

IX. Searching In Vain: Why European Integration did not Work Earlier

1. The Ambivalence Between Culture and Politics in Europe

Europe is proud of its civilization. The diversity of European culture is appreciated across the globe. Yet, look at Europe with honesty, close to the pride of culture and civilization lies the legacy of pain and destruction. Europe's history can be written as one of glorious moments in the cultural memory of mankind, but also as a continuous story of power struggles, violence and man-made disasters. Only the very last chapter of European history has brought about peaceful cooperation and political integration as genuine elements of Europe's civility. Obviously, in former times European political culture has been weak as far as the realization of peace and the voluntary pooling of resources of Europe's power were concerned. For most of Europe's long history, culture and politics were apart from each other. Peace and power were antagonistic categories of statehood in most of Europe's history. One notable exception, medieval Christendom, was more religious than politically uniting. Another exception, the medieval Hanseatic League, while economically and legally effective in its own right, was limited to Northern Europe, was missing a political framework and did not address the issue of European identity. To use the economy as an important tool in linking the people of Europe, and the order their elites manage politically, was always a good idea in itself, but it did run counter to other, more dominant ideas about how to organize power and politics across the continent. Peaceful economic and, subsequently, political integration as part of European civilization, is a new reality for Europe. It became a reality only after Europeans realized through pain and destruction that their civilization could only be preserved by means of peaceful and democratic integration. It took Europe more than two thousand years to peacefully establish a pluralistic European political order and to recognize Europeans as citizens of their own united yet diverse continent.

Of course, manifold ideas and concepts of how to integrate Europe existed in former times.¹ In fact, they have accompanied European history. But they never materialized in a peaceful way, based on mutually recognized legitimacy among all European people and political units. The continent is older than its contemporary nation states. The current territorial delineation of European nation states is a relatively new method of ordering Europe's geography. While these territories are the dominant factor of public political reference for the citizens of Europe and for the world in its relations with

1 See Bussière, Eric, et al. (eds.), *Europe: The European Idea and Identity, from Ancient Greece to the twenty-first century*, Antwerp: Mercatorfonds, 2001; Pagden, Anthony (ed.), *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to European Union*, Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002.

Europe today, they are relatively young and have dominated European history only for the shortest period since its civilization began to manifest itself.

The borders of Europe have always been as troublesome as the continent's political identity.² Europe's eastern borders have changed over time and cannot claim natural logic. For Greek geographer Eratosthenes, head of the Alexandria library in the third century before Christ, Europe stopped at the Bosphorus, a concept also shared by Greek historian Herodotus. During the time of the Roman Empire, the whole Mediterranean basin was considered European. In the Middle Ages, the Bosphorus and the river Don were considered to be the eastern borders of Europe, and fifteenth century maps show Europe without Anatolia. In 1730, the Russian court accepted the delineation of Swedish geographer Philip Johan von Strahlenberg, according to whom the Ural Mountains and the Kum-Manych Depression, which divides the Russian plain from the Northern Caucasus, constitute the borders of Europe. Strahlenberg's definition legitimized Russian expansionism and it became widely accepted by scientists – not however so by the Russian government, which also claimed sovereignty over the Northern Caucasus, and of course over the whole of Siberia, and does so to this day.

Europe as a product of history has always been shaped by its topography and climate: a mild climate, a highly diverse and well structured physical environment, naturally dividing Europe into regions and sub-regions. Its well-developed infrastructure originates in streets related to Roman military endeavors and in the networks of Christian monasteries, impacting on legal norms, educational structures and economic trajectories. Yet as striking as its geographical compactness and its natural environment is, Europe is habitat to a highly diverse population, expressing itself in at least 40 languages. Migration has been a continuous feature of Europe, voluntary as well as enforced in character.

The bodily characteristics and features of Europeans “normally” distinguish them from the people of Africa, the Middle East and Asia – although even this stereotypical argument is weakening as Europe has become home to people from all over the world. Yet among themselves, Europeans are continuously inclined to distinguish fellow Europeans not only by language, but also by facial outlook, size or hair-color, mentalities and habits, dress code and life style, religious confession and political conviction.³ There are more stereotypes about differences among Europeans – and even jokes – than about their commonalities compared with other people in the world. Yet the term “European” clarifies origin. Often it might also define attitudes, behavior and opinions, if not imagined perceptions and full-fledged world-views. The perception of Europeans is as confusing as the self-assessment of Europeans amid their diversity.

2 See Heath, John Everett, *Place Names of the World: Europe – Historical Context, Meaning and Changes*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000; Groenendijk, Kees, et al., *In Search of Europe's Borders*, The Hague: Kluwer 2003.

3 See Kelley, Judith, *Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.

The public order under which Europeans are living never completely corresponded to their ethnic or linguistic composition. If not for human differences, Europeans were always striving for territorial clarity. Claims for territory are as old as European history. It is not astonishing that Europeans are different from each other. But it is astonishing that Europeans took so long to realize the advantages of cooperation – more or less – over the inclination to fight each other and, if possible, to go it alone. The European continent has seen long periods of religious homogeneity, long periods of economic cooperation and long trajectories of fruitful cultural exchange. Yet, even the height of Christianity in Europe did not bring about a stable political order that would have been able to recognize linguistic and ethnic diversity, let alone different theological interpretations of the same Christian faith. European students were probably more mobile in the twelfth century than they are in the twenty-first century. The continent has experienced long periods in which the same or at least comparable political systems existed side by side. Yet they did not pool their resources, let alone the paraphernalia of their respective claim to national sovereignty.⁴

European unity has always been more than a political matter of war and peace, as important as this is. European unity has ultimately been a philosophical, if not an anthropological issue. As everywhere else in the world, people in Europe are searching for freedom and protection to pursue a life of happiness in accordance with their identity. They look after their families and reach out to other groups that constitute and share their own identity. Distancing oneself from others and opposing their claims of identity, interests and principled world views is as much part of the human experience as the desire to communicate, relate and cooperate with others for the sake of mutual enhancement of interests. Everywhere this anthropological basis of human society has always been linked to historical and intellectual experiences. As form in movement, Europe has entered the world's history and has prevailed as such to this day. Balancing the human quest for freedom and security with a variant of order and authority has not been a European burden alone. But Europe has given the world manifold variations of answering this obviously eternal struggle of man with him- and herself, with other human beings and with nature surrounding them all.

European history has been a history obsessed with territory and territorial claims. It has experienced all possible and impossible forms of power and political order, has tried to tame or to rewrite its history and has pretended to master its future or even redefine future's destiny. Europe has tested its borders – both in a territorial sense as well as a category of the human experiment with the given resources of nature and civilization. Progress and decline, renaissance and breakdown: Europe has always been a combination of an inward-looking search for a balance between stability and dynamics

4 See Barraclough, Geoffrey, *European Unity in Thought and Action*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1963; Arts, Will, et al., *The Cultural Diversity of European Unity: Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study*, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003.

and of an outward-looking attitude of curiosity toward others and, at times, aggressive, universal claims and projections of its own norms.

Traditionally, European dynamics has affected all spheres of life and has been diverse and competitive, even antagonistic. Development costs have been externalized in the history of Europe – serfs ploughed the land for their feudal owners, masses paid for churches and palaces, resources were collected across the world from people falling under European colonial rule. But for centuries Europe was also the most innovative and creative part of the world – art, often commissioned by ruling nobility or the clergy, medical progress and educational structures, trading patterns and technological achievements of all sorts are part of the European heritage.

Europe cannot be understood without its Christian heritage and its prevailing Christian realities. Yet Christianity did not originate in Europe and Jesus Christ obviously was born a Palestinian Jew. European identity has grown as a diverse combination of elements and many of its ligatures are *a priori* contradictory.⁵ Whichever ideas were bred in Europe, one can surely find others, which are contrasting and challenging. Pursuing interests has not been alien to Europeans across the continent, but how to balance them lastingly with those of one's neighbor has been absent in Europe's history of ideas, let alone in Europe's political history. Competition and suspicion were only superseded by pride and prejudice in favor of one's own community, no matter how it was defined in terms of framework, borders, and goals.

The cultural development of Europe has often been supported by the political powers of a given time. But political culture as a mode of behavior defining methods, goals and means of public policy has only developed most recently as a scientific concept and concern. Europe seems to be driven by the impossible combination of Leonardo da Vinci's vision to fly across any valley there is and Blaise Pascal's fear of the stars in the dark sky at night. Endless optimism and depressing skepticism accompany Europe's intellectual evolution. No intellectual step has ever been taken in Europe without outside influence reflecting earlier positions of thought, and no theory discussed in Europe could ever claim uniqueness without being challenged by new experience and insight. Yet uniqueness is what Europeans and non-Europeans alike tend to attribute to the results of Europe's complex and idiosyncratic path through history. No matter how unique Europe has become as a product of its cultures and civilizations, for more than two-thousand years it has not been able to forge a single political entity based on the free will of its people, the pooling of its material resources and the definition of unquestionable European interests.

Why has Europe not achieved this advancement of its potential prior to the second half of the twentieth century? Why did it build ideas and institutions only as contrasting and not as integrating patterns? Why did it fail for so long to link the three potentials

5 See Bussière, Eric, et al. (eds.), *Europe: The European Idea and Identity, from Ancient Greece to the twenty-first century*, Antwerp: Mercatorfonds, 2001.

Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt has defined as the most important sources of all statehood: culture (and notably religion), politics, and the economy?⁶ The archaeology of European integration can trace many noble concepts and idealistic proposals that have tried to do so. But never before the second half of the twentieth century were the goals of European unity linked to viable methods and sustainable means enabling their implementation. Whenever integration was pursued in Europe's long history, it either remained a spiritual and intellectual effort or it was executed by force and coercion, and in doing so, immediately limiting itself, as it was such behavior that was provoking national, if not nationalistic counter-reactions. Any effort to define European integration as the prime European interest leads to a large body of literature. But as far as its reality is concerned, it has to build on the limited legacy of the past fifty years of European integration. All earlier aspects or elements might be considered preparatory steps, but often they were no more than that. Europe's struggle to balance diversity and unity cannot project a solid and proud past into the unknown future. But this struggle should not be misjudged by past failures either, as it has advanced since the second half of the twentieth century with remarkable speed based on new arrangements between ideals and material contributions, goals and methods of integration, means and ends of European Union.

2. The Archaeology of European Integration

Europe's history is the history of contested borders and challenged concepts of order. The European space has been pressed together from the outside, leaving its delineation continuously imprecise and it has been in movement and under uncertainty from within.

Europe has also been a continent with its people constantly on the move, voluntarily or forcefully.⁷ Efforts to unify Europe have often been executed with violence. This fatal error had to fail as it inevitably provoked resistance from within Europe's diversity. It is surprising enough that amid the experience of cultural and linguistic diversity, Europeans have time and again tried to bring about unity.⁸ They have done so for different reasons and with different degrees of success. But before the second half of the twentieth century they never achieved unity for a relevant period through a mutually

6 Burckhardt, Jacob, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, Stuttgart: Kroener, 1978 (12.ed.).

7 See Hoerder, Dirk, et al. (eds.), *People on the Move: Migration, Acculturation and Ethnic Interaction in Europe and North America*, Providence: Berg, 1993; Leboutte, René (ed.), *Migrations et Migrants dans une Perspective Historique: Permanences et Innovations*, Bruxelles/New York: Peter Lang, 2000; Moch, Leslie Page, *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe since 1650*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003 (2nd ed.).

8 See de Rougement, Denis, *The Idea of Europe*, New York: Macmillan, 1966; van der Dussen, Jan, and Kevin Wilson (eds.), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, New York: Routledge, 1993; Murray, Philomena B., and Paul B. Rich (eds.), *Visions of European Unity*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

recognized, law-based legitimate political system as it is now constituted by the European Union. Ten reasons can explain why Europe never achieved unity and integration earlier:

(1) The notion of Europe is rooted in mythology and religion. In its origin, it was not linked to a political concept for a clearly defined territory and a diverse people. It was rather a notion to justify European difference and authenticity in contrast to the dominating cultures in the region today called the Middle East. Through mythology and religion Europe is linked to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean: The semantic root of the term “Europe” refers to the Semitic word “ereb,” meaning dark, or where the sun is setting. According to Greek mythology, the beautiful girl “Europa,” daughter of the Phoenician king Agenor, was kidnapped by the Greek god Zeus, disguised as a bull, and hijacked from Tyros to the island of Crete. There, “Europa” became the mother of the Minoan dynasty, Europe’s oldest political formation. In Crete, one can sense the geographical features of Europe, its natural climatic mildness and physical structures contrasting with the vast and unfocused deserts in the Phoenician hinterland, today’s Middle East. It might have been the physical difference that is almost sensually present on this small island that the Greeks wanted to identify with their world in contrast to the Levant.

