

## 4. Chapter: Theories and Models

### 4.1. Introduction

This chapter identifies and carefully examines the relevant existing scientific theories and models that may underpin and substantiate the *Strategic Resilience* concept, by explaining how terrorism and its accompanying violence and threat scenarios affect the resilience of populations and individuals and their coping strategies in direct and indirect ways. Each identified model is analysed in depth, to dissect its critical elements that can contribute to *Strategic Resilience* and may be converted into concrete proposed policy measures.

### 4.2. Identification and Selection

The fundamental idea of *Strategic Resilience* is making sure that the intimidating and coercive negative effects of terror attacks potentially developing in an open society, are suppressed or unable to materialise. The research frequently describes these primary effects as fear, anxiety, stress and trauma, based on feelings of uncertainty, vulnerability, helplessness and senselessness.<sup>227</sup>

Understanding these potential effects of terrorism on open societies then allows deducing the fields of study relevant and of interest for the research on these issues and which then may point to potential coping mechanisms. These subjects may include inter alia, terrorism studies, fear and trauma management, clinical psychology, mass psychology, communication theory as well as risk and crisis management.

A search for relevant academic literature with a reference to resilience and *social or societal resilience* in the face of disaster or terrorism was then conducted. In the assessment of the results, it became clear that the terrorism threat does share similarities with the threats of other life risks (e.g. natural disasters, industrial accidents, train crashes, pandemics) – all of which authorities try to build technical and social resilience against. But

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227 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22 ; Wilkinson 1986, 3.

the threat of terrorism can also be uniquely distinct from other life risks as it is able to evoke stronger negative emotions in the open society, totally unrelated to the statistical risk. Trauma following other (non-terrorist) disasters is usually limited to those directly affected. Therefore, research looking at building resilience in these areas, is mostly focused on functional preparedness of those directly affected or most probably at risk. When researching resilience against terrorism, the focus needs to be wider as already the simple menace of terrorism can have serious impact on individuals even if they are only indirectly exposed, and its effect often includes death salience.<sup>228</sup> Accordingly, the selection criteria for relevant research were adjusted to include this distinctiveness of the terrorism threat, to assure the research has a practical application.

As a result of the process, twelve theories and models were identified that are critical to understand and substantiate the requirements the *Strategic Resilience* concept places on open societies and their governments who aspire to heroic composure and acceptance of uncertainty in the face of adversity:

- Model of Global and Situational Meaning
- Just-World-Beliefs Theory
- Logo Theory [Existential Analytic Theory of Meaning]
- Terror Management Theory
- Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception
- Appraisal Tendency Theory
- Mass-Mediated-Terrorism Concept
- The Robespierre Affect
- Emotional Contagion / Social Influence Theory
- Affiliation Theory
- Conservation of Resources Model
- Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model

They are each described and analysed on the following pages.

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228 See Schaurer and Ruff-Stahl 2016 ; Maguen *et al.* 2008, 16.

### 4.3. Analysis

#### 4.3.1. Model of Global and Situational Meaning

*Global Meaning* may be described as an individual's personal answer sheet to the question "WHY" specific positive or negative events happen in the world, to make life appear more predictable, understandable and thereby controllable for the individual.<sup>229</sup>

Maguen et al. explain that "*humans strive to maintain worldviews that provide a sense of security and meaning to buffer against feelings of anxiety related to reminders of mortality and the limits of control over fate and environment.*"<sup>230</sup> *Global Meaning* consequently encompasses a multitude of beliefs: an individual's perception of the existing order in the world, beliefs about the self-worth, beliefs about the self in relationship to the world and others within it and the control over it, life goals and beliefs about what is right and wrong and what are justice and fairness.<sup>231</sup>

These beliefs held are also constitutional for the personal meaning, constructed by an individual in view of the vague, ambiguous threat of future terrorist attacks, and thereby determine his way and level of coping.<sup>232</sup> The decisive factor is what kind of meaning the individual prescribes to an event.<sup>233</sup> If the individual, based on his held beliefs can positively answer the "WHY" question to himself, he is said to be able to withstand almost any "HOW".<sup>234</sup>

Since the *Global Meaning* is built over time on life experience, it can also alter over time.<sup>235</sup> But apart from gradual shifts over time, research has shown that individuals in general cling to their held beliefs, showing a strong bias to interpret an external stimulus in a way that will allow them to maintain their previous view of the world (their *Global Meaning*), they do this instead of choosing an interpretation that would require them to alter or adjust their beliefs.<sup>236</sup> The same bias makes individuals "*tend to seek out*

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229 See Park and Folkman 1997, 118-119 ; Smith 2017, 225.

230 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21 ; Arndt *et al.* 2002.

231 See Park and Folkman 1997, 118-119.

232 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 23.

