Germany could not be sent any longer. Soon, also Eisenlohr and Seitz could no longer communicate directly; since *Adelaide*’s wireless apparatus was rendered inoperative by order of the Governor-General.³³⁶



Ill. 7 Governor Theodor Seitz



Ill. 8 Governor General José Norton de Matos

Nevertheless, more and more troubling rumors about Angola reached the Governor in Windhoek. In late August, Dr. Hans Schultze-Jena (1874–1914), the head of the Outjo district bordering Angola, sent a telegram about suspected British troop movements or at least growing British influ-

333 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telgr Consulate Luanda to KGW, 8.8.14. Telgr. DGL to German Consulate Luanda, 1./8.8.14; cf. *Suchier* 1918: 26.

334 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telgr KGW to German Consulate Luanda, 9.8.14.

335 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Tel. Consul to KGW, 14.8.14; cf. *Wenzlhuemer* 2012: 107.

336 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Note Cpt B. Tadsen to German Consulate Luanda, 9.8.14.

ence in Angola. Most wearisome were allegations that “the Portuguese are attempting to get the Ovambo at our throats”, as Seitz expressed it. He did not hesitate to counter these “attempts” by an immediate order to “send a messenger to [Kwanyama King] Mandume [to tell him] that the governor will forward weapons and powder. German troops will come to support him against the Portuguese.” While Schultze-Jena himself conveyed the surprising message to the King that he “will be given 100 guns plus ammunition”, Missionary Welsch was asked to come from Oukwanyama to Windhoek to report about his latest impressions from the area.³³⁷ In early September, the governor asked Welsch to forward and translate a letter to Mandume in which Seitz, after letting the King know about Germany’s “great victories” in Europe, repeated the offer of “100 guns for your warriors and wine for you”. Assuming Portuguese attempts to “alienate” the Kwanyama, he assured Mandume: “if you stay faithful to the Germans you need not fear the Portuguese. If they attack you, I will send German troops to expel them.”³³⁸ However, soon the Germans would find themselves under attack and it was to be seen whether they would ever be in a position to defend King Mandume against the Portuguese.

2.2 Beyond German Reach – Smuggling Food across Angola

Food had become scarce in many African colonies since steamship lines had withdrawn their services following the outbreak of the war. Already in August, the Governor General of Belgian Congo asked for additional supply of provisions for his colony.³³⁹ Reports about “shortage of food supplies” reached Europe also from Monrovia and Dakar.³⁴⁰ GSWA imported more food than it produced. The British, well aware of the statistics, assumed that the colony would surrender after five months due to lack of food. Governor Seitz understood that ships would no longer reach GSWA even from Angola and Consul Eisenlohr suggested putting the procurement in private hands in order to avoid raising suspicion. Seitz therefore requested the merchant Otto Busch from Keetmanshoop to organize the

337 BAB R 1001/6645: 4-7, Tlgr BA Outjo to KGW, 22.8.; remark Seitz 24.8.; telgr 28.8.; 123, Welsch (Omupanda) to KGW, 8.10.14.

338 BAB R 1001/6645: 8-10, KGW to Mandume; KGW to Welsch; KGW to BA Outjo, 6.9.14.

339 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18, 840, USC Boma to SoS, 30.8.14; cf. *Suchier* 1918: 77f.

340 TNA FO 371/1884:250, Brit. Consul Dakar, 15.8.;254, Br. Consul Monrovia, 14.8.14.

transport. He had just returned from a trip to Luanda to investigate the possibility of labor recruitment for the diamond fields of GSWA. Busch was a jack-of-all-trades who had already in 1905, during the Nama War, assisted the German consulate in Cape Town to reconnoiter the Anglo-German border along the Oranje River for smugglers of weapons and food.³⁴¹



Ill. 9 Luanda, DKG Bildarchiv

341 *Seitz* 1920: 15f.; *Morlang* 1998: 43; PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consul Cape Town to German military stations, 5.9.05; NAN A.529 n.8, Busch: Berichte Grenzschmuggel, 1905.



Ill. 10 Ernst Heinrich Eisenlohr

In mid-August 1914, Busch traveled to Luanda. This was still possible by ship, and Busch would act within the next months as Germany's '(secret) agent' in Angola. More self-confident than talented for this undertaking, Consul Eisenlohr ordered him to go from Luanda to southern Angola and procure and carry "in an inconspicuous manner" as much foodstuff as possible to GSWA. Busch was promised a commission of 7.5% of all costs. The German vice consuls in Benguela and Moçâmedes had to support the undertaking. Eisenlohr transferred to them \$12,000 and \$6,000 respectively. In case the amount would not suffice, Busch should take on credits on account of the consulate.³⁴²

However, in 1914 the Germans in Angola were unable to install a "complex system of bribery and clandestine interference" similar to the Germans in the Cape Colony under Consul von Humboldt during the Nama War (1905/6).³⁴³ In a long letter to Governor Seitz (reaching the addressee five weeks later) Eisenlohr detailed the difficulties of transporting foodstuffs to GSWA: 1) food was scarce in Angola and Portugal. The Portuguese central government had ordered the Governor General to deliver food to the Cape Verde Islands and to Portugal. Eisenlohr considered it likely that the Governor General therefore would soon prohibit the export of food to foreign states. Therefore, the purchase and transport of food to

342 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to VC Moçâmedes/Benguela, 14.8.14; NAN A.529 n.2: 3, O. Busch: Erlebnisse... in Angola, Anfang August–24.12.14.

343 Dederling 2006: 283 on German policies to smuggle weapons and equipment to GSWA.

GSWA should be executed swiftly before the authorities learned about it; 2) money was scarce in Angola and it was barely possible for the consul to draw large sums at the public bank without raising suspicion (Busch assumed one million marks would be needed); 3) there was no established connection between Angola and GSWA. Portuguese ships did not call at ports in GSWA. Telegrams that did not pass the censor at the British telegraph station were not transmitted. Eisenlohr thus assumed that sending Busch to southern Angola under the pretext of erecting a pig farm near Catumbela at the plantation of the trader Antonio da Costa would be the best way to commence the “smuggling”, as he called the transport. It was intended to convince da Costa to use his own credit for the inconspicuous procuring of foodstuff. Eisenlohr believed the transport would be best organized by using “fisher boats or smuggler boats from Moçâmedes” and to land the food in GSWA near the border. At the same time he planned a transport by ox wagons to Outjo, but warned of the difficulties due to the “Kwanyama rebellion”. Eisenlohr intended to send under pretext 25,000 to 50,000 Marks to Moçâmedes to enable Busch to pay a first rate “especially to the smugglers”. He urged Governor Seitz to send money also from GSWA to Angola.³⁴⁴ A similar request was sent to the German consul in Cape Town.³⁴⁵

The European war washed ashore unexpected assistance for an undertaking that was not yet formally illegal, but which certainly stretched to the edge the role a diplomatic representative could take up. The engineer Georg Kéry of Budapest arrived in Luanda from São Tomé and met Eisenlohr since no Austrian consulate was available. As Kéry spoke Portuguese, he was recruited by Consul Eisenlohr to support Busch’s mission and was sent to southern Angola.³⁴⁶ At the same time, Eisenlohr was eager to enlist the services of the Luso-Portuguese Study Commission still surveying southern Angola. He re-called Dr. Vageler to Lubango.³⁴⁷ Code words were exchanged between Eisenlohr and Kéry, who was to inform Busch and Vageler on their meaning.³⁴⁸ Assessing the situation in the south, Kéry suggested a small-scale transfer of foodstuffs on land, calling at the “German farmers [Strauwald, Schneider and Schwarzer having their farms

344 BAB R 1001/6645, 21, Consul Eisenlohr to KGW, 14.8.14 (arrived 21.9.).

345 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to Consulate Cape Town, 17.8.14.

346 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda to Georg Kery, 18.8.14.

347 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telegr Consulate Luanda to Schoess, Lubango, 18.8.14.

348 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda remark on code words, ~8/14.

in southern Angola], the German missionaries, [Consul] Schöss and the Study Commission”. To send the supply by boat was deemed unfeasible by Kéry and Busch since they had no means available to ship 60 to 100 tons. Without contact to the government in GSWA, they did not know where to land; should it be in Swakopmund, Cape Frio, or Cape Cross? Furthermore, Angolan fishermen in Moçâmedes and Porto Alexandre were allegedly ordered to report any foreign ship and it was feared that the British navy was nearby.³⁴⁹

In the meantime, Busch met the head of the Study Commission Schubert in Moçâmedes and initiated him into the secret mission to procure and transport food to GSWA. Schubert, who had been to Windhoek and understood the necessity of the food supply, was willing to support him. He explained that due to lack of water only the land transport from Capelongo downstream the Kunene River up to the border at Erickson Drift would be feasible. Schubert was positive about the success of the undertaking since the Study Commission could “initiate” the procurement and transport “under the guise of its semi-official Portuguese mission”. Schubert was also convinced of the support by German and Afrikaaner farmers in the region. Farmer Strauwald would know the way across Ovamboland to GSWA. Busch told Schubert that he had already commenced the purchase of food with the brokerage of a Portuguese farmer in Catumbela. It was agreed that Strauwald should take a letter to the Rhenish mission station at Ondonga notifying Governor Seitz that transports were underway to Erickson Drift. From Ondonga messengers should bring it to the German police station at Okaukwejo, which was to forward it to the district office in Outjo. Busch wrote to missionary Tönjes at Ondonga that deliveries from Huambo (terminus of the Benguela railway) via Capelongo (Schwarzer’s farm) to Erickson Drift were being prepared. Since three Study Commission ox wagons would arrive there “within a few days”, Busch requested Tönjes to go to Erickson Drift with all his transport capacities and to bring the “urgently needed foodstuff” to Outjo. He advised him to distribute “extragifts” to any “assisting Ovambos”.³⁵⁰ Busch also addressed a letter to the head of the Outjo district, Dr. Schultze-Jena, requesting him to forward the letter from the consulate in Luanda about the transport to Governor

349 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Georg Kéry to German Consulate Luanda, 24.08.14.

350 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Otto Busch to Missionary Tönjes, Ondonga, 22.8.14.

Seitz. The supply could be taken over at the border – “probably Erickson Drift”.³⁵¹

Over the following weeks numerous letters were exchanged between Germans in southern Angola and the German consul in Luanda detailing enigmatically the routes, waterholes, and transport capacities in the region, “so people do not suffer from hunger”.³⁵² It was repeatedly stated that Germans serving the food supply of GSWA would thereby fulfill their military duty. Those Germans living in Angola, however, who wanted to avoid the return to Germany and their military duty were threatened by the consul with being court-marshaled after the war. Only those should stay in Angola who were either under no military duty or who could help to bring food across the border.³⁵³ Minister Rosen informed the consul, however, that it was almost impossible for the returnees to reach Germany from Portugal. Therefore, they were to be discouraged to travel via Lisbon.³⁵⁴

Consul Eisenlohr could count on the German members of the Study Commission, which had to maintain its official character at all times while the Portuguese Colonel Coelho had to be “held at bay”. It was agreed that Schubert should lead the first three ox wagons to Erickson Drift, “if possible accompanied by Mr. Coelho” under the pretext he would start survey works at the drift. Vageler should guide Kéry and the farmers Schneider and Schwarzer along the river with their food transport. Once the connection to GSWA has been established the Study Commission would retreat and leave the execution to Schwarzer, Schneider, and Kéry, who was to remain stationed at Erickson Drift.³⁵⁵

However, despite careful planning, difficulties soon became apparent. The unusual traffic in Angola’s south was to the detriment of the smuggling activities of the Germans. They were concerned about the anti-German sentiments among the Portuguese population. The Afrikaaner Zacharias Roberts was asked to assist in convincing at least “the natives [south of Humbe] to support us if possible (promise rich rewards to the chiefs)”. Furthermore, Schubert learnt that 1,000 troops would soon arrive from Lisbon to subdue the Kwanyama under Mandume. Rumors abound-

351 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Otto Busch to Bezirksamt Outjo, [o.D.] ~ August 1914; NAN A.529 n.2: 6, O. Busch: Erlebnisse... in Angola, Anfang August–24.12.14.

352 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schubert (Luanda) to Vageler, 2.9.14.

353 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.I) German Consulate Luanda to VK Benguela, 9.9.14.

354 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.I) DGL to German Consulate Luanda, 25.9.14.

355 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) note of Schubert, 30.8.14; Confirmation Schubert, 2.9.14; BAB R 1001/6645, 26-30, Telgr Busch (Outjo) to KGW, 14.9.14

ed that these men were also sent to protect the border against any German attack.³⁵⁶

Eisenlohr still hoped not to raise suspicion with the Portuguese authorities. But they happened upon a chance to assume what the Germans were planning when the German vice consulate Benguela ordered 500 sacks of corn from the merchant and former German honorary consul Eduardo Prazeres. Eisenlohr was outraged about the “foolish und perfidious” telegram informing him about the order. It was contrary to his instructions to Busch not to procure any foodstuff in the region of Luanda.³⁵⁷ A few days later Busch sent the encrypted message from Benguela that “transports departed on land, many wagons”. Eisenlohr was again irate, since a German trader would usually not send a telegram from Benguela to the consul in Luanda, considering that a vice consulate was located in the town.³⁵⁸ Secrecy was not Busch’s thing. Complaints about his overconfidence and his boasting during the purchase of goods in Moçâmedes were still recalled years later.³⁵⁹ The British Vice-Consul Beak in Lobito soon got hold of the German attempts to purchase foodstuffs for GSWA and assumed the financial support of Consul Eisenlohr. He “called the attention of the local authorities to this fact, with the result that the buyers ... were held up.”³⁶⁰

Further problems arose, delaying the “smuggling”. Traditionally, the authorities kept a close eye on the movement of any European. Traveling within Angola had required a passport since 1761.³⁶¹ Worse, at the end of August Vice Consul Schöss informed Busch that farmer Strauwald, the most important messenger across Ovamboland, did not arrive in Lubango to pick up the letters and his load. Schöss now deemed him untrustworthy. He therefore sent the “pro-German” Afrikaaner Piet du Plessis with the letters to Governor Seitz and missionary Tönjes in Ondonga. Du Plessis had lived in GSWA and knew the area on both sides of the Kunene. He would leave Lubango the next day. Schöss mentioned that the Portuguese administration followed all his steps closely. He had already sent two ox wagons with flour to Fort Dongoena, addressed to the Study Commission. He hoped to procure enough foodstuffs to equip 16 additional ox wagons

356 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schubert, Luanda to Thurner, 2.9.14.


357 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telegr. VK Benguela to Consulate Luanda, 1.9.14.

358 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telgr. Busch, Benguela to Consulate Luanda, 9.9.14.

359 BAB R 1001/6634: 136f., Report of Baericke (16.11.19), Annex 9 Memo Allm., 23.5.22.

360 TNA FO 371/1884: 424, Brit. VC Lobito to Army Headquarters Cape Town, 10.10.14.

361 *Curto/Gervais* 2001: 6 FN 14.



Ill. 11 “Huila – Schubert”

with corn and flour; altogether around “150 tons”. The Portuguese allowed food exports only via custom stations, and Schöss warned Busch of the controls and the penalties for defraudation of the customs. It was still to be seen how the Portuguese officials would react to the food transports when they learned about their purpose. Would it be possible to ask the Governor General to permit the transports? Consul Eisenlohr deemed it too early for such a step.³⁶² Under pretext, he withdrew another 200,000 Goldmark in Luanda and had the money sent via courier to Benguela for the purchase of new foodstuff.³⁶³ However, the imminent campaign against the Kwanyama provided the Portuguese authorities with ample arguments to exclude German action in the war zone. In September, a state of emergency was declared for the Huíla district. Only the support of Colonel Coelho enabled Schubert to continue his journey from Porto Alexandre to Huíla and Lubango.³⁶⁴

362 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) VK Schöss, Lubango to Busch, Benguela, 30.8.14.

Since Governor Seitz did not receive the information about the ongoing procurement in Angola, he asked the representative of the *Woermann-Line* in Swakopmund, Brauer, to go with his ship to Moçâmedes and transport food to GSWA.³⁶⁵ In a letter to the Vice Consul Schöss, forwarded by Brauer, Governor Seitz requested him to provide the mariner with “as much sugar and gasoline as could be possibly loaded onto his ship.” The remainder should be transported to the border along the Kunene River. Seitz also asked Schöss for news regarding the Portuguese position in the war and “whether strict neutrality or a pro-English attitude” was shown by the Governor General in Luanda.³⁶⁶ Following Brauer’s arrival in Moçâmedes on September 9, it was “unthinkable” to provide him with the goods. An employee of Schöss’ company could only explain the situation in a letter: Pointing to the new state of emergency in the Huíla district, he responded to Seitz that it was now even more difficult to transport goods to GSWA. Any traffic from the coast to the interior was prohibited. He had already sent several ox wagons to the Kunene border, but it seemed doubtful whether these loads would reach Erickson Drift, the intended point of transfer. He furthermore mentioned that on September 2 400 “native troops” had arrived from Mozambique and were sent inland to the Huíla District. Additional 1,200 troops from Lisbon were expected to arrive in Moçâmedes on September 20. The population believed these men were sent at the request of Britain.³⁶⁷ Indeed, it was no secret that Lisbon sent “fifteen hundred additional troops for garrison service” in Angola. The American minister believed this “an additional precautionary measure against occupation by any of the European powers”.³⁶⁸

Brauer’s appearance had caused excitement among the population. When Schubert arrived in Moçâmedes on September 10, 1914 he saw Brauer’s boat and noticed anti-German sentiments. Immediately after the war had broken out, contradictory rumors began to circulate in southern Angola.³⁶⁹ Brauer was considered a German spy. His vehicle was carefully checked before he was ordered by the district governor to leave.³⁷⁰ He

363 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) note Eisenlohr, 10.9.14.

364 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schubert to Eisenlohr, 10.9.14; 11.9.14; Santos 1978: 198f.

365 BAB R 1001/6645, 14, KGW to Woermann-Linie, 21.8.14.

366 BAB R 1001/6645, 12, 15; PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) KGW to V-Cnsl Schöss, 29.8.14.

367 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) VK Moçâmedes to KGW, 11.9.14.

368 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 820, USML to SoS, 8.9.14.

369 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz (Huíla) to Faugère, 11.8.14.

370 BAB R 1001/6634: 83f., Report of A. Schubert, Annex 1 to Memo Allem., 23.5.22.

could not take in any provisions, but at least, Brauer could take with him the latest journals reporting that the Prime Minister had declared Portugal to be benevolently neutral in favor of the allies. He also forwarded letters from the consulate and from Consul Alfred Haug (1873–1929), Johannesburg, who, upon his return to Europe, had passed Moçâmedes and left a note about the likely South African attack routes and war objectives (wireless station Windhoek). Finally, he confirmed the rumors about the troop movements in Moçâmedes. Thus, Brauer’s journey to Moçâmedes was indeed a reconnaissance tour. After his return, he reported that Angola was completely under British influence and deemed it unrealistic to procure provisions for GSWA there.³⁷¹

The day Brauer arrived in Moçâmedes, Eisenlohr wrote to Governor Seitz that, upon his return from Lisbon on September 2, Governor General Norton de Matos had emphasized to him that the friendly relations between Portugal and Germany should remain as they were. Until the Governor’s declaration, Eisenlohr was never sure whether or not Portugal was neutral. Eisenlohr also mentioned the transport of troops, which were “probably” not just meant to subdue the Kwanyama, but also to protect the border against German incursions or to disarm German troops in case they retreated from GSWA due to the British invasion. Eisenlohr feared that the British could cause the Portuguese to attack GSWA from the north in order to split the German troops. He urged Seitz to have the situation at the border closely monitored and to ensure that there were no German actions at the border that could be interpreted by the Portuguese as an intended attack on Angola.³⁷²

Within the next days it became apparent that Angola’s authorities knew everything and were “not well disposed towards Seitz’ plan” to transport foodstuff from Angola to GSWA. On September 12 Norton de Matos, who allegedly harbored an *idée fixe* about the coming German invasion of Angola,³⁷³ published a decree according to which the export of foodstuff from Angola was only possible with the permission of the district governor and only if these products were dispensable in Angola. This decree was in line with similar provisions in the metropolis. Already on August 3, 1914 the government had forbidden “the exportation to foreign countries

371 BAB R 1001/6645, 46f, Report Brauer, 25.9.14; 37, Haug to KGW, 2.9.14; BAB R 1001/6634: 136, Rpt Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.19), Ax 9 MA, 23.5.22; *Seitz* 1920: 32.

372 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consul Luanda to KGW, 10.9.14; *Norton* 2001: 208.

373 *Stals* 1968: 186 ‘nie goedgesind ... nie’; *Baericke* 1981: 20 ‘Invasionsidee’.

from continental Portugal ... of foodstuff (except wine), livestock and combustibles”.³⁷⁴ This was a reaction to food scarcity in Portugal due to the failure of crops in 1913. The government authorized “the purchase of thousands of tons of wheat to supply the deficiency”.³⁷⁵ Also modern research confirms that Angola produced barely enough food to sustain its population. “[M]alnutrition continued to be the most widespread and serious problem [in Angola] by the twentieth century”.³⁷⁶

Norton de Matos’ decree changed the situation. It was not possible to transport the supplies clandestinely across the border if the authorities had expressed the desire to keep the food in Angola. Eisenlohr therefore went directly to Norton de Matos. He openly told him about efforts in southern Angola to transport food to GSWA and that he did not want his compatriots to infringe Portuguese law. The governor gentlemanlike evaded the issue by claiming he signed the decree due to attempts from Belgian Congo to purchase all food available in Angola. He understood, on the other hand, that Angola’s richness consisted in food and that the poor merchants of southern Angola depended on the new business opportunity with GSWA. He therefore had nothing against the export to GSWA – as long as the Governor of the Huíla district agreed. Eisenlohr, in turn, pointed to the difficulty of informing the Germans about the decree and hoped the authorities would be lenient in case of contravention.³⁷⁷

As a next step, Eisenlohr planned to go to Benguela and Moçâmedes to inform his compatriots about the new situation. Before that, he again met Norton de Matos who now told him that on the same date as he regulated the food export (September 12) he had formally declared the state of emergency in the Huíla district. Nobody was allowed to enter the district except Portuguese officials. The only exceptions he allowed were for the Study Commission and Eisenlohr to inform the Germans. Norton de Matos now explicitly refused the export of food to GSWA. Eisenlohr was thus left with two (illegal) options for transports to GSWA: either via ship or across the “completely waterless” southern part of the Huíla district. Both possibilities were dangerous. Conceding that the chances of success

374 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 134: 690, USC General to SoS, 31.8.14 (Annual Report).

375 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 133: 600, USC General to SoS, 20.5.14 (Annual Report).

376 Dias 1981: 375f. “[T]he question of improving domestic food supplies continued to be largely ignored by the government [still] in the 1920s.”

377 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to DGL, 14.9.14. Eisenlohr also mentioned that a British citizen purchased in Luanda food for the Congo. The Governor General gave him the same answer as he gave to Eisenlohr; cf. Baericke 1981: 35.

were limited, Eisenlohr claimed he would attempt “without regard to hardship and danger” to send transports on both routes.³⁷⁸ However, he failed to take into consideration the Governor General’s legalistic ingenuity to prevent the Germans from taking any useful step towards the completion of their mission. In Lisbon, Britain’s Minister Carnegie received a more candid explanation for the proclamation of the state of emergency in southern Angola: “to refuse the entry into that part of the colony of Germans, who, under the guise of missionaries, might endeavor to foment disturbances among natives. Both German civilians and missionaries had already been making trouble.”³⁷⁹

Just before the steamer left for Moçâmedes on September 19, the Governor General sent Eisenlohr a message that his permit to enter the Huíla district was withdrawn since soon also the Moçâmedes district would be under a state of emergency. Eisenlohr insisted on going to the south in order to mitigate potential conflicts with district officials due to the ongoing attempts to deliver food to GSWA despite the ban (which was not known to all involved Germans). He wrote to Minister Rosen in Lisbon to request the government to lift the ban – but such step would have taken months.³⁸⁰

Despite the setbacks, in those days the Germans in Angola seemed to have been in high spirits. German Consul Dr. Asmis, who had to leave the Belgian Congo for Angola wrote to the American Consul McBride about his pleasure to read four-week old German newspapers in Luanda detailing German successes in France. “The excitement in Germany is great ... our mood [in Luanda] is excellent.”³⁸¹ However, it was not granted to Consul Eisenlohr to repeat these “successes” diplomatically in Angola. The Portuguese authorities continued to hold him back. When he arrived in the harbor of Moçâmedes he was not allowed to land and had to return to Benguela. Similar situations arose in the hinterland. Vice Consul Schöss was provoked repeatedly in Lubango. All his attempts to send foodstuffs across the border proved futile. Busch, already on his way to Erickson Drift, was arrested south of Huambo. The Portuguese officials and the population considered the deliveries to be German war preparations. The density of fortresses in southern Angola proved now an advan-

378 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to DGL, 18.9.14; Estado de sitio, no distrito da Huíla, *Boletim Oficial de Angola* no.37, 12.9.14, no.985: 806f.; cf. Ramos 1970.

379 TNA FO 371/1884: 354, Brit. Minister Lisbon to FO, 23.9.14.

380 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to DGL, 19.9.14.

381 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18,703, Asmis to McBride, 27.9.14 ‘we are in the best of spirits’.



Ill. 12 “Huilla – Chibia”

tage to be used against German activities. Sub-Lieutenant Manuel A. Sereno (1877–1914?), Commander of Fort Otoquero, near the German border, received the order from the new District Governor Alves Roçadas to intercept the ox wagons sent from Lubango, Humbe, and Chibia heading towards GSWA. Subsequently Sereno and his men confiscated eleven wagons near the Kunene River³⁸² and discovered three German storages. Also Africans reported about the great number of soldiers in the area south of Humbe setting up military edifices along both banks of the Kunene River. All fords were blocked and anyone attempting to cross the river was apprehended.³⁸³ In this particular case, the Portuguese colonial state showed that it was capable to organize institutional cohesion: The orders given at the center were truthfully carried out on the periphery. Also ox wagons for the Study Commission were withheld. Portuguese mistrust that

382 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 68, Relatório pedido pelo Capitão-Mor de Cuamato, 22.10.14.

there was no difference between the provisions sent to the Study Commission and those sent by Schöss proved well founded.³⁸⁴

When Consul Eisenlohr involuntarily landed in Benguela he met Busch who had procured food and sent it to the border. Busch told the consul how Kéry was stopped with 13 ox wagons and ordered by officials to return to Huambo. Here the group was interrogated. The official was concerned that the Germans would deliver guns to the Kwanyama. Since no weapons were found, he released the group. Kéry and Schwarzer returned to their load, which was guarded, on the road to Caconda where they had arrived on October 1. Kéry wanted to reach Luceque, where two traders were expecting him with another 19 ox wagons. The administrator in Caconda however ordered all the goods to be secured in Caconda. Kéry's group thus had to return to Benguela at the end of October.³⁸⁵

In Benguela the district governor told Eisenlohr that in the meantime the Governor General had prohibited all export of food except to Portugal or the Portuguese colonies. Eisenlohr therefore wrote to Rosen in Lisbon that under these circumstances the endeavor had to be "provisionally abandoned". Busch was told to discontinue the transports of food and to sell all perishable goods. Eisenlohr hoped to clarify the situation with Norton de Matos who had come to Moçâmedes to welcome the troops from Portugal. He hoped to convince him to "alleviate" the prohibition of exports. The *Jornal de Benguela* commented that Portugal would no longer stay neutral and that the arriving troops had to "conquer Damaraland" and to "castigate alongside" the Kwanyama. It was now widely known in southern Angola that an "expedition of 5,000 soldiers" would subdue the Kwanyama.³⁸⁶ Eisenlohr was concerned since the troops sent to Mozambique had stopped over in Luanda on a British steamer under British flag. This could lead to confusion in case a German war ship encountered these transports.³⁸⁷

383 BAB R 1001/6645: 63, Rautanen to BA Outjo, 29.9.14 [quot. Josua ja Namuhuja]; R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 31, statement Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21; *Santos* 1978: 200.

384 BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 13f., testimony Ambass. Norton de Matos, 5.5.26.

385 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Report of Georg Kéry to Consulate Luanda, 16.11.14.

386 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Gallangue) to TRP, 2.10.14.

387 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to DGL, 2.10.14; *Portaria* no. 1:028, in: *Boletim Oficial de Angola* no. 39, 26.9.1914: 866.



Ill. 13 "Angola" Ox wagon



Ill. 14 "Bei Junda?", Angola, Ox wagon

Before he arrived in the south, the Governor General had declared the state of emergency also for the districts of Moçâmedes and Luanda. Vice-Consul Schöss tried in vain to convince Norton de Matos to permit food transports and the transfer of mail to GSWA. The former was not allowed due to the “lack of customs stations” along the southern border. The latter was not permitted due to the state of emergency. Eisenlohr was annoyed by this constant “reference to the wording of whatever laws”. He admitted defeat and considered the “undertaking to have failed.”³⁸⁸

On September 14, Seitz received a telegram from Outjo, notifying him about a letter forwarded by a man from Angola, du Plessis, indicating that ox wagons loaded with food, including those of the study commission, were under way from Angola. It was suggested to proceed from the border at Erickson Drift to Okaukweyo, preferably also with the ox wagons of German mission stations where the goods should be stored temporarily. Similar to the news received from Brauer, the governor was informed that 1,600 soldiers from Portugal were under way to Moçâmedes. Also trader Busch had arrived in Outjo and reported that the provisions delivered by Kéry and Schwarzer would arrive at Erickson Drift, but would *not* cross the border.

The organization of the food transports to GSWA was immensely hampered by the absence of Governor Seitz, who was then in the south of GSWA, and Schultze-Jena, Outjo’s district officer, who had still not returned from his journey to King Mandume. After more than a week had passed, Seitz ordered Schultze-Jena to immediately leave for Erickson Drift after his arrival from Ovamboland. He was directed to pay and take over the food transports from Kéry or Thurner and direct them to Okaukweyo.³⁸⁹ Contrary to Eisenlohr’s intention, the “undertaking” he had initiated continued – the smuggling drama would soon turn into a tragedy.

388 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to Otto Busch, Benguela, 12.10.14; *Portaria* no. 1:050; 1:051, in: *Boletim Oficial de Angola* no. 39, 26.9.1914: 869.

389 BAB R 1001/6645: 16 Telgr BA Outjo to KGW; 26 Busch to KGW, 14.9.; 32, KGW to BA Outjo, 23.9.14; R 1001/6634: 158, Report Seitz (10.5.1921), Ax 13 Memo Allm., 23.5.22.

2.3 Misunderstandings – the Naulila Incident, October 1914

After requesting Eisenlohr, sending Busch and then Brauer, Schultze-Jena's trek was Governor Seitz' fourth attempt to create a supply line from Angola. Schultze-Jena had indeed informed King Mandume about Seitz' intention to deliver 100 guns and ammunition and asked about possible Portuguese advances. He also visited two mission stations (Olukonda [Sept. 7] and Omupanda [Sept. 19]). There, he told missionary Wulforst that the delivery of guns to Mandume was conditioned upon the case that the Portuguese joined the British and advanced across Ovamboland.³⁹⁰

One week after Seitz' order, Schultze-Jena set out from Outjo with a small expedition to go to Erickson Drift, also with the intention to contact Portuguese officials in order to discuss the possibility of delivering mail and supplies via Angola to GSWA. His troop consisted of the two lieutenants Alexander Lösch (1885–1914), survey corps, and Curt Roeder (1887–1914), a farmer near Outjo (Chauas-Okawa) and reserve officer, Constable Joseph Schaaps, Police Sergeant Braunsdorf, the soldiers Kimmel and Pahlke, four African “police servants”, and five Africans to handle three ox wagons. A Danish farmer, Carl Jensen, accompanied them as “interpreter”. The “old Africa-hand” had worked in the gold mines of Cassinga and knew southern Angola from his wagoner service during the expedition of Alves Roçadas in 1907. Contrary to what has been written about him, he was *not* “an able linguist fluent in Portuguese, German and the Ovambo language”. He spoke fairly German, but his knowledge of Oshiwambo and Portuguese was limited.³⁹¹

The men left Outjo on October 3, 1914 for the 300-kilometer trek north; this very day Schultze-Jena received a letter from missionary Rautanen about Portuguese soldiers occupying all Kunene fords. According to Jensen, except for Schultze-Jena, nobody knew of the object of the mission. Rumors spread that British troops had landed in southern Angola, preparing to invade GSWA from the north.³⁹² It was thus an additional objective of the mission to clarify Portugal's neutrality.³⁹³

390 NAN A.505: 34, A. Wulforst. Chronik Station Omupanda, 20.11.15; BAB R 1001/6645: 11, Telgr. BA Outjo to KGW, 28.9.14; cf. *Pelholo* 1958: 177; 2002: 191.

391 *Southern* 2007: 8; 10, ref. to *Baericke* 1981: 45; *Santos* 1978: 202; *Kurz* 1995: 20.

392 BAB R 1001/6645: 63, Rautanen to BA Outjo, 29.9.14; Bethe to KGW, 11.10.14.

393 BAB R 1001/6634: 98, Report of C. Jensen, Ax 4 to Memo Allem.; 131, Jensen to DGL, 30.4.15, Ax 8 Memo Allem, 23.5.22.

After a few days, the group entered Ovamboland, the most densely populated area of GSWA. Around 100,000 inhabitants had been – as one of the first South African officials to travel there in 1915 put it – “left [by the Germans] entirely to their own devices.” During the next weeks, the 16 men had to follow the traditions of the area. According to missionary August Hochstrate (1861–1936) “[i]t was the custom that when European visitors came to the country they would visit the native chief”.³⁹⁴ Ovambo kings exerted a “thorough control of the whole trading process, and a system of compulsory ‘gifts’ meant that in effect the surplus generated in trade tended to accumulate in royal hands.” The kings had their messengers and “officials [to] watch over every move made” by the Europeans. Since German officials had requested the support of German and Finnish missionaries (as Russian citizens, they were formally enemy subjects) in the transport of foodstuffs from Angola (for lack of transport capacity, the latter had refused) and since at least one missionary had informed Ondonga King Martin of this request, the purpose of the German visit was well known in Ovamboland. Rumors reached the German group that Portuguese soldiers had set up traps for them. Then, a mysterious German, who had defected from the *Schutztruppe*, appeared. The man, Haunschild, warned the group of the Portuguese and offered help. Schultze-Jena asked him to find out about the whereabouts of Portuguese troops.

Schultze-Jena, although a high-ranking official, was not exempted from the gift system and the “pervasive royal control”.³⁹⁵ He first met Uukwambi King Ipumbo and Finnish missionaries. Ipumbo, in control of the route to the Kunene, was – according to Jensen, who translated – unfriendly to Germans. Due to their rich gifts he spoke highly of the Portuguese. Schultze-Jena presented him with a rifle and sold him a horse in exchange for Ipumbo’s permission to cross his area. He told the King to stay calm in spite of the war between Europeans.³⁹⁶

The group intended to go to Erickson Drift. Referring to his map of the Kunene region Lösch, the surveyor, stated that the ford’s southern bank would still be on German territory.³⁹⁷ There, they arrived on October 16,

394 Pritchard 1916: 3; BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 35, testimony Hochstrate, 26.4.26.

395 Clarence-Sm./Moorsom 1975: 370f.; cf. Peltola 2002: 191; NAN A.505: 34, A. Wulfhorst, Chronik der Station Omupanda, 20.11.15.

396 BAB R 1001/6634: 137f., Report Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.19), Ax 9 Memo Allem.; Hartmann 1998: 270; Stals 1968: 187; Peltola 1958: 177; Schaaps 1930: 382; Henning 1925: 110; Baericke 1981: 48.

397 BAB R 1001/6645: 67, BA Outjo to KGW, 3.10.14; 1001/6634: 99, report Jensen, 2.8.21.



Ill. 15 “Viehtränke am Kunene”



Ill. 16 Hans Schultze-Jena



Ill. 17 Erickson Drift, 1921

1914 in the early morning and erected their camp some 500 meters south of the river. The place was located 14 kilometers south of the Portuguese Fort Naulila (also called Ehinga, Esinka, Ouinga or Kinga). At Erickson Drift the river changes its course to the west; at the time it was around 130 meters wide and shallow; arms of the river (*mulola*) crossed the vicinity. In the past the riverbed had changed. The margins were covered with belts of high reeds, swamps, “creeks and pools infested with crocodiles”. On its northern (‘Portuguese’) bank the two hills of Calueque (or Kampili) domi-


nated the landscape.³⁹⁸ It was known that the right of possession over Erickson Drift was disputed. The Germans considered it the northern edge of the “neutral zone” between the two disputed parallel lines agreed on with the Portuguese in 1912. Lösch was intrigued by the hills of Calueque, a “small cluster of kopjes [and] a striking landmark for miles around”.

At Erickson Drift Schultze-Jena did not find the ox wagons with food from Angola. The group had arrived three days late. Since late September, Vageler had tried to arrange the handover of food deliveries organized by Vice Consul Schöss. He had waited in vain at the Zwartbooi and Erickson Drifts to meet German officials and to inform them about the delays and difficulties with the deliveries from Angola. Not expecting anymore that Germans would arrive, Vageler decided to return to Humbe on October 13, 1914. He also learned that several ox wagons were confiscated by Portuguese officials. However, on his way to Humbe Vageler met another German who informed him about an alleged Portuguese telegram he had heard of that a certain Dr. Schultze was expected, probably at Erickson Drift. Vageler decided to meet this man. He expected him to be a German official, whom he considered in danger in case he entered Portuguese territory. Vageler wanted to cross into GSWA to warn him. However, his approach of the border near Fort Naulila in the evening of October 14 did not go unnoticed in the “densely populated area”. He was arrested and brought to Fort Naulila, where he was interrogated by Commander Sergeant Gentil. He claimed that he had lost his way,³⁹⁹ but he raised suspicion since he carried large sums of money. The next day Vageler was transported to Fort Cuamato. From there he sent a telegram to Schöss before being taken to Humbe.⁴⁰⁰

398 *Kanthack* 1921: 322; 327, cf. photograph of Erickson Drift; cf. *Pearson* 1910: 509.

399 BAB R 1001/6634: 151, Vageler to KGW (~11/1914), Ax 11, 23.5.22; *Baericke* 1981: 32.

400 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 31, statement A.Varão, 11.11.21; *Hennig* 1920: 109.



Map 2 Erickson Drift, excerpt "Deutsch-Südwestafrika, Blatt 3 Rehoboth (Amboland)", 1912

Being unable to take over any foodstuffs or see anyone upon the opposite riverbank, Schultze-Jena decided to send Roeder and Jensen with a letter (in “slightly Luso-cized” German) to the Portuguese Fort Dongoena to inform its commander about his arrival. The “Iberian administrative system [in the colonies] was characterized by a dense network of petty white officials” and for foreigners it was not easy to understand each one’s responsibility.⁴⁰¹ His mission to try to establish a supply line from Angola did not allow Schultze-Jena to hide from the Portuguese. However, he did not contact the nearest Portuguese post, Fort Naulila (that had replaced the vacated Fort Henrique Couceiro in the neutral zone), because it was not yet mentioned on his maps. It was Haunschild – he had been in contact with the Portuguese on October 15 – who reported the following day, October 17, the arrival of the Germans to Sergeant Gentil in Fort Naulila. Gentil sent a patrol to verify the information. Shortly before two Portuguese soldiers entered the German camp, Haunschild rejoined the Germans. He then disappeared, however, before he could be questioned about the suspicion that he might have spied for the Portuguese. The two soldiers asked the Germans what they were looking for. Schultze-Jena answered that they were coming from Outjo and were pausing. He requested them to forward a (second) letter to the administrator in Humbe informing him about his arrival and asking for a meeting.⁴⁰² After the return of his men, Gentil sent a messenger to his district officer (*Capitão mor*), Captain Antonio F. Varão, in Fort Cuamato notifying him about the arrival of the Germans and their letter.⁴⁰³

In the meantime, Roeder and Jensen, after having waved white flags as signs of their peaceful intentions, asked at Fort Dongoena, around 30 kilometers north of Erickson Drift, whether there was war between the two countries. The question was most pressing since at the same time in Lis-

401 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 55, report C. Palermo, 5.11.14 ‘em almão levemente aporuguezado’; Machado 1956: 15; Clarence-Smith 1985: 321.

