

6 The formation of the Christian body at work

In the present chapter, I will propose a sketch of the contours and contents of the formation of the Christian body in contemporary work settings. With the notion of ‘the Christian body’ at work, I take up the Christian (see e.g. Lewis 1980:63f) identification of the many bodies of those who live as Christians¹ with the place of the formation of the one body of Jesus Christ. In this respect, I will address two main aspects of the study of Christians at work: first, the framing of Christian existence at work (6.1) and, second, the embodiment of Christian existence at work (6.2). In doing so, I will use three different sources. First, I will draw on a theoretical sketch developed on the basis of data from our study of Christian managers in Switzerland.² Second, I will use Pierre Bourdieu’s work on the habitus (6.1) and Viktor Frankl’s work on meaning in life (6.2) as conceptual backgrounds, as well as some additional perspectives or ‘hermeneutical lenses’³ to further explore and accentuate the contours and contents of the Christian body at work. Third, I will relate this discussion to some of the accounts⁴ introduced in the first five chapters of this dissertation. While drawing on these three sources, I will propose ‘being a Christian’ or Christian existence as a key category in the study of Christians at work. I will argue that, in terms of the existential aspects of the term Christian, the two emphases—first, on the reality of Jesus Christ and, second, on the bodily and concrete character of Christian living—can be brought together to specify the bodily participation of those who live as Christians in the formation of the body of Christ in contemporary work settings.

Let me, in the remainder of this introduction to the present chapter, comment on the status of the theoretical sketch of Christian existence in contemporary workplaces which I developed on the basis of the above-mentioned empirical study of managers.⁵ The theory proposed is intended as a contribution to the general study of Christians in contemporary Western contexts. Because the sample is geographically and functionally limited to Christian managers in German-speaking Switzerland (see 1.3),

1 Which, from an existential stance, includes those who live as Christians, while rejecting, for various reasons, the (nominal) label ‘Christian’ (see 6.1.2).

2 On the data used and the method applied in the data collection and analysis, see 1.3.

3 For an overview of the hermeneutical lenses used in this dissertation to explore Christian embodiment, see 1.4.

4 See the target discourses described in 1.2.

5 On the role of practitioner perspectives in the study of Christians at work, see also 1.4.

further research will be needed to advance the proposed theory to explicitly cover sections of the workforce, first, in other geographical contexts and, second, who are not usually considered to be ‘managers’⁶. The empirically grounded theoretical sketch considered in this dissertation consists of two main parts: first, a map of understanding to frame Christian existence at work (see 6.1) and, second, a sketch of the characteristic elements of how Christian existence is embodied in contemporary work settings (6.2). In the present dissertation, the function of the theory developed on empirical grounds is thus, first, to complement the conceptual work of this dissertation with regard to practitioner framings of Christian existence at work and, second, to provide the basic building blocks of a theoretical sketch of the embodiment of Christian existence at work. As the empirical grounding of the proposed theoretical sketch is limited by the sample of Christians studied, this chapter will not only introduce the theoretical sketch developed on empirical grounds, but also indicate its potential broader viability by relating it to extant research on Christians at work and to the various theoretical approaches indicated above.

6.1 Framing Christian existence at work

In the present section, I will, first, introduce a map of understanding⁷ which seeks to capture the different connotations in the practitioner use of the terms Christian and Christians and their function in framing Christian existence at work. Second, I will compare the notion of Christian existence to Bourdieu’s notion of a habitus to argue for the priority of the existential aspects of the terms Christian and Christians in the study of Christians at work.

6.1.1 Mapping the framing practices of Christian managers in Switzerland

The study of Christians at work, as proposed here, takes into account the Christian practice and self-localization as displayed by Christians at work, and seeks to refrain from arbitrarily imposing conceptions which are at odds with self-localization by practitioners. The hermeneutical frame or map of understanding I am going to sketch in this section takes up practitioner experiences and perspectives and locates them within the context of

6 On the semantic ambiguity of the term, see 3.5.

7 My use of the term ‘map of understanding’ is inspired by Alexander’s (2018) article of the same title (on faith in early Christianity).

an overarching framework or map. Thus, the frame proposed here is not identical with the perspectives proposed by the subjects studied, but takes them into account and offers a gentle systemization which seeks to abstain from imposing competing overriding conceptions that obscure Christian localization practices. It seeks to accentuate the positioning work of the practitioners studied. For example, most of the individuals studied distance themselves from the label religion/religious and consider themselves practicing Christians, but not as religious. The map of understanding I propose does not ignore this crucial positioning work by categorizing the respective subjects as religious simply because this is a common category used in academic research concerning Christians, but seeks to capture what these individuals are doing by positioning themselves the way they are.⁸

The basic category with which to frame the study of Christians at work is the category of being a Christian [*Christsein*]. While this seems to be a trivial observation, it must be noted that extant research relevant to the study of Christians at work uses other categories. While in management and organization studies, faith, spirituality, or religion are used as the basic categories (see chapters 2–4), theological approaches tend to conceptualize Christian existence at work under the rubric of ethics or morality (see chapter 5). All these concepts can be included in a map of understanding for the study of Christians at work, but none of them necessarily carries conceptual priority over the category of being a Christian. This means nothing less than while in extant research the category ‘Christian’ is usually construed as a subcategory of, say, faith, spirituality, religion, or ethics, in a hermeneutically oriented study of Christians at work, the notions of faith, spirituality, religion, and ethics can themselves become subcategories of the broader category of being a Christian (see below in this section). With the conceptual prioritiza-

8 There seem to be parallels with the more prevalent self-identification of individuals as ‘spiritual but not religious’ (see Fuller 2001) or SBNR, which became prominent around 2001 (see Johnson et al. 2018:122). Google Scholar (accessed 25 May 2018) has no direct matches for CBNR or ‘Christian but not religious’, while the Recherche-Portal of the University of Zurich (accessed 28 May 2018) shows one article directly matching the search for ‘Christian but not religious’ (a 2018 study on Christian hardcore punk in the United States by Amy McDowell). See also Buszka and Ewest’s (2020:63) reference to research from the Pew Research Center in the United States indicating that, in 2017, 27 % of those surveyed identified themselves as ‘spiritual but not religious’, and 35 % within that group of ‘spiritual but not religious’ also identified themselves as being Protestant (!). <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922629-241>, am 21.09.2024, 11:20:17

tion of the category Christian, the categorical⁹ connotations carried by the term Christian as used by the practitioners studied can be taken into account. To be sure, there is also a different practitioner usage of the term Christian, in which other connotations are predominant, and in which the term can indeed function as a subcategory of the categories of, say, religion, faith, or spirituality (e.g. P5:41¹⁰; P9:197), similar to its predominant use in fsw literature (for examples, see 4.1). The frame of understanding I will propose here is intended to capture these different usages.

The main distinction which characterizes the frame is that between being a Christian nominally or being a Christian existentially. The nominal way of being a Christian is, according to the accounts of the managers studied, biographically determined by being born into and raised within a (family) context, which is, on paper, Christian,¹¹ and in which Christianity is practiced to different degrees and in different forms. The nominal mode of being a Christian can (but does not have to) include a variety of elements, such as participation in religious education activities, service attendance, family prayer, membership in a congregation, and also the holding of certain beliefs (for example, in the existence of God, e.g. P5:61; P9:21.91 – 95). Even though the nominal mode can include a considerable amount of activity, what characterizes it as nominal is that it is not experienced as something which is personally relevant or of concern (e.g. P14:33–35.45). In this mode, for example, the holding of a general belief in the existence of God can coincide with the making of derogatory jokes about Jesus on the cross (P5:61).

In contrast, in the existential mode of being a Christian, Christian practice and identity become a matter of personal concern and relevance. I have called the shift from a nominal to an existential mode of being a Christian the ‘activation of Christian existence’ [*Aktivierung des Christseins*].¹² All¹³ the

9 On the differentiation between the categorical/existential and the categorizing/nominal connotations of the term, see below in this section.

10 P5:41 stands for research participant 5, paragraph 41 in the respective interview text. If a second or a third interview was conducted with the same participant, this is indicated in the following format: P5’:41, or P5’’:41, respectively.

11 All our research participants grew up as Christians (see 1.3). As the nominal level is also the level of nominal religiosity (see below), the frame could, however, in principle be expanded to include people who are, nominally, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, or adherents of any other religion (see below).

Christians studied recount a form of activation as a crucial aspect of their biography. The different forms of activation can be differentiated between according to the presence or absence of experiences, processes, and practices of initiation, such as a conversion or baptism (e.g. P5:56–69; P7:185–197; P14:45), and in terms of their singular or developing character on a time frame. While some experience the activation as a singular event (e.g. P9:132–139), others experience it more as a process of intensification (e.g. P18:320–346; P8:155.180 – 187). Additionally, while for some the activation experience is more of an inner process (e.g. P5:56–69), for others it directly and immediately affects their life circumstances and, in particular, their professional orientation (e.g. P6:36f; P7:185–197; P9:109–127). In spite of this emphasis on personal relevance, many participants in the study recount that it was through the witnessing of and participation in positive relationships with other Christians that they became Christians themselves, existentially speaking (see e.g. P5:56–69; P7:185–197; P10:77; P13:52;

- 12 As all the participants in our study come from a Christian background (that is, their starting position prior to the activation was on the nominal Christian level), our sample does not cover cases of the activation of Christian existence experienced by individuals from other religious backgrounds. It is, however, documented that there are people from various backgrounds other than Christian ones (in particular, Jewish, Hindu, and Islamic) who come to follow Jesus (see e.g. Adeney 2009, Miller & Johnstone 2015). Some of them refrain from applying the label ‘Christian’ to themselves, a phenomenon which is, in Christian missiology, sometimes referred to as ‘insider movements’ (see e.g. Asad 2009; for the debates and some examples concerning the phenomenon in Hindu contexts, see Baago 1967 & 1968, Boyd 1974, Chetty 1969, Hoefler 2001, Kent 2011, Richard 2005, and Vinod 2013; as far as Muslim contexts are concerned, see Anderson 1976, Brown 2007, Cobb 1969, Cumming 2009, Goldsmith 1976, McCurry 1979, Miller & Johnstone 2015, Parshall 1998, Riggs 1941, Tennent 2006, Travis 1998, Travis & Woodberry 2010, Wilder 1977, Wolfe 2011 & Woodberry 1989; on Jewish contexts and Messianic Judaism, see the literature discussed in 6.1.2). The framing of such a mode of existence then becomes more complex. If individuals from other than Christian backgrounds live as Christians, existentially speaking (on the characteristics, see below), but refrain from using the label Christian for themselves, they could be described, in the light of the frame presented here nominally, as non-Christians, who live in a mode of existence which is identical to that of those who are Christians, existentially speaking.
- 13 The case of P4 differs from that of the other participants in this regard, in that she self-identifies as a Christian nominally, but her activation indicates a strong emphasis on what Schneuwly Purdie & Stolz (2014:94) refer to as “alternative spirituality” mixed with Christian spirituality, and combined with an emphasis on the importance of faith and spirituality at work. From the data that we have from her, I am at present unsure where to localize her within the frame because it is not clear if her Christianity means more to her than merely a status on paper.

P14:31.46 – 58). Activation is thus experienced individually but mediated socially.

While for some, the shift from a nominal to an existential mode of being a Christian is marked by starting to engage in Christian practices, such as service attendance (P10:77.163), engagement in Christian practices can also occur on the nominal level. The crucial factor is not one's engagement or level of engagement in a Christian practice, but the relevance one ascribes to it.

In terms of its substance, the characteristics of an existential mode of being a Christian as described by the practitioners studied can be relatively clearly defined, even though the different profiles display different nuances and different configurations of the basic characteristics.¹⁴ A Christian mode of existence is characterized by three main orientations of, first, an emphasis on a personal relationship with God (e.g. P2:20; P5:61.120 – 123; P7:50; P9:23.33 – 35.95 – 99.119.198 – 207.215 – 219; P10:55–57.77; P14:81) and, second, an emphasis on Jesus Christ, or an individual's orientation toward Christ (e.g. P5:107–109.119 – 123.127; P6:24.147; P6':58; P7:19–20.189.193; P9:23.33 – 35.95 – 99.109.119.125.198 – 207.215 – 219) and, third, an individual's orientation toward the Bible (e.g. P2:20; P5:61.67.107; P7:147.193; P9:23; P14:90–93). These three aspects do not seem to compete with each other in terms of different foci, but are interdependent, and orient and reinforce each other.

The distinction between a nominal and an existential mode of being a Christian makes it possible to account for some remarkable phrasings which go unnoticed in a one-dimensional understanding of the use of the term Christian, which refrains from differentiating between the two modes. One of the managers studied spoke about his Christian upbringing: "I grew up as a Christian and then had a phase where I was not interested in God at all (...) And then I met my wife, who was also not a Christian" (P6:107).¹⁵ He (P6:106–111) characterizes his upbringing as Christian because his parents, initially, were active in a church and, later, became committed Christians (P6:111). In the first usage, the main connotations of the term Chris-

14 In this respect, our study thus reflects Hans Joas's (2012:187f) observation of the dissolution of confessional milieus and the formation of an interdenominational Christian milieu, where it is valid that „die Trennungslinie verläuft, immer weniger zwischen den Konfessionen und ihren Milieus und immer mehr zwischen Christen und Nicht-Christen.“

15 Original German quotation: „Ich bin christlich aufgewachsen und hatte dann eine Phase in der ich gar nichts wissen wollte von Gott (...) Und dann habe ich meine Frau kennengelernt, die auch nicht Christ war.“

tian seem to have a categorizing or nominal function. He grew up in a Christian context and not, say, in a Buddhist or Muslim environment. But then, following his Christian upbringing, there was “a phase where I was not interested in God at all” (P6:107). In practice, this meant that he abstained from visiting church services for some time. Note that, sociologically speaking, one could easily continue to categorize him as a Christian (*vis-à-vis* Muslims, for example) at this stage, even in his time of distance from God and the church. However, in terms of his Christianness, P6’s verdict is clear: “And then I met my wife, who was *also* not a Christian” (P6:107, my emphasis). Although he only says it implicitly, for P6 his disinterest in God made him, actually, a non-Christian. This reflects what I call an existential standpoint. He does not refer to himself as a Christian in this particular biographical stage *because he was not living as a Christian* at that time, that is, his (nominally) being a Christian did not characterize his mode of existence. For him, his nominal status is not the point here, but his way of life and his attitude to God. In his biographical account of his relationship to the institutional church, P6 only mentions a break in his attending services, but not canceling his church membership. For example, in the framework of Stolz and colleagues (2014:94), he would have to be categorized as institutionally religious, experiencing a temporary decrease in intensity of his institutional religiosity, resulting in temporary categorization of his religiosity as institutionally distanced. During these changes, the model would continue to categorize him as a Christian, ignoring the existential concerns at stake during these changes in his life.