233 See Frankl 2006, 47.

234 See *ibid.*, 47.


235 See Park and Folkman 1997, 118-119.

236 See *ibid.*, 120.

experiences that confirm their global beliefs, even if these experiences confirm beliefs that are negative”<sup>237</sup>

Fear and anxiety are the natural reactions to the inability to recognize an ordering structure which provides clarity and orientation.<sup>238</sup> Traumatic events, like terrorist attacks, can impact the existing structure based on held beliefs. In these cases, especially individuals with previous mental health difficulties are most likely to have difficulties coping with the stressors related to the threat of terrorism or actual attacks.<sup>239</sup> Also in general, “individuals with a previous trauma history tend to be more likely to be functionally impaired from exposure to subsequent traumas.”<sup>240</sup>

Figure 7: Park & Folkman’s Model of Global and Situational Meaning.<sup>241</sup>



237 *ibid.*

238 Klein 1987, 53.

239 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 24.

240 *ibid.*

241 Park and Folkman 1997., 117.

Park & Folkman explain the psychological process of the individual to find congruence between his previous beliefs concerning the world (including regarding himself, his goals, his relationship to others and justice), the so-called *Global Meaning*, and the *Situational Meaning* of a new event.<sup>242</sup>

Park & Folkman's "*Model of Global- and Situational Meaning*" as shown above, portrays the different individuals' steps in the process of how an individual tries to make sense of an event which may very well have been a jihadi terrorist attack or the perceived credible threat of it.

### Relevance

When considering the threat from terrorism, applying this model to a given situation allows deducing from it different opportunities for intervention as to reduce or eliminate cognitive dissonance and rumination, and instead to support coping to avoid "*spikes in anxiety and depression as well as symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)*" in the individuals.<sup>243</sup>


The opportunities for intervention exist during the *Initial Appraisal process* stage (A+B) as well as in the *In the Mean-Making Coping* stage (C+D).

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242 See Park and Folkman 1997.

243 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 15 ; See also Galea *et al.* 2002.

Figure 8: Amended Park & Folkman's Model of Global and Situational Meaning.<sup>244</sup>



Appraisal process stage

- A) During the *Primary Appraisal*, the individual is assessing whether the new event or situation is posing a threat to him to which he would respond with a fight or a flight reaction.

The assessment is affected by different factors:<sup>245</sup>

- The scale of an event
- Threat to resources
- Tone and type of information about the event available through government or media (are fear-based reminders used?)
- The Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* (How safe does the individual feel? Is the new event a threat to previously held beliefs about his safety?)

244 Adopted from Park and Folkman 1997, 117.

245 See *ibid.*

- e. Existing memory of previous similar events
- f. Previous exposure to trauma
- g. Demographic factors
- h. Mental health conditions

B) During the *Secondary Appraisal*, the individual assesses which resources he can avail himself of to respond to the assessed potential threats.<sup>246</sup>

The following measures should be considered by the authorities to positively affect the *Primary Appraisal*:

- *The scale of an event*: The perceived level of threat emanating from an event is not solely based on the possible or expected number of casualties. The scale of an event, its potential number of casualties, the amount of destruction and longer-term impact does play a role though, in its assessment and its ability to produce fear and anxiety. Authorities should therefore put a focus on the prevention of large-scale attacks, especially Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. They should also communicate their efforts and achievements and put the probability of such attacks being successfully conducted, into perspective. Authorities must also communicate their ability to cope with the effects of such attacks through large-scale exercises, involving police and emergency services and first responders.
- *Threat to resources*: The ability of an individual to cope with an attack and continue his life just like he did before the attack, does strongly depend on whether his social, psychological and material resources have remained intact.<sup>247</sup> Authorities can reduce the perceived threat to personal resources through an attack, by promising in advance generous compensation packages for material losses, suffered in or as a consequence of an attack. This must include personal and business losses (considering a large prevalence of small and medium enterprises (SME) in Germany), for example because of destroyed or cordoned off premises. Concerning the loss of social resources, as a preventive measure, authorities can encourage development of such social resources, through supporting and enabling the creation and strengthening

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<sup>246</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>247</sup> For more on *Conservation of Resources Theory* refer to chapter 4.3.11 or to Hobfoll *et al.* 2006, 215.

of social bonds in sports and social clubs, societies, inter- and trans-generational projects, neighbourhood groups, volunteer opportunities and neighbourhood management. As a responsive measure, authorities should provide opportunities (and go public on it) for personal affiliation which is a natural reaction after the loss of social resources.<sup>248</sup> The perceived threat to psychological resources may be reduced by authorities through establishing a compelling narrative that provides meaning and purpose which allows the individual to make sense of the potential threat and expect better personal coping even with any direct suffering.<sup>249</sup>

- *The Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* where the beliefs held by an individual about his own safety and security, are shattered by an attack which breaches the existing imagined security barrier, underlines the importance of *Strategic Resilience* and preparedness. This requires the deliberate consideration of risks and vulnerabilities as a pre-requisite.<sup>250</sup> The strategically resilient response to the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*, therefore, lies in heroic calmness as a conscious paradox: It is important to generate *Strategic Resilience* not through the manufacture of added protection, but through the acceptance of (certain levels of) risk and uncertainty.<sup>251</sup> For the authorities, this means not only fulfilling the society's request for more security, but also communicating the counter-concept of the acceptance of uncertainty, far and wide for the greatest impact.<sup>252</sup>
- *Fear-based reminders from authorities or media*: By conducting "successful" attacks and threatening with more, terrorist convey the frightening message to the citizens of the impotence and weakness of the authorities.<sup>253</sup> When addressing the terrorism threat, authorities therefore must stay away from fear-based messaging that would only play further into the hands of the terrorists. Instead, they have to make use of their authority to sort out attacks in order to provide meaning and to encourage resolve, unity and defiance to the public.<sup>254</sup> This is possible as government authorities and their officials are (with few exceptions) the natural

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248 See Dechesne 2012, 85–86; Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 221.