402 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 63, Relatório pedido pelo Capitão-Mor de Cuamato, 22.10.14: ‘12. [17.]10.1914 – Monsieur! Excusez le papier et cette lettre, mais je ne parle pas bien le français. Je suis venu de Outjo et j’ai envoyé deux de mes compagnons à Dongoena pour notifier au commandant de mon arrivé, parce que j’ai crois que Dongoena serai la station la plus prochaine. Je vous propos une entrevue. Veuillez destiner la place et le temps. With kind regards, Dr. Schultze-Jena, Administrateur de Outjo.’; Santos 1978: 204; Stals 1968: 187 (German letter); the latest German map (*Sprigade/Moisel* 1914: No. 6), however, mentioned ‘Ouinga’; on the difficulties of making maps in GSWA Demhardt 2000: 206f.

403 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 32; 35 testim. A. Varão, 11.11.21; Baericke 1981: 49.

bon negotiations about sending troops to the western front were ongoing, and “it was generally felt that within weeks, if not days, Portugal would become a belligerent.” However, it turned out that the Portuguese army was completely unprepared for this task.⁴⁰⁴ Fort Dongoena’s Commander, Sergeant Batouchas, may not have been aware of these discussions about an intervention, but he knew that Portugal was (for the time being) neutral. This he stated to the Germans and he also explained that the Portuguese troops who had landed in Moçâmedes were to be employed against the Kwanyama. Roeder and Jensen handed over their letter to be forwarded to the administrator in Humbe, Armando de Campos Palermo. Batouchas provided them with a *laissez-passer* and they procured an old copy of the Lisbon daily *O Seculo*, accidentally detailing the reasons for the dispatch to Angola of an expeditionary force. In the afternoon they left Dongoena and arrived at the German camp the next morning. Roeder and Jensen informed their group that there was no war with Portugal. They learned about the two Portuguese soldiers who had visited the camp and the letter given to them for their superior. Jensen assumed that King Iipumbo had already informed the Portuguese about the German mission, so they could plan ahead.⁴⁰⁵

In the early morning of October 18, immediately upon receiving the message from Fort Naulila, the *Capitão mor* in Fort Cuamato, Varão, sent a telegram to Sub-Lieutenant (*alferes*) Manuel Sereno in Fort Otoquero, who had confiscated the ox wagons Schultze-Jena was looking for. Varão ordered Sereno to go “with all forces available” to Naulila. In line with the decree on the state of emergency, Sereno, “at 37 years of age, a very mature junior subaltern”,⁴⁰⁶ was tasked with intercepting and disarming the Germans, who had allegedly entered Portuguese territory. Varão was aware of the difficulty understanding the Germans and directed Sereno to use “native interpreters”.⁴⁰⁷ Varão left it to the initiative of the *alferes* “to act in accordance with the circumstances” and “with patriotism”. He also informed the Governor of the Huíla district, Roçadas, and asked for orders.⁴⁰⁸

404 *Meneses* 2010: 42.

405 BAB R 1001/6634: 120, Report Jensen, Ax 6 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; *Machado* 1956: 10f.

406 *Southern*, 2007: 8; cf. *Fraga* 2010: 127; *Santos* 1978: 206f.; *Machado* 1956: 22f.

407 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3:4, Varão, auto de averiguações, 30.10.14 ‘com toda força disponível’.

408 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 32f, testim. Antonio Varão, 11.11.21; *L’Ange* 1991: 172.

Sereno rode with his men 30 kilometers from Otoquero to Fort Naulila where he was told by Sergeant Gentil that the Germans camped south of Erickson Drift (also called “Caloéque” or “Kalusheke”). Sereno reached Schultze-Jena’s camp on October 18, 1914, around 4 p.m., with 15 dragoons and 20 African soldiers. At that moment, the Germans “were naked” (*im Adamskostüm*), since they were taking a bath. Sereno asked the Germans what they were looking for on Portuguese territory. Schultze-Jena responded that he had announced his presence in Fort Dongoena and was waiting for the administrator of Humbe to come to Erickson Drift for negotiations. (He had also sent word to missionary Wulffhorst in Omupanda about his arrival at the Kunene and asked for more information about all events in Ovamboland; Wulffhorst responded.) He then referred to German maps (Sprigrade & Moisel) indicating that his camp south of the southern bank of Erickson Drift was on German territory. Sereno disputed this. Lieutenant Lösch is said to have responded: “It is well known that Erickson Drift forms the border and the two small [Kampili] hills beyond the Kunene assure me that we are at Erickson Drift. The hills are part of the cataracts.”⁴⁰⁹ In fact, Erickson Drift was six miles upstream of the Kavale cataracts. However, Lösch was not completely misguided by his map. The Kunene River formed a northwards stream bend between Erickson Drift and the Kavale rapids, the northern “starting point” for the parallel limiting the “neutral zone”. According to the German map, at Erickson Drift this parallel “re-touched” the river before it turned again northwards, thus leaving Erickson Drift’s southern bank in the “neutral” (or German) zone and not on indisputably Portuguese territory. The situation was most confusing and the British engineer F.E. Kanthack remarked in 1921: “[N]early all information concerning this section of the river, both official and otherwise was ... misleading.”⁴¹⁰

Schultze-Jena also told Sereno that he was searching for the deserter Haunschild, whom he had seen in Ovamboland; indirectly referring to the ancient legal doctrine of “hot pursuit” that may have justified the crossing into foreign territory (had there been a treaty).⁴¹¹ Schultze-Jena openly stated that he wanted to talk to the administrator of Humbe to receive per-

409 BAB R 1001/6634: 99, Report Jensen (2.8.21), Ax 4 Memo A., 23.5.22; R 1001/ 6640: 38, hearing Gonçalves, 13.10.25; NAN A.505: 34, Chronik, 20.11.15; *Baericke* 1981: 51.

410 *Kanthack* 1921: 322;336; *Machado* 1956: 58 ‘não existia uma carta regular da região’; cf. *Demhardt* 2000: 208; *Nasson* 2014a: 170 on the ‘loose character of colonial borders’

411 Cf. *Poulantzas* 2002 [1969]: 4-11 dating back to Byzantine law.

mission to continue his journey to Lubango. Sereno told him that the area was in the jurisdiction of the *Capitão mor* in Fort Cuamato who was in charge of such permits, and not the administrator Campos Palermo.⁴¹² As Sereno later wrote, he invited Schultze-Jena to meet the *Capitão mor*, to be “provided with the requested permit *or* to decide what should happen with the Germans.” A. Schubert of the Study Commission, who was told the story by Jensen, raised doubts whether Jensen did understand the proviso allegedly made by Sereno. Sereno did not speak French or German, Jensen’s Portuguese was insufficient and he had to re-translate what he understood into another foreign language, German.

Language challenges of European travelers in a colonial context have been repeatedly analyzed by historians. Traditionally, those problems of miscomprehensions and misinterpretations occurred between European visitors and African hosts. However, similar difficulties could arise between Europeans especially when Portuguese nationals were involved since other Europeans usually had not learnt Portuguese “back home”, but French or English. However, the “European *lingua franca* [of west-central Africa] was Portuguese”, and Schultze-Jena was not the first German visitor to have underestimated the challenge of finding his way across Angola without understanding Portuguese. Traditionally, such travelers – those visiting an African court – were eager to find able intermediaries who would act as “master of ceremonies” and advise their “employers ... in matters of protocol”. Schultze-Jena, who had merely planned to visit Angolan officials to ask them for a permit, miscalculated the need to carefully select his interpreter who should also have been a “trans-cultural ‘translator’”. But Jensen was not an *ambaquista*, he was a miserable interpreter whose Portuguese, as Sergeant Batouchas reported, was “hard to understand.”⁴¹³

412 Naulila was one of eight forts in the *Capitania mor* Cuamato under Captain A. F. Varão: Forts Roçadas, Otoquero, Nalusheque, Naulila, Aucongo, Inhoca, Damaquero, and Cuamato – head quarters of the *Capitania mor* and of the 17th Native Company. The latter consisted of 120 African soldiers being commanded by two officers and twelve non-commissioned officers. They were distributed among the forts. In addition, Varão commanded 25 dragons and a battery of artillery in Damaquero. However, twelve artilleryists had only one cannon and no ammunition (BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 29, statement Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21). *Capitão mor*: ‘an official chosen by the Portuguese government to represent the interests of Portugal to the local rulers, to protect the local Portuguese community from oppression and to ensure they remained at least partly under government control.’ Heywood/Thornton 1988: 223.

413 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 54, report C. Palermo, 5.11.14; Heintze 2011: 20; cf. Stolz et al. 2011.

After he believed to have understood what was said, Schultze-Jena accepted Sereno's invitation to meet the *Capitão mor* of Fort Cuamato. However, according to Jensen's translation of Sereno, the *Capitão mor* was currently in Naulila, while Sereno, according to Portuguese sources, had explained that Captain Varão was currently at Cuamato, where the Germans were supposed to meet him. Since it was almost sundown, Schultze-Jena invited Sereno and his men to stay as his guests overnight in the German camp. Jensen had to translate the conversations. The atmosphere during dinner was relaxed; although Sereno did not believe Schultze-Jena's explanation that he was on the trail of a deserter. He was convinced that the Germans wanted to pick up the load of the ox wagons he had already confiscated. The Germans on their part were not convinced that the troops recently arrived from Lisbon (as shown in the newspaper brought from Fort Dongoena) were only supposed to subdue the "rebellious" Kwanyama and occupy their territory since in October the rainy season was imminent. Both sides put guards near the camp all night long.⁴¹⁴

The next morning, October 19, Lieutenant Lösch was hesitant to follow the Portuguese invitation. He wanted to stay in the camp. According to Vageler, who quoted Constable Schaaps, Lösch said: "Nobody will leave the fort alive". It was not clear what gave him reason for his mistrust. But Vageler reported that he later learned that Schultze-Jena had received warning letters from missionaries in Ovamboland. Sereno noticed Lösch's reluctance and explicitly requested him to join them in Naulila, allowing him to carry his gun and inviting him and the other Germans to bring their bedding gear, thus implying that their sojourn would be longer. The Germans, however, convinced that they would only ride to Fort Naulila and return the same day, took only their arms. Around 8 a.m. Sereno, Schultze-Jena, Lösch and Roeder together with Jensen and the African "police servants Hugo, Andreas, and August" departed for Fort Naulila, 14 kilometers north.⁴¹⁵

Shortly before they reached the fort, the horses were watered at the river. In the meantime, Sereno sent one of his men, Sergeant Gonçalves, to

414 PA R 52529: 53-61: Memo port., 1921; BAB R 1001/6635: 51, Memo Allm, 23.5.22; R 1001/6639: 43, *Diário de Notícias*, ~15.2.15; Machado 1956: 65; *Southern*, 2007: 9.

415 BAB R 1001/6634: 150f., Dr. Vageler to KGW (~November 1914), Annex 11 to Memo Allemand; p. 120., Report of C. Jensen, Annex 6 to Memo Allemand, 23.5.22

Naulila to announce their arrival and to order breakfast.⁴¹⁶ Gonçalves returned 15 minutes later. Jensen understood from him that the *Capitão mor* Varão had returned to Fort Cuamato, but had left a letter. Schultze-Jena, listening to Jensen's translation was surprised, but did not want to reject Sereno's offer to have breakfast in Naulila. When they arrived around 9:30 a.m., the Portuguese officer ordered to unsaddle the horses and to serve breakfast. Gonçalves and one corporal stayed with the horse-gear, the other soldiers went for fodder. Sereno was at pains to explain to the Germans that Captain Varão was at Cuamato. He read the order written by the *Capitão mor* and also showed it to Jensen so he could explain to Schultze-Jena that they all had the order to proceed to Cuamato. Jensen assumed that this letter had just been written by Varão informing the Germans that he had to leave and that they were now in Portuguese custody, but free to follow him (Varão) to Cuamato under the supervision of Sereno. Jensen was not sure to have correctly understood the letter and told Schultze-Jena about this order by the *Capitão mor*. Schultze-Jena, not informed about the decree of the Governor General from September 12 about the state of emergency that gave plenty of prerogatives to the military, protested. He reminded Sereno of his invitation and argued that he trusted a Portuguese officer to honor his own words. The latter tried to play down the tension and invited the Germans to have breakfast before they all would continue their journey to Fort Cuamato. Schultze-Jena refused and ordered his men to bit the horses. No one understood the other. Jensen, now completely overstrained in his language capacity, noticed that the Portuguese soldiers had been given order by Sereno to take position with their guns. When he alerted Schultze-Jena to this conduct, the latter ordered his men to mount their horses. He protested against being tricked and the impertinence that he should ride to Fort Cuamato, since he was only following the invitation to the fort in the belief that he could meet the *Capitão mor* here in Fort Naulila. Schultze-Jena insisted on returning to his camp to wait there for the response of the administrator in Humbe, Campos Palermo, or the *Capitão mor* Varão. Sereno, "known for his brusque manner and direct approach"⁴¹⁷ responded that he had express or-

416 For food the fort depended to a large degree on Africans living in settlements nearby; photographs published in *Ilustração Portuguesa* (no. 470, 22.2.1915; no. 471, 1.3.1915) show *Índigenas de Naulila*. Women were 'charged' with preparing corn (*milho*) for the troops. The fort had also several animals, among them a domesticated ostrich and two camels.

417 *Southern* 2007: 9; *Norton* 2001: 209; *Machado* 1956: 35; *Baericke* 1981: 55.

ders not to permit the Germans to return to Erickson Drift, but to keep them here or bring them to Fort Cuamato. He seized the bridle of Schultze-Jena's horse to stop him from riding. According to Sereno, Schultze-Jena was at that point about to take his gun. Sergeant Gonçalves warned the unarmed Sereno. Feeling threatened (*ameaça*), he gave the order to fire. Schultze-Jena was shot dead by the surrounding soldiers. Roeder and Lösch wanted to escape through the gate but were shot by the guards too, without having fired a single shot.⁴¹⁸ Lösch died within minutes, while Curt Roeder was still alive. Jensen managed to escape, but was hit by a bullet and caught near the river, whereupon he was taken to the prison cell of Naulila. Jensen accused the Portuguese soldiers of having looted the body of Schultze-Jena and robbed Roeder, heavily wounded, of their valuables. The "police servant Hugo" escaping with the Germans was shot dead and allegedly thrown into the Kunene River "for the crocodiles". "Police servants August and Andreas" were rounded up, beaten and put into prison. August managed to escape the following night to Eunda on German territory. Andreas, too, later escaped from Portuguese custody.⁴¹⁹

The administrator in Humbe, Campos Palermo, had in the meantime received a telegram from Fort Dongoena and soon afterwards received the letter from Schultze-Jena.⁴²⁰ He was confused and glad to be able to show it to his prisoner Vageler, who had just been transferred from Fort Naulila, for translation.⁴²¹ That night, Campos Palermo sent telegrams to the District Governor in Lubango, informing him about the arrival of the Germans at Erickson Drift and asking for permission to meet them. When the permission was received from Governor Roçadas, Campos Palermo sent a telegram to Fort Cuamato that he would meet the group from Outjo.⁴²²

Vageler could offer his services for the negotiations and Campos Palermo released the German. On October 18, they and the trader and interpreter Pieter Jacob van der Kellen and two other men (one soldier guard-

418 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 66, Relatório pedido pelo Capitão-Mor, 22.10.14; cf. Santos 1978:211.

419 BAB R 1001/6634: 101f., Report of Jensen, Ax 4 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; p. 154, Vageler to KGW (~11/19), Ax 11 Mémoire All., 23.5.22; R 1001/6639: 43, *Diário de Notícias*, ~15.2.15 (German transl., 20.2.25); R 1001/6640: 39, testimony Gonçalves, 13.10.25; *Suchier* 1918: 30; a different version: *Southern* 2007: 9f. ref. to *Cidade* 1928: 497.

420 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 61, Telgr. (copy) Batouchas to Administrator Humbe, 17.10.1914; AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5^a Rep, Cx.996, auto de averiguações 'Naulila' (1914).

421 BAB R 1001/6634: 148, Vageler to RMW (10.11.1921), Ax 10, 23.5.22; *Stals* 1968: 187.

422 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 33, statement A.Varão, 11.11.21; *Hennig* 1920: 110.

ing Vageler) rode to Erickson Drift as stated in Schultze-Jena's letter, 70 kilometers south of Humbe. The group arrived on October 19, around 9 a.m. at the German camp, when Schultze-Jena and his men were about to enter Fort Naulila. Vageler, convinced that there was war between Germany and Portugal, persuaded soldier Georg Kimmel to ride after the seven men who had left an hour ago, to warn the Germans not to enter the fort and to inform them about the arrival of the administrator from Humbe. However, Kimmel reached the fort when the Portuguese had caught already the escaped, but wounded, Jensen. Kimmel was caught too and brought in together with Jensen. *Alferes* Sereno ordered Kimmel to write a letter to the remaining Germans to also come to Naulila. He did not know about the telegrams from Roçadas in Lubango permitting negotiations with the Germans. Nor did he believe Kimmel's assertion that the administrator of Humbe was currently in the German camp. Rather, Sereno told Kimmel not to mention in his letter that two Germans were dead. Kimmel and Jensen, however, wrote in German: "Schultze-Jena, Lösch shot dead" which Sereno could not read. Around noon Vageler sent, behind Campos Palermo's back, sergeant Braunsdorf and "Bushman Jan" to cautiously monitor the situation in the fort. Around 5 p.m. they both returned to the German camp with the message from Kimmel and Jensen, received from an African accompanying Kimmel to Naulila.⁴²³

Upon reading the message, Vageler was once more convinced that there must be war between Germany and Portugal. He wanted to inform the Governor in Windhoek as soon as possible. With the help of the German constable and the police sergeant Campos Palermo and his men were rounded up, but later released when the Germans departed south towards Eunda. During the night following the incident, Sereno sent patrols out to reconnoiter the area. In the meantime, he had learnt via telegraph from Fort Cuamato that the administrator of Humbe had indeed been waiting at Erickson Drift. Gonçalves later confirmed that he had been again at the place of the German camp to search for the remaining Germans. As the escaped "police servant August" witnessed on his way south, a Portuguese patrol of 20 men reached almost the main location of the "'free tribe', thus at least 15 km into German territory", blocking the path on which they may have expected the remainder of the German expedition on their way

423 BAB R 1001/6634: 152, Vageler to KGW~11/1914, Ax 11, 23.5.22; *Schaaps* 1930: 384.

back from Erickson Drift.⁴²⁴ Since the Germans had taken another route “across the bush” to Eunda, they reached the place unhindered the next morning. Here they joined two men who were waiting in vain with additional ox wagons for Schultze-Jena. Before the group left for Outjo, they were also joined by “police servant August”. From the German group, he was the only witness of the incident in Naulila not in Portuguese custody. He told Vageler that Sereno ordered to his men to take up their guns when Schultze-Jena gave instructions to prepare the horses to escape from Naulila. August also claimed that Sereno personally shot at the Germans.⁴²⁵ When the German party arrived in Outjo on October 24, Vageler sent a six-pages telegram to Governor Seitz that “by order of the commander [of Fort Naulila] Dr. Schultze, Lösch, Röder and police servants Andreas and Hugo were shot from behind, without a clue”.⁴²⁶

With the desertion of Dr. Vageler to GSWA, Governor General Norton de Matos and others saw their suspicion confirmed that the Study Commission was in fact nothing more than a tool of German expansionism. Despite requesting the engineers to continue the survey works, he had ordered their close observation in early October.⁴²⁷ Finally, Colonel Coelho and District Governor Roçadas agreed to dissolve the Commission. The German members had to return to Moçâmedes and were supposed to embark on the next steamer to Europe.⁴²⁸ Engineer Thurner was arrested in Lubango together with the other German members of the Commission, the surveyors Klemoscheg and Hempel, and with Vice Consul Schöss and his family. The arrest was not only “for their protection”, but also because they were considered “German spies”. The group was transported to Moçâmedes and put on a ship to Luanda.⁴²⁹ Also Dr. Alfred Schachzabel, ethnologist and “erudite traveler representative” of German aspirations,⁴³⁰

424 BAB R 1001/6634: 148f., Vageler to RMW 10.11.1921, Ax 10 Memo Allem.; p. 154, Vageler to KGW~11/1914, Ax 11 Memo Allem.; R 1001/6640: 39, testimony Gonçalves, 13.10.25; *Schaaps* 1930: 384; The ‘free tribe’ was probably the ‘native tribe in Okolonskasi [Uukolongadhi, near Eunda, Olusuati], a Free State (Negrostate) without chief’ where Schultze-Jena passed on 15.10.14, R 1001/6634: 98f., Report Jensen, Ax 4 Memo Allem., 23.5.22.

425 BAB R 1001/6634: 153, Vageler to KGW, Ax 11 Memo All., 23.5.22; *Schaaps* 1930: 385.

426 BAB R 1001/6645: 82, Telgr Vageler to KGW, 24.10.14; R 1001/6634: 88, Report Schubert, Ax 1 Memo All.; p. 158, Report Seitz 10.5.1921, Ax 13 Memo All., 23.5.22.

427 BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 11, testimony Ambassador Norton de Matos, 5.5.26.

428 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Chefe do Gabinete to Ger. Consul Luanda, 26.10.; 9.11.14.

429 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schöss to German Consulate Luanda, 28.11.14.

430 *Pélessier* 1996: 661; cf. *Heintze* 1995.

was arrested in Benguela and sent to Luanda, as he was in contact with persons who had established food storage facilities in several places.⁴³¹ As Germans, Busch and Schachzabel experienced numerous difficulties in Benguela: “People see new phantoms [*Gespenster*] everyday. In Bihe, Canda ... in Moçâmedes they see *Zeppeline* and *Aeroplane*”. There were rumors in Benguela that Busch had “instigated” the “mulatos” to poison all Portuguese.⁴³²

In Naulila, Lieutenant Roeder died of his wounds the night following the incident. In the morning, Sereno told Jensen to accompany him to the German camp to lure the remaining Germans into the fort. However, when they arrived at Erickson Drift, Vageler’s group had already left for Eunda. According to Jensen, Sereno then felt that he had committed an error. He started an “inquiry”. His soldiers had to confirm that Schultze-Jena had pointed his rifle at him. Jensen was ordered to confirm Sereno’s self-defense. He finally understood that *Capitão mor* Varão had not been in Naulila that morning. Varão’s letter, Jensen claimed, was hastily written by one of Sereno’s men before the Germans arrived.⁴³³

On October 21, Roçadas informed Governor General Norton de Matos about the incident, who in turn notified the government in Lisbon. Roçadas ordered the *Capitão mor* to undertake a thorough investigation. Sereno, Gentil, and other witnesses were heard; the German “war materials” were neatly listed. As Varão remembered, the prisoners Kimmel and Jensen had to be “pressed” hard to answer their interrogators. It was later claimed that the resulting report and all testimonies were destroyed during the battle in December.⁴³⁴ However, copies of the 52-page report have survived in the *Arquivo Histórico Militar* in Lisbon. Sketches were drawn of the German camp, the way along the Kunene River and the scene of shooting. It can be assumed from the numerous side-remarks that this re-

431 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Chefe do Gabinete to German Consul Luanda, 28.11.14.

432 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Otto Busch to German Consulate Luanda, 26.10.14. It was known in Luanda that in Elisabethville, Belgian Kongo, German merchant Scheffler was shot by a policeman because he happened to be the first German the sergeant met after he had learnt about the sacking of Lieuwen in Belgium by German troops. NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18, 703, German Consulate Luanda to USC in Boma, 5.10.14.

433 BAB R 1001/6634: 103, Report of C.Jensen, Annex 4 to Memo Allem., 23.5.22.

434 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 35f., testimony Commander Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21.

port and the accompanying documents were the starting point for the preparation of the Portuguese legal memoranda after the war.⁴³⁵

For diplomatic usage, Portugal's government developed its own version of the occurrences at Naulila: A German force crossed into Angola "in search for provisions. They were stopped by Portuguese troops and a short engagement took place after which they recrossed the frontier." The British Foreign Office was informed about Eisenlohr's endeavor to procure provisions for GSWA and the Governor General's prohibition to do so. The government in Berlin depended completely upon the Portuguese version.⁴³⁶

2.4 Revenge? – Devastating the Kavango Forts, Oct.–Nov. 1914

When Governor Seitz learned from Vageler about the incident at Fort Naulila early in the morning of October 24, the same telegram also informed him that 1,800 Portuguese soldiers were currently marching towards the German border, that fortresses were set up along the border, that Germans in Angola, including consul Schöss, were "in dire straits" and that all food transports had been confiscated. Convinced that a state of war now existed between Portugal and Germany, Vageler urged the governor – "in the interest of the defense of the colony" – to take the matter serious. The facts of the Naulila incident seemed confusing. However, considering all what he had learned about Angola over the last two months, one thing seemed undisputable for Governor Seitz: the state of war with Portugal.⁴³⁷

Would the Portuguese attack GSWA from the north? Was an Allied encirclement of GSWA to be feared? A few hours after he learnt of the incident, Seitz sent a telegram to the Commander of the *Schutztruppe*, Lt.-Colonel Joachim von Heydebreck (1861–1914), in Kalkfontein (in the far south of GSWA, today Karasburg) to inform him accordingly. The only German post at the border with Angola, the police station Kuring-Kuru

435 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3, auto de averiguações, 30.10.-9.11.14; Sereno, Material de guerra, 31.10.14; AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5ª Rep, Cx.996, auto de averiguações 'Naulila'.

436 TNA FO 371/1884: 424, Telegram BML to FO, 23.10.14; *RK4* 1915: 17 (15.11.14).

437 BAB R 1001/6645: 83, Telgr Vageler to KGW, 24.10.14; R 1001/6634: 145, Rpt Baericke 16.11.19, Ax 9 Memo All, 23.5.22; R 1001/6634: 88-91, Report Schubert, Ax 1 Memo All.; p. 158-160, Report Seitz 10.5.1921, Ax 13 Memo All., 23.5.22; *Samson* 2013: 78.

(opposite the Portuguese Fort Cuangar on the Okavango River) seemed to be in danger.⁴³⁸

At the same time Seitz ordered to send “open!” radio-telegrams (three times during three nights) to “all board stations and coastal stations” “in all directions” to let friend and foe know that the “lieutenant of Fort Ishinga [Naulila] had invited Schultze-Jena, Lösch, and Röder to Ishinga and had killed them there.” He expected – so he argued after the war – that Angola’s Governor General would thereby also be informed about what had happened and would respond with an explanation. Norton de Matos did not respond. German cables had been cut and British cables were no longer open for Germans. Attempts by Eickhoff, the engineer in charge of the wireless station at Windhoek, to reach the wireless station in Nauen near Berlin in order to receive an answer from the Colonial Office as to whether or not Portugal was at war with Germany, failed. The “five terrific steel lattice pillars, nearly four hundred feet high, tied by cables with bolts as big as a man”⁴³⁹ remained silent. Since the destruction of the station of Kamina in Togo on August 27, 1914 upon the approach of French troops, only “under favourable conditions” had “direct communication with Berlin” been possible. Until then, Seitz had been in “daily connection” with Berlin.⁴⁴⁰ In Paris, the radio station on the Eifel Tower had detected in early October that Berlin could still send messages to Windhoek via an unknown post in Cameroon or East Africa, but since mid-October messages from Berlin could no longer be received in Windhoek.⁴⁴¹ The Windhoek station was built to cover a radius of 4,000 kilometers to reach Kamina. Millions had been spent and now Germany’s global wireless network proved futile. The British were still concerned about it; especially as there were “rumors of wireless stations being erected on the south coast of Brazil by German sympathizers”.⁴⁴²

438 BAB R 1001/6645: 89, Telgr KGW to Cdr, 24.10.14; *Oelhafen* 1923: 51; *Cann* 2001: 151; *Baericke* 1981: 60; *Seitz* 1920: 33; *Suchier* 1918: 25; 63.

439 *Ritchie* 1915: 54; BAB R 1001/6645: 88, radio KGW to all stations, 24.10.14.

440 *Park* 1916: 116; 130 claims that until ‘end of March wireless messages were being received at Windhuk direct from Berlin’, which is an exaggeration; BAB R 1001/6645, 12 KGW to Vice-Consul Schöss, 29.08.14; R 1001/6634: 161, Eickhoff to RMW 15.11.21, Ax 14 Memo All., 23.5.22; cf. *Crabtree* 1915: 390; *Roscher* 1925; *Marguerat* 2006: 109-113; *Klein-Arendt* 1995; *Mantei* 2004.

441 TNA FO 371/1884: 366, French Embassy to FO, 9.10.14; NAN A.566 v. 2: 6, Schmitt to parents, 5.2.15.

442 *Friedewald* 2001: 56; *Baum* 1919: 597; cf. *Thurn* 1912; *Doß* 1977: 46f.; *Suchier* 1918: 77.

Commander Heydebreck was less than pleased with Seitz' intention to inform the world about the Naulila incident. He was, however, equally concerned about Kuring-Kuru and advised to either "substantially reinforce or withdraw" the station. Still on October 24, in the afternoon, Seitz justified his radio telegrams by pointing out that the "murder... proved the start of Portuguese hostilities", thus German ships must be warned of Portuguese war ships. However, Heydebreck – apparently aware that radio-telegrams could for technical reasons only be sent after midnight – insisted that a general notification was "questionable". Seitz then ordered via telegram his engineers at the wireless stations in Windhoek and Aus to abstain from sending the messages about Naulila "for the time being". Whether or not the telegram from Windhoek reached Aus (in the far south of GSWA) before midnight or not would later become an important question. After the war, the Germans claimed that they had indeed sent the wireless messages so that also stations in Angola would have received them.⁴⁴³

Still on October 24, Seitz and the Police Commander, Lt. Colonel Heinrich Bethe, decided to order their forces at the police station Kuring Kuru to attack Fort Cuangar. A telegram was sent to Grootfontein, the nearest district office, ordering to "burn down" Cuangar and to "give no quarter". The press in GSWA was immediately informed about the Naulila-incident; the call for revenge became widespread. More than 200 kilometers north of Grootfontein, the head of Kuring Kuru, Constable Oswald Ostermann, received Bethe's order on October 29 – a time lag known to Seitz and Bethe. The next day, *Rittmeister* (cavalry captain) Lehmann, military commander of Grootfontein, arrived with seven men.⁴⁴⁴

It must be noted that historians have argued the Germans had the "strategy" to compel Portugal to "abandon its position of neutrality through a contrived border dispute and associated incident. This action would serve as a pretext to provoke a break with Portugal", i.e. to wage war against it and annex Angola to fulfill the German dream of *Mittelafrika*. Even though the war aim of *Mittelafrika* was indisputably formulated in August 1914, it goes by itself that a close reading of the archival material does not allow for such an interpretation. The incident in Naulila was caused by too many variables in order to be planned by German "strategists". Also, the later course of action taken by the Germans, most of all the clumsily

443 BAB R 1001/6645, Telgr KGW to Cdr; KGW to wireless stations; Cdr. to KGW, 24.10.14.

444 BAB R 1001/6645, 126, Telgr Bethe to Lehmann; 90, KGW to Press, 24.10.14; cf. *Historicus* 2012: 34; *Oelhafen* 1923: 91f.; *Suchier* 1918: 32; *Hennig* 1920: 112.

long preparation of the campaign against Naulila, does not give the impression of a well-prepared “strategy” to send troops against the Portuguese.⁴⁴⁵

Fort Cuangar had been erected in 1909, when the lower Kavango area was first occupied under the command of District Governor João de Almeida. The Kavango valley became an important corridor for Portuguese colonial activity in southeastern Angola. Cuangar was chosen to be the administrative center (*capitania mor*) of the military district Lower Kavango (*Baixo Cubango*). It was headed by the *Capitão mor* Silva Nuñez later by Lieutenant Joaquim F. Durão. Under his command fortresses along the lower Kavango were erected: Bunja, Sambio, Dirico, and Mucusso. Fort Cuangar, located around 300 meters off the river on a hill, could be described as a military “village”, manned in 1914 by two officers, five non-commissioned officers, five European and around eighty African soldiers of the “native company 10/V”.⁴⁴⁶ In the immediate vicinity the families of the African soldiers lived in a “particular village” (*sansala*) an enclosure with a diameter of around 50 meters. From time to time, also Portuguese itinerant traders inhabited the surroundings.⁴⁴⁷ Around the fort, agricultural works (vegetables) were executed. Governor Almeida intended to improve the meals of his men and hoped to make his forts less dependent on canned meat that had to be transported at high costs from the coast.⁴⁴⁸ More than twenty mules warranted the transport of goods and personnel. Even a longboat (called *Cunene*) anchored in Cuangar. It was used to patrol the river and to supply the smaller forts Bunja, Sambio, Dirico, and Mucusso.

445 *Cann* 2001: 147 ref. *Stoecker* 1986: 284; 1991: 251 cit. Jagow to Zimmermann, 21.8.14.

446 BAB R 1001/6639: 190, testimony of Lt. Santos, 1.7.25 Officers: Commander Lt. J.F. Durão, supported by Lt. José Souza Machado; NCOs: Sergeant Major Americo Cabral, Sergeants Julio Santos, Americo da Rocha, Alberto Perreira, José Freire d’Abreu.

447 BAB R 1001/6639: 108, testimony of da Rocha, 30.4.25.

448 PA R 52534, Réplique du Gouv. Portug.: 53, ~15.4.29. Allegedly the fields were ‘champs d’expériences pour les cultures indiquées par les services agronomiques officiels’.



Ill. 18, 19 "Fort Cuangar, Juin 1914"



Ill. 20 “Fort Cuangar”, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911

In the beginning, relations between Fort Cuangar and the German police station Kuring Kuru were not free of frictions due to the disputed borderline from the Kunene to the Kavango River. Kuring-Kuru was founded (first as a small straw hut) in 1910 in reaction to the Portuguese expansion. The policemen’s task “was not to implement German law and order in the region, but rather to observe and control the Portuguese activities”. The latter understood this move as an infringement of their “suzerainty” over the Kavango people; also, the Germans prevented their colonial neighbors from using the river’s southern (“German”) bank. In 1914 two brick houses had been erected, military aspects were neglected. After all, Kuring Kuru was administered by the colonial police and manned not with soldiers, but with three police officers, five “native police servants” (*Polizeidiener*), and three workers. The neighboring villages (~1,000 inhabitants) were headed by the old Chief (*hompa*) Himarua and his nephew, the “pro-German” Kandjimi Hauwanga. In August 1909, the latter had signed a “treaty of friendship” with the German Lieutenant Zawada, who prepared the founding of the police station. Zawada immediately informed Governor de Almeida of this move. Personal relations of the garrisons became cordial. The Commanders Lieutenant Durão and Constable Oswald Ostermann

regularly visited each other. Since 1910 the Germans reported to have been “showered with amenities” by the soldiers from Cuangar. In mid-August 1914 Ostermann learnt about the war in Europe. He understood that Portugal had joined the war against Germany and informed Durão.⁴⁴⁹

At the end of October, the news about the Naulila incident had probably not yet arrived in Fort Cuangar. The connection over 430 kilometers via other forts by cable and messengers was tedious, especially since parts of the area along the German-Portuguese border were known to be “Bushman land” not to be crossed by “other natives”, as the German soldier Mattenklodt described it.⁴⁵⁰ The Portuguese later claimed that both commanders had concluded a gentlemen’s agreement to inform each other when they received the order “to fulfill their military duty”. Durão therefore did not carry out precautionary measures.

In 1914, Fort Cuangar consisted of four long houses arranged in rectangular form, built of either adobe or *pão pique* (wattle-and-daub). These buildings were surrounded by an embrasure earthen wall of around 1.70 meters height with two elevated bastions and encircled by trenches, built in 1909, when the “peaceful character of the natives” had not yet been established. However, the trenches were dilapidated and the two rows of barbed wire fences supposed to cover the earthen wall around the fort were broken. Cuangar was equipped with two old 7 cm cannons “in very bad condition”, as the former Sergeant Alberto Perreira remembered. There was no artillerist to operate them, and there were no maxim guns. Henry-Martini rifles were available in sufficient numbers, though there was not enough ammunition. Portuguese witnesses later justified this neglect with reference to the good relations they had with the “per se peaceable natives” and the Germans. It had thus never been considered to “use the fort for military purposes”.⁴⁵¹ It was claimed that there was even no surveillance of the immediate vicinity of the fort.⁴⁵² These testimonies may also be read as a retrospective rationalization of the unlikely German

449 Eckl 2007: 12; 2004: 187; Zollmann 2010: 327; Santos 1978: 153; BAB R 1001/6639: 201f., testimony M, 5.7.25; R 1001/2185: 132f, Hpt Witte, report on border [~11/1911]; NAN ZBU 1010 J XIII b 4: 211, Report Okavango Expedit., Dias to Zawada, 19.11.; resp. 26.11.09.

450 BAB R 1001/6639: 201, testimony M, 5.7.25; p. 187, Consul Robern to AA, 6.7.25.

451 BAB R 1001/6639: 193f, testimony of Lt. Santos, 1.7.25; p. 201, testimony of ‘M’, 5.7.25; BAB R 1001/6640: 108, extra-file p.11, testimony of Lt. Perreira, 4./6.7.25;

452 BAB R 1001/6639: 4, extra-file: 22, Questionnaire, 4/24.

success in conquering the fort. In general, the Portuguese manpower and equipment was superior to their adversaries.

There were rumors that Fort Cuangar would soon be attacked by the Germans. At the end of October the Germans had dug trenches on their side of the river and had piled up sandbags. They tried to hide the arrival of reinforcements. Lehmann's ox wagon was left in the bush, but his arrival was reported to Durão. Nevertheless, he was taken by surprise when the twelve Germans attacked at 4 in the morning on October 31. It has been assumed that Ostermann "very reluctantly obeyed the order to attack the Portuguese post at Cuangar", but he faithfully followed his orders to "give no pardon".⁴⁵³ "Their action was prompt, decisive, and brutal." Durão slept in his house 200 m away from the fort. Also, the other European and African soldiers did not sleep inside the fort but in their huts erected 50–100 meters away. During the night of the attack, Fort Cuangar was guarded by one Sergeant and three to six African soldiers while Lieutenant Machado and four other soldiers slept inside the fort. The German police squad, equipped with rifles and two maxim guns, had crossed the Kavango River a few kilometers downstream. They first blindsided the guards of the fort and killed Lieutenant Machado and four men. Waking up from the noise, Durão and his sergeants did not know yet that the Germans had already taken the fort. They ran into the direction of the fort in order to gain access to their guns but were shot, since the Germans had mounted a maxim gun on a bastion and fired into the direction of the surrounding huts. They not only killed Durão and other soldiers but also the trader Nogueira Machado and his family sleeping in their ox wagon.⁴⁵⁴

The attack lasted for around 1½ hours. Nine Portuguese and 14 African soldiers were killed during the raid. The unlikely 'victory' of twelve against almost 100 men was soon called a "massacre". The Portuguese claimed that the Germans had used dum-dum bullets, had shot wounded soldiers and killed their wives and children. It was said that the Germans had been supported by "many natives of chief Assonga" or (Kandjimi) "Auanga" of Cuangar and others coming from GSWA. Since 1911, the latter was considered a "German spy tasked with creating border inci-

453 *Southern* 2007: 10; cf. *Morlang* 1998: 43; *Baericke* 1981: 63 Durão Ostermann's friend.