P6 then goes on to describe how he has become acquainted with the church again by being invited to a service of worship by his mother, but that his particular way of practicing his faith¹⁶ did not begin then, but when he started to pray regularly at work because of a challenging business project he was responsible for (P6:36f). The framework based on the distinction between a nominal and an existential mode of being a Christian makes it possible to differentiate in this case: while, nominally, P6 grew up as a Christian, the activation of his Christian mode of existence occurs much later in his biography. And, existentially speaking, being a Christian merely nominally does not count as being a Christian. Thus, there are, in this respect, two different ways of using the word Christian.¹⁷

16 I will discuss the role of the term faith below in this section.

17 Whereas, on a nominal level, being a Christian is an option *vis-à-vis*, for example, being Jewish or being a Buddhist, the optionality changes with regard to the shift from a nominal to an existential mode of being a Christian: the activation is characterized by the

Another manager in the study describes his religious upbringing as a member of a church (including being baptized as a child, participating in religious education, and later being married in a church setting) and explains how it was only later that he had an activation experience, when he became active in a community of committed Christians and was rebaptized as an adult: “And then I realized: this conscious decision—because before I had already believed, *but I had still not really felt like a Christian*. But this then somehow helped” (P10:163; my emphasis).¹⁸ Again, sociologically, one could have already categorized P10 as a Christian prior to his activation experience, a Christian who then intensified his Christian engagement. And intensity can indeed be a way to describe the existential mode in contrast to a nominal mode. However, P10’s concern here is different. He did not feel not active enough, or that his engagement was not intense enough. He did not really feel like being a Christian *at all*.

“Really” serves here as a marker for the existential mode of being a Christian. What appears, on the level of the hermeneutical frame, as the distinction between an existential and a nominal mode of existence, appears on the level of the language of some of the Christians studied as certain markers or qualifiers of their Christianness. In addition to “really”, other terms¹⁹ are used, such as “confessing Christian” [bekennder Christ] (P5:41), “Christian who believes in the Bible” [bibeltreuer Christ] (P5:107), “committed Christian” [engagierter Christ] (P14:45) “devout Christian” [gläubiger Christ] (P5:130; P13:6.48), “convinced Christian” [überzeugter Christ] (P9:23; P14:227), or “practicing Christian” [praktizierender Christ] (P8:9). This way of qualifying one’s Christianness is a remarkable practice. First, it takes into account that it would not be clear to everyone what I meant if I just said: “I am a Christian”. The particular qualification that is

realization that there is more to being a Christian than being it nominally, and by embracing the newly realized substance of a Christian mode of existence. In this sense, a Christian mode of existence is concerned with the substance of being a Christian, and activation, Christianly understood, is an existential matter concerning one’s attitude to God, Jesus Christ, and the Bible. Of course, one can imagine that the existential–nominal distinction could also be applied to being a Jew or a Muslim or whatever, but what marks the framework proposed here as a framework concerned with Christian existence is the particular substance which characterizes Christian existence and its particular embodiment (see the following section).

18 Original German quotation: „Und dann habe ich gemerkt: Dieser bewusste Entscheid – Denn vorher hatte ich schon geglaubt, aber *mich doch nicht so wirklich als Christ gefühlt*. Aber das hat dann irgendwie geholfen.“

19 With different connotations that reflect the individual configurations of the characteristics of a Christian mode of existence.

performed implies, first, a kind of theory of the space of relevant possibilities of how the term Christian can be understood and, second, the localization of oneself within this space. For example: “Given that there are practicing Christians (whatever this entails) on the one hand, and people who call themselves Christians without practicing their Christianity, on the other hand, I am a *practicing* Christian.”

Such acts of positioning can also be observed in how the terms faith, spirituality, and religion are used. None of these terms is used exclusively with regard to Christian modes of being. That is, all these terms can, but do not have to be categorized as Christian (Christian faith, etc.). What catches one’s eye is the absence of sympathy and sometimes even explicit antipathy toward the concept of religion. Only one out of 18 research participants describes himself as religious (P11:255). In a systemizing view, and with reference to the proposed hermeneutical frame, the terms religion and religious seem to be used predominantly with reference to a merely nominal mode of being a Christian. However, it must be clarified that nominal does not qualify one’s religiosity here, but one’s being a Christian. In such a view, one can be ‘existentially religious’, but still be a (merely) nominal Christian. That is, nominal does not mean here that one’s being religious is irrelevant to how one lives one’s life, but, as the interview passages below will indicate, being religious is understood as being *at odds* with key characteristics of being a Christian. In other words, one’s religiosity might be highly relevant for daily living, but in a way which is perceived as inauthentic or incongruent with the characteristics of Christian existence. In this outlook, one might be, at the same time, a Christian on paper and highly religious in ways which do not qualify as authentically and existentially Christian (or the other way round: one can be a Christian, but not religious, see e.g. McDowell 2018).²⁰ This amounts to regarding Christianness and religiosity as basically different categories (which can but do not necessarily overlap).²¹ Thus, the terms religion/religious are mostly not used for self-designation, but to designate a mode of being Christian which contrasts with an existential mode. Faith, on the other hand, can be used, in contrast to religion, to refer to an existential mode:

20 In this light, a statement like ‘I am a practicing Christian’ can mean something radically different to ‘I am religious’. On the differences between the nominal–existential distinctions with regard to religiosity and with regard to being a Christian, see also 7.3.2.

21 Note that I am still synthesizing practitioner views here, for further theoretical consideration of the concept of religion with regard to Christians, see 6.1.2 and 7.3.2.

P13: For me, there is a clear separation between faith and religion—I do not know if you define it in the same way.

Interviewer: Define it.

P13: (Laughs) For me, faith designates a relationship between a human being and God. And religion is *a human-made system*,²² with rituals, structures. For example, when I go to church on Sunday, this is actually religious behavior, isn't it? However, it can—religion can support faith, but it can also hinder it. Religion is also often misused by human beings. That some pastors or preachers or whoever say: You have to do this and that now; because God told me, you have to do this now. And in this regard, I am always very skeptical. I say, it is always directly between God and me. And another person does not have to tell me what to do. Thus, this is really also a call for independent thinking, independent searching, and I—that is why for me the Bible is so central—I use commentaries from time to time which help me to understand certain expressions, for example in the Old Testament, where it can get quite complex and you ask yourself: “What does God want to say with this story? I do not understand it at all.” And then you read commentaries and you start to understand.

But, as I said, this separation between faith and religion is very important for me, *and therefore I try hard not to become a religious person* who gets caught up in such compulsions, to put it like that. And then, he says, you have to go to church every Sunday, and if you don't do it—this always results in stress, which I see in many—this exists in all religions, also in the Free Church, in Catholicism, in the Reformed Church. Of course, this exists in the other religions, too (P13:42; my emphasis).²³

22 Note that this particular way of criticizing religion mirrors the New Testament critique (and criticism) of tradition as displayed in the synoptic and Pauline writings (see 4.2.2).

23 Original German text:

P13: Für mich gibt es eine starke Trennung zwischen Glaube und Religion – ich weiss nicht, ob Sie das gleich definieren. Interviewer: Definieren sie es. P13: (Lachen) Für mich ist Glaube eine Beziehung zwischen Mensch und Gott. Und Religion ist ein *von Menschen gemachtes System*, wo Rituale drin sind, Strukturen. Zum Beispiel, wenn ich am Sonntag in die Kirche gehe, ist das eigentlich religiöses Verhalten, oder? Es kann mir aber in Glaubens- Religion kann dem Glauben helfen, sie kann aber auch hindern. Religion ist auch das, das dann oft von Menschen missbraucht wird. Dass irgendwelche Pastoren oder Prediger oder was auch immer anderen sagen, du musst jetzt das und das machen, weil Gott es mir gesagt hat, deshalb mach du jetzt das. Und hier bin ich immer sehr skeptisch, ich sage, es ist immer direkt zwischen mir und Gott. Und ein Dritter muss mir hier eigentlich nicht dreinreden. Also, das ist wirklich auch eine Aufforderung zum selbständigen Denken, zum selbständigen Suchen, und ich – deshalb ist für mich die Bibel so zentral – ziehe manchmal schon auch Kommentare und so zu Rate, die mir helfen, gewisse Worte zu verstehen, vielleicht des Alten Testaments, wo es manchmal etwas komplex ist und du denkst, was möchte Gott jetzt sagen mit dieser Geschichte, das verstehe ich jetzt gar nicht. Und dann liest du Kommentare und kommst so ein wenig auf diese Spur.

Note that the anti-religious stance is closely linked to the characteristics of an existential mode of being a Christian, as identified above: an emphasis on a personal relationship with God, an emphasis on an individual's orientation toward the Bible (see P5:107–109; P13:42) and an emphasis on the centrality of Jesus Christ²⁴. These can be also found in a passage from another participant with his own theory of and positioning²⁵ against religion:

P5: All the cathedrals and also all the religious things I do not really like anymore. I used to like them a lot. But I think religion is *too severely human-made*²⁶ and interpreted too much by what someone read or skipped through in the Bible, at best. And I think: these religions are not my thing. This is why I am consciously a person *who believes in the Bible*, a *Christian* who believes in the Bible, and for me—well, I respect the religions, Catholicism, the national church, Reformed, and their contexts; that is not the problem. But I just have the feeling: I prefer to orient myself toward the original rather than to what anyone has said about the original.

Aber eben, diese Trennung zwischen Glaube und Religion ist mir sehr wichtig, und *ich möchte deshalb versuchen, möglichst kein religiöser Mensch zu werden*, der in solche auch Zwänge oder so dann hineingerät, sag ich jetzt mal. Und dann sagt er, du musst jeden Sonntag in die Kirche gehen, wenn du das nicht machst – Oder, das gibt dann immer diesen Stress, den ich manchmal sehe in vielen – Also das gibt es in allen Religionen, das gibt es auch in der Freikirche, es gibt es im Katholizismus, es gibt es in der reformierten, es gibt es natürlich in den anderen Religionen.

24 Not explicitly in the passage quoted above, but also in P13:42.

25 Even though we did not systematically ask for a positioning toward religion, four participants (in addition to P5 and P13, see P4:76f and P9:103) brought up the theme. While these four indicate antipathy toward the general concept of religion, others show reservations with regard to other religions (P6:147; P6'50; P9:49). It is crucial to note that the more systematic (d)evaluations of religion are related to the characteristics of Christian existence, as shared by the other participants (relationship with God, orientation toward Christ, Bible-orientation). Based on this, and on my general impression from the field, and what Joas (2012:187) has called the formation of an interdenominational Christian milieu (at the cost of a dissolution of confessional milieus), I estimate that many of the people living, existentially speaking, as Christians probably share some of the reservations about the category of religion. With regard to one of the church contexts, in which two of the managers studied are active, a negative attitude to religion seems to be a common tendency (this impression was confirmed to me in a personal conversation with Rafael Walthert, who conducted fieldwork in the respective setting (see Walthert 2013; on the 'evangelical rejection of religion', see also Hamilton 2018 and Luhrmann 2012). In addition, a critique (and criticism) of the notion of religion can also be found in Christian theological approaches (see also 6.1.2).

26 Note, again, that this particular way of criticizing religion mirrors the New Testament critique (and criticism) of tradition, as displayed in the synoptic and Pauline writings (see 4.2.2).

Interviewer: That is, religion is—can you say that?—too rigid, too structured?

P5: Yes, and it actually distracts people from Jesus. What has always disturbed me—I am Catholic, or I was—I can interpret a little bit—it has always disturbed me that Jesus is such a little boy in the picture, while Mary is such a metre-high statue. It simply misses the point. So somehow, you are consciously or unconsciously distracted from Jesus even though in the end it says in the Bible: no one comes to God except through Jesus, through the redemption that Jesus made for us. That is what I miss in religions: it distracts people from the center (P5:107–109; my emphasis).²⁷

The category of religion(s) is primarily used here to label something from which P5 distances himself (a nominal mode of Christianity) and is juxtaposed or contrasted with what I have called the characteristics of an existential mode of being a Christian. An issue which seems to be related to this kind of relativization of religion is that the question of church membership and the positioning within different Christian traditions and denominations seemed to be of secondary relevance for the research participants.²⁸

27 Original German text:

P5: Die ganzen Kathedralen und auch das Religiöse ist nicht mehr so ganz mein Ding. Früher habe ich das sehr gern gehabt, aber ich denke, die Religion ist *zu stark vom Menschen gemacht* und zu sehr interpretiert durch das, was er in der Bibel allenfalls gelesen und überlesen hat. Und ich denke: Diese Religionen sind jetzt nicht mein Ding. Deshalb bin ich auch ganz bewusst ein bibeltreuer Mensch, ein bibeltreuer Christ, und ich kann jetzt mit – also ich achte die Religionen, Katholizismus, Landeskirche, Reformierte, Umfeld, das ist alles nicht das Problem. Aber ich habe einfach das Gefühl, ich orientiere mich lieber am Original als an dem, was irgendjemand über das Original erzählt hat. Interviewer: Das heisst, das andere ist Ihnen – kann man das so sagen? – zu starr, zu strukturiert? P5: Ja, und es lenkt eigentlich von Jesus ab. Was mich immer stört – ich bin ja katholisch, ich habe ja daraus – oder gewesen – ich kann ja ein bisschen interpretieren – mich hat einfach immer gestört, dass Jesus so ein Kleiner ist im Bild, während Maria so eine meterhohe Statue ist. Es geht einfach an der Sache vorbei. Also irgendwie lenkt man bewusst oder unbewusst von Jesus ab, wo doch im Endeffekt in der Bibel steht: Niemand kommt zu Gott ausser durch Jesus, durch die Erlösung, die Jesus für uns gemacht hat. Das ist halt das, was ich bei den Religionen vermisste: Es lenkt vom Zentrum ab.

28 On denominational orientations, see 1.3 and 4.2.1. If one asks how the research subjects relate to different denominations and ecclesiastical traditions, one can find a dynamic and often non-linear relationship across the faith biographies of the managers studied. In addition to the traditional Christian churches, (which sometimes offer ministries focusing on professionals and business people), a number of other organizations play a role in the formation of the research subjects' Christian lifestyles, such as organizations of Christian business people (e.g. CGS, the Gideons, ICCG, IVCG, and VCU), work-related groups, such as prayer groups either within a particular company or those open to employees and/or managers and entrepreneurs across different organizations (such as the *Unternehmergebet* meetings in various Swiss cities).

This *nondenominational* approach is important to me, that is, interdenominational. Also, I do not like it when people focus too narrowly only on their own congregation. (...). This business prayer meeting [Unternehmergebet] is also—is for believers, but irrespective of their denomination, I don't even know where most of them go to church. I also don't like it when it gets so rigid in a congregation that you have the feeling that there's a mainstream there now and everyone does it because others do so, and so on—that's when it becomes religious for me. And that is why I always enjoy interdenominational stuff (P13:176).²⁹

While the participants express a general respect for the diversity of different churches³⁰ and other religions (see e.g. P5:107), the question of one's relationship to the Christian denominations seems to be located predominantly on the nominal level and thus seems not to be of utmost relevance for being a Christian at work, even though most of the research subjects are active churchgoers.³¹

While the terms religion and religiosity are thus linked primarily to the nominal level of Christianity, the terms faith and spirituality can both be used to designate an existential mode of being a Christian, even though faith seems to be the term which many of the managers studied prefer over spirituality. In addition, the term faith can also be used on a nominal level. It is then used in a way comparable to that of religion:

But now, in a secular setting, it would be totally inappropriate to want to pray there. It would also be strange for those people who do not have the same faith or do not have such an *intense* faith (P5:41; my emphasis).³²

- 29 Original German quotation: Mir ist dieses *nondenominational*, also dieses Überkonfessionelle sehr wichtig. Ich habe es auch nicht gern, wenn es da so „Gmeindli“-Denken gibt (...). Dieses Unternehmergebet ist auch – es ist für gläubige Leute, aber egal, welche Konfession, ich weiss von den meisten nicht einmal, wo sie überhaupt in die Kirche gehen. Ich habe es auch nicht gern, wenn es dann so eng wird in einer Gemeinde, dass man das Gefühl hat, da hat es jetzt einen Mainstream und alle machen das, weil es die anderen machen und so – da wird es dann für mich religiös. Und deshalb habe ich immer Freude an überkonfessionellen Sachen.
- 30 P7(:50) compares the variety of Christian churches and traditions with the variety of the animal kingdom.
- 31 Irrespective of whether the participants were churchgoers or not, a crucial factor that accompanies the activation experience is relationships to other Christians who are perceived by the participants as living authentically as Christians.
- 32 Original German quotation: Aber jetzt in einem Kreis, in einem weltlichen – das wäre natürlich *far away*, da irgendwie beten zu wollen. Es wäre ja auch komisch für jene Menschen, die nicht den *gleichen* Glauben haben oder nicht so einen *intensiven* Glauben haben.