249 See Frankl 2006, 51.

250 See Diederichs 2017, 51.

251 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

252 See Gearson 2012, 191 ; Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

253 See Nacos 2007, 202–203.

254 See Bangstad 2017, 37-41 ; Nacos 2007, 194-195.



authority in a disaster situation for the media, since the “*follow-the-leader-syndrome*” gives them “*influence [...] on the language used and the depth of the media’s reporting.*”<sup>255</sup> A study has shown that despite a lower volume of messages, the messages by the authorities have proven to have a greater impact on public opinion than competing ones.<sup>256</sup>

- *Existing memory of previous similar events*: Individuals are likely to have increased easy mental access to prior emotionally evocative events like terrorist acts in their memory. Thereby the often-attached emotions like fear, anxiety, anger or disgust, are stronger in their memory than ordinary non-salient events.<sup>257</sup> This latent accessibility of those memories may let the individual “*overestimate statistically small, but affectively potent risks*”<sup>258</sup>, like the “*dread risk*”<sup>259</sup> of becoming a victim of a terror attack and respond to it accordingly.

In the knowledge of this, authorities should communicate about risk and reassure the public through “*adequate disaster planning and emergency response systems.*”<sup>260</sup> When deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), it should be considered that beyond necessary and actionable information about the situation on how the authorities are responding and what the citizens themselves can do, further continuous reminders about terrorist threats is likely to increase the recipients’ level of anxiety. Studies also found that memories, which shape reality, can be influenced even at a later point in time.<sup>261</sup> By selecting and weaving different memories into a meaningful narrative that lets people make sense of previous, even traumatic events in their lives and in their connection to others, history – or the memory of it – can be re-written.<sup>262</sup> This allows individuals as well as the society to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and personal growth.<sup>263</sup> One of many examples for this can be

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255 *ibid.*, 106–107.

256 See Nacos *et al.* 2011b, 194.

257 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 19–20.

258 *ibid.*, 19–20.

259 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

260 Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 30.

261 See Vedantam 2017 ; Park and Folkman 1997, 120.

262 See Frankl 2006, 51 ; Vedantam 2017.

263 See Frankl 2006, 51.

seen in the “*Boston Strong*” movement, following the terror attacks on the Boston Marathon in 2013.<sup>264</sup>

- *Previous exposure to trauma*: According to multiple studies, people who have had previous exposure to and experience with a disaster situation, are expected to be better equipped to handle another new crisis situation, IF they had found a way to come to terms with the previous situation.<sup>265</sup> However, if individuals did not “properly” overcome a previous trauma, they “*tend to be more likely to be functionally impaired from exposure to subsequent traumas.*”<sup>266</sup>

To avoid compounding trauma and functional impairment, authorities need to establish and monitor procedures for trauma intervention/therapy after exposure to an attack. This is especially important for front line staff, but equally for those indirectly exposed.

- *Demographic factors*: The perceived threat experienced by an individual from an event and his perceived competence to adequately deal with a situation, are strong determinants of his response.<sup>267</sup> The individual threat perception about terrorism has shown to be influenced by demographic factors like gender, age, education and ethnicity.<sup>268</sup>

Authorities must consider this when trying to carry the population to a resilient response. They must ideally identify typical behavioural patterns (and preferences) during disasters and address the different groups accordingly.<sup>269</sup> Research in disaster response in Germany for example, found that older people prefer more information than younger people. And they both prefer different channels to get that information.<sup>270</sup>

The following measures should be considered by the authorities to positively affect the *Secondary Appraisals*:

- *Training*: An individual’s perception of the terrorist threat is strongly determined by his own perceived ability to adequately respond to it. Accordingly, the mastery of basic knowledge of emergency procedures and basic first aid and rescue skills can reduce the personal threat perception and reduce the anxiety level. It also increases the probability that the

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264 See Sherman 2015.

265 See Diederichs 2017, 17.

266 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 24.