Greek philosopher Aristotle defined Europe as form in being. For him Greeks and Scythians were “the Europeans” in contrast to Asians.⁹ His compatriot Plato saw Europe as the mirror of an idea, a heavenly image in pure material form. Christianity entered Europe through Anatolia, today’s Turkey. There, the term “Christians” was used for the first time in their first church outside of Jerusalem, in a cave above the city of Antioch (56 AD). Christianity spread with great speed, but it did not carry a political program to form Europe’s identity. The biblical origin of Europe relates to chapter nine and ten of Book Genesis: According to this text, Noah sent his three sons Ham, Seth, Japheth in all directions to create the nations of the world and to ultimately unify them. Japheth reached Europe and became the founding father of all Europeans, a legend that remained vital in Christian Europe until the tenth century.

(2) Centers of gravity changed in Europe. For the first millennium – beginning with ancient Greek civilization and ending with the Germanic destruction of the Roman Empire – Europe was built around the Mediterranean. The earliest expression of Europe was protected by the Limes of the Roman Empire that cut the British Isles and mainland Europe from the North Sea to the Black Sea. This Europe was defined by Roman law and became increasingly Christian. Greek political concepts also added to this period of

9 Aristotle, *Politeia* VII/1327b, The Scythians are people from the vast grassland and steppe between China and what is today’s Ukraine. According to Greek historian Herodotus, in the 5th century BC they had moved from the river Don to the Carpathian mountains.

European formation. Most importantly, yet without lasting impact, were the notions of democracy and of political federation.

The split between Western Rome and Eastern Rome became as constitutive for the second period of European development as the transfer of power to the North Alpine regions – that is to Franconia and the Franks that later split in order to become the nucleus of the German and French nations. Their leaders claimed to be the legitimate heirs to the Roman Empire, which found political expression in the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Its development began with the coronation of Charlemagne on Christmas Day, 800, by Pope Leo III.¹⁰ Charlemagne developed his imperial cult in his favorite capital, the city of Aix-la-Chapelle, which could, however, never compete with Rome as the center of Europe. Constantinople as center of Eastern Rome, that is Byzantium, made a stronger imprint on the mental map of Europe than Aix-la-Chapelle, until Western Europeans tended to exclude it from their mental map of Europe altogether when the city was conquered by the Ottomans and renamed Istanbul in 1453. The split between Latin and Byzantine Christianity in 1054 had already sent a shock wave of spiritual rift across Europe, superseded by the conquest of its South Eastern region by another religion. The split between Latin and Orthodox Christianity has never become irrelevant as far as mental and socio-political differences among European Christians are concerned.¹¹ With the enlarged European Union in the early twenty-first century, Orthodox Christianity has increased in the European Union while it is struggling theologically and in its social application with concepts of modernity and social ethics that have long since become normality among Latin Christians.

The shifting centers of Europe were followed by the trading patterns of the Hanseatic League, the emerging strength of Western European sea powers Spain and Portugal, by the rising Muscovite state claiming to be the “third Rome” after the fall of Constantinople, and by the emergence of imperial powers on the British Isles, in France, and in Austria under the Hapsburgs. The spiritual, neo-imperial unity of central Europe could not hold. After the religious split in the age of reformation it escalated into political quarrel and destruction. With the Thirty Years War, the center of medieval and early modern Europe – today’s Germany – came under the influence, if not the control of its neighbors.

(3) Greek and Roman political and legal notions were unable to find wide recognition across Europe. Although both ancient “super-powers” were largely perceived as self-complacent or outright imperial by fellow Europeans, they did lay the

10 On his legacy for “Christian Europe” see Morissey, Robert, *Charlemagne and France: A Thousand Years of Mythology*, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2003; Becher, Mathias, *Charlemagne*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003; Story, Joanna, *Charlemagne: Empire and Society*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.

11 See Gallagher, Clarence, *Church Law and Church Order in Rome and Byzantium: A Comparative Study*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.

foundation for the formation of political theory and terminology in Europe. Since the eighth century B.C. ancient Greeks distinguished between “amphiktionia,” a spiritual union of states, “symmachy,” a contract based defense system under the leadership of a hegemonic state with federal organs, a federal council, its own court, currency and army, “isopoliteia,” mutually recognized and legally defined citizenship rights, and “sympoliteia,” a permanent federation of city states and tribes with a definite administrative structure and a common citizenship. The dichotomy between autonomy of city states and peace for all in one system of protection was already evident during Greek history.

The Roman Empire knew two types of federal contracts: The “foedus aequum,” an inter-state contract among equal economic and military partners, while the partners had to renounce their independent foreign policy and had to provide Rome with additional troops. The “foedus iniquum” was an inter-state treaty with Rome dominating its partners. After these partners had become provinces of the Roman Empire, their citizens received Roman citizenship. By the end of the 4th century AD, Rome accepted foreign troops on Roman soil. But they also had to accept the secession of an increasing number of former federal partners, which were changing loyalties in favor of Rome’s Germanic enemies.

The Roman Empire is often idealized as the expression of a successful political and cultural unity in Europe. It was a city-centered Empire, yet based on agriculture and the increasing production of metals and construction materials. Its languages were Latin and Greek. Its imperial cult did not overcast the binding written law. The Roman Empire introduced a common calendar, a common currency based on gold and silver throughout its territory, and built not only representative public monuments but – more importantly – streets across Europe that helped to unify the empire as a market. Yet the north alpine world, dominated by Germanic and Scythian people, did not embrace the Roman concept of Europe. Partly nomadic, partly sedentary in wooden villages, their trading system was based on barter. Agriculture was limited to small areas near forests, not on the Roman type of huge pastries (“villae”). Tribal diversity was echoed in linguistic diversity. Conflicts of power and primacy of pagan customs were alien to the theologically refined Christianity of the Mediterranean basin.

(4) Christian universalism was a highly mobilizing religious force, but it did not stimulate a consensual political order in Europe. Christian faith and Christian culture transformed Europe not only as far as its religious landscape was concerned, but also in all possible aspects of civilization and the arts. From Christian church spires to educational institutions, from the impact of the monastic culture across Europe to works of arts, painting, music and literature, European civilization has received its strongest mark from a millennium of Christian faith and religiosity. From the debate about the Christian duty to refuse military service in the Roman Empire, to the famous concepts

of European unity expressed by Dante Alighieri in the early fourteenth century, the Christian contribution to uniting Europe was always morally powerful but politically weak. In his book “De monarchia” of 1308, Dante described the Pope as envoy of God and hoped for European unity under the leadership of an Italian emperor and the Roman nation. Dante was followed by Pierre Dubois, crown jurist of French King Philip the Fair, who considered a unitarian federation with arbitration court and a council of kings and dukes the right basis for a European federation (in “De recuperatione terrae sanctae”). His concept was heavily influenced by the crusades in order to liberate the tomb of Jesus in Jerusalem from “Muslim occupation.”

At the time when Bohemian King Georg Podiebrad (1420-1471) sent an envoy to the Pope to negotiate his concept for a European Union of Kings, he presented to the French king the text for a Treaty on a Confederation between King Louis XI of France, King Georg of Bohemia and the High Council of Venice to resist the Turks. While the Hundred Years War between England and France marked the beginning of national wars in Europe, the concept of European unity was largely legitimized as defense against Muslim Turks. The Grand Design of Henri IV, drafted in 1638 by the French King’s friend, the Duc Maximilien Béthune de Sully, postulated a Christian republic as a European confederation, consisting of 15 members: The hereditary monarchies France, England, Lombardy, Sweden, Denmark and Spain, the five electoral monarchies Bohemia, Hungary, the Holy See, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, and Poland, and the four republics Venice, Switzerland, the Italian Union and the United Netherlands. The concept of the Duc de Sully was quite detailed: He suggested a Council with 60 members mandated to create a European international law. He envisaged a joint army with 250,000 infantry, 50,000 horsemen, 200 canons and 120 war ships. Overcoming war among European states was as strong a driving force behind his concept as the desire to deter and eventually beat the Ottoman Turks. Neither his nor related ideas were translated into political actions. They moved to the archives of European integration archaeology. Yet, they embody much of what has become EU reality in the twenty-first century.

(5) The universalism of the age of enlightenment was as limited as its Christian precursor.¹² While the material interests of European powers were driven by imperial conquest and the desire to strengthen global sea dominance, national identities, pride and difference were rising among the ruling elites across Europe. The enormous success and technological achievements that went hand in hand with the global rise of European power contributed to a rational world view among European intellectuals. But this rarely generated insights into the usefulness of cooperation and political unity among Europeans. The “Republic of Letters,” as the Age of Enlightenment was called, advanced the conquest of nature, critical rationalism, the notion of progress and the

12 See the classical study by Berlin, Isaiah, *The Age of Enlightenment*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956.

value of science. It increasingly de-legitimized the monarchical and feudal political orders, most notably in France. But it did not constitute a shared new social norm favoring European political unity.

William Penn's "Essay towards a present and future peace in Europe" of 1692 promoted the idea of a League of Nations and a Council of Europe as the cooperative union of Europe's monarchs.¹³ The secretary of the French delegate to the Peace Congress of Utrecht in 1713, the Abbé Charles de St. Pierre, proposed a European Federation among the Christian rulers of Europe. The Peace Congress in Utrecht sanctioned the principle of the balance of power, which lasted until the Congress of Vienna in 1815 as the dominating European state system.¹⁴ The pentarchy of its five leading powers (England, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia) was based on mutual recognition of individual power, on mutual suspicion and on the negligence of the interests of smaller nations. None of these influences could advance political unity in Europe.

Charles de Montesquieu – one of the architects of the concept of separation of powers – remained rather apolitical in his "De l'esprit des lois" of 1748 as far as the relationship between the individual society and its future attitude toward the state and the continent was concerned. He confused notions of federalism and confederalism and remained silent on specific institutional provisions for a Europe that he wished to see designed as a "society of societies."¹⁵ The obvious political pluralism in Europe was neither accommodated under a religious nor under a political and legal umbrella. In this, Montesquieu was not alone. Hardly any concept or effort between the sixteenth and eighteenth century was more advanced and focused. The "Republic of Letters" did not help the development of European identity and a common European interest, although leading intellectuals of the time were more respected than ever and became corner stones in the evolution of political and general philosophy to this day.

(6) If at all, European countries made a bad use of the common cultural heritage of the continent. Although each era of national literature, each architectural style or periods of composition found equivalents in other countries, the specific contributions of national artists were by and large used to underline identity differences instead of promoting European commonalities. Whether Shakespeare is British or a genuine expression of European civilization is as interesting as the question to whom Beethoven or Mozart, Voltaire or Goethe, Calderón de la Barca or John Milton, Henri Matisse or Christopher Wren belong. Quintessentially, they are all leading European personalities, but in the age of nationalism, culture was largely misused against its potential ability to

13 See Dunn, Richard S., and Mary Maples Dunn, *The World of William Penn*, Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1986.

14 See Sheehan, Michael, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, New York: Routledge, 1996.

15 See Shackleton, Robert, *Montesquieu: A Critical Biography*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

shape a sense of European commonality. The heroes of Europe's culture were nationalized, often beyond recognition.

Ideational solipsism also prevailed as far as the development of conceptual notions of the modern European state is concerned. Concepts of statehood and differentiations between unitary and federal states were largely shaped as reflection of the rising importance of the individual nation state. The guiding notion of national sovereignty, preeminent since the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia, reduced the horizon of state theorists to the national level.¹⁶ The evolution of legal dogma followed suit. To this day it is one of the last domains of the prevalence of nation state superiority over European integration. This is surprising in spite of the enormous contribution of European law to the shaping of an integrated Europe.