The context of the passage is the question of whether the respective manager would pray openly at work, for example in a meeting. Viewed through the lens of the hermeneutical frame proposed here, one can observe a shift of levels in the terminology used. The ‘same faith’ is, on a nominal level, equal to the ‘same religion’. However, most of the people P5 talks about here, that is, the people he works with, do in fact have the same religion *on paper*. Nevertheless, it would be strange for them to pray at work, but why? While they may have the same faith nominally, their faith might not be as intense as that of P5, which seems to be a polite way of saying that the others are Christians only on paper, existentially speaking.

In sum, living in a Christian mode of existence or being a Christian in existential terms can be framed in contrast to being a Christian merely on a nominal level. As a Christian way of life usually becomes relevant somewhere in the course of a manager’s biography, the passage from a nominal to an existential mode of being a Christian can be referred to as the activation of Christian existence, in which being a Christian becomes relevant to how individuals live their lives. From the sketched framing practices of Christian managers, one can suggest that, in their way of using the term, the label Christian primarily carries connotations that indicate an existential (or categorical) qualification, that is, a qualification *of people* living in a particular mode of existence. In contrast, the (categorizing) use of the label Christian as a subcategory referring to (members of) a particular religion or faith (vis-à-vis, therefore, such labels as Buddhist, Hindu, Jew, or Muslim) is secondary. With regard to the terms faith and religion, the managers studied display a tendency to use the term religion with reference to the nominal level and the term faith with respect to the existential level of being a Christian.

One could argue that, irrespective of the empirical material presented here as a basis for the development of the theoretical sketch of the framing of Christian existence with respect to work, the above sketch is theoretically coherent in its own right. If one defines an existential mode of being a Christian as a form of existence in which being a Christian is relevant for how one lives one’s life (at work and elsewhere), in contrast to a nominal mode of being a Christian, where one is a Christian mainly on paper (which has little or no relevance for one’s daily way of living and conduct), it seems to follow logically that there must usually be some form of activation where one transitions from the nominal to the existential level, assuming that being a Christian on paper is the (biographical) starting position—and apart from the hypothetical (and in the Swiss context arguably unlikely) case where being a Christian has always been relevant with regards to how one

lives one's daily life (in this case, biological birth and activation would coincide). In the following section, I will build on the empirically identified existential positioning of practitioners as Christians. In particular, I will discuss the existential aspects of the term Christian(s) on a more general theoretical level, in particular against the background of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of a habitus, to argue for 'being a Christian' or Christian existence (instead of faith, spirituality, or religion) as a basic category with which to study Christians at work.

6.1.2 *Pierre Bourdieu's habitus and the existential meaning of the label 'Christian'*

The theme of the existential characteristics of being a Christian, as identified in 6.1.1, is not exclusively found among practitioners, but also in extant fsw research and theological approaches to the workplace. In particular, it flashes up in the writings of Delbecq (2004:251), who points to the importance of the suffering Christ for the Christian manager's spiritual journey (see 4.3). It is also reflected in the proposal by Mabey and colleagues (2017) of a "Jesus-centered interpretation of spiritual leadership". They note Jesus's lynching for dissidence and indicate that "a meaningful life can only be achieved by following Jesus" (Mabey et al. 2017), and point to the necessity of an inner transformation (which displays parallels to what I call activation) through the Holy Spirit (see 4.3). The existential meaning of the term Christian is also touched upon by Heslam (2015). He, drawing on the writings of Abraham Kuyper and his distinction between particular (or special) and common grace, outlines the workings of particular grace as that by "which people turn from their sins, put their trust in Christ, receive the regenerating work of his spirit, and inherit the gift of eternal life" (Heslam 2015:9). Daniels and colleagues (2012) refer to it by noting that "we acknowledge that Christ lived a life in perfect obedience to the Father" (2012:70). They outline that "the result of His perfect obedience, however, was not material success but rather a sentence of death by the cruelest instrument of torture then known to the Roman Empire" (2012:70) and point to "Christ's command that we emulate His life by taking up our cross and following Him" (2012:70). In this subsection, I will explore the existential connotations of the term Christian by drawing on the Pauline writings (and in particular Miller's interpretation of Paul) and Horrell's work on the historical emergence of the label Christian(s) and by relating this work to

Bourdieu's notion of the habitus.³³ When it comes to the question of the existential meaning of the term Christian with regard to particular contemporary forms of living, Bourdieu's notion of the habitus is instructive because it brings together various aspects which concern the formation of particular lifestyles.³⁴ Bourdieu's account of the habitus is probably the best known and most influential one, but the notion can already be found in the writings of earlier authors.³⁵

Bourdieu's "Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste" (2010³⁶) is an analysis of social stratification in France which explores the function of tastes in ordering the relations between social groups, classes, and class fractions. Bourdieu describes the allocation of economic and cultural capital. He uses a number of interrelated concepts and notions, such as social space, lifestyles, the habitus, agents, and cultural practices. I will focus here on Bourdieu's notion of the habitus, describe it in relation to other relevant concepts, and then relate it to the notion of being a Christian in order to accentuate both the correlations and differences between a habitus and a mode of existence pertinent to Christians. In my discussion, I will proceed according to the following logic: According to Bourdieu, (1) *classes* and class fractions are configurations or different types of distribution of economic and cultural (2) *capital* (2006:287.315). A class is characterized by relatively homogenous (3) *conditions of existence* (2006:315). The necessities and facilities linked to these conditions are translated into a particular (4) *lifestyle* by what he calls a (5) *habitus* (2006:315), which can be recognized in the (6) '*stylistic affinities*' (see 2006:294) of practices. Finally, I will discuss (7) the emergence of Messianic Judaism with regard to the formation of Christian lifestyles as an instructive case study of the difference between nominal Christianity and the existential formation of Christian living.

1) As regards *classes*, one could argue that, while Bourdieu's habitus is concerned with classes, when it comes to the meaning of the term Christian, the broader sociological category to which the term refers is that of

33 On Mellor and Shilling's notion of the religious habitus, see 4.2. For a review of Bourdieu's writings pertaining to religion, see Rey (2007).

34 The following passage on Bourdieu draws upon my unpublished seminary paper on the habitus and Messianic Judaism, written under the supervision of Tamar El Or. See also my discussion of some aspects of Bourdieu's habitus concept in 5.5.

35 See Mellor and Shilling (2010:207f) and the literature there.

36 Originally published in French in 1979.

religion. In such a view, a Christian habitus is a religious habitus³⁷. The idea that ‘Christian’ is a religious category seems to be taken for granted in many of the few studies discussed above (see 4.1). Interestingly, this view, however, not only runs contrary to practitioner intuitions (see 6.1.1), but also seems to be somewhat at odds with the use of the term ‘Christians’ as it historically emerged. Historically, Χριστός (‘Christ’) is a distinctively Jewish concept (Grundmann et al. 1973)³⁸. And Χριστιανός (that is, ‘Christian’, or ‘follower of Christ’) was the term outsiders most probably first used in Antioch to refer to the disciples of Jesus.³⁹ The term is used very early (in the letters of Pliny to Trajan) in the context of political loyalty (Horrell 2007:362.370.372). Thus, while in Bourdieu’s account the habitus refers to the category of class, the term ‘Christians’ historically seems to have been related to the category of *politics* (see Horrell 2007:362). However, if we take note of the reported historical origins of the term, as well as of the historical and cultural development of the Jewish and Christian communities⁴⁰ for a contemporary understanding of the label Christian, both a purely religious⁴¹ and a purely political understanding of the label Christian(s) seem to be deficient. Rather, it seems that the attention provoked by the people who were called Christians was related more to their being adherents of Jesus than to a particular specification they displayed in terms of a broader category, be it politics or religion. It thus seems to be more appropriate to say that, historically, the terms ‘Christians’ and ‘Christian’ can be thought of as

37 Note that Mellor and Shilling’s notion of the religious habitus explicitly refers to the category of religion (see 4.2).

38 Or, more precisely, Χριστός is the Greek equivalent of the *Hebrew* concept of the משיח (see e.g. Grundmann et al. 1973 and Shahar 2018).

39 As reported in Acts 11 (on the historical status of Acts 11, see Horrell 2013, 2007. See also my discussion of Acts 11 in chapter 4.2, and on the politico-existential character of the label Christian, see sections 5.3.6 and 7.2).

40 On the so-called parting of the ways, see Boyarin (2004a) and Becker and Reed (2003).

41 From a historical perspective, the category of ‘Christian’ is arguably older than the Western concept of religion. Daniel Boyarin (2009:11–16) has forcefully made the case that “‘religions’ were invented in the fourth century” (2009:16). He points out that the emergence of the idea of a religious identity constituted by a set of beliefs and practices “abstractable from cultural systems as a whole” (2009:12) served to construe a Christian identity distinct from Judaism. In this view, historically speaking, negotiations around the meaning of the label ‘Christian’ brought forth the category of religion, which served to construe a Christian identity distinct from Judaism (a term, which Boyarin claims, was invented by Christians). In particular, he points out how the “mapping of a border with something Christianity will call Judaism will make the new Christian self-definition as a ‘religion’ work” (Boyarin, 2004a:xi).

related to but transcending contemporary Western categories, such as religion⁴² and politics. Formally, the category Christian is not a new type of category in that there have, historically, been other categories construed on the basis of a name or title of a person to denote followership.⁴³ Substantially, it clearly marks a new generic social state (that of being allegiant or belonging to Christ), which can, arguably, not be fully subsumed under the sociological categories of, say, religion or politics, although it seems to be somehow related to them. Historically, the term ‘Christians’ refers to a group of individuals whose life has become characterized by belonging or allegiance to Jesus Christ (Horrell 2007:362). As such, the categorization of someone as ‘Christian’ implies a particular view of social space in which two main groups of people are differentiated between, those who belong to Christ and those who do not. The category ‘Christian’ thus, in terms of its historical substance (that of belonging or allegiance to Christ), displays a generic or categorical or existential quality. This categorical quality, to a certain extent, conflicts with a contemporary categorizing (or nominal) religious usage of the term, in which religion is set as the generic category and where the term Christian marks one subtype of the category religion. The categorizing connotation, which is predominant in contemporary usages of the term Christian as a subcategory of the category religion (or faith, or spirituality), however, seems to obscure the categorical and existential connotations which the term Christian may also carry in both historical and contemporary usages.

The tension between different connotations that different usages of the term Christian imply, that is, the tension between the existential and categorical connotations on the one hand, and the nominal and categorizing connotations on the other, can be illustrated by systematizing the existential and categorical connotations of the term Christian by drawing on a Pauline

42 In addition to Boyarin’s historical conclusion that fourth century Christians employed the category religion to frame their Christianness (which implies that the term Christian is older than the Western concept of religion), it is to be noted that, contemporarily, there have been Christian voices which have been critical of religion (for an analysis of practitioner criticism of religion, see Hamilton 2018, Luhrmann 2012, McDowell 2018, and the analysis of contemporary Christian managers in Switzerland in section 6.1.1 of the present dissertation). Additionally, there has been a long tradition of Christian theological critique and criticism of religion (see e.g. Dalferth & Grosshans 2006, Feil 2000, Tietz 2006). See also the notions of a *religionsloses Christentum* and a *nicht-religiöse Interpretation* as made popular by Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1998, for a discussion see Gremmels & Huber 2002 and Hamilton 2018).

43 For example, *Κατωπαῖνοι* or *Ἡροδιανοί* (see Grundmann et al. 1973:529).

perspective⁴⁴ on the mode of existence pertinent to followers of Christ, and by contrasting this with a contemporary Western categorizing usage of the term and, in this respect, by contrasting a ‘religious person’ with a ‘Christian’. Now it needs to be noted that the allegiance or belonging of Christians is to a person whom they claim died and rose again.⁴⁵ This is not only relevant in that Christians claim that their belonging is to a person who is alive:⁴⁶ it is particularly relevant in specifying Christian allegiance or belonging to Jesus Christ as including participation⁴⁷ in the death and new life of Jesus Christ. In this respect, what separates the Christian from a religious person is an existential difference. Religious people, no matter whether they refer to themselves (nominally) as Christians, Muslims, or whatever, are still mainly characterized by being living people. In contrast, the term Christian, existentially understood, does not primarily qualify a particular *human* form of existence.⁴⁸ One cannot become a Christian, in this sense, by choosing to adopt certain traditional ‘Christian’ beliefs and practices or ways of life. Being a Christian is not first and foremost a lifestyle in this sense, but a ‘deathstyle’. There is an existential barrier between being a human being and being a Christian, as the Christian individual participates in the death of Jesus Christ, and thus in the *full death* of the human person as we know it.⁴⁹ Christians’ participation in Christ’s

44 On Paul’s terminology with regard to the followers of Christ, see Horrell (2007:365f).

45 The participation of individuals in the crucified and resurrected Jesus Christ has been particularly developed in the Pauline writings (see e.g. Linebaugh 2018).

46 See, for example, the Pauline writings referring to the term faith as a current relationship (Oakes 2018:257); and Maydiou’s (1954:302) insistence that “Christ is not and cannot be a past phase of history”.

47 On the notion of participation in Pauline thought, see for example Davey (2019), Eastman (2018), Hays (2008), Linebaugh (2018), Miller (in particular, 2014:102.130 and the literature there), and Rabens (2018).

48 See also Paul’s reproach to the Corinthians that they ‘walk as humans’, that is, “κατὰ ἄνθρωπον” (1 Cor 3:3f, see also section 4.3.2). Such a reproach makes no sense if one fails to consider Paul’s understanding of the addressees as participating in Christ’s death and resurrection, which radically distances them from ‘human ways of life’ before death, so to speak. In this light, there seems to be no “Christian humanity” (Rich 1984:122) apart from a crucified and dying form of humanity, that is, apart from humans who share in Christ’s death and resurrection.

