

### XIII. Defining Europe's Global Interests

#### *I. Exploring the Seas of the World*

##### *(1) Navigating with Caution*

As far as the evolution of its global interests is concerned, the European Union acts like a modern version of Prince Henry the Navigator. Carefully, the Portuguese Prince was stumbling his way into the discovery of the world beyond the coasts of Europe. In 1418, the ships he had commissioned traveled for the first time from the coast of Portugal to Madeira. In 1427, they reached the Azores. In 1435, on Henry's behalf, the courageous captain Gil Eanes sailed round Cape Bojador – across the Canary Islands on the African coast – and reached the highly feared “Sea of Darkness.” By 1444, in the name of Henry the Navigator Portuguese ships reached the Capverdian Islands, Senegal and Gambia. By 1446, they reached Guinea. It was not until 1487 that Bartolomeu Diaz sailed around Cape of Good Hope. By then, Prince Henry the Navigator had already been dead for 27 years.

With the Treaty of Maastricht, in force since November 1, 1993, the European Union was created. Since then, the EU has been pursuing the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, Treaty of Maastricht, Title V). In the course of less than two decades, the ominous Second Pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht has grown into a wide spectrum of foreign, security and defense policies of the European Union. After the completion of its Economic and Monetary Union, the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy has become the main integration project for the EU. In the post-Cold War world, the global presence of Europe has become the main rationale for European integration. New security challenges and foreign policy opportunities occur out of area. They force the EU to either become a global player or remain a regional subject of world affairs. The EU had no choice but to overcome the limits of its self-perception as a civilian power. As a global player, the EU needs to contribute to global governance and world order in all aspects possible.<sup>1</sup> In the meantime, the global presence of Europe entails a wide array of instruments and is covering a broad ground from peace-keeping operations to development aid and democracy promotion. The EU's global presence is far from being comprehensive, robust and sufficient. But the EU has gone a long way from the days of the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht. Security is defined in broad terms, including military and civilian aspects. Politically, the most decisive move in the development of a European

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1 See Carlsnaes, Walter, et al. (eds.), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy*, London: Sage, 2004; Marsh, Steve, and Hans Mackenstein (eds.), *The International Relations of the European Union*, Edinburgh: Pearsons, 2005; Telò, Mario, *Europe: A Civilian Power?: European Union, Global Governance, World Order*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a major element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU was the Franco-British agreement of December 4, 1998, in St. Malo. Without France and Great Britain, the concept of a common security and defense policy of the EU would have remained a dead-born theory. The leading military powers among EU member states decided to develop a common and independent European defense capacity. Often, France and Great Britain differed on the usefulness of an independent European defense capacity. While France has always favored it, Great Britain emphasized the primacy of NATO. In St. Malo, the leaders of both countries struck a compromise. This was of central importance for all other EU member states. What France and Germany have been to the achievement of the euro, France and Great Britain are to the achievement of a common European army and defense structure: the pivotal European states.

The breakthrough of a European Security and Defense Policy under the overall framework of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU owes its relative speed to the deep frustration and anger across Europe over the four Wars of Yugoslavian Succession during the 1990's. The European Union was incapable to stop the first wars on European soil since the end of World War II. It neither had a legal mandate nor the military instruments, or the political will to prevent the Yugoslavian tragedy. The decisions in St. Malo were a step in the right direction. The ultimate breakthrough among EU member states followed the Kosovo war in the summer of 1999. Never before had failed crisis management of the European Union triggered such a speedy set of actions and a comprehensive policy approach: The office of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy had been legally established with the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on October 2, 1987, entered into force after ratification on May 1, 1999). Former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana took up this almost impossible job under the roof of the European Council in October 1999 (original budget 40 million euros). He began to exercise it with diplomatic skills, enormous commitment and steadily growing success. Gradually, military-political coordination and decision-making structures were established in Brussels. The Helsinki European Council of December 2000 decided the "2003 Headline Goals" according to which the EU was to initiate an operative military component of 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers for possible crisis management. A Capabilities Commitments Conference in November 2000 had registered the readiness of EU member states to provide up to 100,000 soldiers, 400 fighter planes and 100 marine ships for future military crisis management of the EU. This nucleus of an EU military unit should be staffed from existing armies, "without any major commitment to more soldiers or more equipment."<sup>2</sup> One exception was related to the lack of adequate transport planes, being one of the

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2 Reid, T.R., *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*, New York: Penguin Press, 2004: 182.

fundamental deficits of the EU: The EU agreed to produce a fleet of new troop transport aircraft, to be built by Airbus.<sup>3</sup>

Frictions between EU and NATO slowed down the ambition of a substantial EU commitment in military crisis management, no matter the elegant diplomatic rhetoric. In the end, arrangements between the EU and NATO in December 2002 on the use of common structures and capacities ended prolonged debates about the dangers of “duplication” and “decoupling.” The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, halted the initial effort of an integrative approach for a European Security and Defense Union. For the time being, the idea of a collective European defense union, including a European army, was put aside. Following an American request for burden sharing, and under the impression of the need of crisis management in an age of asymmetric warfare, Europe began to concentrate on a small and flexible structure for EU military out of area crisis management. In 2004, EU member states agreed on the establishment of a European Rapid Reaction Force of around 60,000 soldiers, structured in units of 1,500 soldiers in reinforced battalions (“Battlegroups”). These Battlegroups were ready for action in 2007. In a non-formal sense, joint military operations by British, Spanish, Italian and Polish troops in Iraq had been of an anticipatory nature. The EU Battlegroups were to combine peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. They would operate in harmony with the concept of a NATO Rapid Deployment Force being developed simultaneously. Whatever the ultimate fate of these Rapid Deployment Forces may be, with the development of a European Security and Defense Policy the EU was adding hard power to its global role. The European Union could not afford to simply remain a benevolent soft power. The complex nature of modern security concerns require a definition of security that entails military and civilian, environmental and developmental, policing and order-building aspects. The evolution of EU policies and instruments happened with laser-like speed compared with other integration projects. In light of the even faster transformation of global security challenges following the terrorist attacks of “9/11,” the incremental and cautious development of EU policy instruments in foreign, security and defense matters was still reminiscent of the gradual global outreach of Portuguese seafarers in the fifteenth century.

One of the interesting paradoxes of the evolution of a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU has been a surprising reversal of form and function. During the Wars of Yugoslavian Succession, then EC leaders were hiding behind the absence of legal instruments that would enable the European Community to take action. Less than two decades later, the European Union is advancing its foreign, security and defense instruments ahead of legal clarifications. The 2004 Constitutional Treaty proposed the establishment of a European Diplomatic Service (called European External Action Service) in support of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy who was to be renamed Foreign Minister. While the constitutional

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3 Ibid.

debate was still going on and the ratification crisis over the European Constitution escalated, the European External Actions Service was already beginning to take shape in Brussels. In the 2007 Reform Treaty, the future competences – by and large remaining of an intergovernmental nature - were outlined in detail (Title V, General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy).<sup>4</sup> However, the prestigious title of an EU Foreign Minister was scrapped – much to the regret of those who wished for a stronger EU profile in global affairs. The proposed future title High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was even clumsier than that of its predecessor. The High Representative was also to become Vice-President of the European Commission, thus replacing the Commissioner for External Affairs. This connection of the two posts dealing with external affairs was considered as a sign of strengthened authority of the EU in foreign and security affairs. Notwithstanding the fate of the Treaty of Lisbon, the expansion of the European External Action Service is already taking place. The multilevel mechanism of EU governance will continuously influence, shape and Europeanize foreign and security affairs. Reality is ahead of treaty provisions.

The same anticipatory development occurred with regard to the first military and policing operations under the banner of the EU (that is to say as intergovernmental, cooperative actions coordinated by the Council Secretariat). Even before proper military structures were organized, the European Union initiated its first out of area peace-keeping actions. An EU-led civilian police mission in Sarajevo with 500 police officers from 30 countries in January 2003 was followed by “Operation Concordia” in Macedonia. Between March and December 2003, the EU led a civilian police operation of 300 men from 27 countries to implement the EU brokered peace-plan for Macedonia. In 2004, this mission was followed by the civilian police mission “Proxima,” unfortunately lacking a robust mandate to implement the peace accord by fighting corruption and organized crime in Macedonia. In 2003, for the first time the European Union operated as peace-keeper in Africa. “Operation Artemis” in the north-eastern Congolese region of Bunia was aimed at providing security and order as precondition for improving the humanitarian situation in Bunia. “Operation Artemis” “provided the operational template”<sup>5</sup> for EU’s future Battlegroups. It came to a successful end in September 2003. In December 2004, “EUFOR” (European Union Force) with 7000 soldiers under EU command replaced NATO’s Stabilization Force SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This operation, code-named “Althea,” was the biggest military mission of

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4 European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,” *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 306/Vol.50, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML>, 23-38.

5 Lindstrom, Gustav, *Enter the EU Battlegroups*, Chaillot Paper No. 97, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007: 9.

the European Union yet. The stabilization of the Western Balkans remained the first priority for the EU, but it could no longer avoid operations with a global reach.<sup>6</sup>

Other operations followed, including the EU support to the Palestinian Civil Police (EUPOL COPPS), the Aceh Monitoring Mission in 2005, monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement on the Indonesian island, the monitoring of elections in Kongo in 2006 under a UN mandate, and the training of judges, investigating magistrates and senior policy officers in Iraq since 2005 (EUJUST Lex). The most spectacular mission in terms of world politics so far came about with the EU presence at the border post between the Gaza Strip and Egypt in Rafah, which started in November 2005 (European Border Assistance Mission, EU BAM). After Israel and the Palestinian National Authority had agreed to reopen the Rafah crossing, the EU was asked to provide border assistance. After a decision in the EU General Affairs Council on November 21, 2005, it took only until November 25, 2005, for the first European police officers to appear at Rafah. The mission was immediately staffed with 77 police officers. Soon, the original mandate was prolonged until at least 2008, but its execution remained subject to the overall situation in the unruly Gaza Strip. Following the war between Israel and Hezbollah forces in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, the European Union stepped up its engagement in the Middle East: More than 6,000 soldiers were stationed in Southern Lebanon and in the waters between Lebanon and Israel. Although the soldiers were of individual national backgrounds, the whole operation was considered to be the biggest military involvement yet of the European Union in search for a lasting and stable peace in the Middle East.

The Treaty of Lisbon was to dissolve the three pillar structure of the EU but kept the European Union's foreign and security policy on the basis of intergovernmental consent. As far as military capabilities are concerned, the EU can only get active if individual member states explicitly contribute to its capacities. In spite of the establishment of a coherent set of institutions in Brussels – namely the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, the Military Staff and the EU Operations Center – the European Security and Defense Policy had not yet become a proper supranational operation. Like its overarching framework – the Common Foreign and Security Policy – the European Union's global projection remains dependent upon decisions of the European Council. Only in matters of external trade and, partially, in matters of development policy can the European Commission represent Europe directly. This confusing gap of cohesion may slightly be bridged with the creation of a double-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who will simultaneously serve as Vice-President of the European Commission. Eventually, its real relevance will not be a matter of treaty provisions but of personal authority.

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6 See Tocci, Nathalie, *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007; O'Brennan, John, *The EU and the Western Balkans: Stabilization and Europeanization Through Enlargement*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.

Progress cannot be denied. Any European military or policing presence would have been unimaginable only a few years earlier. Now, even Israel wants the EU to get involved in the Middle East with more soldiers and a more robust mandate. By all accounts, the new trends in the Middle East were the most dramatic turn in the global recognition of the European Union as an honest mediator and peace broker. Since 2003 the EU is participating in the Middle East Quartet that had outlined a Road Map to a viable peace based on a two-state solution. Only now, with a stronger military and policing profile, has the claim of the European Union to serve as an honest and impartial broker of peace in the longest standing and most tragic conflict on earth gained momentum.

The police mission of the EU in Afghanistan (as of June 2007 the fifteenth EU mission under the European Security and Defense Policy) and the civilian mission monitoring the independence of Kosovo after the province's formal independence on February 17, 2008 have been logical continuations of a trend that had started with extreme caution and hesitance: During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the European Union has advanced its global ambition by a gradual and creeping approximation to this challenge comparable to the approach of the Portuguese seafarers sent to discover the oceans of the world by Prince Henry the Navigator almost six centuries earlier.<sup>7</sup> While the United States of America has been familiar with geostrategic and global thinking at least since the late nineteenth century, the European Union was incrementally forced by new geopolitical and geo-economic realities to follow a similar direction in the early twenty-first century.<sup>8</sup> The EU is increasingly contributing to global governance.<sup>9</sup> This has also become evident in the field of climate policy. The European Union wants to be understood as a "world player".<sup>10</sup> However, EU citizens remain ambivalent about the role their political actors should play. While 70 percent of Europeans want to see the EU as a world power like the United States, only 44 percent support additional defense spending if that should be the unavoidable consequence of their claim to global involvement.<sup>11</sup>

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7 See Geographica Slovenica (ed.), *Political Geography in the twenty-first Century: Understanding the Place, Looking Ahead*, Ljubljana: Institute of Geography, 2001.

8 See Brimmer, Esther (ed.), *The EU's Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002; Rühl, Lothar, *ESDP and Intervention Strategies in Reaction to US and NATO*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 137. Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2004.

9 See Ortega, Martin, *Building the Future: The EU's Contribution to Global Governance*, Chaillot Paper No. 100, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007.

10 See European Union. European Commission, *A World Player: The European Union's External Relations*, 2004, <http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/47/en.pdf>.

11 See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, "Europäer wollen Weltmacht sein," September 7, 2005.

## (2) *The EU Security Strategy*

Beyond immediate crisis management, the EU tried to stabilize its global outreach by way of creating intermediary structures between its own sphere and its hemisphere: Membership of the European Commission in the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Barents Euro-Artic Council or the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization are some examples of how of the EU bridged Europe's surrounding shores. Build on these experiences and realizing the limits of possible enlargements in its vicinity, the EU began to develop a more or less cohesive Neighborhood Policy. Before the underlying concept of this projection as regional power had been concluded, the EU was already beyond the immediate discovery of geography and had entered the world of geopolitics. In December 2003, for the first time in its history, the European Union published a comprehensive Security Strategy.<sup>12</sup> Considered as a European response to the National Security Strategy of the US of September 2002 – which was controversial in Europe primarily because of its justification of “pre-emptive strikes” against states posing a fundamental threat to the security of the US<sup>13</sup> – it was a remarkable document nonetheless given the EU's traditional reluctance to go global and claim to be a strategic power.<sup>14</sup>

The emerging global outreach of the EU's strategic horizon took place in the shadow of the United States. It was largely driven by the new geopolitical approach of the US in its “War on Terror,” pronounced by the Bush Administration in the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The EU document could not hide lingering disputes among EU member states on fundamental threat perceptions, and moreover on subsequent policy conclusions. National and ideational attitudes had to be brought to consensus. The EU Security Strategy was a genuine contribution to reconcile the US and the EU conceptually and in terms of their respective threat perceptions after the strong and painful disputes over the war in Iraq.