267 See Diederichs 2017, 29–30 ; Furedi 2007, 19.

268 See Nacos 2007, 182–184.

269 See Diederichs 2017, 41.

270 See *ibid.*, 33.

individual may also step in as an ad-hoc volunteer when needed. Courses offered in the UK to employees and research conducted in Berlin on course offers, showed a demand by the citizens for such offers.<sup>271</sup> Authorities need to consider how to meet the demand and develop creative solutions with partners from the emergency services or disaster response forces, law enforcement and academia on how to increase the reach and effectiveness, for example through:

- The delivery of online-based learning could be incorporated into the online training and coaching programs, already in place in large enterprises.
- The hours for the compulsory first aid course required to receive a driving licence in Germany, have recently been reduced. Maybe it would be wise to increase the qualification hours again or require drivers to come back into training and prove their abilities in first aid and rescue skills on a regular (bi-annual?) basis. Considering the logistical effort, one may also consider providing incentives for untrained citizens to undergo these courses and pick up the skills. Tax incentives or reduced fees for the driving test may be other incentives for people to brush up their skills.
- Also on the community level, the community could offer advantages to citizens who can show the right qualification (like certified first aid skills), by offering free access to community infrastructure like swimming pools or sports facilities or preferred access to public housing or university accommodation.<sup>272</sup>
- The offer of new formats like “First-Responder Parties” like “Tupperware Parties” where the basic training or refreshers are held at home among friends.
- Public Days, like First-Responder Days could be rolled out much more prominently, also as a sign of high esteem.
- “Fire Station Experience”: Set up more infotainment-based facilities where families, groups and school classes can train and learn about the risks and then practice the response in a playful manner. As a

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<sup>271</sup> See *ibid.*, 222.

<sup>272</sup> Since 2008 communities in England and Wales are able to use so-called *Time Credits* to reward their citizens for the time they contribute by volunteering. For an academic introduction into the concept of *time banking* and *time credits* and the application in Cambridge see Markkanen and Burgess 2015 ; See also Cambridge City Council 2014.

side effect this may also be beneficial for recruitment. [The measure should be connected to activities at different touchpoints, e.g. school for maximised effectiveness]<sup>273</sup>

- Consider scripting scenarios and adaptation of scenario-plays which can be shown in shows in amusement parks. As a side effect this may also be beneficial for recruitment. [The measure should be connected to activities at different touchpoints, e.g. school for maximised effectiveness]

#### Meaning-Making Coping stage

C) In the *Problem-Focused Coping*, the individual takes action in response to the event in order to change the situation. By education, training and providing necessary support, authorities can equip the individual to be able to better cope. Among others, these could include

- First aid skills
- Basic rescue and evacuation drills,
- Active shooter training
- Self-defence, or terrorism awareness/vigilance training

Which type of training, education and support is required has to be established, based on the specific circumstances of the individual and the applicable scenarios and general threat situation. They will be different for the bouncer of a night club in a crowded area in the centre of Berlin, to that of a primary school teacher in Heidelberg.

D) The *Emotion-Focused Coping* is based on the positive re-framing /re-interpretation of the originally held *Global Beliefs* or of the time before the event which will allow the individual to achieve congruence between both and maintain his/her *Just-World-Beliefs*. Authorities have an ability to influence this process through “speech acts” and indirectly, through the “*follow-the-leader-syndrome*”<sup>274</sup> of the media.<sup>275</sup> Authorities may also use the effects of *emotional contagion* and create large gatherings offline or online and instruct multipliers and influencers who offer a new and more positive interpretation to the individual.

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273 Activities like RUN HIDE TELL in the UK are an example, how even young people can be equipped with skills to be able to better respond, if a situation should arise.

274 Nacos 2007, 106–107.

275 See Lippmann 2013.

Authorities may also try to prevent and hinder gatherings which want to disseminate a different interpretation of events (“fake news”). How this can be done is shown by the prevalent organisation of counter demonstrations in situ or online “shit storms” on *Facebook / Twitter* and/or by biased reporting by the media of events which are critical of the government and their prevalent world view.<sup>276</sup>

Furthermore, by increasing the general proficiency of the population to cope with negative emotions, individuals are likely to be better equipped to deal with the strong emotions connected to experiencing a terrorist attack. While this requires to take a long-term focus on the challenge, successful programs already exist (e.g. for children the *Papilio* prevention projects, developed in Augsburg)<sup>277</sup> and may be rolled out, adapted to the target segment as part of curricula in schools, apprenticeship programs, university or driver’s licence training (to prevent road rage). The potential positive effect which these measures can have on social relationships in a society in general, will go far beyond just dealing with the negative emotions stirred up by terrorism.

#### E) *Global Meaning*

Another possibility to improve the coping of individuals with the terrorist threat is to nurture a set of beliefs which help constitute a *Global Meaning* which in turn is supportive of that coping process. Considering their limited striking capability, terrorists cannot profoundly threaten the existence of countries; accordingly, it is not on the battlefield where they need to be primarily defeated, but in the people’s psyches.<sup>278</sup>

“Nudging” the world views in a direction that will allow citizens to better cope with attacks, by attaching a coping-friendly meaning to the events, requires a whole-of-government approach and effort. This is not an ad-hoc process, as engrained beliefs are not easily changed, but require a long-term nurturing process.