49 Paul makes it as clear as possible in Romans 7:1–6 that he is not speaking metaphorically here in terms of death. The notion that the Romans have ‘died to the law’ is, I contend, not a metaphorical way of employing the notion of death. On the contrary, Paul illustrates in his example of the married couple that it is *indeed* death which is required to be released from the law (see Romans 7:6; on Romans 7, see also Miller 2014 and the literature there).

death and resurrection offers a way to begin to understand why Christians facing a trial can choose to be executed rather than reviling the name of Christ.⁵⁰ They must somehow be convinced that their execution will not diminish their status of being alive in Christ. A manifestation of a similar Christian fearlessness can be found in the non-violent protests of the American civil rights movement, as described by Martin L. King on the day prior to his assassination:

We aren't going to let any mace stop us. We are masters in our nonviolent movement in disarming police forces; they don't know what to do. I've seen them so often. I remember in Birmingham, Alabama, when we were in that majestic struggle there, we would move out of the 16th Street Baptist Church day after day; by the hundreds we would move out. And Bull Connor would tell them to send the dogs forth, and they did come; but we just went before the dogs singing, "Ain't gonna let nobody turn me around." Bull Connor next would say, "Turn the fire hoses on." And as I said to you the other night, Bull Connor didn't know history. He knew a kind of physics that somehow didn't relate to the transphysics that we knew about. And that was the fact that there was a certain kind of fire that no water could put out. And we went before the fire hoses; we had known water. If we were Baptist or some other denominations, we had been immersed. If we were Methodist, and some others, we had been sprinkled, but we knew water. That couldn't stop us. And we just went on before the dogs and we would look at them; and we'd go on before the water hoses and we would look at it, and we'd just go on singing "Over my head I see freedom in the air." And then we would be thrown in the paddy wagons, and sometimes we were stacked in there like sardines in a can. And they would throw us in, and old Bull would say, "Take 'em off," and they did; and we would just go in the paddy wagon singing, "We Shall Overcome." And every now and then we'd get in jail, and we'd see the jailers looking through the windows being moved by our prayers, and being moved by our words and our songs. And there was a power there which Bull Connor couldn't adjust to; and so we ended up transforming Bull into a steer, and we won our struggle in Birmingham. Now we've got to go on in Memphis just like that.⁵¹

Sociologists have taken account of this being in relation with what is beyond human existence by using notions such as transcendence (see e.g. Pollack & Rosta 2015:70) or "other-worldly realities" (Mellor & Shilling 2014:275). Transcendence does not, however, only appear on the level of Christian existence as a phenomenon studied by sociologists, but also on the level of the sociological categories applied. With regard to the sociolog-

50 On the execution of Christians, see also Horrell (2007) and chapter 5.3.6 in the present dissertation.

51 <https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkivebeentothemountaintop.htm> (accessed on 10 July 2018).

ical categories of faith, spirituality, or religion, while they can be used to approach the phenomenon of Christian existence at work, in a way Christian existence also transcends these sociological categories of faith, spirituality, and religion because in Christian existence, human existence is transcended in that Christians share in Christ's death and resurrection.

2) As regards *capital*, according to Bourdieu, classes and class fractions are configurations or different types of distribution of economic and cultural capital (2006:287.315). In this respect, the category of Christianity, existentially understood, relates to configurations or different types (the Christian and non-Christian type) of distribution of particular *spiritual* capital, which entails the spiritual experience of what Kuyper (see Heslam 2015:9) refers to as special grace and, in particular, the experience of participating in Christ. More specifically, the 'Christian spiritual capital' is that of being a beneficiary of the workings of the Spirit, who 'infuses' human bodies with Christ's dying and resurrection (see Miller 2014:103). Here, participation or non-participation in Christ becomes the crucial criterion for differentiating between different types of distribution of spiritual capital.

3) In Bourdieu's account, a class is characterized by relatively homogeneous *conditions of existence* (2006:315). The conditions of Christian forms of existence are marked by one's immersion in the body of Christ, risen from the dead, while the conditions of non-Christian forms of existence are marked by non-allegiance to Christ⁵². For Bourdieu, the necessities and facilities linked to these (class-related) conditions are translated into a particular *lifestyle* by what he calls a *habitus* (2006:315). In terms of Christian existence, the basic condition of being immersed in or belonging to Christ translates, in interaction with the contextual cultural, political, economic, and religious conditions, into a variety of lifestyles pertaining to the variety of forms in which a 'Christian habitus' (such as a Pentecostal or Amish habitus) can be shaped. However, what marks these lifestyles as Christian is not nominally belonging to a group such as the Pentecostal or the Amish, but the conditions of existence marked by the respective people's membership in the living Christ.

4) How does the habitus operate according to Bourdieu? Cultural practices are defined within a "space of *lifestyles*" (2006:315, my emphasis), within an area of "stylistic possibles" (2006:315). There are different areas of cultural practice, such as the fields of sport, music, food, politics, language, food, clothing, cosmetics, et cetera (2006:315). The habitus works in all areas of practices (2006:297f). Each area has its stylistic possibles. The

52 In other words, by not living *κατὰ Χριστόν* (see e.g. Colossians 2:8-9).

different dispositions of a habitus are embodied, that is, specified, in each field of practice “by implementing one of the stylistic possibles offered” (2006:315), in other words, by living in a particular or distinct way. In a similar way, the condition of being a Christian is, in light of the Pauline writings, related to particular lifestyles by one’s being ‘clothed’ with (or invested into, or localized within) Christ.⁵³ This condition radically relativizes other features of one’s social profile, such as nationality, legal and religious status, occupation, and gender (see e.g. Galatians 3:26–28; Colossians 3:11). It entails a lifestyle which is characterized by the way Jesus Christ treats those who belong to him: loving, joyful, peaceful, forgiving, patient, kind, and gentle (see Galatians 5:22–25; Colossians 3:11–17). This is the spirituality of the Christian life, as those who are allegiant to Christ live by the Spirit and are called to live in accordance with the Spirit (Galatians 5:25). They let the Spirit produce in them what has been referred to as the ‘fruit of the spirit’, which is characterized, according to Galatians (5:22f), by love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control. This is, in Galatians, contrasted with the “works of the flesh” (Gal 5:19), which are, among other similar things: sexual immorality, impurity, depravity, idolatry, sorcery, hostilities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of anger, selfish rivalries, dissensions, factions, envy, murder, drunkenness, and carousing (Gal 5:19–21). Christians are thus confronted with two “stylistic possibles” (Bourdieu 2006:315) in terms of lifestyle. They can live *either* in accordance with the Spirit or with the flesh. These refer to a Christian and a non-Christian way of living. It is important to note that descriptions of the Christian lifestyle like those presented in Galatians 5 are poorly understood if taken as a list of moral norms that stand for themselves. Yes, Christian life is marked by love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control.⁵⁴ However, this is not first a list of ideals that are prescribed, but a description of qualities of the life lived by “those who belong to Christ” and “have crucified the flesh with its passions and desires” (Gal 5:24). If there is a Christian imperative, it is not first: “be kind, be loving, be patient and so on”, but rather “participate in Christ, perceive, embrace and understand that you are crucified and raised with Christ, and live accordingly”. While living a non-Christian lifestyle is still a possibility for Christians, it is a lifestyle which is in radical conflict with their status as Christians. The expe-

53 Note that the term ‘Christian’ does not occur in the Pauline writings. On Paul’s terminology with regard to the followers of Christ, see Horrell (2007:365f).

54 For an account of Christian agency in a virtue ethics framework, see Miller (2014).

rience of consistency⁵⁵ or inconsistency between one's Christian status and one's lifestyle⁵⁶ seems to be best understood as part of a process of renewal and of being conformed⁵⁷ to the image of Jesus Christ (see Colossians 3:10, Romans 8:29), where one learns to live according to the stylistic possible that is congruent with one's status as a Christian. Sociologically, this process can take on many different forms, as the variety of activation experiences reported by the managers we studied indicates.⁵⁸

5) According to Bourdieu, the habitus is characterized by two capacities: First, the capacity of an agent to produce "classifiable practices and works" (2006:291), and second "the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products" (2006:291), that is, the ability to produce classifying operations and classificatory judgments (2006:291, see also 5.5). The social world, which is the space of lifestyles, is constituted by the relationship between these two capacities. Thus, the habitus refers to the "generative formula" (2006:291), the "two major organizing principles of social space" (2006:297). Therefore, the notion of the habitus serves to account for 1) the practices and products of an agent, and 2) the capacity of an agent to classify practices and products (perception, appreciation, taste). These classificatory judgments of practices and products are linked to a bird's-eye view of social space dependent on one's position within it (2006:90f).⁵⁹ In a similar way, according to the Pauline tradition, in the

55 Compare also the notion of activation as discussed in 6.1.1, which refers to the shift from nominal to existential, that is, of becoming existentially what one has already been on paper.

56 Interestingly, Miller (2014) argues that the content of this status (the 'indicative' in the Pauline writings) is no different in content from its corresponding lifestyle (the 'imperative' in the Pauline writings). Rather, the lifestyle *is* the content of the status, which can be both described and prescribed. In this respect, Miller contends that Paul's indicative statements in Romans 5 and 6 do not refer to a cosmic or forensic state, but "describe the church's consistent behavior rather than its cosmic 'state', but he also points out that this consistently holy action is not unassailable" (Miller 2014:103, see also 2014:4).

57 On the notion of being conformed to the image of Christ with regard to contemporary spirituality discourses, see Kohli Reichenbach's 'Gleichgestaltet dem Bild Christi' (2011).

58 Our study of the activation experiences of Christian managers uses the 'body pedagogics' approach by Mellor and Shilling as a sensitizing conception (see section 1.4 and the literature there). It focuses on the three elements of, first, the *means* and activities through which people encounter key dispositions, second, the *experiences* and perceptions they have while they acquire or fail to acquire these dispositions, and third, the embodied *outcomes* (dispositions, orientations) of this acquisition.

59 See also Mellor and Shilling's (2010:202) definition of a habitus as a "socially structured bodily disposition", of which taking an external, third-party view of one's own practices is an essential part (2014:281, see also 4.2.1, 5.5).

Christian condition of belonging to Christ, a Christian is sealed with the Spirit of God, who enables both the production and discernment of Christian lifestyles.⁶⁰ The discerning capacity, similarly to the producing capacity, is not given with the status of an individual per se, or with a decision to become a member of Christian tradition, but is given by the Spirit (1 Cor 12:10) with an individual's status as being "in Christ". The production and discernment of Christian lifestyles is reflected historically in the development of Christian practices, Christian theologies, Christian ethics, and Christian forms of spirituality. In this sense, what marks practices, theologies, ethics, and spirituality as existentially (and not merely nominally) Christian is their being based on their producer's allegiance or belonging to Christ. In other words, the Christianness of cultural products is dependent on the Christianness of the one who produces them.

6) According to Bourdieu (2006:294), within a social group with relatively homogenous conditions of existence, there is a "stylistic affinity", that is, the practices of a whole set of agents are systematic (the product of the application of identical or interchangeable schemes) and systematically distinct (from the practices constituting another lifestyle) (2006:293). This creates an "immediately perceptible family resemblance" (2006:294) in the practices of all agents of the same class, in a way that is comparable to handwriting, which is

a singular way of tracing letters which always produces the same writing, i.e., graphic forms which, in spite of all the differences of size, material or colour due to the surface (paper or blackboard) or the instrument (pen or chalk)—in spite, therefore, of the different use of muscles—present an immediately perceptible family resemblance, like all the features of style or manner whereby a painter or writer can be recognized as infallibly as a man by his walk (2006:294).

A similar metaphor of lifestyles as handwriting in the sense of an "immediately perceptible family resemblance" (2006:294), which can be clearly recognized by its readers, also occurs in the New Testament writings. Paul argues that the followers of Christ in Corinth embody a letter from Christ, read by everyone, "written not with ink but by the Spirit of the living God, not on stone tablets but on tablets of human hearts" (2 Cor 3:3). In this sense, the presence of Christians living a Christian lifestyle in work contexts can be interpreted as the embodiment of letters from God to the people present in the workplace, which can be read by everyone. The identical or

60 See also Vivian Ligo's (2011) contention that a Christian perspective can only be described from within its context. The discernment of a Christian lifestyle is, in this light, a gift of the Spirit.

interchangeable scheme which is applied in the production of Christian lifestyles is the image of the Son (Romans 8:29, see also Kohli Reichenbach 2011) and, in particular, his death and resurrection, in which Christians participate. It must be noted here, again, that according to Miller's (2014:4f) interpretation of Paul, Christians' participation in Christ's death and resurrection is quite concrete in that they put to death their passions and desires, situated in the body, and thus die with Christ, while the Spirit infuses their bodies with Christ's dying and with the just life of Christ. Existential Christian practices are thus systematically distinct from the practices constituting other lifestyles. Here, one again encounters the generic character of the Christian category. With reference to the Christian condition, there are only two main lifestyle producing schemes, one non-Christian and the other Christian. These are the image of Adam and the image of Christ, referring to one's Christian (in Christ) or non-Christian, that is, Adamic, status (in Adam). "For just as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive" (Romans 5:22). "And just as we have borne the image of the man of dust [Adam], let us also bear the image of the man of heaven" (1 Cor 15:49)⁶¹. This reference to Pauline thought in the light of Bourdieu's handwriting metaphor may indicate, again, that being a Christian is not first a nominal affair. In other words, the question of whether or not someone is called a Christian is of lesser importance than the question of whose handwriting someone's life represents.

7) Thus, Bourdieu's notion of the *habitus* serves well as a conceptual background frame with which to sketch the existential connotations and contours of the term 'Christians', as referring to people who are allegiant to or participate in Christ. There are, as has become obvious, tensions between the widespread contemporary usage of the term 'Christian' as a nominal religious category and an existential understanding of the term. The practitioners we studied (see 6.1.1 and Brügger 2018; Brügger, & Huppenbauer 2019) deal with these tensions by adhering to their use of the label Christian, but at the same time qualifying the term and specifying what they mean by it. In culturally and nominally non-Christian contexts, the embodiment of these tensions can be observed in recent developments, where adherents to different religions turn to Christ, while at the same time they choose to reject, nominally, the label Christian and seek to follow

61 See also Romans 5:12–19; 1 Cor 15:21f, 45–49

Christ within their own religious context.⁶² While the reasons for nominally rejecting the label ‘Christian’ differ from context to context, they seem to have in common their rejection of the Christian label as understood with reference to contemporary Western cultural and religious forms of life, while at the same time embracing the existential substance of a Christian mode of existence as characterized by one’s participation in Jesus Christ. This is made possible, first, by a reductionistically nominal usage of the label Christian, where the term is emptied in terms of its existential meaning, and is applied to people and their lifestyles in Western contexts where, historically, many Christians have lived. As many of these people tend not to live as Christians, existentially speaking, and as it is no longer clear what the label Christian signifies at all, this vacuum of meaning is filled by the simple (mis)interpretation that Western lifestyles (or values⁶³) are Christian lifestyles. Suddenly, the term has received a new meaning, and contemporary Western forms of life seem to represent a ‘lived’ (mis)interpretation of the term, which is taken seriously by those who embrace the existential substance of Christianity while rejecting its label.