Under the title “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” the EU Security Strategy analyzed the main threat scenarios for Europe in the early twenty-first century and reflected on the strategic imperatives Europe saw itself confronted with:<sup>15</sup>

- Also in the twenty-first century, Europe remains confronted with security threats and challenges. A European Union with twenty-seven member states, 491 million citizens and a share of 25 percent of the global gross domestic product

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12 European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003

13 U.S. National Security Strategy: *A Balance of Power that Favours Freedom*, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4rice.htm>.

14 On the immediate reactions to the EU's Security Strategy see Everts, Steven, “Two Cheers for the EU's New Security Strategy,” *International Herald Tribune*, December 9, 2003; for a deeper analysis see Reiter, Erich, “Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 3-4 (2004): 26-31; Biscop, Sven, and Jan Joel Andersson (eds.), *The EU and the European Security Strategy*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.

15 European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, op.cit: 5-9.

inevitably has to act as global player.

- Recent developments in international affairs have raised the awareness that non-state actors and new security risks can threaten the stability of Europe. Terrorists with religious extremism as their ideology and the readiness to use violence have chosen Europe both as their target and their base. The dependency of Europe and thus Europe's vulnerability have increased with the latest developments of globalization.
- Security is a precondition for development. Between 1990 and 2003, four million people have died in warfare. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East, and progress in the bio-sciences, which can lead to a dangerous use of chemical and radiological material, expose Europe to growing risks. But likewise, hunger and malnutrition, AIDS, the impoverishment of sub-Saharan Africa, the competition for natural resources – with consequences for global warming – and the energy dependency of Europe, are dangerous trends.
- State failure, bad governance and the collapse of states are alarming phenomena that undermine the goal of global governance and increase regional instability.

In light of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the European Union declared its readiness to confront the new global challenges and presented its relevant achievements:<sup>16</sup>

- The EU has contributed to the global fight against terrorism with the introduction of a European Arrest Warrant and other measures to stop financial transfers to terrorist groups.
- The EU supports the policy of preventing proliferation of atomic weapons and demands universal recognition of multilateral measures and treaties in support of this goal.
- The EU supports the end of regional conflicts and wants to contribute to the rehabilitation of failed states. This includes the EU's efforts to reintroduce good governance in all countries of Southeast Europe.
- The EU is pursuing a policy of enhanced security in its neighborhood. Integration of further European states into the EU – in particular in Southeast Europe – will enhance security and stability in the EU's vicinity.
- The EU supports a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is considered to be a strategic priority of the EU. The EU remains committed to a peaceful solution based on two states and declares its readiness to provide resources until the conflict is resolved.
- The EU considers the Mediterranean as a region which requires increased and effective cooperation in economic, security and political terms. The EU also

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16 Ibid.: 10-13.



underlines its desire to increase its engagement with the Arab world.

On the basis of these principles and experiences, the EU's support for an effective multilateral order is considered a high priority as the adequate global frame to resolve the new strategic challenges:<sup>17</sup>

- The EU declares its commitment to the preservation and development of international law. Strengthening the role of the United Nations is a priority for the EU. However, international organizations, regimes and treaties have to comply with international norms, and international organizations have to be ready to act whenever international norms are breached.
- Transatlantic relations remain one of the core elements of the international system. Strengthening them is not only in the bilateral interest of the EU and the US, but according to the EU it will strengthen the international system in general. The EU will continue to support the development of regional cooperation and integration schemes. ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union are explicitly mentioned.
- The quality of the international system depends on the quality of the governments that form this system. Therefore it remains essential to continue the EU's policy of improving governance elsewhere through means of support and cooperation, but limited by conditionality in the EU's relations with external partners, and targeted trade measures. Countries that prefer to opt out of the orbit of international norms must realize that they will have to pay a price for this norm-breaking behavior.

As far as policy challenges for the EU are concerned, the European Union drew the following conclusions from its security analysis:<sup>18</sup>

- The EU will pursue its goals in a more active manner by using the whole spectrum of its instruments of crisis management and conflict prevention.
- The EU expressed its desire to develop a strategic culture in Europe supportive of early, speedy and if necessary robust interventions.
- The EU intends to strengthen its capacity to act based in a systematic pooling and effective use of available defense resources. The EU is aware of its need to achieve greater cohesion and better coordination in all policy fields that are vital for the strengthening of the global weight of the EU. In this regard, transatlantic relations with the US are considered irreplaceable.

Prince Henry the Navigator was a theoretician who is said to have only once touched the planks of a ship. In a similar sense, the Security Strategy of the European Union was primarily a theoretical construction that was waiting to stand the test of practice. Over time, it indeed lived up to the practice. Although the EU document avoided the term "preventive attack," it did recognize that in light of new threat

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17 Ibid.: 14-16.

18 Ibid.: 17-21.

potential the first line of defense might often be outside Europe. In response to a possible combination of totalitarian Islamic ideologies, the readiness of fanatics to resort to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in undemocratic and hence unpredictable states “we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.”<sup>19</sup> Slowly, but inevitably (and not unlike Prince Henry the Navigator and his captains), the European Union was sailing toward the most dangerous currents and unknown cliffs of twenty-first century world politics.

### (3) *The Broader Middle East and Neighborhood Strategies*

The Broader Middle East was identified both in Europe and in the US as the main challenge and potential threat for the West, mainly due to uncertainty, backwardness and the absence of pluralism in most Arab societies. Since the Bush Administration had declared reforms, if not the outright transformation of the Broader Middle East, its priority in the war against terrorism, the European Union had to catch up with reality in broadening its theory of how to deal with challenges that were considered more of a threat than an opportunity. More important than the semantic quarrel over whether the zone of instability between “Marrakech and Bangladesh” (as US strategists Ronald D. Asmus and Kenneth M. Pollack put it)<sup>20</sup> should be labeled Greater Middle East or Broader Middle East was the issue of goals, means and instruments to be used in order to encourage freedom and democracy on the southern Islamic borders of the West. By all accounts, the region is essential for peace and well-being of Europe and the United States. In the early twenty-first century, 15 of 22 Arab states were governed in an authoritarian or dictatorial manner. Islamic fundamentalism was not only threatening the West, but also various Arab regimes. Permanent terror attacks, most notably in Saudi-Arabia grew the awareness of the inherent problematic character of Arab regimes – and the dilemma that radical religious alternatives might not be any better, and in fact probably even much more anti-Western.

It was important to note that while Prince Henry the Navigator was driven by a desire to fight the Moors – that is to say, all non-Christians – the European Union of the early twenty-first century constantly warned against the danger of a clash of civilizations and religions. Overshadowed by legitimate controversies over Israel’s policies in the occupied territories, the democratic character of Israel and the legitimate

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19 Ibid.: 11; on the complexity of the matter see Kühnhardt, Ludger, *System-Opening and Co-Operative Transformation of the Greater Middle East: A New Trans-Atlantic Project and a Joint Euro-Atlantic-Arab Task*, EUROMESCO Papers No. 26, Lisbon: Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, 2003; Pflüger, Friedbert, *Ein neuer Weltkrieg? Die islamistische Herausforderung des Westens*, Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004; Marchetti, Andreas (ed.), *Ten Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Defining European Interests for the Next Decade*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 154, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2005.

20 Asmus, Ronald D., and Kenneth M. Pollack, “The New Transatlantic Project,” *Policy Review*, 115 (2002): 3-18.

security needs of Israel did not always find the appropriate recognition in Europe. It could therefore not come as a surprise to the EU that controversies over Israel exacerbated its disputes with the US. Often, the EU was perceived as being more interested in the Euro-Arab diplomatic dialogue than in more controversial matters of promoting democratic governance in the Arab world. Whether or not this was a correct and fair perception, it did not help to facilitate the evolution of a common Western strategy toward the Broader Middle East and mutual trust between the West and the Islamic world. Americans and Europeans also had to learn that a reform-oriented opening of political conditions in the Arab world ruled by autocratic regimes for all too long could produce Islamic trends, including radical ones, suppressed in the past. Hamas' victory in free and democratic elections in Palestine in January 2006 triggered a new round of frustration, chaos, and radicalization, including the violent take-over of power in the Gaza Strip in June 2007 by Hamas. In the end, it was impossible to simply boycott the Hamas government if a new all-out escalation in the Middle East was to be avoided. But how to deal intellectually with Islamic concepts of politics if they find democratic legitimacy would remain the even bigger challenge for the West for many years to come. The voyage around Cape Bojador had never been without risk.

Following the formulation of its first ever Security Strategy on December 12, 2003, the European Union complimented its new strategic assertiveness on May 12, 2004, with a Strategy Paper of the European Commission on European Neighborhood Policy. The goal of the EU's policy toward its neighbors in the East, the Southeast and the South was defined as "a set of priorities, whose fulfillment will bring them closer to the European Union."<sup>21</sup> This statement was followed by a cascade of good intentions: "Political dialogue and reform; trade and measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information, society, environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people contacts."<sup>22</sup> The ultimate goal would be to share with the neighboring countries in the East, the South East and the South the advantages of the enlargement of the European Union to post-communist Central Europe in 2004, "in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned."<sup>23</sup>

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21 European Union. European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper*, May 12, 2004: 3, [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf). For an analytical assessment of the matter see Dwan, Renata (ed.), *Building Security in Europe's New Borderlands: Subregional Cooperation in the Wider Europe*, Armonk, N.Y./London: EastWest Institute, 1999; Gillespie, Richard, and Richard Youngs (eds.), *The European Union and Democracy Promotion: The Case of North Africa*, London: Frank Cass, 2002; Batt, Judy, et al., *Partners and Neighbours: A CFSP for a Wider Europe*, Chaillot Papers No.64. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003; Dannreuther, Roland (ed.), *European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy*, London: Routledge, 2004; Marchetti, Andreas, *The European Neighbourhood Policy: Foreign Policy at the EU's Periphery*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 158, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2006.

22 European Union. European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper*, op.cit.: ibid.

23 Ibid.

The vision of the Neighborhood Policy of the European Union “involves a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration.”<sup>24</sup> East of the EU and around the borders of the Mediterranean, the EU intends “to promote a ring of well governed countries with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.”<sup>25</sup> For the fiscal period between 2007 and 2013 the European Union provides 11.2 billion euros of aid through the new European Neighborhood Instrument. For the Eastern European partner countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) the EU thus provides an average support of 3.64 euros per head. For the Mediterranean partner countries the EU provides 3.36 euros per head. In absolute terms, this financial instrument seemed almost ridiculously low. But the EU insisted that the appropriate use of its support would eventually trigger structural reforms across Europe’s neighborhood. Concrete projects include, for instance, the support of a European-Maghrebinian Energy Market as part of a “strategic energy partnership” with the Maghreb region.<sup>26</sup> Neighborhood cooperation in the field of energy must indeed be of particular interest to the EU as its energy imports will grow from 50 percent in 2004 to 70 percent in 2030. The EU also announced support in Southern Mediterranean countries for the establishment of independent regulatory authorities and the opening of markets for fixed telephone and for advanced services such as the internet.<sup>27</sup> The main obstacle to the EU’s Neighborhood Strategy: It could not remain a cohesive, single strategy beyond the moment it was to take into consideration the vast differences between the belt of neighbors as diverse as Morocco or Ukraine.

Moreover, the Neighborhood Strategy of the European Union did not even try to answer the question as to how the EU would be able to generate the necessary resources for the implementation of its Neighborhood Policies. The result of budgetary negotiations for the fiscal period 2007–2013 in December 2005 was disappointing for European foreign policy experts. Out of a budget of 862.3 billion euros, a sum of only 50.0 billion euros was attributed to Foreign and Security Policy, including for Development Cooperation. This means a decrease from 7 to 5.8 percent of the budget total compared with the period 2000-2006. Nobody was able to explain how the EU should be able to meet growing duties with shrinking means. This did not seem to be less easy than the Portuguese effort in the fifteenth century to find the right sea route to India. Some of the naval ships that Prince Henry the Navigator had sent to sea in order to find the fastest sea route to India ended up exploring the Northern Arctic Sea. The EU’s Northern Arctic Sea was a frozen budget for its neighborhood ambitions.

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24 Ibid.: 5.

25 Ibid.: 6.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.: 19; see also *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, “Mehr Geld für Europas Nachbarn,” December 5, 2006.

Nevertheless, at least conceptually the EU has already taken the next step in its discovery of the world. On June 23, 2004, the European Commission and the European Council presented their final report on a Strategic Partnership of the EU with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The paper stated that common interests should be pursued among the partners of the EU's Neighborhood Policy. Common challenges should be dealt with together. The partner countries south of the Mediterranean should be recognized in their diversity and be dealt with in a differentiated manner. Reforms could only succeed if they would grow out of the partner societies; they could not be imposed from the outside.<sup>28</sup>

The paper was lacking a precise description of common European interests. It was also vague on the instruments and means the EU might be ready to use in order to consistently pursue its normative goals. The term "conditionality" was used in a rather unclear manner, leaving more questions open than it was able to answer. As far as the rationale for the EU's Neighborhood Policy and its attachment to the Mediterranean is concerned, the paper was astonishingly lacking in detail. The EU itself has a Mediterranean coast and yet it seemed as if for the EU the "Mediterranean" only meant "Southern Mediterranean" – and more precisely, the Arab and Islamic Mediterranean. The attachment of the EU to those states and societies, according to the Strategy Report, originates in the presence of a growing number of inhabitants and citizens of the EU with roots in the Southern Mediterranean and in the Middle East. Geographic proximity creates interdependencies. In recognizing this simple fact, the EU Strategy Report was already looking beyond the next corner and called for the need to gradually develop partnership with the countries of the Gulf region. In spite of the general desire for partnership, the EU could not overlook that regional conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime had grown into new security challenges. Partnership with the EU would give all partners of the EU the ability "to move at a pace in accordance with their willingness to engage."<sup>29</sup> The agenda for democratic reform and pluralism in the Broader Middle East could not have been wrapped in a more elegant diplomatic language, totally blurring the purpose and intention of the original meaning of the exercise of engagement. It added to the confusion about long-term strategy and EU coherence when the new French President Nicolas Sarkozy launched his plan of a Mediterranean Union in 2007 without initially engaging all his EU partners and clarifying links between a Mediterranean Union and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership existing since 1995. Eventually, the European Council of March 2008 unanimously decided on the establishment of the Union for the

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28 European Union, European Commission, *EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East: Final Report*, June 23, 2004, [http://ec.europa.eu/external\\_relations/euromed/publication/2004/euromed\\_report\\_78\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/publication/2004/euromed_report_78_en.pdf).