454 AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5ª Rep, Cx.996, telgr. Capitão Mor Alto Cubango to Gov. Lubango, 15.11.14; BAB R 1001/6639: 109, testimony da Rocha, 30.4.25; *Cann* 2001: 151.



Ill. 21 “*Station allemande de Kuring Kuru, 1911*”



Ill. 22 “*Station allemande de Kuring Kuru, 1914*”

dents.”⁴⁵⁵ In 1915, a British source reported that “Kanjemi ... offered his assistance ... [but] was refused”. He was “however permitted to loot and to pull down the earthworks”. The fort was dismantled to prevent the Portuguese from using it as base for expeditions against GSWA. The fort’s livestock was distributed among the “German natives”; the rest of the booty was taken to Grootfontein.⁴⁵⁶ The large amounts of food and ammunition found were taken as proof that Portugal was preparing to invade GSWA.⁴⁵⁷

After the destruction of Cuangar, Ostermann continued to raid Portuguese forts along the Kavango. On November 4 and 8, he burned down Bunja and Sambio. The Portuguese soldiers already knew about the destruction of Cuangar and had left their forts before the arrival of Ostermann. On November 12, the troops in Fort Dirico were defeated and the fort was destroyed too. Four days later, Fort Mucusso was taken and destroyed by the “marauding Germans” without fighting. Portuguese soldiers escaped into the ‘bush’. Some arrived in December in Fort Cuito Cuanavale; a few prisoners were taken to Grootfontein.⁴⁵⁸ Even the British in the occupied “Caprivi Strip” learnt that the “fort at Libebe ... was captured and burnt by a German force composed of considerable number of natives with about fifteen Europeans [on November 26].”⁴⁵⁹ The Portuguese “post A” (Porto Luso/Caiundo) at the Kavango River was destroyed by Africans after the soldiers had escaped, expecting the Germans to turn towards them. No doubt, chief Kandjimi Hauwanga sided with the Germans. Having lived with his people on both sides of the river, he decided to settle on the German bank.⁴⁶⁰

455 AHM/Div/2/2/60/11, Reocupação do Cuangar, in: *Dáskalos* 2008: 186; BAB R 1001/6639: 193-6, testimony Lt. Santos, 1.7.25; 203, the spelling of the chief’s name was inconsistent; *Baericke* 1981: 21; 63 Seitz prohibited the ‘use of native troops’; *Stals* 1984: 114.


456 TNA FO 371/2231, Gen Smuts to GG Buxton, 15.10.15; BAB R 1001/6634: 162, Ostermann to RMW (27.06.21), Annex 15 Mémoire All., 23.5.22.

457 BAB R 1001/6634: 155, Vageler to KGW (~11/1914), Annex 11 Mémoire All., 23.5.22.

458 AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5^a Rep, Cx.996, Report d’Oliveira on Cuangar, 31.12.14; Report Vasconcelos e Sá on Cuangar, 26.1.16; *Southern* 2007: 11; *Oelhafen* 1923: 92.

459 TNA FO 371/1882: 80A, Telgr. High Com. South Africa to SoS Colonies, 15.12.14.

460 Damian Nakares account of Kwangali history: 101-121, in: *Fleisch/Möhlig* 2002.



Ill. 23 “Fort Luzo am Okavango”

After this second border incident, confusion was rampant in Europe as well as in Africa. The German Foreign Office wondered about a “German incursion” into Angola.⁴⁶¹ The Foreign Office in London was directly informed by Consul Hall Hall from Luanda who had spoken with the Governor General about the “massacre” in Cuangar. Hall Hall also pointed out that troops were on the way, but due to the distance could not arrive “for some considerable time.” It seemed “difficult to see how war between Germany and Portugal can be much longer postponed.”⁴⁶² “In south[ern Angola] panic reigned” after the six forts along the Okavango River had been destroyed. “Merchants and officers tried to hide their valuables in the Spiritan mission station of Catoco, assuming, it would not be pillaged by the Germans. At the same time, it was well known in the region that a grand army expedition was on its way to fight the Kwanyama and, first of all, the Germans.⁴⁶³ However, as Spiritan Prefect Keiling deplored, discipline was at a new low. The head of the military Upper Okavango district, commanded the “misery” “without instructions and is drunk most of the

461 BAB R 1001/9025, Bl.4, Tlgr AA, 31.10.14; *Journal of Afric. Soc.* 15 no.59 (1916): 284.

462 TNA FO 371/1884: 438, Brit. Consul Luanda to FO, 17.11.14; 437, internal remark, FO.

463 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 1.12.14.

time”.⁴⁶⁴ In Luanda, where pro-British demonstrations had been staged by the Municipality and the *Associação Comercial*,⁴⁶⁵ the Governor General saw his convictions about German aggressiveness once more confirmed. He assumed that Cuangar was a German reaction to Naulila. The information given to the provincial press at the end of November listed the number of deaths in both incidents.⁴⁶⁶ Norton de Matos related the events to the German Consul and expressed his belief that the Governor in Windhoek did not know about the incidents in Naulila and Cuangar. He also informed Eisenlohr that he had told Commander Roçadas via telegram not to cross the German border under any circumstances. The official report of the Governor General on the incidents was available in November. A few days later Consul Eisenlohr learnt about the incident from a German perspective since the expelled Vice Consul Schöss had arrived in Luanda in the meantime. Schöss knew about the events from Pieter van der Kellen who had been with Vageler to Erickson Drift where they met the remainder of the German patrol.⁴⁶⁷

Consul Eisenlohr – left without any information from Windhoek and depending on hearsay – believed in an unfortunate sequel of misapprehensions, but was unable to convince Norton de Matos of it. As a show of goodwill, he informed the Governor General about Otto Busch’s food storages.⁴⁶⁸ On November 20, Eisenlohr even suggested that they might go together to the border to clarify the situation and to avoid further confrontation that may lead to “international imbroglio”. Norton de Matos did not believe the consul, as he had already received an intercepted German telegram stating “Franke is marching against the Portuguese”. Pointing to the general prohibition of the usage of telegraphs, he even refused Eisenlohr’s proposal to contact his counterpart in Windhoek via the wireless apparatus of the German steamer *Adelaide*. It was claimed that Norton intentionally prevented the sending of a peace negotiator, as ordered by the Minister of Colonies. Instead, the Angolan authorities were eager to procure evidence of a German complot. Already before the incidents at the border became known, the press in Angola constantly conveyed the message of

464 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Gallangue) to TRP, 10.11.14.

465 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II), Câmara Municipal de Loanda: ‘Ao Povo’, 25.10.14.

466 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) *A Província* no. 140, 23.11.14. ‘Notícia...a conhecer a morte de tres oficiais alemães, um official portugues, um sargento e diversas praças’.

467 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consul Luanda to DGL, 25.11.14: 5/9.

468 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) German Consulate Luanda to DGL, 18.12.14.

the German threat to Angola.⁴⁶⁹ Consul Eisenlohr deplored widespread anti-German rumors: The ethnologist Dr. Schachzabel was allegedly the head of a “negro plot [*Negerverschwörung*]”.⁴⁷⁰ Also the consul “had allied [him]self with the *Africanos*, in order to topple Portuguese rule in Angola”. Eisenlohr complained to the Governor General about a “hysteria” concerning reputed German zeppelins and airplanes in the Benguela hinterland. Norton de Matos played down these rumors; but to avoid further friction or even violence, he asked Eisenlohr to help him with the removal of all Germans from the interior of Angola to Luanda or Europe.⁴⁷¹

2.5 The Build-up of the Army in Angola, August–December 1914

Having neither declared war on Germany nor its neutrality, but placing emphasis on its alliance with Great Britain, the position of Portugal was ambiguous in the early months of World War I. Unquestionable, however, was the republic’s stand towards its colonies: defending the overseas territories at all costs. In Angola this included a double task since the occupation of Kwanyama territory had been already planned, and suddenly in the same region a second threat had seemed to materialize – a possible German invasion.

In his memoirs, Norton de Matos related how he explained to President Machado on August 4 that once war was declared, “numerous German troops ... would invade southern Angola” and occupy the harbors of Lobito and Mossamedes”. He therefore urged preparations and sending a strong expeditionary force. Shortly before he returned to Luanda, Colonial Minister Lisboa de Lima informed Norton that a declaration of war should be postponed as long as the troops had not arrived in the colonies and that negotiations with the British were ongoing about the “collaboration” between their troops in Africa.⁴⁷² Thus, Angolan troops were to be reinforced with troops from Portugal as soon as possible. On August 18, 1914, the Minister of War, General Antonio J. Pereira de Eça (1852–1917) ordered Lieutenant-Colonel José A. Alves Roçadas (1865–1926) to take over the task of leading the troops to Angola in order to subdue the

469 PA Luanda 3 (SW Krieg) Germ. Consul Luanda to DGL, 25.11.14; *Baericke* 1981: 38; 64.

470 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schachzabel to German Consulate Luanda, 13.11.14.

471 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Remark German Consulate Luanda, 12.11.14.

472 *Norton de Matos* 1946 vol. IV: 84, transl. in *Baericke* 1981: 28; cf. *Afonso* 1989: 282f.

Kwanyama, who continued to “raid unpunished the Kunene margins” and to safeguard the border with GSWA. Rumors about an “understanding between the Germans and these natives” had reached Lisbon in the meantime.⁴⁷³ Roçadas, a former *aid-de-camp* of King Dom Carlos I., who in 1910 as Governor General in Luanda had organized the colony’s smooth transition from monarchy to republic, was considered an “experienced Africa-hand” and “hero” of the war in southern Angola in 1907. Given his experience, Roçadas was “seen as the natural choice”. He informed Governor General Norton de Matos, at the time ‘only’ a major, of his tasks. He requested the mobilization of Africans and Europeans in Angola, as agreed with the Minister of Colonies. The cooperation between Roçadas and Norton, however, remained strained.⁴⁷⁴

It has been stated that the “colonial policy of the republican regime was absolutely chaotic.”⁴⁷⁵ Nevertheless, during the war the government in Lisbon managed to send thousands of troops back and forth between the metropolis and the colonies. Roçadas’ expeditionary force of 1,569 men (infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineering, and ambulance corps) left Lisbon on two steamers on September 10 and 12. They arrived in Moçâmedes on September 27 and October 1 (with Roçadas). While it has been argued that the number of soldiers “showed some naiveté, given the resources and the tasks assigned”, the climatic, hygienic, and infrastructural aspects of the bush warfare should also be considered. The decree of the Ministry of War of August 12, 1914, appropriating 1,000,000 Escudos for war materials explicitly mentioned that the current state of materials was “insufficient”.⁴⁷⁶ However, the money provided did not solve all issues. Portuguese troops in southern Angola had serious problems of adapting to the African theater of war: According to Portuguese sources the men raised in Portugal were “less than well kitted out for campaigning in Africa. It was noted that the soldiers’ poor quality uniforms and boots very quickly came apart at the seams.”⁴⁷⁷ It was wise not to send too many soldiers from Portugal. Especially once the rainy season was imminent with its “torrential downpours ... that brought the *calenturas*, or fevers ... Contingent after

473 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) *Jornal de Benguela*, no. 34, 26.8.14; *Samson* 2013: 77.

474 *Pélissier* 1969: 87; 100; *Southern* 2007: 7; *Regalado* 2004: 83; *Norton* 2001: 209.

475 *Pitcher* 1991: 65 referring to *Clarence-Smith* 1985.

476 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 134: 800, USC General to SoS, 18.8.14 (Decreto N^o 753).

477 *Southern* 2007: 6f., referring to *Ferreira* 1934: 134f.; *Fraga* 2010: 125f.

contingent of European conscripts sent to support the military manoeuvres of Portuguese conquest sickened and died away in disabling numbers.”⁴⁷⁸

Since September, Portuguese authorities in southern Angola were ordered to closely watch and report any suspicious German or African action in or near Portuguese territories or along the coast of the Atlantic.⁴⁷⁹ On September 16, when the engineer Schubert of the Study Commission arrived in Lubango he noticed “feverish, warlike activity” to accommodate more troops. Artillery exercises were held for several days. The Governor General himself went to Moçâmedes to welcome the troops from Portugal. He urged Roçadas to wait with an attack on the Kwanyama since the worst was to be expected from the Germans. But Roçadas neither accepted him as superior nor did he believe in an imminent German invasion. Two days later, in Lubango, Norton de Matos lambasted internal and external enemies of Angola in a public address. When Schöss requested an explanation for the war preparations, Norton de Matos referred to the Kwanyama expedition and refused to inform GSWA’s Governor about these plans.⁴⁸⁰ In addition to the expeditionary forces, around “2,000 black troops [were now stationed] in south Angola”. Given these war efforts, the Portuguese Foreign Minister considered it advisable that the Cape Government should consult directly with Britain’s Consul in Luanda about defense matters; a suggestion that “seem[ed] scarcely desirable” to Colonial Secretary Harcourt.⁴⁸¹

It took more than a month to transport all men and load across the desert from Moçâmedes inland. The incomplete Moçâmedes railway reached only 180 kilometers to Vila Arriaga and could not be fully used. From the railhead to Humbe it was more than 200 kilometers over bad roads. For want of trucks 1,200 tons of load, including nine guns and six heavy machine guns, had to be transported with a limited number of porters and slow ox-wagons. The lack of water and pasture for grazing took a heavy toll on animals and soldiers. The forces from Portugal, Mozambique, and those locally recruited, numbering now around 3,000 (Prefect Keiling even mentioned 5,000⁴⁸²) men, were ordered to march to Lubango. There, the first column arrived on October 18. “Roçadas then

478 Miller 1982: 23; BAB R 1001/6634: 39f., expt Dossier 2, 1-2 Mémoire justif., ~3/22.

479 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 30, statement Commander Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21.

480 BAB R 1001/6634: 85f., Report Schubert, Ax 1 Memo A., 23.5.22; Baericke 1981: 36.

481 TNA FO 371/1884: 424, BML to FO, 23.10.14; CO to GG South Africa, 26.10.14.

482 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Galangue) to TRP, 2.10.14 ‘5000...en route’.

took over stewardship of the [Huíla] district and, with his staff officers, began to prepare his force for possible hostilities.” At the same time several Afrikaaners were requested by the authorities to take part in the expedition against the Kwanyama.⁴⁸³

The new District Governor was immediately informed about the ongoing German attempts to transport food across the border to GSWA. The district’s state of emergency declared on September 12 put Roçadas in a comfortable position to impede any moves of the Germans. In addition, it was prohibited to build up victuals for more than eight days; otherwise the authorities were entitled to confiscate the excess. The addressees of these provisions were evidently the Germans. King Mandume or other African leaders, against whom the Portuguese allegedly built up their forces, were hardly affected.⁴⁸⁴ In the following weeks the moves of the German traders were closely watched by Roçadas’ men. It was assumed by the German Consul that one reason for the Portuguese being so well informed was that in the interior of Angola officials did not hesitate to open German letters; after all, the Governor of Huila had requested an interpreter of German to “verify” all the information that was coming from the neighboring colony.⁴⁸⁵ Roçadas was eager to expose the entire German network in southern Angola. In Lisbon the daily *A Capital* even assumed that the declaration of the state of emergency was related to the “espionage” of the German Consul.⁴⁸⁶ Vice Consul Schöss was arrested on charge of high treason. It was claimed that he had spied on Portuguese documents by bribing a subaltern official to copy for him a military report about the “neutral zone” between Angola and GSWA. However, Schöss stated to his superior Eisenlohr that this “unfounded” claim was not related to the border incidents but was already under discussion since January 1914.⁴⁸⁷ The Governor General sent a letter of complaint to the German Consul in Luanda about the conduct of Schöss. Given the embezzlement of documents, he considered him a German spy who had to leave the colony. Also Piet du Plessis (who had taken Busch’s letter to Outjo) was exposed for working for the government in GSWA.⁴⁸⁸

483 *Southern* 2007: 7; BAB R 1001/6634: 82, Report Schubert, Ax 1 Memo All., 23.5.22.

484 BAB R 1001/6634: 156, Vageler to KGW (~11/14), Annex 11 Memo Allem., 23.5.22.

485 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Csl Luanda to VK Benguela, 15.11.14; *Dáskalos* 2008: 184.

486 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) *A Capital* No. 159, 24.10.14 sent by DGL.

487 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda to DGL, 25.11.14.

488 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Chefe de Gabinete to German Consulate Luanda, 28.11.14.

Following the Naulila incident and his own enquiry, Roçadas expelled all Germans from his southern district which he considered to become soon a theater of war in case of German retaliation. However, he had difficulties to assess how and where to distribute his troops, assuming the Germans could attack anywhere along the border, be it across the Kunene or across the Okavango River. Lack of intelligence on the military situation in GSWA prevented him from recognizing that a German campaign to “take Porto Alexandre or Moçâmedes should have appeared remote.” First squadrons under Major Salgado and Lieutenant Aragão reached the Kunene River (Vau dos Elephantes, Zwartsbooi Drift, Erickson Drift) on November 12 to reconnoiter possible German movements and advanced to Fort Rocadas where they arrived on the 17th.⁴⁸⁹

In October, the Portuguese government authorized “a special credit of 500,000 escudos to defray the expenses” of the expedition to Angola. Portugal was now “*de facto* at war”, but no declaration of war followed from either side.⁴⁹⁰ The British informed the Portuguese that “cooperation between Union forces and Portuguese forces in Angola would be impossible owing to the distance which separates them.” The Portuguese were thus left alone with the defense of Angola. Luanda requested further reinforcements. Their possible employment in the south was to be “kept secret”. After all, “the main question” whether Portugal would send troops to France to fight against Germany, had to be seen now in a different light.⁴⁹¹ Minister of War Pereira de Eça, an ardent interventionist, “had ignored the reality of the army under his command.” There were neither enough men nor modern equipment available to defend simultaneously Portugal, the colonies, and a sector of the Western front. The republican reforms aiming at the modernization of the forces were still being implemented and the military’s finances were in dire straits.⁴⁹² Even the mobilization of fresh troops for the colonies proved difficult. Infantry battalions embarked in Lisbon only on December 10. For fear of German attacks on the convoys, the British Admiralty was repeatedly requested to warn H.M. Cruisers “to keep a look-out for” the Portuguese transports.⁴⁹³ They landed in

489 BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 14; 35, testim. Norton de M., 5.5.26; *Cann* 2001: 152.

490 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 851, USML to SoS, 31.10.14; *Teixeira* 2003: 24; 1998.

491 TNA FO 371/1884: 428, FO to BML, 28.10.14; 430 internal remark FO, 28.10.14.

492 *Meneses* 2010: 42; *Teixeira* 2003: 24

493 TNA FO 371/1884: 45, Port. Minister London to FO, 8.11.;52, Admiralty to FO, 11.11.14.

Moçâmedes on December 24 where they stayed until March 1915.⁴⁹⁴ The troops were lucky to have missed one of the worst defeats the Portuguese ever suffered in Angola.

2.6 Colonial Armies on the Southern African Battlefield, 1914–1915

It has been argued that one of the characteristics of World War I in Africa is that it was a European conflict fought by Africans on behalf of their ‘masters’.⁴⁹⁵ The war in GSWA and the Luso-German border war were the exception to this rule. The majority of the combatants came from Europe. The participation of Africans was nonetheless distinct and relevant.

For a better understanding of the political and social context of the colonial armies that turned into inadvertent foes it will be helpful to analyze first their institutional background. A brief description of the South African invasion of GSWA will then be followed by an account of the battle of Naulila, the resulting Portuguese retreat and the German surrender.

2.6.1 An Ancient Institution – the Portuguese Colonial Army in Angola

Portugal’s armed forces were the guarantor of the Empire, the “stronghold of sovereignty”; tasked with safeguarding the “integrity of the kingdom” (that included all colonies, Articles 2; 119 of the Constitution of 1838) against internal and external enemies. Their norms and values were focused on these two aims and internalized through centuries of colonial service.⁴⁹⁶ Since the 1870s the importance of “colonial service in military careers” grew considerably.⁴⁹⁷ The humiliation of the “ultimatum” in 1890 led to a process of reorganization of Portugal’s armed forces. The need to create a modern army modelled after European competitors seemed evident to politicians and administrators. The objective was to render the troops more operational and to equip them in a way so that they could accomplish their duties. “There was no close identification between the monarch and his army”, but the latter gained in reputation since the con-

494 Sousa [n.d.⁻¹⁹³⁵]: 13f.

495 Michel 2004: 925.

496 General José A. L. dos Santos, in: *Cristóvão* 2007: 320; cf. *Hespanha* 2004.

497 *Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa* 2006: 113.

quests in Mozambique which raised patriotic sentiment towards the colonies. Public opinion in Portugal celebrated the “heroes” of the “generation of 1895”. In the following years army and navy assumed a more important national role than hitherto. It was said that officers should be liberated from “ministerial tutelage”.⁴⁹⁸ For a long time, Portugal’s colonial affairs were jointly administered with the navy by the Ministry of Navy and Overseas (1835–1910). Only in 1911, after the revolution, was an independent Ministry of Colonies established. However, also later the colonies could count on the 6,000 navy men, “many of its officers carrying out official jobs in the colony.” The army consisted of about 13,000 men “scattered all over the Empire; from these less than 4,000 were Europeans”. Attempts since 1911 at army-reform laws according to the republic’s needs had “required funds which were not at hand”.⁴⁹⁹

Traditionally, the majority of Angola’s troops were stationed in Luanda. In 1815, for example, 1,153 soldiers accounted for 25 % of the city’s total population and for 90% of the administrative personnel.⁵⁰⁰ In 1874, six battalions of infantry and one of artillery were stationed in Angola. America’s commercial agent reported:

“The soldiers are composed chiefly of convicts from Portugal. The officers are in part from the mother country and in part provincial. These unfortunate convicts, badly fed and poorly paid ... very soon fall victims to the climate. Their places are immediately supplied out of the fresh arrivals that come by every mail steamer. A large number of these poor fellows come out here for trifling offences along with others who have committed hideous crimes. I have often thought the justice of Portugal too severe in passing a sentence of three years service as a soldier in Angola.”⁵⁰¹

The recruiting of the colonial forces in Angola remained rather particular. Angola’s “first-line army” staffed by European soldiers barely numbered 2,000 men. The government assumed that “the fewer European recruits and formal civilian militia the better – since these were a possible threat in times of discontent”. According to historian Douglas Wheeler, “[o]fficers for the European part of the army were hard to obtain” and “in short sup-

498 *Meneses* 2010: 9; *Fernandes* 2010: 100f.; US Minister Birch assessed acidly that the army played a ‘vicious role’ in Portuguese politics. He considered the army ‘useless’ and without ‘real benefit to the country’ (NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 1.9.19: 15).

499 *Tavares de A./Silveira e S.* 2006: 117; *Almeida-Topor* 2010: 51f; *Wheeler* 1978: 115.

500 *Curto/Gervais* 2001: 4; 31 FN 70; 54 Table V.

501 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS, No. 89, 2.5.1874.

ply for Angolan service”.⁵⁰² Traditionally, victories in Africa were less celebrated “than their Brazilian counterparts, and rewarded much less richly than military service in Asia.”⁵⁰³ The upper echelons of the army could view the colonies “as a means of expanding career prospects”.⁵⁰⁴ Indeed, “military training was the prevailing educational background of the political and administrative heads of the Colonial Office.”⁵⁰⁵ However, for ordinary “Europeans, Angolan service acquired a just reputation of deadliness: poor pay, unhealthy climate, African hostility, isolation, living expenses usually twice those in Portugal, long term of service (four to six years), and few opportunities for advancement at the lower levels.”⁵⁰⁶ Given the “expenses and European high mortality” Lisbon avoided sending expeditionary forces and used them only in times of extraordinary crisis.⁵⁰⁷

Considering costs, equipment, and adaptability, “[e]mploying African troops was considered a wise expedient”. Therefore, the “second-line force”, the *guerra preta* (black war), appears to be the most decisive factor of Portuguese conquest and survival in Angola. An officer once bluntly stated “that to the African, more adapted to the climate and much cheaper, the role of *chair à canon* will be reserved”. Furthermore, “it was expected that military service would act as a powerful ‘civilizing’ mechanism, or, in the words of Governor General Norton de Matos, as ‘one of the most effective mechanisms for opening a breach in the tenebrous primitive civilizations’.”⁵⁰⁸ The most legendary of these “native forces”, the French *tirailleurs sénégalais*, founded in 1857, appears young in comparison with similar Portuguese institutions. African auxiliaries were employed since the sixteenth century. *Guerra preta* battalions could be (forcibly) raised by loyal chiefs (*sobas*), or “ordered on a more regular footing with salaries, and sometimes uniforms.” The “chief advantage [of this system] ... was its rapid mobilization in a crisis”.⁵⁰⁹ As in any other African colony, “African

502 Wheeler 1969: 427; 429 on ‘several nineteenth century, European led revolts in Luanda’.

503 Alencastro 2011: 45.

504 Clarence-Smith 1979a: 172; cf. Corrado 2008: 29f.

505 Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa 2006: 125; cf. Samson 2013: 32.

506 Wheeler 1969: 427.

507 Wheeler 1968: 54, ~50% mortality from malaria/yellow fever during expeditions in 1860.

508 M. de Albuquerque, *Revista Militar* 41 (1889); NdM in: *Borges Coelho* 2002: 129; 134.

509 Wheeler 1969: 426f.; cf. Corrado 2008: 43.

collaborators were indispensable”.⁵¹⁰ “Most colonial armies were warbands of African mercenaries” and Portugal’s colonial army was one of them.⁵¹¹ The force was according to estimates from 5,000 to 20,000 men strong. It “was considered the backbone of the armed forces.”⁵¹² In the 1850s, Angola’s cavalry, artillery, infantry, and police forces “cost the colony about 160 million *reis*, half of the colony’s entire revenue.”⁵¹³ Also, later on, “Portugal spent abnormally high amounts on [colonial] defense”.⁵¹⁴

Despite a tendency in historiography to assume ‘Lusitanian disorder’ when it comes to the institutionalization of structures, it would be wrong to assume that Portugal’s colonial army was an institution lacking rules. In 1913 a decree laid out the organization of the colonial army. The integration of Africans was minutely described in this document of 147 pages (Art. 164–193), stipulating the classification, purpose, recruitment, terms of service, age (18 to 35 years of age, Art. 175 no.15), and promotion.⁵¹⁵ As elsewhere, Africans were excluded from ranks in the high command.⁵¹⁶ Furthermore, the Portuguese recruited “Boer soldiers” since the 1880s to organize “military mission[s] of primitive character”.⁵¹⁷

Wars in Angola have been described as *les guerres grises* (the gray wars). This wordplay can be understood not only as describing the *mélange* of colonial and native adversaries in Africa, but as pointing to the mixing of “black” and “white” that took place *within* the Portuguese army.⁵¹⁸ Historians have repeatedly analyzed the “Africanization” of European institutions in Africa, and colonial armies were no exception to this tendency. Overall, Portugal’s army in Angola was “a *mélange* of slave soldiers, some local militia [often led by officers originating from Luanda’s “creole elite”], and the contingents still commanded by African rulers.”⁵¹⁹ Cadornega’s praise in 1681 for the *Mestiço* soldiers “in the

510 Young 1994: 107; cf. Viotti 1985: 43; Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 55: ‘Collaboration is a subject which is politically sensitive and often ignored’; Lawrence/Osborn/R. 2006.

511 Iliffe 2007: 199; 205; Pélissier 1977: glossaire ‘guerra preta: horde de razzieurs’.

512 Wheeler 1969: 228.

513 Birmingham 2011: 92 refers to *Caldeira*, Apontamentos d’uma viagem, Lisbon 1852: 208.

514 Clarence-S. 1985a: 320; cf. on military spending Robinson 1979: 88; Wheeler 1978: 187.

515 AHU MU M. de Amorim, Pt 26 Angola 1917-24, Organização do Exército Colonial.

516 Michel 2004: 925.

517 NARA RG 84, Lisbon v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 18.10.19: 3 Woods.; Pélissier 1977: 417.

518 Pélissier 1977: 18; 20; Mesquitela 1980: 512.

519 Isaacman 1972; Young 1994: 106; cf. Bühner 2011 on ‘trans-cultural waging of war’

wars in the backlands against heathen inhabitants” has been often quoted. Given this historical background, it would be a mistake to speak of the East African *German* colonial army under Lettow-Vorbeck as “the first integrated army”.⁵²⁰

The “ordinary manner of responding to rebellions and threats was to draw upon manpower within the territory”⁵²¹; or, if not available or considered disloyal, to import Africans from other Portuguese colonies. African professional soldiers, or *empacasseiros*, were preferably used against enemies foreign to them. Portugal followed a policy applied also in other empires. Just as Nigeria’s Hausa soldiers were sent to the Gold Coast, and the *tirailleurs sénégalais* conquered Dahomey, and men from Dahomey served in Cameroon,⁵²² Mozambicans were employed in Angola and vice versa. Portuguese politicians called this a sign of Imperial “solidarity” which included the “obligation to contribute [to] the integrity and defense of the Nation”.⁵²³

However, a “considerable portion of the African soldiers in the Angolan army under Governor Paiva Couceiro (1907–1909) had been forcibly enlisted or shanghaied.”⁵²⁴ Often these men were brought from Mozambique to the Angolan theater of war. In 1909, with the conquest of Angola’s south in full swing, the “leading Mozambican intellectual of the early twentieth century”, João dos Santos Albasini (1876–1922), a journalist and political activist, witnessed in his capacity as head of native labor services in the port of Lourenço Marques the arrival of new recruits. His description in his journal *O Africano* is so poignant that it merits to be cited in full length:

“One afternoon I happened to be on the wharves when the steamship *Freire de Andrade* ... tied up. At the same moment a military force, headed by a sergeant, stopped in front of the steamer. Afterwards twenty some men, very black and very sad, began to disembark, tied together at the neck two by two. Who were these poor devils? What could be the reason for such a thing? ... On the wharf a sergeant and a captain, weary and sickly, forced that rabble to get into military formation and assume a martial stance. One of the pitiful prisoners looked up at the inclement sky and out to the vastness of the sea, perhaps remembering the liberty he enjoyed as a savage, the loving company

520 *Boxer* 1963: 30 trnsl. Cadorn., *História Geral das Guerras Angolanas*; *Michel* 2004: 925.

521 *Wheeler* 1969: 428; *Walter* 2014: 207.

522 Cf. *Brunschwig* 1974: 58.

523 *Ferreira Mendes* 1940: 227.

524 *Wheeler* 1969: 427.

of ferocious, but less cruel people ... and, who knows, perhaps he was remembering some three very dirty little black children in the lap of a revolting black woman he cried silently, the tears ran in a ribbon down his large ebony coloured face. Then one of the soldiers, a bent, crumpled and filthy man with a low forehead, who always glanced fearfully behind him – one of the numbskulls necessary for such a roundup – was delighted to catch a glimpse of his Negro crying ... He grabbed the man and was vigorously applauded by a round of guffaws from his comrades: even beasts cry!

It was five o'clock in the evening. The sun was over the side of Matolla, enveloped in its ruby-eyed ray of lights. It was about to set, to hide itself, so not to see so many things in this grotesque world. Later the blacks, still tied together by the neck, two by two, surrounded by a square of bayonets which gleamed in the sun of a just God, traveled along the road of this city [Lourenço Marques] on their way to the police headquarters – a kind of purgatory where they prepare souls for exalted bliss.

Days after this scene another contingent arrived in this same place with this same destiny, and in Inhambane another and another, and at this hour other contingents are en route to serve the country. The country needs soldiers. Enough is enough!"⁵²⁵

This account portrays the climate of ruthlessness in which African soldiers were "conscripted". In his literary style, Albasini elevates the "savage... as a tower of humanity... amidst debauched cruelty." With a thinly veiled parody this "eloquent and passionate man" turns colonial notions of savagery and ferociousness upside-down when he contrasts the African family and the Portuguese soldier sending the 'recruits' through the hell of a boot camp to prepare them for the purgatory of war.⁵²⁶ A Portuguese resident of the Zambezi Valley was scarcely less appalled by the recruitment practices:

"They [the peasants] are all forced volunteers, except for those who are criminals, treacherously incarcerated in a manner that the metropolitan government chooses to ignore. The volunteers are recruited under the pretense of doing a particular job, and when they arrive they are suddenly detained, until the opportune moment when they are transported to military centers where they receive enthusiastic discourses on the responsibilities of military life. ..."⁵²⁷

The much talked-about term "collaborator" that is used to describe "native police men" and "native soldiers" acquires a different meaning in light of the violence described by Albasini and others. These colonized men were not necessarily "willing to play their assigned parts" and yet they helped

525 *O Africano*, 19.6.1909, transl. in: *Penvenne* 1996: 444f.

526 *Penvenne* 1996: 445; 422; cf. *Hayes/Haipinge* 1997: 85

527 Carlos Wiese: *Zambésia*, in: *BSGL* (1907), transl. in: *Isaacman* 1977: 8.

the “native policy regime to succeed”⁵²⁸ – because they were compelled to do so. Given that so many men were shanghaied, disciplining the colonial agents remained a structural problem for the Portuguese Empire. The *guerra preta* not only quelled rebellions and protests; there were also numerous “army mutinies of Angolan troops”.⁵²⁹ Officials thus preferred to “convoke loyal African chiefs, who would come with their private armies”.⁵³⁰

It is certain that other African men willingly joined the Portuguese army. Nevertheless, the term “volunteer” might be problematic since often those men registered as volunteers were in fact sent by their chiefs, rather than men who freely chose to join the army. Apart from their ability to fight, language skills made them indispensable interpreters, clerks and, at times, officers of military units. The relationship between rulers and the ruled was more complicated than the image of a dualistic colonial state might entail. In September 1914, for example, around 200 Christians of the mission station Catoco in southern Angola were enlisted, much to the despair of their Spiritan missionaries who saw their work threatened by the army.⁵³¹ Novelists have repeatedly analyzed the “basic tragedy” of Africans serving the colonizers and the resulting “clash of cultures” and transitions. Castro Soromenho (1910–68) related the conquest of the last Lunda chief Calendende and described how a lieutenant calls Tipóia (one of his African *praços*) a “brave Portuguese soldier”, “which causes the puzzled African to ask how a black man can be Portuguese.” The author continues to exemplify in “the faithful black Portuguese” the perversion of one’s own “sense of values” which is so great that Tipóia “substitutes for his loss of cultural identity a blind devotion to the government.” However, once he loses his rifle in an ambush, Tipóia is stripped off his uniform and banished to the bush after thirty years of service. His “last thread of self-respect” is broken when he returns to the bush, “symbolically naked as he came, he is neither African nor Portuguese.”⁵³²

The interpretation of the motives and incentives for the “collaboration” with the colonial state has its own particular history. Albert Memmi, in his essay *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957) could see “those among the

528 Steinmetz 2008: 608; cf. Lawrance et.al. 2006: 3f.; Zollmann 2010: 90f.

529 Wheeler 1969a: 3; cf. Corrado 2008: 20; 102.

530 Borges Coelho 2002: 131; cf. Birmingham 1978: 532.

531 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Eminence Reverendissime, 9.9.14.

532 Hamilton 1975: 38f. on Fernando M. de Castro Soromenho: Viragem, 1957.

colonized who worked with Europeans only...in pathological terms.”⁵³³ In the decades since differing interpretations have gained influence that try to rationalize motives and pay “attention to non-dualistic forms of cross-cultural linkage.” While some African men might have hoped to protect their own group against “historic enemies” or encroach upon the latter’s territory, others wanted to reinforce a privileged position, increase their economic status, or enjoy the prestige of the military. These factors were neither mutually exclusive nor were they the only reasons for men to become colonial soldiers.⁵³⁴

2.6.2 A New Breed – the Colonial Army of GSWA

The German army (taking into account the federal structure of the German Empire: the Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg contingents of the *Reichsheer*) was *not* the guarantor of the German colonies. Though “the protection of the territory of the Federation” was a national objective according the Constitution’s (1871) Preamble, Art. 1 defining the “territory of the Federation” did not mention the German colonies, as there had been none at the time of its drafting – and they were never included subsequently. However, Imperial legislative powers comprised “the military and naval affairs of the *Reich*” (Art. 4 no. 14). The Imperial Navy was thus early on commissioned with the ‘protection’ of German “protectorates” that were according to the Colonial Law (*Schutzgebietsgesetz*, 1886) under the state authority (*Schutzgewalt*) of the Emperor on behalf of the *Reich*. It was a task only reluctantly accepted. Germany’s military elites of the late nineteenth century were highly critical of the colonial adventure. The former Chief of the Admiralty, Chancellor Caprivi, bluntly stated “The less Africa, the better for us.”⁵³⁵

This reluctance has found its continuation in historiography. The German colonial army, the *Schutztruppe* (protection, or security force) has been recently characterized as Imperial Germany’s “forgotten third military branch”.⁵³⁶ Indeed, classic treatises on the German military barely mention the colonial army. Gerhard Ritter’s seminal *The Sword and the*

533 Cooper 2002: 55; cf. Memmi 1991 [1957]; Shipway 2008: 24f.

534 Cooper 2002: 60; Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 57-61; Michel 2004; Bühner 2011: 138f.; 154.

535 Schwarz 1999; on colonial law cf. Hartmann 2007a: 53f.; Grohmann 2001; Fischer 2001.

536 Bühner 2011: 87.

Scepter made no allusion to it at all. Contemporary historians could assume: “The Bismarckian Empire and the Prussian army formed an indissoluble entity.”⁵³⁷ However, the *Schutztruppe* was barely part of that entity, having no traditions and originating from mercenaries and the navy. The latter being itself a rather new and bourgeois creation that gained in reputation only under Secretary of the Navy Tirpitz. Yet, the standing of the *Schutztruppe* in German politics or popular culture did not mirror the growing popularity of the navy since 1900. German boys wore sailor suits, not khaki. It is said that the *Schutztruppe* acted as the “dumping ground” for disgraced German officers. Their fluctuation was high, the composition too heterogeneous to allow for the creation of an *esprit de corps*. However, the soldiers attempted to create a myth around their “heroic” service in *Südwest*.⁵³⁸

The colonial army in GSWA had very humble beginnings. A small military detachment was formed in 1888. Privately financed by a colonial company (*DKGSWA*) it consisted of three German officers and twenty African commoners. Unable to exert any power, Germany’s first commissioner of the colony, Heinrich Göring (1838–1913), requested a force of between 400 and 500 men, a request rejected by Chancellor Bismarck. In January 1889, however, the Parliament in Berlin agreed that under the private command of Captain Curt von François (1852–1931) around fifty German “mercenaries” would be detached to GSWA. In the following years the *Schutztruppe*, as it was called since 1891, was constantly increased. In 1894, under the new Commander Theodor Leutwein (1849–1921) the *Schutztruppe* – no longer a private enterprise – had grown to 540 German soldiers, fully financed by the Imperial budget.⁵³⁹

The German colonial military administration, based on parliamentary vote and headed by the Chancellor, was a peculiarity within the body of German military law. Traditionally, the German military was no *Parlamentsheer*. Instead, the Emperor ruled the army and the navy with almost absolute power. Although mentioned in the constitution of 1871, the military remained quasi extra-constitutional.⁵⁴⁰ Colonial military law as enact-

537 Ritter 1970 [1965] *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk*, v. II; Rosenberg 1964 [1928]: 1.

538 Olusoga/Ericksen 2010: 120; Kuss 2010: 131-8; Ciarlo 2011: 271 argues ‘[c]olonial troopers became the new hot “brand”, both metaphorically and literally’;

539 Cf. Tiebel 2008: 65-78. The *Schutztruppe* of GSWA celebrated its 25th anniversary in May 1914, cf. *Südwestbote*, 11. Jg. no. 47, April 1914, ‘Die Schutztruppe’; no. 64, 29.5.14.

