

Paul Weismann

# Soft Law and its Importance in Ensuring Member States' Compliance with Union Law



**Nomos**



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Paul Weismann

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## Preface

This work is based on my habilitation thesis which I completed at the University of Salzburg. The continuous and thorough exchange of thoughts on all kinds of aspects relating to this text with my then academic supervisor, Professor *Stefan Griller*, was particularly helpful in all phases of my work on it. For this support I would like to express my sincere gratitude. The text was awarded the *Dr. Alois Mock-Wissenschaftspreis*, for which I am thankful to the eponymous foundation.

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Paul Weismann  
Salzburg, April 2023



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