29 Ibid.: 4; on the broadening horizon of the EU see Kühnhardt, Ludger, *The Lakes of Europe*, ZEI Discussion Paper C104, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2002; Aydin, Mustafa, *Europe's Next Shore: The Black Sea Region after EU Enlargement*, Occasional Paper No. 53. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004.

Mediterranean. By then, the French project had become a joined EU initiative, aimed at giving the Euro-Mediterranean partnership a new strategic perspective.

#### *(4) Migration and Demographics as Common Concern*

The mutual interests of Europe and the Broader Middle East have not been conclusively clarified by the EU's Strategy Papers. Common interests can be pursued only if they are based on a common understanding of purpose and goal about the journey toward reforms. The EU could hardly believe that only the Arab Middle East would have to embark on reforms while the EU, by virtue of being politically and economically more advanced, would be exempted from the exercise of reforms. Democratic deficit, socio-economic modernization, and the need for cultural dialogue – these topics could have also applied to any internal EU agenda for reform and modernization. They remained vague in the EU's papers as far as their applicable content for the countries of the Broader Middle East was concerned.

Most ambivalent for Europe is the issue of migration. While the Strategic Paper pursued an approach of normative equidistance, it could not be denied that for the majority of Europeans, increased migration from the Arab-Islam south of the Mediterranean has become a matter of concern, if not of fear and prejudice. Since 2002, Spain has become the EU member state hosting the largest number of migrants per year. From 1.6 million people migrating into the EU in 2003, 594,300 came to Spain. This was more than twice the migration Germany (144,900) and France (55,000) experienced combined. Italy is the second largest recipient of migrants in the EU (511,200 in 2003). Among the migrants to Spain and Italy were and are not only legal and, moreover, illegal migrants from the Maghreb and Africa, but also migrants from Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, and China.<sup>30</sup> Many Europeans worried about these immigration streams. Yet, in face of a weakened productivity of its economy and confronted with an aging population, Europe will hardly be able to maintain its level of affluence if it does not accept further migration from both the South and the East of its borders. In the absence of sufficient fertility among European citizens to reproduce the EU's population, this seems to be the only viable alternative to maintain the necessary productivity for stable and sustainable welfare state structures in Europe. Opposing both children of one's own and migration from neighbors – who all of a sudden turn from “neighbors” into “aliens” once they convert into migrants – is an alternative Europe cannot sustain. A Strategy Paper of the EU dealing with the definition of its neighborhood policy toward the Middle East is certainly not the venue to reflect about the link between these issues. But as it claimed honesty and true partnership, it should not have shied away from a superficial analysis

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30 See Eurostat, *European Demography in 2003*, August 31, 2004, [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_PUBLIC/3-31082004-BP/EN/3-31082004-BP-EN.PDF](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-31082004-BP/EN/3-31082004-BP-EN.PDF).

of the matter either. It is beyond any doubt that the European Union is in dire need of a more coherent and pro-active migration policy.<sup>31</sup>

According to the Green Paper on Demographic Change launched by the European Commission in March 2005, the EU will have 18 million fewer children and younger people in 2030.<sup>32</sup> Roughly two active people between 15 and 65 will have to take care of one inactive person above the age of 65 as far as pension claims and health costs are concerned. By 2030, according to the European Commission, the EU will lack 20.8 million people of working age. The overall EU population will fall to 468.7 million in 2030. Malta and Cyprus will be the only EU member states with growing populations. On the other hand, the US population will increase by 25 percent between 2000 and 2025.

By 2020, Arab countries will have to generate 100 million new jobs for their young and growing populations. In the absence of any realistic ability to achieve this, millions of young Arabs will have the intention to migrate to Europe, responding to the social pressure inside their own societies. More worrisome for an aging Europe should be the growing age gap between Europe and the Arab world. In 2050, the average Yemenite will be 32 years younger than the average European. While the latter is contemplating health and pension matters, the Yemenite will still be concerned about his own productive future and that of his children. He will continue to ask for his right of a future. How will Europe deal with the implications of these issues that are inextricably interwoven into its partnership web with the Broader Middle East?

It is also astonishing that EU Strategy Papers usually do not dedicate a single sentence to the question of religion. Beside vague reference to totalitarian Islamic extremism, the Strategies of the EU remain silent on the matter. Neither the complex issue of the public role of religion nor the prospect for cooperation, bridge-building and dialogue among the three “Religions of the Book” that claim to be the Children of Abraham found place and discussion in the EU’s Strategy.<sup>33</sup> The future of religious relations in the Mediterranean and the Broader Middle East will become a strategic political issue, notwithstanding the EU’s failure to address the matter. The dispute about Danish caricatures in early 2006 demonstrates ample proof of this inescapable tendency.

It was considered a positive tendency of transatlantic reconciliation that the EU and the US Administration of President George W. Bush were ready to frame a new rhetorical compromise on their policies toward the Broader Middle East after two years

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31 See Cuschieri, Marvin Andrew, *Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean: The Need of Reconstruction of Policy-Making*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 168, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2007.

32 European Union, European Commission, *Green Paper “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations”*, March 16, 2005, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0094:FIN:EN:PDF>

33 See Feiler, Bruce, *Abraham: A Journey into the Heart of Three Faiths*, New York: HarperCollins, 2002.

of the worst transatlantic crisis since World War II.<sup>34</sup> In a Joint Declaration at the annual EU-US Summit on June 26, 2004, at Dromoland Castle in Ireland, both sides agreed to support all forces in the Broader Middle East that are ready to take up the challenge of modernization and democratization. Building human rights and democracy, the rule of law, and sustainable market economies had become a rather vague addition to the phraseology of the war on terrorism. The US and the EU, as well as NATO as the most important military and political link across the Atlantic Ocean, will continue in their gradual and emerging involvement in the world “East of Jordan,” as it is now designed. A new US President as of 2009 would not alter this global commitment of the US, challenging the EU to participate in a leadership role. During the peak of British imperialism, the notion “East of Eden” had signified the readiness to go global – and it was a term with immediate significance. In the twenty-first century, new arbitrary efforts to redesign the map could hardly be more successful than old imperial concepts. As for the EU, its proliferation of “policy strategies” and the permanent announcement of “strategic partnerships” are hollow. It sounds imposing and yet it is often lacking the foundation it requires to turn a strategy into reality. As for both transatlantic partners, no reconciliatory communiqué could cover the continuity of grave differences: The Iraq debate was hardly buried when the issue of how to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambition was beginning to simmer as the possible next transatlantic dispute.<sup>35</sup> The rise of Iran as a new regional power and its ambition to gain nuclear arms has not found an effective Western answer. To apply the traditional logic of deterrence would require mutual recognition. For Iran this would mean to be recognized by the US as an equal partner, while in the US (and in Israel) Iran is simply considered a growing threat of ultimate danger. It is a sign of improvement in transatlantic relations that the EU and the US coordinated their policies on Iran much better than a few years earlier on Iraq. The EU claimed credit for taming the US and preventing a belligerent escalation while the US administration (and Israel) maintained the right of last resort in case Iran’s nuclear build-up becomes too grave a threat to its security or that of Israel.

The military action of the US in 2003 against the regime of Saddam Hussein had provoked unprecedented anti-Americanism across the world. President Bush was singled out to be blamed for a wrong policy choice. Europe was anxiously waiting for a new US President to be installed in January 2009. It could however not be excluded that in the absence of an alternative to stabilize and finally democratize Iraq President Bush might eventually be rehabilitated by history. Historians might conclude that the war against Iraq was similar to the way Columbus discovered America - a fatal error that led

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34 See Gordon, Philip H., and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004; Crowe, Brian, “A Common European Foreign Policy After Iraq?,” *International Affairs*, 79.3 (2003): 533-546; Zaborowski, Macin (ed.), *Friends Again?: EU-US Relations After the Crisis*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006.

35 See Meiers, Franz-Josef, *Transatlantic Relations after the U.S. Elections: From Rift to Harmony?*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 140, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2004:23-30.



him to a great success. Thus, Columbus became more famous than Prince Henry the Navigator with all his cautiousness and meticulous sense of detail and complexity. In the end, both the EU and the US under a new President would have to engage together and with all societies and countries in the Broader Middle East if they wanted to succeed in transforming the region that had emerged as the pivotal threat to the West in the early twenty-first century. The countries and societies in the Middle East are too proud and self-assertive to accept the status of objects of a benevolent West forcing them into reforms. The EU and the US will have to recognize their neighbors in the Arab world as subjects of self-determined change toward open and dynamic societies, ready to live in partnership and cooperation among them and with the West. Otherwise, the threat and fear emanating from an unruly Broader Middle East will not wither away for the West. Whenever asked to define its values, the West proudly recalls its Judeo-Christian heritage. The Islamic faith and world will have to be reconciled with this self-assessment if the West wants to have a peaceful future throughout the uncertain course of the twenty-first century.

All in all, the evolution of European Foreign and Security Policy is confronted with one fundamental theoretical challenge. In the past, European integration advanced through negative projects, tearing down borders was the *leitmotiv* of economic integration from the Treaties of Rome to the introduction of a common currency. As for European Foreign and Security Policy, it seems to work, at least so far, only as a positive project, a project that moves forward only if it does not encounter obstacles that could question the anticipated additional gains for all EU member states and institutions. This approach, however, could only generate creeping, piece-meal achievements, insufficient to convince the public at large about the meaningfulness of the overall operation. In matters of foreign and security policy, so it seems, the negative component that was used in economic integration as a driving force, could only come from the outside, pressure on Europe not to tear borders down, but to rather build them up in order to protect Europe against new enemies. This logic, however, was and is as uncomfortable for many as it is unpleasantly realistic. If we were to look for driving forces that can help to create more coherence and a stronger overall EU policy performance in foreign and security matters, it remained uncomfortable to say that the search for an enemy has obviously not lost its age-old function. For the European Union still oscillating between the comfort of portraying itself as a soft power and the rough winds of a world in which hard power prevails, balancing comfort and expectation is equivalent to balancing interests and values, that is to say a precise definition of threats for Europe and a realistic configuration of values relevant to the projection of Europe.

## 2. Assessing European Interests and Understanding Strategy

Defining interests and formulating a global strategy has never been easy for the European Union. Connecting Europe's past with Europe's global future has been as difficult as the effort to pool the interests of all EU member states and institutional actors under the umbrella of one coherent and common European interest. And yet, gradually, the European Union is becoming a global actor, being forced to answer questions about its interests and underlying strategies.

“Interest” as a political term is a dynamic concept. It cannot be framed in a static way based on experiences and parameters of an ever-valid past. It cannot deny changing circumstances and variable priorities. Yet it remains linked to the root of all politics, geography and history, resources and ambitions. Interests are an expression of the motivation of an actor, be it an individual or a political unit such as the European Union. The most classical study on interests – Albert Hirschman's book “The Passions and the Interests” – has analyzed the considerable changes in the way interests are conceptualized in relation to other sources of human and collective political motivation.<sup>36</sup> Interests relate to actions as they give reasons for an actor's behavior. Interests also reflect the result of a process of assessment that leads to a certain conclusion defined as “interest.” In fact, interests are both the product of an assessment and the basis for reasonable or at least comprehensible behavior. As for the European Union, its dynamic and procedural character explains the difficulties in defining intuitive-like interests. Neither the depth of assessment nor the scope of possible action can relate to established patterns of political behavior and tradition. The development of consensual European interests that both grasp the intention of the process of integration and initiate comprehensive actions in pursuing it has grown into a dynamic and ever stronger trajectory. The evolution of common European interests in foreign and security policy will remain subject to a continuous process of “challenge and response.” The formation and formulation of common European interests will remain a contingent “product” of the evolving reaction of European Union actors to new challenges and opportunities that are a function of the self-proclaimed global profile and ambition of the European Union. The more the European Union sees itself as global actor, the more it has to recognize the need for a reasonably cohesive Common Foreign and Security Policy with global outreach. As the EU can no longer deny the impact of external developments for the well-being and scope of action of Europe, it has to formulate its Common Foreign and Security Policy as its first priority in the age of globalization.

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36 Hirschman, Albert, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977; see also Hindess, Barry, *Political Choice and Social Structure: An Analysis of Actors, Interests and Rationality*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1989; Bicknell Truman, David, *The Government Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*, Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1993.

The definition of common European interests was reasonably easy as far as the evolution of a common external trade policy was concerned. But once the sphere of hard politics was reached, new and deep gulfs of interests, commitments, resources and ambitions became visible. The classical yet often futile debate about the relationship between interests and values is constantly present. In their classical study about “realism and complex interdependence,” Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye have outlined the characteristics and effects of world politics as seen through the lenses of realist assumptions defining the character of politics as a struggle for power. The dominant character of the nation state, they suggested, cannot deny the existence of multiple channels that connect societies and affect the formulation of policy choices. The agenda of interstate relationships, they argued, “consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy.”<sup>37</sup> One of the consequences of this insight is the fact that military security does not consistently dominate and define the agenda. Yet it is part of the agenda of complex interdependence, a truth the European Union had to learn gradually and painfully.

The Wars of Yugoslavian Succession during the 1990’s marked a turning point in the European integration history as far as the willingness to resort to pro-active foreign, security and ultimately even defense policies were concerned. Until the outbreak of four consecutive Wars in former Yugoslavia, the idea of a Common Foreign and Security Policy had been a taboo for many. European integration was largely understood as a civilian project and the European Union as a civilian power.<sup>38</sup> As much as this was the correct antithesis to the European history of tragic warfare, it could not provide an adequate answer of an affluent and peaceful continent to the outbreak of violence in its immediate neighborhood. European citizens – confronted with the media coverage of warfare and expulsions in former Yugoslavia – demanded action from their politicians. Confronted with this challenge, integrated Europe had to respond. No matter how slow the response was, no matter how bureaucratic its method of institution-building looked and no matter how much the EU had to recognize American leadership in stopping the murderous atrocities in former Yugoslavia – the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy began to take shape faster than most others projects of European integration that one could identify in fifty years of history.

The reluctance of the EU to resort to military force as an instrument of projecting its power found an explanation in Keohane’s and Nye’s assessment of complex interdependences. Military force, they had argued, is hardly used by governments in response to other governments within a region “when complex interdependence

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37 Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Glenview: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1989:25.

