

Supporting Recovery, Reintegration, and Accession: Opportunities and Challenges for the OSCE in Ukraine

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Abstract

Ukraine’s recovery will be long and costly and will require a concerted international effort. The recovery process, partially guided by Ukraine’s EU accession agenda, will involve not only physically rebuilding the country but also reintegrating Ukrainian society. Based on its experience, especially in the Balkans since the 1990s, the OSCE has the potential to contribute significantly to Ukraine’s recovery, helping the country’s institutions to navigate the complexities of reintegration and EU accession.

Keywords

Ukraine, recovery, reintegration, EU accession

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Introduction

Since 2014, Russia has waged war against Ukraine. Until February 24, 2022, this took the form of a grey zone conflict in which the Kremlin used the full arsenal of hybrid and conventional warfare to further its objectives. Since then, what Moscow refers to as a “special military

operation” has been a full-scale conventional war. At the time of writing, eight years of hybrid and almost two years of conventional warfare have taken a huge toll. According to a March 2023 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment carried out jointly by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Union, and the United Nations, Ukraine’s recovery needs were estimated to be about \$411 billion.¹

Broad international efforts to support Ukraine’s recovery have been underway since 2017. Events like the annual Ukraine Recovery Conference are both an important symbolic reaffirmation of Western support for Ukraine and a

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mechanism to co-ordinate concerted financial support to ensure that the country can build a sustainable economy and a stable democracy. Thus, the 2023 London conference functioned as a platform where representatives from fifty-nine countries could announce major initiatives and raise donor funding worth \$60 billion to support Ukraine's recovery.

The OSCE has been notably absent from these increasingly formalized and institutionalized efforts to support Ukraine's recovery. In light of the OSCE's consensus principle and the continuing participation of Russia and states that are allied with or dependent on it, this is hardly a surprise. The war in Ukraine has almost completely paralyzed the OSCE, and the Organization faces enormous challenges to its ability to contribute meaningfully to recovery efforts. However, this does not mean that the OSCE cannot play a role in supporting recovery now and in the future. Provided there is sufficient political will, there are a number of opportunities for the OSCE, based on its longstanding presence in the country, projects it has implemented there over the past decade and elsewhere (such as in the Western Balkans and the Baltic states since the 1990s), and certain niche areas of expertise in which it can add real value to broader international recovery efforts.

The main objective of this analysis is to identify these challenges and opportunities and to offer policy recommendations for the OSCE. Our focus is two specific dimensions of Ukraine's recovery: the reintegration of Ukrainian society and the country's path to EU accession. The

paper examines the role that the OSCE could play in this context. The analysis is mainly based on interviews with OSCE officials, staff in delegations from participating States, Ukrainian officials, and a number of experts in think tanks and universities, as well as relevant official policy documents, academic scholarship, and grey literature.

In the next section, we outline the different dimensions of postwar recovery and establish what is specific about the Ukrainian context, identifying the connections between (social) reintegration and EU accession and pointing to particular OSCE experiences in this regard. The following two sections elaborate on reintegration and accession opportunities and challenges for OSCE engagement, respectively. We summarize our findings in a concluding section before offering seven recommendations to policymakers in the OSCE and participating States.

Postwar recovery

Postwar recovery is a challenging task. It requires physical reconstruction, the transformation of a war economy into a peace economy, and the psychological rehabilitation of the population. It involves a range of tasks related to the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and the transition to a peacetime security sector. Questions of law and order and transitional justice, including the prosecution of past crimes and compensation for victims, need to be addressed alongside the challenges of returning and

reintegrating refugees and internationally displaced persons (IDPs).