Immanuel Kant's contribution of 1795, namely to organize a European peace order on the basis of republics, and his recognition of the primacy of law, was an extrapolation of his domestic struggle for the rule of law, but not yet a concrete concept of how to transform European antagonisms into viable political unity.¹⁷ The search for peace in Europe seemed to remain eternal. Victor Hugo's plea for the creation of the United States of Europe at the Paris Peace Conference of 1849 was a frustrated echo of Kant's vision, having to recognize that rule of law based democratic rights were not advancing as consequence of the 1848 revolutions.¹⁸ They were rather regressing. This did not help to support the visionary concept of the United States of Europe.

(7) Astonishingly absent from practically all debates and publications on European unity were links between state theories and moral claims on the one hand and a discussion of the role of the material world, that is to say the economy. Neither Johannes Althusius' social federalism of the sixteenth century¹⁹ nor Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's "left federalism" of the nineteenth century, or Constantin Frantz' "conservative federalism" of the nineteenth century, reflected sufficiently about the impact of the most critical economic developments in Europe on the political structure and nature of the continent. Neither the enormous increase in trade and the evolution of the modern banking system, nor the agrarian crisis of the sixteenth century, or the breakthrough of the modern industrial mass society with its social upheavals and

16 On the legacy see Craxton, Derek, and Anuschka Tischer, *The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary*, Westport: Greenwood, 2002.

17 Kant, Immanuel, *Perpetual Peace*, translated by Benjamin F. Trueblood, Washington DC: American Peace Society, 1897; see Schwarz, Wolfgang, *Principles of Lawful Politics: Immanuel Kant's Philosophical Draft „Toward Eternal Peace“*, Aalen: Scientia, 1988; Kühnhardt, Ludger, *Von der ewigen Suche nach Frieden: Immanuel Kants Vision und Europas Wirklichkeit*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1996.

18 Hugo, Victor, *The United States of Europe*, Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1914.

19 On this forgotten theorist of federalism see Hueglin, Thomas, *Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on Community and Federalism*, Waterworld, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999; from his own pen Althusius, Johannes, *Politica Methodice*, with an introduction by Carl Joachim Friedrich, New York: Arno Press, 1979.

increasing monopolizing trends of capital and power accumulation led theoreticians of the European dream to sufficiently contemplate the role of the European economy.²⁰

(8) European history is full of efforts to impose hegemonic rule over neighboring countries in order to advance national power, pride and resource-based interests. From the dominating claim of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation to the Napoleonic Wars, and from Hitler's racist and aggressive conquest to Stalin's class-ideology driven totalitarian answer, Europe has suffered from hegemonic aspirations. They excessively transposed national claims of homogenous and impermeable sovereign control over one people and territory to the European level. This provoked immediate resistance, and lastingly destroyed trust among Europeans. Once the binding glue of a common religious creed was broken in the age of reformation, Europe was in search of ways to prevent civil war. It did so by mutually recognizing the religious creed of its rulers and their people. Roman-Catholicism and the many variants of Protestantism began a long and still unfinished process of ecumenical understanding of their unity in reconciled diversity. Whenever this quest for ecumenical harmony was challenged in later times, it was rather by secularization than by missionary zeal of either confession.

(9) One of the longest and strongest legacies of European history is the definition of oneself in contrast to some "other." Greek historian Herodotus was the first to identify Greeks in antagonistic difference to the Persians, the losers of the sea battle of Marathon. The longest lasting notion of "the other" in Europe is related to the Muslim world. Since territorial losses to invading Arab troops in the eighth century in Spain and, albeit temporarily, in France, Islam is more feared than understood in Europe. France became the nucleus of a universalistic, Christian state in opposition to Muslim Arabs. In 732 AD, an anonymous author, in pursuing the chronicle of Bishop Isidore de Seville about the battles of Tours and Poitiers, mentioned "Europeans" as the other force in these battles. Here, for the first time, the term "European" was used. As Christian Europe, the concept of a continent in opposition to the Muslim world was further rooted during the long and daunting period of the crusades, lasting from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. After the Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople in 1453 and renamed it Istanbul, the notion of "the other," and often in fact the notion of an outright enemy, found its new focus in Western Europe. Although not Arabs, the Turks became the antidote of new waves of European identity formation, contributing to this perception with the assaults on the Hapsburg Empire and the conquest of large parts of South Eastern Europe.

20 Archaeologists of European integration claim that for the first time the term "integration" in its economic sense was applied by Gaedicke, Herbert, and Gert von Eynern, *Die produktionswirtschaftliche Integration Europas: Eine Untersuchung über die Aussenhandelsverflechtung der europäischen Länder*, Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1933.

Abbé Dominique Dufour de Pradt, Napoleons' chaplain, was the first to describe the emerging opposition between Russia and the United States, a topic Alexis de Tocqueville was to pursue in his 1840 book "On democracy in America." In reflecting upon these new geopolitical concepts, Europeans were quick to define themselves either against Russia or against America or against both. The notion of Europe as being "the other" of Russia found confirmation after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, a clear rupture with the mainstream of political and economic development of Europe. The aggressive totalitarianism of the Soviet Union helped to forge European and trans-Atlantic integration structures. This last and most successful use of the notion of an enemy as a driving force for European unity cannot conceal the fact that similar impulses did not achieve analogous results in past centuries. The most important reason for this difference is related to the role of the United States as European federator after World War II. In past centuries, Europeans might have been united against the Russians, the Turks, the Arabs or whomever else. But they were always as much split among themselves and not ready to recognize leadership by any of their own. However, such leadership was required to advance the degree of unification that became possible only after World War II with the US as European federator.

(10) Europe as an imagination and concept remained weak in light of the dominance of the nation state that had emerged since the sixteenth century. Authority and rule were linked to a specific territory. The control of territory legitimized the claim of sovereignty and sovereignty became the ultimate source of power and pride in Europe. The first lobby group to change this equation in favor of European integration was the International League for Peace and Liberty, founded in 1867 in Geneva with Garibaldi and Bakunin among its members. In 1868 they published a newspaper, "Les Etat-Unis d'Europe," which circulated until 1919. With the Franco-German War of 1870, its orientation became less federal and more partisan. Later ideological splits among socialists, anarchists and national republicans limited its scope and relevance.

Charles Lemonnier, one of the founding members of the International League, proposed the Swiss or the American model for the future evolution of Europe. He conceptualized a European federation with France, Germany, Italy, England, Spain, Austria, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden. A federal core, consisting of Italy, France, Switzerland, Belgium and England should begin the first steps toward federation, he hoped. The European federation should run its own army, maintain a supreme court and develop an economic and social union (sic) in order to dissolve national boundaries and to promote a European sense of togetherness.

Federal theories were also developed in Germany, but largely in order to understand and develop the German Empire as a federation. From Samuel von Pufendorf and Ludolph Hugo in the seventeenth century to Georg Jellinek in the nineteenth century, German legal philosophy was largely driven by the notion of shared sovereignty

between imperial rule and autonomy of individual territories within the German Empire.²¹ This tradition of shared sovereignty (“duplex regimen”) was to prevail in many normative contributions from Germans once European integration started in the second half of the twentieth century. Authentic German contributions to the search for a European integration concept in the nineteenth century followed French and other voices. Arnold Ruge in the Paulskirche Parliament of 1848 or Julius Fröbel in a 1859 book (“Amerika, Europa und die politischen Gesichtspunkte der Gegenwart”) suggested the United States as model for European integration. Neither of them offered how to do so and by whom it could be done.

3. Errors Turn into Catastrophes

The quest for European unity remained torn between idealistic constructions of intellectuals and few politicians on the one hand and the myopic, finally self-destructive political actions dominating the European state-system throughout the nineteenth century. The hegemonic cultural aspiration of the French Revolution – that is to say, its universal claim for freedom, equality and brotherhood – was destroyed by its own hegemonic political succession under Emperor Napoleon.²² The aggressive ambition to transform Europe under his dominance into a messianic embodiment of French universalism failed, provoking nationalistic counter-reactions of the strongest nature. Instead of embracing the values of the French Revolution, most of Europe preferred to copy French nationalism as protective shield against the aggressive universalism of revolutionary and post-revolutionary France. The age of the French Revolution coincided with a socio-economic revolution, opening the door toward industrialization while not being able to find a reasonable balance between economic empowerment and social concern. Poverty aggravated as much as the dynamics of industrialization grew. Social theories analyzing these developments turned into social movements and political parties. Moreover, they turned into ideologies, thus adding to those fabricated in the aftermath of the political consequences of the French Revolution.

Nationalism and socialism, egalitarian democracy and the battle cry for civil and social rights began to define the social parameters of Europe’s societies. In political terms, Europe encountered the limits of a peaceful use of balance of power-mechanisms. With the Congress of Vienna, it embarked on a path toward competitive

21 See Jellinek, Georg, *The Rights of Minorities*, London: P. S. King & Son, 1912; Carr, Craig L., *Samuel Pufendorf: The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

22 See Baker, Keith Michael, *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture*, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987; Aston, Nigel, *The French Revolution, 1789-1804: Authority, Liberty and the Search for Stability*, Houndmills/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Campbell, Peter R., *The Origins of the French Revolution*, Houndmills/New York: 2005; Haas, Mark L., *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

power plays, exacerbated by mistrust, nationalistic pride and aggressive prejudices among the leading powers of Europe. The rise of democracy failed in the 1840's, but the failure of integrating Europe's emerging mass societies into a stable social order was only second to the failure of turning balance of power-suspensions into a stable political order. A combination of imperial, nationalistic and economic tensions turned the unstable equilibrium generated by the Congress of Vienna into a disastrous sequence of wars. Their global effect was a precursor to the global loss of power for Europe's colonial states. Inside the continent and on a global scale, Europe's errors ended in Europe's catastrophes.

Four factors were of a particularly destructive nature: Territorial primacy, ideological rigidity, excessive power considerations, and the undemocratic nature of the political systems involved. From the "Republic of Letters" to the gas chambers of the Nazis and the Gulags of the Soviets, Europe underwent the biggest possible self-destruction of its moral credibility as cradle and protector of civilization. Walter Hallstein was right when he described Europe not as a new creation, but as a rediscovery. The traumatic breakdown of culture and politics, in fact of humanity itself, that Europe was experiencing at the height of the age of ideologies and totalitarian perversion of politics was certainly not anticipated, not even intended by the early architects of the nineteenth century order of Europe.

Unworthy of all traditions of civility on the continent, only the complete failure of ideology-driven power politics opened the gates for a new and solid realization of the old idea of European unity. Now it was on Europe, against all experience with its own history, to prove that it had learned the most crucial lesson of history.

In many ways, the French Revolution and Cartesian rigidity of rationalism had marked a new beginning. Old certainties had broken down in Europe, yet they were not replaced by new stability and consistency. Old myths and new realities began to coexist next to old realities and new myths: For instance, the myth of human self-emancipation and the reality of a lasting struggle for constitutional liberties, the myth of national unity and the search for a balance between nation and democracy, the myth of social fraternity and the just effort to relate individual identity and social cohesion. As far as the European order was concerned, three trends caused lasting and ultimately irreversible challenges: The increasing ideological orientation of national politics in all of Europe, the extrapolation of power politics and struggles for dominance across the continent, and the myopic reduction of political thought into national, if not outright nationalistic categories. In terms of foreign policy, nineteenth century Europe thought in the parameters of coalitions and alliances. In terms of domestic policies, nineteenth century Europe's political elites focused on how to prevent participation of the mass society and the introduction of democratic rule.

The Congress of Vienna was able to create a security system of a certain balance, which was probably optimal for its time. But it could not generate sustainable

confidence and cooperation. Its paradigm of securing oneself against the evil that is the other was projected as measurement for the pursuit of domestic policies against those demanding a stronger political participation. What has been labeled Europe's bourgeois era was a European phenomenon indeed, but never in harmony with itself. The internal transformation with deep social upheavals nurtured more ideological notions of politics, new categories of distinguishing enemy and friend and de-legitimized national order and international cooperation alike.

Most unfortunate for the development of nineteenth century politics in Europe was the growing ideological character of most debates. Two features were dominant: The myth of the nation, integrating and excluding at the same time. And the myth of human equality, limiting freedom and yet always remaining incomplete as long as human diversity prevails. Starting from these ideological premises, political thought in Europe created new concepts based on hope (and sometimes only the myth of hope) for social, cultural, economic and even biological integration, but it did not contribute to the formation of a human "European-ness."

The effort to frame transforming realities into new terminology produced a whole set of ideological notions, including nationalism, socialism and communism, Darwinism and racism. Human imagination formed a new sphere of artificial ideologies implying endless potential for progress if properly applied. Ideological thinking evolved in the biggest possible human acquisition and domination of the world without actually providing proof of its solidity or even its sheer practicality.