In the case of terrorism, “*governments need to be able to communicate a coherent story about the enemy. [As] in any war the public needs to have some idea about who is the enemy and what they are fighting for.*”<sup>279</sup>

276 See Haller 2017 ; See Fengler 2018 ; Kölner Stadt Anzeiger 2017 ; ZEIT ONLINE 2019.

277 See Papilio gemeinnützige GmbH 2020.

278 See Rothkopf 2016, 325.

279 Furedi 2007, xxxiv.

In the conflict with terrorists, the citizens need compelling reasons and purpose why they must endure the hardship and suffering which terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities.<sup>280</sup> To be defiant as a society and united in the face of these threats and of active measures by the terrorists to break-up unity and sow distrust, the citizens need to share common meaning and purpose. While altering global beliefs is difficult in important matters like security, it is ironically traumatic events like terror attacks which can shift opinions and galvanize the cohesion of society, as Furnham explains:

*One of the most robust findings in the literature is the fact that just world beliefs help people cope with disturbing or threatening events [...] and that the shared experience of these events causes people to develop a consensual view of reality.*<sup>281</sup>

However, today's increased differentiation of news reports, makes it harder to develop a consensual view of reality.<sup>282</sup> While this may appear challenging in a complex and contested information environment, recognized authorities nevertheless have an advantage when communicating. They can make use of their authority to "frame" terrorist attacks in order to provide meaning and encourage resolve, unity and defiance in the public.<sup>283</sup>

Authorities must identify and analyse the existing view of *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) in the society and anticipate the threat and impact posed to the meaning by terrorism, and prophylactically proceed to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios. After these processes, the purpose should then be infused into the existing view of *Global Meaning*.

#### F) *Emotional Contagion*

Not all emotions are the result of a conscious thought process. An emotional arousal may be transferred between individuals without conscious thought. The likelihood of the transfer is higher if the emotions are strong and negative. The effect is described in detail in *Emotional Contagion / Social Influence Theory* in chapter 4.3.9.

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280 See *Logo Theory [Existential analytic theory of meaning]* in chapter 4.3.3.

281 Furnham 1993, 326–327.

282 See Giebel 2014, 369.

283 See Bangstad 2017, 37–41.

### 4.3.2. Just-World-Beliefs Theory

The *Just-World-Beliefs* (JWB) Theory proposes that people's self-concept is based upon the idea that the world is just and predictable, where everybody gets what he deserves, and everybody deserves what he gets.<sup>284</sup> Holding JWB has been identified as a powerful coping mechanism which helps in answering "WHY" distressing and disturbing events happen and is linked to producing lower stress levels, reduced impairment and better mental health after traumatic events.<sup>285</sup>

The individually held JWB create a safely predictable environment because "*fate is predictable and earned*", based on personal characteristics or behaviour.<sup>286</sup> The ability to see themselves as "*effective agents in the world, with the ability to control their fates*" is a powerful motivation for individuals to defend their justice-based ordering structure of fairly distributed outcomes, even despite contradicting evidence.<sup>287</sup>

In order to maintain personal JWB, research found that individuals react to perceived innocent suffering of others with an impulse to help righting the wrong, if they feel this can be achieved with reasonable effort or cost.<sup>288</sup> If they feel it may not be achieved, individuals may try to cope with the cognitive dissonance of innocent suffering versus their JWB, by directing blame and guilt at the victim.<sup>289</sup> Victims themselves, if they are holding JWB may react with blaming themselves for their behavior or situation. Both isolates and further injures the victims and their families.

Relevance:

The JWB-Theory is relevant for building and preserving *Strategic Resilience* in three ways:

- 1) While it is positive to hold JWB, terrorist may be able through heinous and callous attacks to severely impact or puncture the JWB and make

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284 See Park and Folkman 1997, 118.

285 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 23 ; Furnham 1993, 326-327.

286 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 22.

287 *ibid.*

288 See Furnham 2003, 801–802 ; Prati and Pietrantoni 2010, 903.

289 See Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 217.

the ordering structure unrecognizable, giving way to fear as the previously held clarity and orientation is destroyed.<sup>290</sup>

- Authorities need to preview possible scenarios of threats to JWB and develop satisfying answers to the “WHY” (we must endure?) question which will be raised by the people, media, political opposition as well as the terrorists’ sympathisers. Providing meaning for the struggle and the hardship it puts on individuals and the society, is an absolute essential.
  - Authorities must also be able to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the JWB – this may involve law enforcement, justice system, and health and social system.
  - When communicating with the people after an attack, the concept of justice to be dealt can be very powerful to address, if it can be followed up on.<sup>291</sup>
  - To sustain the JWB, it is also essential to provide necessary support like adequate victim compensation and public recognition of sacrifice to those carrying the burden.
- 2) The “victim blaming” component of JWB is important to address
- Authorities need to understand it and preventively sow it into their discourse to prevent isolation of victims by connecting their fate with the fate of the nation, city, town, community etc. The authorities also must not shy away from acknowledging the sacrifice made by the victims (e.g. the honouring of the murdered French police officer Arnaud Beltrame in 2018)<sup>292</sup>

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290 See Klein 1987, 53.