The enormity of postwar recovery in Ukraine has been widely recognized in academic and policy debates.² What is often less appreciated is its multi-dimensionality, with some authors explicitly denying those societal challenges of postwar reconstruction that are best encapsulated in the notion of reintegration. For example, Shatz et al. note that “Ukraine [will not] be emerging from a civil war, which comes with the risk of residual dissatisfied elements resisting and forming an insurgency,” and that therefore “the postwar reconstruction challenges in Ukraine are unlikely to resemble the challenges [...] faced in Iraq and Afghanistan.”³

In our view, and in that of several of our OSCE and Vienna-based interlocutors,⁴ this approach fails to grasp the full complexity of the war in Ukraine and its likely aftermath. The war between Russia and Ukraine constitutes one dimension of a complex conflict.⁵ This conflict escalated rapidly from the end of 2013 onwards across all three of its layers: a conflict within Ukraine over the country’s geopolitical orientation, a conflict between Moscow and Kyiv over Ukraine’s sovereign independence and territorial integrity, and a conflict over spheres of influence in the contested European neighborhood between Russia and the West. No forward-looking assessment of what is needed for a successful postwar recovery would be credible without this fuller understanding of the conflict environment in which the war between Russia and Ukraine has been embedded since 2014.

Ukrainian society will need to be reintegrated as a whole. This societal dimension of recovery and reintegration will require a focus on (re-)building democratic institutions that are resilient to the kinds of hybrid challenges Russia is likely to continue to employ against Ukraine. At the same time, it will be necessary to establish institutional structures through which rewards are provided to local elites (and their supporters), which could help to prevent the resurgence of violence in the liberated territories.

From an OSCE perspective, the connections between reintegration and accession are particularly important as they indicate potential areas in which the OSCE can contribute based on its existing expertise and track record. According to the principles adopted at the 2022 Lugano Recovery Conference, “the recovery process has to contribute to accelerating, deepening, broadening and achieving Ukraine’s reform efforts and resilience in line with Ukraine’s European path.”⁶ Linking recovery to EU accession gives domestic and international efforts a sense of direction, especially in light of the European Commission’s June 2022 Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union, which restates the Copenhagen criteria for membership.⁷ Among these, the first, political, criterion sets out that membership requires “that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,” while the second, economic, criterion specifies “the existence of a functioning market economy

as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” as another requirement for membership.⁸ According to the third criterion, “[m]embership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”⁹ Based on its overall positive assessment of Ukraine’s current performance against these criteria, the European Commission recommended that Ukraine be granted candidate status, subject to a number of steps aimed at strengthening the rule of law, intensifying the fight against corruption, and finalizing the reform of the minority rights framework.¹⁰

Taken together, the Ukraine-specific challenges of recovery, including the parallel requirements of societal reintegration and EU accession, underline the relevance of OSCE experiences. The OSCE has played an important role in postwar recovery in the Western Balkans, in past and ongoing accession processes there and in the Baltic states, and, more broadly, in the process of socializing countries “east of Vienna” into European and Euro-Atlantic value systems.¹¹ Key areas of OSCE expertise and past OSCE-EU cooperation¹² that are repeatedly highlighted in existing studies include the integration of national minorities, freedom of the media, and legislative reform, areas in which the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) also had a track record of projects that have, in part, informed the subsequent and ongoing work of the OSCE Support Programme for Ukraine (SPU).

One potential problem, noted both in the existing literature and by several interlocutors, concerns competition between OSCE and EU deployments in attracting qualified personnel.¹³ This is now further complicated by the fact that the quality and quantity of accession expertise in the EU and the OSCE is nowhere near its peak of the early 2000s and is very limited in Ukraine itself.¹⁴ Nonetheless, OSCE and Vienna-based interlocutors were near unanimous in their assessment that the Ukrainian recovery process offers a number of specific opportunities for OSCE engagement, allowing the Organization to draw on its experience in facilitating post-conflict reconstruction and societal reintegration alongside EU accession.¹⁵

The twin challenges of reintegration and accession

Within the broader context of Ukraine’s overall recovery, societal reintegration and EU accession stand out as two areas in which the OSCE could potentially make the largest contribution, based on the Organization’s past experiences (especially in the Balkans).¹⁶ Views from within Ukraine are rather different in this regard. Some Ukrainian interlocutors claimed that in terms of the degree of compliance with the political criteria for accession, such as the stability of institutions that ensure democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities, Ukraine has already reached the level that Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania had reached when they

were allowed to join the EU.¹⁷ At the same time, however, there is also an acknowledgment that the OSCE's experiences in the Balkans were both mixed (in terms of actual success) and not fully applicable to the situation in Ukraine (in terms of the OSCE's capabilities and capacities). In the Balkans, for example, Russia was never a belligerent party in any of the conflicts, contrary to the situation in Ukraine since 2014.