Socio-cultural, demographic and economic upheavals were phenomena across Europe. Political efforts to handle them remained confined to the borders of each state or empire. The quest for internal homogeneity dominated and the rigid use of sovereignty and balanced power in foreign affairs secured the illusion that social homogeneity (through banning other races or eliminating other classes) could be a solution to all the evils of modernity. In the end, ideological messianism created unimaginably more problems, even beyond the horrible suffering of millions of human beings. In the nineteenth century, neither the social nor the national question found adequate European responses. In fact, Europe was considered to be a problem and a reality of the past, incarnated in feudal and absolutist structures that did not give way to the overall recognition of national sovereignty and social equality. Freedom and equality became domestic and foreign policy categories. But emphasis on social stability and international cohesion, of cooperation inside borders and across boundaries of ethnicity, race, language and class was poor.

Neither the aggression with which Napoleon had destroyed the old order in Europe, nor Metternich's effort to restore monarchical legitimacy and a system of balanced power with the recognized hegemony of a few states could lead Europe into an era of peace with itself. In terms of power politics, the German question – on the agenda since the Thirty Years War – was on the mind of almost all leaders in Europe. In terms of

social evolution, the fear of democratic mobilization and economic participation of the masses in an emerging age of industrialization was on their minds too. Europe was missing coherent and complementary domestic institutions and it was missing truly European institutions to deal with the foreign policy fall-out of the big transformation into nineteenth century modernity. Rule of law as a guiding principle for the domestic and the international order was still an alien concept and the more one of the orders tended to move into the direction of rule of law, democracy and cooperation, the more national antagonism and anti-liberal foreign policy flourished. The demographic explosion Europe was experiencing in the first half of the nineteenth century exacerbated the social and political crisis.

It remains surprising that in the midst of an increasingly nationalistic century the first small effort to organize European economic cooperation came about: Danube navigation was confirmed as the right of all ships by the 1836 Paris Peace and the Rhine Navigation Convention of October 17, 1868 – declaring free navigation for all ships in the Rhine – looks almost like a happy yet limited precursor of twentieth century European economic cooperation.²³ Beyond this singular convention, the nineteenth century did not produce a European legal order. It also did not generate European democracies that could advocate political legitimacy linked to European inter-state legality. Yet the constitution-building history in Europe throughout the nineteenth century was to become another forerunner for political Europe in the early twenty-first century. Rooting political orders in constitutional provisions – limiting power by distributing it – was an early hint at what European integration was to achieve should it be lastingly rooted in legitimacy.

While the European power states led by undemocratic elites remained bound by mutual struggle, they reached out for a projection of their respective powers across the world. Imperialism was a continuation of the internal European quarrels by other means in different venues. The gradual retreat of the Ottoman Empire from its hold over South Eastern Europe – a long process between 1683 until 1913 – opened this region for other European empires to pour in, guided by their own no less imperial interests. Balance of suspicion under the umbrella of one civilization became the main feature of Europe.

National romanticism attributed to the social rooting of this distortion of all processes of civilization in Europe always geared toward interaction and mutual inspiration. To saturate one's own national identity, mythology was activated and enmity toward others became acceptable. Identity was transposed from a category of individual psychology to a driving force of social and political processes. Most artificial

23 See Wentholt, Wyger, *A Study of Monetary and Economic Situations in International Relationship: Freedom of Navigation on the Rhine as a Western European Interest*, Amsterdam: W.Wentholt &Co., 1957. For the follow-up to the original "Rhine Navigation Convention" see Convention to Amend the "Revised Convention for Rhine Navigation" signed at Mannheim on 17 October 1868. Strasbourg, 20 November 1963, London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1967. The free navigation principle for the Danube was revoked in 1948, when the "Belgrade Convention on Danube Navigation" declared the river open only for ships belonging to one of the riparian countries.

expressions were generated by the German and by the Italian national movements. The European movement toward freedom and democracy of 1848 ultimately failed. It could neither tame power politics nor turn domestic priorities from the illusion of national homogeneity under authoritarian rule into hope stemming from the priority of civil rights. Parliamentary democracy had to fight a tough fight before it was established alongside the rule of law. Although the economic and social trends of the time were basically Europe-wide in nature and effect, they did not trigger political movements supporting them through a new domestic and foreign policy order for the continent. Growing interconnectedness – always felt in the sphere of European culture – did not automatically generate new political norms. It did not even facilitate new social norms as increasing nationalism, a mixture of pride and prejudice, demonstrated.

The biggest tragedy for Europe was the prevalence of warfare as a legitimate category of politics in a continent increasingly populated and filled with high-technology weaponry. The search for a system of coalitions and alliances and for a balancing of power almost seemed far-sighted and promising in light of the atavistic vices that led a long life as heroic virtues. Without national solidarity there could be no balance among European states, so the rationale seemed to suggest. But the idea of lawyers such as Pasquale Mancini in Turin (who became Italian Foreign Minister in 1881), according to whom international law was to be based on nations and no longer on states as basic units of Europe, was both insufficient and premature. Insufficient it was, because it did not recognize multinational states as acceptable and viable units. And it was premature – or rather one-sided – as it did not reckon with the prevalence of both forces – the state and the nation – that had to be accommodated if Europe were to find peace and inner calm. There was much more suffering to endure before the European Union was to statute Europe as a Union of states and citizens.

The best to hope for in the heated atmosphere of the nineteenth century was rational and realistic power politics. Before cooperation or even integration, Europe had to exhaust all variants of balance and alliance formation. What the continent did not tame was the rising power bloc in its center. The German question was to give a blow to all nicely knit versions of Realpolitik and rational balance. The German dualism between Prussia and Austria did not solve the problem either. More so in Prussia, the consciousness of newly acquired power escalated into a harsh will to power, perceiving France even as a more dangerous competitor than Austria. Honor and prestige, pride and prejudice, balance and suspicion, could never grow into more than fragile inter-state relations and poisoned inter-people perceptions. Political liberalism did not translate into concepts, let alone strategies for a new beginning in Europe.

Instead, the political arena in Europe began to radicalize with these dynamics, unleashing in the Crimean War of 1854/1855. According to British historian Alan J.P. Taylor, this was a war not based on mutual intention to attack but on mutually reinforcing fear, characteristically echoed in the fact that the war aims were “defined in

the negative.”²⁴ The same assessment could also be made about the path into World War I and, moreover, the path to stop it. As for the Crimean War, the ambition of the Russian Tsar Nicholas I, to exert influence over Ottoman Turkey and to gain control of the Dardanelles, provoked British counter-measures. The local Russian-Turkish War escalated into a war among Europe’s powers when the Western powers entered the Black Sea after the Turkish fleet had been destroyed. This was a flagrant violation of the 1841 Treaty on the Dardanelles between France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia and declaring the Straits closed to all but Turkish warships in peacetime. Now, the conflict actually became a Russian-British war with French, Turkish and Lombardi support for the British. The seizure of Sebastopol nevertheless took more than a year before it finally fell to the British in September 1855. The Treaty of Paris of 1856 prevented the escalation of the Crimean War into a full-fledged European war, a possibility looming on the horizon for a long time. A limited war ended with a limited peace.

The Treaty of Paris – with the first inclusion of the Ottoman Empire into the European state system and public order – left a power vacuum that became a precondition for the central European national wars of the next two decades.²⁵ As much as it was a rational act, the Holy Alliance between Austria and Russia, and moreover its mysterious dissolution, triggered new leadership quarrels among the European powers. The principle of balanced power was inevitably to collide with the nationality issue that was to destroy the rationale of the entire European state system. The rise of Prussia – beginning with the German-Danish War of 1864, and escalating with the Franco-German War of 1870/71 and the humiliating coronation of the first German Emperor in the Versailles castle on January 30, 1871 – was accompanied by an elaborate system of secret diplomacy. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck established an alliance with Austria in 1879, an alliance with Austria and Russia in 1881 and an alliance with Austria and Italy in 1882. Encircled by France, Great Britain and presumably Russia, Bismarck thought in categories of concentric circles. Moreover, he thought in categories of suspicion, fear and security in order to stabilize his new power state in Europe’s geographical center. Not even the seed of Europe as a legal community could be laid under these circumstances.

24 Taylor, Alan J. P., *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1954:65. The diplomacy of the Crimean War was dominated by the famous French-Austrian “Four Points:” According to them “stable relations could not be established between Russia and Turkey unless (1) the Russian protectorate of the principalities were replaced by a European guarantee; (2) the navigation of the Danube were ‘freed’; (3) the Straits Convention of 1841 were revised ‘in the interests of the Balance of Power in Europe’; (4) the Russians abandoned their claim to a protectorate over the Christian subjects of Turkey and instead the five Great Powers obtained from the Turkish government security for the Christians.” (ibid).

25 Its main provisions: Great Britain safeguarded Turkish independence and achieved the neutralization of the Black Sea. The Danube Duchies remained under Turkish suzerainty with guarantee of the European powers.

When the Ottoman Empire gradually withdrew from the Balkans, “Balkanization” began to manifest itself: Rising partition and secession of hardly viable nation states, claiming to symbolize the quest for national integration after dreadful periods of oppression and rightful secession from the imperial forces.²⁶ European efforts were absent to balance the dissolution of the first European Empire – others were to follow – with collective forms of cooperative management of European affairs. Instead, with the exception of the multinational Russian Empire, the heydays of national sovereignty flourished across Europe after the 1870’s.

Then and now, only Switzerland showed an alternative way for European states: Since the Federal Constitution of 1848, Switzerland has been a stable multilingual and multinational state, a nation above nations.²⁷ It is amazing that parallel to this unique European state-formation, under the flag of colonial expansion, a thoroughly different concept grew into reality: Global empires under the flag of European powers. Rivalries among them did not escalate within Europe but were executed in their hectic struggle for overseas possessions. European power rivalries gained a global dimension. They also served as a premature and highly controversial form of globalization. But first and foremost, European colonial expansion was a continuation of inter-European power struggles on a global scale. Politics of national, exclusionary unification and power politics went hand in hand in Europe’s highly dynamic and unbalanced nineteenth century. As over-stretched as it was, this order of Europe was to suffer self-destruction, beginning with the outbreak of World War I in 1914.²⁸

26 “Balkanization” meant the continuous division of territory liberated from Ottoman rule among contending people in the region: In 1859, for example, Moldova and Walachia shared a common duke, in 1861 they were united as Romania, at the Berlin Congress in 1877 Romania received full independence, along with Serbia and with Montenegro. Serbia formed an independent principality, but turned itself into a Kingdom in 1882. In the Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the Russo-Turkish war on March 3, 1878, Bulgaria was recognized as autonomous under the Ottoman emperor. The Berlin Congress of July 1878 reduced the size of Bulgaria. In 1908, Bulgaria became independent, followed however by two “Balkan Wars” with its former allies Greece and Serbia, in which Bulgaria lost Southern Dobruja to Romania and large parts of Macedonia to Serbia and Greece, which in turn provoked Macedonian nationalism. Albania became independent in 1913. Bosnia-Hercegovina was put under Austro-Hungarian control by the Berlin Congress and became part of Yugoslavia after World War I. On the legacy of “Balkanization” see Zwerin, Michael, *A Case for the Balkanization of Practically Everyone: The New Nationalism*, London: Witherwood House, 1976; Thio, Li-Ann, “Battling Balkanization: Regional Approaches toward Minority Protection beyond Europe,” *Harvard International Law Journal*, 43.2(2002): 409-468.

27 See Gruner, Erich, “Die Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft von der Französischen Revolution bis zur Reform der Verfassung,” in: Schieder, Theodor, (ed.), *Handbuch der Europäischen Geschichte*, Vol.5, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981: 968-986.

28 See Joll, James, *The Origins of the First World War*, London: Longman, 1984; Macmillan, Margaret, *Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World*, London: John Murray, 2001; Marwick, Arthur, et al., *Total War and Historical Change: Europe 1914-1955*, Buckingham, PA.: Open University Press, 2001; Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig, *The Origins of World War I*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003; Jukes, Geoffrey, *The First World War*, New York: Routledge, 2003; Neiberg, Michael S., *Fighting the Great War: A Global History*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Two components of a new arrangement inside European states and among them began to appear with irretrievable force in the European arena: The universal claim to national self-determination, expressing itself for the first time with the breakdown of the Russian Empire in 1917, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the German Empire in 1918, and the Ottoman Empire in 1919; and the claim for universal democratic self-determination, overcoming the relicts of imperial order through republics (or at least through constitutional monarchies), no matter how weak or contested democratic rule of law was to remain in their midst.