291 Walsh 2013 recounts such a powerful address after a terrorist attack during US President George W Bush’s visit to Ground Zero on September 14: „*The president, who had been in office less than eight months, grabbed a bullhorn and started thanking the fire fighters and other first responders at the scene, telling them that they were in the country’s prayers. Someone in the crowd shouted that he couldn’t hear the president, and Bush replied with the words that made history. “I can hear you!” he declared. “The rest of the world hears you! And the people – and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.” The crowd reacted with loud, prolonged chants of “USA! USA!” In this electric moment, Bush captured the mood of the country, delivering just what the American people wanted a combination of gratitude for the rescue workers’ bravery and diligence, defiance toward the terrorists, and resolve to bring the evil doers to justice.*“

292 An example is the case of Police Lieutenant-Colonel Arnaud Beltrame who was killed in a jihadi attack after offering himself as a hostage in exchange for the life of an innocent citizen. His ultimate sacrifice was honoured in a public state act by French President Emanuel Macron in the *Cour d’Honneur* at *Les Invalides* on live



- Victim compensation is a tangible public acknowledgment of sacrifice and innocent suffering and can prevent victim blaming. It should be treated confidentially. Any possible following discussion about the height of the compensation or its legitimacy should be expected and confronted.
  - Transgressions in the press or social media, attacking victims or their families in an inappropriate and demeaning manner by putting blame on them, should be ostracized by society and dealt with through the courts.
- 3) The authorities must consider efforts by terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the West to deliberately exploit JWB upheld in Western societies, by portraying the West as the rightful recipient of attacks to right a fundamental wrong.
- Terrorist groups are deliberately targeting JWB to justify their violence against the West while portraying the West’s action as unjust and illegitimate, trying to undermine the population’s will in the West to oppose them. The different memes and narratives (depending on the target audience) always portray the perpetrators as upholding the rights of the “real” victims:
  - Historical and perpetual injustice suffered by Muslims through the West since the crusades,
  - Alliance of the USA and the West with “the Jews” and their helpers, who are occupying the Holy Land and suppressing Palestinian people,
  - Support of “apostate regimes” in the Middle east by supplying weapons,
  - Suppression of Muslims in the West,
  - Dishonouring of Muslim women,
  - Racism.

These efforts when directed towards the outside, are not only a self-justification but a psychological weapon to create discord and division in the West and to reduce the population’s will to continue the fight against terrorism. Authorities need to recognise this as psychological warfare and carefully choose their actions and their communications strategy along their own narrative.

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television on March 28<sup>th</sup> 2018. The ceremony can be seen here: <https://www.pscp.tv/w/1LyxBrOokobxN>.

### 4.3.3. Logo Theory [Existential Analytic Theory of Meaning]

At its core, *Logo Theory* states that every human being, regardless of his or her cultural heritage, draws strength from a single source of life, namely the meaningfulness of his/her existence.<sup>293</sup>

Man's existence is said to centre around meaning that is why he becomes mentally ill when this centre becomes frustrated – for example, by a crisis. If the human being in such situations lacks meaning or access to it, then he needs a meaning-centred support, possibly in addition to a therapeutic as well as a pedagogic one.<sup>294</sup>

Logo theory posits that self-transcendence of one's existence is a fundamental ontological characteristic of human existence: man is said not to be interested in any inner states (as suggested by Freud and Adler), but he is always outward-oriented toward the world, and within that world he seeks a meaning which he can fulfill (or a person whom he could love).<sup>295</sup>

And because of a pre-reflexive ontological self-image, he also somehow knows that he realizes himself to the very extent in which he forgets himself, and he forgets himself exactly as he surrenders himself to a cause, he serves, or a person he loves.<sup>296</sup> This need for meaning in man, Frankl describes with the *will to meaning* (“*Willen zum Sinn*”).<sup>297</sup>

If a person finds meaning, then he is – if need be – ready to renounce, to suffer, to make sacrifices, even to sacrifice his life<sup>298</sup> as “*suffering ceases to be suffering at the moment it finds a meaning*”.<sup>299</sup>

According to this theory, man can gain meaning in three ways:<sup>300</sup>

- Through deeds he does, or a work that he creates.
- By experiencing something or someone (through love for example)
- Through his ability to change his attitude towards a situation where man is confronted with the fact that he cannot change it and, in the process, changes himself: by maturing and growing beyond himself.

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293 See Schlieper-Damrich 2014.