While Russia allowed at least a limited OSCE presence on the ground prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022—in the form of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM, which ran from March 2014 to March 2022) and the PCU (which ran from June 1999 to June 2022)—any OSCE presence in Ukraine is now operating outside the Organization's consensus principle. With Russia and Belarus wielding their veto power, the OSCE cannot be used to its full potential in Ukraine.¹⁸ Instead, the Organization has had to rely on delivering support through the specially created extrabudgetary SPU. Conceptually and logistically, the SPU stands in the tradition of the PCU;¹⁹ because of its extrabudgetary nature, however, it has greater flexibility, can be more responsive to the needs articulated by Ukraine, and can provide tailor-made support without the constraints of a specific mandate that requires the continuous support of all fifty-seven participating States.²⁰

At the same time, seeing the SPU as a “test case for future OSCE financing” more generally²¹ could give rise to problems for the Organization. All participating States bar Russia and Belarus agreed

on keeping an OSCE presence on the ground in Ukraine,²² and the SPU is supported by funds from twenty-nine of them and the EU. The SPU's main donors are Western, including the United States, Canada, and Switzerland, as well as Germany, France, and other EU member states,²³ making the SPU a clearly Westernized, but importantly not wholly EU-ized, initiative.²⁴ Maintaining this broad consensus among the fifty-five participating States, and thereby marginalizing and rendering ineffective the Russian narrative of biased pro-Western OSCE engagement in Ukraine, will require preventing the SPU from becoming an “executive branch” of the EU—in terms of either funding or the nature of the projects being implemented.²⁵ Especially from a funding perspective, this is a significant challenge given that many participating States have traditionally not contributed to the extrabudgetary financing of OSCE projects, not least because of the political sensitivities associated with it.²⁶ It is against this broader background of OSCE engagement in Ukraine that we will now offer more specific reflections on the role the Organization could potentially play within the fields of societal reintegration and EU accession.

Reintegration

Reintegration has been an ongoing task for Ukraine since the Russian defeat around Kyiv in the first few months of the war and even more so since the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the autumn of 2022. The recovery

needs in liberated areas are significant. Among those most frequently mentioned by OSCE and Vienna-based interlocutors were demining and environmental rehabilitation, social-psychological support for trauma-affected population groups, refugee and IDP return and reintegra-

tion, combating human trafficking (including the abduction of children to Russia), and accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.²⁷ These needs are reflected in the ten projects that are currently run by the SPU (see table 1).

Project	Funding	Start date	End date
Enhancing Ukraine’s Chemical Emergency Response Capacity	€1,268,182	November 1, 2022	May 31, 2025
Strengthening Ukraine’s Financial Monitoring System Preparedness to Fight Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Threats	€458,751	November 1, 2022	May 31, 2025
Support to Environmental Rehabilitation with Focus on Building National Humanitarian Mine Action Capacities of Ukraine	€2,129,768	February 1, 2023	May 31, 2025
Support to National Stakeholders in Enhancing Accessibility of Constitutional Justice	€1,070,000	November 1, 2022	July 31, 2025
Promoting Human Rights–Based Approaches in Higher, Legal and School Education	€382,944	November 1, 2022	May 31, 2025
Safeguarding Human Rights through Courts, Phase Two	€1,980,058	November 1, 2022	July 31, 2025
Strengthening Ability of Media Stakeholders to Apply Media Standards and Promote Media Literacy	€782,887	November 1, 2022	May 31, 2025
Environmental Monitoring of the War Against Ukraine and Recovery Strategy	€821,694	November 1, 2022	May 30, 2025
Strengthening Capacity of the National Police of Ukraine to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, including Cyber-Enabled Crime	€1,454,741	November 1, 2022	May 31, 2025
Building the Capacity of National Stakeholders to Provide Social and Psychological Support to People in Time of War and During Post-Conflict Recovery	€1,400,283	November 1, 2022	May 31, 2025

Table 1. Projects being implemented by the Support Programme for Ukraine as on August 31, 2023 (source: authors’ compilation based on OSCE data).