540 Wehler 1970: 14 called the German military an ‘enclave within the constitutional framework autonomous from the parliament’ (‘parlamentsautonome Enklave im Verfassungsbau’).

ed since 1891 deviated from this tenet. The official justification for this was that rights and duties of German citizens in the colonies were affected by military law and therefore a formal parliamentary law (*Gesetz*) and not just an Imperial decree (the ordinary form of colonial ‘legislation’) was required. The decisive step of the *Schutztruppengesetz* of 1896 was the exclusion of the Naval Office from the colonial administration (including military affairs), which became henceforth the exclusive realm of the Foreign Office’s Colonial Department, thus a *civilian* responsibility. In 1897, the high-command of the colonial forces, headed by a staff officer, was integrated into the Colonial Department and thus supervised by the Colonial Director, himself responsible to the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor.⁵⁴¹ Besides this separation of the German colonial forces from the army and naval forces, another novelty of the law of 1896 was the fact that Germans living in the colony could be drafted in the colony (§ 18). The pension system of the colonial military became far more attractive than in the army and navy. Contrary to German forces in Cameroon or in East Africa, commoners were almost exclusively recruited among German volunteers from the army and navy (§ 25, who signed up for three years) or conscripts from GSWA. They were mostly employed as “mounted infantry” or in the field artillery. “Native troops” (*Eingeborenen-Soldaten*) were recruited only reluctantly and in small numbers. While the Germans in East Africa could count on the (allegedly) “singular fidelity of their *Askari*”,⁵⁴² the *Schutztruppe* in GSWA had alienated the *Baster* auxiliary troops to such an extent that the latter rose against their colonial rulers in 1915.⁵⁴³ There was no *guerra preta* in GSWA.

Despite the political and military necessity for *Schutztruppen* if the German Empire was to hold onto its colonies, they were generally assigned “police tasks” to defend Germans and their property against “rebellious” Africans. Section 1 of the *Schutztruppengesetz* of 1896 stipulated cautiously: “For the maintenance of public order and security in the African *Schutzgebiete* ... *Schutztruppen* shall be employed whose supreme commander is the *Kaiser*.”⁵⁴⁴ For anything else they were simply too small, as

541 Cf. *Bührer* 2012: 2-13; 2011: 103-12; *Kuss* 2010: 128; *Conrad* 2003: 202f.; *Grohmann* 2001 134 the Emperor remained commander-in-chief; he appointed *colonial* officers.

542 *Michel* 2004: 919 ‘singulière fidélité de leurs *askari*’; cf. *Bührer* 2011: 158; *Kettlitz* 2005.

543 Details of organization, recruiting, and disciplinary systems were stipulated by Chancellor’s ordinances (§ 27 SchTrG); *SchutztrO* v. 25.7.1898; *Tiebel* 2008: 141; 146; *Kuss* 2010: 160.

544 § 1 Zur Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung und Sicherheit in den afrikanischen Schutzgebieten... werden Schutztruppen verwendet, deren oberster Kieghsherr der Kaiser ist.

became evident during the first months of the Herero- and Maji-Maji wars in 1904. Without enforcements from the German army and navy the *Schutztruppen* were – at times – almost helpless against concerted African military action. In this respect, it is important to note, that the civil supervision of the German colonial forces, which made it a *Parlamentsheer* (parliamentary army), was *de facto* revoked after five months of the Herero War, when the General Staff in Berlin took over the command of the *Schutztruppe* in May 1904. General Lothar von Trotha (1848–1920) was dispatched and took over the civil governorship in Windhoek until November 1905, while Governor Leutwein (himself colonel) was sidelined. During the war against the Nama, up to 13,000 men were sent in from Germany. The conduct of the war in GSWA 1904–07 and its “genocidal escalation” remained highly disputed. Faced with criticism, colonial enthusiasts complained bitterly “about the ‘unpatriotic’ opponents of ‘world policy’, but also about the noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the war that prevailed in Germany.” Historian Isabel Hull has scrutinized the development of German military culture in the early twentieth century and argues that the organizational dynamics inherent in this culture led the army to annihilate civilians wantonly in the course of war, the African theater of war being no exception.⁵⁴⁵

Civilian superiority was introduced in 1905. The posts of civil governor and commander of the local *Schutztruppe* were divided and the governor assumed a higher-ranking role in order to avoid “frictions” between military and civil administration on the ground. In German colonial politics and in the everyday administration of GSWA, the *Schutztruppe* played a less important role “as the pioneering period drew to a close”.⁵⁴⁶ The governor could determine the leader and strength of a military campaign. He also decided upon the distribution of the troops in ‘his’ colony. In 1914 GSWA’s colonial forces were organized into nine companies and two artillery batteries. The *Schutztruppe* had been reduced constantly after 1907. Similar to Angola, the Imperial government subsidized the colonial budget. A profitable colonial economy was never achieved in GSWA. The colonial troops were paid for by the Imperial budget and the majority of parliamentarians in Berlin insisted repeatedly on further troop reductions;

545 Häußler 2011: 76 points out: ‘The extermination of the Ovaherero was not originally envisioned by the military command, but developed gradually as an option.’; *Dedering* 1999a: 21; cf. *Hull* 2005: 1; 33f.; 131f.; *Clark* 2007: 687f.

546 *Gann/Duignan* 1977: 93; on colonial law’s nature *Hartmann* 2007a: 52; cf. *Schack* 1923.

the military equipment was mediocre at best.⁵⁴⁷ In 1914, 1,950 soldiers (90 officers, 350 non-commissioned officers and 1,500 German commoners) and 875 civil servants (incl. 450 policemen) served in GSWA. They made up 17 per cent of the European population of 14,830.⁵⁴⁸ Given the strength of the German army in 1914 of around 800,000 soldiers it is justified to speak of a “minuscule mounted infantry garrison” in GSWA, a *quantité négligeable*. Finally, the merging of the *Schutztruppe* and the police in GSWA into a *Gendarmerie* was discussed. The Colonial Office only halfheartedly defended the intentions of GSWA’s military to maintain the numbers of troops. This has later been described as the “weak attitude of the colonial administration”.⁵⁴⁹

Rumors about the strength and the purpose of the *Schutztruppe* in GSWA were rampant when it was enlarged during the war 1904–07. Portuguese, but also British officials harbored “grave suspicions about the number of soldiers” that were transferred to GSWA in 1905 to subdue the Nama. It was considered that 13,000 troops were militarily unnecessary for this task. Thus, the assumption was made that the Germans aimed at putting themselves in a position “to squeeze us” in southern Africa, as Britain’s High Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Selborne suggested. Also historians have described Germany’s colonial force as “well equipped and well trained”.⁵⁵⁰ On the other hand, it has been emphasized time and again by German officers after 1918 that the *Schutztruppe* was not prepared to wage war against Europeans. Neither were the ports fortified against attacks from man-o-war nor was the latest military equipment made available to the troops.⁵⁵¹ This policy was based on the assumption that the German colonies would be protected in the North Sea. The German Navy was not prepared to defend the colonial coasts. Her British counterpart was aware of this strategy and assured the South Africans that

547 *Gründer* 2004: 122; 126, ‘For the *Reich*...the colonies remained...purely a losing enterprise.’ In 1914 the support of the Imperial budget to *Schutztruppe* and police was reduced from 14.8 million to 12.2 million *Reichsmarks*. Further expenses of around 6.1 million were to be born by the budget of the colony. *Der Südwestbote*, 11. Jg. no. 36, 25.3.14, S. 2; no. 60/61, 20.5.14: 1.

548 Cf. *Michels* 2006: 154; *DKL* 1920 III: 321 ‘Schutztruppen’; *Bley* 1996: 233; *Seitz* 1920:7.

549 *Neugeb.* 1993: 212; *Nasson* 2014: 436; *Kolonialkrb.* 1924: 81 ‘schwächliche Haltung’.

550 *Dedering* 2000:46; 2006: 278; Selborne to Lyttelton, 24.5.05 *id.*: 49; *Michel* 2004: 919.

551 *Eckenbr.* 1940: 165: ‘Armament [of SchTr] was lacking’; *RKA* 1918: 23; *Tirpitz* 1919: 67.

in case of war the supply lines between Germany and GSWA would be interrupted.⁵⁵²

2.6.3 The South African Conquest of GSWA (I), September–December 1914

The question whether Africa (outside the realms of the Congo-Act) would become involved in the war was answered by the Germans: On August 4, 1914 German battle ships bombarded two French ports in Algeria. British forces bombarded the wireless station of Dar es Salam on August 8.⁵⁵³ Soon after, hostilities (involving German gun boats) broke out along the Congo River in *Neu-Cameroon*.⁵⁵⁴

On August 7, South Africa's government under General Louis Botha (1862–1919) offered to support the British government, which responded with the request to “seize such part of GSWA as will give [the South African government] command of Swakopund, Lüderitzbucht, and the wireless stations there or in the interior”.⁵⁵⁵ In London, the Admiralty considered the seizure of the “coast wireless stations ... an urgent necessity”, and the capture of Windhoek was also being discussed because of the wireless station there.⁵⁵⁶ A sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D) had a discussion of “offensive operations against” GSWA on the agenda in mid-August, but no results were minuted.⁵⁵⁷ The Parliament in Cape Town decided on September 10, 1914 to declare war on Germany. It was claimed that Germany had the “desire to possess the Union”. Already in 1904 scenarios had been considered in case that troops from GSWA “invade[d] the South African colonies.” On September 14 the Royal Navy bombarded the wireless station at Swakopmund. The Caprivi Strip in the far north-east of GSWA was “fortuitously secured by a virtually bloodless” campaign” by Rhodesian forces on September 22. The British then set up several posts along the Kwando valley along the

552 *Dederig* 2000: 50; cf. *Seligmann* 2012; *Kuss* 2010: 328.

553 *Marguerat* 2006: 98; *Almeida-Topor* 2010: 85; *Samson* 2006: 28f.; 33.

554 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18, 703, Fritz Gerber to German Consul Luanda, 22.12.14.

555 Governor-Gen. to Ministers, 7.8.14, in: *Union of South Africa* 4/1915: 4; *Spies* 1969: 47.

556 TNA ADM 137/9: 86, Naval Notes on Expedition to GSWA, 8.8.14; CO 633/83/11: 111-113, Ax C Report, U.G. 46-'16, 12/1916; CO 633/83/8, U.G. 42-'16, 12/1916.

557 TNA FO 371/1883: 172, Agenda, CID sub, 14.8.14; *Samson* 2013: 69; *Nasson* 2014:436.

border between Angola and Northern Rhodesia during the war “to guard the fords”.⁵⁵⁸

The *Schutztruppe*'s mobilization (starting August 7) had been rather disorganized, transport capacity (four lorries) seemed miserable. The General Staff in Berlin was barely interested in the colonial theater of war and considered these troops as helpful only to bind enemy forces in Africa. Governor Seitz was told by the Colonial Office not to engage with South Africa unless forced to do so.⁵⁵⁹ Contrary to what was claimed during the World War, no “large military force” was stationed in GSWA in 1914.⁵⁶⁰ The *Schutztruppe*, including all reserves now 5,000 men strong, was not prepared to face a fully equipped European army. Thus, not so much GSWA's “poorly defended frontiers” or military capacity but geography made the conquest challenging. According to one South African officer “it was a case of ‘sand, and sand, and sand, and sand, and not a drop to drink’.”⁵⁶¹ “The total [South African and British Rhodesian] forces, which at one time or another took part in the operations numbered some 50,000, though probably no more than 40,000 were ever in the field at one and the same time” under the command of Louis Botha.⁵⁶² The South African troops were detached in four columns of 8,000–10,000 men. Three columns were operating in the south of GSWA targeting the railway junction at Keetmanshoop. Colonel Beves landed in Lüderitzbucht on September 19 with 16 man-o-wars. The German troops withdrew and the town with its important wireless station surrendered. Beves then wanted to follow the railway tracks eastwards across the Namib Desert to Aus and Keetmanshoop. However, the *Schutztruppe* repeatedly prevented the South Africans from taking over strategic waterholes.

South Africa's second column headed by Colonel Grant moved north from Port Nolloth and overran the German border post Ramansdrift on the Orange River on September 18, 1914. However, their first attempt to enter deeper into German territory ended “in fiasco”.⁵⁶³ On September 25 the Germans led by Commander of the *Schutztruppe* Heydebreck attacked near Sandfontein and took 200 rank-and-file and 15 British officers as

558 *Crabt.* 1915: 4; *Park* 1916: 115-9; *Samson* 2006: 21; *Yorke* 1990: 373; *Reyn.* 1972: 245.

559 *Bührer* 2012: 20; cf. *Samson* 2013: 41; an account full of hatred is *Hintrager* 1934: 88.

560 *Cana* 1915: 360f.; *Weck* 1919: 131.

561 *Davenport* 1978: 185; *Alport* 1934: 63; cf. *Seitz* 1920: 8f; *Kraus/Müller* 2009: 223-9.

562 *Park* 1916: 132; cf. *Samson* 2013: 38f on military organization.

563 *Michel* 2004: 922; *Samson* 2013: 76f.; cf. *Robinson* 1916.

prisoners of war, including Colonel Grant. Furthermore, to the detriment of South African war efforts, there “was real opposition” among South Africans – most of all in the Afrikaaner camp – to war against GSWA. It had been “[o]ne of the aims of South African leadership ... to use the war to promote greater unity between the Boers and the English speaking population”, but instead a “rebellion” broke out. This held off the South African advance more powerfully than German resistance. S.G. “Manie” Maritz (1876–1940), Jan C.G. Kemp (1872–1946), Christiaan Beyers (1969–1914) and other Afrikaaner officers from the South African War (1899–1902) aimed at liberating South Africa from the British “yoke”. Soon their deeds were blamed on “German intrigue”, since much to the “embarrass[ment]” of the Germans, who wanted to avoid the provocation of hostilities, Maritz and Kemp joined the German forces with their men after they were driven out of South Africa. Loyalists under Smuts and Botha had to fight the “rebels” from October to December 1914. Given “a little breathing space”, German forces used the time for maneuvers against the Portuguese.⁵⁶⁴

2.6.4 An Unlikely Victory – the Battle of Naulila, December 18, 1914

None of the colonial powers had a strategic plan for Africa when hostilities broke out in Europe.⁵⁶⁵ Neither the German nor the Portuguese colonial army was prepared to fight European adversaries in Africa. Forces stationed in the colonies were intended to act as the primary vehicle through which European rule manifested itself towards Africans.

One day after the decision to attack Fort Cuangar was taken by Seitz and Bethe, on October 25 the governor authorized a “punishment expedition” via telegram against Angola as proposed by Commander Heydebreck. The German target was Fort Naulila. The intended conquest was a “top secret” affair. GSWA’s most experienced officer, Major Victor Franke, an *alter Afrikaner* (old African) in the colony since 1896 was to be its leader. The first transports left Kalkfontein on October 26 and 27. On October 29, upon his return to Windhoek from the south with around 400 men, Heydebreck assessed the situation along the Angolan

564 Davenport 1978: 184; Samson 2006: 8; 83-9; TNA CO 633/83/11, Report U.G. 46-16, 12/1916; Nasson 2014: 436 ; Nasson 2014a: 167; 170.

565 Michel 2004: 920; a contemporary perspective Strümpell in *Kolonialkriegerbund* 1924: 81.

border with Seitz. They concluded: It would be “ignorant” to assume that there was *no* state of war between the two colonies because Angola’s Governor General had *not* notified Seitz formally about the outbreak of the war (General Botha had neither informed Seitz before South Africa started its conquest of GSWA in September 1914). Given the Portuguese silence after the Naulila incident (and the German wireless messages, if they were sent), the rumors about Roçadas’ army approaching the Kunene border, and the claims that the Portuguese had extended their patrols into German territory up to Ondonga, as well as the alleged attempts to instigate a revolt against the Germans, Seitz and Heybreck not only “took it for granted that a state of war now existed between the two countries”. They also “had reason to believe because of the size and composition of Roçadas’ force that the Portuguese were about to intervene in support of the British.” They resolved that it would be irresponsible to send another official as negotiator to Angola to demand satisfaction for “Naulila”. Since previous attempts to contact Portuguese authorities with envoys (Brauer, Schultze-Jena) failed, they expected that only a strong military expedition could obtain clarification about the unlikely case that Portugal was *not* at war with Germany. It was expected that in this case the Portuguese would immediately start negotiations to avoid a confrontation.⁵⁶⁶

The decision to send Franke to Angola was *not* dictated by “strategic consideration[s]”, but by the perceived threat of an imminent invasion – and the intention to revenge (*vergeltten*) the death of the three officials, as one soldier put it bluntly. The Germans, anxious to defend their porous southern border along the Orange River and the Kalahari Desert against South Africa, would have liked to *avoid* having to “establish a decisive presence in th[e northern] border region.”⁵⁶⁷ There were no military forces stationed north of Otavi and Outjo, almost 300 kilometers south of Angola’s border, whereas six companies were stationed in the south. Furthermore, the decision to dispatch an entire regiment to the northern border had only been made possible by the anti-British rebellion in South Africa forcing Botha and Smuts to first turn against the rebels.

During the last months of 1914, the question of Portugal’s decision to go to war or to remain “neutral” was most puzzling, and not only to offi-

566 BAB R 1001/6645: 131, Telgr Cdr to KGW, 25.10.14; R 1001/6634: 158f., report Seitz (10.5.21), Ax 13; 161, Eickhoff to RMW (15.11.21), Ax 14, Memo Allm. 23.5.22; *Cann* 2001: 162; *L’Ange* 1991: 169; *Southern* 2007: 11; *Stals* 1972; *Kuss* 2010: 136.

567 *Hayes* 1993: 90; *Almeida Tei*. 1935a: 10-35; NAN A.424 War Diary Bertling, late Oct. 14.

cialists in GSWA. Contemporaries in Portugal and elsewhere found it equally difficult to predict the next step. In early October the American Minister in Lisbon, Thomas H. Birch, met with the Foreign Minister Freire de Andrade who stated “Portugal would enter the war just as soon as called upon by the British Government”. Birch then mentioned various manifestations of a “strong popular sentiment among the masses ... against the sending of troops from Portugal.” The Foreign Minister “expressed himself as anti-German in feeling, [however,] he personally hoped Portugal would not enter the conflict.” Still, he informed his envoy in Berlin, Sidónio Pais, about the possibility of Portugal’s entry into the war. The army in Portugal was partially mobilized.⁵⁶⁸ Two months later, the German Consul in Luanda claimed to “know that Portugal is no longer neutral. However, a declaration of war has not yet been issued.” He did not mention how he had learnt about the alleged decision.⁵⁶⁹ It was the subtle Norton de Matos, who reminded him that the Portuguese Government had never declared officially its neutrality.⁵⁷⁰

While these questions were debated, Major Franke was already on his way north. He had arrived in Windhoek with Heydebreck from Kalkfontein and immediately continued with his regiment northwards to eliminate the Portuguese threat along the border and to “retaliate” against Fort Naulila.⁵⁷¹ However, the preparation of Franke’s “expedition” took several weeks. In early November, a British man-o-war intercepted a wireless code message from Governor Seitz to Berlin including the line “Franke marching against Portuguese”. Britain’s envoy in Lisbon, L. Carnegie, shortly thereafter informed the government in Lisbon.⁵⁷²

Franke’s regiment reached Otjiwarongo by rail on November 1 and it was clear that the expedition would arrive in Ovamboland in the middle of the rainy season (lasting from October to April), which would make things more difficult. However, since the Germans were convinced that the Portuguese were preparing their own attack on GSWA, time seemed of essence to avoid being crushed between British and Portuguese forces. A large train of ox wagons was compiled for the remaining 400 kilometers’

568 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 820, USML to SoS, 9.10.; 14.10.; 21.10.; 26.10.; 2.11.; 24.11.14; *Samara* 2004: 59; cf. *Teixeira* 1998.

569 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) German Consulate Luanda to VK Benguela, 2.12.14.

570 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) Chefe de Gabinete to German Consulate Luanda, 4.12.14.

571 BAB R 1001/6634: 65f., General ret. Franke to RMW, 23.03.22; *Historicus* 2012: 36-9.

572 TNA FO 371/1884: 487, GG South Africa to CO, 5.11.14; FO to BML, 10.11.14.

trek, the hardship of which (most of all the lack of water) was amply described by Franke, Suchier, and Bertling. After the tragic death of Commander v. Heydebreck on November 12 due a grenade accident, Franke had to return from Ombika near Okaukwejo to Windhoek to attend the funeral and to take over the command of the *Schutztruppe*.⁵⁷³

Historian Ernest Stals poses the relevant question whether the attack on Naulila was still advisable from a military point of view. Fresh South African troops were assembling, the commander dead, and instead of the rainy season, Franke's soldiers were faced with a drought in the north. Nonetheless, given the perceived threat from the troops at the Angolan border, the intention to "take revenge", and, as Franke noted, in order to avoid that "our reputation among the Ovambo suffers", he returned on November 24 to Ombika, south of the Etocha Pan. His regiment still consisted of around 400 soldiers (four maxim guns, six artillery pieces).⁵⁷⁴ The rather small number of soldiers – less than ten per cent of the *Schutztruppe*'s force level after mobilization – demonstrates the preeminent German concern with the South African invasion. Detachments advanced to find and deepen waterholes; there was barely enough water for all men and animals. Hundreds of the 2,000 oxen perished while pulling weaponry and supplies through the sand. Vageler joined the regiment near Okaukwejo to guide the men towards Fort Naulila. The government's native commissioner Hermann Tönjes, a former missionary, arrived from Olukonda. For Franke, he was not only an important interpreter, but most of all he could explain to the Ovambo kings that the Germans were not a threat to *them*. Franke also "spoke to the Boer du Plessis" who brought news from Angola and accompanied the regiment to Naulila. As Schultze-Jena before him, Franke had to visit Ovambo kings to make "presents" to those whose territory he wanted to cross. On November 25 he met with Ondonga King Martin and missionary Martti Rautanen (1845–1928) in Olukonda. Ongandjera King Tshanika (1887–1930) and Uukualudhi King

573 NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 14: 973, 1.11.14; *Oelhafen* 1923: 55; 81; *Suchier* 1918: 39; *Samson* 2013: 75 others claim he was killed by a 'Boer rebel'.

574 *Stals* 1968: 188; NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 14: 976, 12.11.14; 2. Kompanie, Ukamas 90 men lead by Captain von Watter; 6. Kompanie, Outjo 150 men lead by Captain Erich Weiss; 1. Batterie artillery equipped with 4 mountain- und 2 fieldguns, 150 men lead by Franke's deputy Cpt Georg Trainer; Cpt. Gerhard Sulling; wireless station; Doctors: H. Greiner, W. Suchier, BAB R 1001/6634: 134, Baericke, Kimmel, Jensen to DGL (30.04.15), Ax 8 to Memo Allem., 23.5.22; *Suchier* 1918: 32; *Hennig* 1920: 113; *Baericke* 1981: 84; *Mattenklodt* 1936: 29.

Mwaala (~1880–59) were hesitant to permit the troops into their land. Only when Franke visited them with an automobile (indicative of his status as the new commander) they became “more compliant”. Private Bertling noted in his diary “Mandume and other chiefs absolutely want to join us against the Portuguese. But they have to do it alone. So nobody can say later we have instigated [*aufgehetzt*] natives against whites. Today [Dec. 12] an entire wagon full with gifts was sent to one chief.” Franke had indeed ordered the delivery of “100 rifles for Mandume” to the Finnish mission station Olukonda. Its head, Rautanen, was less than pleased with this “gift”.⁵⁷⁵

The (outmoded M 71) rifles had been stored in Outjo following Governor Seitz’ plan from August 1914 to deliver guns to Mandume in case the Portuguese instigated a revolt. However, native commissioner Tönjes considered it “not advisable” to send more than seventeen rifles to the Kings – five for Mandume and three each for the others. Seitz conceded, but asked Tönjes to transport the guns to Ovamboland. When the latter visited the Kings in October 1914 to counter Portuguese advances through the distribution of “gifts (worth 400 M)”, he handed over rifles for the kings only. Given Franke’s expedition, Tönjes was told to remain in Ovamboland and to keep the “100 rifles” until the *Schutztruppe* commander decided about their distribution; whether he ever did so remains unknown. At least with Mandume the German gifts had the intended outcome. Through missionary channels, he thanked Governor Seitz for the promised guns, and assured him of his allegiance to the Germans. Later, the King let the governor know that he looked forward to the death of the three Germans being revenged. Nevertheless, Franke was eager to avoid that Mandume’s men join the German forces at Naulila. According to Portuguese sources, however, he enlisted African support, most of all Shihetekela, the chief (*soba*) of Little Cuamato (Ombandja), deposed by Roçadas after the conquest in 1907.⁵⁷⁶

575 NAN A.424 War Diary Bertling 10.12.14; NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 14: 975; 978, 11.11.; 24.11.14; Baericke 1981: 66f.; Suchier 1918: 35; 46; *Historicus* 2012: 57; 65.

576 BAB R 1001/6645: 47, Tönjes to KGW, 25.9.; 50, KGW to Tönjes, 30.9.; 53, 64 BA Outjo to KGW, 1./3.10.; 68, KGW to BA Outjo, 9.10.; 132, KGW to Nord-Etappe, 26.10.; Wulfhorst to KGW, 8.10.; 16.11.14; cf. *Historicus* 2012: 77; Hayes 1992II: 90; Almeida Teixeira 1935a: 24



Ill. 24 Capitão Alves Roçadas



Ill. 25 Major Franke

In the meantime, also Lt.-Colonel Roçadas marched with most of his forces closer to the border. He was reportedly appalled by Sereno's acts and assumed a German invasion was now imminent. Coming from Lubango he arrived in Fort Roçadas on November 23, which he had erected in 1906. The Portuguese knew about Franke's march from as early as November 12. Rumors poured in about alleged German movements near the border and the considerable size of Franke's regiment. Roçadas later claimed that King Mandume had sent him word about the approaching Germans on November 5. Given the slow progress of Franke's column being still far away, this intelligence was misleading and confused Roçadas. Expecting an attack, but unaware where Franke might strike, he "left the bulk of [his] force dispersed along a 35-kilometer front in mutually supporting formation" to protect the roads and the fords. Making matters ever more complicated, on November 25, the minister of colonies reminded Roçadas via telegram "all [soldiers must] know that we are not at war with Germany". A few days later, also Norton de Matos sent him a telegram requesting to "maintain [Portugal's] neutrality" and not to "provoke" any hostilities. Roçadas was not allowed to cross the border.⁵⁷⁷

Roçadas was presented with the German prisoners taken in Naulila and interrogated them. The mysterious German deserter Haunschild had been arrested north of the borderline. He was allegedly working for Uukuambi King Iipumbo and eager to prove that he was not one of the "German

577 Roçadas 1919: 166; Machado 1956: 55; 88; Baericke 1981: 69; Southern 2007:12, *Cann* 2001: 154.

spies” – whereas the Germans were concerned that he was spying for the Portuguese. He drew a map depicting all military stations in GSWA and their composition.⁵⁷⁸ Carl Jensen later claimed to have warned Roçadas during his interrogation of German revenge. Jensen, who was recognized by his former employer Roçadas, lied to him by stating that GSWA had 20,000 troops, four times more than in reality. Roçadas gave orders to concentrate troops along the Kunene fords to prevent an attack on Humbe – 300 men were stationed at Erickson Drift (Vau do Calueque). He relied early on the *guerra preta*, ordering to provide the Cuamato with weapons to be used against the Germans. Due to their friendly relations with King Iipumbo the Portuguese were informed about Franke’s next moves. According to Jensen, “every officer expected war”. From the direction the Germans were marching a particular target was not discernible. Roçadas, convinced that the German’s would cross the Kunene River, “saw no reason to concentrate his forces east of the Kunene in a committed defense of Naulila.” He was eager to protract Franke’s attack. 600 marines from Moçâmedes were expected to arrive every day.⁵⁷⁹

When he arrived in the Uukwaludhi area near the Kunene River on December 11, Franke ordered a reconnaissance of Fort Naulila. Two patrols were sent to find a campground for the regiment. None of the commanders had sufficient intelligence about the enemy’s army. Within the administration of GSWA, the native commissioner Captain Streitwolf was also in charge of the military affairs of Angola. But, as his biographer writes, this responsibility always remained an unimportant (*onbelankrik*) part of his official duties – the files were only maintained to 1911. Franke set up a camp south of Erickson Drift around 25 kilometers west of Naulila. A Portuguese camp was located on top of the Kampili Hills across the river observing everything. In the first skirmish between patrols several Portuguese and German soldiers were wounded, the Portuguese prevented the Germans from getting closer to the fort. The soldier Baericke lost his group and was arrested the next day by a patrol under Lieutenant Aragão. Roçadas, who had arrived in Fort Naulila on December 9, interrogated him. Using the Norwegian trader and hunter Brodtkorb as interpreter the commander threatened to shoot Baericke if he did not tell him the strength of Franke’s regiment. He also asked Baericke about his own estimation of

578 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 30, statement Commander Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21.

579 Machado 1956: 116; Cann 2001: 155; BAB R 1001/6634: 121f., Report Jensen, Ax 4; 6, Memo Allem. 23.5.22.

the number of soldiers in Naulila and whether he believed that Franke would conquer Naulila.⁵⁸⁰ The captive responded with an estimation of the Portuguese troops concentrated in Naulila (around 2,000 men) and lied to him that Roçadas was observing only the advance column and that Franke has no particular target, but was planning to invade southern Angola in three columns via Zwartbooi Drift, Erickson Drift and Naulila. In his later report, Baericke was of the opinion that due to this response Roçadas decided to reduce his troops in Naulila and sent several platoons west to Erickson and Zwartbooi Drift, claiming thus to have contributed to the German “success”.⁵⁸¹

Following the interrogation Roçadas indeed found it difficult to establish not only when, but also where Franke would attack, considering the German encampment 25 kilometers away from Naulila and right in front of a ford. It seemed that there would be more valuable targets than Fort Naulila, such as the town of Humbe across the river. Roçadas ordered Major Salgado to move with his company to Naulila, but on December 13 he told him to go to Erickson Drift in order to fortify the hills and prepare for an “artillery barrage” of the German camp. Mozambican soldiers were sent nearby to Fort Otoquero.⁵⁸² Manasse Veseevete, a Herero born in GSWA who had settled in the Nkumbi-area after 1904 where he joined the Portuguese army, remembered in 1986 the situation along

“the [Kunene] river where there was war. We were given rifles with telescopes to watch the river where Germans might cross, both where there are mountains and where there are no mountains. The Portuguese realised that when the Germans were out of water they were very strong but in the water they were vulnerable. They thought it wise to overcome the Germans in the water.”

However, the Germans never tried to cross the river. They were aware of the danger posed by the observing Portuguese on top of the hills.⁵⁸³ On December 16, after six weeks, Franke’s regiment had completely arrived in the camp near Erickson Drift. Of Roçadas’ 3,000 men about 450 European and 300 Mozambican infantrymen and 60 dragoons remained in and

580 *Stals* 1979: 95; NAN STR 21, II m 1, Bl.22; *Baericke* 1981: 67;88;101; *Historicus* 2012: 72.

581 BAB R 1001/6634: 145f., Report Baericke (16.11.19), Ax 9 Memo Allm., 23.5.22.

582 AHM/Div/2/2/21/18: Major A. Salgado, [n.d.]; *Cann* 2001: 159; *Historicus* 2012: 83.

583 *Heywood/Lau/Ohly* 1992: 180, Manasse Vesevet[e] on his youth narrated to A. Kaputo, 30.3.1986; V. then ‘dodged the war’ by pretending to have fever; *Suchier* 1918: 49.

near Fort Naulila that was similarly constructed as Fort Cuangar. An unknown number of “irregulars”, Cuamato combatants, were given guns by the Portuguese to support them outside the fort by attacking the German flanks.⁵⁸⁴ Roçadas’ forces were “deployed south of Naulila in a defensive arc of some 2,000 metre radius” including three artillery pieces, four machine guns, infantry and cavalry. “A supporting line was established 200 meters behind the first”. On the 17th in the afternoon the bulk of the Germans began to march eastwards, moving away from the river (and the artillery prepared to hit if they attempted to cross) and circling the eastern (less protected) flank of Fort Naulila, that was by now the clear target. But Roçadas was hesitant to move additional forces to the defense of Naulila. Salgado continued to guard the fords.⁵⁸⁵




Ill. 26 “Fort Naulila, 18.XII.1914”

584 Stals 1968: 190; *Oelhafen* 1923: 90; Hennig 1920: 114; *Ferreira Martins* 1942: 52-59; *Varão* 1934: 59f.; different numbers in *Morlang* 1998: 46; *Mattenklodt* 1936: 41f.; BAB R 1001/6634: 134, Baericke, Kimmel, Jensen to DGL (30.04.15), Ax 8 Memo Allm., 23.5.22.

585 *Cann* 2001: 160; NAN A.424. War Diary Friedrich Bertling, 17.12.14; as the German march left no room for speculation, the Portuguese could have, as Vageler pointed out, avoided the fighting by clarifying their neutrality. BAB R 1001/6634: 148f., Vageler to RMW (10.11.21), Ax 10 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; *Historicus* 2012: 93-8.

In Prussian tradition, Franke planned a battle “in which the enemy was enveloped and attacked at its flanks... Such a battle risked everything in a single moment”. The 6th Company of 150 men led by Captain Erich Weiss and the 1st Artillery battery of 150 men equipped with four mountain and two fieldguns, led by Franke’s deputy Captain Georg Trainer were ordered to march eastwards during the night to Fort Naulila and to attack from the north-eastern direction in the early morning of December 18 under Franke’s command. The 2nd Company of around 90 men led by Captain von Watter was to march through the night along the Kunene River. Watter was to open the battle with an attack on the trenches protecting the fort along its southern flank, thus preventing the Portuguese from crossing the Kunene River.

Battle of Naulila
December 18, 1914



Map 3 *Battle of Naulila*

However, things did not unfold as planned. When ordering the attack for December 18, Franke knew that he was taking a risk. The military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’ warning regarding “attack[s] on defensive positions”

was not new to him: “One thing is sure ...: *it is a risky business to attack an able opponent in a good position.*” Roçadas’ men had improved fortifications, and it was to be seen whether they were “able opponents”.⁵⁸⁶ Luckily for the Portuguese, Captain von Watter’s guide du Plessis had underestimated the distance to the fort and his 2nd Company did not arrive in time to open the attack from the south. The other two companies waited in vain to hear the first German shots. Around 5 a.m., shortly before sunrise, the Germans were fired at from trenches their reconnaissance patrol had not noticed. It was pure luck that the Portuguese artillery shot too high; the thick bush made any orientation almost impossible. Despite their shock about the miscarried pincer movement and the surprising Portuguese barrage, the Germans correctly positioned their artillery and machine guns and used them “to great effect”.⁵⁸⁷ Fort Naulila’s munitions depot was hit and exploded; all barracks and surrounding huts caught fire. Until 7 a.m. Franke’s troops came as close as 200 meters to the fort. Roçadas made a fateful decision: he left the fort, but he did not organize relief forces from his regiments nearby. The men left behind tried to keep the Germans at bay by increased firepower. The fort was equipped with four guns and four maxim guns, the quintessential European weapon of choice during “expeditions” against “natives” that was now turned with equally great effect against Europeans.⁵⁸⁸ In addition, the huge baobab trees nearby served as base for snipers. The Germans found themselves attacked from all sides by native *franktireurs*, who were equipped by the Portuguese and supported them “excellently”, as they targeted the officers in particular.⁵⁸⁹ The body of the sacrosanct white colonial master now became the target if he belonged to the enemy’s army. The Germans were shocked by this ‘tactic’. But the Portuguese were not satisfied either with the *guerra preta*, who had allegedly left their left flank unguarded and allowed Franke to pass during the night without warning the Portuguese. Captain Varão complained in his memoirs that many of the “Cuanhama” (meaning Cuamato) auxiliaries had escaped the night before the fighting commenced. This was, he and others assumed, due to the above-mentioned *soba* Shi-

586 Hull 2005: 161; Clausewitz 1976 [1832]: 535; BAB R 1001/6641: 12, file: 29 testimony A. Varão, 11.11.21.

587 Southern, 2007: 12; NAN A.424; Bertling 22.12.14; cf. *Oelhafen* 1923: 86; *Morlang* 1998: 46; on artillery as the ‘decisive’ weapon of WWI cf. *Ziemann* 2013: 29f.

588 Ellis 1975: 75; *Historicus* 2012: 104 claims R. remained in Naulila, but quotes no source.

589 BAB R 1001/6634: 66, General ret. Franke to RMW, 23.03.22 ‘vorzüglich unterstützt’.

hetekela, who was deposed by Roçadas in 1907 and now took revenge by supporting the Germans.⁵⁹⁰ Both sides thus considered – much to their chagrin – the participation of Africans to be decisive for the battle. *Alferes* Sereno, regarded by the Germans as responsible for the “murder of Naulila” took part in the battle.⁵⁹¹

The longer the combat lasted, the greater the absence of unity between the Portuguese officers and the rank-and-file became apparent. Headed by Roçadas there was no absence of battle-hardened cadres, but he had left the fort too early. Tactical mistakes, inadequate commandership, the lack of preparation of the metropolitan forces, and the lack of motivation to defend the fort at all costs against a numerically inferior enemy became more and more evident. The troops stationed in Naulila had a rather low level of combat moral, which led to panic in the ranks the closer the enemy got to the fort. Private Bertling observed from his position that the Portuguese soldiers were “constantly running around haphazardly [*planlos*]. From left to right, and from right to left”, while their artillery was hitting the German baggage train; a cavalry counter-attack was gunned down. Whereas the Germans at one moment believed the battle to be lost, the Portuguese evacuated the forward trenches, having run out of ammunition. Franke was always near the first line, a far cry from his characterization by South Africans “as a cautious commander”. When a white flag was seen, he left his cover, but was shot in the face from a sniper above him in a tree. Believing his wounds to be deadly and aware that the heavy death toll would soon make any advance impossible, Franke ordered Captain Trainer to take over the command and to storm the fort immediately. With bayonets the Germans charged through the thorn bush fences inside the fort, whose mud walls had been destroyed by artillery.

Finally, the 2nd Company of Captain von Watter – whom Franke had already called in November “unreliable” and horribly slow (*schreckliche Transuse*) – arrived at the battlefield, convincing the Portuguese that any counter-strike would be hopeless. Most Portuguese had already escaped across the Kunene, others surrendered. In one forenoon the Portuguese had lost not only their face but also “the fruit of their previous campaigns.

590 *Varão*, 1934: 59f.; *Teixeira* 1935: 24; *Cann* 2001: 160; *Hayes* 1992: 181.