38 See Schlotter, Peter (ed.), *Europa – Macht – Frieden? Zur Politik der „Zivilmacht Europa“*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003.

prevails.”<sup>39</sup> There could have been no doubt about the complex interdependence between integrated Europe and the dissolving Yugoslavia. Keohane and Nye also gave a hint on how to understand the readiness of integrated Europe to change its attitude, no matter how reluctant and belated it might have been. Under conditions of lacking hierarchies among multiple issues, they had argued, “politics of agenda formation and control will become more important.”<sup>40</sup> If the EU wanted to maintain and even increase its international scope of action and autonomy, it had to grow out of the self-limiting concept of a “civilian power.” It had to develop a European Security and Defense Policy. Its structures did not automatically respond to a common European interest. But the need to contribute to the agenda setting in all matters relevant for any Foreign and Security Policy grew steadily. As the instruments of EU’s Foreign, Security and Defense Policy were designed and gradually turned into practice, the goals of EU policies had to be defined as well. The need increased for the formulation of a comprehensive security strategy.

It was questionable whether or not the first EU Security Strategy actually was a strategy. Strategy has been defined as “the bridge that relates military power to political purpose.”<sup>41</sup> In the case of the European Union, so it seemed, the opposite was tried, namely to relate an inevitable political purpose to the unavoidable exercise of power. The literature is dominated by academic studies with a clear bias toward the military dimension of strategy. Often, Carl von Clausewitz’s famous words are invoked that in strategy, “everything is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy”<sup>42</sup>. If strategy is understood, in a broader sense, as the ability to apply political means to fulfill clearly defined political ends, it is indeed “ultimately about effectively exercising power.”<sup>43</sup> As long as the European Union only wanted to be perceived as a benevolent power, it was limiting itself in the projection of a coherent claim to power status.

Strategy requires a clear understanding of one’s interest, a realistic notion of one’s abilities and a precise concept of one’s goals. Modern military strategy reminds us of the fact that “how common it is for imaginative, energetic and determined strategic thinkers and defense planners to forget that the enemy too has preferences and choices.”<sup>44</sup> As for the European Union’s Security Strategy, the absence of a discussion of the goals of the “others” is significant. This is all the more astonishing as other

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39 Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, op.cit.: 25.

40 Ibid.: 58.

41 Gray, Colin S., *Modern Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999:17; see also Elting, John R., *The Super-Strategists: Great Captains, Theorists, and Fighting Men who Have Shaped the History of Warfare*, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985; Momah, Sam, *Global Strategy: From its Genesis to the Post-Cold War Era*, Lagos: Vista Books, 1994.

42 von Clausewitz, Carl, *On War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976: 178.

43 Gray, Colin S., *Modern Strategy*, op.cit.: 20.

44 Ibid.

regions in the world are increasingly beginning to reflect on the meaning of European integration for them.<sup>45</sup>

Strategy – from the Greek word “strategos” (general) – is intended to use one’s own force and resources to the end that one’s “interests will be effectively promoted or secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.”<sup>46</sup> Historian Paul Kennedy has pleaded for a broader definition of strategy, going beyond the military and encompassing the use of all possible resources of a nation into an integrated approach to pursue one’s specific and yet multidimensional interests. Balancing ends and means is a perennial challenge for those who formulate policies intended to implement a strategic calculus. Kennedy underlined the need “to understand that wisdom and judgment are not created in isolation; they are formed, and refined, by experience – including the study of historical experiences”.<sup>47</sup> Kennedy summarized his historical findings with the understanding that all great powers were confronted with tests and problems inherently affecting their search for security both in wartime and in peacetime. The essential political character of a grand strategy reminded Kennedy of the American promise: The nature of strategy, he wrote, “is about the implementation of policies which would secure (in the Founding Fathers’ words) ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ for the polity in question, however restricted that policy might be.”<sup>48</sup> In doing so, the United States has grown into a strategic superpower, Kennedy argued, by learning from European experience of centuries of balancing power, overcoming warfare and stabilizing peace. It is ironic that in the early twenty-first century, the European Union was forced into its first comprehensive strategy statement by the American dominance in the definition of goals and means in the war against terrorism that had escalated since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

As much as military strategy in times of asymmetric warfare must deal with rather chaotic circumstances, the political effort to define a foreign and security strategy has to deal with the enhanced unpredictability of the international order. Chaos theories have entered the sphere of military and political strategy formulation.<sup>49</sup> What has been labeled “the butterfly effect” by chaos theory has to be translated into political categories. The main intellectual challenge is to find an underlying order in a highly

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45 See Ortega, Martin (ed.), *Global Views on the European Union*, Chaillot Paper No. 72, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004.

46 Lexicon of Military Terms, 1960, cited in Luttwak, Edward N., *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1987: 240.

47 Kennedy, Paul, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in: Kennedy, Paul (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1991: 6.

48 Kennedy, Paul, “American Grand Strategy, Today and Tomorrow: Learning from the European Experience,” in: Kennedy, Paul (ed.), *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, op.cit.: 169.

49 See Gray, Colin S., *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*, London/Portland: Frank Cass, 2002; on the theoretical dimension of rational strategy formation see also the relevant mathematical and economic literature such as Koons, Robert C., *Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality*, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Reinhard Selten, *Models of Strategic Rationality*, Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer, 1988.

complex behavior of apparently chaotic or unpredictable systems that constitute the contemporary world order: From cyber warfare to climate change, from upheavals in financial markets to terrorism – chaos seems to dominate the agenda of politics, which still claims to be both in control and legitimate to define the monopoly of violence and the regulatory mechanisms of public life. Whether or not under such circumstances any strategy cannot be more than a chaotic and insufficient effort is a serious question. The rather friendly and diplomatic notion of “strategic adjustment” defines the new mood in the strategic community.<sup>50</sup>

This coincides with the rehabilitation of ideas that impact strategic choice. Four dimensions have been identified in recent literature by which ideas impact strategy: they “yield programmatic changes in state behavior in the absence of external change;” they are a source of cognitive change and impact processes “by which ideas gain currency;” they contribute to an “active dynamic between ideas and institutions” and underline the “real, but bounded capacity of government organizations actively to seek out, or to create, new ideas and to institutionalize them;” finally ideas “serve as focal points in elite bargaining, but also play a similar critical role in domestic politics, helping to determine what domestic political coalitions will or will not form.”<sup>51</sup> Strategists emphasize “choice” and reflect on “agents of strategy-making.”<sup>52</sup> Thus they legitimize its right and they justify the ambition of the European Union to embark on the formulation of a Foreign and Security Strategy that definitely transcends the self-imposed boundaries of a Single Market and the qualities of a “civilian power.”

For the EU this does not only require to outline strategic goals, to define interests and to conclude policy choices beyond a gentle diplomatic language; it also requires the continuous assessment of the EU’s power to logically project its interests into the realm of global Realpolitik. Since the EU never understood itself as an actor in the international system being able or even willing to enhance its own security by making “all other actors accept an insecure existence”<sup>53</sup> it had to reverse the classical security dilemma. Instead of solely focusing on the notion of self-help in the absence of predictable and norm-abiding behavior by other actors in the global arena, the EU has to conceptualize a security strategy that will make the world safer for all and not only for

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50 Trubowitz, Peter, et al. (eds.), *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

51 Trubowitz, Peter, and Edward Rhodes, “Explaining American Strategic Adjustment,” in: Trubowitz, Peter (ed.), *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment*, op.cit.: 18.

52 Goldman, Emily O., and John Arquilla, “Structure, Agency, and Choice: Toward a Theory and Practice of Grand Strategy,” in: Trubowitz, Peter (ed.), *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment*, op.cit.: 311; on the theoretical role of ideas in the process of institutionalizing European integration see also Parsons, Craig, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2003: 1-33.

53 Rothgeb Jr., John M., *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992: 55; on the economic dimension see Goddard, C. Roe, et al. (eds.), *International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in a Changing Global Order*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Oatley, Thomas, *International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy*, New York: Longman, 2004.

itself. In doing so, it was inevitable that the EU would – at least partially – be perceived as antagonistic to some vested interests of the United States.<sup>54</sup> But as much as it would have been illusory for the EU to define itself as a counter-power to the US, it is unfair to consistently insinuate that the EU is trying to do exactly that. It is more correct to describe the effort of the EU as one of complementing the US by more precisely defining its own interests and strategic goals than ever before.

The formulation of a Security Strategy for the European Union was but one element in “organizing Europe’s place in world affairs.”<sup>55</sup> Although the European Union still lacks what one analyst has coined “fungibility” – that is to say “the ability to fully transform, and to utilize, the capabilities of the Member States and thereby to put them fully at the disposal of the Union without any loss of efficacy”<sup>56</sup> – its international significance has grown immensely. Its population has outgrown the US, its GDP is almost equal to that of the United States and although its per capita income remains almost 30 percent below that in the US (largely due to the membership of post-communist economies with lower productivity rates), the EU and its leading member states are in a key position as far as the definition of global economic issues is concerned. The EU’s account of world trade is higher than the equivalent rate of the US, although it has shrunk in absolute terms due to the rise of other trading regions in the world. The euro has developed into a stable international currency, being recognized as reserve currency across the world. Two third of the membership of the OECD are EU member states and the European Commission itself is an “active participant” under Article 13 of the OECD Convention.

In the United Nations, the then EEC was invited already on October 11, 1974, to participate in the sessions and work of the General Assembly as an observer. The contribution of EU member states to the budget of the United Nations is higher than the US contribution, let alone that of Japan, Russia or China. Only recently, the issue of EU performance in the United Nations has found scholarly attention. The result is telling: The then EC member states reached consensus on 60 percent of all recorded votes in the UN General Assembly in 1979. By 2002 and with the EU in place, this figure had increased to 75.5 percent of the recorded votes in the UN General Assembly. As far as the effect of EU enlargement to post-communist countries of Central Europe was concerned, the trend toward consensual voting behavior already increased before they

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54 For a contextualization of this claim see Colson, Bruno, *Europe: Repenser les Alliances*, Paris: Institut de Stratégie Comparée/Economia, 1995.

55 See Kasekamp, Andres (ed.), *Organizing Europe’s Place in World Affairs: The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy*, Tartu: Department of Political Science, 2001.

56 Whitman, Richard G., *From Civilian Power to Superpower?: The International Identity of the European Union*, Houndmills: Macmillan Press 1998:108; see also Lenzi, Guido, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy: Defining the European Security Policy*, Fiesole: European University Institute, 1997; Wessels, Ramses A., *The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective*, The Hague/Boston: Kluwer, 1999; Mahncke, Dieter, et.al. (eds.), *European Foreign Policy: From Rhetoric to Reality ?*, Brussels: Peter Lang, 2004.

became formal EU member states in 2004. In 1995, the fifteen “old” EU member states voted identically in 70 percent of the recorded votes, while the twenty-five showed a consensual vote in only 40 percent of the votes. By 2002, the difference had almost vanished: While the “old” fifteen EU member states voted identically in 75.5 percent of the registered votes, the twenty-five states showed a consensus in 62.3 percent of the registered votes.<sup>57</sup>

As far as the details of the EU voting behavior are concerned, the EU Institute for Security Studies concluded that out of 80 recorded votes during the 57th UN General Assembly in 2002, in 33 cases the EU consensus was identical with the votes of the United States. In 47 cases, the EU consensus differed from the votes of the United States, primarily on matters of the Middle East and the quest for a more coercive international regime to implement international criminal law standards. The 26 cases of voting in which the EU member states could not find consensus among themselves were largely related to matters of nuclear disarmament, significant for the special position of the two European nuclear powers France and Great Britain.<sup>58</sup>

The European Union is operating more than 120 delegations in third countries and another five delegations at the seat of international institutions. Although most delegations still play a secondary role in their host country compared with the Embassies of the key member states of the EU, their visibility has grown and their impact has increased. The delegations of the European Union are a superb instrument for the global projection of the role of the EU. They need to get clearer strategic directives from the EU headquarters in order to strengthen their political role and effect. Along with the emerging European External Action Service, the EU is in the process of significantly enhancing global visibility. The combined defense spending of all EU member states is not more than 40 percent of the defense spending of the United States. On the other hand, the EU is the leading donor of development aid worldwide. Yet, its global political and strategic profile is suboptimal, to say the least. Although the external profile and influence of the European Union is obvious, its reputation and impact could be raised. For the time being, it does not seem likely that the European Union will gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Instead, the EU debated the German application for an individual seat, strictly opposed by Italy, Spain and Poland. In the end, at least for the time being, both Germany and the EU failed.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (no matter his eventual title) will have to work with success over a longer period of time in order to gain a similar international reputation, profile and power usually attributed to

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57 See Paul Luif, *EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly*, Occasional Paper No. 49, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003: 29.

58 Ibid.: 57-75, gives all relevant details; see also Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth, “The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe?,” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9.1 (2004): 67-92; Ortega, Martin (ed.), *The European Union and the United Nations: Partner in Effective Multilateralism*, Chaillot Paper No. 78, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005.



the Secretary of State of the United States. Yet, who would have assumed two decades ago that the European Union might at all present a single spokesman on foreign and security matters to the world, backed by a developing European External Action Service and carried by a growing number of policy strategies and instruments? As usual in politics, the assessment of the global role of the EU is a matter of perspective and proportion: Compared with traditional super-powers, the EU is still “a fleet in being.” Compared with its own performance two decades ago, the European Union has achieved a lot in enhancing its integration in matters of foreign, security and defense policy.

By looking through the various activities and actions of the European Union since the beginning of its foreign affairs posture, the following “stages of institutionalization” of EU’s Foreign and Security Policy can be identified.<sup>59</sup> The original agreement among EU member states to cooperate in the field of foreign policy, “and even to establish norms,” constituted “the policy domain as an intergovernmental forum.” This step was intergovernmental and yet accompanied by thorough skepticism about its rationale and perspective. Information-sharing, as practiced during the phase of European Political Cooperation (EPC), established trust among the institutional actors, permanency in the mechanism of cooperation and growing awareness within the political elite of the EU member states that it would be in their joint interest to strengthen their joint international role by enhancing the level of cooperation, no longer considering a cautious trend toward integration a serious possibility. Organizational steps were taken to underpin this experience, finally establishing governance structures, instruments and mechanisms duly recognized by EU consent and poised to advance into the sphere of solid supranationality.

On a theoretical level, the debate continued between conflicting normative concepts, primarily identified as intergovernmental versus supranational. In reality, a complex web of multilevel and often idiosyncratic overlaps between the two contrasting normative claims evolved. It was unlikely that Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy would achieve a quantum leap into a Single Foreign and Security Policy during a short period of time. In light of the enormous speed with which Foreign, Security and Defense Policy has taken center-stage as the most important project for the integration process in the first years of the twenty-first century, it was however not unrealistic to assume further and rapid progress in that policy field in which the classical notion of the primacy of national sovereignty is more deeply rooted than anywhere else.