The ten projects currently being implemented have all been carried over from the PCU, demonstrating its logistical and conceptual legacy. This has enabled the continuation of important projects dealing with reintegration and other challenges, including from before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Uk-

raine. It has also made it possible to retain relevant personnel and thus to preserve local and institutional expertise.²⁸ In a broader sense, this has prevented the disruption of the three-decades-long presence of the OSCE in Ukraine and has maintained both connections and

goodwill in parts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some line ministries.²⁹

However, the environment in which SPU projects are being implemented is very different from that in which the PCU operated after 2014, let alone at the time of its inception in 1999.³⁰ In addition, the OSCE's credibility, especially in the eyes of many Ukrainians, has diminished because it is seen as having failed to prevent the February 2022 invasion, is associated with the ill-fated Minsk accords, and is still considered a tool for Russian influence.³¹ This also limits what the OSCE will be able to contribute in the future, with interlocutors remaining sharply divided between those who categorically rule out the possibility of another ceasefire monitoring mission³² and those who foresee a future role for the OSCE in this regard.³³

Complementing some of the ongoing SPU projects in the legal sphere, the OSCE, through its Moscow Mechanism, has also made important contributions to documenting violations of international humanitarian and human rights law during the Russian war of aggression. These include a number of interim reports by experts appointed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).³⁴ This supports other efforts to build capacity in this area which can subsequently be drawn upon in investigating, documenting, and potentially prosecuting relevant crimes,³⁵ for example the destruction of the Kakhovka dam and hydroelectric power station.³⁶

Another key issue for reintegration, and one that is closely linked to the EU

accession process, is “the reform of the legal framework for national minorities” recommended by the European Commission in its opinion on Ukraine’s membership application in June 2022 and reiterated in its 2023 country report.³⁷ This is an area in which the OSCE has considerable and ongoing experience thanks to its activities in the Balkans³⁸ and the Baltics.³⁹ While some OSCE and Vienna-based interlocutors considered this a logical entry point for clearly relevant and long-established OSCE expertise in the form of the High Commissioner on National Minorities,⁴⁰ their Ukrainian counterparts were much more skeptical in this regard. In particular, they noted that any apparent encroachment on the legal status of the Ukrainian language would threaten the country’s national security⁴¹ and that granting broad minority language rights not only to Russian speakers but also to members of Ukraine’s Hungarian and Romanian national minorities would trigger resistance from Ukrainian elites and civil society alike.⁴² The Law on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine” on Certain Issues of Exercising the Rights and Freedoms of Persons Belonging to National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in September 2023. It made further progress towards aligning Ukraine with relevant EU legislation on national minorities. Among other things, the law guarantees the right to education in national minority languages but does not include the Russian language in these provisions. These views are also borne out in recent

public opinion polls, according to which 52 percent of respondents believe that the Russian language should not be taught at all in schools, compared to the 33 percent who believe that it should be taught along with other foreign languages, with only 6 percent believing that it should be taught at the same level as the Ukrainian language.⁴³

A further example of transferable experience from the Balkans is the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). Established in the 1990s, SECI is not very widely known, even within the OSCE.⁴⁴ Its unique contribution has been to facilitate implementable recovery projects by co-ordinating across the public and the private sectors.⁴⁵ For several years, this experience has been transferred to Ukraine and has included a number of projects, including on the digital standardization of good municipal governance services in east Ukraine, the inclusion and economic empowerment of Ukrainian refugees and IDPs, and a number of humanitarian aid projects financed by private sector donors.⁴⁶ Other SECI projects, such as the establishment of SECI Business Advisory Council Missions in Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv, also dovetail with Ukraine's broader (EU) reform agenda.⁴⁷ If properly scaled up, SECI's experience could facilitate the better leveraging of private sector involvement, especially when it comes to the economic reintegration of refugees, IDPs, and veterans. However, facilitating more private sector engagement in its contribution to the Ukrainian recovery effort "would require a significant policy shift" for the OSCE.⁴⁸