591 AHM/Div/2/2/21/16: 44, ‘Oficiais que tomaram parte nos combates de Naulila’; *Baericke* 1981: 104 summarizes the rumors about Sereno’s fate: Officially, he was killed during the battle of Naulila; Vageler and Suchier reported that he was jailed for the ‘murder’; *Baericke* was told in Luanda that Roçadas shot Sereno during the retreat near Fort Gambos.

Inability and inaction of the officers, most of all Roçadas, were responsible for this reverse.”⁵⁹² “Fighting terminated after three hours”.⁵⁹³

Directly after the battle, German troopers started to reconnoiter the vicinity for *franktireurs*, who were still shooting at them after the capitulation. The fear and horror of the battlefield after the battle, the cries of the wounded and the destructions were described in Private Bertling’s diary. He expressed his disgust (*widerlich*) at the fact that seven Africans, wearing loincloths and no signs of affiliation with the Portuguese – so the Germans said – were caught with their guns and hanged.⁵⁹⁴ A drumhead court-martial (Weiß, Vageler and one lieutenant) had sentenced the “irregulars” to death.⁵⁹⁵ “Cruelty [is] probably the strongest sign of power at all.”⁵⁹⁶ Five hundred Africans were assumed to have fought for the Portuguese – a rather unlikely estimate. Their *soba* stated to Trainer that they had been forced by the Portuguese and had been promised bounty after the defeat of the Germans. The latter considered it a disgrace that Africans had seen Europeans fight one another.⁵⁹⁷ Worse, however, was the fact that (civilian) Africans had been given guns by colonial authorities and had been ordered to shoot at Europeans, a situation, Art. 3 of the Congo-Act (1885) wanted to exclude. Such wars were considered by the Germans contrary to “reason” and “race consciousness”; they would damage the “respect” for and the “nimbus of the white man”⁵⁹⁸ This hysteric debate continued well into the post-war period.⁵⁹⁹

592 NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 14: 974, 9.11.14; *Morlang* 1998: 46; *Pélessier* 1969: 100; 1977: 485; cf. battle details in *Machado* 1956: 140-173; *Oelhafen* 1923: 85-9; *Baericke* 1981: 69-72.

593 AHM/Div/2/2/25/12: 2, Amara Polónia, report on J. Pissarra, 3.2.15; *Suchier* 1918: 55.

594 NAN A.424 War Diary Bertling 22.12.14; BAB R 1001/6638: 25 Leskowski to AA, 13.10.24.

595 BAB R 1001/6641: 224 (28), Trainer Denkschrift, 9.2.29; on war violence *Ziemann* 2013: 9.

596 *Häußler/Trotha* 2012: 83 ‘Grausamkeit, das vermutlich stärkste Zeichen von Macht überhaupt.’

597 The same was true for verbal abuses among Europeans. The German Consul in Belgian Congo Asmis, for example, had to endure numerous insults when he had to leave the Colony. Fellow passengers on the steamer threatened to throw him overboard and, much to the chagrin of Asmis, explained all the insults to the Germans, their Emperor, and the Empress ‘to the natives’. NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18, 703, USC Boma to SoS, 24.9.; Asmis to GG Boma, 16.9.14.

598 *Fonck* 1917: 3; *Hintrager*, 1952: 440; cf. *Dederling* 1999: 2; *Nasson* 2014: 454f.

599 On the campaign against French colonial soldiers in Germany, the ‘black shame’ on the Rhine cf. *Koller* 2001: 207-61; *Maß* 2006; 2001; *Wigger* 2006; cf. chapter 3.3.9.

The number of men killed, wounded, and imprisoned during the battle is inconsistent in the literature. At least three Portuguese officers and 65 commoners were killed, but there are also claims that 200 Portuguese soldiers died. 75 soldiers were wounded. The Germans took 37 (or 66 as others claim) Portuguese prisoners, among them three officers. Nine German soldiers were killed in action, three men died of their wounds on their way back.⁶⁰⁰ Thirty Germans were wounded, Franke among them.⁶⁰¹ The sanitary and medical conditions made warfare in Africa “particularly cruel”.⁶⁰²

After their victory, German officers tried to interrogate their Portuguese counterparts. Neither party spoke the other’s language. However, the Germans did understand that Roçadas had “escaped” from the battlefield. They soon noticed panic among the Portuguese. The shooting continued, unabated, the battle seeming to continue with the Germans as mere on-lookers.

2.6.5 The Power of Rumor – the Portuguese Retreat, December 1914

The worst predictions had come true: Germany, which had been feared by the Portuguese for the last thirty years, had become a Germany that attacked the Portuguese in Angola. For the first time since the Dutch capture of Luanda in 1641 and the debacle against the French in Cabinda in 1784, Portugal was faced with a European invasion of Angola.⁶⁰³

Eighteen Portuguese officers started to retreat with their men from the right flank of the battlefield and crossed the Kunene River, following the example of their commander Roçadas.⁶⁰⁴ The combat ended around 8:30 a.m. The last Portuguese troops crossed the Kunene River around 9 a.m. and marched immediately to Fort Dongoena where the first men arrived around 2 p.m.⁶⁰⁵ Roçadas, who would not believe that 400 Germans had merely come to the Kunene River to destroy Naulila, was convinced that Franke’s regiment was just the spearhead of a large invading army. Having still massive numerical advantage, Roçadas decided not to go on the

600 NAN A.424 Diary Bertling 22.12.14; BAB R 1001/6638: 24, Suchier to AA, 13.10.24; R 1001/6922: 8-19, ‘List: killed in action’ 1926; Santos 1978: 215; Fraga 2010: 129.

601 *Oelhafen* 1923: 90; *Pélissier* 2004: 263; *Morlang* 1998: 46; *Mattenklodt* 1936 [1928]: 46.

602 *Michel* 2004: 925; cf. *Brou* 1916; *Suchier* 1918: 65-75; *Kuss* 2010: 304-10; *Proppe* 1974.

603 Cf. *Penha Garcia* 1918: 130; *Pélissier* 1977: 485.

604 AHM/Div/2/2/21/16: 46 Ax XIX Relação dos oficiais e praças; *Historicus* 2012:123.

605 AHM/Div/2/2/21/14: 1 E. Machado, A retirada de Naulila após o combate do dia 18 [n.d.].

offensive to reverse the initial setback, as he was concerned the Germans would cut his retreat. He hoped to block the Germans marching to Humbe and gaining access to the Huila plateau. But the retreat he ordered was disorganized; the morale was broken although there had been no outright destruction of Portuguese forces at Naulila. The continuing shooting created confusion; hundreds of Portuguese soldiers began to run for their lives, no longer obeying their officers. The retreat transformed into a wild escape and finally into a stampede that invited catastrophe – but the victorious Germans did not pursue them. What had happened? African “irregulars”, being equipped by the Portuguese with guns and ammunition, turned sides. While the Germans complained that they were still shot at by these men, others had already begun to target the withdrawing Portuguese – an army that had conquered Cuamato and deposed their *soba* only seven years before. Historians of colonialism have repeatedly pointed to the false dichotomies of resistance and collaboration and emphasized the complexities of colonial encounters. Motives and strategies of all groups evolved and changed over time according to their own needs⁶⁰⁶ – sometimes abruptly, as was the case after the battle of Naulila.

The German witnesses analyzed this blurred picture of a colonial encounter – that ran contrary to the common ideology of European superiority – as a cautionary tale: The Portuguese had “committed a crime” by handing weapons to these “irregulars”. They were playing a “dangerous game” and now that they had lost the battle they could not expect any loyalty from Africans, “the arrow had to return to the shooter”.⁶⁰⁷ The fleeing soldiers, however, in their panic, could not know whether they were targeted by Germans, or Africans under German command, or Africans on their own.

In considering the shooting by Africans, Captain Trainer wrote a letter to Roçadas offering joint action against the “imminent rebellion”. Sending a Portuguese sergeant with the letter to his commander, Trainer never received an answer. He ordered that all Africans had to hand in their guns and threatened to hang those who disobeyed, but with little success.⁶⁰⁸ The Portuguese prisoners complained about the degrading treatment by the German troops, who forced them, bound together on their necks and holding a white flag, to form a living shield when the Germans fetched water

606 Cf. Aldrich 2010: 106; Oelhafen 1923: 91; Hennig 1920: 118 Africans took ‘revenge’.

607 BAB R 1001/6641: 222 (15), Trainer: Zur port. Denkschrift, 9.2.29; cf. Hayes 1992: 182.

608 BAB R 1001/6641: 224 (28), Mj. Trainer: Zur portugiesischen Denkschrift, 9.2.29.

at the Kunene River. All guns were prepared. “We were ready for combat”, had Roçadas’ force used this moment for a counter-strike from the opposite bank. Contrary to what is still stated in secondary literature, German troops did *not* raid “deep into southern Angola”. After tearing down the fort, Franke’s regiment returned to GSWA the next day, handing out presents to the “pro-German” Ovambo and taking with it as bounty a maxim gun, guns and ammunition, 16 ox wagons and medical equipment. Any hopes to receive further supplies from Angola were dashed. However, the threat of a Portuguese attack on GSWA was minimized. The troops were welcomed back in Outjo on January 12 and were soon sent south to resume a (hopeless) fight against the South Africans who had landed in Walvisbay.⁶⁰⁹

Roçadas, on the other hand, who had provisionally assembled his troops at Dongoena, finally believed in the German invasion, Norton de Matos’ *idée fixe*. He assumed that an invading army was immediately behind him. Similar to other sites of World War I, the rumor (*boato*) developed into its own truth, verified by the shooting that could be heard, everywhere. *Capitão mor* Varão remembered that near Fort Dongoena his troops had received a letter from the Germans forwarded by a Portuguese soldiers. The letter demanded the immediate commencement of peace negotiations and threatened that all Africans carrying weapons would be hanged. It was, according to Varão, also claimed by the Germans that there were more troops behind them. The Portuguese did not respond to the letter. Some spent the night in Fort Dongoena; others left the fort at 7 p.m. heading for Humbe. The next day, December 19, in Humbe, rumors spread that the Germans had crossed the Kunene. Order was given to vacate Fort Roçadas and to destroy everything that could not be taken away. A hut housing all artillery ammunition was set ablaze. The detonation could be heard in Humbe where soldiers and population alike presumed that they were under a German artillery barrage. The impossibility of controlling rumors was underlined by the “panic” that followed this “false alarm”.⁶¹⁰ Humbe was vacated too and subsequently sacked by Africans. The troops marched until 10 in the night to Bela-Bela, 25 kilometers north of Humbe.⁶¹¹ The degree of panic that had stricken the Portuguese can be

609 NAN A.424 Diary Bertling, 22.12.14; Roberts 1986: 496; Teix. 2003: 25; Suchier 1918: 74.

610 AHM/Div/2/2/25/12: 13;19, Polonia, Conclusão, 3.2.15; Hayes 1992:183; cf. White 2000.

611 Varão 1934: 59f; Suchier 1918:60 quot. *O Mundo*, 2.9.15; BAB R 1001/6634: 146, Report of Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.19), Ax 9 Memo All., 23.5.22 (photos); Baericke 1981: 78f.

seen from the continued march northwards for the following ten days until December 28: Mutucua, Cahama, Cavalaua, Binguiro, Forno da Cal. It was said that Africans pursued the Portuguese up to Fort Gambos, 150 kilometers north of Fort Naulila.⁶¹²

Lacking any intelligence about their retreat, Roçadas still assumed that the Germans had continued their invasion and were behind all the shooting. This assumption led him to his second, “monumental error”: He ordered the “evacuation of all forts in the south”. Still ten days after the battle the commander of Fort Evale believed that “the Germans were in Humbe”. According to Varão it was predominantly the lack of cavalry that prevented the rumors from being clarified by reconnoitering the Germans. Franke had become the “bogeyman” of the Portuguese and Roçadas thought it necessary to win time and space in order to organize the defense of the Huila plateau.⁶¹³

When the “news” about the Portuguese defeat spread, this was, as missionary Wulfhorst expressed it, “for all Ovambotribes like a call to rise against the Portuguese; [e]ven though nothing had been said.” South of Cuito Cuanavale there was not a single Portuguese fort left between the Kunene River and the Northern Rhodesian border. Except for the missionaries, there was “not a single white in the region”.⁶¹⁴ Garrisons were attacked, soldiers ran for their lives, leaving behind provisions, weaponry, and war materials (40,000 cartridges in Fort Evale alone). The “strong sense of vulnerability” that has been described for soldiers at Angola’s periphery proved to be justified in December 1914. The “violence, hunger, despair, crying, and fear” experienced by the escaping troops have barely found their way into the sources subsequently, but it is reasonable to assume them to be accurate.⁶¹⁵ This “disaster”, as was clear to the observing missionaries, could have ended up much worse if the *boches* had decided to pursue the fleeing troops. But there was no need for that. The Cuamato and others, assuming “the Portuguese gone for good”, took revenge for the defeat in 1907 and looted the forts. And with every abandoned fort more

612 AHM/Div/2/2/21/14:1, E. Machado, ‘A retirada de Naulila após o combate do dia 18’ [n.d.].

613 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Evale) to TRP, 27.12.14; *Varão* 1934: 59; *Pélessier* 1977: 485 ‘le croque-mitaine’; on research about rumors in WWI *Attenhöner* 2008: 2-6.

614 BAB R 1001/6634:146, Report Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.19), Ax 9 Memo All., 23.5.22; NAN A.505:35, Chronik Omupanda, 20.11.15; *Suchier* 1918:61 quot. *O Mundo*, 2.9.15.

615 *Roque* 2003: 110 on a source from Moxico, 1904; on rumor in Africa *White* 2000.

weapons came into their hands. Within days the ‘colonization work’ of thirty years collapsed – *além-Cunene* was free again.⁶¹⁶

The Portuguese had repeatedly faced the problem that “African soldiers deserting from the harsh conditions in the colonial army” could turn against them.⁶¹⁷ This time, however, it was not a riot by a makeshift *guerra preta*, who had been given guns and now turned against their “masters”; rather, the shooting after the battle of Naulila developed within days into an open rebellion by peoples the Portuguese had expected to have defeated seven years before. While it has been stated about the First World War in Africa that African people were “always secondary actors and direct victims”,⁶¹⁸ the situation in southern Angola following the battle of Naulila changed dramatically. The Portuguese became secondary actors and direct victims, being chased northwards and leaving behind their military equipment and settlements.

King Mandume, against whom Roçadas was supposed to fight in the first place, became aware of his adversary’s downfall. His men soon joined the Cuamato and Vavale and attacked Fort Kafima, east of Evale. This ended in just another disaster for the Portuguese. Kafima’s garrison was “completely annihilated” and one lieutenant and one sergeant were taken prisoner by the Kwanyama. Mandume took his chance, while two of his adversaries, the Portuguese and the Germans, were about to be defeated.⁶¹⁹ However, a third colonial player entered the scene in GSWA and Ovamboland.

2.6.6 The South African Conquest of GSWA (II), January–July 1915

Given the complete retreat of the Portuguese, “the Germans did not have to worry about their northern frontier for the remainder of the war.” But in December 1914 General Jan Smuts (1870–1950) also crushed the “Boer Rebellion”, following which he could finally resume South Africa’s GSWA campaign; “a short clinical campaign ... with only 266 deaths.”

The “rebels” ‘Manie’ Maritz and Kemp deflected to the Germans in late 1914. On December 22, near Scuit Drift, Maritz undertook it to attack

616 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz to Faugère, 15.1.15; *Meneses* 2010: 44; *Southern* 2007: 13.

617 *Clarence-Smith* 1976: 220 on ‘bandit groups in the rugged lands of the escarpment’.

618 *Bois* 2006: 19: ‘des acteurs secondaires et des victimes directes’; cf. *Nasson* 2014: 442.

619 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Evale) to TRP, 27.12.14; 20.2.15; *Hayes* 1992: 184.

South Africa's third column, headed by Colonel van Deventer, coming east from the Kalahari Desert. On February 3, 1915 German forces near Kakamas again attacked van Deventer. However, these skirmishes proved militarily meaningless. Maritz "complained about the red tape in the Prussian military machine" and "denounced the German soldiers as 'poor horse masters'."⁶²⁰ After reinforcements, van Deventer's column took Warmbad and reached Kabus north of Keetmanshoop on April 20. Coming from Lüderitzbucht, the South Africans, now under General Duncan McKenzie reached Aus in March 1915 and pushed towards Gibeon. From the east, across the Kalahari Desert, Lt.-Colonel Christian Berrangé advanced via Hasuur. On April 12 Keetmanshoop was occupied. On May 2 the three united columns of van Deventer, McKenzie, and Berrangé, now under the command of General Smuts, attacked the German troops near Gibeon and took 200 prisoners. The remainder of the *Schutztruppe* barely managed to retreat towards Windhoek. The fourth column had landed in Walvisbay (belonging to South Africa) on December 25, 1914 and occupied Swakopmund on January 14. Commander-in-Chief General Botha, arriving in Swakopmund on February 26, hoped to unite in Windhoek with his three columns coming from south. German counterstrikes under the command of Franke proved fruitless considering the South African manpower. The eagerly awaited German East Asian Squadron from Kikutchou under Admiral Maximilian von Spee (1861–1914) never arrived. The 2,200 men were lost in the battle of the Falkland Islands. As the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, put it: "the clearance of the oceans was completed."⁶²¹ There was no more hope for relief.

The Germans relocated the remainder of the *Schutztruppe* and the entire administration northwards. Governor Seitz escaped to Grootfontein in early May. On May 12, Botha occupied Windhoek. After a four-week pause and failed attempts to negotiate a cease-fire until the end of the war in Europe, fighting resumed. The *Schutztruppe*, exhausted and lacking any confidence merely administered its own retreat. Military engagements ended in disaster, the German officers were shocked at the speed of Botha's advance. Proposals to link up with GEA were put down as unrealistic. On July 9, Governor Seitz and Commander Franke signed in Khorab the un-

620 Cann 2001: 162; Samson 2013: 80f.; quote in Dederling 2000: 52; Samson 2006: 89-92; cf. Walker 1917.

621 Herwig 1980: 158; Seitz 1920: 23; Eckenbr. 1940: 179 Franke offered a reward of 100 M to whoever reported first the arrival of Spee; Stevenson 2004: 199; Sondhaus 2011: 107.

conditional surrender of GSWA. The *Schutztruppe* still consisted of 3,497 men.⁶²² Most of the commoners were put into camps near Aus. Officers were allowed to keep their weapons and returned to their farms. In subsequent years, the “laxity of the rules regarding the treatment of the Germans” gave rise to protests in South Africa. The Administrator E. Gorges had to justify his policy before Parliament and argued that such claims were based on “misleading statements”. German civilians, he emphasized, were law abiding under British rule. The Magistrate of Omaruru, Major Thomas O’Reilly, wrote: “the general conduct of black and white leaves little to criticize and much to be grateful for.”⁶²³

Aware of the catastrophic consequences (for the Portuguese) of the African participation in the border war between GSWA and Angola, the South Africans taking over GSWA were eager to “warn” the African population, “that this was a white man’s war; that they could take no share in it”.⁶²⁴ However, the South African troops soon had to turn to a new German adversary who did not adhere to this notion of waging a “white war”. Southern Africa was in turmoil. The war had repercussions in Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland, where the Chilembwe rising of January 1915 shortly challenged British authority.⁶²⁵

The Luso-German and the Anglo-German confrontation in Angola and GSWA had ended. In East Africa, however, the carnage between Portuguese, Belgian, British and German troops had just begun to unfold. After first skirmishes in August 1914, Portuguese troops coming from Mozambique occupied in 1916 the disputed Kionga triangle south of the border river Rovuma. Then, 1,500 soldiers traversed the Rovuma River and occupied Newala in German East Africa just to learn that they were trapped by the troops of Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964). The battle in November 1916 ended in disaster for the Portuguese. In November 1917, the *Schutztruppe* (1700 *Askari*, 300 Germans) crossed the border. A nightmare descended upon the people of northern Mozambique. The ensuing *odyssey* was a hopeless attempt of Lettow-Vorbeck to survive and to bind allied forces in Africa. The “main weapons of the *Schutztruppe* were their legs”. “Bushcraft” was the only response the Ger-

622 NAN A.566, v. 3: 6, Hennig, 5.1.18; *Devitt* 1937: 92; *Samson* 2013: 84f.; *Nasson* 2014: 437; cf. NAN ADM 8, 25/23, German casualties (15 Officers; 134 privates).

623 TNA CO 633/84/2: 4f. Memo, 12.3.17; cf. *Raif* 1935; *Spies* 1969: 56f.; *Rizzo* 2012: 75.

624 *Pritchard* 1916: 2; cf. *Nasson* 2014a: 167; 178; *Keegan* 1999: 228; *Kaufmann*; *Siebold* 1916.

625 *Page* 1978: 90f.; 1990: *Nasson* 2014: 445; cf. *Vandervort* 2009; *Vogt* 1973.

mans had against the overwhelming allied forces. Hunger and diseases haunted the marauding *Schutztruppe*. Hunted by General Smuts' troops they had no particular aim but to find the next Portuguese settlement they could loot. The few surviving German members compared their deeds to those of the *Landsknechte* during the Thirty Years War leaving behind only terror, famine, and death.⁶²⁶ Despite the Portuguese claim to have sent altogether 34,000 troops to Africa, the Germans "seemed able to move at will", almost reaching the Zambezi River in July 1918. Then Lettow-Vorbeck turned northwards, he crossed into Northern Rhodesia where he surrendered on November 18, 1918. Throughout the East African campaign, "the British were much irritated by the lamentable performance of the Portuguese armed forces".⁶²⁷

2.7 Greater than a "Small War" – the "Rebellion" in Angola, 1914–15

Portuguese escape and German retreat did not mean the end of the war in Angola. For the region's inhabitants, the battle of Naulila meant the continuation of an ordeal that had began years ago with the Portuguese attempts to cross the Kunene River. The worst was yet to come. It is significant to emphasize the continuity of war in (southern) Angola in order to assess the situation in late 1914. After continuous attempts at conquest since 1859, and after a crushing defeat in 1904, the Portuguese had established themselves in the region for seven years, albeit marginally, inside their forts. Beginning in June 1914, even the German Consul Eisenlohr in Luanda had learned of "native revolts in southern Angola".⁶²⁸ None of the colonial administrations had the effective control over Ovamboland it may have wished for. Therefore it is mistaken to speak of "a power vacuum [that] was suddenly created" by the border war and the Portuguese retreat.⁶²⁹ Rather, when they withdrew from the region, the Portuguese had found themselves reduced to the role they had played before 1907. Thus, the kingdom of Kwanyama under Mandume that had economically and demographically dominated Ovamboland since the late nineteenth century attempted to re-establish a position threatened by the Portuguese advance.

626 Bührer 2011: 467f.; cf. Pesek 2010; Meneses 2010: 52; Strachan 2004; Samson 2006: 4.

627 Stone 1975: 732; cf. Teixeira 2003: 25; Samson 2013: 175f.; Meneses 2010: 60; 77.

628 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.I) German Consulate Luanda to VK Moçâmedes, 16.8.14.

629 Clarence-Smith/Moorsom 1975: 374.

Given the “biographic turn” in colonial and imperial history, the relative power of the elites (of both the Portuguese and the Kwanyama military) may serve as a justification for the focus on the leaders. In the notable absence of sources that relate the perspectives and the “consciousness” of the “subaltern” classes on both sides of the battlefield, it must be left to the future to let them “speak” by historiographic means. Historiographic “elitism” that includes colonizing *and* insurgent subjects will at least add a layer to the recognition of the interests that guided them and the conditions under which they acted – that is, their “use of armed force”. This chapter therefore hints at the under-investigated area of modern African military history as a potential avenue of further research.⁶³⁰

2.7.1 The “Expedition” under General Pereira de Eça, 1915

The Portuguese in Angola had experienced the “long and complex wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”. Against people like the Kissama, the Portuguese had undertaken “numerous campaigns” for three centuries. “They had no lasting success.”⁶³¹ Only with the advent of advanced military technology, better transport facilities and improved health services colonial armies won the upper hand in the early twentieth century. The contemporary scientific breakthroughs neutralized the geographic and disease barriers that had hitherto limited European encroachments.⁶³²

These technological changes, the new “tools of Empire” are to be taken into consideration in the following sections on the crushing of the African “rebellion”. However, neither better equipment nor improved logistics could exclude military setbacks, as the Portuguese army experienced in 1904 and again in December 1914. Portuguese reactions to the debacle and its catastrophic consequences were confused and, to a certain degree, dishonest. On December 20, the Governor General related to Consul Hall Hall that “about one thousand whites ... and large numbers of natives ... attacked inferior Portuguese forces at Naulila”. Norton de Matos assumed that the Germans, being “driven out of their colony [by the British]” desired to establish themselves in Angola.⁶³³ The same day, Norton de

630 Rolf 2014: 6 quoting Osterhammel; Spivak 1988; Moyar 2007: 226f.; cf. Thornton 1999: 2.

631 Thornton 1999: 1; Heintze 1972: 415f. the Kissama were finally subdued around 1917.

632 Cf. Black 2009: 151–71 for an overview on the ‘the victory of the West, 1860–1913’.

633 Headrick 1981; TNA FO 371/1884:424, Con. Luanda to FO, 20.12.14; cf. Rizzo 2012:233.

Matos informed Eisenlohr about the battle, deploring a “long series of infringements on Portuguese sovereignty by German forces”.⁶³⁴ The news about the “serious battle” in Naulila soon spread in Angola.⁶³⁵ On December 27, after anti-German demonstrations, Norton “suggested” to the consul (who was an almost daily visitor of the Governor General in his “palace on the hill”⁶³⁶) to leave Angola immediately, which Eisenlohr did the same night. Four weeks later, the crew of a British cruiser arrested him on board a Portuguese ship.⁶³⁷

In Parliament, the Minister of Colonies Alfredo Gaspar (1865–1938) explained on December 22, 1914 that the Germans had “again” attacked *o pôrto de Naulila*, with much superior force than “the first time”. He spoke of “800 to 1,000 aggressors”. Roçadas had retired and concentrated his troops to assure a “counter-attack”. He deemed it to be “very urgent to send more troops” to “maintain our territory”.⁶³⁸ On December 24, a note of protest was sent to the German government. Portugal’s envoy, Sidonio Pais, demanded reparations from the German government and requested an investigation. In Berlin, the news from Angola caused consternation and disbelief as politicians relied on Portuguese information and had no intention to go to war with yet another country.⁶³⁹ Further, the German attack on Angola caused “considerable excitement in the press.” Not only in allied but also in neutral countries reports were published that “Germans again invade[d]” neutral Portuguese Angola – to tarnish the “German reputation”, as Berlin complained. Politically, the victory at Naulila proved to be a “disaster”.

In Lisbon, on December 29, a cabinet meeting took place to consider the details of sending additional expeditionary forces to Angola.⁶⁴⁰ In the following weeks, the battle of Naulila occasioned “considerable renewed activity in Portuguese military circles”.⁶⁴¹ While in Great Britain and Ger-

634 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) Chefe de Gabinete to German Consulate Luanda, 20.12.14.

635 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 18.2.15; cf. *Rosen* 1932: 227.

636 *Wheeler* 1969a: 18; cf. *Norton* 2001: 212; NAN A.529 n.2:57f., Busch: Erlebnisse, [n.d.].

637 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg II) Consul to GG, 27.12.14; AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, rnk MNE, [n.d.].

638 Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, 22.12.14: 16f. ‘É urgentíssimo mandar mais tropas’.

639 BAB R 1001/6634: 4, DGL to AA, 20.04.21 *Whitebook* 17.2.19: 201 No.302; *RKA* 1915: 86.

640 *Castro Brandão* 2002: 278; *Fraga* 2010: 129; *Wheeler* 1978: 107; *O Seculo*, 30.12.1914; *Morlang* 1998: 47; a GEA newspaper reported about the battle, embedding it into the narrative of German victories *DOAZ*, Jg.17, no.9, 27.1.15: 2 (Wilhelm II. birthday).

641 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 153: 820, USML to SoS, 4.1.15; cf. *New York Times* 24.12.14: 2.

many “military interventions in the non-European world grew increasingly unpopular”⁶⁴² following the wars in South Africa and Southwest Africa, Lisbon’s government could count on public support for its effort to maintain Portuguese rule in Angola. After all, the enemies were European intruders and their African proxies. A declaration of war on Germany seemed likely; a step the British deemed “undesirable”, however. Nevertheless, closer cooperation between South African and Portuguese troops was discussed. Republican circles around Afonso Costa were convinced that “only Britain could protect Portugal’s colonies in Africa from German cupidity.”⁶⁴³ Mid-January the government contracted a company to transport men, horses, and ammunition to Angola. This indicated for the American minister in Lisbon “that Portugal is virtually at war with Germany”. However, due to growing dissatisfaction of officers in Portugal, ongoing plots and subsequent resignations of ministers, the preparation of the expedition was hampered.⁶⁴⁴ When the state of emergency was pronounced in Lisbon following an attempted coup and a new dictatorial government was formed under General Pimenta de Castro (1846–1918), new troops were about to embark on their journey to Angola. In the night of January 19, 1915 just before they boarded the ships, officers were arrested for plotting against the government. There were calls to “desert or to refuse to embark for operations against the Germans in Africa ...; fear among armed-forces personnel burgeoned once the news” about ‘Naulila’ reached Lisbon.⁶⁴⁵

In Berlin, the Portuguese envoy received the response that no information was available about Angola, but an enquiry would be initiated if the Portuguese government facilitates the transmission of a cypher telegram between Germany and GSWA. This request was discussed with British diplomats in London who argued that the Germans could “communicate with SWA by wireless”. Foreign Secretary Grey initialed the draft of the Portuguese response, informing the Germans that Portugal’s government exercises no control over cables to Africa.⁶⁴⁶

In Luanda, shortly thereafter, Norton de Matos lost his post; Angola’s south had become the “Achill[e]’s heel of his governorate”. Bearing the political responsibility for the disaster, he was axed from his post by Pi-

642 *Methfessel* 2012: 52.

643 TNA FO 371/2231, Tlgr. CO (Harcourt) to GG SA, 1.1.15; *Birmingham* 2011: 153.

644 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 153: 820, USML to SoS, 18.1.; 25.1.15; cf. *Ramos* 2001: 440f.

645 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Port.: 140, FML to MAE, 31.1.;156, 4.3.15; *Wheeler* 1978: 113/8.

646 TNA FO 371/2231, BML to FO, 7.1.15; remark A. Nicolson, E. Grey, 8.1.15.

menta de Castro in late January 1915. At the end of February, after having written a lengthy report about Angola and the numerous “rebellions” in recent months,⁶⁴⁷ he left a colony that was politically and economically worse off than in the preceding years.⁶⁴⁸ Due to the defeat in Naulila, it was not granted him to present himself as a “second” Salvador Correia de Sá e Benevides, who had expelled the Dutch ‘invaders’ from Luanda in 1648.⁶⁴⁹

In February 1915, Portugal’s new strongman, Pimenta de Castro, who opposed any intervention on the European battlefield, appointed the former Minister of War and ardent interventionist General Pereira de Eça to the post of Angola’s Governor General and Commander-in-Chief. Aged 63, he seemed “an unlikely choice” for this mission. It seems probable that Castro hoped to have neutralized a possible opponent. Never before had a general been appointed to lead a campaign in Angola. His mission had three objectives: (1) Protecting Portugal’s sovereignty against further German attacks and revenge for Naulila, if necessary; (2) re-occupation of the areas and fortresses abandoned in 1914 and (3) occupation of the Kwanyama kingdom.⁶⁵⁰ Given the Portuguese investments, the South Africans were concerned that Portugal’s troops could go on the offensive against GSWA. However, they wanted to “carry through the campaign” all by themselves. From Pretoria, the Governor General reported to London his ministers were “anxious that no Portuguese claim to territory [in GSWA] should arise.” But Foreign Secretary Grey knew that it was “impossible” to give the Portuguese “an assurance against German aggression” when they “consider that a serious attack is already in progress.” Grey therefore refused to “ask them to limit in any way their own action against the Germans in [GSWA].”⁶⁵¹

647 *Dáskalos* 2008: 181; 188; cf. *Norton* 2001: 215f.; *Pimenta* 2008: 94; NdM would have stated his term was over. GG served short terms of duties. 1900 -10, nine GG ruled in Luanda, *Henige* 1970: 232; *Wheeler* 1969a: 6.

648 Mostly due to the war (German ships could no longer reach Angola) the value of foreign trade had decreased by ~35 per cent, exports by ~40 per cent; the escudo ‘fluctuated greatly after the outbreak of war.’ NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 610, USC Boma, Report on Trade of Angola, 9.9.15; BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 36, testimony Norton de M., 5.5.26; *Da Costa* 2008: 212.

649 *Norton* 2001: 186; *Henriques* 1995: 83 on Correia de Sá’s historiographic ‘function’.

650 *Meneses* 2010: 45; *Strachan* 2004: 80; *Pélissier* 2004: 271; cf. *Teixeira* 2003: 25.

651 TNA FO 371/2231, remark A. Nicolson, E. Grey; CO to FO, 8.1.; FO to CO, 12./18.1.15.

Angola's new Commander-in-Chief had, just as his predecessor, a fully-fledged "imperial biography". The artillery officer made his first experience in the African theater of war in 1891, when he spent one year in Mozambique (again in 1897). A "hero" of the conquest of Mozambique, the Major was sent to Cap Verde in 1903. During the first years of the republic the Colonel made himself a name as defender of the new order when he subdued monarchist plotting in Northern Portugal in 1912 – in these years the army was regularly called in to intervene in questions of public order. A few months later de Eça was promoted to the rank of General. Due to his ruthlessness, he soon bore the byname "iron man". In February 1914 he became Minister of War in Bernardino Machado's government. In London, de Eça negotiated Portugal's participation in the war, which he favored. However, the Government could not agree on a common position and, furthermore, failed to prepare the general elections. On 12 December 1914, Machado's Government resigned.⁶⁵²

In southern Angola, in the meantime, Africans were eager to push back any Portuguese attempt to reestablish colonial influence. Small platoons did not stand a chance in the area "abandoned by the [Portuguese] government in such a cowardly way". The thickness of the bush around the Kunene River benefitted the defenders.⁶⁵³ Of a first Portuguese reconnaissance peloton that dared to enter the region, most soldiers were "massacred".⁶⁵⁴ Fear for the mission stations and concern of Africans "waiting for an occasion to plunder" reined among missionaries. But it seemed that the "promises of the chiefs" not to attack the mission stations were kept.⁶⁵⁵ It was understood since the end of January that the Germans had "evacuated Portuguese territories but are inciting the natives near frontier to revolt." However, on February 1, 1915 a German platoon crossed once more the border, after having been informed about this opportunity by "the Ovambo", to take away the artillery that was left in the abandoned Fort Dom Luís de Bragança.⁶⁵⁶

In stark contrast with the "classical" Portuguese mode of waging war in the colonies, more and more metropolitan troops were sent to Angola,

652 Rolf 2014: 9; *Da Costa* 2008: 124-7; *Wheeler* 1969: 759; 1978: 107; *Minist. da Guerra* 1917: 10; *Pélissier* 2004: 269f.; *Teixeira* 2003: 24; *Malva Novais* 2006.

653 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling to TRP, 27.12.14; *Hartmann* 1902: 229; *Kanthack* 1921: 329.

654 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz (Huila) to Faugère, 15.1.15.

655 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huila) to TRP, 3.2.; (Tyipelongo) 4.4.15.

656 TNA FO 371/2231, telgr. BML (Carnegie) to FO 4.2.15; *Oelhafen* 1923: 92.

hastily recruited in Portugal's countryside. After the disaster of Naulila the General Staff in Lisbon considered it evident that only heavily armed metropolitan troops in sufficient numbers would withstand the *Schutztruppe*. In early 1915 it did not seem unlikely that the Germans might attack Angola again since they had "already twice violated the border."⁶⁵⁷ However, the Foreign Minister admitted that the first task of the reinforcements "would be to restore order among the natives in the South". He assured the British Minister Carnegie that no "operations" against Germans would be initiated "without previous consultation with [the British] government."⁶⁵⁸ When the new reinforcements arrived, the population of Huíla, relieved that the Germans had not attacked their town, considered it unfortunate that these troops had no experience. Moreover, the troops had a reputation for being "undisciplined". It was feared that they would "panic" on their first encounter with German troops, "just as in Naulila".⁶⁵⁹ General de Eça had similar reservations. After his arrival in Luanda in March 1915 (replacing Lt.-Colonel Roçadas who had requested that the campaign "be prosecuted by a more senior officer"⁶⁶⁰) the General took his time to meticulously prepare the campaign to secure southern Angola for good. He did not occupy himself with the "revolt" in the Congo district.

The hesitation of de Eça to push forward against the German border and the Kwanyama was also due to the difficulties with regard to the reorganization of the armed forces. The "state of Portuguese national defenses" was described by one officer as "disgraceful". "By 1915, the army-reform laws appeared to be a failure". The political upheavals in Lisbon, and most of all the constant ministerial crises worsened the situation. Given the endless changes, the role of political direction in the determination of force structure and military objectives was limited. When Pimenta de Castro was overthrown on May 14, he was accused of not having acted with courage against the Germans.⁶⁶¹ Norton de Matos was among those in Lisbon who worked on bringing him down. Under Prime Minister José de Castro he was appointed Minister of Colonies in June. France's Minister to Portugal, Emile Daeschner, saw it with a sense of irony that Norton de

657 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 18.2.15.

658 TNA FO 371/2231, BML (Carnegie) to FO 26.2.15.

659 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz (Huíla) to Faugère, 15.3.15.

660 *Southern* 2007: 13; cf. *Pélissier* 1969: 102; *Sousa* [n.d.^{~1935}]: 11.

661 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Portugal: 196, FML to MAE Delcassé, 20.5.15; *Wheeler* 1978: 115.



Ill. 27 Norton de Matos, *ministre de la guerre du Portugal* Ill. 28 *General José Pereira d'Eça*

Matos, who was recalled after the disaster of Naulila because the army under his responsibility appeared to be “completely unprepared”, found himself in charge of providing his successor in Angola with the means necessary for the operations he himself was unable execute. After a cabinet reshuffle in July 1915 Norton became Minister of War and was responsible not only for the campaigns in Angola and Mozambique but also for organizing the departure of Portuguese troops to France.⁶⁶²

Mistrust, lack of discipline and insubordination were rampant in the armed forces following the revolution; relations between officers and rank-and-file were strained and deteriorated under war conditions. The loyalty of officers and civil servants to the republic was openly questioned. While the troops assembled in Angola, Norton de Matos’ Ministry of War set up a committee “to investigate the personnel of [its] department with the view of making such changes as may be compatible with ... safety and harmony of the government”. Monarchist officers were axed while promotions were granted to men unfit for their positions.⁶⁶³

662 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Portugal: 229, FML to MAE Delcassé, 24.6.15; Norton 2001: 222.