It was largely an academic dispute whether or not intergovernmental cooperation in foreign and security matters could indeed “spill-over” into supranational structures, mechanisms and instruments. The gap between global challenges and Europe’s

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59 According to Smith, Michael E., *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004: 32-36; for a more theoretical approach see Krahnemann, Elke, *Multilevel Networks in European Foreign Policy*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

performance remained a permanent issue for media and political actors alike. And yet, multilevel governance has definitively begun to take control of foreign and security matters in a way unforeseeable in the early days of European Political Cooperation in the 1970's.

Declarations and demarches were used as the first instrument of European Political Cooperation in 1970. In 1971 coordination at the UN-level began. In 1973, formal consultations with the US started. 1974 saw the beginning of institutionalized regional political dialogues, beginning with the Euro-Arab dialogue. In 1975, the European Community began to coordinate its positions at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and started to use economic tools for European Political Cooperation. In 1977, a Code of Conduct for the behavior of EC firms operating in South Africa under apartheid was agreed upon. In 1981, the EC developed peace plans for the Middle East and endorsed military operations by some EC member states as part of the Sinai Force. In 1982, an EC regulation for actions of European Political Cooperation – sanctions against the Soviet Union – was activated. In 1984, the European Community declared a weapons embargo against Iraq and Iran. In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht enshrined the evolution of a Common Foreign and Security Policy as the consensual goal of all EU member states. By then, the EU agreed on common positions, joint actions and actions taken in conjuncture with the Western European Union (“Petersberg Tasks”) on matter of peacekeeping. Since 1998, the EU has presented its first common strategies on matters related to its policies vis-à-vis Russia, the Baltic States and the Ukraine. The publication of the EU Security Strategy in 2003 was the logical continuation and consequence of this sequence of an enlarged commitment to foreign, security and defense matters. The empowerment of the EU's High Representative and the strengthening of human resources and capacities in Brussels was the inevitable next step. Institutional deficits could no longer be used as excuses for policy deficits.<sup>60</sup>

It remains imperative for the European Union to develop more coherence in its foreign, security and defense posture. This can only be done would the EU be ready and capable to precisely define its global ambitions. Institutionalizing coherence cannot be possible without recognizing the primacy of supranational solutions. The EU's High Representative and his staff, but also the relevant Committee for Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, should make it one of their priorities to initiate a Europe-wide

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60 For an intergovernmental assessment of the actors in Europe's foreign policy see Hill, Christopher (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, London/New York: Routledge, 1996. This volume gives an overview of national political preferences in foreign policy matters, leaving completely out the European Commission and the European Parliament. In his concluding essay, David Allen paraphrases Alan Milward's famous title: “The European Rescue of National Foreign Policy” (288-305); see also Tiersky, Ronald (ed.), *Europe Today: National Politics, European Integration, and European Security*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999; for a broader perspective see Winn, Neil, and Christopher Lord, *EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation-State: Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*, Houndmills: Basingstoke, 2001.

discourse about the global ambitions and political strategies of the European Union. Should European patriotism grow, it would be imperative to broaden the public debate about European foreign and security matters beyond the core group of institutional actors.

The budgetary perspective of EU's Foreign, Security and Defense Policy must be another matter of grave concern in the process of streamlining decision-making processes. No matter how strong the personal profile of any EU's High Representative may be, no sustainable policy can be implemented without the necessary resources in the institutional structures he or she is leading. In the decades ahead, the European Union will probably face tough battles between fiscal intergovernmentalists, welfare state oriented advocates of the primacy of social and economic redistribution policies inside the EU, and proponents of a coherent and multidimensional global posture of the European Union. In the end, this might turn out to be another inevitable (and therefore welcome) political battle signifying the ever increasing role of the European level in dealing with questions of public concern all across the EU.<sup>61</sup>

### 3. "Baptism by Fire:" The Emerging Policy Priorities of the EU

In a fine study about the impact of EU's Foreign and Security Policy during the 1990's, Roy H. Ginsberg chose a significant subtitle: "Baptism by Fire."<sup>62</sup> Ginsberg was not only studying the institutional provisions of Europe's Foreign and Security Policy, he was also analyzing its feedback and effect, including the external perceptions of this outcome. Borrowing from economic theory, Ginsberg described the EU's effort of

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61 Contributions to this necessary debate also dealt with the practical logistical, organizational and technological dimensions of a Single European Defense, see: European Union Institute for Security Studies (ed.), *European Defense: A Proposal for a White Paper. Report of an Independent Task Force*, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004; on the evolving debate about European security see Sauder, Axel, *Souveränität und Integration: Französische und deutsche Konzeptionen europäischer Sicherheit nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges (1990-1993)*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995; Gasteyger, Curt (ed.), *An Ambiguous Power: The European Union in a Changing World*, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996; Lotter, Christoph, and Susanne Peters (eds.), *The Changing European Security Environment*, Weimar/Cologne/Vienna: Böhrer, 1996; von Bredow, Wilfried, et al. (eds.), *European Security*, Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1997; Holland, Martin (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Record and Reforms*, London/Washington D.C.: Pinter, 1997; Whitman, Richard, *From Civilian Power to Superpower?: The International Identity of the European Union*, Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1998; Missiroli, Antonio, *CFSP, Defense and Flexibility*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies 2000; Vilanova, Pere, and Nuria Fernandez, *Europa: El Debate sobre Defensa y Seguridad*, Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 2001; Jain, Rajendra K. (ed.), *The European Union in a Changing World*, New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 2002; Koechlin, Jérôme, *L'Europe a-t-elle une adresse?*, Geneva: Edition Georg, 2003.

62 Ginsberg, Roy H., *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001; see also Musu, Costanza, "European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of 'Converging Parallel'?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 8 (2003): 35-49; Duke, Simon, "Preparing for European Diplomacy?," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40.5 (2002): 849-870.

formulating and implementing a Common Foreign and Security Policy as “politics of scale.”<sup>63</sup> For the 1990’s, Ginsburg concluded that on 72 foreign policy issues, the EU tried to exert an impact on the United States. In 30 cases, or 42 percent, the EU had a significant impact; in 25 cases, or 35 percent, the impact was considerable, in 10 cases, or 14 percent it was marginal, and only in 7 cases, or 10 percent, it was nil.<sup>64</sup>

Only if collective EU action is more than the sum of its constituent parts will costs and risks of foreign and security policy be reduced by pooled sovereignty and resources. Moreover, only then can the potential link between effect and impact be raised. Common action has strengthened the international position of the European Union in areas as distant and unrelated as in the realm of multilateral negotiations on greenhouse gas emissions (Kyoto Protocol of the UN and its follow-up instrument), on issues of human rights (in the setting of the United Nations) and regarding the evolution of security mechanisms since the end of the Cold War (particularly in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe).

Skeptics remain hesitant to recognize the ability of the EU to define common European interests and to exert the necessary political will to pursue them. Yet, special partnerships with other regional integration schemes, pursuit of human rights as precondition for association and cooperation agreements with the EU and conditionality for development aid programs defined by the goal to support rule of law, democracy and civil society have become viable foreign policy instruments that clearly express EU interests. Efforts of a gradual harmonization of norms and laws have become an integral part of the EU’s neighborhood policy and will increase the projection of EU interests, both economic and political, in those partner countries.

Foreign and security policies of the European Union are defined and largely determined by an interplay between national and Union actors, international events and the whole range of collective Western actors – notably the United States and NATO – that are intrinsically interwoven into the internal psychology and range of interests determining EU policies. The multilevel system of governance, usually applied in internal EU policies, is more complex in foreign and security matters. The EU’s interplay with international institutions and procedures has to be added to the matrix of multilevel governance. EU positions on United Nations matters, EU reactions to US policies, EU governance processes, both ad-hoc and more permanent, and communiqués on events all over the world add to the evolution of European Union policies and interests, the application of its instruments and the contribution of its specific means. Only in rare cases can the EU enjoy the privilege of developing a policy strategy – a grand design – by its own will and choice. This is not a phenomenon the EU is experiencing specifically. Foreign policy strategies are by definition reactive to external

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63 Ginsberg, Roy H., *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*, op.cit.: 27.

64 Ibid.: 267.

factors and events. The EU can only be measured according to this highly unpredictable and volatile basis of all international relations.

Likewise, the EU has to be measured by the degree of its inactions in foreign policy: From the 1968 uprising in then communist Czechoslovakia (Prague Spring) to the 1986 Libya crisis, from the Greek-Turkish dispute over some Aegean islands in 1996 to the breakdown of law and order in Albania in 1997, the European Union preferred not to act as a broker. In some cases, individual EU member states blocked the EU to operate as an entity: Greece prevented the EU's recognition of Macedonia between 1992 and 1995 and in 1997 France blocked an EU initiative in favor of human rights in China. Most prominent was the failure of the European Union to prevent the outbreak of four Wars of Yugoslavian Succession between 1991 and 1999. And the transatlantic dispute over the need to go to war with Iraq in 2002/2003 ended as the biggest ever dispute inside the European Union, not only preventing a common position to evolve, but also undermining a lot of trust capital the EU had accrued among its member states, and between them and the candidate countries of Central Europe. However, more than any other single external event or internal initiative these two external events – the Wars of Yugoslavian Succession and the Iraq crisis – raised awareness that the European Union needed to be “more active, more coherent and more capable” as the Security Strategy finally admitted in December 2003.<sup>65</sup> By the summer of 2004, the European Union was almost forced to contribute support to the first democratic election in Iraq. An EU participation in a UN led Protection Force in Iraq, as suggested by the Secretary General of the United Nations, did not work out. On June 22, 2005, an EU-US sponsored conference on the future of Iraq held in Brussels signaled a formal end to the policy rift between the EU and the US. Although this conference took place in the EU's own capital, the EU had traveled a long way to reach the new, US-made Iraq. The US and the EU had entered Iraq separately. They would have to stay in together and they would have to leave jointly – and hopefully only with success. For the time being, none of them had a convincing answer of how to turn the violent transformation of Iraq into a stable, democratic and prosperous model for the modernization of any other Arab country. By 2007, a gradual improvement of public security in Iraq became undeniable and yet, a strong foreign presence seemed to remain necessary in order to stabilize the new political and social system in Iraq.

Gradually, the European Union had been recognized as a global player.<sup>66</sup> A global player is not a global power yet. This difference marks the structural limitations of the EU's global role. Telling, for instance, is the absence of the European Union in US-led efforts to institutionalize a multilateral scheme for security and stability in North East

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65 European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, op.cit.: 17.

66 On the EU's perception in Asia-Pacific see the very comprehensive study by Holland, Martin, and Natalia Chaban (eds.), *The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions of the EU*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.

Asia, another trouble-spot of world politics.<sup>67</sup> Although the EU had tried to engage in nuclear diplomacy regarding the North Korean ambition to produce an atomic bomb, it could not sustain a cohesive effort of involvement in the resolution of this urgent matter. It simply was not perceived as an “Asian power,” no matter its regular cooperation with ASEAN. Whether or not this might remain a temporary or a structural limitation of the projection of EU power will be decided by history. The question must surface in light of the enormous economic stakes of the European Union in the development of Northeast Asia. In China, South Korea, and Japan, the EU had become a leading foreign investor, even surpassing the US at times who has since long established itself as the leading trading partner of the regions economic giants. In 1980, China ranked 25th as a destination for exports from Europe. As consequence of the fundamental changes under way in China since the late 1970’s, the EU increased its economic interests, reinforced by diplomatic relations between the EU and China that were established already in 1975. In 2004, China had become the third export market for the EU, surpassed only by the United States and Switzerland. As for investments, the European Union is among the biggest investors in China. In 2000, for the first time the EU ranked as the top investor in China. It does not look as if the EU will do much worse in the years to come. Roughly 80 percent of all European investments in China go to the manufacturing sector. In the long run, however, this can have ambivalent effects on Europe’s own manufacturing sector. The competitiveness of China for jobs will constantly grow, along with increased productivity and quality. While the Arab world is threatening Europe with its failure, China seems to increasingly threaten Europe’s affluence with its success, given the implication of a projection of China’s enormous growth rates of roughly 8 percent on annual average during the past two decades. While economic interests of the EU in North East Asia are beyond doubt – although not thoroughly coordinated on the EU level and often subject to competition among EU member states, notably Germany and France – the absence of concise political and strategic interests of the EU in North East Asia is, at least, surprising. It simply demonstrates the continuous limits of a global role of Europe.

Moreover, the EU remains torn between conflicting aims and diverging national interests. Nowhere is this more evident than in the relationship between its emphasis on human rights and the pursuit of national economic interests among leading EU member states. In spite of the arms ban imposed upon China after the Tienamen Square massacre in June 1989, EU member states, and among them mainly France, sold military equipment in the amount of 281 million US dollars in 2002 alone. When some EU member states contemplated to lift the EU’s arms ban on China, they finally had to accept the wish of the Bush Administration in March 2005 not to go ahead with such plans. Europe’s North East Asia policy, if there is any, still sails in the shadow of the US. When China used military force in Tibet in spring 2008, the EU was again torn

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67 See Fukuyama, Francis, “Re-Envisioning Asia,” *Foreign Affairs*, 84.1 (2005): 75-87.

between the goal to defend human rights, economic interests and the possible ramifications of boycotting the Olympic Summer Games 2008 in Beijing.

As the EU's Security Strategy suggested, the European Union needs to conduct foreign and security policies throughout the world defined by the changes in threat assessment and by unfolding globalization opportunities. The global performance of the European Union as multilateral trade negotiator has been recognized since the first decade of the existence of the European Economic Community. Its participation in the Dillon Round of the early 1960's was the first performance of a European external policy. From GATT's Uruguay Round in the 1980's to the WTO Doha Round of the early twenty-first century, the European Union has been recognized as a global economic player. International environmental diplomacy has seen a gradual and firm evolution of the role of the European Union.<sup>68</sup> In political and strategic terms, a breakthrough of a robust and determined single European voice is yet to happen.

The European Union and its member states have acquired a respectable name in international development cooperation, accounting for more than 60 percent of all global development aid. The evolution of an explicit development policy of the European Union has contributed to more visibility and efficiency of the EU's development aid. At the core of the EU's strategy and policy toward the developing world is the mechanism by which the European Union is organizing and executing its relations with the poorest countries in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean. Beginning with the first Yaoundé Convention in 1964, linking the then six members of the European Economic Community with 18 associated African states and Madagascar, the EU focused its development policy with the first Lomé Convention in 1975, followed by three subsequent Lomé Conventions and finally leading to the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. The development of these association schemes with most African, Pacific and Caribbean countries mirrored the overall evolution of North-South relations, of experiences and learning processes in development philosophy and the increasing focus of Europe to define priorities in its relationship with a group of countries that mostly had colonial relationships with Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth century. The mechanism of the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement increased the export share of many developing countries to Europe. The biggest effect however was the transformation of former colonial "patron/client"-relations into viable and respected relations among partners.