Societal reintegration will, to a significant extent, need to be achieved at the local level. It is also a critical factor in the EU accession process, as decentralization is key to resilient democratic institutions. This is a central concern for Ukrainian interlocutors, but one that is not widely shared by OSCE and Vienna-based interlocutors. From the point of view of Ukrainian interlocutors representing local self-government, the OSCE should be involved in the continuation of decentralization reform—one of the most successful reforms in Ukraine over the past decade.⁴⁹ According to local-level interlocutors in Ukraine, the current centralization of power, including through the suspension of decentralization reform, is "a path from democracy to Russian-style autocracy,"⁵⁰ and "the EU must use all its influence to preserve the achievements of the decentralization reform."⁵¹

Accession

The example of decentralization is indicative of the close connection between the reintegration and the accession agendas. Ukraine's reintegration objectives are embedded in, and their success will depend on, longer-term reform efforts to restore and strengthen the country's resilience, including comprehensive institutional and legal reforms and economic recovery, all of which are "closely aligned with the EU accession agenda."⁵² Here again, OSCE and Vienna-based interlocutors stressed the relevance of the OSCE's experience in the Western Balkans but also noted other examples of the

Organization working with the EU on pre-accession conditionality issues, such as in the Baltic states and the 2004 and 2007 accession countries across Central and Eastern and Southeastern Europe.⁵³ There was also an awareness, however, that the OSCE, in contrast to these earlier experiences and ongoing projects in the Western Balkans, is unlikely to be as engaged and effective regarding Ukraine's accession,⁵⁴ partly because Ukraine itself was seen as "unlikely to want the OSCE to contribute" to its accession preparations.⁵⁵

There was less skepticism among Ukrainian interlocutors about how welcome an OSCE contribution to pre-accession reforms would be. For example, Ukrainian interlocutors noted that the OSCE could provide significant support to the Ukrainian government in the implementation of the Commission's recommendations on freedom of the media.⁵⁶ However, they also recognized that the OSCE's potential support of relevant legal reforms will only have maximum impact in the longer term and once martial law has been lifted.⁵⁷ In this context, it is also important to consider the results of a recent opinion poll carried out by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.⁵⁸ While there is overwhelming public support for EU accession (77%), only just over a quarter of respondents (27%) considered it necessary to prioritize reforms in order to fulfil the accession criteria as soon as possible. More than two-thirds of the respondents also thought that further reforms were needed before accession (43%) or that Ukraine was nowhere near ready for accession (25%),

confirming skepticism among our Ukrainian and international interlocutors concerning the likely speed of the accession process and the likelihood of a broader OSCE role within it in the immediate future. At the same time, some of the priorities identified by respondents, such as the fight against corruption (38%), prosecuting international crimes (33%), and aiding liberated territories (31%), clearly speak to existing OSCE expertise and could provide opportunities for the OSCE and the EU to co-operate on these issues.

However, the European integration of Ukraine itself faces several serious obstacles. The first is state weakness and the resistance of the Ukrainian elites to democratic reforms, combined with deep-seated corruption and economic degradation (which began before the open Russian invasion), which is partially offset by the activity of Ukrainian civil society. With the start of a full-scale Russian invasion, these existing problems have been exacerbated,⁵⁹ and the country is now further from joining the European Union than it was before the start of the conflict.⁶⁰

The second obstacle is that there is an increasingly contentious debate over the nature of Ukraine's accession process. Irrespective of their own country's membership, there was broad support among OSCE and Vienna-based interlocutors for Ukraine's accession to the EU.⁶¹ However, there was also an insistence that there cannot be any shortcuts in the accession process and that Ukraine must fulfil all of the Copenhagen criteria before acceding.⁶² Ukrainian interlocutors, by contrast, emphasized that the decision

on Ukrainian membership should first and foremost be a political one that takes into account the specific circumstances of the war, allowing the country to join on the understanding that the Copenhagen criteria will only be fully met at some point after accession.⁶³