Given the historical roots of the label Christian, both the contemporary Western reinterpretation of the term as a cultural and religious category, which seems to render the question of one’s allegiance to Christ irrelevant or secondary, and the practical rejection of contemporary Western Christian labeling and its respective ways of life represent remarkable moves of social identity construction. Within a global context, we now find ourselves in a situation where some people hold on to the label Christian but reject its existential content, while others embrace its content but reject the label. One such movement, which serves well as an illustrative case, has been referred to as Messianic Judaism. According to Rudolph (2016:355), Messianic Jews, that is, Jews who “have claimed to follow Yeshua (Jesus) as the Messiah of Israel while continuing to live within the orbit of Judaism”, existed in the first four centuries AD and reappeared in the eighteenth century. Shapiro (2012:1) defines Messianic Judaism as

62 For example, in Jewish, Muslim, or Hindu contexts (on the ‘insider movements’ phenomenon, see the literature mentioned in 6.1.1). On the related notion of “inreligionization”, which calls for not only, say, “an Indian Christianity”, but “a Hindu Christianity”, see Bosch (1991:477f).

63 On the problem of the category of values with regard to Christian living, see Brügger (2010:111–117) and the literature there.

a movement of people who identify as Jews and self-consciously embrace—although to degrees that can differ quite widely—Jewish culture and religious tradition, while at the same time maintaining a belief in the divinity of Jesus, the Trinity, and the authority of the New Testament.

There is a strong emphasis on beliefs in the phrasing of the ‘Christian element’ of Messianic Jewish identity in the above definition. In more relational terms, a Messianic Jew is described as a “Jew who has come to faith in Yeshua” (Shapiro 2012:4) or simply as JYD (Jewish Yeshua-Disciple, see Nerel 2013). Messianic Jews emphasize the Jewishness of Jesus and the early church. The current movement grew out of the broader historical phenomenon of participants in Christianity who are of Jewish birth (Shapiro 2012:4). While in the nineteenth century a Hebrew-Christian movement emerged, a combination of factors (see Shapiro 2012:4; Ariel 2012:319) led these participants in Christianity in the late 1960s to prefer their Jewishness as a cultural context for their religious practice and to reject the label Christian.

Using Bourdieu’s (2006:315) terminology, Messianic Judaism can be described as a social group with relatively homogenous conditions of existence with regard to its positioning in the context of the wider Jewish and Christian traditions. For Bourdieu, social construction of the identity of a group can be observed in the practices performed by the agents who are part of the group. In this respect, the practices of Messianic Jews can be read as a “system of distinctive signs” (2006:291). Their social identity is “defined and asserted through difference” (2006: 293). They “manifest their distinction” (2006:295) through practices, such as Messianic Jewish worship music⁶⁴, the stylization of Messianic Jewish circumcision ceremonies (Reason 2004), or in the negotiation of the role of women in contemporary Messianic Judaism (Kollontai 2009). Thus, Messianic Jews find their position in “a system of oppositions and correlations” (Bourdieu 2006:296). In all its diversity, Messianic Judaism is characterized by its rejection of the Christian label, and its embracing of Yeshua as the Messiah, of Jesus as Christ. Thus, the movement of Messianic Judaism has become an embodied prophetic question mark which challenges the labeling of contemporary

64 Dance and music are of particular importance in Messianic Judaism. There is an impressive number of Messianic Jewish musicians and composers with a distinctive style of music, in which traditional Jewish elements are combined with elements from contemporary Christian worship music. Dancing is also part of Messianic Jewish culture, in both distinctively Jewish and in typically charismatic ways; see Hocken (2009:101).

Western ways of life as Christian⁶⁵, to which its existential meaning has become secondary or irrelevant. Arguably, if the lived interpretation of the meaning of the label Christian in Western contexts had not departed from its original meaning (where ‘Christian’ and ‘Messianic’ are equivalents linguistically), maybe there would have been no need (for contemporary Messianic Jews) to reject the label Christian, nor would there have been a need for Christians to construe the category Christian as a religious category in contrast to Judaism (in the fourth century, see Boyarin 2009, 2007 & 2004b).

To conclude, to frame and understand Christian existence in contemporary working contexts, I argue that it is crucial to rediscover the primacy of the existential and thus categorical connotations of the term ‘Christian’ over the nominal and thus categorizing connotations. The basic meaning of the term is lost if its existential character is ignored. Used in a merely nominal sense, the term is emptied and becomes prone to misinterpretations⁶⁶. Christianity, in existential terms, is a category of its own. Even though the categories of faith, spirituality, and religion have become the common categories with which to study Christians at work, the Christian label with its existential connotations displays a certain resistance to being fully subsumed under these three categories.⁶⁷ I have thus drawn upon an analysis of the framing practices of practitioners (6.1.1) and upon a conceptual interpretation of the Christian category against the background of Bourdieu’s habitus (6.1.2) to make the case for ‘being a Christian’ or Christian existence as the basic category with which to frame the study of Christians at work. Having addressed the framing of Christian existence (at work), I will now turn to the question of how a Christian mode of existence is embodied at work.

6.2 Embodying Christian existence at work

In the present section, I will, first, discuss crucial elements of Christian embodiment at work as identified on the basis of our (see 1.3 and Brügger 2018; Brügger & Huppenbauer 2019) empirical study (6.2.1) and relate this to Viktor Frankl’s idea of finding meaning in life (6.2.2). I will argue that Viktor Frankl’s notion of meaning in life serves well as a conceptual back-

65 By Westerners or by outsiders.

66 With regard to an original and existential understanding of the term.

67 On the relationship of the study of Christians to these terms, see also chapter 7.

ground to accentuate the contours and contents of the Christian body at work.

6.2.1 *Distancing, connecting, and investing*

In this section, I will first introduce a theoretical sketch of the embodiment of Christian existence at work, which is based on our empirical data, as configurations of the three movements or dynamics of distancing, connecting, and investing (1). Subsequently, I will indicate how aspects of these three movements can be found in extant research, in particular in current sociological and theological approaches (2), and in the fsw and theological literature discussed in chapters 4 and 5 (3).

1) One of the steps I conducted when analyzing the data was to group together all passages in the interviews or fieldnotes that I thought could be roughly characterized as descriptions of scenes of ‘Christian existence embodied at work’. When I first looked at these descriptions, I discovered a recurring element which I first coded as “letting go”. This code entailed a number of codings⁶⁸ which displayed various forms of establishing a distance between oneself and one’s work, or between oneself and a particular problem one encounters in relation to one’s work. These acts of distancing could be either ritualized or informal. They could be part of an intentional act to practice one’s faith or they could be more implicitly present in a manager’s behavior.

What struck me then was a kind of dissonance: the research participants are all highly active people, managers and entrepreneurs in busy and fast-paced business environments. How could it be that the main element of how they live their Christianity at work was by distancing themselves in some way from their work? When I read the respective codings again, I noted two aspects which occurred in addition to the distancing I first discovered: First, they also entailed strongly active elements of engagement, but the action the managers took seemed to be somehow mediated by the distance they were able to establish beforehand. Second, I found that both movements, that of distancing and that of active engagement, were related to and somehow dependent on the experience of a connection with God. From a systemizing perspective, there are thus three interrelated dynamics or movements present in a manager’s embodiment of Christian existence at work: *distancing* from ‘the world’, *connecting* with God, and an active engage-

68 That is, text passages from our observation and interview data which I coded under the respective code. On the coding method, see 1.3.41, am 21.09.2024, 11:20:17

ment with ‘the world’, which, for reasons I will explain below, I have called *investing*. This outline allowed me to formulate the working hypothesis that the embodiment of Christian existence at work can be described as being characterized by different configurations of the three elements of distancing, connecting, and investing. In the following, I will describe possible relationships between the three dynamics and criteria for specification of the three dynamics based on descriptions of scenes from our data.

Let me now turn to addressing the relationship between the movements of distancing and investing. It is important to note that, according to their basic intention, these are contrary movements: distancing oneself from the world runs contrary to an active engagement with the world. However, it is the particular combination and dosage of the two elements which are of importance:

P3: Pausing is important to me. It's unbelievable how many thoughts go through your head all the time. I notice how difficult it is when I try to take just ten breaths without thinking about anything. Just ten breaths. I also do it at work before I have to do something.

Interviewer: Pausing?

P3: Yes. Before I write a letter or an e-mail, for example. Otherwise, I work on something and think about ten other things at the same time. If I just sit quietly for a moment first, I can then concentrate better on one thing. (P3:15–18).⁶⁹

P3 thus first distances himself from the thoughts in his mind. This is a kind of semi-ritualized practice⁷⁰, in which he interrupts the stream of daily activities by sitting and consciously breathing for a moment.⁷¹ The investing, that is, the active engagement with the world to which P3 refers

69 Original German quotation:

P3: Das mit dem Innehalten ist mir wichtig. Es ist unglaublich, wie viele Gedanken einem so die ganze Zeit durch den Kopf gehen. Ich merke das, wenn ich versuche nur zehn Atemzüge zu nehmen, ohne dabei an etwas zu denken, wie schwierig das ist. Nur zehn Atemzüge. Ich mache das auch beim Arbeiten, bevor ich etwas erledigen muss.

Interviewer: Das Innehalten?

P3: Ja. Bevor ich einen Brief oder eine E-mail schreibe, zum Beispiel. Sonst arbeite ich an etwas, und studiere gleichzeitig an zehn anderen Sachen herum. Wenn ich zuerst kurz einfach ruhig dasitze, kann ich nachher besser ganz bei einer Sache sein.

70 Another example of the integration of a semi-ritualized practice with a similar structure can be found in P1(:10). She employs a body technique from contemplative prayer (standing still with an awareness of body and breath) in hectic moments at work.

71 The connecting element (see below) is not mentioned here directly. It may well be implied indirectly insofar as the distancing activity mentioned is actually transferred into the work setting from the context of a scripture-reading practice (in a non-work setting)

here, can be described in two different ways: in terms of the currency of what he invests, it is, first, *paying attention* to the task at hand, such as writing an e-mail.⁷² Second, more generally speaking, P3 invests *himself* in the task at hand, in that he can “concentrate better on one thing” [ganz bei einer Sache sein] (P3:15)⁷³. This self-investment is made possible by the freedom experienced through prior distancing from thought and distractions.⁷⁴ Thus, the movement of distancing seems, in this case, to enable the later investment. The movements of distancing and investing can vary in terms of their objects and mode (distancing) and of their currency and targets or projects (investing).

P6 offers another case. After some turmoil in the company which employed him, he has decided to start a new business:

I could have gone back to being a manager at a company now. But then I might have buried my talents. Someone told me that prophetically: “No, do this now, it will increase your talents.” And I think in that sense life has already changed massively in that direction, that I’m even more prepared—So we’re risking everything at the moment, it’s *all in*, and if it goes wrong, we won’t have a house afterwards, just an old caravan or the offer to stay with some good friends in L10⁷⁵. We have fewer possessions at the moment than we’ve ever had before because we’ve *invested everything* (P6:97, my emphasis).⁷⁶

in which P3 leads a group through a phase of breathing/body awareness in preparation for the collective reading of a biblical text (P3:9–14). Interestingly, while the preparation is similar in work and non-work settings, the scripture reading in the non-work-related spiritual practice is, in the work setting, replaced by the performance of the work-related task at hand. Of course, one could argue that the structure of spiritual practices is often intended to create an effect which lasts longer than the practice itself (see e.g. Walther 2013). From the perspective of Christian embodiment at work, it seems that Christian practices, such as worship services, mirror the triad of distancing, connecting, and investing (see e.g. on distancing as *Unterbrechung* with regard to worship services, Meyer-Blanck 2011:348.394 – 396) and are structured toward the practical formation of Christian individuals who are capable of navigating their relationship to the world on the basis of their relationship with God.

72 See also my discussion of Tucker/Kierkegaard (chapter 4) and Smith (chapter 3) on the important role of attention in the experience of spirituality or faith at work.

73 On the importance of self-investment, see also Ligo (2011:444.448; and 4.3.1).

74 See also Delbecq’s (2004:250) notion of detachment “from thought and affect”.

75 Names of places are anonymized.

76 Original German text: Ich hätte jetzt wieder als Manager in eine Firma gehen können. Aber ich hätte dann vielleicht meine Talente vergraben. Das ist mir auch prophetisch gesagt worden von jemandem: „Nein, mach jetzt das, es wird eine Vermehrung der Talente geben.“ Und ich glaube, in diesem Sinne hat sich das Leben schon massiv in diese Richtung verändert, dass ich noch bereiter bin – Also wir riskieren momentan alles, also es ist *all in*, also wenn es schiefgeht, haben wir nachher kein Haus mehr, nur noch einen

While, in P3's case, the object of distancing was his thought and distractions, P6 indicates a distance from his own possessions. However, he does not totally distance himself in the sense of completely giving his possessions away, but the inner distance toward his possessions allows him to constructively invest them. The distancing element occurs here not primarily as an act, but as an aspect which shapes his attitude of freedom to his possessions, which then enables an act of investment. The target or project in which he invests is, in P6's case, establishing a new enterprise, while in P3's case it is the writing of an e-mail or letter.⁷⁷

P6's case also indicates what I have termed 'connecting' as an additional element, which is crucial to enable and understand both the movements of distancing and investing. For P6, the connecting aspect occurs, first, in his experience of being led by God to invest his possessions in the start-up company and, second, in the relativization of the worth of his possessions and of 'worldly success'⁷⁸ in the light of his relationship with God:

P6: Well, I was never really scared or anything. Somehow—we said: “Yes, if we go bankrupt, we go bankrupt.” I always told the banker: “Look, the only thing you don't know is that we have an old caravan (laughter), and we're keeping it, right!” And when I now see how everything is going, I have to say that it really is a miracle. So we have now made a six-digit profit in our second quarter—the third quarter of this year—from zero. So, sure, what we invested is not yet paid back. Exactly, we bought on the 27th in the morning, and we learned that we were actually in the red with the company T⁷⁹, instead of in the black, right. And we received two orders—

uralten Wohnwagen oder das Angebot von guten Freunden, bei ihnen in L10 zu schlafen. Wir haben momentan so wenig Besitztum wie noch nie, weil wir *alles investiert* haben.

77 P6's case is paradigmatic in that it inspired the naming of the category of investing vis-à-vis that of distancing. As the category of 'investing' refers to Christians' active engagement with the world, one could also have used embodiment or engagement here. However, as the movement of investing is inextricably linked to the movements of distancing and connecting, it seems to be more appropriate to reserve the notion of embodiment for the overall formation of Christian existence at work as including distancing, connecting, and investing. As activities of investing, that is, forms of engagement with the world, are those that can be primarily perceived by an observer, it seems appropriate to say that acts of investing provide the overall embodiment of Christian existence at work with its *clothing* or outer shape. On the Latin *investio*, see Lewis and Short (1879). On *vestio*, see also Lewis (1890) and Lewis and Short (1879). See also the Greek ἐνδύσις (as in 1 Peter 3:3).

78 Another example is P10(179–185), who describes how bonus payments play an important role for many working in the finance industry, and that because of his faith this is not so important to him.

79 Company names are anonymized.

on the 27th when we signed! So I don't know, that's probably all God can do to say: "I'm with you, I support you in this, and it will go well." I do not know if it really will go well.

Interviewer: But it feels like it will?

P6: I just have faith that it will go well.

Interviewer: You have faith. Or do you have faith, but it does not feel like it will go well; it is neutral?

P6: It doesn't always feel the same, you know? (P6:128–132).⁸⁰

P6's confidence as an entrepreneur is based on his relationship with God (connecting), through which this-worldly realities lose their ultimate grip (distancing) and become the arena for enacting his faith (investing).