The growing insistence of the European Union to add dimensions of a political dialogue and the threat of conditionality to its instruments of development policy demonstrated another transformation in the relationship with its former colonies. The growing role of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), established in

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68 See Bretherton, Charlotte, and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London/New York: Routledge, 1999: 80-109.

1992, proves the seriousness of the humanitarian orientation of the EU's relationship with the developing world, most notably in Africa.

The development of almost five decades of European relations with the developing world reflects a fundamental transformation in Europe's relationship with its former colonies. Besides a strong European priority on structured and contractual relations with former colonies in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean, the EU increasingly sharpened its policies and instruments in support of the evolution of regional cooperation and integration schemes across the world. This added to the intention of the European Union – as scholars saw it – to strive for “a post-Hobbesian order” in international relations, based on pooled sovereignty and increasingly complex interdependence.<sup>69</sup>

Yet the gap between the world of affluence and the world of poverty remains the biggest concern for long-term stability and moral credibility in the world. While in 2003, the year of the Iraq crisis, the annual US defense expenditure was around 430 billion US dollars and the annual commitment to the occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq was more than 165 billion US dollars per year, official US development assistance was a little over 13 billion US dollars in 2002 and meant to rise to 15 billion US dollars in 2006. The aid record of Europeans is not any better. In 2003, the agricultural subsidies of the EU were seven times higher than the EU's contribution to development aid. Adding direct national development aid contributions does not really improve the EU's record in light of the fact that while the EU as a whole is subsidizing a European cow with 913 US dollars per year, the EU gave eight US dollars per head to the population of sub-Saharan Africa. “European agricultural exports, subsidized by the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), drive farmers in poor countries out of business – and into destitution,” Timothy Garton Ash rightly criticized this horrendous EU policy. In despair he added: “Where are the crowds on the streets of European capitals protesting against the CAP?”<sup>70</sup>

In spite of all idiosyncrasies, flaws and obstacles to implement Europeanized interests, EU foreign policy priorities have become increasingly visible. More often, the European Union tries to project topical powers instead of spatial powers. Not being the center of instability itself any more, Europe tries to project stability, human rights, good governance and market economy worldwide. As long as it remains an incoherent actor, it will often be perceived with skepticism. Spectacular events will always receive more attention than long-term planning and operations by the EU. Capacity-building and a deficit in capacities, will power and instruments, may always accompany any strategic discourse about Europe's global role. Complete consistency between strategies and goals, instruments and means may never be achieved in foreign policy. Textbook wisdom and blueprints can hardly be guiding lines for the execution of the global role of

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69 See Wind, Marlene, *Sovereignty and European Integration: Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order*, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001.

70 Garton Ash, Timothy, *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time*, London: Allen Lane, 2004: 170.



Europe. Europe's global role will remain as much actor driven as subject to events, based on common interests and on the specific heritage of some EU member states or interest groups in the European Parliament or the European Commission. There simply is no blueprint for the design of the foreign and security policy of a global actor. But the key ingredients of the EU's foreign policy concept can be identified, both in terms of geographical and in terms of normative priorities. In the pursuit of its external actions, the European Union intends to balance interests and values, genuine experiences of individual member states and an emerging Union interest.

- (a) The main decision-making elements in EU foreign and security matters include:
- Common strategies to be agreed upon by the Council: They are defining the objectives of the EU, the scope and duration as well as the means available in order to carry out the strategy.
  - Joint actions and common positions to be agreed by the General Affairs Council: These decisions are meant to implement common strategies. Normally, the Council is including the perspective of the European Parliament into its decision-making process.
- (b) The most important positive EU foreign policy instruments include:
- Negotiation of trade agreements.
  - Negotiation of cooperation and development cooperation agreements.
  - Negotiation of association agreements.

The EU is practising several negative instruments as means of political punishment. These foreign policy instruments include:

- Embargo (ban on exports).
- Boycott (ban on imports).
- Delaying the conclusion of agreements.
- Tariff increase, quota decrease or reduction and suspension of aid.
- Delay in granting successive loans.

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union is increasingly confronted with the evolution of an appropriate system of military-civilian cooperation. During the Cold War, this notion was limited to cooperation between the military and civilian forces in cases of domestic catastrophes and crises inside Europe. In light of the new structure of challenges and confrontations outside Europe, the EU has rather speedily developed new and appropriate mechanisms of "civil-military cooperation" (CIMIC). The EU's police missions in Macedonia and the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams of various EU member states in post-Taliban Afghanistan have enabled the European Union to reassess capacities and operational structures of civil-military cooperation and

coordination.<sup>71</sup> This important interplay between hard power and soft power will be applied more constantly in future operations. Election observer missions such as in Venezuela, Nigeria or Kenya have added to the global projection of EU interests and values.

Beside its operational outlets, the European Union is engaged in regular political dialogues with all key countries of the world, namely the United States, Russia, China, Canada, Japan, Ukraine, and India through Summits between the respective Head of State and the EU leadership. On a ministerial level, the EU conducts bilateral political dialogues with countries as diverse as New Zealand, Mexico and Armenia, Uzbekistan, Chile and Korea, but also with practically all relevant regional cooperation and integration schemes in the world, notably with ASEAN, MERCOSUR, the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council, ECOWAS, SAARC, the San José Group, but likewise with the non-aligned movement, with the countries of the European Economic Area and with the partner countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. On the expert level, the European Union conducts regular meetings on all relevant international questions from human rights to drug trafficking, from non-proliferation to consular affairs, from terrorism to all issues relevant in the context of the United Nations. The EU has used the instrument of appointing a special representative contributing to peace-making in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Europe and Afghanistan.

(c) As far as thematic priorities are concerned, the EU is increasingly developing issue cohesion and global interests in the following policy areas:

- Support of regional cooperation and integration: Support for the development of regional groupings throughout the world reflects the normative consensus in the European Union concerning the value of a multilateral and multidimensional world-order, based on the recognition of regional advantages and forms of cooperative interdependence. From the formulation of the Yaoundé Convention in 1964 to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since 1995, the special preference shown for the development of ASEAN, the negotiation of an association agreement with MERCOSUR and with SICA and the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements with Caribbean, African and Pacific partner groupings, the European integration process has been linked to the global trend of regional cooperation. The EU's policy objectives are pursued in various ways. The spectrum reaches from rhetorical encouragement to institutional support and a pro-active enhancement of preferential regional schemes of cooperation. Most delicate and complex are the developments in those relationships that obviously

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71 See Wenig, Daniel, *Zivil-militärische Zusammenarbeit in der Europäischen Union*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004; Duke, Simon (ed.), *The EU and Crisis Management: Development and Prospects*, Maastricht: European Institute for Public Administration, 2002.

matter most for the EU's own well-being, namely in the complex sphere of EU Neighborhood policies, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ("Barcelona Process") and the new Union for the Mediterranean. Given the proximity of the partner countries and the volatility of the region bordering the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, the EU initiated a highly complex process. So far, however, this process was not able to transform the asymmetric character of the partnership between the EU and the littoral states of the Southern Mediterranean.<sup>72</sup> In spite of all divergence, the EU remains convinced that regional cooperation is the path to enhanced well-being and political stability in any region of the world and thus a contribution to a more balanced and peaceful world-order. Through economic assistance, cooperation agreements and political dialogue the EU is pursuing this policy goal in a very pro-active manner.<sup>73</sup>

- As much as "conditionality" has become a political mantra for the EU since the early twenty-first century in pursuing its foreign policy, including its support for regional cooperation, the struggle for human rights has always been a leitmotif guiding the European Union's relations with other parts of the world. The promotion of human rights – considered to be the cornerstone of a stable political order that is based on democratic values and the rule of law – is much more complex than the promotion of regional integration. However, regional integration can only succeed beyond a certain limit if it is rooted in similar political structures among the participating countries. Moreover, the EU believes, it must be rooted in respect for universally recognized human rights, democratic procedures and rule of law that facilitates the advancement of a pluralistic and lively civil society.
- Starting with the European experience in the struggle against communist dictatorships during the Cold War, the EU's policy of promoting human rights has been included in all international activities of the European Union, most notably in its development policies. The European Union pursues the promotion of human rights with a set of instruments, "but clearly prefers positive to negative measures" as empirical evidence shows<sup>74</sup>. Since 1986, the European Union has provided small amounts of financial support for the promotion of human rights and human rights related institutions in various countries. The various EU funds were finally consolidated in 1994 under one budgetary heading – the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights – as requested by the European Parliament. Since then, the budget line has been constantly increased although it is only a small fraction of the overall budget for

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72 See Calleya, Stephen, *Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations*, London: Routledge, 2005.

73 See Smith, Karen E., *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Oxford: Polity, 2003: 72-85.

74 Ibid.: 110.

the EU's external relations, which itself is a budget of only about seven percent of the whole EU budget.

- Since the 1990's, the European Union has broadened its objective of promoting human rights by suggesting that democracy and good governance are fundamental preconditions for a lasting and solid protection of human rights. Promoting human rights has become a continuous objective of the EU's external relations. The breakdown of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe has contributed to a new ideological consensus in Europe – also within the “old” European Union – about the importance of rule of law, democratic procedures and good governance. Good governance became a new catch-word in dealing with the manifold problems of political development and transformation, both inside and outside Europe. The Copenhagen Criteria defining the conditions for EU membership since the early 1990's include the notions of rule of law, democracy and good governance. In negotiating the Cotonou Agreement – the framework for EU's relations with most developing countries – the quest for democratic rule and good governance was likewise ranking prominently for the EU. In the absence of an international codification of the notion of good governance and even of the concepts of rule of law and of democracy, the European Union is obliged to specify its claims and goals unilaterally: Imposing conditionality on development aid, granting aid for programs of democratization, human rights and good governance, observation of and assistance for fair and democratic elections and the use of various diplomatic means have become the main instruments through which the EU tries to support good governance, democracy and rule of law. Almost inevitably, the European Union was confronted with inconsistencies in pursuing different policies vis-à-vis different countries, regimes and regions while at the same time struggling to formulate consensus among its member states, which were pursuing specific interests not always in line with the proclaimed normative goals of the EU. While the EU imposed diplomatic sanctions, for example, on Burma in 1990, on Nigeria in 1995, on Pakistan in 1999 and on Zimbabwe in 2002, France did not shy away from inviting Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe to attend a Franco-African Summit in 2003. In 2004, the EU threatened Sudan with sanctions without truly manifesting the seriousness of its threat to the regime in Khartoum.<sup>75</sup> The biggest limit of EU policy projections became evident when

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75 For an overview of cases of aid suspended and sanctions imposed by the European Union for violations of human rights and democratic principles in third countries between 1988 and 2002 see Smith, Karen E., *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, op.cit: 205-208. On the EU's diplomatic involvement in Sudan during the Darfur crisis see Bacía, Horst, “Zwischen Einflussnahme und Drohungen: Das Dilemma der EU in der Darfur-Krise,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 4, 2004. On the general EU's crisis management in sub-Saharan Africa, with special emphasis on the military operation “Artemis” in Bunia in 2003 see Faria, Fernanda, *Crisis*

the EU tried to prevent the nuclear program of Iran by way of negotiations. These negotiations were able to prolong the illusion that Iran would accept stopping its nuclear ambitions. But eventually, the EU negotiators failed to achieve their original intention. Iran pursued its dangerous path that was aimed from the beginning at strengthening the country's role as the new center of power in the Broader Middle East, no matter global the repercussions.

- Conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building have become permanent issues of concern for the European Union since its failure to stop the outbreak of the Wars of Yugoslavian Succession during the 1990's. Beginning with the EU Summit in Cologne in 1999, the European Union has developed a broad array of instruments in support of its goal to prevent conflicts from escalating into violence. Preparing the post-conflict conditions for lasting peace is a long-term task. It requires the EU to cope with the complex root causes of conflicts. While the EU failed to resolve the Cyprus question through the EU membership of Cyprus in 2004, it was proud to halt the escalation of political conflicts in Macedonia in 2002. Following the formal, yet internationally controlled independence of Kosovo on February 17, 2008, the EU was ready to supervise the civilian observation mission in Kosovo while at the same time it was obliged to enhance its effort to bring Serbia closer to European Union membership. In the Middle East, the European Union is increasingly getting involved as a peace-keeping force that can succeed only on the basis of a robust mandate.

Long-term peace building requires new threat assessments, applied instruments and an innovative set of strategies. The European Union is in the process of developing interlocking instruments of soft and hard power. The nature of conflicts unfolding in the twenty-first century forces the EU to constantly broaden its horizon beyond the traditional definition of its role as a soft-power.

- The fight against organized international crime has become another priority in the global projection of EU interests. Although the fight against drugs already has a long history reaching back into the 1970's, only with the end of the Cold War did organized crime become an element of asymmetric and non-governmental "relations" in an increasingly open and disordered world. Trafficking of women and organized prostitution, drug trade, smuggling of goods and even of illegal migrants became notorious concerns for the security systems across Europe – and not only in Europe. More than half a million illegal immigrants arrive in the European Union annually. Although not all of them are criminals, their migration into Europe is a criminal act nurturing fear and prejudice against migrants across the EU.

The European debate about a coherent policy defining the EU as a space of freedom, justice and law became more focused in the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001. The EU immediately agreed on the terms of a European arrest warrant, including a common definition of terrorism. Europol and the relevant American security institutions maintained very professional and successful means of cooperation that were unaffected by the political crisis between the US and some European governments on the Iraq issue in 2002/2003. The EU has become aware that Europe had been used as a safe haven for terrorists while at the same time Europe could not prevent also becoming a target of terrorism as the Madrid train bombing on March 11, 2004, and the London subway bombings on July 7, 2005, bitterly showed. Nevertheless, instead of reducing the fight against terrorism to a “global war,” the European Union tries to tackle the root causes of terrorism and it perceives the preventive fight against terrorism as a policing task across the EU.