The problem that arises for the OSCE is that, given the current set-up of its support for Ukraine, it has neither the capacity nor, more importantly, the mandate to directly contribute to the reforms required under the EU accession process. The OSCE is not an instrument of EU policy. Under the Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and the OSCE on the functioning of the PCU,⁶⁴ projects are initially proposed by Ukrainian line ministries, which then negotiate details with the SPU prior to sign-off by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁵ This long and bureaucratic process and the ongoing war further reduces the government's capacity to deal with it.⁶⁶ This can be a frustrating experience for all stakeholders: as one interlocutor noted, "even an EU-funded demining project, which all sides agreed was a key priority, took more than four months to be approved."⁶⁷ As line ministries are effectively driving all project initiation, their priorities, including domestic political priorities, determine which projects the OSCE will be asked to implement. Thus, "the OSCE did not, and will not, develop its own programs for reforming Ukrainian institutions"⁶⁸ and instead "relies on the EU and the Ukrainian government, which together should reach an agreement on the nature and scope of the reforms."⁶⁹ This notwithstanding,

donor co-ordination, including between the EU and the OSCE, works well,⁷⁰ and the broader recovery agenda has created ample opportunities for the OSCE to support aspects of the EU accession process, especially in relation to legal and institutional reforms.⁷¹

Recommendations

Ukraine's recovery will be a resource-intensive process requiring concerted international support and close co-ordination between the Ukrainian government and bilateral and multilateral donors. It poses challenges that derive from the complex nature of the conflict. What also makes Ukraine's recovery particular is that it is closely tied to the country's EU accession agenda.

Within the parameters and limitations discussed above, the OSCE can still contribute to Ukraine's recovery. Based on the foregoing analysis and the input received from OSCE and Vienna-based interlocutors and contacts in Ukraine, we offer the following recommendations.

Retain, expand, and further invest in analysis, monitoring, and evaluation capacity to proactively drive future programming in consultation with key stakeholders. Given the limited capacity of the Ukrainian government, the need to avoid duplicating donor efforts, and the importance of deconflicting projects on the ground, the OSCE's unique institutional knowledge and networks across Ukraine and in governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations would be a useful, and arguably unrivalled, asset in

this regard. Participating States, especially those that are also members of other regional and international organizations and multilateral donor frameworks, need to take a leading role in this regard. This could take the form of a Group of Friends or a special representative or personal envoy appointed by the Chairperson-in-Office or the Secretary General of the OSCE.

Work more closely with other international organizations on future programming for Ukraine recovery efforts. Building on the OSCE's experience in the Western Balkans, multilateral donor co-ordination and co-operation should be improved with a view to Ukraine's long-term recovery needs. This should extend beyond the EU and include the UN and its specialized agencies, as well as international financial institutions. Consultations should also give due consideration to the future institutional framework of multilateral donor engagement with Ukraine.

Explore expanding existing funding beyond predominantly Western donors. Participating States should involve the SPU more closely in existing international recovery efforts, including the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine and the Ukraine Recovery Conference. Existing OSCE Partners for Co-operation could also be approached.

Facilitate entry points for the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and ODIHR. As long as the OSCE as a whole cannot provide a mandate for the Organization's support of the recovery effort in Ukraine, the SPU, as it is attached to the Secretariat, should closely co-ordi-

nate with these institutions, which can act more independently and could add valuable critical expertise to both societal reintegration and EU accession efforts.

Maximize existing niche expertise and experience in the economic and environmental security dimension. The OSCE has well-established expertise in facilitating projects anchored in (but extending beyond) its second dimension that are relevant to Ukraine, including mitigating the environmental consequences of war (including in the context of demining) and facilitating connectivity (including customs and integrated border management).