In the light of our data, the connecting aspect in how Christian existence is embodied at work can be specified in relation to different forms of distancing. In one type of connecting, it involves intentional distancing in the form of an interruption of the stream of activities which is recognizable for the observer (e.g., P1:10; P3:15–18; P15:356), and which serves to create space for connecting with God.⁸¹ It seems in particular it is the use of

80 P6: Also ich hatte auch nie gross Angst oder so. Irgendwie auch – Wir haben gesagt: „Ja wenn wir Konkurs gehen, gehen wir halt Konkurs.“ Ich habe dem Banker immer gesagt: „Schau, das Einzige, das du nicht weisst, ist, dass wir einen uralten Wohnwagen haben (Lachen), und diesen behalten wir, gell!“ Und wenn ich jetzt sehe, wie alles am Laufen ist, dann muss ich sagen, das ist ein riesiges Wunder. Also wir haben jetzt in unserem zweiten Quartal – im dritten Quartal dieses Jahres – einen sechsstelligen Gewinn gemacht – von null. Also, sicher, es ist noch nicht zurückbezahlt, was wir investiert haben. Eben, wir haben am 27. am Morgen gekauft, wir haben erfahren, dass wir eigentlich in der Verlustzone sind da beim Unternehmen T, statt positiv, oder. Und wir haben zwei Aufträge bekommen – am 27., als wir unterschrieben haben! Also ich weiss nicht, mehr kann Gott wahrscheinlich gar nicht machen, um zu sagen: „Ich bin mit dir, ich stehe dir hier bei, und das wird gut kommen.“ Ich weiss es ja auch nicht, ob es wirklich gut kommt.

Interviewer: Aber es fühlt sich so an?

P6: Ich glaube einfach, dass es gut kommt.

Interviewer: Und du glaubst es. Oder glaubst du es, und es fühlt sich nicht so an, es ist neutral?

P6: Es fühlt sich nicht immer gleich an, gell.

81 Note that the object of connecting can, in principle, also be oneself (e.g.: „Und ich nutze schon noch viel so Pausen (...) bewusst, um so wie zu mir oder zu Gott auch zu finden“ P15:294) or other people (e.g. P10 (P10:57) argues that his attitude toward other people is directly influenced by his relationship with God). In particular in interruption techniques inspired by Christian contemplative practices, concern for oneself is not in

bodily techniques which serves to combine the aspects of distancing and connecting into a singular practice:⁸²

Singing, for example. So, when I sing in my apartment or in the car or wherever, it also happens that I have a physical sensation—singing is something physical—and at the same time I distance myself from what I usually do or what otherwise occupies me, in a connection with the numinous, with God, and that I then feel gifted because I see it from the outside, because I feel loved, because I feel privileged (P7:171).⁸³

While in this first type of connecting, the movement of distancing is intentionally included, in another type the connecting aspect accompanies the stream of activities as a background melody which can, for example, shape the attitude of an individual to her/his work and to other people s/he encounters while working (see e.g. P5:63–65.121 – 123.133 – 145⁸⁴, P10:55–57; P14:61.99.111 – 117.161.171). In some cases, there are interruptions to the stream of activities, but they may be so subtle that they are barely recognizable by an observer, for example natural pauses in conversations used for connecting with God (P15:294, also in P15:318–343), or sequences in a meeting where others are talking (P2:20–51.60 – 68). P2's case is very interesting in this regard. When leading a session of a hectic meeting, he seems to continually oscillate between subtle interruptions as forms of distancing, active engagement with meeting participants, and

competition with that for God, as these techniques create space for individuals *in their relation* to God. In terms of interpersonal communion, while it is conceptually the individual relationship with God which enables positive relationships with other human beings (e.g. P10:57), many of the participants in our study recount that it was through the witnessing of and participation in positive relationships with other Christians that they became Christians, existentially speaking (see e.g. P5:56–69; P7:185–197; P10:77; P13:52; P14:31.46 – 58). On activation as a phenomenon which is experienced individually, but mediated socially, see 6.1.1.

82 For another example, see also P3's breathing technique, discussed above.

83 Original German text: Zum Beispiel beim Singen. Also wenn ich in meiner Wohnung singe oder im Auto oder wo auch immer, passiert das auch, dass ich eine körperliche Sensation habe – Singen ist etwas Physisches – und gleichzeitig in Distanz trete zu dem, was ich sonst mache oder was mich sonst beschäftigt, in einer Verbindung mit dem Numinosen, mit Gott, und dass ich mich dann beschenkt fühle, weil ich es von aussen sehe, weil ich mich geliebt fühle, weil ich mich privilegiert fühle.

84 In paragraphs 133–145, P5 explicitly discusses the role of intentional interruptions and concludes that they are *not necessary* to maintain a relationship with God during the working day, although intentional interruptions may sometimes be helpful. This is conceptually interesting, in that God and the world are not construed here in an oppositional way, but one's relationship with God is characterized as a crucial aspect *of* one's living in the world.

seeking a connection with God in what he is doing, which he refers to as “reconnecting” (P2:62).⁸⁵

In more general terms, the relationship between Christian individuals and God thus serves as the nerve center from which both their detachment from the world (distancing) and their engagement with the world (investing) are orchestrated. The individual relationship with God serves as the stable ground or archimedic point from which the dynamic relationship to the world characterized by the dialectic of distancing and investing is organized. The dialectic of distancing and investing allows movements in both directions, which means that there is no given conceptual or temporal priority of distancing over investing. Rather, the relationship between the two seems to be cyclical. As human beings always find themselves already thrown into some form of engagement with the world, the stream of activities of investing serves as the context for movements of distancing, which then in turn serve as the basis for movements of investing and so forth.

In summary, Christian engagement with the world (investing) emerges in a dialectic tension with Christian disengagement from the world (distancing), while both Christian engagement with (investing) and disengagement from the world (distancing) are orchestrated from and characterized by the individual’s relationship with God (connecting). Different situations of Christian embodiment can thus have different emphases with regard to the dialectic between distancing and investing (distancing might be more prominent in one situation than investing or vice versa). Embodying a Christian mode of existence at work can thus be understood as being characterized by different configurations of the triad of distancing, connecting, and investing.

The three characteristic dynamics of Christian embodiment can be further specified with regard to different variations in concrete situations. Moments of distancing can be specified with regard to different objects from which someone distances her- or himself (such as people, roles, thoughts, emotions, ambitions, expectations, possessions), modes (ritualized, semi-ritualized, informal), and action reference, in that they either comprise separate acts (e.g. a break from work to pray or meditate) or accompany existing (work-related) acts (e.g. in the form of particular attitudes or orientations). Moments of connecting can also be specified with regard to their action reference, and with respect to their being more

85 To study such situations of embodiment, it was crucial to combine observations with interviews, where we first observed a situation and could afterwards ask participants about their experience in a particular situation (see 1.3).

explicit or implicit (which often means they are more or less observable for the researcher, or even not directly observable). Moments of investing can be specified in terms of the currency that is invested (e.g. attention, money, ‘oneself’) and of the project or target in which it is invested (e.g. a person, a task, a project, a business).

While in extant research, particularly in fsw research and in theological approaches to the workplace, singular aspects related to distancing, connecting, and investing are addressed, so far I have not found a general characterization of Christian existence at work similar to the one proposed here. However, it must be noted that the theoretical sketch of the embodiment of Christian existence at work proposed here displays strong similarities with extant sociological and theological approaches which have not focused particularly on work contexts, but which can nevertheless be relevant for Christian existence at work. In the following, I will thus discuss the sketch’s correspondence to two broader contemporary sociological approaches and one theological account (2) and, subsequently, turn (again) to fsw research and theological approaches to the workplace as presented in chapters 4 and 5 to explore how the concepts of distancing, connecting, and investing can be said to be reflected there (3).

2) Mellor and Shilling (2014:281) describe Christian forms of life as particular actualizations (“instaurations”) of a religious habitus which draw upon the “three central features of the Christian cultural ‘repertoire’” (2014:283):

- (i) a focus on individuals being drawn out of their societies (by opening their bodies and minds to a transcendent, other-worldly sphere) (...), (ii) the development of a relationally-defined but unique sense of personhood (arising from the experience of communion with God) (...) and (iii) acquiring the capacity to reflect upon, interrogate and deploy the individual conscience (in engaging morally with, and identifying religious potential within, secular society) (2014:283).

Their first feature of the Christian cultural repertoire can be said to describe the movement of distancing in sociological terms (“individuals being drawn out of their societies” 2014:283) enabled through connecting (“by opening their bodies and minds to a transcendent, other-worldly sphere” 2014:283). Mellor and Shilling’s second feature describes what I have called connecting as “the development of a relationally-defined but unique sense of personhood (arising from the experience of communion with God)” (2014:283). Their third feature can be said to describe, in sociological terms, what I have called investing as “the capacity to reflect upon, interrogate and

deploy the individual conscience (in engaging morally with, and identifying religious potential within, secular society)” (2014:283).

In a similar vein, Pollack and Rosta (2015:66) argue that different forms of religious meaning, first, work with the distinction of transcendence and immanence and are orientated toward a transcendent sphere.⁸⁶ Second, they (the forms of meaning) make transcendence accessible in that they reintroduce the distinction between transcendence and immanence into the realm of immanence. Pollack and Rosta (2015:66) refer to Niklas Luhmann in calling this second step a “re-entry”. While Mellor and Shilling’s three central features of the Christian cultural repertoire seem to be roughly congruent with the different aspects of what I have called the triad of distancing, connecting, and investing, Pollack and Rosta’s transcendence–immanence distinction and transcendence orientation relate to the distancing and connecting elements of the triad proposed, and their ‘re-entry’ seems to be roughly congruent with the *investing* movement. Pollack and Rosta’s account particularly seems to capture the idea that this kind of engagement with the (immanent) world carries with it the prior movements of distancing from the world (the transcendence–immanence distinction) and of connecting with a (transcendent) God.⁸⁷

In theological terms, the triad resonates with writers who emphasize the participation of Christians in Christ’s incarnation and, in particular, his death and resurrection (e.g. Kelly 2010, Miller 2014, Nelson 1995).⁸⁸ In Miller’s (2014:4f.102f) reading of Paul, followers of Christ participate (connecting) bodily and literally in Christ’s death and resurrection by putting to death their passions and desires, situated in the body (distancing), and they thus die with Christ, while the Spirit ‘infuses’ their bodies with Christ’s death and resurrection life (connecting). They participate in the new life of

86 One could argue that it is not “the different forms of religious meaning” (2015:66) which work with the distinction of transcendence and immanence, but the sociologists who study these forms.

87 Some of the research subjects in our study might agree with the transcendence–immanence distinction, the transcendent orientation, and the notion of re-entry, as proposed by Pollak and Rosta, but would probably disagree with the labeling of the overall complex as ‘religious’, arguing instead that their relationship with God transcends the notion of religion (see e.g. P13) and that the label ‘religious’ is, therefore, not well-suited to it. In addition to the perspective of the managers studied, it would also be interesting to hear the perspectives of non-Christians on Pollack and Rosta’s conception of religion since it seems to be a paradigmatic reformulation of John 1:14 (I have not found an explicit reference to this text!).

88 I follow Kelly (2010) in understanding Christ’s death and resurrection (and ascension) as part of Christ’s incarnation.

Christ, which becomes visible in just (2014:136) practice (investing). In short, they “practice the body of Christ”⁸⁹. In terms of investing, Miller argues that the habitually practiced actions called for in Romans 12–15 are the contents of what Paul means in Romans 5 by just practice and in Romans 6–8 by “a life free from the sinful passions of the body and serving God obediently” (2014:136). The imperatives of Romans 12–15, then, are “a command to *continue to be Christians*, to be Christ” (2014:138, my emphasis) in how they live their lives.

Miller’s interpretation is important to understand the role of Christians as members of Christ. This helps to put the triad of distancing, connecting, and investing, which occurs in the data of our study, in the right context, from a Christian (theological) point of view. In short, Christians’ relationship to Jesus Christ cannot be reduced to one aspect of Christian embodiment at work (e.g. that of connecting), but the reality of Christ is also to be understood as the context in which the whole set of dynamics of Christian embodiment at work, as specified by the movements of distancing, connecting, and investing, takes place. While many interviewees emphasize the centrality of Jesus (e.g., P5:107–109.119.121; P7:185–197; P9:23.33 – 35.90 – 99.119.125.198 – 209.215 – 219; P13:52–56.136; P15: 129–130|138.176 – 178–180.186.220.242), there is a particular passage which indicates the presence of Jesus as the transformative reality in which Christians are to live. The context of the passage is the question of how to deal with fear:

It’s very simple: when a child has a nightmare, and always when this occurs in social relationships in which love for children prevails—I take this for granted, I’m sure it is the case with you, too—then we become socially so much more intelligent. And when a child has a nightmare, I do not explain about REM phases to it, but I go to it, give it closeness, and I take its fears seriously without believing them. I really listen, without submitting to them in order to dissolve them. And then I notice physically and mentally exactly the moment at which the child comes down, namely when it starts listening to me. Before that, only my presence is important. And that is what Christ does. Christ is simply present at first; he works through his presence, it’s always like that. In the Bible, I can read wherever I want to: as soon as Christ enters the scene, everything changes. Those who were quite self-confident before are now quite insecure (laughter), and those who were afraid before draw hope.