294 *ibid.*

295 See Frankl and Batthyány 2017, 180.

296 See *ibid.*, 180.

297 See *ibid.*, 180.

298 See *ibid.*, 144.

299 Frankl 2006, 51.

300 See Frankl and Batthyány 2017, 185.

This applies to suffering, guilt and death as well: suffering can be transformed into achievement (*Leistung*), guilt into transformation (*Wandlung*), and the transience of human existence can be transformed into a spur for responsible action (“*Ansporn zu verantwortetem Tun*”).<sup>301</sup>

Suffering is understood as an ingredient of life. Insofar, the ability to suffer is an expression of viability or mental maturity (“*Lebensfähigkeit*”) that allows humans to turn tragedy into personal triumphs.<sup>302</sup>

This transformation relies on the peculiarity of being human which grants man the freedom to assume an “identity” (“*Freiheit zum Persönlich-keit – Werden*”).<sup>303</sup> It is the freedom from one’s own facticity and the freedom to one’s own existentiality.<sup>304</sup> It is the freedom from “being fixed” or determined and the freedom to “become different”, to change.”<sup>305</sup>

When Frankl speaks about meaning, he does not mean abstract meaningfulness, but rather a completely concrete meaning, namely the concrete meaning of a situation with which an equally concrete person is confronted in each case.<sup>306</sup>

Frankl’s *Logo Theory* of meaning does not merely establish a therapy for the mentally ill, but also serves and this above all, serves to sensitize all people for meaning in an existential analysis.<sup>307</sup> In this sense, his theory of meaning is pedagogically a very valuable help to prepare all people for critical events in life.<sup>308</sup>

#### Relevance:

Terrorism aims to destroy the will of a society to resist and to survive by targeting its soul, that is its faith or belief system, which is its *centre-of-gravity* in “Clausewitzian” terms,<sup>309</sup> *Logo Theory* provides answers through its *Logo Therapy* how to uphold that faith system even in distress when faced with an existential situation of suffering and loss.

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301 *ibid.*, 185.

302 *ibid.*, 15.

303 See *ibid.*, 269.

304 See *ibid.*, 269.

305 See *ibid.*, 269.

306 See *ibid.*, 183.

307 See Schlieper-Damrich 2014.

308 See *ibid.*

309 See Gorka 2012, 200.

*Logo Theory* allows the deduction that suffering without meaning or purpose, without a WHY is unsustainable for people; it cannot be taken over an extended period of time through discipline alone. *Logo Theory* maintains that “*there is nothing in the world that would so effectively help one to survive even the worst conditions as the knowledge that there is a meaning in one’s life.*”<sup>310</sup> Or as Frankl puts it simply: “*suffering ceases to be a suffering the moment it finds a meaning.*”<sup>311</sup>

In a crisis like a terrorist threat or attack, *Logo Theory* advocates action over rumination by focusing man’s gaze on the remaining good in suffering – and on discovering hidden possibilities of meaning – and then act upon it.<sup>312</sup>

*Logo Theory* teaches that seeking an answer to the “*Why me - question*”, related to suffering is not helpful. Man should rather focus on the question how to respond to the situation. The theory does so in the conviction that the environment does not determine a person: What matters, is what man makes of his environment, how he approaches it.<sup>313</sup> Embracing the discovery of “*What for*” will allow individuals to develop a “*tragic optimism*” of knowing how to suffer.<sup>314</sup>

The importance of a meaning orientation, putting the focus on the future, on a purpose that will be fulfilled in the future, has shown to have been absolutely critical for the survival of prisoners of war.<sup>315</sup> As is true for prisoners of war the same is true in the conflict with terrorists. The citizens need compelling meaning and purpose why they must endure the hardship and suffering terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities. To maintain such defiance as a society, its citizens need to share common meaning and values.

Building this attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death can be achieved by weaving, sustaining, and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative. To be believable, the values and meaning must however be reflected in the words and actions of the authorities and must be consistent with and aligned across the whole-of-government.<sup>316</sup> Depending on,

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310 Frankl 2006, 47.

311 *ibid.*, 51.

312 See Frankl and Batthyány 2017, 16.

313 See *ibid.*, 264.

314 Frankl 2006, 61-65.

315 See Frankl and Batthyány 2017, 27 and 175.

316 See *ibid.*, 196.

if this relates to the *Situational Meaning or Global Meaning*<sup>317</sup>, held in a society, the process of transforming these may be a longer or shorter-term process, but will require continuous care even after a meaning has been accepted.

#### 4.3.4. Terror Management Theory

The *Terror Management Theory* is built on the concept, that individuals have a natural anxiety towards death.<sup>318</sup> For this reason, individuals “*strive to maintain worldviews that provide a sense of security and meaning to buffer against feelings of anxiety related to reminders of mortality and the limits of control over fate and environment*”.<sup>319</sup> This fear of death influences the people’s everyday lives – often unconsciously<sup>320</sup>: Research has found out that people who are faced with decisions in certain situations react differently when faced with the idea of mortality.<sup>321</sup> Correspondingly, terrorist attacks and the perceived vulnerability from terrorism can be stark reminders of peoples’ mortality and as a consequence can “*affect individuals’ perception, processing, and appraisal of events.*”<sup>322</sup>

When death salience is triggered, individuals react by undertaking efforts to try to protect and uphold their anxiety-buffer of death-denying meaning-providing world views.<sup>323</sup> Typical reactions include:

1. The development and clinging to exaggerated nationalistic beliefs,
2. The support for aggression against people supporting opposing opinions,
3. The investment in close personal relationships and focus on the in-group,
4. The ignoring and/or rejection of threatening information and their originators.<sup>324</sup>

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317 See chapter 4.3.1.

318 See Becker 1973.

319 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21.