In March 1915 de Eça had 3,700 men at his disposal. In June, the new government granted his expedition another 1,500.000 Escudos in expenses.⁶⁶⁴ In July, a European army the size of which has never been seen before in Angola was assembled: 265 officers, 7,500 commoners, and 60 guns were shipped to Moçâmedes; additional personnel and materials came from Angola, Mozambique or South Africa. Altogether the forces included 372 officers, 10,049 commoners (including *degradados*), 70 guns, 340 ox-wagons, and 82 Fiat trucks. The size of the expedition was thus three times as large as the one of Roçadas in 1914 and almost reached the size of Portugal's entire army in times of peace (13,000 men).⁶⁶⁵ This campaign was the "most extensive" in Angolan history until the war 1961–74. Further, the army enlisted Africans; as elsewhere during the World War "in their search for local combatants, European administrations resorted to an almost enslaving form of conscription".⁶⁶⁶ And as in all campaigns since the 1880s, the Portuguese could count on Afrikaner "auxiliaries". By 1915, these expeditions were not yet "something of the past". Looking for German movements, since January Afrikaner guides began to reconnoiter the drifts to *Damaraland*. A formal "Boer commando" was established in May.⁶⁶⁷

In the meantime, another limiting factor for the campaign became more and more evident: the drought and the lack of water and transport resulting from it. De Eça's strategy consisted of crushing any resistance to his advance with the sheer number of men, thereby reducing any tactical disadvantage of his troops. But the supply of so many soldiers was an exemption in the way colonial wars were fought by the Portuguese. It was only possible "against the backdrop of World War I and the threat of German encroachments".⁶⁶⁸ Since 1912, agriculture and cattle raising had made

663 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 153: 801, USML to SoS, 27.7.15, *Wheeler* 1978: 113.

664 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 142: 800, US CG to SoS, 11.6.15.

665 *Pélissier* 1977: 489f.; 2004: 272; cf. *Iliffe* 2007: 219 on the effect of lorries on the colonial economy; *Wheeler* 1969: 428; 1978: 114 dispatchments from Portugal usually comprised less than 1,000 men. From 1914–18 Portugal deployed in Angola 23,445 men, plus 'several thousand *Cipais*-irregular troops'. Troops from Portugal: 392 officers, 11,777 soldiers. Colonial troops: 292 officers, 1,774 'white soldiers', 9,240 'native soldiers'; 3,473 horses and mules were sent from Portugal (BAB R 1001/6634: 32, excerpt Portug. Memo., 17.2.19: 336); *Hayes* 1993: 91.

666 *Wheeler* 1969: 429; *Nasson* 2014: 443 on British and French practices; cf. *Kuss* 2010: 18.

667 AHM/Div/2/2/37/55, Pimento (Lubango) to Estado Mj, 24.9.15; *Pélissier* 1979: 194; *Stassen* 2011: Figure 6.

668 *Isaacman/Isaacman* 1977:56; cf. scale of 'African-white' participation *Pélissier* 1969:119.



Map 4 Southern Angola in 1915

progress in the administration's bid to overcome Angola's dependence on rubber exports.⁶⁶⁹ The troops, however, consumed far more than could be produced locally. Next to expensive imports, the military administration resorted to violent requisitions of food – and porters to carry it. This caused upheaval not only in southern Angola. In the north, near São Salvador, Chief Alvaro Buta “found himself pressured by the government to recruit porters for the campaign against the Germans” and decided instead to continue a smoldering rebellion. The costs for the expedition were enormous, prices rose in Angola. To make things worse for officers and civil servants, since early 1915 their salaries had not been paid to incur expenses.⁶⁷⁰

In comparison to previous campaigns the infrastructure available to the army had improved considerably, and de Eça ordered his men to carry out further expansions. The need to deploy the army to extend and guard *o Império* spawned technical changes such as the laying of new rail tracks or

669 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 610, USC Boma, Report on Trade of Angola, 9.9.14.

telegraph lines. Most importantly, the challenge to transport weaponry and personnel across the desert had been alleviated by the construction of the railway from Moçâmedes eastwards since 1905. The tales about the twelve days in the unforgiving desert – a “white man’s grave” – and the hundreds of oxen that “perish[ed] annually in the journey”⁶⁷¹ were now a relic of a legendary past. The “toy railroad”⁶⁷² had not yet reached the plateau in early 1915, but had crossed the desert. In March 1915, the first platoons were transported to Vila Arriaga. They had to cross the Chella Mountains on foot. In mid-1915 the railways had reached kilometer 183 east of Vila Arriaga, leaving behind the escarpment.⁶⁷³ Furthermore, as a consequence of the campaigns since 1904, there were, as the botanist Pearson put it, “at present well-beaten tracks from the plateau down to the Kunene” following the Caculovar River to Humbe.⁶⁷⁴ However, de Eça had to postpone the march down south due to “lack of water and pasture”. For the Afrikaners, who had lost much of their ox-wagon business to the railway,⁶⁷⁵ the war was a chance to regain profits.

Despite his time-consuming procurement of war materials and shipment of troops, the situation de Eça faced on the ground was still characterized by want not only of water and transport facilities. Telegraph lines had to be set up. Knowledge of southern Angola had improved since the campaign of 1904, but credible maps were lacking.⁶⁷⁶ Intelligence was scarce; in Benguela, the General at least met with Prefect Keiling who informed him about his encounter with King Mandume in January and warned him of the danger for his men caused by the lack of water. When in February a few raindrops fell, small troops (with their cattle and horses) could dare to

670 Wheeler 1969a: 6; AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 14.4.15.

671 Rooney 1912: 286. Before the railroad, the ‘whole of the transport of the country ... [was] in the hands of the [Afrikaaner]’ (Cunninghame 1904: 156). Previously, the tsetse fly had prevented the use of oxen in the area, but ‘as a result of the destruction of the indigenous buffalo’ at the end of the nineteenth century this ecological ‘shield’ no longer existed (Kienetz 1977: 568).

672 Wittlesey 1924: 124.

673 Sousa [¹⁹³⁵]: 14; Santos Correia 1943: Mp.1; cf. Wittlesey 1924:124; Daskalos 2008: 83.

674 Pearson 1910: 508 ‘circuitous, exceedingly rough’ roads to the east; 511; Kuss 2010: 16.

675 AGCSSp 3L1.11b4, Cancellia (Kwanyama) to TRP, 21.6.10 via Evale; Pearson 1910: 507.

676 Whittlesey 1924: 114; AGCSSp 2L1.1.1, Carte de l’Ovampo par le R.P. Duparquet, (L. Wuhrer) ca. 1885. In 1893, the American Consul Heli Chatelain claimed there ‘is no satisfactory map of the Province’ of Angola. Knowing Kimbundu, he did not trust ‘the misprints of names’ on Portuguese maps, Chatelain 1893: 304; NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 4, USC to SoS, 26.7.92: 463.

advance southwards; but since the rainy season came to a close the worse was yet to come. Given the secrecy of the military, missionaries were doubtful how the officers would decide about their “expedition”.⁶⁷⁷ Prefect Keiling was concerned that if the Portuguese continued to wait, they would “not find a drop of water on their way and die of thirst, which is worse than the bullets of the Kwanyama.”⁶⁷⁸ Unease about the long period of preparation grew. In May 1915, a missionary in Huila wondered why 1,200 men had been sent and did not move, but consumed the little food that was left. Soldiers, decimated by malaria, were rendered “useless” before being sent to the battlefield.⁶⁷⁹ A small expedition staffed with soldiers from Mozambique was sent against the people of Tyipelongo. However, the assembled army did not deter the Kwanyama to continue their raids which caused a further exodus to the north.⁶⁸⁰

Finally, preparations were concluded and marching order was given in June to de Eça’s 10,000 men. Rumors about the Germans’ hopeless situation had reached southern Angola. Equipment was transported from the railway terminus via Lubango, Chibia, and Fort Gambos by ox wagons, motor trucks and thousands of human carriers. Missionaries deplored that even men from Christian villages were requisitioned, just as the carriages of private individuals (including missionaries’) and all mission-educated craftsmen (smiths, carpenters) with their tools, as well as any cattle of Africans.⁶⁸¹

It is said that the Portuguese officers neither had the operational capacities nor the necessary means available to organize a campaign of this size 300 kilometers away from the point of departure in Moçâmedes. Most motor trucks broke down. Those still running had to be used to transport water, provisions and officers of the General Staff. All others had to march from the plateau down to the Kunene River and beyond. For the time being, the “major task” of warfare in the region meant “subduing the forces

677 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 15.4.15; Goepp (Bailundo) to TRP, 7.7.15; 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huila) to TRP, 2.3.15; (Tyipelongo), 4.4.15.

678 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 14.4.15; 25.4.15. It seemed ‘consoling’ to him to know that the Germans were in dire straits too. It was said that they had retreated to Etosha. ‘They are dying of hunger.’ Rumors had it that Franke had retired to the forts ‘Omtuni [Namutoni] and [O]Kaukueyo’ with merely 200 white and 100 black soldiers dying from hunger.

679 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz (Huila) to Faugère, 14.5.15.

680 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Tyayombo) to TRP, 17.5.15.

681 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 25.4.15; 3L1.11b5, 28.7.15.

of nature”, as one German officer had expressed it already in 1905. Other concerns were subordinated to the persistent search for water. As in most previous colonial campaigns, also the Portuguese in 1915 experienced “nature’s role as a direct threat to [their] armies.” Hundreds of forcefully recruited porters paid with their lives, dying of hunger, malaria, and exhaustion. The horrors of warfare were experienced even without engaging the enemy. Soldiers drew a “dantesque picture of their march ... ravaged by thirst and diseases”, while decomposing bodies of famine victims were seen all along the routes. Father Goepf, in a letter to his superior in Paris, knew who was to blame for all the ruins and bloodshed in Africa: *l’horrible Guillaume*. And he admitted the “disgrace” he felt about the conclusions drawn by Africans who “could not understand at all that we [Europeans] have killed each other for one year in a row”: “Whites are worse than all beasts.”⁶⁸²

On July 7, 1915 de Eça reoccupied Humbe whose African population, weakened by the famine, did not resist. Those still able to bear arms had probably fled to Kwanyama territory. Simultaneously, de Eça sent 100 cavalymen and 36 Afrikaaner to raid the western shore of the Kunene River – a reprisal for the humiliation in December 1914. Near Fort Dongoena they massacred allegedly 600 *indigenas* among them the *soba* of Dongoena and seized 500 head of cattle. The “Boer commando” then crossed the river into Uukwambi areas. In mid-July 1915, they made a reconnaissance tour to Fort Naulila. Not informed about the surrender at Khorab, they questioned Africans about “German movements”, but most of all they were establishing roads and water reserves. The whereabouts of the weapons looted in the forts were of great concern. The risk of Portuguese soldiers being shot with their own guns was high. One officer obtained a *Mausers* and learnt that the people of Dongoena had sold twenty *Mausers* to the Uukwaludhi “whose *soba* sides with the Germans.”⁶⁸³

More fresh troops were called in. The 3rd Infantry Battalion, for example (in Moçâmedes since early December 1914 and stationed in Vila Ariaga since March) reached Humbe on August 6, where the General assembled his troops. An entire day had to be scheduled to cross the river

682 Pélissier 2004: 273 ref. to *Gusmão* 1935; François quot. in Lehmann 2014: 533; 535; AGC-SSp 3L1.11b5, Goepf (Bail.) to TRP, 7.7.15.

683 Pélissier 2004: 274; AHM/Div/2/2/37/55, Pimento (Vau de Caloéque) to Chefe do Estado Major, 16.7.15.

north of Humbe.⁶⁸⁴ Informed about the German surrender and relieved of the necessity to guard the border, de Eça subdivided his army into four columns to occupy the areas east of the Kunene River around forts Cuamato, Naulila, Evale, and the Kwanyama region. The Portuguese policy of conquest was built around the notion of different “tribal” polities that were to be occupied one by one. Pockets of resistance were to be isolated and then crushed. The occupation of Cuamato, Naulila, and Evale was realized without much fighting. King Mandume was now encircled from the north and the west and found it difficult to concentrate his troops. Ombandja (Cuamato) Chief Shihetekela Hiudulu was no longer able to organize resistance. De Eça ordered the reestablishment of Forts Cuamato and Naulila.⁶⁸⁵ He had “no information about the exact number of Kwanyama forces” and did not exclude the possibility that Mandume’s men would be joined by Ombandja – possibly with all the weapons that had fallen into the hands of the Africans since the Portuguese retreat.⁶⁸⁶ Nevertheless, de Eça’s troops began to enter Kwanyama territory.

2.7.2 Reforms and the Coming of War – King Mandume, 1911–15

Modern-day Namibian politics has no want of “heroes of anti-colonial resistance”: Hendrik Witbooi (c.1830–1905), Samuel Maharero (c.1856–1923) and Jacob Marengo (c.1875–1907) are glorious names in history. What distinguishes Mandume ya Ndemufayo (c.1894–1917) from most of these men was not only his young age, but, most of all, his totally uncompromising stand on foreign occupation of his kingdom. While his older co-“heroes of anti-colonial resistance” were, at one time or another, integrated into the colonial political or economic landscape, located in the “grey area between domination and resistance”,⁶⁸⁷ he never was. “Mandume”, as one of the missionaries stated who knew him best, was “of a fighting disposition and would never rest.”⁶⁸⁸ His “fighting disposition” was based on personal experiences and historic changes within Ovamboland. These

684 Cf. *Sousa* [n.d.⁻¹⁹³⁵]: 14f.; *Pearson* 1910: 506; 511; *Hayes* 1992 II: 196 (Sheetekela, 27.12.89).

685 *Sousa* [n.d.]: 11; *Pélissier* 1977: 491; AHM/Div/2/2/38/27: 1, Ordem do Commando Superior (Humbe), 8.8.15.

686 AHM/Div/2/2/38/27: 2, Commando Superior (Humbe). Instruções No. 3, 9.8.15.

687 *Apter* 1999: 589; cf. *Kössler* 2008: 318 on memorialization of ‘national hero[es]’.

688 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 41, testimony missionary Albert Hochstrate, 26.4.26.

were not necessarily evident to European contemporary observers. They mostly assumed that “pre-colonial societies were in a pristine condition that to all intents ... had remained unchanged over aeons.”⁶⁸⁹ However, these changes can only be sketched here in order to locate Mandume’s resistance within the political and social history of the region.

Ovamboland, located on the Cuvelai floodplains between the Kunene and Okavango Rivers, was described by a contemporary geographer, less than enthusiastically, as “the [Kalahari] desert margin”: “The plain is covered with thorn which is almost impenetrable in places. ... A very scanty population ekes out a wretched living.”⁶⁹⁰ The notion of an isolated population permeates also historiographic accounts: Even in the 1970s, Angola’s southern border has been described as “one of the least known regions of Africa.”⁶⁹¹ The isolation based on geography was emphasized politically since 1886 by the Luso-German border. From a colonial perspective, the border cutting Ovamboland in two designated the region to the status of a periphery and marginality. Similar to Darfur, the Rif, or the interior of British Somaliland, Ovamboland “remained outside European control” before the First World War.⁶⁹²

Ovambo societies had developed during the nineteenth century into several “strong centralized kingdoms”. Missionaries and officials, adhering to the notion of the bounded ethnic groups, usually spoke of “tribes” whose leaders were called “chiefs”, *sobas*, or *Häuptlinge*. Modern historians prefer the term “King”, in Namibia the term *ohamba* is also in use.⁶⁹³ Since the mid-nineteenth century the Kwanyama kings of northeastern Ovamboland were considered “the most powerful” (reigning over a population estimated between 45,000 and 80,000 before 1914).⁶⁹⁴ Among Europeans they had a fearsome reputation. The prospector Boyd Cuninghame heard in 1903 of “Olulu [Weyulu 1884–1904], the King of the Kwinhamas, the great raiding tribe... who ... have never been subdued.”⁶⁹⁵ The Apostolic Prefect of southern Angola, Louis Keiling, alleged they would “live only on warfare and looting. The military authorities and citizens without defence are terrified when they merely hear their

689 Vansina 1987: 437.

690 Wittlesey 1924: 125; cf. Urquhart 1963; Nitsche 1913; Tönjes 1911.

691 Miller 1977: 108 on the pioneering work of Clarence-Smith; cf. Miettinen 2005: 13f.

692 Clarence-Smith/M. 1975: 365 (pre-1915); Iliffe 2007: 197; Almeida-Topor 2010: 17f.

693 Cf. Miettinen 2005: 56; Corrado 2008: 84 FN 21; Harding 2013: 146-8 on terminology.

694 Clarence-S./M. 1975: 368; cf. Wallace 2012: 11; Oliveira 2010:1057; Wright 1999: 409f.

695 Cuninghame 1904: 164 (did not cross into Ovamboland); on the term ‘tribe’ Jones 1990:76.

name.”⁶⁹⁶ Irrespective of any colonial remoteness, Kwanyama territory was located along a political and economic key frontier: Geographically “closer to the Angolan slave trade” for which they raided their northern neighbors and “marked by a higher degree of militarization, the Kwanyama became the most embroiled of all Ovambo in this ‘frontier of violence’.”⁶⁹⁷

Combining seasonal rain-fed settled agriculture with cattle herding (agro-pastoralism) and hunting, Ovambo polities also set up a “vigorous local trade”. The mode of production in Ovamboland was not only highly vulnerable to prolonged drought, cattle diseases, and locusts, it was also increasingly influenced by European traders, missionaries and, later, colonial officials.⁶⁹⁸ European goods, including clothing, ox-wagons, alcohol, but most of all firearms were purchased from European traders of Walvis Bay or Moçâmedes, or Ovimbundu traders from Caconda. By controlling trade in Ovamboland and beyond, several kings and other chiefs monopolized horses and guns and built up a following of men (*omalenga*). The *omalenga* and modified military organization proved to be the basis for accumulation through raids and the forcible collection and sale of cattle, ivory, and slaves. The increasing demand for these items and the accessibility of firearms facilitated their rise to dominance. As in other African societies, this kind of ‘modernization’ had “counter-evolutionary tendencies”, leading to insecurity and instability.⁶⁹⁹ For the first time, significant differences in style of living emerged within Ovambo societies. The growth of trade and the rising tide of new commodities flooding the region intensified social divisions. The kings were utterly dependent on European goods and begun to rely on “internal taxation” (cattle and slave raids, extortion of tribute) in order to pay for the merchandise and their growing debt.

“[T]he [*oma*]lenga, each of whom received a horse and a number of rifles from the King ... led a body of about 100 men on raiding expeditions. The [*oma*]lenga now became the tax collectors, and the traditional ritual seizure of cattle for the King’s court (*okasava*) became a harsh and arbitrary tax, which fell mainly on the most vulnerable members of society.”⁷⁰⁰

696 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling, Rapport sur la Prefecture de la H. Cimbebasie:10 (1911).

697 Hayes 1993: 96, ref. to Miller 1988; cf. Williams 1991 for an overview.

698 Moorsom 1977: 56f.; Siiskonen 1990: 79;92;146

699 Cooper 2002: 50; cf. Dobler 2014: 2-20; Heintze 2011; Bazin/Terray 1982: 22.

700 Clarence-S./Moorsom 1975: 376; Hayes 1993: 97 ‘modifications in military organization’.

The subjects – who had suffered stock losses as a result of the great epizootic in 1897 and the famines that followed the droughts and floods since 1908 – reacted with resistance. Their impoverishment (caused by the replacement of “traditions” with arbitrariness in combination with natural disasters) led to the erosion of the kings’ and *omalenga*’s means of accumulation and control. In response, they tried to manipulate the system of labor migration as additional source of revenue by extorting “tax” from returning labor migrants; whereas many Ovambo attempted to avoid the predation of the *omalenga* by resorting to migration.⁷⁰¹ Likewise, kings and *omalenga* were jeopardized by the actions of the government of Portugal. The reactions in southern Angola or northern GSWA to the encroachment of merchant capitalism were manifold. While rulers took their chances and enriched themselves, others, especially those of lower social strata saw no alternative but to respond violently. The concept of “social banditry” has been applied to explain the reactions of these men (and women). In Eric Hobsbawm’s universalist terms: they either came to “the world of capitalism”, “or, what is even more catastrophic, it comes to them from outside, insidiously by the operation of economic forces which they do not understand and over which they have no control”.⁷⁰²

Thus was the situation when Mandume became King of Kwanyama in early 1911, succeeding his uncle Nande. The predatory raids and excessive taxation weakened not only societal ties but also the King’s central authority to contain centrifugal tendencies. The loss of central power was probably also related to the relationship made in pre-Christian Ovambo cosmology between the King and his rainmaking powers. The unremitting droughts undermined the legitimacy of the King. Despite the sacred character of kingship, kings had been deposed in the past purportedly for failure to make rain. In a time of fragmented power, immense social pressure, repeated famines, and rising inequality, Mandume decided to focus his rule on “internal renovation”. A strong personality who “knew how to inspire fear from an early age” and having a “reputation for forcefulness”, he perceived the legacy of his uncle as a “‘degeneration’ of the Kwanyama state”.⁷⁰³ Mandume’s policy is an example of what T.O. Ranger analyzed as an African reaction to the “stresses of the nineteenth century”: some African societies “developed both stronger military institutions and

701 Clarence-Smith 1979; cf. Dobler 2014: 7 on kings stealing cattle to pay commercial debts.

702 Clarence-Smith 1986; Hobsbawm 1959: 3; 14 emphasizing the ‘uniformity’ of banditry.

703 Hayes 1993: 97f.; cf. Pélissier 1977: 205; Estermann 1976: 126 on raids; Salokoski 2006.

more centralized political machinery.”⁷⁰⁴ Profoundly traditionalist, the “essence of Mandume’s reformism was to increase Kwanyama agricultural productivity, reduce dependency on external links with merchant capital and re-assert the centrality of royal authority at a time when fragmentation at the Kwanyama state seemed imminent.”⁷⁰⁵

The *omalenga*, on the other hand, tried to extend their judicial and military power. They presided over their own administrative districts of the kingdom (*oshikandjo*). “The tension between kings and *omalenga* lay at the heart of Ovambo politics”. King Mandume tried to re-centralize power and curbed the power of the *omalenga* and their followers. He not only ordered them to cease trying people at their homes, he also prohibited further raids for cattle and captives without the King’s sanction and centralized tribute exaction under royal control. As a response to the hunger, he urged his subjects to cultivate more land.⁷⁰⁶

Finding Kwanyama society in turmoil and involved in several power struggles (with the colonial powers, between fractions on the royal lineage, between King and *omalenga*, between *omalenga* and subjects, between King and subjects) Mandume made two important decisions after his accession: He moved his capital southwards to N’giva (Ondjiva) closer to the German border and since 1891 a Rhenish mission station. He “intended to balance pro-German leanings with an anti-Portuguese stance.” To this end, he stood in friendly contact with the Rhenish mission (yet at times, conflicts did occur) and he expelled Portuguese traders from his kingdom. The population was “ill disposed towards [them] owing to their charging too high prices for their goods.”⁷⁰⁷ Mandume is said to have rejected their trade in alcohol and slaves. His policies were considered successful by Rhenish missionaries, who would try to act as his advisors and reported in 1911: “Mandume holds himself well. He is not as weak as the

704 Ranger 1969: 296; cf. Mittelberger 1968/69 on Kwanyama ‘religião primitiva’.

705 Hayes 1993: 92f.; cf. Pélissier 1977a.

706 Hayes 1993: 95; 97; 100; 112; 109: ‘In Mandume’s tussle with the military commanders, the latter had argued that Kwanyama prosperity depended on their raids. Mandume countered that the only way to obtain sufficient food was to work hard in the fields and that the real Kwanyama problem was fear of work. This argument ... constituted the core of Mandume’s populist ‘reforms’ because they were directed most fundamentally at producers, not the *élite*. Centralisation and the curbing of the latter were prerequisites for the healing of society after decades of increasing social division. The healing itself would come with the elimination of hunger.’

707 Hayes 1993: 99; BAB R 1001/6640:125, extra-file: 40f., testimony A. Hochstrate, 26.4.26.

deceased Nande. Also, the poor man gets his rights with him. The big people, who were previously ruining the country, he holds in discipline.”⁷⁰⁸ The Spiritans, on the other hand, were not so well disposed towards the new King. His predecessor Nande had been their “friend”. Prefect Keiling considered Mandume to be “jealous” of the Catholics’ influence on the youth. Mandume disliked their connection with the Portuguese authorities and therefore, Keiling maintained, looked for closer bonds with the German Lutherans.⁷⁰⁹ Furthermore, there were rumors that the Portuguese prepared an expedition to occupy Kwanyama territory. Mandume seemed convinced that the Catholic missionaries had requested this expedition.⁷¹⁰ The Spiritans, afraid of being caught between the adversaries, decided in October 1911 to move their mission station north to Evale where they also hoped to find water.⁷¹¹ In 1912, Mandume ordered the Catholic mission station to be destroyed.⁷¹²

Cuamato (Ombandja) to the west of Oukwanyama territory was occupied since 1907. To the north an ongoing war of the Portuguese against Evale (first occupied in 1909⁷¹³) ravaged the country. The fate of his neighbors convinced Mandume of the colonial threat to his sovereignty. It is likely that this threat also caused Mandume to work against the political fragmentation of his kingdom since it reduced the prospect of waging war successfully against either the Portuguese or the Germans. Both could have used the smaller chieftaincies to pursue a ‘divide and rule’ strategy. Oral tradition has it that Mandume already during the second meeting with his councilors after becoming King in 1911 pointed to the possibility of “war with foreigners who threatened to seize [Ovambo] land.”⁷¹⁴ All parties rearmed. The Portuguese set up new fortresses and also Kwanyama authorities amassed weapons and continued the raids to recoup their losses. Missionaries working in Ovamboland knew the smuggling practices

708 RMG Berichte 1911: 215, transl. Hayes 1993: 102; Hayes/H.e 1997: 77; Becker 2005: 45.

709 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Cardinal, 9.9.16; 3L1.11b6, Keiling to TRP, 8.9.12.

710 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cuanhama) to TRP, 29.10.11.

711 AGCSSp 3L1.11a1, Keiling: Compte-Rendu, Cuanhama, 1.11.11; 20.10.11; 1.5.13.

712 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Congr. de Propaganda Fide, 8.11.13. Keiling sent him two ‘resolute’ Christian Kwanyama to tell him that irrespective of the destruction the Spiritans had the ‘intention to return to his country.’ Keiling claimed that Mandume received the envoys well, gave presents, and claimed to be a friend of the mission that would be welcome to return.

713 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Keiling (Caconda) to TRP, 7.8.09 (excerpts).

714 Hayes 1993: 100.

quite well: Missionary Wulfhorst remembered that the Portuguese traders in the Kwanyama area

“sold spirits to the natives, and that weapons were sold to them secretly. The Portuguese at that time [~1911] were not in possession of that area and therefore they could not compel the natives to work. There was originally trade in slaves, but this became less in Mandume’s time. The Portuguese did not energetically suppress the trade in slave, but carried it on secretly ... Mandume drove away the [Portuguese] traders”.⁷¹⁵

As a result of decades of trade in guns, the military capacity of the Ovambo was not to be underestimated. Colonial officials in GSWA had repeatedly considered the possibility of attacking individual kingdoms but had always decided against it. When an official argued in 1912 for the apprehension of chief Tshanika, ‘native commissioner’ Captain Streitwolf declared: “we will never apprehend Tschanika. He is chief of Ongandjera (~15,000 inhabitants, 3,000 warriors)”.⁷¹⁶ King Mandume was assumed to have “30,000 warriors at his disposal of which almost all have guns.”⁷¹⁷

In the Brussels Act of 1890, the European powers had agreed to impose a ban on gun and ammunition sales to Africans. The widespread sale of modern weaponry across the continent (estimated at 16 million over the nineteenth century) caused concern and fear among nascent imperialists of the military modernization (or “revolution”, as historians describe it) taking place in Africa. The battle of Adua (1896), the “greatest African victory against foreign invaders”, would soon prove them right.⁷¹⁸ In order to avoid conflicts (and sales) the ‘German’ part of Ovamboland was prohibited to Europeans. “Nevertheless, certain individuals from South West came in. The traders who wished to reach the Oukwanyama area had to make a detour and ... had to do so via Portuguese territory.”⁷¹⁹ The smuggling of weapons, alcohol, ivory, and cattle between formally German and Portuguese territories proliferated in both directions. “Ovambo leaders sought firearms above else in their dealings with merchant capital” since they needed them for their raids. Also after 1900, it was palpable that neither colonial power had the means to enforce the “border”.⁷²⁰ In June 1902,

715 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 15, testimony Wulfhorst, 3.5.26; cf. Santos 1978: 172.

716 NAN ZBU 688, F V b 2, Bl.22, Ref 8 to Ref 3, 26.4.12; cf. Eirola 1992: 269–275.

717 BAB R 1001/9027, Bl.107, Dr. P. Vageler, n.d. [~ 12/14].

718 Reid 2012: 108; Iliffe 2007: 196; cf. Tlou 1985: 78.

719 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 49, testimony of missionary Hochstrate, 26.4.26.

720 Hayes 1993: 96; smuggling continued into WWI; cf. Zollmann 2010: 313.

Angola's Governor General complained that an "Orlog of Damara-Hottentots" had crossed the Kunene.⁷²¹ In 1904, the German administration stepped up its efforts to subdue the weapons trade in Ovamboland, since guns and ammunition had found their way to the "rebellious" Herero. Two Greeks were arrested and admitted to have traveled from Moçâmedes to Kwanyama territory to barter powder and front loaders for cattle for Rhodesia. Both confirmed that Portuguese and German traders sold "many guns" to the Ovambo. "Almost every Ovambo bears a gun, Mauser, Henry Martini, M 71".⁷²² When GSWA's Governor Leutwein, encouraged the German consul in Luanda to request the Governor General to prevent further trade (also by German traders via Moçâmedes), the consul deemed such steps "inopportune". He did not want to give the Portuguese reason to utter counter-claims. After his journey across southern Angola the consul confirmed to Leutwein that Portuguese smuggling to Ovamboland was rampant.⁷²³

For decades, the traders bartering between the Kunene and Okavango were part of the social fabric of the area, just as the missionaries. They were of military concern to the colonial administrations, but at the same time these "[b]ackwoods traders were the forerunners of Portuguese expansion on all the frontiers of the old slaving colony." Dr. Schultze-Jena, when still head of the Grootfontein district of GSWA, characterized them in 1909 as men who "have nothing to lose".⁷²⁴ Unrestrained by legal or moral norms they blurred lines of distinctions in many ways. They sought freedom from social or religious "constraints of their own societies" as much as economic advantage among Africans. The resulting temptation to 'go native' by living with and from the local population made them not only suspicious to administrators, but also caused concern among colonial ideologists, since they obscured the clear demarcation of "us" and "them" on a colonial frontier. Their trade in weapons, alcohol, and even slaves caused an embarrassment to the colonial administration by pointing out its inability to act according to international law. The traders and their deeds

721 PA Luanda 4 (Luanda-Politisches) German Consul Luanda to RK Hohenlohe, 25.6.02.

722 PA Luanda 4 (Luanda-Politisches) Minutes: Chr. Metrossuto, C. Roumelioti, 14.10.04.

723 PA Luanda 4 (Luanda-Politisches) German Consul to KGW, 24.11.04: 'In Angola, in connection with the military operations against Ovamboland, in order to deflect attention to their own guilt, the accusation has been raised again and again that the high-quality weapons in Ovamboland were delivered by German traders.'

724 *Birmingham* 1978: 527; transl. in *Eckl* 2007: 20f.; cf. *Medeiros* 1977: 79.

also challenged the imperial narrative of order and discipline brought to Africa.⁷²⁵

Reactions of Ovamboland's *élite* to the colonial intrusion were manifold. While Mandume expelled traders, others were more welcoming. Historian John Iliffe recognizes "one common feature" during the period of colonial invasion: "African polities were divided. Like the European Powers, each had its war and peace parties, its hawks and doves."⁷²⁶ The formation of factions among Ovambo kingdoms and within these societies is a case at point. While the politics of King Mandume in 1915 underlines the "juxtaposition of European aggressors against African defenders", the history of Ovamboland makes equally clear that the choice of reactions to the colonial onslaught cannot be confined to these "categories".⁷²⁷

Cultural differences between individual kingdoms became more marked. Historians speak of a "cultural mutation" that was "most advanced among the Ondonga by 1915, for they were most profoundly affected by all aspects of European intrusion". Finnish missionaries began to evangelize in Ondonga from 1870 onwards. It was no coincidence that the last independent King of Ondonga "was the first Ovambo or Nkhumbi King to be converted to Christianity."⁷²⁸ A "sense of fraternity" is not discernible from the conduct of neighboring Ovambo kings. Furthermore, "the study of resistance has been extremely elitist",⁷²⁹ but questions could be posed about splits within Kwanyama society. Who opted to fight, who wanted to stay neutral or 'collaborate'?

It appears that Mandume's assertive personality dominated the decision to fight. After four years in power, his *omalenga* were willing to support him in his confrontation with Portuguese colonialism. Patricia Hayes, a historian who has written substantially about Mandume, describes the King as a "forceful leader in both his drive for social renovation and in his resistance to colonial occupation. [H]e stands out as one of the most compelling figures in Namibian history." Contemporaries were divided over his character and policies: After a visit to the King in 1911, German native commissioner Streitwolf described him as "amiable" (*liebenswert*).⁷³⁰

725 *Viotti da Costa* 1985: 42f.; cf. *Lindner* 2011: 320f.; *Zollmann* 2010a; *Penvenne* 1996: 459.

726 *Iliffe* 2007: 200; on the debate about 'the notion of tribe' cf. *Apter* 1999: 582.

727 *Isaacman/Isaacman* 1977: 34.

728 *Clarence-S./Moorsom* 1975: 380; cf. *Lau* 1986: 38 on Jonker Afrikaner; *Hayes* 1993: 96.

729 *Isaacman/Isaacman* 1977: 39; 55 'speak of recurring patterns of collaboration'.

730 *Hayes* 1993: 89f.; NAN BGR 2, F 9 b, Report Streitwolf, KGW to BA Grootfontein, 31.10.11.

Rhenish missionary sources “suggest that Mandume was impetuous, restless and highly autocratic, reluctant to accept criticism, whether from headmen, elders or paternalistic German missionaries. “He was intelligent and thoughtful,” wrote Missionary Wulfhorst, “but very willful” [including the killing of ‘many people’].” His intelligence also “greatly impressed [the Spiritan Father] Keiling”.⁷³¹ Self-confident but aware of the challenges that lay before him, Mandume demanded to be on equal terms with the colonial rulers in their distant capitals.⁷³² In his argumentation he resembled Prince Nicolas of Congo (c. 1830–1860) who had declared in a famous letter of protest that “the Catholic kingdom of Congo is a friend and loyal ally, but not a vassal” of Portugal.⁷³³ Recognizing the importance of close relations with the Germans, Mandume went so far as to speak of the German Governor Seitz as his “brother in Windhuk”. Allegedly, in early 1914 he approached the German police station Kuring-Kuru asking whether he could take refuge there since “he feared a Portuguese campaign of revenge”.⁷³⁴ As shown in the previous chapters, since August 1914, when Seitz became concerned about possible Portuguese attempts to instigate an Ovambo revolt against German rule, a sense of alliance is discernable between Mandume and the governor who promised the King support in case of a Portuguese attack.

Mandume’s enmity to the Portuguese was older than this ‘alliance’ with the Germans. This might have, first of all, geographical reasons. The Portuguese, since they crossed the Kunene River, were nearby and, with their soldiers and traders, unsettled the polities of Ovamboland. The Germans, on the other hand, were far away; the only Germans the King saw regularly were missionaries with whom he seemed to have built a relationship of trust. The nearest German settlements Outjo and Tsumeb were located at least 200 kilometers south of Ovamboland, ‘behind’ the waterless and thinly populated Etosha Pan. Thus, chances for conflict were minimized and German traders or soldiers were few who could have been raided by Mandume’s men.

If bounty was a goal of the raids, it was easier to seek in northern direction. It is to be acknowledged that many reports about the gruesomeness of the Kwanyama and their relentless raiding of neighbors and colonialists

731 Hayes 1993: 103 on Keiling 1934: 171-5; cf. Estermann 1976: 174, ‘a sadistic youth’; 145.

732 On the tradition of Portug. Kings treating African chiefs as equals Viotti da Costa 1985: 53.

733 Letter of Prince Nicolas to *Jornal de Commercio*, 1.12.1859, transl. in Wheeler 1968: 58.

734 *Südwest*, 5. Jg., 28.4.14: 2; NAN ZBU 2365, VII a, Bl.4, KGW, 16.7.14, ‘Rachefeldzug’.

alike should be judged as colonial exaggeration that served but one purpose: to justify the final conquest. Nevertheless, the reports are too many from too different sources to dismiss the core, the raids, as untrue.⁷³⁵ As mentioned above, these raids were controversial also within the Kwanyama court. Mandume aimed at reserving the privilege for himself to decide about individual raids. Whether it was the unremitting drought, or the intention to provoke and harm the Portuguese who encircled Mandume's realm, or mere Kwanyama renegades that stood behind the resumption of raiding in 1914 must be left open; complaints accumulated. In May 1914 a newspaper in Moçâmedes reported that a Portuguese supply train was raided by some Kwanyama. Prefect Keiling related the incident privately by commencing with the words "as usual" (*comme de coutume*). Kwanyama had blocked the road leading to Forts Evale and Kafima. Of the 19 soldiers and two Portuguese traders only a few escaped, the rest was killed or taken prisoner. In addition, two ox-wagons and one field gun including ammunition were taken. The attack was an embarrassment to the colonial government. But in spite of attempts to better guard the roads between Humbe and Kafima, the Kwanyama continued their raids northwards along the Cuvelai river bed on neighboring Ganguella and others, destroying villages, taking prisoners and many head of cattle.⁷³⁶ Soon thereafter, Fort Evale to the north of Kwanyama territory was attacked. In June 1914, Kwanyama troops robbed a traveling party including a priest who survived severely injured. Pater Keiling was concerned about the security of his mission. He described a situation of all-encompassing fear. For him, Mandume was a ruthless overlord in Southern Angola who enslaved Ganguela and Ambuela people and forced them to pay him "heavy taxes to save their lives".⁷³⁷ He mentioned 42 destroyed villages (Ganguella and Gallanges) and almost 300 killed villagers; 200 were taken prisoner in August 1914 alone. The Spiritan mission was engaged in paying ransom for a few of them who were then resettled at the mission station Catoco.⁷³⁸ In August 1914, Father Bonnefoux spoke of a "revolt" led by the Kwanyama.⁷³⁹

735 Nathanael 2002: 1 'In his youth my father was himself captured in a tribal war and taken to a place in north-eastern Oukwambi, now lying across the border in Angola, where King Mandume ya Ndemufayo of the Kwanyamas kept him as a slave'.

736 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Caconda) to TRP, 19.5.14; cf. *Estermann* 1976: 130.

737 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Bailundo) to TRP, 14.7.14, 'impôt assez élevé'; 18.8.14.

738 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Eminence Reverendissime, 9.9.14; 9.9.16.

739 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huila) to TRP, 11.8.14.

For the Portuguese administrators, “Mandume’s audacity” became manifest in these incursions into territory they had deemed already ‘pacified’. Planned since 1913, the expeditionary force under Alves Roçadas was sent in September to execute a “punitive expedition” against the “terrible opponent”.⁷⁴⁰ Given that also missionaries were attacked, Prefect Keiling had intended in September to visit the “King of these terrible Kwanyama”, but considered it prudent to wait until the government had occupied the region *manu militari*.⁷⁴¹ As this attempt came to naught after the Naulila incident and the battle, and as Roçadas was more concerned with the German threat, Mandume could send his men to sack Fort Kafima (Okafima) in late December 1914. Three Portuguese soldiers were captured by Mandume’s men and taken to N’giva. The King, according to missionary Wulforst, was well aware of the Naulila incident and told him: “This is how the Portuguese do it.” In “recognition” of Mandume’s contribution in the fight against “our enemies”, GSWA’s Governor Seitz presented “his friend” with three horses.⁷⁴² Still in June 1915, when all odds were against him, Commander Franke requested missionary Rautanen in Olukonda to express his gratitude to the “chiefs [*Kapitäne*] who gave me presents” and to assure them that he would return their favors in due time.⁷⁴³

King Mandume was now the “most powerful” man in Ovamboland and beyond. He was so powerful that Prefect Keiling – following the King’s invitation – deemed it necessary to visit Mandume in January. Despite “intrigues of German Protestant missionaries”, the King gave the Catholic missionary an impressive reception at his *palais* with his “thirty ministers” and ample presents. Keiling asked for guarantees for the mission stations in southern Angola. Mandume’s men had taken hostage 94 Christians from the Kavango area and Keiling requested them to be released. Defending war as “honorable” and “necessary for the upkeep of his court”, Mandume granted the guarantees and the release. But he made it also clear that “he did not wish any more Portuguese (i.e. Catholic) mission [stations].” When asked to release the three Portuguese soldiers captured at Kafima, Mandume reportedly responded: “Are you a missionary of God or

740 Sousa [n.d.^{~1935}]: 9 ‘a audácia do Mandume’; ‘um terrível adversário’.

741 AGCSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Cardinal, 9.9.14.

742 BAB R 1001/9025: 40f, DG Lisbon to Bethmann-Hollweg, 15.12.14; 98, Tlgr. AA, 7.2.15; NAN A.505: 34, Chronik Omupanda, 20.11.15; *Oelhafen* 1923: 92.