I have read with great interest the rites⁹⁰ of the Jesuits. By Ignatio. In his morning rites, he—as early as in the, I think it was in the 17th century—did almost systemic constellation work in his imagination. He always said: Imagine now all your figures

89 Which is the title of Miller’s book (2014).

90 P7 refers here to the spiritual *exercices* of St. Ignatius. The term “rites” is also related to the Ignatian tradition. (see the Chinese rites controversy)

in your fantasy world that are relevant today—today, very practically. So: Who are you meeting? Which debts or which problems do you have to solve? Imagine all this exactly: Where are you, and what does it look like? And then (P7 hits the table) add Christ. And now something happens. And this is very practical—there is an effect (P7:19–20).⁹¹

While this passage indicates Christ as the reality in which to live, others describe how Jesus Christ relates to distancing and investing (P6:147), and how they relate to Christ's dying and resurrection in various ways, such as when a difficult situation is 'brought to the cross of Jesus' in prayer (P9:129.181.193 – 197), or by meditating on Christ's dying and resurrection (P15:176–180), or by celebrating the Lord's Supper, particularly in challenging situations (P17:97.271 – 283). This indicates that, even though the Pauline notion of participation in Christ's dying and resurrection cannot be said to be part of the standard repertoire of convictions described by the Christian managers studied, it is also not totally foreign to some of them. And maybe more importantly: the dynamics related to participation in Christ can be encountered in numerous places across our empirical data. The Christological framework with which the triad of distancing, connecting, and investing can be situated, as referring to different aspects of Christians' participation in Christ, seems to me the most crucial aspect of Christian embodiment at work addressed in Christian theology. One might surely find much more theological material which addresses one or more

91 Original German quotation: Es ist ganz einfach: Wenn ein Kind einen Albtraum hat, und immer, wenn es in einem sozialen Gefälle, in welchem eben Liebe herrscht zu den Kindern – ich setze das jetzt einmal voraus, ich bin mir sicher, es ist so, bei dir auch –, dann werden wir sozial so viel intelligenter. Und wenn ein Kind einen Albtraum hat, erkläre ich ihm nichts über REM-Phasen, sondern ich gehe hin, gebe ihm Nähe, und ich nehme es in seinen Ängsten ernst, ohne diese zu glauben. Ich höre wirklich zu, ohne mich dem zu unterwerfen, um es aufzulösen. Und dann merke ich physisch und psychisch ganz genau, wann das Kind runtergpaced ist, nämlich dann, wenn es anfängt, mir zuzuhören. Davor ist nur meine Präsenz wichtig. Und das ist das, was Christus macht. Christus ist einfach zuerst präsent, er wirkt durch seine Präsenz, es ist immer so. In der Bibel kann ich lesen, wo ich möchte: Wenn Christus die Szene betritt, wird alles anders. Die, welche vorher ganz sicher waren, sind jetzt ziemlich unsicher (Lachen), und die, welche vorher verängstigt waren, schöpfen Hoffnung. Ich habe mit viel Interesse die Riten der Jesuiten gelesen. Von Ignatio. Der hat – bereits im, ich glaube, das war im 17. Jahrhundert – in seinen Riten am Morgen fast systemische Aufstellungsarbeiten gemacht in der Fantasie. Er hat immer gesagt: Stelle dir jetzt alle deine Figuren in deiner Fantasiewelt vor, die heute – heute, ganz praktisch – relevant sind. Also: Wen triffst du? Welche Schulden oder welche Probleme musst du lösen? Stelle dir das alles genau vor: Wo bist du, und wie sieht das aus? Und dann (P7 schlägt auf den Tisch) stelle Christus dazu. Und jetzt passiert etwas. Und das ist ganz praktisch – Wirkung: 7

facets of the triad of distancing, connecting, and investing. While I cannot delve into this in more detail here, let me indicate briefly that the movement of distancing resonates, for example, with the notion of “Unterbrechung” (disruption) in German theology, such as in the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher⁹², Eberhard Jüngel⁹³, or Johann Baptist Metz⁹⁴.

3) Aspects of Christian embodiment at work, as sketched here on an empirical basis, are also addressed in fsw literature and in theological approaches to contemporary work contexts. In the following, I will sketch how the dynamics of distancing, connecting, and investing can be seen to be reflected in these bodies of literature.

In terms of investing, Ligo (2011:444; see also 4.3.1) outlines that working involves “giving of oneself” (2011:444), participation of the “whole person, body and spirit” (2011:444), and that the spirituality of work calls for self-investment (2011:448). In her approach, the fourth criterion of a Christian spirituality of work encompasses self-investment in creativity (instead of self-preoccupation). In terms of the reality of Christ as the context of Christian embodiment, according to Ligo (2011:449), “to be in Christ” is the fundamental meaning and existential condition of being Christian. This condition is marked by “the mystery of the passion, death, and resurrection of Christ” (2011:449). Work, in the totality of its aspects, can be assumed as a form of “participation in Christ’s total act of self-giving” (2011:460) in his passion, death, and resurrection. In work, one becomes a participant “in God’s own *self-giving* to creation, as well as God’s self-giving within the Trinitarian reality of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” (2011:459; my emphasis). “Through the Incarnate Son, redeemed humanity finds its irrevocable place within the self-giving of the Trinity. Redeemed humanity finds itself encircled by the Trinity of Lover, Beloved, and Love,” says Ligo (2011:459), thus emphasizing the connection between what I have called investing and connecting.

In the case of Delbecq’s (2004:249–252; see also 4.3.2) “composite executive” named Sally, which he uses to describe the Christian manager’s spiritual journey, the facets of Christian embodiment described above can also be observed. In the early stage of her journey, Sally adopts two spiritual disciplines: reading of scripture in the evening followed by reflection and

92 As an “Unterbrechung der Geschäftstätigkeit” (interruption of business activities), see Meyer-Blanck (2011:396) or an “Unterbrechung des bürgerlich-geschäftlichen Lebens“ (interruption of civic-commercial life), see Stroh (1998:326).

93 See e.g. his *Unterbrechungen* (1989) and on Jüngel, see Meyer-Blanck (2011:395).

94 See his *Unterbrechungen* (1981):771/9783748922629-241, am 21.09.2024, 11:20:17

prayer (connecting) and a daily examen, that is, an exercise aimed at continuously integrating lessons learned from scripture reading into daily activities (investing) through daily evaluation of one's conduct and prayer. Later, she starts to practice 'mindfulness', that is, attending to God in the 'now' of each daily activity (combining connecting and investing) and including short breaks (distancing) between activities to remind herself to be 'present' in what she is doing (Delbecq 2004:250). This increases her ability to be present with each task or person (investing). She then starts to include the "contemplative practice" (2004:250) of "Christian centering prayer", "where she detaches from thought and affect for twenty minutes twice-daily" (distancing), where she learns to "detach from fears, anxieties, and self-concerns" (2004:250). Sally also begins to practice discernment, which helps her to listen to all points of view, to solve problems participatorily (investing), to return (distancing) to prayer (connecting), and to hold a problem in her heart while paying attention (investing) to the movements of desolation and consolation, says Delbecq (2004:251). Thus, she learns to include affective and spiritual insights alongside rational problem-solving (investing). Additionally, she develops an increasing understanding of the Christian tradition's emphasis on the suffering Christ and, in this way, develops the capacity to endure difficult moments in her organization (distancing and connecting) and to provide support to others (investing) in difficult situations (2004:251).

While Delbecq proposes understanding the spiritual journey as involving "cycles of conversion", one could phrase this in the terminology proposed here by saying that oscillating between the movements of distancing and investing is continually orchestrated by one's relationship with God. The spiritual journey progresses by grace, according to Delbecq (2004:252). It involves "increased illumination and unification", which is "never over this side of death". Interestingly, the idea of growth is not prominent in the accounts of the Christian managers we studied, although the notions of maturing (P2:70; P15:92) and intensification (e.g. P2:70; P18:320–346) do occur, the idea of a shift or passage (with more or less clear temporal boundaries in terms of the managers' biographies) from a nominal to an existential status of being a Christian⁹⁵ features more prominently.

According to Radzins (2017; see also 4.3.3), living labor implies being thoughtful about one's work, be it "painting, plowing, writing, building, or cooking" (2017:295), and it involves (an investment of) the "faculty of attention" (2017:295). While in dead labor work becomes only a means to

95 What I have termed *activation*, see 6.1.48922629-241, am 21.09.2024, 11:20:17

an end, living labor comes from what Simone Weil calls “the world beyond”, says Radzins (2017:298), from what is unseen (thought, contemplation, or attention). This focus on the ‘world beyond’ can be said to imply a form of distancing from (or relativization of) ‘this world’. “Spirit appears in the *connection* between the world beyond (what is unseen) and this world (the seen)” (Radzins 2017:298; my emphasis). One’s engagement with the world (investing) is to be understood in the context of one’s relationship to the divine (connecting): For Weil, “the divine is materially present (...) the world is ‘God’s language to us’” (Radzins 2017:303) and the beauty of the world is “Christ’s tender smile” (Radzins 2017:305) to us.

Mabey and colleagues (2017; see 4.3.4) argue for “Jesus-centered ethical leadership” (2017:757). This requires one’s distancing from trusting in personal strength through repentance and an inner transformation through the work of the Holy Spirit (connecting) within a person.

According to Cavanagh and colleagues’ (2003; see 4.1.4) sketch of a Christian account, while humans are made to live in a relationship with God (connecting), there is a human tendency “to place fundamental confidence and hope in a spiritual substitute for God” (2003:130), such as wealth and success. Therefore, Jesus calls on human beings to repent (distancing and connecting), change their direction, and reorient their priorities (investing) toward God (connecting). Following Jesus involves a radical change (distancing) which “is paradoxically both given by God and enacted by humans” (2004:130) (investing which includes connecting and distancing). It is in the community of followers of Christ that the “Christian story takes on bodily existence” (2003:131), which indicates that Christian embodiment is not an individualistic endeavor, but takes place as Christians participate in the body of Christ.

Honecker (1995, see 5.3.2) points out that, from a Christian perspective, work is relativized (distancing) through faith (connecting), in that faith is more important than work (1995:457). In addition, from a theological perspective, the Christian faith bestows meaning on one’s work. Faith can even instill meaning into work which is experienced as toilsome, given that it is useful for the wider society. Through the motif of the cross, which Christians are to bear as they follow Christ (connecting and investing), they can accept toilsome work contexts and can overcome (distancing) dispiritedness (1995:469).

According to Black (2008:50; see 5.4.3), each member of a corporation is fully responsible for the entire “corporate body”. Individual members act on behalf of and realize the whole: “When I act, the whole is in me” (2008:50). “Each member is the whole corporation when he or she acts in

its name” (2008:50.52). This is most aptly described not by “representation”, nor by “agency”, but by “embodiment” (2008:50.52). Corporate members embody the corporate relationship. Such embodiment seems to mirror Christian embodiment, in that it entails the aspects of distancing (of oneself from oneself), of connecting (to the corporation), and of investing (‘act in its name’). As the church is “the first corporation” (2011:2), Black’s remarks may shed light on the relationship of the individual to the whole in Christian embodiment. Miller (2014:198), drawing on Martyn (2010), says that “it is not the individual Christian that acts as Christ but the church who does”. However, seen from the perspective of Black’s corporate theology, this is not a question of either the individual or the whole, for “When I act, the whole is in me” (Black 2008:50), as I am practicing not myself but Christ.

For Black, corporate existence seems to be similar to what I refer to as Christian existence, as “those participating in the corporate relation can be said to be participating in the life of the Trinity itself” (2008:50). In particular, corporate existence requires assistance from the Spirit, that is, it requires participation in the relationship between God and Jesus Christ (2008:50). Thus, for Black, corporate life requires *all* its participants (Christians and others) to live with faith⁹⁶ and to practice the spiritual exercises of mutual submission (distancing), expressing one’s view of the criterion of action (investing), listening to the expression of others, synthesizing a greater criterion, and seeking to uncover “the will of God in daily life” (2011:8). Thus, “searching for God” (connecting) is an inherent part of corporate existence (2011:6) for *every* corporate member. Black’s approach sheds light on Christian existence in its relationship to contemporary corporate life. While what I have described as the nominal mode of being a Christian seems to be largely irrelevant for corporate life, the features of an existential mode of being a Christian as described above seem to be critical for corporate life. In particular, what I have described as the characteristic dynamics of embodied Christian existence could be regarded in the light of Black’s work as qualities necessary(!) for the corporate relationship to ‘work’, that is, for corporations to function appropriately.

According to Daniels and colleagues (2012; see 5.4.2), Christians are, through redemption, “liberated from the idolatry of the market and set free to pursue, with assurance of power, a business life lived in obedience to Christ” (2012:73). Redemption thus involves liberation (distancing) and a

96 Defined as being “prepared to disclose completely and subject oneself to mutual judgment, as well as judgment by authority” (2008:50–52, footnote 27)

call to participate with God (connecting) in the restoration and transformation (investing) of business (2012:75).

I have only briefly indicated how these aspects of the embodiment of Christian existence at work appear in current fsw and theological research related to contemporary work contexts. One could also proceed in a more systematic way, by focusing on singular aspects, such as connecting and describing in more detail how that aspect is covered by different authors, for example by Cavanagh and colleagues (2003), Tucker (2010, see also 4.1.), or Lynn and colleagues (2010⁹⁷, 2009, see also 2.2.). However, the purpose of my short tour through relevant research in this section was not to provide a complete systematic review of how these aspects of embodied Christian existence are addressed in extant research. My intention was mainly to show that, even though the terminology I use to describe facets of Christian embodiment is to a certain degree (but not completely) new, the content of these dynamics is already present and described in extant research. And different nuances and aspects of Christian embodiment at work addressed in research literature can be plausibly framed under the headings of distancing, connecting, and investing. What I sought to describe in this section based on empirically grounded theory development and theoretical reflection is that, in real-life situations, different dynamics and facets of Christian embodiment come together in particular combinations and variations. Thus, while there can be myriads of totally different situations of Christian embodiment at work, there are at the same time a few patterns and characteristic dynamics that are present across a variety of concrete situations of Christian embodiment at work.

In addition, some of the authors discussed in this section identify the person of Jesus Christ as the reality in which Christian embodiment is situated. To explore this from yet another angle, I will draw upon the work of Viktor Frankl, an author who also occurs in fsw literature. In the following, I will use his work on meaning in life as the conceptual background against which to accentuate the contours of the Christian body at work.

97 See their focus on relationship (with God) as a main dimension of faith at work (2010:232). <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748922629-241>, am 21.09.2024, 11:20:17

6.2.2 Viktor Frankl's meaning in life and the Christian body at work

'Meaning' is a term often employed in contemporary research on spirituality at work (see chapters 2 and 3)⁹⁸. Some fsw authors have particularly drawn upon the notion of meaning in life (e.g. De Klerk 2005, Driver 2007, Lips-Wiersma & Morris 2009). The concept of meaning in life was originally proposed by the neurologist Viktor Frankl, a concentration camp survivor and the founder of logotherapy. Because of its strong conceptual connections to fsw discourses, and because I think it holds some promising potential for the accentuation of crucial aspects of Christian living, I will sketch, in the following, some of the key aspects of his approach (1) and then relate them to Christian living at work (2).

1) Logotherapy is an approach to psychotherapy which is based on the assumption of a "will to meaning" as a particularly human phenomenon. Frankl (2015[1977]) diagnoses a comprehensive crisis of meaning: In contrast to animals, no instincts tell human beings what they have to do, and in contrast to former times, no traditions tell them what they should do. Not knowing what they have to do, nor what they should do, humans often do not seem to know exactly what they actually want (2015:11.123). This leads to a fundamental crisis, existential frustration, a feeling of meaninglessness, says Frankl (2015:12.15).⁹⁹

Frankl points out that Maslow¹⁰⁰ held the human will to meaning to be the primary orientation of human beings (2015:16) and that he situated meaning among the higher needs in his hierarchy of needs. However, Frankl questions Maslow's idea that, in order to pursue the higher need for meaning, lower needs must first be met. Frankl (2015:16) points out that the question of meaning in life can arise exactly in a situation of crisis and unmet lower needs, "when one is at one's worst" [*wenn es einem am dreckigsten geht*].

98 Additionally, it appears in theological approaches, in particular in Honecker's (1995:469) account (see 5.3.2), according to which the Christian faith bestows meaning on one's work.

99 For a different perspective on the veining influence of tradition, see the discussion of Mellor and Shilling's (2014) account in 4.2. They describe the same development differently by arguing that the influence of traditions is still there, but that the way in which traditions and individual lives are interrelated has changed.