#### *4. Europe: Projecting a New Vision of Itself*

##### *(1) Hesitantly Returning to a Global Role*

The enlargement of the role of the European Union as an international actor is beyond any doubt. Yet, the question of how Europe would ultimately want to position itself in this world remains to be answered. The debate about a European seat on the Security Council of the United Nations is but one rather formal dimension of this evolving issue. A modern answer to the “modernity,” which the European Union claims as far as the organization of political structures among people and states is concerned, would be a UN Security Council seat for the EU, representing all its states and citizens. There can be no illusion that France and Great Britain will insist on their global privileges by continuing their membership on the Security Council. Should the issue ever become a matter of real consideration and negotiation, a technical solution would have to be found for recognizing the traditional claim of France and Great Britain. But far from this question, the European Union does not look as if it would approach the issue at all in the foreseeable future. Instead, a useless and time-consuming detour is simmering on the back burner of European Union debates. Germany (and sometimes Italy) has not renounced its ambition to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Instead of favoring further national seats on the Security Council of the UN – be it for Germany or for Italy – the European Union could only strengthen its genuine global role if it were able to consensually advocate a common European seat. A European seat on the UN Security Council could be matched by other regional seats for Latin America, Africa, South Asia and the Arab world. These regional seats could be

organized in a rotating manner, not unlike the old system of rotating EU presidencies. It would nevertheless create a new dimension for a regionalizing world order.

In order to gain a stronger global presence, the European Union needs more than a political profile in the United Nations. As long as Europe's global identity does not become evident through a cohesive, continuous and consistent global commitment on all possible matters of relevance to mankind, the European Union will not be taken sufficiently seriously as a genuine global player. The first wave of globalization in fifteenth and sixteenth century was driven by European internal dynamics, adventurous European seafarers and explorers, creative merchants and faithful missionaries. It ended as a quest for global dominance and colonial control, followed by a worldwide shrinking of Europe's presence and influence. The new wave of globalization in the twenty-first century is largely defined by American technology and material power. It nevertheless is a wave of globalization that includes the European Union. With the European Union's expanding global role, Europe is returning to the world stage after a century of imperial overstretch, domestic self-destruction and internal rehabilitation. It is a Europe with a completely new global image and reputation. The European Union offers a new contract of partnership to the world.

This ambitious new projection of Europe's interests, claims and goals is linked to the fundamental transformation of European security identity. From the sixteenth century onward, Europeans tended to define security toward each other. From the theological disputes in the Age of Reformation to the military battles of the Thirty Years War, from the conflicts in the age of enlightenment to those in the age of nationalism, Europe was struggling with itself. In doing so, it also had to inevitably struggle with the "rest of the world." Colonial expansion was also a function of internal European conflicts. Imperial overstretch followed colonial expansion and self-destruction followed the imperial overstretch. The cataclysmic escalation of a century long struggle for Europe's identity turned toward a new prospect with the emerging European integration process. European integration has generated a new understanding of Europe's security identity, including in its global dimension. Cooperative patterns of internal European behavior, based on the reciprocal use of resources of the continent, have also begun to define and advance a common approach of the EU to the world at large. The European Union likes to be perceived as an EU that offers partnership to the world and integration or deepened association with its immediate neighborhood.<sup>76</sup> It is in line with this self-perception that the European Union offers to be a partner for intercultural and inter-religious dialogue.

The European Union would also have to position itself in the emerging power quarrels of an increasingly uncertain world order. This includes the relationship of the

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76 See Tunander, Ola, et al. (eds.), *Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity*, Oslo: PRIO, 1997; Aggestam, Lisbeth, and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda*, Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 2000.

European Union with the United States of America on the one hand, and with Russia on the other hand. In general terms, the European Union projected its interest to be a friendly and constructive partner with both. But looking at the relationship in more detail, the ambivalence of EU approaches became evident. Regarding the US, the EU had no alternative but to reinvigorate transatlantic relations as the central key for the management of world affairs. Yet, a certain European trend to define Europe against the US and to pretend the possibility of a transatlantic divorce did not stop. Regarding Russia, the EU was aware of the growing authoritarianism in Russia and the potential of threat by Russia because of Europe's energy dependency. Yet, a certain European inclination to pretend a partnership based on equal values and interests with an increasingly unpredictable Russia prevailed. Since the early years of the twenty-first century, the EU relation with Russia was developing into a particular problem for a coherent relationship between the EU's enlargement policies, its neighborhood strategy and the EU's overall global ambition.

- The EU was somewhat ambivalent in its support for the second wave of post-communist democratization revolutions that were unfolding since 2003 in Georgia and in the Ukraine, sweeping into Central Asia by 2005. While the EU took “a clear and even bold initiative”<sup>77</sup> as a resolute mediator in the Ukraine after the election fraud of November 2004, it only reluctantly responded to the long-term ambition of the new president of the Ukraine to join the EU after Victor Yushchenko finally got elected in late December 2004 and was peacefully installed on January 23, 2005, as the country's President. It remained undecided whether or not the EU might finally accept a “European perspective” for the Ukraine, that is to say the prospect of EU membership should the Ukraine eventually succeed with its internal transformation and thus comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. Some observers were beginning to argue that EU membership for Ukraine could be more realistic than EU membership for Turkey. The enlargement debate would eventually also touch the interest Georgia has expressed in joining the European Union. Together with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are member states of the Council of Europe. The Southern Caucasus was increasingly becoming a region of strategic interest for the US and hence for NATO. The European Union would not be able to postpone the development of its own coherent strategy for this region at the outer limits of Europe.
- A pro-active enlargement prospect for the Euro-Atlantic institutions toward the Ukraine and the countries of the Southern Caucasus will intensify the growing dilemma of EU policies vis-à-vis Russia. For the time being, the obvious return to authoritarian rule under President Putin since 2003 does not correspond to a

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77 Bernstein, Richard, “EU diplomacy, the way it's supposed to happen,” *International Herald Tribune*, November 26, 2004.



coherent and resolute recalibration of EU strategies toward Russia. The European Parliament has become a critical voice as far as Russia's policies in Chechnya, but also the rupture of democratization and the destabilization of the rule of law and the market economy in the Russian Federation, are concerned. On the other hand, the governments of leading EU member states – France and Germany in particular, in 2005 astonishingly joined by Spain – were promoting a policy of engagement and quiet diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia. They were cautious because of European energy dependencies and the long-standing fear “to provoke” Russia. Other EU member states such as Poland with 100 percent dependency on Russian oil imports and 99 percent dependency on Russian natural gas, Slovakia with 100 percent dependency on Russian oil imports and 100 percent dependency on Russian natural gas imports, or Hungary with 100 percent dependency on Russian oil imports and 81 percent dependency on Russian natural gas imports, were much less enthusiastic about hugging the Russian bear.

In November 2003, the EU and Russia had identified four “common spaces” for their future cooperation: A common economic space, a common space of internal security, a common space of external security, and a common space for research, education and culture. In spite of mutual frustrations both on the side of the EU and of Russia, France and Germany were continuing a special relationship with Vladimir Putin's Russia that was irritating<sup>78</sup> other EU partners and the US as well. Most EU citizens and political leaders were categorically rejecting the idea of a possible Russian membership in the EU, even over the long-term. Some analysts, however, expected that in the mid-term an EU-Russia-Treaty could become the framework for a lasting partnership, replacing the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997. The internal EU debate about strategies and policies toward Russia was a constant reflection about the uncertainty that is prevailing in Russia. While some EU member states are inclined to built bridges toward Russia and enhance the degree of engagement, others remain skeptical and worried about Russia's long-term future. They prefer clear borders and the recognition of limits to the EU-Russia partnership. In fact it is astonishing that while the EU and Russia are discussing the deepening of bilateral relations through a long-term treaty, a corresponding “EU-US-Treaty” was obviously not planned for with the same European drive. During the 2007 German EU Presidency, new negotiations on an EU-Russia Partnership Agreement did not begin. Hence the original 1997 agreement was automatically prolonged without any impulse for a new strategic orientation. Polish resistance against too close EU relations to Russia turned EU priorities

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78 See Meier, Christian, *Nach dem Gipfel von Den Haag. Russland und das neue Modell der Partnerschaft mit der EU*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2004.

toward energy solidarity with Poland and laid to rest German plans for a new “Ostpolitik.” For once, intra-EU solidarity was seen as prime interest, not the least in order to facilitate the negotiations that led to the Reform Treaty of December 2007. In order not to provoke Russia too much at the same time the EU did not succeed in formulating a coherent policy toward the Ukraine and the Caucasus as initially expected by the German EU Presidency in early 2007. In June 2007, the European Council only decided on a Central Asia Strategy Paper, not without meeting criticism for its primarily rhetorical nature. In the meantime the EU has produced more strategy papers than strategies and more visions than concrete implementations of foreign policy. It probably should get the benefit of the doubt as a common foreign and security policy has only been emerging for less than two decades. But the gap between EU reluctance and global expectations is clearly rising. The European Union needs to shape its coherent and pro-active global positioning in all aspects of international relations beyond its internal idiosyncratic institutional reform aspirations. The world expects more from Europe and Europe should develop more ambitions and tools to apply them.<sup>79</sup>

## (2) *The Old World in a New World Order*

Multiple political identities and stable internal peace frame the current European encounter of the world. The biggest obstacle to a convincing profile of Europe’s latest global projection was inherent in the European approach to global challenges and opportunities: While the political culture in the United States is intuitively universalistic, the European approach favors procedures, incremental approximations to new realities and cautious differentiation. The European Union was hesitant to project its role beyond the next cycle of mandates or fiscal plans. This was not just a matter of projecting visions and futuristic scenarios. The European Union preferred to operate on a pragmatic day-to-day basis. To introduce long-term political planning was inherently alien to the EU. It would require a change in the political culture of the EU and more courage on the side of key EU actors to advance the idea of a more coherent and future-oriented approach to politics. Such a turn in EU behavioral patterns would not require a radical transformation of the political scene in Europe. Relative simple reforms could really make a difference: The European Parliament could introduce the European equivalent of the State of the Union Address regularly delivered by the American President. A regular State of the European Union Address, delivered by the President of

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79 See Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, *The EU in the World*, Speech, Brussels, February 2, 2006. <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/59&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>; Lieb, Julia, and Andreas Maurer, *Europas Rolle in der Welt stärken: Optionen für ein kohärentes Aussenhandeln der Europäischen Union*, SWP-Studie S 15, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2007.

the European Commission, the President of the European Parliament and the President of the European Council would be a refreshing innovation in Europe's political culture.

For two centuries, wars in Europe were part of a sad normalcy. It was a permanent burden to deal with the question of German power inside Europe. It was a permanent problem to externalize intra-European power conflicts through the medium of global imperialism and colonialism. In the end, the internal European conflicts and their global externalization came to an end. Europe's supremacy in the world faded. In 1914, four-fifths of the world's land surface outside Antarctica was under either a European flag or the flag of a nation of European descent.<sup>80</sup> In 1900, 25 percent of world population was European. In 2010, roughly 7 percent of the global population was European. Now, the EU does not consist of more than one percent of the surface of the earth. Colonial dominance over practically all territories outside Europe has come to an end, with the tragic exception of the fringes of Europe where Russia was still involved in a struggle of secession and decolonization with the Muslim people of Northern Caucasus. Whether or not during the twenty-first century Europe would become a museum to the world, a home for the aging, a target of tourism and the leisure playground for its citizens and visitors, or Europe would become the model of a peaceful transformation of conflicts, the laudable expression of unity in plurality, and a dynamic and innovative technological and economic zone in connection with a stable and supreme social model, remains the pivotal question for the European Union to answer. Whether or not by 2019, Europe will once and for all have overcome the unhappy peace order of 1919 and will have positioned itself as a model of regionalization, integration and social inclusion remains to be seen. No path into the future is predestined. Everything depends upon European decisions – and upon European visions about the future of the old continent in a new world order.

The goal of an integrated, truly Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy of the EU will never be a purpose in itself. It would be the logical precondition for a cohesive global role of the European Union. Much depends on spending, and especially on the readiness of Europe to enhance its common defense spending. The fact that the United Kingdom spent 33.5 billion dollars on defense in 2002 against 26 billion dollars for France and 24.5 billion dollars for Germany, 13 billion dollars for Italy and 7.5 billion dollars for Spain alone does not mean too much. Even the fact that military spending had dropped in France, the United Kingdom and Germany by 13 percent during the 1990's cannot be taken as the sole parameter in comparing US defense spending with European defense spending. A better focus than the simple reference to the share of GDP for defense (down during the 1990's from 3.27 to 2.26 percent in the United Kingdom, from 2.41 to 1.72 percent in France and from 1.55 to 1.16 percent in Germany) would be a comparison between the overall EU defense spending and that of

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80 See Roberts, J. M., *The Penguin History of the Twentieth Century: The History of the World 1901 to the Present*, London: Penguin Books, 1999: 89.

the United States. Over the first years of the twenty-first century, defense spending dropped from 60 percent to less than 50 percent of the US budget while the spending for defense equipment had gone down from 40 to 25 percent of the overall budget. However, defense, security and stability in the world of new conflicts, asymmetric warfare and unstable state structures cannot be defined by the degree of military spending and the focus on technology and equipment only. The EU had to admit that its biggest gap vis-à-vis the US is in technology: While the Pentagon is spending about 28,000 US dollars per soldier per year on research and development, the EU member states together are spending four or five times less.<sup>81</sup> While the combined EU defense spending is less than 50 percent of US defense spending, it is substantially higher than the defense budget of Russia, China or Japan. In terms of manpower, the combined EU forces of 1.8 million soldiers are stronger than the 1.5 million US armed forces, twice as many as Russia's military personnel and almost as many as China's. It should also be noted that EU participation in UN Peace Keeping Missions is seven times higher than US participation.<sup>82</sup>

All in all, the defense capabilities of the European Union and its member states are not so irrelevant or small. Yet, the overall efficiency and, even more importantly, the political will to project European interests on a global scale is limited and decisively below the global presence and performance of the United States. As long as security and defense spending will not be pooled on the level of the European Union, the EU will lag behind. It should become imperative for the European Union to assess the cost of non-integration of defense budgets, schemes and instruments.<sup>83</sup> The EU is increasingly confronted with the need to redefine European public goods in fiscal terms, including a European public good in defense and military matters. For the fiscal period 2000 to 2006, the budget of the European Union had amounted to approximately 100 billion euros per annum. While around 51 percent was spent on the Common Agricultural Policy – no matter how many reforms have taken place to reduce this amount of subsidies to a group of approximately 4 percent of the overall EU population – and 28 percent on structural actions – notably for Regional Funds and for Cohesion Funds – only 7 percent of the budget was allocated for expenditures related to external actions, including pre-accession funds. 8 percent of the remaining budget was spent on internal policies and 5 percent on administrative expenditures. For the fiscal period 2007-2013

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81 Reid, T. R., *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*, New York: Penguin Press, 2004: 180.

82 See Ferguson, Niall, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire*, New York: Penguin Press, 2004: 238.

83 Instead, academics preferred to stereotypically repeat the theoretical arguments why a Common Foreign and Security Policy could not work – although it was beginning to be proved to the contrary, see Wagner, Wolfgang, "Why the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy Will Remain Intergovernmental: a Rationalist Institutional Choice Analysis of European Crisis Management Policy," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10.4 (2003): 576-595.

the EU budget for external actions increased only gradually and was to reach 9.9 percent in 2013 (a total of 50 billion euros for the whole period 2007-2013).