Engage more directly with Ukrainian institutions at the regional and the local level. The overall success of Ukraine's recovery will also depend on strengthening local resilience, and here the OSCE can, through existing initiatives such as SECI, facilitate the involvement of the private sector, thereby meaningfully contributing to projects that aid inclusive economic recovery through job creation.

Manage expectations and rebuild trust. At present, the OSCE has a limited (and indeed a diminishing) capacity to deliver on its core mandate and, especially within Ukraine, suffers from a trust deficit. The Organization, key participating States, and donors such as the EU must therefore be careful to manage expectations about what the OSCE can contribute to the recovery effort within the currently existing constraints, using carefully selected and judiciously designed projects to rebuild trust in the Organization as a dependable partner for both Ukraine's security and the security of the wider Euro-Asian and Euro-Atlantic area. Rebuilt

trust can then serve as a foundation for a more ambitious OSCE agenda for contributing to Ukraine's recovery in the longer term.

Notes

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- 15 E.g., Interviews 2 and 3, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, OSCE Official, Vienna, March 31, 2023; Interviews 7 and 8, cited above (Note 4); Interview 12, OSCE Official, Vienna, May 3, 2023.
- 16 Interviews 2 and 3, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interviews 7 and 8, cited above (Note 4); Interview 12, cited above (Note 15).
- 17 Interview 17, Ukrainian Local Government Officials (Odesa district), Odesa, June 9, 2023; Interview 18, Ukrainian Local Government Officials (Odesa oblast), Odesa, June 9, 2023; Interview 28, Ukrainian Academic (Kharkiv), online, November 2, 2022.
- 18 Interview 1, OSCE Official, Vienna, March 30, 2023; Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 7, cited above (Note 4).
- 19 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 7, cited above (Note 4); Interview 10, OSCE Official, online, April 13, 2023.
- 20 Interviews 2–4 and 7, cited above (Note 4); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 21 Interview 3, cited above (Note 4).
- 22 Interview 2, cited above (Note 4).
- 23 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interviews 3 and 4, cited above (Note 4); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 24 Interview 2, cited above (Note 4).
- 25 Interviews 2, 7 and 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 26 Interview 10, cited above (Note 19).
- 27 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interview 3, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 7, cited above (Note 4); Interview 9, Former OSCE Official, Vienna, March 31, 2023; Interview 10, cited above (Note 19); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 28 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 29 Interviews 2 and 3, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 7, cited above (Note 4); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19).
- 30 Interview 7, cited above (Note 4); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19).
- 31 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interviews 2, 4, and 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 32 E.g., Interviews 3 and 7, cited above (Note 4).
- 33 E.g., Interview 2, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14);

- Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19).
- 34 These interim reports can be accessed at: OSCE, “Interim Reports on Reported Violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Ukraine,” <https://www.osce.org/odihr/537287>
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- 36 David Hastings Dunn and Stefan Wolff, “Ukraine War: What We Know about the Nova Kakhovka Dam and Who Gains from its Destruction,” *The Conversation*, June 6, 2023, <https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-what-we-know-about-the-nova-kakhovka-dam-and-who-gains-from-its-destruction-207130>
- 37 European Commission, cited above (Note 7), 21; European Commission, Ukraine 2023 Report, SWD(2023) 699 (Brussels: November 8, 2023), https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_699%20Ukraine%20report.pdf
- 38 Reffaele Mastrorocco, “OSCE and Civil Society in the Western Balkans: The Road to Reconciliation,” in *Transformation and Development*, ed. Anja Mihr (Cham: Springer Nature, 2020), 83–100.
- 39 Rob Zaagman, *Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania* (Flensburg: European Centre for Minority Issues, 1999).
- 40 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 7, cited above (Note 4).
- 41 Interview 19, Ukrainian Prosecutor (Odesa), Odesa, June 9, 2023; Interview 23, Ukrainian Local Government Official (Donetsk oblast), online, June 12, 2023; Interview 29, Ukrainian Academic (Kyiv), Malta, May 13, 2023.
- 42 Interview 24, Ukrainian Media Professional (Kramatorsk), online, June 12, 2023; Interview 27, Ukrainian Academic (Kharkiv, displaced to Finland), online, May 13, 2023; Interview 28, cited above (Note 17).
- 43 Anton Hrushetskyi, “Attitude towards the Teaching of the Russian Language in Ukrainian-Language Schools: The Results of a Telephone Survey Conducted on February 14–22, 2023,” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, March 9, 2023, <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1202&page=1>
- 44 Interviews 3 and 4, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 8, cited above (Note 4); Interview 12, cited above (Note 15).
- 45 Interview 8, cited above (Note 4); Interview 12, cited above (Note 15); Interview 13, Former OSCE Official, Vienna, May 3, 2023.
- 46 Interview 12, cited above (Note 15).
- 47 Interview 12, cited above (Note 15); Interview 13, cited above (Note 45).
- 48 Interview 5, cited above (Note 14).
- 49 Interviews 17 and 18, cited above (Note 17); Interview 25, Ukrainian Local Government Official (Mariupol district, displaced to the UK), online, June 18, 2023; roundtable discussion with fifty-eight public servants from local government structures across Ukraine in Odesa, June 8–9, 2023, part of the Jean Monnet module “The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security: Tackling Evolving Threats, Building a Strong Security Ecosystem” (the in-person component took place at the National University Odesa Law Academy).
- 50 Interview 28, cited above (Note 17); roundtable discussion, cited above (Note 49).
- 51 Interview 23, cited above (Note 41); Interview 28, cited above (Note 17).
- 52 Interview 3, cited above (Note 4); also Interview 1, cited above (Note 18);

- Interview 2, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interviews 7 and 8, cited above (Note 4); Interview 9, cited above (Note 27); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4); Interview 20, Ukrainian Media Professional (Odesa), online, June 10, 2023; Interview 21, Ukrainian Media Professional (Odesa), online, June 10, 2023; Interview 22, Ukrainian NGO Representative, online, June 18, 2023.
- 53 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interview 4, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 8, cited above (Note 4); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4); Interview 12, cited above (Note 15); Interview 13, cited above (Note 45).
- 54 Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19).
- 55 Interview 11, cited above (Note 4); also Interview 7, cited above (Note 4); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19).
- 56 Interview 19, cited above (Note 41); Interview 25, cited above (Note 49); Interview 26, Ukrainian Academic (Mariupol, displaced to Germany), online, June 18, 2023.
- 57 Interviews 19 and 23, cited above (Note 41); Interview 25, cited above (Note 49); Interview 28, cited above (Note 17).
- 58 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Public Opinion Survey for the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine (Kyiv: KIIS, 2023), https://kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20231026_r/AReport_PublicSurvey_EUAM_sept2023_eng_public.pdf
- 59 Interview 27, cited above (Note 42); Interview 29, cited above (Note 41).
- 60 Interview 25, cited above (Note 49); Interview 26, cited above (Note 56); Interview 28, cited above (Note 17).
- 61 Interviews 2–4, cited above (Note 4); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interviews 7 and 8, cited above (Note 4); Interview 9, cited above (Note 27); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 62 Interviews 3 and 4, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 63 Interview 27, cited above (Note 42); Interview 28, cited above (Note 17); Interview 29, cited above (Note 41).
- 64 As of October 2023, the SPU has still not been formally accredited in Ukraine, and the sole basis for its operation remains the Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and the OSCE on the PCU, which remains in effect (Interview 14, OSCE Official, Vienna, October 10, 2023; Interview 15, OSCE Official, Vienna, October 10, 2023; Interview 16, OSCE Official, Vienna, October 10, 2023).
- 65 Interview 10, cited above (Note 19).
- 66 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19).
- 67 Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 68 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18).
- 69 Interview 5, cited above (Note 14).
- 70 Interview 1, cited above (Note 18); Interview 3, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 6, cited above (Note 15); Interview 7, cited above (Note 4); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).
- 71 Interviews 3 and 4, cited above (Note 4); Interview 5, cited above (Note 14); Interview 10, cited above (Note 19); Interview 11, cited above (Note 4).