100 On Maslow's relation to fsw discourses, see 2.1.3, am 21.09.2024, 11:20:17

For Frankl, human existence is fundamentally marked by an orientation toward meaning, and thus by self-transcendence:

(...) the fact that being human always points beyond oneself to something that is not oneself—to something or to someone: to a meaning that needs to be fulfilled, or to another human being that we lovingly encounter. In service to a cause or in love for a person, a human being fulfills himself. The more he is absorbed in his task or devoted¹⁰¹ to his partner, the more he is human, the more he becomes himself. He can only realize himself to the extent that he forgets himself (...). (2015:17)¹⁰²

The experience of fulfillment, of happiness, *accompanies* the fulfillment of meaning in life. The former is an effect of the latter (2015:18f). Meaning cannot be given to a situation or invented or produced, it has to be *found*, to be discovered, says Frankl. Meaning cannot be created (because it is already there). Meaning [*Sinn*], as it is implied in concrete situations, has an objective quality. What can be created is either nonsense [*Unsinn*] or a subjective feeling of meaning [*subjektives Sinngefühl*], says Frankl (2015:29).

The process of finding meaning is similar to that of the perception of a body in space, or “gestalt perception” [*Gestaltwahrnehmung*] (2015:29). Each situation with which life confronts a human being comprises a demand, a “requiredness” (2015:28f.124). But while gestalt perception refers to the perception of a body in relation to a background or spatial context, the finding of meaning refers to *the discovering of a possibility against the background of reality*.

According to Frankl, it is *possible* to find meaning. Human beings are guided by their conscience [*Gewissen*] in finding meaning. Conscience is an organ of meaning [*ein Sinn-Organ*] (2015:30). Conscience can be defined as the ability to discover the unique meaning which is hidden in every situation. As a genuinely human organ, one’s conscience is, however, of a fleeting nature, and until the very end of life it does not allow human beings to know for sure whether they have really fulfilled the purpose of their lives or whether they only believe they have fulfilled it. Despite this uncertainty,

101 Note the parallel in the German original between *hingegen* (devoted) and *Aufgabe* (task).

102 Original: (...) die Tatsache, dass Menschsein allemal über sich selbst hinausweist auf etwas, das nicht wieder es selbst ist – auf etwas oder auf jemanden: auf einen Sinn, den zu erfüllen es gilt, oder auf anderes menschliches Sein, dem wir da liebend begegnen. Im Dienst an einer Sache oder in der Liebe zu einer Person erfüllt der Mensch sich selbst. Je mehr er aufgeht in seiner Aufgabe, je mehr er hingegen ist an seinen Partner, umso mehr ist er Mensch, umso mehr wird er er selbst. Sich selbst verwirklichen kann er also eigentlich nur in dem Masse, in dem er sich selbst vergisst (...).

human beings are called to obey [*gehorchen*] the voice of their conscience and, firstly, to listen [*hören*] to its voice (2015:30). This is why education should not only transfer knowledge, but develop and differentiate a person's conscience, which means improving her/his ability to hear the demand inherent in each situation (2015:31). This means education for responsibility.

Meaning in life thus refers to the concrete meaning of a concrete situation. It is the requirement of the hour [*Forderung der Stunde*] (2015:31). It is addressed to a concrete individual person. Every day and every hour have their meaning, and as human beings are unique, there is a *particular* meaning for everyone. The meaning which inhabits a situation is unique. Thus, meaning in life is ever-present, but it changes from situation to situation and from person to person (2015:32). The ability to find meaning is independent of gender, intelligence, education, or religiosity¹⁰³. There is no situation or person to which or to whom life does not offer a particular meaning. Because of this particularity of meaning, a psychotherapist cannot tell anyone *what* this meaning is but only *that* there is meaning. The fact that life never loses its meaning is due to the possibility of finding meaning, even in suffering.

A person may find meaning in three ways, in Frankl's view: first, by doing or creating something, second by experiencing something or loving somebody, and, third, in the case of unavoidable suffering or an unchangeable situation, by enduring one's fate with the right attitude. Thus, even the tragic aspects of human existence, such as suffering, guilt, and death, may be transformed into something positive by facing them with the right inner attitude, says Frankl (2015:33f). Through this, suffering can become transformational, leading to inner maturity and growth.

Enduring suffering is a crucial form of meaning. What is important is *how*, that is, with which attitude we endure unchangeable and unavoidable suffering, says Frankl. Suffering is the highest dignity of a human being compared to finding meaning through commitment to a task or loving another person. Why? In terms of being creative and fulfilling a task, there are the two categories of success and failure. In terms of suffering, the two relevant categories are despair and fulfillment. These are in a different dimension than success and failure. Thus, for the suffering person, failure may be compatible with fulfillment, while this seems impossible from the viewpoint of the task-orientated person. Nevertheless, there is a primacy of

103 Frankl holds that someone who is consciously areligious may be unconsciously religious at the same time (see e.g. 2015:38).

finding meaning through doing something, being creative, and fulfilling a task (*homo faber*) over finding meaning through enduring suffering with the right attitude. Only when suffering is *unavoidable* does its endurance become the necessary path to finding meaning. Enduring avoidable suffering would be waggery [Mutville,], says Frankl (2015:87–89).

Frankl indicates some implications of his account of meaning for the questions of leadership and management: in terms of leading or working with other people, it is crucial to become aware of the other person as s/he is meant in her/his secret form [*den gemeinten Menschen und seine geheime Gestalt*] (2015:51). Thus, we are not to take people “as they are”, but as they are with regard to their meaning in life (2015:14). Meaning is a particularly human phenomenon. It relates to the noetic or spiritual [*das Geistige*], which Frankl (2015:94) distinguishes from the somatic [*das Somatische*] and from the mental aspects [*das Psychische*] of human beings (2015:53).¹⁰⁴

With regard to management, Frankl points to the problem of a confusion of means and ends. First¹⁰⁵, it is to be noted that the experience of happiness and delight/lust is a *side effect* of finding and fulfilling meaning in life. They can thus not be found by directly pursuing happiness or lust, but by finding and fulfilling meaning in life. Frankl (2015:77) refers to the direct pursuit of happiness and lust as “neurotic”. The primary striving of human beings is thus not orientated toward happiness and lust, but toward meaning. Second, like lust and happiness, power is also secondary to meaning: power may be a necessary instrument with which to fulfill one’s meaning in life. It is thus secondary to the primary meaning orientation. If the pursuit of power becomes someone’s primary orientation, this demonstrates a neurotic motivation and a departure from the genuinely human orientation toward meaning, says Frankl (2015:77f). In particular, the primary orientation toward power is “the disease of managers” (2015:83), often encountered in its most primitive expression, the ‘will to money’.¹⁰⁶

The goal of Frankl’s logotherapy is to reorient a client toward meaning. For Frankl, the Greek term *logos*, as it is used in ‘logotherapy’, stands for ‘spirit’ [*Geist*] and ‘meaning’ [*Sinn*] (2015:85.101). Our meaning in life is the

104 In psychotherapy, it is therefore necessary to differentiate between symptoms that are caused on the noetic, the mental, or the somatic levels, according to Frankl.

105 This first point is, in Frankl’s account, not formulated with particular respect to management. I describe it here because the second point, which is concerned with management, is linked to this first point in that the two are different forms of a confusion of means and ends.

106 Note the parallel to the observation made by Daniels and colleagues (2012:64) that under the conditions of the fall, businesses become ends instead of means (see 5.4.2).

essential element of who we are as people. A biography is the temporal explication of a person, says Frankl (2015:95). Self-transcendence of the person toward the *logos* refers to the specific human phenomenon that human existence always points beyond itself toward meaning (2015:101). Being human can be defined as being responsible because human beings are responsible for fulfilling a meaning (2015:102). Meaning in life is also key to Frankl's conception of freedom: human beings are subject to biological, psychological, or sociological conditions and are, in this sense, not free. Human beings are not 'free from' in terms of conditions, but 'free to' in terms of having the freedom to respond to the conditions they face (2015:113). This freedom is given even in the midst of unavoidable suffering, which can only be endured.

2) Of particular relevance for the question of Christian existence at work is Frankl's understanding of finding meaning, which he argues can be compared to that of the perception of a body in space, or gestalt perception [*Gestaltwahrnehmung*]. Let me reiterate what appear to be the crucial aspects in this regard before I relate Frankl's account to Christian living at work. Each situation with which reality confronts a human being comprises a demand, a "requiredness", says Frankl (2015:28f.124). As gestalt perception refers to the perception of a body in relation to a background or spatial context, the finding of meaning refers to the discovering of a possibility against the background of reality. This possibility is, however, closely tied to the situation at hand; it inhabits it, so to speak. However, what is not specified here is that the meaning of a situation, once discovered as a possibility, also needs to be *realized* or embodied. The realization of meaning seems to be implied in Frankl's notion of finding meaning (2015:29).¹⁰⁷

At this point, let me suggest a parallel between Frankl's account of meaning and the embodied character of Christian existence. A Christian who reads Frankl's work might be reminded that the term which Frankl uses for meaning (*logos*) is the same term as is employed in the Johannine prologue to refer to the Word becoming flesh.¹⁰⁸ Of course, the semantic contexts of Frankl's and the Johannine use of the notion of the Logos differ, and in terms of content, they seem to differ at least with regard to

107 And specified, in particular, in his three ways of finding meaning (see above and 2015:33).

108 On the Johannine prologue with regard to fsw research, see also Bartunek's (2006) account (see also 4.2.1).

the personified understanding of the Logos as put forth in John's gospel.¹⁰⁹ However, I suggest that Frankl's conceptual frame of meaning may serve to elucidate such phrases as 'the formation of Christ' (see Bonhoeffer 2005:99) or 'the practice of the body of Christ' (see Miller 2014) in concrete contexts.¹¹⁰ In particular, I suggest that the terminological parallel can be used to indicate a parallel in terms of content between Frankl's meaning in life and a Christian mode of existence. What is, in Frankl's general account, termed meaning, refers, in a Christian mode of existence, to the person of Jesus Christ. If we read the Johannine prologue through Frankl's eyes, it could be read as 'the meaning became flesh and took up residence among us' (see John 1:14). In turn, in a Christian reading of Frankl, Christ is the personified meaning toward which the existence of Christians is structured, and He becomes embodied, formed, or practiced in the concrete¹¹¹ life of Christians.¹¹²

This observation can also be linked to Ephesians¹¹³ 2:10¹¹⁴: "For we are his workmanship, having been created in Christ Jesus for good works that God prepared beforehand so that we might walk in them"¹¹⁵. By taking account of the possible relation (indicated above) between Frankl's approach and the Johannine prologue for an interpretation of contempo-

109 In Frankl's account, it seems to me that meaning can, but does not have to be, personified, in that finding meaning can, in some situations, refer to loving a person (e.g. 2015:33).

110 Bonhoeffer (2005:99) identified "*how Christ may take form among us today and here*" (2005:99) as the main Christian ethical question, and Miller (2014, see the title of his monography) says that those who participate in Christ *practice* the body of Christ. Theologically speaking, the notion that contemporary Christians act as members of the body of Christ and thus embody Christ has been described as an 'ongoing incarnation' (see 1.4, and also 4.3.3 on Weil's "incarnated Christianity"). With reference to systematic theology, the 'ongoing incarnation' is a concept at the intersection of theology, Christology, pneumatology, ecclesiology, anthropology, and ethics.

111 See Bonhoeffer's contention that Christian ethics is not about abstract principles, but about a person, about the form or shape [*Gestalt*] of Christ, and the formation [*Gestaltung*] of Christ among us today and here (1992:87).

112 I have already noted (see 6.2.1) how the participation of Christians in Christ's death and resurrection resonates with the movements of distancing (from the world) and of investing (oneself in the world).

113 On Ephesians, see Petrenko (2005) and the literature there.

114 αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἔσμεν ποίημα, κτισθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς οἷς προητοίμασεν ὁ θεός, ἵνα ἐν αὐτοῖς περιπατήσωμεν.

115 This more literal rendering of the last subclause is actually provided by the online NET Bible in a footnote (<https://net.bible.org/#!/bible/Ephesians+2> accessed online on 1 June 2018), while the normal translation reads "so we may do them":

rary Christian living in the light of Ephesians 2:10, we can specify the meaning of Christian embodiment in work contexts. If the process of finding meaning consists in discovering a possibility against the background of reality, as Frankl says, the question is what exactly do individuals *perceive* if they discover the meaning of a situation? In case the meaning is related to taking a certain action or loving someone, individuals must perceive *themselves* (in a realm of possibility, according to Frankl) as doing the particular deed or loving the respective person. How can this be related to an understanding of contemporary Christian existence? Christians who are in the process of finding the meaning of a situation also perceive themselves, but not primarily in a realm of possibility, but as being *created*¹¹⁶ *in the body*¹¹⁷ *of Christ* (“we are his workmanship, having been *created* in Christ Jesus”). Christians can thus perceive or see themselves *in Christ* as doing the “good works that God prepared beforehand so that we might walk in them”. Thus, Christian individuals can see or perceive the situation in question, themselves, and the meaningful action performed, person loved, or suffering endured, all in the context of the reality of the body of Christ. This is why, although the concrete deed, love, or attitude required in a given situation still needs to be performed, acting it out does not transfer the deed from a realm of possibility into a realm of reality. Because these works have been “prepared beforehand” in the reality of Christ, they are real already, which is why those in Christ can “walk in them”. To use Weil’s terms (see Radzins 2017:298), the Spirit appears in connecting “what is unseen” (the world beyond), but no less real, with “the seen” (this world). The language of Ephesians of ‘walking in prepared works’ suggests that, in Christian living, God’s action and human action somehow come together, a thought which is reflected by contemporary authors who say that Christian action is “both given by God and enacted by humans” (Cavanagh et al. 2003:130) or that it is, at the same time, genuine agency that is enacted, and totally a gift (see Miller 2014:61). In other words, Christian individuals embody themselves as they already are (embodied) in Christ. As Ephesians 2:10 refers to the crucified, risen, and ascended Christ (see, in particular, also Ephesians 1:20), it is the crucified, risen, and ascended Christ who is embodied on earth by the community of followers of Christ (1:22f).¹¹⁸

116 This is a creation which seems to be based on being raised from death with (συνήγειρεν) Christ, see Ephesians 2:6.

117 See Ephesians 1:23.

118 On Christ’s ascension as a new phase of His incarnation, see Kelly (2010:801.805).

I have offered above (see 6.2.1) a sketch of how Christians' bodily participation in Christ's death and resurrection can be conceived of in terms of distancing, connecting, and investing. Moreover, while there is an intimate, hidden, and thus individual dimension to such an embodied way of life, it is nevertheless visible¹¹⁹, and it is at the same time thoroughly individual and communal. It takes place in the here and now of individual situations in which individual Christians are placed, but it also connects them with the community of all Christians, existentially speaking, who are encompassed by "the living Body of the Lord" (Kelly 2010:815)¹²⁰, in whom the agency of Christians is situated and whose presence Christians live "performatively" (Kelly 2010:799).

In this chapter, I have addressed the formation of the Christian body at work by focusing on the framing (6.1) and the embodiment (6.2) of Christian existence at work. I have drawn upon empirical data from Christian managers, as well as upon different theoretical sources, with a view to exploring and describing some of the key existential and dynamic qualities of the formation of the Christian body at work.

119 See Miller (2014:130): "What we must hold together is that participation in the death of Christ is "real" and that this participation is a visible one borne out in the church's acts".

120 In this sense, in the light of Ephesians, the Christian body can be said to be at work continually, not just in work situations or work contexts, and it expands over "all things" (Eph 1:22), but its work is not marked by an unhealthy dominance (Posadas 2017:330.352) over human lives, but by peace (Eph 2:14) and rest (Mt 11:28).