The Europe of power politics and monarchical imperialism was not replaced peacefully and its substitutes were immediately contested in the name of conflicting ideologies. From 1914 to 1945 Europe was going through a dire and daunting civil war, its second thirty years war.²⁹ Fragile concepts of democratic rule of law were struggling with socialist-egalitarian concepts, nationalistic authoritarianism and racism. Each of the dominating ideologies in Europe during that period was related to the primacy of the nation state. Each of them gained power in excluding itself from any other sphere and reality. 1917 was indicative of things to come: With the entry of the United States into the European war theater and with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Europe was torn apart and became increasingly dependent upon the two peripheral powers. In geopolitical and in normative terms they challenged each other and tore Europe further apart. But ultimately Europeans themselves were dismantling their continent from a subject to an object of world politics. The de-empowerment and self-destruction of Europe was the deed of Europeans. Hitler's and Nazi Germany's aggression became the culminating expression of this tragic and horrendous path toward nihilism and dehumanization. Hitler's war was followed by Stalin's victory, no happy alternative for those who were to suffer its consequences.

Europe as a Europe of powers had failed. It had also failed as a Europe of weak democracies and fragile rule of law. Reconstituting Europe after thirty years of war over internal and external principles of public order could only succeed if domestic democracy and cooperation among democracies were to be linked. Ideological politics inside the nation state could only be tamed through solid rule of law. Power politics among nation states could only be tamed through a community of law. This was a tall order indeed. But in the midst of the failure of the old, fragile and futureless order, there was no alternative should European self-esteem, and the very civilization the continent was so proud of, be rescued.

The treaty system ending World War I in 1919 constituted new neurotic aggression among the losers of the war. The terms "Versailles" or "Trianon" became battle cries

29 See Liddle, Peter, et al., *The Great War, 1914-1945*, London: HarperCollins, 2001.

for revisionism.³⁰ The rejection of the US Congress to join the League of Nation made this brain-child of US President Woodrow Wilson a still-born framework to constitute a new order in Europe. Wilson's 14-point declaration of January 8, 1918 became the birth certificate for new nation states in Central Europe and the point of reference for decolonization movements that were to succeed a generation later. In his time, Woodrow Wilson's vision for a new Europe, a Europe free from hegemonic forces and nationalism, fear and terror, oppression and suffering, was not well received. Yet his legacy clearly is one of the noble founding stones of a new Europe. "What we demand," Wilson outlined his post-war concept, "is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression."³¹

4. *Turning Times: The Final Awakening*

Among the most surprising discoveries of the early years of the twentieth century is the enormous increase in economic interdependence among European societies and states. However, the worst disaster for the continent was yet to come. The most widely cited explanation refers to the absence of a political framework ordering the growing exchange of trade and ensuring its stability above political upheavals among the countries and societies involved. A Franco-German rapprochement based on economic cooperation failed after World War I. The creation of a European Coal Commission in 1919, to co-ordinate coal production and distribution in Europe, did not succeed, because it "lacked sufficient authority."³² A French initiative based on the idea of a bilateral Franco-German rapprochement brought about a steel cartel and the "short-lived"³³ Franco-German Commercial Treaty of August 1927. The world economic crisis of 1929 destroyed all hope for deepened economic co-operation, although at this point nothing would have been more appropriate. Instead, economic regulation and decisions about policy preferences were completely left in the hands of national politicians. No

30 The academic debate lasted throughout the twentieth century, see Jessop, T. E., *"The Treaty of Versailles": Was it Just?*, London: Thomas Nelson, 1942; Boemeke, Manfred B., et al. (eds.), *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

31 Wilson, Woodrow, *January 18, 1918: President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points*, http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points.

32 Dedman, Martin J., *The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95*, London/New York: Routledge, 1996: 32.

33 Ibid: 33.

matter how evident economic rationality was, political priorities, prejudices and pressures prevailed – with disastrous consequences.³⁴

Ten reasons are relevant to better understand why Europe finally awoke to reorganize public and inter-state life.³⁵

(1) Geopolitical considerations: With the rise of the Soviet Union and the United States, no European country was any longer able to pursue its traditional policies of hegemonic aspiration, imperial conquest and power struggle among neighbors. The political elites in all European states, even the most autarkic and seemingly strong, had to realize the limits of their ambitions. The wars of 1914 and 1939 had been unleashed by Germany, but their effect had turned out to be disastrous even for the winning parties. The geopolitical context also recalibrated the character of future political regimes in Europe. Western European countries had resisted Nazi totalitarianism, but not all of them had successfully rejected authoritarian rule. Faced with the challenge of an aggressive and expansionary Soviet communism, their choice became crystal clear: Preserving freedom was not only a matter of national independence and sovereignty, it was also a matter of domestic democracy and self-determination. America's support for a viable democratic future was the most important and encouraging commitment they could have hoped for. It triggered new reconsiderations of strategic and national interests, but, all in all, it set into motion the establishment of the "Western world," the "free world" as it became known under the impact of the Cold War.

(2) The negative memory of total destruction.³⁶ Combined with a loss of global relevance, it contributed to the transformation of ideas about European unity into social norms favoring their realization with certain urgency. This was, of course, a gradual process, not yet focused immediately after World War II, but traceable in many places

34 On the effect of World War I and the development of European ideas during the interwar period see Stirk, Peter M. R. (ed.), *European Unity in Context: the Interwar Period*, London/New York: Pinter, 1989; Stirk, Peter M. R., *A History of European Integration since 1914*, London/New York: Pinter, 1996; Spiering, Menno, and Michael Wintle (eds.), *Ideas of Europe since 1914: the Legacy of the First World War*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

35 On the whole history see Lipgens, Walter, *A History of European Integration*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982; Krebs, Gerhard, and Dieter Oberländer, *1945 in Europe and Asia: Reconsidering the End of World War II and the Change of the World Order*, Munich: Iudicium, 1997; Alting von Gesau, Frans A. M., *European Unification in the Twentieth Century*, Nijmegen: Vidya Publishers, 1998; Stirk, Peter M. R., and David Weigall (eds.), *The Origins and Development of European Integration: A Reader and Commentary*, London/New York: Pinter, 1999; Kanthoor, Willem Frans Victor, *A Chronological History of the European Union, 1946-2002*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002.

36 See Smith, M. L., and Peter M. R. Stirk (eds.), *Making the New Europe: European Unity and the Second World War*, London/New York: Pinter, 1990. The worst side of the destruction in Europe was, of course, the annihilation for millions of human beings for purely ideological, mainly ethnic reasons. Unfortunately, this horrendous drama did neither begin nor ended with World War II. See Naimark, Norman, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-century Europe*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.

and among people of highly different backgrounds across Europe. European unity as an ideal had a long history, but always a weak popular and even a weaker political backing. Once the idea of European unity had been translated into the necessity for European integration, this new social norm was soon to become a cultural foundation for operational political choices.

The first visible steps toward this goal were taken on the level of what later was to be called “civil society.” Most prominent were the efforts of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, based on his 1923 book “*Paneuropa*.”³⁷ Seeing Europe threatened after the break-down of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia (renamed Soviet Union in 1922), he pleaded for a renewal of the continent through a political and economic union of all European states from Poland to Portugal. Their union should be based on mutual security guarantees, a common alliance against the Soviet Union, a customs union and eventually a United States of Europe. The list of members joining his Pan European Union (“*Paneuropa Union*”) before and after its first congress, held in 1926 in Vienna, was impressive: among them were French Prime Minister Léon Blum and his minister of works and social welfare, Louis Loucheur, the President of the German Parliament, Paul Löbe, Erich Koch-Weser, chairman of the German Democratic Party and for some time Minister for Justice, Konrad Adenauer, then mayor of Cologne and President of the Prussian State Council. In 1927, Aristide Briand became Honorary President of the Pan European Union. It was almost the natural precursor of the plan he designed three years later as French Prime Minister and that carries his name; it became the first truly political concept for an integrated Europe.

Economic facts after World War II were more powerful than all former well-meaning efforts: According to a UN Commission, 100 million Europeans were living on less than 1,500 calories per day, which is to say they were starving. The immediate post-war period caused further severe economic damage everywhere. Agricultural output in Western Europe in 1947 was only 70 percent of the pre-war level. In the same year, to name but one example, industrial production in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg was still 30 to 40 percent below the level of 1939.

(3) New understanding of the role of the economy: This was essential in bringing about a transformation of European integration from an abstract ideal into a socially recognized norm. In fact, it was the driving force for many as they analyzed the prospects for economic recovery after the destruction of two World Wars that went hand in hand with enormous inroads into the economic production and its very material base across Europe. Was Europe to be reconstructed and were European citizens to ever reach the shores of new affluence, they had to reverse the nationalistic, autarkic and

37 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard von, *Paneuropa*, Vienna: Paneuropa-Verlag, 1923 (in English the book was published as *Panurope*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1926).

war-industry driven character of their economies – and they did.³⁸ This rational calculation coincided with the logic of newly institutionalized political relations in Europe.

The first steps were taken by industrialists and in fact had been taken by them already before the outbreak of World War II. In 1924, business leaders and economists founded the International Committee for a European Union, among them the banker Paul van Zeeland, who was to become Belgian Prime Minister, and the French banker Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, father of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who was born in Coblentz in the French occupied Rhineland in 1926.

In this very year, steel industries from France, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg created a steel cartel, pushed by Luxembourg industrialist Émile Mayrisch, who was an ardent supporter of Franco-German reconciliation. In 1927, steel producers from Hungary, Austria and the Czech Republic joined the cartel, intended to regulate and better distribute steel resources in Europe by eliminating the open market that had turned into aggressively nationalistic competition. Almost half of European steel production fell under the cartel, although at the expense of customers. Yet it reduced nationalistic tensions particularly between French and German producers striving for a new military buildup in their countries.

(4) Fear of falling back into destructive patterns of ideology-driven politics: This can be grouped together with the wide-spread fear of losing many people to the siren songs of simplistic political ideological pragmatism that dominated among the newly emerging political elites. Many among the ruling personalities and political parties during the formative years after World War II had a strong anti-totalitarian background and were eager to see their nations and the whole continent take a very different course.³⁹ Their idealism-based political realism grew at the right time. It would have hardly been imaginable to repeat it if the critical decisions toward European integration had been postponed for another decade or so because of leadership inertia. As much as ideals about European unity often had been formulated too early, now it was the hour of courageous, wise leadership decisions, which, by the same token, was the most obvious path to enable their people to embark on a better future.

Aristide Briand, Édouard Herriot, head of the Radical Party, cabinet minister and author of a book about the United States of Europe⁴⁰, Paul Löbe, Konrad Adenauer, Edvard Beneš, long time Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, and Ignaz Seipel, Austria's Catholic post-World War I Chancellor, were among the members of

38 See Foley, Bernhard J. (ed.), *European Economies since the Second World War*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.

39 For documents see Lipgens, Walter (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, Vol.3 (The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries 1945-1950), Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988.

40 Herriot, Édouard, *The United States of Europe*, London: George Harrap, 1930.

Coudenhove-Kalergi's "Pan Europe Union."⁴¹ Their pro-European attitudes were shared by other members of the political elites in the inter-war period and by members-to-be in post-war Europe. It was no coincidence that Adenauer came from the West German Rhineland, a highly contested region, but more open for collaboration with Germany's Western neighbors than many other regions in his country; Robert Schuman had a French father, was born in Luxembourg, remained a German citizen until 1918, immediately afterwards becoming a member of the French National Assembly in 1919 and finally French Foreign Minister from 1948 until 1953; Alcide de Gasperi came from the region of South Tyrol, representing the Italian minority in the Austro-Hungarian parliament before World War I and becoming Italian Prime Minister after World War II. These post-war leaders knew the fate of border areas and of ethnic or linguistic minorities and had a genuine sensitivity for cooperation in Europe. A generation later, Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of German unity in 1990, did not get tired of recalling the impression it had made on him as a young man from the French occupied city of Ludwigshafen to be forced by French soldiers to use the other side of the sidewalk; this motivated him to participate in the movement to tear down border posts between France and Germany. Other post-war leaders had suffered totalitarianism in concentration camps or as prisoners in war camps. They had looked into the abyss of war and the nihilistic destruction it had caused in Europe. They wanted, once and for all, to see Europe change its course. Their idealism defined the rationality of their policies in favor of European unity and integration.