743 NAN A.566, v. 3 Franke (Otjiwarongo) to M. Rautanen, 14.6.15; *Peltola* 1958: 179.

an agent of *Mnene Poutou* (the [Portuguese] government)?” Promising Keiling not to hand his prisoners over to the Germans, he did release two of them to the Lutherans, who had them transported to the German Fort Okaukwejo.⁷⁴⁴ The third prisoner, a sergeant, was allegedly killed because he refused to instruct the Kwanyama on how to use a captured canon.⁷⁴⁵

According to the missionary Wulfhorst, in April 1915 Mandume received a letter of complaint “from the Portuguese”. “He had a headman who could read a little Portuguese ... I [Wulfhorst] said to Mandume, ‘leave the Portuguese alone; if they attack you, you will be destroyed and all your headmen who influence you against the Portuguese will run away and misfortune will overtake you.’ Mandume rose and stated that he would knock their heads off.” He had made a similar statement to Captain Streitwolf in 1911, and, given the message of Seitz from October 1914, still “hoped that the Germans would wage war against the Portuguese.”⁷⁴⁶ Despite the guarantees given by Mandume, Keiling reported about new raids of Kwanyama men against neighboring villagers. Near Caconda a village was burnt down in mid-1915, 25 were killed and 45 taken prisoner.⁷⁴⁷

Did Mandume make “an attempt to impose his paramouncy over the whole area [the Ovambo-Nkhumbi population]” following the expulsion of the Portuguese in late 1914?⁷⁴⁸ Given what Keiling reported about his visit in January 1915 of the “the *grand Seigneur* of all Ovampo” who – according to Keiling – was able to instate “his own appointees in smaller Ovambo polities to the north” and who succeeded to play Protestants off against Catholic missionaries, the King seemed at the height of his power, being at liberty to act as it pleased him.⁷⁴⁹ The onslaught of colonialism threatened all this, including traditions, that were so cherished by Mandume and formed the baseline of his reign. Colonial policies to be implemented in the future stood at odds with the Kwanyama way of life. Mandume would lose his power to rule. Instead a petty white official would be placed in a fort near his royal residence, similar to Cuamato or Evale. Road construction would have brought in more “foreigners” he so de-

744 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling to TRP, 18.2.15; 3L1.11b5, Keiling to TRP, 20.2.15.

745 BAB R 1001/6639: 61, Questions to Hochstrate and Wulfhorst, 1/25; *Morlang* 1998: 47.

746 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, f.15, testimony 3.5.26; NAN A.505: 39, *Chronik Omupanda*, 20.11.15; NAN BGR 2, F 9 b, Report Streitwolf: 14, KGW to BA Grootfontein, 31.10.11.

747 AGCSSp 3L1.18.8, Keiling (Huambo) to Cardinal, 15.8.15.

748 *Clarence-S./Moorsom* 1975: 380 ref. to *Eça* 1921; cf. *Pritchard* 1915; *Hayes* 1992: 184.

749 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling to TRP, 20.2.15; *Hayes* 1993: 90f.; *Vigne* 1998: 293.

spised. They would have carried with them more alcohol and merchandise. Mandume instead aimed at increased self-sufficiency. Tax collectors and *corvée* were to be expected and would have driven more Kwanyama into labor migration. Violent reactions to these prospects were therefore likely. However, as T.O. Ranger has emphasized, it would be wrong to assume that “resistance ... necessarily impl[ies] a romantic, reactionary rejection of ‘modernity’”. Mandume enjoyed modern merchandise; he lived in a house constructed in rectangular European style; he wore European clothes; he was willing to accommodate missionaries and learnt from them how to write.⁷⁵⁰ The ‘distant’ colonialism of GSWA, as he experienced it through trade and negotiations, was acceptable to him. However, he was unwilling to directly forego his sovereignty to Portuguese officials, as his western, northern, and eastern neighbors were forced to do since 1907. Considering the ongoing attempts at conquest Ovambo leaders seemed to be left with no option but to acquiesce or to resist. King Mandume made a decision. His kingdom was the “only state still capable of contesting colonization”. The Kwanyama would resist.⁷⁵¹

2.7.3 Battle Between Equals? – Mongua, August 18–20, 1915

In waging a war against the Portuguese, Mandume pursued his goal of maintaining political independence. He chose to act upon the defeat of the Portuguese on the hands of the Germans, since his chances of winning had improved considerably. As in similar cases elsewhere on the continent, the campaign of 1915 was thus not a “sudden rupture”, but represented “the dragging out of older and more entrenched animosities” In the war between Mandume and de Eça the nexus between local initiative and imperial context becomes evident. It is important to keep in mind what historian John Hargreaves had pointed out already fifty years ago: African rulers “often pursued clear purposes of their own – the maintenance of independence, the retention of power within their dominion, and the elimination of commercial rivals.”⁷⁵² And it was the reference to the “racist assumptions

750 Ranger 1969: 305; cf. Dobler 2014: 7 on the ‘European style’ of Ovambo Kings; *Shiweda* 2011: 143f. on ‘modernity’ among Ovambo.

751 Pélissier 2004: 270; Harding 2013: 76f. on resistance; Walter 2014: 120 on motives.

752 Nasson 2014: 445; Hargreaves 1960: 108; cf. Reid 2012: 14 on the ‘righteousness of war’.

... of Africans as passive barbarians”⁷⁵³ that made it so easy for Portuguese plaintiffs to claim later a *soba* could never have fought so adamantly for his own power without outside support.

However, when de Eça’s forces crossed the Kunene River, years of famine and social upheaval had “eroded the capacity of societies in Ovamboland to overcome drought”.⁷⁵⁴ This in turn diminished any military capacity that was left. Nevertheless, colonial warfare in the heydays of imperialism did not mean that well-equipped European soldiers fought against helpless ‘savages’. When Africans acquired the skills and equipment the Europeans had used to their advantage, the image changed. This had been true for African defense against European incursions before the eighteenth century and it became in part true again, when Africans gained possession over considerable numbers of firearms in the late nineteenth century. European technical superiority was challenged by its own means. In strategy and tactics this often resulted in a “particular type of cross-cultural synthesis” in the art of war, as has been described for several African theaters of war.⁷⁵⁵ For decades now, historians have established the fact that colonial administrators were “aware of their limitations.” Military or financial “colonial weakness” has been described as a characteristic of colonial rule that brought grievances but also opportunities to Africans.⁷⁵⁶ Since the days of the *descobrimentos* the Portuguese had time and again lost hundreds of men to their African adversaries. The memories of the defeat at Pembe Drift in 1904 and the retreat in 1914 were still fresh. Also, the Germans in their war against the Herero had suffered “international humiliation of defeat by an African adversary during the first part of 1904”.⁷⁵⁷

The alleged specificities of colonial wars have repeatedly been analyzed by contemporaries and historians. Colonel Charles E. Calwell’s *Small Wars* (1896) on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency war became the starting point for an ever-growing literature. Recently these wars have been called “transcultural” or “asymmetrical”. All these attributes set them apart from the wars fought in Europe. The laws of war, as proscribed by the Geneva (1864) and Hague Conventions (1899/1907) were deemed applicable only to “civilized” states and their military. Rules

753 Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 31.

754 Gewalt 2003: 217; cf. McKittrick 2002: 160f.

755 Thornton 1988: 360f.; cf. e.g. Bühner 2011; Reid 2012: x on ‘misleading imagery’.

756 Ranger 1969: 298f., pointing to R. Oliver; cf. Iliffe 2007: 206; Osterhammel 2011: 697.

757 Steinmetz 2008: 608; Prein 1994: 102; cf. Dederling 1999a: 207; Lindner 2011: 74.

about combatants and non-combatants were thus considered irrelevant when fighting “natives”. Wars against indigenous adversaries were regarded as “domestic” affairs. In international law, the Congo Conference had “irreversibly exclude[d] any pretensions to sovereignty that indigenous communities might have entertained.” The “native” enemy was considered “unequal”, often degraded into a subhuman category. Legally speaking, the insurgents were treated as “criminals”, “bandits” – and culturally as “barbarians”. Europeans called their wars against these adversaries “punitive expeditions”. “According to a widespread notion, *other* forms and means of warfare that differed from those employed in warfare in Europe were both necessary and legitimate when fighting non-European adversaries.”⁷⁵⁸

For example, the chances to ask for mercy, to surrender, and to survive as prisoners of war were minimal in “small wars”. The taking of prisoners in colonial wars was deemed “impractical”; they would have needed guards and provision, therefore the killing of prisoners appeared to be the “obvious solution”. The shooting was rationalized as a form of penalizing violence, setting an example for what would happen to those who rebel. Equally, colonial soldiers could barely expect to survive their capture by Africans. For example, one African contemporary stated about the Portuguese defeated in 1904: “we just killed them”. The handing over of Portuguese prisoners to the Germans by Mandume was a rare counter-example. From the European perspective, ceasefire and capitulation of native forces after a battle were deemed to be inexistent. “Small wars” ended in defeat or victory – the latter at times meaning outright annihilation not only of the “rebels”, but also of the people living in the conquered areas. More often than not such policies were accepted by the commanding officers and their superiors. Consequently, colonialism has been characterized as “structurally latent genocidal”.⁷⁵⁹

The colonial peace was “armed” and could, by definition, include “pacification measures”. Ideological justifications for bestialities were easily found by categorizing the enemy into a ‘lower race’, who would be defeated by its own ‘savage’ means. African traditions of warfare were important factors too for the escalating violence in “transcultural wars”. These practices may have shocked European contemporaries. Reports

758 Koskenniemi 2001: 126f.; Methfessel 2012: 46; cf. Walter 2014: 83; 157; 171; 2008; Reid 2012: 133; Kuss 2010: 17; Hull 2005: 131; Guha 1994.

759 Walter 2012: 90; 99; 97; 2008: 14f.; 2006: 39; Hayes 1992 II: 193 (Sheetekela, 27.12.89).

about them often had apologetic undertones, justifying and legitimizing the brutal “pacifying” of “native rebels”. Furthermore, European forces could directly benefit from those traditions if “native auxiliaries” were employed who did not concern themselves with the observance of the European *ius in bello*.⁷⁶⁰

At the imperial home front, an easy victory against the racially different opponents was taken for granted. The number of fallen soldiers from the metropolis was usually minor (in comparison to the Africans killed in action or subsequently). Often these “campaigns”, given their relatively low loss on the European side, were not treated “as a ‘war’ worthy of the name.” There was a widespread and strongly held teleological belief that the “uncivilized native” societies were doomed by history to succumb.⁷⁶¹

Taking this background into consideration, it was expected of General de Eça to win this “small war” by resorting to the utmost force that was put at his disposal. Until the crossing of the Kunene River, the campaign was understood to be the suppression of a ‘post-pacification rebellion’. The war against the Kwanyama, on the other hand, was a colonial war of conquest. Until mid-August, the Portuguese army was privileged in its occupation efforts by being able to avoid any major engagement. The logistical difficulties required that of 11,000 troops under de Eça only about 5,000 soldiers and 500–1,000 African “auxiliaries” were employed east of the Kunene River. As usual in colonial wars, for reasons of mobility and logistics the men were further subdivided into (four) columns with 18 artillery pieces, 28 maxim guns, over 400 ox-wagons, 800 horses, and 73 camels. It belongs to the tragedies of this war that King Mandume was faced with a colonial army that was equipped to face a different adversary – the Germans.

Among contemporaries, estimates for the Kwanyama forces under Mandume remained disputed. The intelligence service of General de Eça has been blamed for its “amateurism”.⁷⁶² Portuguese estimates ranged from a low of 50,000 to a high of 150,000 “rebel fighters”, among them 50,000–60,000 Kwanyama. Also the Portuguese estimates of the number of weapons of the “rebels” differed greatly: from several hundreds, to

760 Cf. *Walter* 2012: 108f.; cf. *Cook* 2006: 638 on the killing of European POW during WWI.

761 *Ravlo/Gleditsch/Dorussen* 2003: 521. In war-databases colonial wars often have not been taken into account because they require a ‘threshold criterion of 1,000 battle death [‘for the system member’, i.e. Europeans]...in a single year.’ *ibid*: 529; *Fulbrook* 2011: 31.

762 *Pélissier* 1977: 491 on the number of Port. forces; *Hayes* 1992: 190f.; *Walter* 2014: 76f.

around 5,000, up to 15,000–20,000 guns.⁷⁶³ German missionary Wulfhorst later disputed that the “rebels” had “100,000–150,000 men able to bear arms” and 10,000 guns. He had been with the Kwanyama for many years and stated

“[t]hey were not in a position to place such a number of men in the field. During that year [1915] there was a famine in the land, for which reason many of the natives did not go forward. ... There was no war until August 1915 ... as far as the fight with Mandume in August 1915 is concerned, there could not have been more than 4,000–5,000 natives present at such fight.”⁷⁶⁴

His colleague Albert Hochstrate estimated “the total number of [Ovambo] able to bear firearms during that time to be between 10,000 and 15,000, which would include the other tribes”, i.e. other than Kwanyama.⁷⁶⁵ There was a colonial “tradition” of extreme exaggeration of the numbers of defeated enemies. “Observers might exaggerate the size of armies because they wished to trumpet the virtues of their partisans” or they included the porters. “Alternatively, they may have been misled by the way African armies fought, which made them appear large” due to their “open order”.⁷⁶⁶ Furthermore, there seemed to be a gap between what the military claimed in public to know about the enemy and what was put down in internal correspondence, indicating the General Staff’s ideas about the enemy forces. “Knowledge systems are essential for empire. Agents of empire need to understand the behavior and culture of those they rule.” This functional understanding of knowledge about Africans was essential to prepare for fighting. Discourses about African “tribesmen”, past or future military adversaries, were thus part of these imperial knowledge systems that were created for one foremost goal: to rule.⁷⁶⁷

A listing of “knowledge” about Kwanyama politics and the way of fighting can be discerned from the instructions of de Eça’s high command.

“Reportedly there are political divergences between both chieftaincies [Ombandja/Cuamato and Kwanyama]. During the attack, they organize all the firearms in the first line, extending it in a long line of shooters shaped like a half moon. The remaining combatants, those who do not possess firearms, wait to reenforce at the time of the assault. The *Lengas*, warlords, lead their *cuas* [platoons] in combat. [They] usually ride on horseback, dressed like Eu-

763 BAB R 1001/6639: 62, Questions, 1/25; R 1001/6638: 138, summary Mascarenhas, 7.6.24

764 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 12f., testimony of missionary A. Wulfhorst, 3.5.26.

765 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 38f., testimony Hochstrate, 26.4.26; Hayes 1992: 192f.

766 Thornton 1988: 365; cf. Walter 2014: 95; Alencastro 2011: 43.

767 Price 2008: 154; cf. Walter/Kundrus 2006; Vansina 1987: 438f.

ropeans in khaki uniforms. The *soba* [chief] is not usually showing himself in front of his warriors. It is likely, however, that Mandume, the Cuanhama chief, will break with this tradition, and join in the play [the fight] for the destiny of his chieftancy. We must therefore count on the greatest resistance [of the Cuanhama].”⁷⁶⁸

The Portuguese knew that they barely knew enough to predict the next steps of the Kwanyama. It was admitted that nothing could be said about the number of troops. However, the sober exposition of the enemy’s fighting order indicates the degree to which de Eça’s staff was willing to recognize the rationality of Mandume and his military leaders.

Having sent three smaller columns to the north and west of Kwanyama territory, the General personally led the largest column of around 2,700 men against King Mandume (the majority being soldiers from Portugal, most of them illiterate, many had never heard before the word “Angola”). Most prominent among de Eça’s “mercenaries” was Harunga or Vita “Oorlog” Tom (1863–1939) with his men. He had already supported João de Almeida in his conquest of southern Angola and was a “key figure within the militarized raiding economy” of the Kunene region, having made a fortune by his “advancement within the military hierarchy”. Among other tasks he had been a “tax collector” for the Portuguese. According to the above-quoted Manasse Veseevete, the “Portuguese regarded him as a general.”

The marching order for August 12, the day of departure from Humbe, acknowledged under the rubric “situation”: “There is no news about the situation of the natives of the Cunene and Cubango areas.” The Afrikaaner commando, arriving from Fort Cuamato and Fort Roçadas, was mostly ahead of the troops and tried to gather intelligence about the attitude of the people.⁷⁶⁹ The actual theater of war, the *terrain* where the enemy was expected to wait until the attack, caused extreme operational strains on colonial troops. However, the relative familiarity of the Portuguese military with the area east of Humbe was a striking advantage for General de Eça in comparison to previous campaigns. Furthermore, the invading army had a precise aim to target: Mandume’s royal residence at N’giva.

768 AHM/Div/2/2/38/27: 2, Com. Superior. Instruções No. 3, 9.8.15; Hayes 1992: 191.

769 AHM/Div/2/2/39/18: 1; 4, Com. Superior (Humbe) Ordem de Marcho, 12.8.; 15.8.15; Pélissier 1969: 107; Rizzo 2012: 53f.; Heywood et al. 1992: 185, Manasse Veseevete[e], 30.3.1986; Bollig 1998: 507; 2004: 261; NAN STR 21, II m 1, Bl.18, *Portugal em Africa*, no. 224: 118, 20.4.1910; cf. Stals/Otto-Reiner 1999.

African fortifications in Angola were “generally composed of complex patterns of trenches, obstacles, and palisades”.⁷⁷⁰ While they had proved adequate to repel attackers for centuries, with the advent of the maxim gun and field gun, Europeans could use their technical superiority to devastate the palisaded hamlets of Ovamboland. Mandume was aware of these weapons and decided not to wait until the Portuguese had closed in and would sack his residence. He would try to stop them beforehand.

While Mandume’s troops were able to forage for food, the Portuguese had to transport everything, which restricted the size of their army and their radius of operation. Eight cannons and sixteen maxim guns slowed down de Eça’s trek and made it vulnerable to attacks. Most of all the lack of water impeded the Portuguese army. Within days pull-oxen and the cavalry’s horses fell victim to the drought. The soldiers “went crazy of thirst”.⁷⁷¹ There were rumors that the troops had to be re-sized due to the drought.⁷⁷²

Apart from logistical challenges, another motive for de Eça’s meticulous preparation of his campaign is discernable. Well aware of the Kwanyama’s reputation as unconquered “great warriors”, he had respect for his task – in this, he differed from many colonial officers. De Eça’s campaign is another example that proves wrong the notion of colonial omnipotence – the possibility of defeat on the hand of African adversaries was always given. The African “initiative during the ‘pacification’”, so clearly emphasized by historian Terence Ranger and many after him,⁷⁷³ can also be discerned from de Eça’s slow march against Mandume.

Missionary Wulforst remembered that the first shots of the battle

“were fired on the 15th August, 1915. I was not present at the fight. I was 80 km distant. I saw that Mandume and his warriors went out to fight. They were mostly armed as natives are, and Mandume also had one or two cannons. I personally saw one. These were taken from the Portuguese. He was not able to use the cannons as he had no ammunition.”⁷⁷⁴

770 Thornton 1988: 370.

771 AGCSSp 3L1.18.8, Keiling (Huambo) to Cardinal, 15.8.15; *Pélessier* 1969: 107.

772 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 22.8.15 reported most men would return to Europe after having incurred expenses of 400,000 Contos, only 4,000 men should stay and wait for the rain before they attack Kwanyama. ‘Dans quel pays vivons-nous!!!’

773 Ranger 1969: 293 ‘Africans helped to make their own history’; *Walter* 2014: 238.

774 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 10, testim. Wulforst, 3.5.26; *Vieira da R.* 1936: 34f.

As historians have pointed out, “[t]here is no distinctively ‘African’ way of war”,⁷⁷⁵ and African leaders knew that it might be advantageous to fight colonial forces with their own weapons. Mandume’s fruitless attempt to break the colonial monopoly of heavy weaponry attests to this; irrespective whether he lacked ammunition, or whether he could not find an enemy soldier willing to teach his men how to use artillery. Instead, he had to resort to alternative means, counting on the strength of his numbers and the thirst of the Portuguese. However, the General’s “lifeline” was not cut: most of the few motor trucks that transported water to de Eça’s men could pass across Ovamboland unhindered – the “first mistake of the Kwanyama”. On August 16, Portuguese cavalry and African “auxiliaries” reported the concentration of hostile “natives” at Mongua, near a few small waterholes (*cacimba*) at the border of the Kwanyama territory. De Eça ordered his troops into this direction, where Mandume’s *lenga* Calola held the position with his men and refugees from Humbe. The Portuguese arrived the next day and set up a bivouac, a defense position to stay over night laid out in the form of a quadrangle. As predicted, Mandume prepared himself to join his men, after being alerted “in the forest” that the Portuguese were approaching his territory. Wulfhorst remembered that the King called on him on the 17th and seemed less self-assured about his victory than ever, telling the missionary “When the Portuguese arrive, I will shoot myself, I will die in Ondjiva.”

On August 18, early in the morning Calola, a personal friend of Mandume, who had repeatedly campaigned against the Portuguese and eleven other *omalenga* attacked the eastern and northern flank of *o quadrado* with all force. Two batteries of field artillery, four batteries of maxim guns, two infantry battalions, and two cavalry squadrons responded with “a true rain shower of bullets”. This first engagement lasted for three hours.

The ensuing battle of Mongua, barely mentioned in Anglophone historiography, would constitute – in terms of numbers – the largest sub-Saharan battle between European and African forces since Ethiopia’s victory over Italy in Adua in 1896.⁷⁷⁶ The “roar of canons” was heard up to the mission station in Namakunde. Missionary Heinrich Welsch (1875–1927) remembered that at first the people believed this to be thunders announcing the

775 Reid 2013: 114; Walter 2014: 211-15.

776 NAN A.505: 33, 41, Chronik, 20.11.15; Sousa [¹⁹³⁵]: 14f.; Pélissier 2004: 269; 275; AHM Div/2/2/40/32, details on the Portuguese soldiers who took part in the battle of Mongua.

rain.⁷⁷⁷ The number of attackers shot by de Eça's maxim guns and cannons is unknown, but the losses were immense. One Portuguese officer and sixteen privates were killed the first day. Mandume's men, having at their disposal abundant ammunition, tried to cordon off the Portuguese and targeted horses and pull-oxen to immobilize the invaders. While de Eça was surprised to find his baggage train attacked, the Kwanyama were forced to rely on the Portuguese rations since there was almost no food left in their territory. They "endeavored to outflank the Portuguese and to cut off their rear communication", Missionary Hochstrate later learnt about this tactic: "the road of retreat leading through the forest was very narrow, sufficient only to allow the passage of a wagon, and that it had been barred by the natives who had thrown trees across it."⁷⁷⁸ De Eca was trapped. He tried to call in support from his other detachments to the west. But despite the Kwanyama's efforts and the capture of several ox-wagons, the Portuguese still managed to get supplies from Humbe into the combat zone. During the night and the next day the Portuguese dug trenches that protected them against snipers from trees and anthills. A merciless battle raged over those *cacimbas* that still held water. Wulfhorst, not an eyewitness of the battle but close to the event, received this description from the Kwanyama afterwards:

The "Portuguese were surrounded by the natives ... they were cut off. For two or three days the Portuguese were without food or water. The natives occupied the water hole, and obtained possession of about twenty wagonloads of provisions and other goods. While they were plundering these, the Portuguese opened fire and drove away the natives from the water hole. The Portuguese then obtained reinforcements".⁷⁷⁹

According to this report, lack of discipline and attentiveness in one particular moment of success lost the Kwanyama the *cacimbas*; marines and Mozambican soldiers, the men so ruthlessly enlisted into the army, captured the ponds on August 19 – the "essential mistake" of the Kwanyama. When King Mandume arrived that same day in the evening with new soldiers, including his personal guard,⁷⁸⁰ and five ox-wagons of guns and am-

777 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 37, testimony Hochstrate, 26.4.26; R 1001/6634: 210, Welsch to Gouv Seitz, 2.5.18; Hayes 1992: 193f.; 1992 II: 150 Jer. Benjamin.

778 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 37, testi. Hochstrate, 26.4.26; Gonçalves 1926: 118.

779 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 11, testimony Wulfhorst, 3.5.26; Pélissier 2004: 271.

780 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 20.2.15: 7 describes the guard as composed of 80 chosen men (aged 20-25 years) and all equipped with 'fine' *Mausers* and *Kropatschek* guns.

munitions, he knew that his success depended on the re-capture of the water. Being a better strategist than his *omalenga*, he also ordered to ensure that no more supplies reach *o quadrado*. What caused the Portuguese such apprehension was to find that Mandume did not follow the strategy that had become “the classic defensive stance of many ... African states at war with the Portuguese in Angola: taking full advantage of [one’s own territory’s] inaccessibility” and refraining “from open attacks”.⁷⁸¹ Mandume instead appropriated ‘colonial’ forms of fighting and adapted them to his own needs. He attacked the supply routes of the Portuguese successfully and introduced volley fire. Contrary to Ovambo “royal taboo” he personally took part in battle. He had “trained himself to be an excellent marksman”.⁷⁸²

On August 20, a ferocious battle raged over the *cacimbas*. Mandume had assembled several thousand men ready to assault the Portuguese camp, shouting “The land does not belong to the white[s]!” According to Portuguese sources, the King had at his disposal not only Kwanyama soldiers, but also men from his traditional enemies, the Cuamato, Vavale, Humbe, and Uukuambi. Was this the “vast and efficient coalition” of Africans that rarely ever occurred during the period of colonial conquest, the Ovambo “league” the Portuguese had feared since 1904? Taking into consideration the Portuguese exaggerations, René Pélissier points out that, except for the Italians in Ethiopia, “never in modern times the Europeans had to face an enemy so numerous in tropical Africa.” General de Eça, aware of his potentially catastrophic situation, finally managed to send out messengers to his columns in Evale and Cuamato to call in support. The enemies shot at a distance as close as 50 meters. But the longer the battle lasted and the deeper the Portuguese could dig their trenches the more hopeless the fight became for Mandume, since the Portuguese, having received supplies the day before, were not running dry of ammunition. Without water and against maxim guns and artillery the defense of Kwanyama territory was a lost cause. As most horses were shot, marines instead of the cavalry had to launch the counter-strike and Mandume’s men could not withstand their force. After ten hours of fighting merely 15

781 Pélissier 2004: 276; Miller 1972: 50.

782 Pélissier 2004: 270; Hayes 1993: 104; 98, ref. to NAN RCO 10/1916/1, UG Representative Namakunde, Notes re Mandume, 29.4.1916; RCO 15/1916/1, RC Ovamboland and Hahn, Re Ovamboland and Chief Mandume n.d. (ca. 1915-16); Hayes 1992: 195.

Portuguese had been shot, but Mandume had lost his *élite* guard in the trenches. He withdrew southward.⁷⁸³

In three days of fighting, the Portuguese had suffered only 35 casualties (including four officers) and 57 wounded which attests to the limited operational success of Mandume's men.⁷⁸⁴ Given the low number of casualties it seems also likely that the Kwanyama forces had fewer guns at their disposal than claimed by the Portuguese. Portuguese officers boasted to South African Major Pritchard shortly after the battle that their soldiers had fired in one day between 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. no less than 2,000 rounds of French 75' shell grenades. They assumed "immense losses"⁷⁸⁵ of between 4,000 and 5,000 "natives", but claimed that only 100 Portuguese soldiers had participated in the battle.⁷⁸⁶ The Afrikaaners who took part in the battle kept their own (glorifying) memories that differed sharply from this Portuguese version. Most of all they inserted 'Mongua' in a long tradition of

"being called [by the Portuguese] on commando against belligerent native tribes. In forty years' time this happened no fewer than twenty-two times, and the last commando ... was during the World War when a native chief, Mandumi, and his warriors surrounded a Portuguese Laager of several thousand Europeans. The Boers had to come and help, and such was the respect which the natives had for the Boers that the approach of a commando of twenty-two men caused Mandumi to retire".⁷⁸⁷

King Mandume, on the other hand, told missionary Welsch afterwards that he had lost merely 25 men; only 100 were wounded. Wulfhorst, who spoke to Mandume on the 22nd in N'giva, however, had the impression that the King's self-assuredness was "gallows humor". Apart from self-applauding exaggerations, rumors about German participation on Mandume's side began to spread after the battle (even though the last German official visiting Ovamboland had wished his farewell to King Martin and Marti Rautanen in May). The Portuguese notion of two differing military

783 *Pélissier* 1969: 105 'a terra não é do branco'; 1977: 493; 2004: 13; 211; 271; *Hayes* 1992: 196; AHU MU DGC Angola 1915-18, Pt 5, 5^a Rep, Cx.973, Tlgr. GG to Min. Colon., 18./25.8.15.

784 AHM/Div/2/2/40/3, Mongua list of fallen; Div/2/2/39/4, Diary Cuanhama campaign 1915.

785 *Pritchard* 1916: 4f.; cf. *Hayes* 1993: 91; *Diário de Notícias* 17.8.28 'Uma ação gloriosa'.

786 NAN SWAA 1496, Report on tour of Ovamboland Mj Pritchard 1915; *Gewald* 2003: 218.

787 *Die Burger* cit. in: NARA RG 59, MF 705, roll 28, 853m00/21; USC Luanda to SoS, 10.12.28; On the Afrikaaner self-image during the war 1899–1902 *Teulié* 2000: 338-45.

cultures, here ‘rational’ European, there ‘savage’ African, was challenged by Mandume’s men. But it was unimaginable that African “warriors” could “learn” themselves how to wage war; thus, European support was assumed. Not only had Portuguese soldiers seen “2,000 cartridges of German guns and more than twenty guns” after the battle of Mongua.⁷⁸⁸ Also the tactics applied by the Kwanyama showed, according to the Portuguese, a European-style military knowledge. Since many of Mandume’s men “wore khaki uniforms with hats and looked like Europeans”, the Portuguese claimed that Germans or other “white people” had supported them. Recent Portuguese historiography sustains the claim that the “Ovambo received sophisticated arms from the Germans”. Indisputably, Commander Franke handed out 20 (or perhaps 100) guns and Seitz presented three horses to “his friend” Mandume after the sacking of Fort Kafima; many of the Kwanyama’s guns were paid for by money earned in GSWA. But German deliveries of weapons and military training in 1915 were “quite impossible” as Wulfhorst and Hochstrate underlined. They argued: “The natives themselves possessed khaki clothing and hats. ... These were brought with them from South West when they returned from their work on the mines.”⁷⁸⁹ Evidently, in addition to the guns bought from Portuguese traders, many weapons from the looting of Portuguese forts in late 1914 found their way to Kwanyama.

The days following their victory at Mongua, the Portuguese saw the abyss opening. It was *not* yet decided whether the victory over Mandume’s army would turn into a disaster. Without any provisions left and most horses and pull-oxen dead de Eça’s troops were isolated, five days from Humbe. 2,700 men could neither continue to occupy Kwanyama territory nor could they return to Humbe. The victorious Portuguese were immobilized while the defeated King Mandume escaped. It was mere luck for the Portuguese that he did not decide to return on August 21 or 22, but rather saved the ammunition that was still left, heading instead for the border with SWA. Aware of the catastrophic retreat of Roçadas in December 1914, the General decided to wait for relief; a solution that was not available to his unfortunate predecessors in 1904 and 1914. A convoy arrived

788 BAB R 1001/6634: 48, RMW to Franke, 6.3.22; Eça, in Memo Just., Doss. 9, doc.2: 10f.; R 1001/6634: 212, Welsch to Seitz, 2.5.18; NAN A.505: 42,A. Wulfhorst. *Chronik der Station Omupanda*, 20.11.15; *Walter* 2014: 251.

789 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 12, testimony Wulfhorst, 3.5.; 38; Hochstrate, 26.4.26; *Morlang* 1998: 47; *Dáskalos* 2008: 181; cf. *Peltola* 1958: 178.

from Cuamato and Naulila on August 24 and saved the situation. Finally, also the column from Evale joined the troops in Mongua. De Eça, now with 4,000 men at his disposal, ordered the erecting of a fort in Mongua and continued to push southwards. Again, the Afrikaaner commando that took part in the battle of Mongua proved valuable on the march to N'giva, since they “kn[e]w southern Angola like no one else.”⁷⁹⁰

The remainder of the campaign was conducted with fearful brutality; a pattern that de Eça had learnt during his campaigns in Mozambique and northern Portugal. The Herero soldier M. Veseevete recalled soberly that

“when we were on our way to Kwanyama, we came to a certain place called Otjizemba where the troops gathered. The Hereros were sent to go and fetch cattle from Owambos, which were to be slaughtered and eaten by the troops. By that time the people had been to Naulila and back. The Owambos had started killing the people, and the people had run to Naulila. It was decided that all Owambos must be killed, so they were killed.”

Violence was employed purposefully to achieve a political goal – to rule over the region. The aim to instill terror in order to impress upon the Kwanyama the futility of further resistance but also to sustain the army was evident. “[F]oraging armies were a bane in all areas where they moved as the country was stripped of food and famine followed”.⁷⁹¹ Restraints in exercising “punishment” were considered inapposite. “Uncivilized races attribute leniency to timidity”, Colonel Callwell wrote in his *Small Wars*.⁷⁹² No colonial soldier wanted to appear weak or timid.⁷⁹³ Many Kwanyama now attempted to surrender. Only a minority under Calola aimed at continuing the fight – without success. Not only the *sobas*, *omalenga*, and other chiefs were hanged. De Eça, the “great military leader”, was alleged to have “ordered the killing of all natives aged over 10: some were hanged with barbed wire, other crucified.” One author went so far to speak of a “veritable holocaust. The Portuguese had taken no prisoners.”⁷⁹⁴ Two years later opposition members in the Portuguese parliament read out sworn statements about these “terrible atrocities which undercut any sense of a Portuguese civilizing mission in [Ovamboland]:

790 AHM/Div/2/2/37/55, Pimento (Lubango) to Estado Major, 24.9.15 ‘são bons guias’.

791 Heywood et al. 1992: 180 Manasse Veseevet[e], 30.3.1986; Thornton 1999:120.

792 Callwell 1906: 148 was read by colonial officers all over Europe, Kuss 2010: 193f.

793 Walter 2012: 106; Häußler/Trotha 2012: 68; 79 ‘Tensions and fear of death end in a blood-bath’.

794 Stachan 2004: 80; GEPB 1936 II ‘Angola’: 662; Goldblatt 1971: 206; cf. Pélissier 2004: 278.

Portuguese rule there now rested solely on terror.” Refusing a parliamentary inquiry, Prime Minister Afonso Costa defended General Pereira de Eca, who was now Military Governor of Lisbon and ordered his men to shoot hunger rioters: “We must not be moved by idealism or forget the concept, or the estimate, that blacks have of humanitarian respect, which they view as weakness or pusillanimity.”⁷⁹⁵

Indiscriminate killing of (potential) rebels and destruction of enemy agricultural production was considered the ultimate response to deal with suspicion and to alleviate one’s own fear of being killed by an unrecognizable enemy ‘hiding in the African bush’, thus making nature (seemingly) the foremost adversary. Historian Dierk Walter pointed to these and other reasons for the blatant ruthlessness of colonial wars, while he stated that “racism as a prime determining factor [for the brutal warfare in colonies] ...has often been overestimated.”⁷⁹⁶ In a similar vein, others have analyzed colonial wars in a from below-perspective that emphasized the processes of brutalization of ordinary soldiers: “brutalization by revenge, by fear, and by frustration.”⁷⁹⁷ This departure from top-down-perspective on ideologies, intentions, and orders of superiors can be fruitfully applied to the Portuguese soldiers fighting in southern Angola. Similar factors caused the troops to engage in gratuitous violence: privations, danger, fear, and the death of comrades. In Angola, the war against “the natives” began with defeat in late 1914. Looting, killing, and destruction were pervasive after the Kwanyama and others took the chance to chase away Portuguese soldiers and traders. After this humiliation, the call for revenge was widespread and was closely related to the intention to “reestablish” colonial order. As in other wars, feelings of revenge caused the war to become excessive. It is characteristic of reprisals that they are stronger than the original attack. The guiding principle is “‘tit for tat’ instead of only ‘tat for tat’”⁷⁹⁸

When Mandume attacked the Portuguese in open battle, he allowed them to use their technical and organizational superiority in leading a war with artillery, trenches and several lines of defense. The war in southern Angola was a colonial war, but it was not the typical “small war” in which, more often than not, *guerilleros* sought to avoid open battles with

795 In *Meneses* 2010: 59; 57; 1998: 91-94; cf. *Jerónimo* 2009; *Methfessel* 2012: 45.

796 Cf. *Walter* 2012: 101; 107 ‘Rassismus ist als primäre Determinante...überschätzt worden’.

797 *Häußler/Trotha* 2012: 89; cf. *Lehmann* 2014: 552f.; *Walter* 2014: 157; 172-79.

798 *Häußler/Trotha* 2012: 63 ‘Revenge celebrates excessiveness’ ref. *Waldmann* 2003: 174.

Europeans and resorted to ambushes, traps, and other guerilla tactics. General de Eça achieved in Mongua what General von Trotha failed to achieve in GSWA in August 1904: Mongua was a ‘true’ battle on the battleground, there was a front, and combatants were recognizable. In this sense, “Mongua” was an “exception” in colonial history and an “archaism” in 1915. What also distinguished this war from the German war in Hereroland was the fact that there was a ‘recognizable’ target, the residence (*embala*) of King Mandume in N’giva. Unlike in other colonial theaters of war, where “conquest was not an event but a dynamic process”,⁷⁹⁹ de Eça’s war was completed with the occupation of Ngiva (for thirty years the “Timbuktu of Angola”) on September 2.⁸⁰⁰

Mandume, aware that the gallows awaited him, escaped to King Martin of Ondonga south of the border, where de Eça could not follow him.⁸⁰¹ 2,000 troops remained in the area after the General returned to Moçâmedes. Six forts were erected in Kwanyama territory. Still in 1916, under the new Governor General Massano de Amorim (1862–1929) the districts of Humbe, Cuamato, Cuanhama and Evale were described as *zonas militares*.⁸⁰² After decades Lisbon had reached the frontiers that had been accorded in 1886. The perceived German threat in 1915 had caused the provision of sufficient men and materials to subdue the last southern “tribe”. King Mandume became the most prominent victim of the Naulila incident.

