Zusammenfassung
Das Buch zielt darauf ab, ein grundlegendes Verständnis des Verbots der Selbstbegünstigung durch digitale Gatekeeper zu schaffen, wie es in Artikel 6 Absatz 5 des Gesetzes über digitale Märkte (DMA) festgelegt ist. Es erläutert die aktuellen Bedenken und bietet gleichzeitig Anleitungen für eine effektive Einhaltung. Bislang wurde den komplizierten Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Online-Suchmaschinen und anderen digitalen Diensten wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Dieses Buch versucht, diese Landschaft zu erhellen, indem es insbesondere die Grenzen zwischen Online-Suchmaschinen, Online-Vermittlungsdiensten und Online-Informationsdiensten aufzeigt, die von den designierten Gatekeepern bei der Gestaltung ihrer Systeme im Hinblick auf die Einhaltung des DMA berücksichtigt werden müssen. Artikel 6 Absatz 5 DMA zielt auf "Plattform-Umhüllungsstrategien" ab, die sich nachteilig auf Verbraucher und Unternehmen auswirken. Im Kern geht es dabei um die Präsentation oder das direkte Angebot (d. h. die Einbettung) von verschiedenen Diensten auf den Ergebnisseiten einer Online-Suchmaschine. Solche Praktiken sind nur dann zulässig, wenn Drittanbietern eines ähnlichen Dienstes die gleiche Gelegenheit zur Präsentation oder zum Angebot gegeben wird. Die Gleichwertigkeit setzt voraus, dass keine Ungleichgewichte bei den Rechten oder Pflichten bestehen und dem eingebetteten Erstanbieterdienst des Gatekeepers, seiner Online-Suchmaschine oder einem anderen zentralen Plattformdienst kein unverhältnismäßiger Vorteil eingeräumt wird. Das Buch entwirft genaue rechtliche Leitlinien für die Einhaltung dieser Verpflichtungen.
Abstract
This book aims to establish a foundational understanding of the prohibition of self-favouring by digital gatekeepers as stipulated in Article 6(5) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). It elineates current concerns while offering guidance for effective compliance. Until now, little attention has been paid to the intricate interrelations among online search engines and other digital services. This book seeks to elucidate this landscape, delineating, in particular the boundaries between online search engines, online intermediation services and online information services that designated gatekeeper need to consider when designing their systems to comply with the DMA. Article 6(5) targets ‘platform envelopment’ strategies that detrimentally impact consumers and businesses. The core concern is the presentation or the direct offering (i.e. embedding) of distinct services on the results pages of an online search engine. Such practices are permissible only if third-party providers of a similar service are afforded an equal opportunity for presentation or offering. Equivalence necessitates that no imbalances in rights or obligations remain and no disproportionate advantage in conferred on the gatekeeper’s embedded first-party service, its online search engine or any other core platform service. This book sets out precise legal guidelines for achieving compliance with these obligations.
Schlagworte
Artikel 6 Abs. 5 DMA Article 6(5) DMA Chancengleichheit disproportionate advantage embedding Compliance Digital Markets Act equal opportunity DMA imbalance in rights information services Einbettung Gatekeeper intermediation services prohibition Informationsdienste Internet regulation Regulierung search engines self-favoring Selbstbevorzugung self-favouring Selbstübervorteilung Suchmaschinen Ungleichgewicht in den Rechten unverhältnismäßiger Vorteil Verbot Vermittlungsdienste- 213–216 List of references 213–216
- 217–218 Index 217–218
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