(5) A changed notion of security: Once the weapons of World War II had come to a halt, it became increasingly obvious that security could no longer be conceived as a zero-sum game according to which one participant's gains would translate into somebody else's losses. Security was no longer the best form of defending one's nation by deterring others. Security was now understood as a common interest of societies that were organized by like-minded political systems and economies. Rapidly, security also became a common concern against expansionist, communist totalitarianism. It is debatable and controversial to this day whether European unity started more out of fear of Soviet hegemony or out of hope for a better, peaceful and affluent future among former enemies. In the end, both factors converged.

The solutions found for Europe's security after World War I had been completely unsatisfactory. The system of the peace treaties signed in various suburbs of Paris remained bilateral, germinated new conflicts as it was based upon revenge for the winners, and supported the tendency toward re-establishing power-politics and the

41 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard von, *Crusade for Pan-Europe: Autobiography of a Man and a Movement*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1943; Zurcher, Arnold J., *The Struggle to Unite Europe, 1940-1958: An Historical Account of the Development of the Contemporary European Movement from its Origin in the Pan-European Union to the Drafting of the Treaties for Euratom and the European Common Market*, Westport: Greenwood, 1975.

agony of balancing mutually suspicious alliances. France maintained its fear of Germany and hoped for new hegemonic status in Europe; Great Britain was vacillating between its role as a world power and its commitment to Europe; Germany felt humiliated, and its new rise was to become the precondition for ferocious revisionism. The European repercussions of the breakdown of the empires in Vienna, Petersburg and Constantinople were not dealt with in the Versailles system. President Wilson's idea to internationalize and universalize European affairs through the League of Nations (with finally sixty-three member states) was good, but it could not work with the US withholding its participation, the Soviet Union only joining in 1934 and again being expelled in 1940 after its attack on Finland, and Germany joining in 1926 but withdrawing in 1933 immediately after Hitler had come to power. The sanction mechanisms of the League of Nations failed completely.⁴² The vacuum of power in Europe was topped by the vacuum of legitimate rule in Europe, turning the continent into a continuous geopolitical nightmare as World War II was to prove.

German defeat in 1945 forced the leading powers to construct a new political framework, both inside Germany and for Europe. The new instability that followed the crushing defeat of Adolf Hitler and his regime was coupled with a fundamental fragmentation of Germany and – with the emerging Cold War this became undeniable – of the whole European continent. The peripheral powers took Europe's destiny into their hands. For the Soviet Union, this meant advancing the installation of Soviet-type regimes in their sphere of influence.⁴³ As for the American dominated zones of occupation, the matter was one of installing or reinstalling democratic rule, market economy and a new foreign policy arrangement that was able to harmonize American, British, French and other Western European interests.

Germany was also linked with the overall European development as far as the terrible plight of refugees was concerned. In 1945, thirteen million "displaced persons" were counted across Europe, ten million of them enforced laborers in Germany. While their return was arranged, West Germany had to absorb over 9 million refugees from its former territories in the East. Between 1950 and 1961, when the Berlin Wall was erected, another 3.6 million refugees moved to West Germany. A quarter of its population was by then recently displaced in the area they finally settled.⁴⁴

42 For an early critical assessment see Sarolea, Charles, *The Policy of Sanctions and the Failure of the League of Nations*, London: International Publishing Company, 1936.

43 As far as East Germany was concerned see Naimark, Norman, *The Russians in Germany: The History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.

44 See Dyshnyck, Walter, *Refugees are People: The Plight of Europe's Displaced Persons*, New York: America Press, 1947; Danylyszyn, Daniel William, *"Prisoners of Peace": British Policy towards Displaced Persons and Political Refugees within Occupied Germany, 1945-1951*, London: University of London, 2001.

(6) A changing notion of power: The transformed global order forced reflection about what was important to one's own identity and what was not. Discovering "neighborly-ness," not as an antagonistic danger, but as a potential asset for the enhancement of one's own well-being, was a surprising novelty among Europeans. Yet once the first effects of this redefinition of patterns of behavior and policy choices became evident, the results were more convincing than most theories had ever assumed.

Among many groups resisting the military hegemony of Nazi Germany over Europe, concepts of a democratic integration were already discussed throughout the war.⁴⁵ Most prominent became the Ventotene Manifest of July 1941 by Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli, who later was to become a communist member of the European Parliament and the initiator of the draft constitution for Europe, which the European Parliament was to pass in 1984. Other resistance movements in Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, but also in Germany (Kreisauer Kreis) developed federal concepts for a new beginning in Europe. Many of these groups met in July 1944 in neutral Switzerland and presented a declaration, mainly arguing for a federal restructuring of state relations in Europe: A constitution was to provide the framework for a European government directly responsible to the people of Europe and not to national governments. Except for delegates from Denmark and Norway, all other delegates from resistance movements endorsed the paper. In December 1946, 40 national movements from 16 countries created the Union of European Federalists, by far the biggest European lobby group for a federal Europe, existing to this day.⁴⁶ Also in Great Britain, federal ideas circulated, and Churchill's son-in-law Duncan Edwin Sandys chaired the United Europe Movement, founded in March 1947 and promoting a Commonwealth-like structure for Europe. This was a response to Winston Churchill's famous speech at the University of Zurich on September 19, 1946, in which the British opposition leader and war hero explicitly called for the formation of the United States of Europe: "Why should there not be a European group," he asked, "which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent."⁴⁷

Besides the many private groups and government bureaucracies, political parties took on the challenge to renew the idea of Europe through concrete steps of integration. Christian democratic movements – emerging on the European level under the heading of the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales*, founded in March 1947 – were to become a distinctive new feature of the European landscape, particularly favoring a federal

45 For documents see Lipgens, Walter (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, Vol.1 (Continental Plans for European Union, 1939-1945), Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985; Lipgens, Walter (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, Vol.2 (Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile, 1939-1945), Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986.

46 See May, Alex, *Europe at the Crossroads: The European Union of Federalists and the Process of European Integration, 1946-54*, London: South Bank European Papers, 1997.

47 Cited in Hitchcock, William I., *The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the Present*, New York: Anchor Book, 2004: 7.

integration of the continent as part of its necessary moral renewal. A Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe was founded in June 1947. The breakthrough of a new reality was imminent.

(7) Europe's loss of global preeminence: The loss of managing internal European affairs without interference from the peripheral powers, the US and USSR, had a double effect that turned out to be extremely favorable for initiating European integration. Fear from communism and the expansionist character of Soviet policy helped to bring together the "Western" camp. Most importantly, it resolved the issue of the prospective future of divided Germany. The stronger the Soviet Union was preparing for a Soviet-type model of rule in its satellite states, East Germany included, the faster the US favored turning negative control over West Germany into positive control by integrating West Germany into the newly emerging Euro-Atlantic security structures and means of economic cooperation.

All in all, the United States became the most important federator for Western Europe. Intellectually and as far as the normative reorientation of Europe was concerned, many in Europe looked to the US. Jean Monnet had studied most of the mechanisms and potential effects of his functional, sector-specific method of community building while in exile in Washington. He was not only strongly influenced by American federalism, but also able to connect with many high-ranking officials of the Roosevelt administration while living in Washington. It is almost ironic how America had influenced a Frenchman who was to become the most venerated "god-father" of European integration. It was also indicative that the fifth congress of the Pan European Union took place in New York in March 1943. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi proposed a Council of Europe with a Supreme Court that would entertain binding powers to resolve legal conflicts among its members and with armed forces to implement its decisions.

From May 1945, US commitment to European recovery and reconciliation through integration became a strategic interest and goal for the Truman administration. The Truman Doctrine, geared at containing Soviet expansionism, and the Marshall Plan, directed at economic recovery of Europe out of enlightened self-interest, became the cornerstones for US post-war policies. Along with the continuous troop deployment in Western Europe, the United States played an active, encouraging and supportive role to implant the ideas of reconciliation, recovery and integration in the best suitable and most lasting form. Economic rebuilding and the strategic imperative to contain and deter the expansionist Soviet Union were only to become successful if liberal democracies in Western Europe would be able to show economic success. Without an expanding market, this was as impossible as it would have been to build democracy without committed democrats.

(8) The changing meaning of national sovereignty: The classical idea of national sovereignty had become somewhat abstract after two wars and a cycle of destructive violence that was only stopped through outside, that is say non-European, intervention. Along with sovereignty, other key concepts of how to define power and relate resources to political processes and goals were reassessed. The search for new mechanisms favored what was to be labeled “functional, sector-specific integration,” intended to break the gap between the ideal and reality by facilitating instruments and means through which integration could turn into social and political reality.

Under the pressure of military defeat by Nazi Germany in 1940, Great Britain had offered France a Union between the two countries. Winston Churchill’s cabinet proposed to their French counterparts a common British-French citizenship and joint organs to lead the war. The French leadership under Prime Minister Paul Reynaud was hesitant and preferred to search for an armistice with Germany as their partner to maintain national sovereignty. The British proposal, beyond demonstrating the readiness to increase Britain’s link with continental Europe, was a substantial rejection of all traditional theories of sovereignty. Interestingly enough, it had been developed by a group around Jean Monnet, de Gaulle and members of the British Federal Union movement, among them historian Arnold Toynbee and Permanent Undersecretary Robert Vansittart. At first, Churchill seemed to have been reluctant to embrace such a far-fetched proposal. When he finally proposed it to his French colleague Reynaud, the French cabinet rejected the idea on June 16, 1940, with a 13 to 11 vote. The same evening, Reynaud resigned and was replaced by his rival, General Pétain, who immediately offered Hitler an armistice. But the debate in France about new concepts for Europe was only beginning, as indicated in a letter sent by Léon Blum – in 1936 the first socialist (and Jewish) French Prime Minister – from a prison of the Vichy government, strongly advocating powerful international organizations once this war was over. Otherwise, he feared, this would not have been the last war in Europe. In spring 1944, de Gaulle’s “Free France” proposed the integration of Western Europe, including Great Britain – this time without gaining too much British attention.

In November 1940, the leader of the Polish government in exile, General Władysław Sikorski, and the head of the provisional Czech government, Edvard Beneš, expressed their intention of creating a Polish-Czech Confederation once the war was over and their countries were free again. In 1942, Sikorski organized a London conference of governments in exile with representatives from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Yugoslavia and the committee Free France. The participants agreed on the creation of a “European Community” after the traumatic war had ended. The literature outpour during World War II on the issue of

Central and Eastern European federation was immense.⁴⁸ In Western Europe, the Belgian Foreign Minister in exile, Paul Henri Spaak, suggested a Union of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg with France.⁴⁹ Based on the resources of their respective colonies, this union would be able to play an independent global role. Other voices from the same region were more limited in their aspirations and some already reached out to their German enemy. Former Belgian Prime Minister Paul van Zeeland, in London the exile in charge of dealing with Belgian refugees, recommended a West European customs and currency union. Louis de Brouckère, former President of the Socialist and Labour International proposed to include German industrial resources into any future West European cooperation.

A precursor of integration trajectories to come was established on September 5, 1944, with the Benelux-Treaty. The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands came to agree on the establishment of a customs union once the war activities came to a halt. The abbreviation Benelux to this day remains synonymous for the readiness of smaller countries in Europe to advance the concept of a federal pooling of sovereignty and resources for the advantage of all.

After 1945, France was still searching for security against Germany. But instead of seeking revenge, Germany was searching for rehabilitation after the millenary moral and political humiliation it suffered with the defeat of Hitler's "Third Reich." France was able to begin reassessing the relationship between sovereignty and security in a new light as its own victory could not generate economic recovery unless geo-economic parameters in Europe were recalibrated.

(9) The notion of territoriality was redesigned:⁵⁰ Although it was too early to tell, European integration would certainly affect the sacrosanct principle of "non-interference in domestic affairs," one of the cornerstones of classical state sovereignty. Yet the race between the fear of losing sovereignty and the fear of losing economic means to rebuild the war-torn societies gave in to pragmatism. When the matter turned again into one of rigid principle – notably during the empty-chair crisis of 1965/66 provoked by French President Charles de Gaulle – the European integration mechanism had already developed so much authenticity and autonomy that it could not be destroyed and buried completely.