It is, to say the least, unwise for the European Union not to make better use of its defense expenditures and to better pool resources in all relevant fields of external relations. In light of the demographic trend in Europe, it is illusionary to assume that Europe or any of its main countries would substantially increase defense spending in the foreseeable future. But in order to limit the technology and capability gap with the US, it is imperative for Europe to make better use of the existing resources available for security related expenditures. The EU has to develop a solid, albeit limited military capability in order to allow the EU to implement its Security Strategy and to strengthen Europe's influence on EU decision-making. Multiple means have to be utilized, an improved division of labor among EU member states as far as expenditure for defense capabilities is concerned, a better use of the public-private partnership, and the optimal use of the newly established European Defense Agency as far as common procurement policies and production of military equipment is concerned. In this context, the absence of a European tax becomes relevant. The 2007 Reform Treaty (as well as the ill-fated European Constitution of 2004) avoided an answer on the matter of a solid EU revenue allocation. Academic studies continue to raise the matter and link it to the need of defining European public goods, most notably in the sphere of external actions of the EU. It is indispensable for the EU to redefine not only the nature of its fiscal instruments, but also the character of public allowances in support of EU policies. The existing modalities for allocating the EU budget have grown over time and as such they remain highly idiosyncratic as the EU reflects on its position of playing a stronger global role.

The most traditional resources of the EU are linked to community policies already developed during the 1960's and 1970's: Around 12 percent of the union budget originates in taxes on agricultural imports, sugar in particular, and other levies on imports into the European Union. In 1979, the then European Community introduced a quota system by which a certain share of each national value-added tax was to be redirected into the EU budget. This sum amounted to not more than 15 percent of the EU budget during the fiscal period 2000 to 2006 and is not different for the period 2007 to 2013. The biggest share of the EU budget – approximately 70 percent – stems from a quota system based on the Gross Domestic Product of each EU member state.

In February 2004, the European Commission outlined its financial perspectives for the fiscal period 2007 to 2013. The Commission proposed an EU budget of 1.15 percent of the combined Gross Domestic Product of all EU member states. This proposal was strongly refused by the leading net contributors to the EU budget, namely Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. In June 2005, the European Council failed to reach a compromise on the budget perspective for 2007-2013 based on a Luxembourg compromise proposal trying to limit the expenditure ceiling to 1.06

percent of the EU GDP. After a long and daunting period of controversy, the European Council in December 2005 successfully framed the budget perspective for 2007-2013. The basic decision was by definition limiting the future EU scope of action. The EU budget for the period 2007-2013 would not exceed 1.045 percent of the EU's GDP. The EU net budget of 862.3 billion euros was slightly upgraded after the European Parliament refused to agree to the decisions taken by the European Council in December 2005. A new inter-institutional deal was found in early 2006. The budget line for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy was not substantially increased (50 billion euros for the period 2007-2013). It was evident that global expectations and EU resources would not be consistent. As long as the EU was not willing to introduce a European financial constitution, the national net contributing system would genetically limit the scope of action of the European Union.<sup>84</sup>

The lack of a sufficiently communitarized budget for foreign actions of the European Union is also limiting the credibility and coherence of EU development policies. The European Union claims to be the biggest development aid donor worldwide. The EU can say so only by adding the national expenditures. The degree of a genuine EU value added to development policy remains controversial. Development aid is a key policy area for bridging interests and values. In reality, the EU is not yet an autonomous actor. The EU is missing a common and communitarized development aid budget worth the name. Development financing remains a national prerogative. The consequence is permanent confusion about competences and about accountability in development policy matters. Also conceptually, the EU's approach to international development issues could be much more streamlined and stronger.<sup>85</sup> The more the European Union wants to be taken seriously as a global player that acts coherently in all relevant matters of international order-building, the more the EU simply needs a communitarized budget for foreign actions in all relevant fields. And it needs clarity about communitarized competences that go beyond the coordination of 27 or so national preferences and policies, interests and values.

The fundamental question remains unresolved: How to define a European public good and how to organize the appropriate budget to implement it with a certain cohesion and consistency? One way would be to continue along the path of developing further fiscal schemes relative to European challenges, such as an energy tax, an environmental tax, a security tax or to establish a certain quota of nationally existing tax mechanisms, such as corporate tax, explicitly to European tasks. More important, however, than incremental enlargements of European tax instruments would be a coherent European debate – and finally solid political decisions – on the principles

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84 For the background of the negotiations in 2004/2005 see Becker, Peter, *Der Finanzrahmen 2007-2013: Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Finanzverfassung oder Fortsetzung der nationalen Nettosalddopolitik?*, SWP-Studie S 36, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005.

85 See Carbone, Maurizio, *The European Union and International Development: The Politics of Foreign Aid*, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.

guiding European public goods. According to academic research, two principles may guide the evolution of a European tax system appropriate to bridge the gap between the growing tasks bestowed upon the EU and the current under-funding of the European Union.<sup>86</sup>

- Coupling European tax levies to specific European functions: As seen in the field of external trade, European interests have evolved and will further evolve around specific functions transferred to the European Union. As they have to be financed, the principles of transparency and accountability require a clear coupling of new European tax levies to specific functions granted to the European Union – and the other way around if the functions are to be properly implemented. External affairs have certainly gained consensus in the European Union as an expression of a common interest and thus this policy field should generate a specifically communitarized budget.
- Coupling European tax levies to a specific European objective: A European tax can also evolve – even in an indirect way – around specific objectives, which the EU intends to achieve. As in the case of environmental protection or the regulation of the common market, the EU has demonstrated the ability to define objectives that require public spending by the member states. The evolution of a common market for defense tools can serve the purpose of enhancing European Union fiscal involvement based on increased defense spending among member states; those who do not increase their share might be “punished” via the mechanism of redefining their GDP contribution to the EU budget.

In both cases, the EU must avoid double spending and fiscal competition between the EU level and that of its member states. Should the EU follow the first principle, it will inevitably lead to the creation of a Union budgetary fund for defense spending, the logical consequence of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Should the EU follow the second principle, it can mean a value added in security and defense policy, but the financial basis would continuously be based on national expenditures in defense and security matters. The application of the first principle would initiate a communitarized budget of the EU. The application of the second principle would prolong the intergovernmental character of European defense and its current nature as the net sum of individual national contributions.

The example demonstrates that the future evolution of Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy is not only a matter of grand strategy and global political implication. It is inherently linked to the evolution of Europe’s internal structures, to the widely debated “deepening” of European integration. For non-Europeans, the first aspect will be the most important one, for EU member states and taxpayers the second issue is the

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86 For the following see Brehon, Nicolas-Jean, “L’impôt européen,” in: Lefebvre, Maxime (ed.), *Quel Budget Européen à l’horizon 2013?: Moyens et politiques d’une Union élargie*, Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2004: 161-180.

more contested one. If the EU wants to achieve a truly relevant and coherent global role through a cohesive web of external relations, strategies, policies and programs, it will have to organize an adequate European tax mechanism. As this will either curtail spending for domestic programs or require an increase in the overall EU budget, the debates on this matter will be long and daunting. In the first case, the issue of internal solidarity and Union cohesion will be articulated; in the second case, the global responsibility and international expectation toward the European Union will be brought forward as the defining argument. In the end, the relevant decisions will indicate the nature and quality of political leadership in Europe.

### *(3) Toward European Public Goods in Foreign and Security Policies*

A coherent global role of the European Union needs to be recognized as an EU-wide European public good. Only then will the fiscal architecture of the European Union be changed. Setting up a budget line for defense matters in the EU will be as relevant as further progress toward the harmonization of European defense spending through the work of the European Defense Agency. Already during the 1970's, the McDougall Report suggested the need for a parallel development of political and fiscal integration with an emphasis on bringing the function of defense spending to the European level. The report estimated that the EU defense budget would have to be in the order of 2 percent of the overall Gross Domestic Product of the then European Economic Community. Until a "pre-federal" stage would be reached, the European defense budget would have to grow to a ratio of 5 to 7 percent of the overall Gross Domestic Product of the Community. Nothing has substantially changed since the 1970's. It is high time for the EU to move forward on this matter.

Unfortunately, the EU budget structure has not yet overcome its inertia. The risk has even increased that the Union budget will remain too small to meet the tasks already bestowed upon the Union. As a consequence of this fiscal inertia, a re-nationalization of policies could result. This would hardly enhance the efficiency and outcome of policies both in quality and quantity. It would only undermine the need to increase the European added value to make specific policies both more targeted and effective. As far as possible EU defense spending is concerned, the nexus between internal cohesion, the evolution of budgetary federalism and the global projection of Europe as well as its perception worldwide is evident. The creation of a viable defense budget for the European Union would not only strengthen the integration process in the field of defense, it would also enhance the legitimacy of the integration through the creation of visible European public goods. Finally, it would increase the security function of the EU in the field of conflict resolution, crisis management and post-crisis stabilization around the world.



The process of pooling resources in the field of security and defense ranges from joint capabilities – particularly jointly procured and operated equipment – to complementary advantages such as interoperability, lower overhead costs and more effective common doctrines, strategies and missions. It also includes the early realization of such initiatives as the creation of a European Security and Defense College, a European Police Academy and a European Training Institute. Of particular relevance are the efforts to forge a European Defense Industry and to strengthen armaments cooperation through the European Defense Agency.<sup>87</sup> Ultimately, the most sensitive question cannot disappear from the public debate in Europe: Why does the EU still need twenty-seven national armies with their respective infrastructures and personnel? Eurocorps – the first multinational European force formed in 1992 – and the European Battlegroups – operational since 2007 – have shown that these are not theoretical matters. The ultimate key to success or failure of a Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy of the European Union will be the EU's ability to move from intergovernmental to supranational structures and mechanisms. Only by properly pooling resources and bringing them under one united EU command can the EU become a coherent and capable global actor who makes the best possible use of limited resources.

Europe's standing in the world was defined for most of the twentieth century by the events of 1914 and 1919: 1914 was the beginning of the first European civil war that ended in 1919 with the de-empowerment of Europe at the tables of the Versailles Peace Conference. Between 1914 and 1919, a world broke into pieces that had largely been shaped and defined by Europe.<sup>88</sup> Whether or not the European Union might accomplish its form and function, both in size and depth, remains to be seen. Elections to the European Parliament will take place in 2014 and again in 2019, followed by the appointment of a new European Commission. The fiscal cycle of the EU is currently set for 2007 to 2013 and the next one is due for the period 2014 to 2020. The pending cycle of enlargements may come to a close around 2020.<sup>89</sup> But even beyond 2020, the European Union will continue to evolve, with all the idiosyncratic modes experienced throughout the second half of the twentieth century and during most of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The process of deepening will continue for many more years

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87 See Schmitt, Burkhard, *From Cooperation to Integration: Defense and Aerospace Industries in Europe*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2001; James, Andrew D., "European Armaments Cooperation: Lessons for a Future European Armaments Agency," *The International Spectator*, 38:4 (2003): 59-74; Keohane, Daniel, *Europe's New Defense Agency*, London: Centre for European Reform, 2004; Macrae, Duncan, "Defense – European Arms Agency—One Step Forward," *Interavia: Business and Technology*, 59 (2004): 41-42. The European Defense Agency has four mandates: defense capability development, research, acquisition, armaments.

88 See Stefan Zweigs intriguing novel *The World of Yesterday* (paperback reprint by Barnes and Noble, New York, 1990), capturing the spirit of this unique moment better than most historical work.

89 See Rehn, Olli, *Europe's Next Frontiers*, Nomos: Baden-Baden 2007.

and most likely for decades. Its ultimate form and function cannot be projected. It will evolve in reaction, and sometimes in anticipation, of the main global trends.

Whatever the results eventually will be – and transient they will remain as all works of politics are –, the European Union has already left a visible and impressive imprint on the map of world history and geopolitics. Notions of political philosophy have been affected by its existence, also patterns of global trade and economic development, trajectories of geopolitics and power equations, and finally even the global perception of Europe.

“A Secure Europe in a Better World” – the title of the first EU Security Strategy of December 2003 was more than a promise to the world. First and foremost, it was the definition of a challenge to Europe itself. Threats and opportunities for a community of 491 million people and a quarter of the world’s GDP will closely coexist in the world of the twenty-first century. They leave the EU with no other choice but to fully become a global actor if it wants to shape its own destiny. In order to do so, the EU has to match aspirations and capabilities, rhetorical goals and politically consensual interests. The EU has to take up responsibility for global security and stability in all its aspects. Only theoretically, the European Union is facing the choice of either being a huge neutral (and hence self-neutralized) zone with an attitude of self-complacent aloofness, or an exemplary, multilateral oriented and pro-active region in strong partnership with the United States. In reality, the choice it faces is either to stay a benevolent yet increasingly marginalized regional power or to become a comprehensive global power with full commitment to the management of world affairs. While the European Union has underperformed in matters of foreign, security and defense policy so far, its very existence and evolution has been more than fifty years evidence of a steep historical learning curve for Europe as a whole. One can expect these European learning processes to continue. Part of the ongoing European learning process remains the steady reinvigoration of transatlantic relations. As the EU’s Security Strategy rightly stated, only by “acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.”<sup>90</sup>

The Security Strategy of the EU has recognized the United States as the dominant military actor in today’s world. It also reaffirmed the EU’s interest in “an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.”<sup>91</sup> The EU can be certain that the new US President, following George Bush in January 2009, will take the EU by its word. The United Nations has been considered to be the ultimate and central organ for peace in the world. The Security Strategy of the European Union – an answer, not a counter-proposal to the 2002 National Security Strategy of the US – was a European proposal for a renewed, trusted and lasting partnership with shared responsibilities in a globalized world. In the years ahead, it is dependent on the European Union – be it through

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90 European Union, *A Secure Europe in a better World: European Security Strategy*, op.cit.: 13.

91 Ibid.

intergovernmental or supranational mechanisms – to prove the claim of its “2010 Headline Goals” that “the European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security.”<sup>92</sup> On the other hand, it is dependent on the US to take the EU seriously as a partner in global strategic leadership. Also in the future, conflicting interests can hardly be avoided on individual issues. Yet, the political will to work together needs to be the defining element of transatlantic relations again. Should this be the case – and there is no law of nature indicating that it could not happen – the heirs of Christopher Columbus and of Henry the Navigator can ultimately find a common frame of mind again, coupled with the necessary political will (and a solid financial basis) to jointly manage the future of world affairs.

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92 Cited in Lindstrom, Gustav, *Enter the EU Battlegroups*, op.cit.: 80.