“The resistance of African societies was bound to be broken in the end.” The battle of Mongua has been characterized as the “Armagedon of Ovambo”,⁸⁰³ King Mandume, despite his military wit, did not win the battle. Given his young age and in power only for four years, he was no experienced warrior in the fight against colonial forces – contrary to de Eça, who had learnt to wage a “bush war” in Mozambique. Mandume’s offensive collapsed after three days of fierce fighting. “In a sense, the duration of an engagement can be interpreted as a separate, secondary success. The decision can never be reached too soon to suit the winner or delayed long enough to suit the loser. A victory is greater for having been gained quick-

799 Pélissier 2004: 270; Mann 2002: 199 on the conquest of German East Africa 1888 to 1904.

800 Pélissier 1969: 108; cf. Walter 2014: 87 ref to Callwell; Kuss 2010: 16.

801 AHU MU DGC Angola 1915-18, Pt 5, 5^aRep, Cx.973, Tlgr. GG to M.Colónias, 6.9.15.

802 AHU MU M. de Amorim, Pt 26 (1915-27) – Angola. Negocios Indígenas. Relatório 1916.

803 Ranger 1969: 297; Pélissier 1977: 492.

ly; defeat is compensated for having been long postponed.”⁸⁰⁴ According to Clausewitz, Mandume’s defeat was thus well compensated by the three-days duration of the battle. Considering the size of the armies, had Mandume won, “Mongua” would have become an important name in history like “Little Big Horn” (1876), “Isandhlawna” (1879), or “Adua” (1896), three famous battles where “native people” shattered the invading European armies. However, Mandume did not become a second Sitting Bull, another Emperor Menelik II. General de Eça was more successful than Colonel Custer or General Baratieri. The leading *History of Namibia* does not even mention the name (O)Mongua.⁸⁰⁵

What were the (probable) causes for de Eça’s success? What influence did the social and political problems of the Kwanyama under Mandume have on the defeat of his large army? Most of all: Kwanyama society was weakened by years of famine. The tensions between the King and his *omalenga* may have had their repercussions on the way the battle was fought. However, the Kwanyama point of view is entirely lacking in the sources. The operational difficulties of Mandume’s forces can be determined by the low number of Portuguese casualties despite the large number of men (and possibly weapons) at his disposal. General de Eça, on the other hand, had more technological advantages at his disposal than his precursors: overland and submarine cables made immediate communication with the administrative center possible where previously words would have taken days or weeks to reach the addressee; steam navigation had enabled the navy to transport more troops in shorter time across the Atlantic; medical skills reduced the numbers of soldiers becoming unfit for war; since the area had seen previous campaigns, it was known to the Portuguese; mechanized transport across the desert was independent of pastures; the employment of motor trucks and ox wagons for the remaining kilometers proved to be successful since the Portuguese did not run dry of ammunition. However, there is no reason to overemphasize the use of technology in warfare when appraising military power. Greater importance is to be attached to the human factor: the military culture, organization, doctrine, operational art, logistics and tactics. More or less disciplined Portuguese soldiers managed to hold the Kwanyama at bay and could finally make use of their superior firepower to inflict enormous ca-

804 Clausewitz 1976 [1832]: 238, ch. *Duration of the Engagement*.

805 Wallace 2012: 208 speaks of ‘four days of heavy fighting in August’; cf. Reid 2012: 135.

sualties on the Kwanyama forces. Nevertheless, de Eça, in his report, paid respect to Mandume's soldiers, whose morale and capabilities "would have honored the best white troops." As a long-term effect, similar to the French and British also the Portuguese were identifying "martial races", and the reputation of the Kwanyama as "the most feared African opponents of Portuguese expansion" was such that in the 1960s the Portuguese army resorted to preferably recruit amongst them for the war against nationalist revolutionaries.⁸⁰⁶

2.7.4 Famine in Ovamboland and the Death of King Mandume, 1915–1917

Using hunger and famine as a weapon in (colonial) warfare had a long tradition in Africa and beyond. The Germans followed a scorched-earth policy in the Maji-Maji war in German East Africa. The Portuguese applied similar methods in their African colonies. In Ovamboland, however, the famine was older than the latest attempts at conquest, but the war aggravated the situation and the famine "undoubtedly facilitated Portuguese victory over the Kwanyama in 1915."⁸⁰⁷ And from as early as 1908, colonial administrators had tried to use hunger as a tool to lure young men of the region away to work in the colonial economy – with growing success. Southwest Africa's new administration was eager to continue this policy.

In August 1915, Southwest Africa's Military Governor, Percival Scott Beves, sent his Natives Affairs Officer, Major Stanley M. Pritchard (b. 1874) to Ovamboland "to get in touch with the native chiefs in order to notify them of the establishment of the [South African] Military Protectorate".⁸⁰⁸ By motorcar, Pritchard and his three officers first reached King Martin of Ondonga. In his residence they discussed the political changes

806 Eça 1921: 46: 'Vou terminar, como é de justiça, fazendo também o elogio do adversário, cuja bravura foi inexcédível. Atacar três dias seguidos um destacamento constituído por duas baterias de artilharia de campanha, quatro baterias de metralhadoras, dois batalhões de infantaria, estando estas forças em quadrado e aproximando-se delas com uma insistência que, no último combate, que durou dez horas, a uma distância que chegou a ser de cinquenta metros, revela um moral e uma instrução de tiro e de aproveitamento de abrigos que fariam honra às melhores tropas brancas.' Wheeler 1969: 432; cf. Frazão 1946: 266; Pélissier 1977: 495; 2004: 279.

807 Dias 1981: 375 referring to Pélissier; cf. Hayes 1992: 185f.; Hull 2005: 156.

808 *Journal of the Royal African Society* 15 no.60 (1916): 372: 'Dinners of the Society'.

and the sending of young men to work in the south. During Pritchard's sojourn in Ondonga, "messengers arrived with reports of serious fighting between the Ovakuanyama tribe of the Ovambo nation and the Portuguese." King Martin expressed his fear that the

"Portuguese would drive the Ovakuanyama far south into Ovamboland and that the whole country would be thrown into a state of turmoil . . . , the consequences of which would be disastrous as the people of Ondonga had not sufficient food for themselves, and certainly could not give any help in this respect to the Ovakuanyama".⁸⁰⁹

This concern was not unfounded since King Mandume, after the "disastrous" battle of Mongua, "sent word [to the missionaries] that his people were retiring, and he could give no guarantee as to what they might do. He had no more power over them."⁸¹⁰ Resistance came to an end "since the Kwanyama literally die[d] of hunger."⁸¹¹ Pritchard turned to the border in an "endeavor to mediate between the natives and Portuguese". According to Missionary Wulfhorst "Mandume desired the protection of the British Government and discussed the matter with me. At his request, [Wulfhorst] drew up a [German] letter, which was handed to Major Pritchard."⁸¹² Mandume, fleeing from N'giva, met with Pritchard (and Wulfhorst as interpreter) in Namakunde, in the neutral zone. The King, who "had great hope that the Germans . . . could render a helping hand against the Portuguese" understood that the Germans were gone for good. He thus asked "to place my country under [British] protection from the Portuguese". Safe passage was granted on the condition that Mandume, whom Pritchard "described as a perfect savage", would no longer fight against the Portuguese. On the occasion of this agreement a photograph of Mandume and Pritchard was taken.⁸¹³

809 NAN SWAA 1496, Report on tour of Ovamboland by Mj Pritchard, in *Gewald* 2003:218.

810 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 42, testimony Hochstrate, 26.4.26.

811 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 9.9.15.

812 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 19, testimony of missionary Wulfhorst, 3.5.26.

813 *Pritchard* 1916: 4; *Timm* 2001: 146; *Hayes/Haipinge* 1997: 79; *Hayes* 1992: 197f.; 1992 II: 91; the collection of pictures taken during Pritchard's tour is available under <http://hpratom.wits.ac.za/atom-2.1.0/index.php/report-by-major-s-m-pritchard>.



Ill. 29 “Chief Mandume and our party, from left Capt Liefeldt, Major Pritchard, Capt Bell and Lieut Moroney”, 1915

After the ‘signing’ ceremony, Mandume returned to Wulforth in Omupanda. He was aware that he had lost the larger part of his kingdom. “He was very sad. He cried.” That same night, September 2, the Portuguese forces advanced to nearby N’giva. Mandume “set his palace on fire. Everything got burned down including the food”. The Kwanyama were fleeing southwards and the Portuguese pushed to the border.⁸¹⁴ With the royal grain reserves burnt, hunger, chaos, and panic spread. The refugees were running for their lives.

How do colonial wars end? There was no formal capitulation of Mandume, merely the chance for his men and their families to escape southwards. South of the border, people were safe from Portuguese soldiers but not rescued from starvation. Missionaries reported about “a shocking

814 NAN A.505: 46, Chronik, 20.11.15; BAB R 1001/6634: 214, Welsch, 2.5.18; Hayes/H. 1997: 80; a signature by Mandume’s own hand is reproduced in: Keiling 1934: 176.

famine and terrible robbing and stealing”⁸¹⁵ A few days after Mandume’s defeat, King Iipumbo of Uukwambi, located to the south-west of Kwanyama territory appealed to the new masters of Southwest Africa:

“My country is under starvation, my people are dying of hunger, and I beg the Government for help. I, myself have got nothing. Through the war every road of buying food have been stopped, and I ask for some flour, rice, coffee and sugar.”⁸¹⁶

On September 11, after the cessation of hostilities, Pritchard visited de Eça’s headquarters at N’giva, where a “useful provisional agreement was entered into between him and the Portuguese Commandant with regard to the boundary line”.⁸¹⁷ Provisionally, the disputed 11-km border strip was to be considered neutral (the 17°23’10” south position was considered the interim “cut-line border”) and “administer[ed] ... jointly by a [Luso-South African] commission” at Namakunde. According to the line, 70% of the Oukwanyama lived on Portuguese territory. Following his escape to Namakunde, Mandume resettled south of the line at Oihole, from where he “uprooted” *lenga* Ndjukuma ya Shilengifa, with whom he shared a conflicting relationship since he became King in 1911.⁸¹⁸

The administrative advance of both colonial states did not change the underlying picture of starvation and turmoil. The only food available was what was found in the “bush”.⁸¹⁹ In September, General Smuts ordered relief programs, but they could do little to rescue the situation. The South African soldiers were depleting their own food stocks. The next rainy season due starting in November again failed. The harvest in 1915 was “completely nil” in the area between Humbe to Gambos and Kwanyama.⁸²⁰ In December 1915 Finnish missionary Marti Rautanen, in Ovamboland since 1870, described an utterly desperate situation:

“The present famine is simply indescribable, as far back as August ... one saw living skeletons from other tribes wandering down to Ondonga. A great number of such men, women and children died in the forests, being unable to

815 A. Wulforst: *Erlebnisse 1910-30 (AVEM)*, transl. in *Hayes* 1992: 199; *Walter* 2014: 82.

816 NAN ADM 17, Iipumbo to Government of Damaraland, 26.8.15, cit. in *Gewald* 2003: 218. ‘This letter was written for Iipumbo by the Norwegian trader and hunter Brodtkorb.’

817 *Pritchard* 1916: 4f.; AHU MU DGC Angola 1915-18, Pt 5, 5^a Rep, Cx.973, Telegr. GG to Ministro Colónias, 13.9.15.

818 *Jour.RAS* 15 n.59 (1916): 284; NAN A.450 Map 1915; *Vigne* 1998: 296; *Akweenda* 1997: 222; *Shiweda* 2011: 25; 31.

819 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 27.7.15 ‘nourriture indigène’.

820 AGCSSp 3L1.12a7, Bonnefoux (Huila) to Direction Generale de la S.-Enfance, 3.12.15.

reach Ondonga. Those who still had some strength left robbed the weaker of what little they had and left them lying to die of hunger and thirst. Mothers with their sucking babes were found lying dead together; in other cases the mothers threw their living babies into the bush, being unable to carry them further. In other cases children a little older, after their parents had died on the road, wandered on alone to Ondonga. Of these children of misfortune I adopted more than 30 but in spite of attention several have died. Thousands of such unfortunates have come to Ondonga and distributed themselves more over the whole tribe. The first refuges were naturally the mission stations and hundreds of people beleaguered our houses begging for food ... Thousands of people have died so that it has become a problem how to get them buried, the more so as the people are too weak to dig graves in the hard ground.”⁸²¹

Given the “unprecedented famine”, Pritchard “urged that relief measures should be undertaken to prevent the natives in some areas from being completely wiped out by starvation.” During a second trip in November 1915, he again negotiated with Martin and Mandume about sending migrant laborers to the mines and farms in the south. He brought with him officers to administer Ovamboland: the new Resident Commissioner Major Charles Manning, Captain Octavus Bowker, and Lieutenant Carl Hugo L. Hahn (1886–1948), called “Cocky” by his friends and *shangolo* (the whip) by Ovambo, the future longtime Resident Commissioner of the norther regions of SWA (1921–1946). Pritchard thereby advanced the South African occupation of Southwest Africa in its entirety. Pritchard, who mentioned the “complete obedience” of Africans to South African orders, also transported the first batch of relief supplies.⁸²² In a telegram from Namakunde to Windhoek he warned: “Considerable numbers of dead bodies seen along the road and natives dying here daily also at other centres. Instances occurring in which natives resorting to consumption human flesh.”⁸²³

The missionaries in the area credited themselves with having protected many Africans in their mission stations during the campaign and the

821 NAN RCO 9, Rprt. Rautanen, 26.12.15, quot. *Gewald* 2003: 219; cf. *Miettinen* 2005:73.

822 *Pritchard* 1916: 1f.; 5 ‘The pictures he showed of famine stricken natives were truly appalling.’ Thirteen pictures were used by Pritchard during a talk he gave to the *African Society* on May 11, 1916, among them one described as ‘Famine stricken natives wait for food’. These ‘photographs of the German South-West Africa Campaign, 1915’ are now held by *Cambridge University Library*. *Royal Commonwealth Society Library* (Ref. GBR/0115/Y3057A) [<http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR%2F0115%2FY3057A;sib0=637;9.10.2014>]; on Hahn *Dobler* 2014: 22-25; *Hayes* 1996.

823 NAN ADM 18, telegram Pritchard to Administrator, 27.11.15, cit. in *Gewald* 2003: 220.

famine.⁸²⁴ Father Devis estimated that “4,000 blacks” had been saved in 1914/15.⁸²⁵ The stations were “flooded by those dying of hunger”; and the missionaries were not always able to find the necessary food.⁸²⁶ Prefect Keiling estimated in March 1916 that a third of the population in southern Angola had died due to the famine.⁸²⁷ Father Bonnefoux reported that in certain regions more than 80% had died, while others had migrated elsewhere. The population of the Mission District Cunene, in 1914 estimated at 200,000, had shrunk to 120,000 in 1916; most of all, the children had succumbed to starvation and dysentery. Even in 1916, skeletons and hyenas abounded along the roads.⁸²⁸ The Portuguese authorities calculated that 154,412 people had died in the district of Huíla due to the “German invasion in southern Angola and the ensuing native rebellion”, i.e. the famine.⁸²⁹ Southern Angola and Northern SWA had been turned into a “great cemetery”. Modern research speaks of “the death of around a quarter of a million people from starvation between 1911 and 1916” in the region.⁸³⁰

The famine of 1915 was called “the famine that swept” – *Ondjala yawekomba*. It “is one of the most fundamental events in twentieth century Namibian history.” Due to famine and colonial conquest the traditional economy based on agriculture, cattle, and trade collapsed, resulting in utter violence and a “suspension of a functioning social order”.⁸³¹ Sustainable living conditions were only to be found elsewhere. After the defeat, many of the surviving Kwanyama voted with their feet and moved southwards into the South African part of Ovamboland. The situation was com-

824 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Eminence Reverendissime, 9.9.16; Hayes 1992: 203.

825 AGCSSp 3L1.11a1, Devis, Sur la mission du Cuanhama, pour son retablisement [8/1920].

826 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 26.11.15, ‘inondé par les affamés’.

827 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 9.3.16; cf. *Mittelberger* 1956.

828 AGCSSp 3L1.12a7, Bonnefoux (Huíla) to Direction Gen. de la S.-Enfance, 12.9.16; 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux to TRP, 20.8.16; BAB R 1001/6634: 216, Welsch to Gouv Seitz, 2.5.18.

829 BAB R 1001/6634: 39, excerpt of Dossier 10, no.1 Mémoire justificatif, ~ 3/1922.

830 *Dias* 1981: 375; *Pélessier* 2004: 279; 272 deems this ‘exaggerated’; *Wallace* 2012: 207.

831 *Gewald* 2003: 213; 238; *Hayes* 1992: 199-207 (201); cf. e.g. *Ndeikwila* 2014: 2 ‘My grandfather, Ndeikwila, was killed by his close relatives [Aiyambo and Nailenge] ... during the famine of 1915. Armed with a rifle, they came early in the morning to his homestead ... As my grandfather was coming out of his sleeping hut, Aiyambo fired a shot ... [my grandfather] died instantly. The two brothers had assumed that there were *mahangu* grains in his granaries, which they did not find. They raided the homestead, taking everything of value they could lay their hands on.’

parable to Mozambique, were peasants “expressed their discontent by migrating in the illusory search for a more benign form of colonialism.” The existence of a related ethnic group facilitated the migration.⁸³² From April 1915, missionaries reported on the migration, since people had to look for new pastures for their herds.⁸³³ But in search of survival and work thousands moved further south. Considering that people perished on the road, the South African administration began in late 1915 to “set up feeding and holding camps along the route from the north.” In need of workers for the farms and mines, officials concentrated the majority of Ovambo famine victims who managed to reach the center of Southwest Africa in the town of Karibib. A camp was set up for over 4,000 inmates to recuperate (some famine victims were given horse fodder) before the men, women and children were sent to their employers. The horrifying conditions in this camp have been amply described by historian Jan-B. Gewald.⁸³⁴

The Ovambo migrant labor system had its early start in the 1890s. It had brought (due to famines and the discovery of diamonds near Lüderitzbucht) soon after 1910 around 10,000 Ovambo per annum to GSWA and developed after the First World War into the economic backbone of Ovamboland.⁸³⁵ The working conditions in the mines and elsewhere were often horrendous. Ovambo knew well that “entering into migrant labor was a process that approached death.”⁸³⁶ The South African administration, despite describing the workforce as “idle”, could not run the economy of the mandated territory without contract labor.⁸³⁷ Thousands of young men worked annually in the farming and mining sectors of Southwest Africa from where they returned after six months for the harvest. The effects on the social life and the cultural changes were drastic. Older institutions such as matrilineal kinship, polygamy, and kingship lost in importance. Permanent occupation “of the whole area in 1915 was followed by a general increase in conversions” to Christianity. The Portuguese government had made it clear to the Spiritans already in 1914 that it wished to see a mission station erected “in the heart of Kwanyama after the expedition”.⁸³⁸ In the first fifteen years (1900–1915) the Spiritan mission station

832 *Isaacman/Isaacman* 1977: 50f. referring to 50,000 peasants escaping to S. Rhodesia.

833 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Tyipelongo) to TRP, 4.4.15.

834 *Gewald* 2003: 224; 236.

835 Cf. *Clarence-Smith/Moorsom* 1975: 372-7; *Shiweda* 2011: 105-114; *Dobler* 2014: 11-18.

836 *Gewald* 2003: 233 ref. to the return home of a laborer: ‘I see that you are alive once again’.

837 *Cooper* 1999: 130 (Report of the Administrator 1922: 21); *Humboldt* 2000: 143f.

838 *Clarence-S./M.* 1975: 380; AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 10.11.14.

Evale, for example, had baptized only 380 individuals and counted merely 76 Catholic families. Often, the converts were freed slaves and used by the missionaries “in their attempts to socially engineer Christian communities.”⁸³⁹

The war-related social disruptions, famine, and diseases played an important role as a catalyst to the rapid expansion of Christianity since 1916. “The new religion was felt to have proved itself the more effective.”⁸⁴⁰ Prefect Keiling spoke of indescribable scenes after the “last grain of rice and corn” had been distributed. Many of the baptisms in 1915/16 were executed *in extremis* due to the famine.⁸⁴¹ He remarked, with a sense of black humor: “The famine has its good sides too.” This belief that Africans “needed catastrophe to bring them to their senses” was not uncommon. Also missionaries in the Eastern Cape made a strong “association between catastrophe and conversion” after the Xhosa cattle killing in 1856/57.⁸⁴²

The “famine broke the Ovambo kingdoms.” Also the direct effect of the fighting on the societies and politics in the region was disastrous. Following the loss of most of his men, King Mandume found it harder to mobilize resistance. South African officials were able to enter Ovamboland peaceably in 1915. However, despite the occupation, unrest remained a challenge to colonial rule. Missionary Welsch complained about the “lack of any authority”.⁸⁴³

Few weeks after the battle of Mongua missionaries feared that a new “rebellion” may erupt. Mandume, from his new *embala* in Oihole in the neutral zone continued “to wage war against the Portuguese in the north” and then withdrew south.⁸⁴⁴ Recognizing the tactical advantage the border offered to him, he was neither willing to renounce his kingship over his subjects in Angola, nor send more men to work. Instead, “Mandumes’ incursions [into Angola] continued”. The Portuguese demanded his extradition. But the King also “increasingly defied the terms of South African

839 Maxwell 2013: 79; cf. AGCSSp 3L1.11a1, Keiling, Situation Evalé, n.D. [January 1916]: 2.

840 Ranger 1969: 316; cf. Hayes/Haiping 1997: 95 Kaulinge: ‘so many people were converted’; Gordon 2006: 125 today, Namibia ‘is statistically the most Christian country in Africa and the heavily populated north has the highest density of Lutherans in the world.’

841 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Eminence Reverendissime, 9.9.16; Compte-rendu annuel, 1916; 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huila) to TRP, 5.10.15 on baptism of ‘moribund’ individuals.

842 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Humabo) to TRP, 10.9.16 ‘a son bien aussi’; Price 2008: 136.

843 Gewald 2003: 238; BAB R 1001/6634: 217, Welsch to Seitz, 2.5.18; cf. Rizzo 2012: 77.

844 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huila) to TRP, 5.10.15; Vigne 1998: 294.



Ill. 30 King Mandume and Lieutenant “Cocky” Hahn at Oihole, 1916

‘protection’”. Officers visited him to bring him to reason. Yet, in October 1916 (missionary Bonnefoux had just reported that all was “calm, even among the Kwanyama”⁸⁴⁵), a Portuguese patrol was ambushed by Mandume’s men, killing one officer and 16 privates. General Botha was so upset that he told Mandume to explain his conduct in Windhoek. He received the response that Kwanyama law prohibited the King from leaving his territory. Mandume had his “own proud view of his actions – ‘My heart tells me I have done nothing wrong’.” In early 1917, open conflict between Mandume and South Africa’s recently appointed Resident Commissioner Manning erupted and the King uttered his famous warning: “If the English want me, I am here [in Oihole] ... I am a man, not a woman and I will fight until my last bullet is expended.”⁸⁴⁶

Refusing joint operations with the Portuguese, who “thirst[ed] for his blood”, the South African administration deemed it sufficient to send in 700 soldiers under Colonel de Jager against Ovamboland’s once most

845 AHD 3p ar.7 m48, GG to MinCol, 21.2.16; AGCSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux, 13.9.16.

powerful ruler. Over the previous year, Manning and “Cocky” Hahn had collected enough intelligence on the King to make feasible an open attack on him. King Mandume, who “embodied the ethnic nationalism of [his] dependents“, was killed in action on February 6, 1917 near his *embala* in Oihole. “It is widely alleged that [Ndjukuma, whom the King had displaced from from Oihole to Omhedi,] collaborated with the South African troops to dispose of Mandume.” Portugal’s most important enemy in Angola was dead. But other “rebellions” followed suit in the north and the east. The Seles and Amboim rose in 1917, and in 1919 the Portuguese led an expedition against the Dembos. Others would follow. After around 350 years of constant military campaign somewhere in the colony the “era before the complete military control and conquest of the present area of Angola” ended only in 1926.⁸⁴⁷

The narration and “interpretation” of the death of King Mandume is a striking example of the difference between “official” (paper-based) and “public” memory: “Colonial officials believed that his death in battle was as a result of machine gun fire. But the belief that spread on the ground at the time and which has continued to persist in oral history is that Mandume, after being wounded, committed suicide before he could be killed or taken by the enemy.” By doing what he had announced to his followers before, he upheld honor at his death. Reverend Vilho Kaulinge (1900–1992), a relative of the King and one of his officers in 1917, stated in 1989 that the South Africans cut the King’s head off and “they showed us his head” in Ondangwa.⁸⁴⁸ “This suicide in oral history is the most socially

846 *Silvester/Wallace/Hayes* 1998: 9; *Pélissier* 2004: 279; *Hayes* 1992: 214; *Silvester* 1992:24.

847 *Vigne* 1998: 294; *Coquery-Vidrovitch* 1988: 66; *Shiweda* 2011: 25; *Pélissier* 1977: 509; *Hayes* 1992: 234.

848 *Hayes* 1993: 91; 111, ref. to: AGCSSp 476-A-IV, Situation des missions 1911-30: 205; NAN RCO 10/1916/1 v 1, Jan Vennel statement, 8.9.1916; RC Ovamboland to Secretary SWA, 3.7.16; RC Ovamboland to Deputy Secretary SWA, 14.5.16; RC Ovamboland, notes for discussion with Mj Fairlie, 6.5.16; *Hayes/Haipinge* 1997: 86-92;75; cf. *Timm* 2001: 145f; *Wallace* 2012: 209; *Shiweda* 2005: 48; NAN A.306 no. 5: 22, Expedition 1917; no. 6: 24 Report of meeting 14.2.17 Col M. de Jager; no.19: 80 photograph ‘Chief Mandume killed Ovamboland 1917’ which suggests that Mandume was beheaded (*Ndongo* 1998: 290 writes that ‘Mandume and some of his warriors were shot dead.’). The Resident Commissioner Ovamboland Manning (1877–1944) stated that the King was buried according to Kuanyama rites, but according to oral history his head was buried in Windhoek.

healing explanation for his death, which could hold together a conquered, divided and kingless Kwanyama nation facing colonial rule.”⁸⁴⁹

Tragically, the reign of King Mandume, which aimed at achieving “order out of chaos” and replacing the instability and hunger of the reigns of Namhadi, Weyulu, and Nande with “peace and plenty”, ended in anarchy and starvation. In 1917, Kwanyama Kingship was abolished.⁸⁵⁰ The long-term impact of the war in Ovamboland was similar to other areas in Africa affected by the World War: social destabilization, closer colonial control, the definitive end of “primary resistance”, in short: the “consolidation” of the colonial state – that once more earned its name “crusher of rocks”.⁸⁵¹



Ill. 31 “Chief Mandume killed Ovamboland 1917”

849 Hayes 1993:108 ‘Such explanations... are frequently the reaction to loss of power’; 1992: 236; Nathanael 2002: 1.

850 Hayes 1993: 110 quot. Kaul.; cf. Estermann 1976: 52; 180; Kreike 2004; Shiweda 2011: 25.

851 Young, 1994: 134; Michel 2004: 927 ‘l’avènement réel de l’État’; Nasson 2014: 433.

2.7.5 Inverted Chronology – POWs, Seizures, and the Declaration of War

African prisoners of war in European hands were an exception to the custom according to which African adversaries after a battle were either slain or left to escape. As mentioned before, “savages” were not considered to be entitled to the legal “privilege” of prisoner-of-war status reserved for European soldiers.⁸⁵² After the Naulila incident, the Portuguese arrested the two “Police Servants” August and Andreas from GSWA, who were part of Schultze-Jena’s group, but apparently they were not heavily guarded since they managed to escape soon. This was also the situation after the battle of Naulila. Major Trainer reported later that Portuguese “native soldiers” were not among the prisoners since they had “managed to escape”.⁸⁵³ It was not reported that the Portuguese took any prisoner during or after the battle of Mongua.

European soldiers, however, were taken prisoner. 37 (or 66 as Germans divergently claimed) Portuguese soldiers, among them three officers, were taken to GSWA. The treatment especially of the officers became a contested issue after the war. While the Portuguese emphasized the dishonorable treatment on the hands of the Germans, the latter pointed to the customary ‘hardship’ of war and the dishonorable behavior of the Portuguese. Captain Aragão had allegedly gone to his knees to beg for his life.⁸⁵⁴ In January 1915, the Portuguese were joined by two comrades who had been taken prisoner by the Kwanyama during the raid on Fort Kafima and were handed over to the Germans.⁸⁵⁵ As mentioned, a third soldier was allegedly killed for having refused to teach Mandume’s men how to use the artillery captured from the Portuguese. All Portuguese soldiers were released after the surrender of GSWA in July 1915 and received a “heroes’ welcome”. It was reported that masses marched through Luanda and Lourenço Marques to celebrate the victory over the *Schutztruppe* “as if it were a triumph of the Portuguese”.⁸⁵⁶ This way, prisoners (of war) were taken and released even before a state of war was declared between the two states.

852 The ‘exception’ is enslavement – an anachronistic practice no longer applied in WWI.

853 BAB R 1001/6634: 59–61, Major ret. Trainer to RMW, 17.03.22.

854 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, MNE to Min Col., 2.6.15; BAB R 1001/6634: 146, Report Baericke (16.11.19), Ax 9 M All., 23.5.22 photo of POW in GSWA in rpt; *Casimiro* 1922: 212f.

855 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 20.2.15.

856 AHM/Div/2/2/31/2, POW Naulila, 1915; *DOAZ*, Jg.17, no.90, 5.11.1915: 2 ‘Bothas Sieg’.

German soldiers and civilians were also arrested following the Naulila incident, the battle of Naulila and afterwards. On October 27, 1914 private Georg Kimmel and the farmer Jensen were transferred to Fort Cuamato, where they were interrogated by the *Capitão Mor*.⁸⁵⁷ Interrogations continued in Lubango by Lt.-Colonel Roçadas about the size and strategy of the *Schutztruppe* and the incident.⁸⁵⁸ Following the Naulila incident, Governor General Norton de Matos wanted to avoid confrontation between Portuguese and German citizens in Angola. To that end he asked Consul Eisenlohr to order all Germans living in the interior of Angola without proper employment and residence to return to Luanda or to Europe.⁸⁵⁹ To avoid further rumors about German machinations in the hinterland,⁸⁶⁰ Eisenlohr also urged the ethnologist Dr. Schachzabel, trader Busch and engineer Kéry to return to Luanda.⁸⁶¹ However, Schachzabel had already been brought to the fort of Benguela with three other Germans. Here they were joined by Fritz Schwarzer and Otto Busch, who were arrested in Canda. The head of the Study Commission Schubert was accused to be a spy too and was taken to Luanda; Pieter J. van der Kellen faced similar charges.⁸⁶² On November 19, the state of emergency was declared for the entire Province of Angola; all Germans were to be taken aboard ships and concentrated in Luanda. Altogether 143 Germans were deported to the Azores Islands. Busch was handed over to the British before the ship entered the harbor of Lisbon.⁸⁶³

Max Baericke, caught before the battle of Naulila, was, following his interrogation, also taken to Luanda and met Jensen and Kimmel. Their le-

857 BAB R 1001/6634: 134f., Baericke, Kimmel, Jensen to DGL, 30.04.15, Ax 8 M All, 23.5.22. Jensen was told Sereno was ignored by his co-officers and had to take dinner alone.

858 BAB R 1001/6634: 104f.; 121 Reports of Jensen, Ax4; 6 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; cf. AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 67, Relatório pedido pelo Capitão-Mor de Cuamato, 22.10.14.

859 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Chefe de Gabinete to German Consul Luanda, 11.11.14; Vageler estimated in 1914 that there were around 30 'Angola-Germans' BAB R 1001/6634: 149, Vageler to RMW (10.11.1921), Ax 10 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; p.157; 154, Vageler to KGW (~11/1914), Ax 11; BAB R 1001/6640: 95, Dr. Vageler, excerpt: 'Die Bahnfrage auf dem Planalto', 15.7.1919.

860 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda to DGL, 16.11.14.

861 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Cnsl. Luanda to VK Benguela, 15.11.14; Santos 1978: 174.

862 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) VK Benguela to German Consul Luanda, 25.11.; 1.12.14; NAN A.529 n.2: 51, Busch: Erlebnisse...in Angola, August–24.12.14; Baericke 1981: 32.

863 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda to DGL, 25.11.14; NAN A.529 n. 2: 58, O. Busch: Erlebnisse...in Angola, Anfang August–24.12.14 [n.d.]; Stassen 2011: 82.

gal status as “criminals” or “quasi” prisoners of war caused the Portuguese administration much consternation. The three (it was never accepted that the Danish national Jensen was a farmer) remained imprisoned in the medieval Fort São Miguel when their compatriots were deported to the Azores. Stating “[we] cannot complain about treatment and food”, they tried in April 1915 to contact the German envoy in Lisbon to obtain their release; but to no avail.⁸⁶⁴

Over the course of 1915, Luso-German relations deteriorated further. Neither the Portuguese nor the British were in doubt about the reasons:

“In regard to [Foreign Minister] Senhor Soares’ observations respecting the breaches of neutrality committed by Portugal in virtue of her alliance with Great Britain which might involve her in war with Germany, Mr. Carnegie [the British Minister in Lisbon] was directed to state that His Majesty’s Government fully recognized these facts, but that if the Portuguese government themselves declared war on Germany it must be on their own responsibility and they must not say that they are obliged to do so in consequence of the Alliance.”⁸⁶⁵

Afonso Costa, upon becoming Prime Minister at the end of 1915 and still believing in the virtues of joining the Allies against Germany, searched eagerly for an opportunity to bring his country into the conflict. The allies’ shortage of naval material seemed to offer this opportunity. When Britain finally requested the Portuguese Government under the alliance to seize all German ships (around 80) in their ports, the requisition (despite the fact that there was formally no war between both states) “was done in such a way as to cause maximum offence to German sensibilities.” Following the seizure in February 1916, the German government lost patience.⁸⁶⁶ Calling the Portuguese “a vassal of England”, it declared war on Portugal on March 9, 1916; thereby rendering superfluous the tiptoeing of the Allies.⁸⁶⁷ In 1916, the Portuguese government handed over to the British at

864 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, GG to Min Colon, 8.3.16; BAB R 1001/6634: 134f., Baericke, Kimmel, Jensen to DGL, 30.04.15; *Baericke* 1981: 106.

865 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, BML to MNE, 27.10.15.

866 *Meneses* 2010: 48; *Stone* 1975: 732; SBRT, v. 307, 39.Sess., 5.4.16: 851 (Bethmann).

867 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, BML to MNE, 2.2.; 1.3.; MNE to DGL, 3.3.; DGL to MNE, 9.3.16. So dependent were the Portuguese on the British that before Germany declared war due to the seizure of ships the British Legation in Lisbon drafted for the Portuguese Foreign Ministry the justification for the seizure to be provided to the German Legation; cf. NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 700, USML to SoS, 13.3.16; *Wheeler* 1978: 128; *Wolff* 1984: 373 (# 347: 26.4.16).

least 25 German steamers and three sailing vessels.⁸⁶⁸ While Portugal's participation in the fighting "occurred, in many ways, against Great Britain's wishes", also among Portuguese politicians the participation remained disputed. But the majority of the Republican Party under Prime Minister Costa recognized the war as an opportunity to portray Portugal as a modern nation, consciously fighting on the side of 'civilization' against German 'militarism'. The national effort to win the war would, it was hoped, strengthen patriotic sentiment and alleviate the nation from any doubt by foreigners as to its ability to stay independent and to develop the Portuguese Empire.⁸⁶⁹

Being formally at war now, on April 20 the Portuguese government issued a decree on the status of enemy subjects, banishing all German subjects from mainland Portugal. Sequestration and liquidation of German property was ordered. German men between the age of 16 and 45 were to be "removed to whatever locality the government may see fit." Their wives and children were permitted to join them, provided they paid all expenses.⁸⁷⁰ Prefect Keiling reported from Angola that since the declaration of war, the "entire colony is in excitement". As one of seven Alsaciens among the Spiritans he was concerned that they would be interned too. Leaving no doubt about his allegiance to France and his believe in France's victory over the *boches*,⁸⁷¹ he turned to the French consul for assistance (which was granted). Several of the Portuguese patres were called to arms.⁸⁷² German property was seized and liquidated, trade with Germany was prohibited. After protesting, the German government responded with similar provisions towards Portuguese nationals and property as "reprisal".⁸⁷³

All Germans in Lisbon, on the Azores Islands, in Mozambique and Goa, Portuguese India, were incarcerated. Consul Wallenstein from the Azores (and his Portuguese wife) apparently took these security measures with a certain sense of humor, speaking to his American colleague about the "'gay prison' in which they all live ... the [Portuguese] authorities are

868 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 711, German vessels, n.D. [1916]; cf. *Gaurier* 2014: 715f.

869 *Meneses* 2010: 38-69; 77; *Wheeler* 1978: 129 Costa 'wished to reestablish the good name'.

870 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 157: 800, USML to SoS, 10.5.16; *Isay* 1923: 123.

871 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Humabo) to TRP, 20.12.16; 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 30.11.16 'Quand donc ces sales Boches cesseront-ils de torturer notre cher pays?'

872 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Humabo) to TRP, 26.3.; 10.5.; 10.9.16.

873 SBRT, v. 307, 60.S., 6.6.16: 1519; v. 308, 68.S., 27.10.16: 1838; cf. *Livermore* 1967: 325.

in every way considerate and civil to all”.⁸⁷⁴ US Consul Bardel, charged with the care of German interests after the declaration of war, reported about the 110 inmates of three “concentration camps” on the Azores: “they are resigned to their lot, do not complain, and, as I am told, are very well behaved.”⁸⁷⁵ The conditions worsened over the course of the war. German submarines operated in Portuguese waters. In December 1916, a U-boat sneaked into the harbor of Funchal, Madeira, sunk three French and British ships and bombarded the city; Ponta Delgada, Azores, was bombarded too.⁸⁷⁶ In Mozambique, Portuguese troops “suffered great reverses” against the invading troops of Lettow-Vorbeck.⁸⁷⁷ At the same time, deadly epidemics of typhoid fever broke out in the camps and chicanery by the Portuguese guards became more marked.⁸⁷⁸

The three Naulila-prisoners were still in Luanda. After 2½ years, during which they lived from German money transfers, they were sent to Lisbon in October 1917. Here they were put in solitary confinement in the Santarem prison. When in December 1917 another military coup in Lisbon brought the former Envoy to Berlin, Sidonio Pais, to power, he ordered the Germans to be transferred from the military prison to an internment camp for civilians on the Azores Islands, where the conditions were “very good”. It took both governments almost one year after the armistice to organize the departure of their respective prisoners: 7,740 Portuguese POW held by Germany found it excruciatingly difficult to obtain from Lisbon the necessary means to return home. In October 1919, the German government chartered a Woermann ship to return the 650 German inmates of the Azores Islands camps. They arrived in Hamburg on November 11, 1919.⁸⁷⁹

The war was over, but, as demanded already in late 1914 by Sidonio Pais, the Portuguese government was determined to recuperate from Germany all expenses not only for the prisoners of war, but also for all costs and damages caused by “German aggression” since 1914.

874 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 703, USC St. Michael to USML Lisbon, 16.5.16.

875 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 703, USC St. Michael to SoS, 23.5.16.

876 BAB R 3301/2284: 58, Marineleitung to RMW, 28.2.21 ‘German U-boats at Funchal’

877 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 711, USML to SoS, 6.12.; 17.12.16.

878 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 703, USML to MNE, 6.12.16; 5.1.17.

879 BAB R 1001/6634: 147, Baericke, 16.11.19; Baericke 1981: 101f.; *Rezendes* 2014: 146f.