During the inter-war period, European governments were obsessed with redesigning borders or ensuring their permanency against revisionist pressure. When the Locarno Pact in 1925 guaranteed the Western borders between Germany, Belgium and France,

48 See Sworakowski, Witold S., *Bibliography of Books, Pamphlets, and Articles in Periodicals, Dealing with Federation Plans for Central and Eastern Europe, developed during the Second World War*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.

49 On the historic role of this ubiquitous man see Huizinga, Johan M., *Mr. Europe: A Political Biography of Paul Henri Spaak*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1961.

50 See Murray, Philomena B., and Leslie Holmes (eds.), *Europe – Rethinking the Boundaries*, Ashgate: Aldershot, 1998.

with Italy and Great Britain as guaranteeing powers, this seemed to be a breakthrough in overcoming the quarrel for territory. But an “Eastern Locarno” did not emerge as far as Germany’s borders with Poland and the Czech Republic were concerned. Hungary was another European country that felt it was treated extremely unfairly at the Peace Conferences post-World War I. While for the Germans, the battle cry of revisionism was “Versailles,” for Hungarians – who lost two thirds of their territory compared with the 10 percent loss of Germany – the battle cry was “Trianon.” It was no coincidence that the final resolution of German unification in 1990 was also dependent upon the comprehensive recognition of the German-Polish border, while the issue of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia, but also the relationship between Austrians and their neighbors and between Italy and Slovenia, were matters that stayed on the European agenda even beyond the divisions of the Cold War. But the form in which these issues were debated after 1989/1990, and the efforts to resolve them in the context of European integration among democracies, were light-years more moderate than the aggressive quest for each square meter of territory that had Europeans obsessed, almost bewitched, during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century.

(10) Politics reclaimed responsibility for ordering public life in Europe: The re-establishment of democratic rule in Germany and its consolidation in other Western European states – with the deplorable absence of Spain and Portugal and a bitter struggle in Greece – was a political act. So was the re-designation of the European state order. The partition of Europe in the Cold War was not a natural process but the consequence of normative differences between democracy and totalitarianism. This normative quarrel superseded the great power struggle between Russia and the United States, to which some far-sighted analysts had already made reference to in the nineteenth century, long before the ideological component existed. European integration as a process to unite like-minded democracies in Europe was the deepest possible rehabilitation of legitimate politics on a continent that had been the traumatic victim of ideological and violent politics. No matter what method was to be chosen, no matter which priorities were pursued, and no matter which technicalities might pose as hurdles on a long path, politics claimed to be in charge of ordering a disordered continent. In doing so in a peaceful, democratic and integrative way, it rehabilitated the legitimacy of its own sphere among highly skeptical and frustrated populations.

When French Prime Minister Aristide Briand presented his concept for European integration to the other governments of the continent on May 17, 1930, he proclaimed the primacy of a political order over the reorganization of the European economy.⁵¹ His comprehensive plan for a European order came at the wrong time. His German interlocutor Gustav Stresemann, the liberal and conciliatory Foreign Minister with

51 See Ferrell, Robert H., *Peace in their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1969.

whom Briand had negotiated the Locarno Pact and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926, had unfortunately died in 1929. In light of the world economic crisis, Briand proposed a political framework that could protect the interests of the strong as well as the weak states of Europe. A European Conference as main organ of a loose confederation should come together on the basis of an annually revolving presidency, chosen among European member states of the League of Nations. A Permanent Political Committee was planned as the executive organ that implemented decisions of the European Conference. A Secretariat was to coordinate administrative tasks. The scope of competences was intended to entail economic, financial and structural matters, also transportation, the health sector, exchange of academicians and parliamentarians, the rationalization of bureaucracies, and the coordination in the policies of the member states toward external powers and the League of Nations.

When Briand reported the reactions to his plan at the eleventh session of the General Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1931, a study commission was installed to look further into the matter. This was the death kiss for Briand's plan. The first truly honest political initiative for European integration moved into the archives. Along with the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 – named after Briand and US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg formulating a strict renunciation of violence as political means among European states – Briand's plan for Europe nevertheless gave testimony that responsible politicians were looking for alternative paths as the continent's radicals were preparing for the ultimate self-destruction of Europe, its moral credibility and political power.

5. *Constructivism at Work*

1945 was not a “zero hour” for Europe. As much as many pre-War realities prevailed, it became increasingly clear that most post-War innovations were already planned, if not designed and created during the horrible years of fighting and destruction.⁵² This also held true for political concepts that attempted to re-create the European continent in a new manner: Shifting from power struggles to cooperative and integrative means, and moving from fragile or authoritarian governance to democracy. This was the perspective for Western Europe at last, while the Eastern half of the continent unfortunately came under increasing pressure from the Soviet Union to follow its social, political and strategic model. On March 5, 1946, British opposition leader Winston Churchill, who had suffered a startling defeat in April 1945, proving democracy as vital reality in Great Britain, spoke of the “Iron Curtain” that was dividing Europe. In the presence of US President Harry S. Truman, his speech, in Fulton in

52 See Stirk, Peter M. R., and David Willis (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe: European Unity and Disunity, 1945-1957*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Truman's home-state Missouri, was to give the new era one of its most widely known phrases.⁵³ For historians, the "Cold War" – another phrase to describe the next five decades of geopolitical antagonism between "the West" and "the East" and the normative struggle between freedom and totalitarian rule – was not to begin before the failed Foreign Minister's meeting of the four victorious war powers in London on December 15, 1947. But the formative period for a whole new era and the emergence of a completely new face of Europe was already in full swing a year and a half earlier.

In addition to efforts of resistance movements and political intellectuals across Europe, "Free France" under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle had proposed the integration of Western Europe, along with Great Britain, as early as spring 1944.⁵⁴ Paul-Henri Spaak echoed these ideas with similar concepts in the autumn of 1944. The end of the war would also bring an end to colonial dominance. It would leave Europe with no choice but to rebuild itself as some sort of a "third force" between the United States and the Soviet Union. India's independence on August 15, 1947 – about a year earlier than planned by the British because of the pressure of the independence movement under Mahatma Gandhi – was symbolic for things to come. Europe would lose its global power base and would have to reconsider internal matters thoroughly were it to reemerge as a relevant factor with a reconstructed, morally and materially sound home base.

Interests among Western Europe's leading countries were obvious. Great Britain had elected the Socialists to power only few weeks after the war had ended, outvoting the conservative social policy of the 1930's and defeating War leader and hero Winston Churchill. For the next six years, until the conservatives under Churchill were reelected in 1951, the socialization of key industries and intensive welfare reforms were national priority. Beginning with India's independence in 1947 and ending with the Suez crisis in 1956, the British Empire was in steady decline. The necessity of properly connecting its fate to that of Europe grew, but remained uncertain and contested. In France, the Fourth Republic, established via referendum in 1946 – after the Allied landing in Normandy, the defeat of the Vichy regime, but against the will of de Gaulle, the military leader of France's war resistance – was but in name a renewed Third Republic with its inherent flaws: weak legislature, strong executive, fragmented political parties. Remarkable was the effect of the economic recovery in France. Between 1949 and 1957, its GDP grew by 49 percent. Just as remarkable was the political instability: The country experienced twenty-five different governments in twelve years before de Gaulle

53 See Gilbert, Martin, *The Origins of the "Iron Curtain" Speech*, Fulton, Missouri: Winston Churchill Memorial/Westminster College, 1981; Harbutt, Fraser J., *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America and the Origin of the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; Larres, Klaus, *Churchill's Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

54 See Pattison de Ménéil, Lois, *Who Speaks for Europe?: The Vision of Charles de Gaulle*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978; Hitchcock, William I., *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998; Jackson, Julian, *Charles de Gaulle*, London: Haus, 2003.

installed the Fifth Republic under his leadership. It also failed in its colonial policies: 1954 was the watershed-year with crushing military defeat in Indochina (Dien Bien Phu) and the outbreak of civil war in Algeria. Parliamentary democracy itself came under increasing pressure in France.

For defeated Germany, the perspective was quite different. Its democratic prospects and credentials could only grow, at least in the three Western sectors of the divided country. With the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in 1949, the process of ideological and geopolitical partition climaxed. The defeat of Nazi totalitarianism and the full record of its horrendous crimes brought about a deep loss of moral credibility for Germans. It also turned the occupied country into the battlefield for the newly emerging Cold War. American, British and French post-war plans for Germany were increasingly overshadowed by the challenge stemming from expansionist Soviet communism. The Federal Republic of Germany under its Christian Democratic Chancellor Konrad Adenauer seized the opportunity to lay the groundwork for its remarkable economic recovery during years of an economic miracle (“Wirtschaftswunder”). It also helped in turning negative control over West German sovereignty into positive control of Germany through its participation in the emerging “Western” structures of integration and cooperation.

Italy’s post-war development was ambivalent. With the beginning of the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily in July 1943, the country was torn between either resisting Hitler or Mussolini or the Allies. King Victor Emmanuel III ousted the country’s dictator Mussolini immediately and sought a separate peace with the Allies. German forces seized Rome and helped Mussolini to establish himself as head of the “Italian Social Republic” on the shores of Lake Garda. The King declared war on Germany. The first elections after the Allies had liberated Northern Italy from both the Germans and Mussolini’s forces were won by Alcide de Gasperi, the leader of the newly created Christian Democrats. He immediately established solid relations with the Anglo-American military authorities. In 1947, the communists had to leave his government when Italy became recipient of Marshall Plan aid. The country had made a turn-around and became a pillar in the Western security calculation. It also became a “natural” participant in the emerging European structures of economic cooperation.

As for the Netherlands, the end of World War II was followed by the immediate declaration of independence of her colony Indonesia on August 17, 1945, after liberation from Japanese occupation. The Dutch view that colonial rule should be reestablished, underestimated the strong nationalistic feelings in Indonesia, but also the unwillingness of Great Britain – who had liberated the archipelago from Japanese occupation – to cooperate to this end. After a failed military intervention by the Dutch, Indonesia and the Netherlands agreed on the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, followed by years of tension. In 1957, all remaining Dutch citizens had to leave Indonesia, followed by the nationalization of all Dutch enterprises in 1958. Parallel to this

humiliating end of Dutch colonial power, World War II had caused enormous economic damage in the Netherlands. Political life fragmented again along the pre-war lines between religious and liberal or socialist parties. In 1948, Queen Wilhelmina was forced to abdicate, feeling bitter about post-war developments both in Indonesia and at home after liberalization from German occupation. Between 1946 and 1958, the Netherlands were governed by a coalition of the Catholic People's Party and the Labor Party under Labor leader Willem Drees. The Dutch struggle with natural disaster during the terrible flood of 1953 did not derail the overall success of economic recovery supported by Marshall Plan Aid. Supporting European economic cooperation and integration was a natural and consensual idea shared in the Netherlands.

In Belgium, with the end of German occupation, internal lines of controversy reemerged between the Walloons and the Flemish: the Flemish, by and large Catholic, were in favor of a return of the Belgian king, who had been transferred by the Germans to Austria in 1944, while the Walloons, like Socialists and Liberals in general, were against it. A referendum in 1950 showed 58 percent of all Belgians in favor of the return of the king, but in the Walloon county it could have signalled civil war. In August 1950, King Leopold appointed his eldest son, Prince Baudouin, to temporarily rule in his place. In 1951, King Leopold formally abdicated, and his son officially assumed the throne as King Baudouin I. As in the Netherlands, post-war policy in Belgium was also dominated by the decolonization issue, in the Belgian case it was the issue of the Belgian Congo. Belgium also debated the recovery of the mixed economy, the matter of regional autonomy, including issues of education and language, and Belgium's role in the emerging new postwar international and supranational organizations. After a miracle recovery in the late 1940's, Belgium was heavily affected by declining investment rates and strongly reduced growth rates, beside the burden of the aging Walloon heavy industry. The prospect of participating in a wider European customs union was cherished across all political and regional camps in Belgium.

Iron ore had largely made the fortune of modern Luxembourg. During German occupation of neutral Luxembourg as of May 1940, Grand Duchess Charlotte and her cabinet fled abroad. After Allied troops liberated Luxembourg in September 1944, the grand duchy was soon to join the United Nations and, also as one of its founding members, NATO. In 1948 its revised constitution abolished perpetual neutrality. Given its involvement in the European coal and steel industry and its geographical location, it was more than natural that Luxembourg joined the efforts to establish a European Coal and Steel Community, and subsequently the European Economic Community. Luxembourg has always been among the most active and respected partners in the European integration process.

In September 1946, members of various federalist groups from fourteen European countries met in Hertenstein, Switzerland, and decided to form a European roof organization. Under the leadership of Hendrik Brugmans from the Netherlands, the

European Union of Federalists was founded in October 1946. The Hague Congress of May 7-10, 1948, was the most powerful demonstration of civil society pressure for a united Europe so far. It was attended by representatives from politics, the economy and culture from all over Europe, representing the dream of different generations to turn the page in Europe's history once and for all. Konrad Adenauer was among the participants, as well as François Mitterrand, to name but two prominent representatives of two different generations and political camps.

As far as the big geo-political picture was concerned, the wartime Alliance between the US, France and Great Britain on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand had already begun to dissolve rapidly during the year prior to the Hague Congress. President Truman's speech to the US Congress on March 12, 1947, defined the doctrine that became paramount for the years to come: The US was to remain committed to European recovery and security, while the USSR was to be contained wherever necessary. Anti-Soviet considerations and pro-federal idealism, new geostrategic realities and wavering democracies, Christian and Socialist, liberal and humanist traditions converged in the notion and concept of the "Western world." When US Secretary of State George C. Marshall addressed Harvard University's Commencement on June 5, 1947, nobody was able to foresee the results of the rising West. Yet his offer to help war-torn Europe was a turning point of unprecedented importance. It would commit the US to stay a European power although the subsequent Marshall Aid program – the European Recovery Program – did not turn into an institution able to manage economic relations among European states. In December 1947, the US Congress agreed to a first aid package for Europe in the amount of 522 million US dollars for France, Italy and Austria. In total, the Marshall Plan aid grew into 13 billion US dollars between 1947 and 1952.⁵⁵

Concepts for the restructuring of Europe remained confusing during the immediate post-war years. Whether emphasis should be on the political reorganization of Europe or on the economic recovery was as much open to debate as the question of leadership: Should the new Europe be Atlantic or European, should it be a third force in world politics or a junior partner of the US in the emerging conflict with an expansionist Soviet Union? How should the prospects for a peaceful and democratic reunification of the European continent be upheld and what would be the role and position of divided Germany? The period between 1945 and 1955 was truly one of trial and error. The new Europe grew as a social and political construction.

Constructivism does not mean the absence of rational roots or the lack of consensus. But it means that not only political, but also military and economic leaders and leading intellectuals contributed to the emergence of a whole set of Euro-Atlantic institutions.

55 For this figure see Knipping, Franz, *Rom, 25.März 1957: Die Einigung Europas*, Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004: 53. Martin Dedman gives the figure of 22 billion US-dollars for the same period: Dedman, Martin, *The Origins and Development of the European Union, 1945-1990*, op.cit.: 48.

At no point in time was the success or failure of any of them self-evident. All efforts were without precedence. Basic ideas had been outlined throughout the long struggle of Europe's failed history. But details and linkages, effects and implications, were disguised under the veil of an altogether uncertain, yet possible future. Compared with the horrors of totalitarian tyranny and cruel warfare, compared with the secular tragedies of the Holocaust and the prevailing Gulags, the construction of a new political and economic Europe was almost an easy task. Its main difficulty stemmed from the inevitable need to redefine security concepts and future economic and political trajectories in accordance with the values of reconciliation, renewal and cooperation. Wherever this was achieved, all early efforts to reconstruct Europe deserve a dignified place in the historic account of these formative years.

Since 1947, American politicians had supported the creation of regional institutions in Europe. As Marshall Aid supported the reconstructing of the widely destroyed infrastructure in Europe, discussions among European leaders focused on the prospects of a customs union on the one hand, and a political mechanism for a new European order on the other hand. On April 16, 1948, the convention of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was signed by sixteen countries; West Germany joined a year later. The OEEC under its French Secretary General Robert Marjolin⁵⁶ became the framework for the implementation of American aid to Europe while the final control of the use of the means remained in the hands of the "Economic Cooperation Administration" of the US government. The Marshall Plan did not generate a supranational institution in Europe, but it was the starting point for a new economic beginning in Europe under democratic auspices.

The next step, again supported by the US, focused on the security situation. After the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg agreed within a few days on a multilateral defense treaty with reciprocal assistance obligations. The Brussels Pact was to exist for 50 years. Later, it grew into the Western European Union (WEU), but it never became more than a coordinating element for the Western European caucus in NATO. NATO was founded on April 4, 1949, by twelve countries – the US, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy, in 1952 enlarged by Greece and Turkey and in 1955 by West Germany – and immediately turned into the backbone of transatlantic security assurances. When NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1999, it had all the reason to be proud of being the most successful defense alliance in human history; it had brought the Cold War and the division of Europe to an end without a single bullet being shot. As for WEU, it was

56 See Ouin, Marc, *The OEEC and the Common Market: Why Europe needs an Economic Union of Seventeen Countries*, Paris: Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 1958; Marjolin, Robert, *Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 1911-1986*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1989; Griffiths, Richard, *Explorations in OEEC History*, Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1997.

absorbed by the efforts of the European Union to establish not only a Common Foreign and Security, but also a Common Defense Policy.

British Labor Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin is given credit for the proposal of October 1948 to establish the Council of Europe. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, holding office since July 1948, immediately agreed, although he would have preferred the name “European Union.” In accordance with the European movements as outlined at their Hague congress he suggested it to be a parliamentary assembly. Great Britain accepted, provided each country was independent in selecting its members and could define the agenda of the Council. Future debates about the scope of national autonomy over supranational institutions and their decision-making were beginning to loom on the horizon. When the Council of Europe met for the first session of its consultative parliamentary assembly in August 1949 in Strasbourg, all national parliaments sent leading politicians to attend. The first President of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe was former Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak.

The goal and purpose of the Council of Europe, its early declarations said, was the formation of a European political authority with limited functions, but real competences.⁵⁷ The Council of Europe was to gain its main success with its support of human rights: The European Convention on Human Rights, signed in 1952, and the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights are widely acclaimed success stories to this day. As the first ever European regional institution, the Council of Europe was to become a reference point for all democratic states on the continent. With Greece and Turkey joining immediately in 1949, the Council of Europe also proved its potential as bridge-builder among conflicting states. When the Iron Curtain finally fell in 1989/1990, all post-communist countries were eager to join the Council of Europe. But by then, the orientating function of the Council of Europe had turned into a sort of waiting room for early membership in the European Union. In 1949, it would not have been conceivable to see the Council of Europe struggling for its future identity while the path toward economic integration had finally also taken precedence over all other European efforts to forge a political Europe.⁵⁸

The creation of the Council of Europe did not stop reflections among European governments concerning a customs union. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson urged French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman to take the leading role. France maintained strong interest in preventing the revival of untamed German economic strength. It had to accept the need to include Germany in all future considerations concerning European

57 For the overly optimistic beginnings see Hurd, Volney, *The Council of Europe: Design for a United States of Europe*, New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958.

58 On the first fifty years of the Council of Europe see Holtz, Uwe (ed.), *50 Jahre Europarat*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000; for the account of one of its former Secretary Generals see Schwimmer, Walter, *Der Traum Europa: Europa vom 19. Jahrhundert in das dritte Jahrtausend*, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer, 2004.

economic integration while simultaneously maintaining its dominant position among Western European states. For a British-US-French Foreign Minister's meeting on May 11-13, 1950, Acheson and Bevin were preparing to resolve the limitation of German steel production that was fixed with 11.1 million tons per year. Along with the prospect of an easing of the occupational status for Germany, France became worried. Churchill, in a speech to the British Parliament, had even proposed to establish a German troop contingent as part of a European army. France had to act, and Schuman acted. After receiving support from German Chancellor Adenauer on May 8, 1950, the next day he proposed to place the complete French and German steel and coal production under a common high authority. This would mean rehabilitation for Germany and security for France. It also meant a completely new experience for Europe. When the treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community was signed on April 18, 1951, nobody could anticipate what was to follow. Constructivism had succeeded in just another form to revive and unite Europe. The outcome – short-term or long-term – was still clouded. Integration was a big goal, a normative plea as the work of the Council of Europe was demonstrating. But with the Schuman Plan – the brainchild of Jean Monnet – European integration was to find its means.

Constructing Europe anew was based on the combination of several factors. The mutual realization of the costs of non-integration was coupled with the awareness that integrating Europe's economies or even political institutions would not require that any partner had to give up something relevant. It meant that each partner would gain something instead. The mutual recognition that differences and contrasting interests would prevail was coupled with the understanding that they should be managed in a completely different way than before. The pressure of geopolitics and interdependence – even felt amid the post-war economic hardship and the pressure on democratic rule – was echoed by the voice of civil societies across Europe aimed at stopping the destructive path of European politics. Integration did not become the natural consequence of an invocation of norms. It became the daunting, often difficult and tiresome process of the slow and sometimes all too slow implementation of procedures. The sober functional translation of a great idea did not strip it off its dignity. In fact, it made its realization possible.

European integration began as a foreign policy exercise, pressed by political groups and voices from European citizenry, but largely driven by the politically responsible elites in democratic governments. The role of the United States as federator cannot be overvalued. Yet autonomous European decisions turned the corner from their devastated and demoralized continent. The scope of the new methods, which were established to manage European affairs, was limited and not overly ambitious. The means were focused, the instruments sustainable. The prospects for deepened integration and widened participation were implicit in the new endeavor. Most important was the prevailing spirit of reconciliation. This helped to navigate through the economic,

political and security agenda of the late 1940's and early 1950's without ever losing sight altogether.

Compared with Europe's past, this was a revolution. It was a thorough revolution in thoughts and a silent revolution in deeds. Sharing sovereignty and pooling resources was to transform the European body politic. It was to accelerate the path to unprecedented affluence and stable democratic rule. It was to broaden the circle of states joining this experiment and gradually, it was turning from experiment into a new normalcy.

X. “For the Sake of Europe”: Prevailing Normative Disputes

1. *No Monopoly on the Definition of Europe’s Interests*

In Europe, Europe is everywhere and every EU citizen is a European. There is no need to participate in the political institutions of Europe to be recognized as European citizen. There is no need to go to Brussels in order to be in a European city. Yet, the political form of Europe is the sum of incremental consensus-building. As much as nation-building or integration-building is a constructivist phenomenon, interest-formation is a genuine and rather daunting phenomenon in Europe. Here, the role of the institutions and of centralized policy-making becomes relevant. In the absence of naturally evident, historically tested and comprehensive political European interests, their evolution is and will remain a process of ideational debate, political bargaining and public interpretation. When it comes to defining common political interests, the European Union is stretched between two opposing poles: Inside the EU, no country or institution can claim the monopoly to define what is “in the interest of Europe.” Looked at the issue from the outside, the expectation for Europe to define and project its interests is much higher than the performance of the EU and its self-acclaimed targets can be. European interests have to grow within a culture of consent that has evolved in more than five decades and yet has not achieved its final contours.¹ How to turn consent into new and commonly acclaimed power and authority remains a persistent struggle for the EU. As a consequence of Europe’s affluence and its rhetorical claims to uphold values that most reasonable people in the world can share in abstract terms, the European Union is expected to strengthen its capacity for action beyond all realistically available means and instruments. How to turn abstract and all-pervasive expectations into a coherent and sustainable projection of Europe’s interests remains a permanent pressure on Europe’s authority and power, both worldwide and as far as loyalty among its citizens is concerned.

Power is a function of ambition and will, of goals and resources, of strategies and tactics. For the European Union to execute power requires highly complex processes of formulating consent. This can undermine the EU’s immediate claim to authority, but might eventually increase its potential power once a consensual decision has been found. As not all issues exercise the same degree of relevance and impact, one has to be

1 On this issue in general and in the context of organized interest representation see Cini, Michelle, *European Union Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Greenwood, Justin, *Interest Representation in the European Union*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Green Cowles, Marie, and Desmond Dinan (eds.), *Developments in the European Union*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; de Búrca, Gráinne, *EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Dinan, Desmond, *An Ever Closer Union: An Introduction in the European Integration*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005 (3rd ed.); Richardson, Jeremy, *European Union: Power and Policy-Making*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 (3rd ed.).