320 See Becker 1973.

321 See Solomon *et al.* 2015.

322 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21.

323 See Becker 1973.

324 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22.

Relevance:

To lessen the potential psychological effects of a terrorist attack on individuals described in the *Terror Management Theory*, authorities can undertake preventive measures which support the coping.

One way is through the support of *Emotion-Focused Coping*.<sup>325</sup> To help people overcome the fear of death, authorities need to nurture the feeling of belonging and secureness in the societal and cultural setting and of a social framework that creates meaning and the perception of comprehensive order and predictability.<sup>326</sup> Authorities must help create opportunities that allow individuals to personally grow and confirm their self-worth by contributing to something bigger than just themselves and to experience meaning, higher purpose and belonging. By “*imbedding the individual [as a valued participant] within a transcendent cultural drama*” Greenberg argues, the individual can himself lead “*a meaningful enduring existence*” and attain “*equanimity*”.<sup>327</sup>

To be successful in the long run, a whole-of-society effort is necessary and needs to be championed in a whole-of-government approach. Practical actions include:

- Establishment of a culture which provides “*a shared symbolic conception of reality that imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence*”,<sup>328</sup>
- Support of societal bonding through social activities like clubs and sports,
- Creation and valuation of volunteering opportunities,
- Inclusive societal and community model which finds roles for everyone.

Taking a *Problem-Focused Coping* approach do deal with the effect of death salience means undertaking efforts to positively affect an individual’s appraisal of an event by providing him with the resources which allow him to feel more equipped to better deal with this situation.<sup>329</sup> These efforts to boost the self-help capability for practical coping with a threat can comprise early advice and advance training. These can include:

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325 See also *Mean-Making Coping Model* in Park and Folkman 1997.

326 See Solomon *et al.* 2015.

327 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

328 *ibid.*

329 See also *Mean-Making Coping Model* in Park and Folkman 1997.

- Emergency preparedness demonstrations and training,
- Life-saving / First aid demonstrations and training,
- Defibrillator use demonstrations and training,
- Security briefings, demonstrations, and
- Training of (social) media literacy skills to be able to better deal with information during crisis,
- Establishment, training and guidance of self-help neighborhood vigilance or watch groups,
- Business continuity planning and training at the workplace,
- Building evacuation exercises,
- Public service announcements,
- Inclusive community or neighbourhood management which will be a source of support in crisis.

Beyond the preventive measures described above, authorities can also directly address the probable psychological reactions identified by the *Terror Management Theory* research:

The development and clinging to exaggerated nationalistic beliefs:

The nation can be a source of meaning, belonging and purpose. It is a system of predictable roles and statuses given, based on shared values and understanding with established customs and rules of behaviour.<sup>330</sup> It is also a vehicle through which an individual can transcend to a higher state by delivering himself to its aspirational higher purpose.<sup>331</sup> Heroism, the sacrifice of the self for and into something greater outside of oneself is according to Becker (1973) a natural urge of the individual.<sup>332</sup>

*“Man will lay down his life for his country, his society, his family. He will choose to throw himself on a grenade to save his comrades; he is capable of the highest generosity and self-sacrifice. But he has to feel and believe that what he is doing, is truly heroic, timeless, and supremely meaningful.”*<sup>333</sup>

Accordingly, society needs to develop consensus on what heroism entails, to utilize the nationalistic excitement and nudge or channel the passion and

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330 See Becker 1973, 4.

331 See Le Bon 2015.

332 See Becker 1973, 152.

333 See *ibid.*, 6.

effort into a productive direction.<sup>334</sup> National symbols, whose understanding is commonly shared, can be powerful too and should be utilised.

The support for aggression against people supporting opposing opinions:<sup>335</sup>

When self-esteem is depending on the intact world view, challenges to the world view are perceived as direct threats and the people holding these views seen as unreasonable, perverse or malign.<sup>336</sup> Possible means to limit the negative effect of these feelings could be:

- Provide symbolic means for confirmation of own world view and the person himself to reduce the perceived threat,
- Help society to develop other coping mechanisms,
- Set clear boundaries of No-Violence and of No-Slander,
- Try to channel the aggression in a productive way,
- Make use of positive effect of hate (fear diminishing),
- Build debating culture, based on the strength of rational arguments already in schools,
- Expose early on to other views and learn how to cope with them.

*The investment in close personal relationships and focus on the in-group:*<sup>337</sup>

- Provide the possibility for personal affiliation and the development of close personal relationships<sup>338</sup>,
- Consider the particular needs of direct victims and indirect victims,
- Try to overcome the in- versus outgroup set-up, by building and using personal relations at the community level,
- Promote exchanges and interactions across ethnic groups to quench stereotypes and to build relationships before ethnic quarrels start.

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334 See *ibid.*, 7.

335 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22.

336 See Lippmann 2013, 76.

337 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22.

338 See Baumeister and Leary 1995.



*The ignoring and rejection of threatening information and their originators:*<sup>339</sup>

This is a normal reaction when the information threatens to negatively impact the held world view and thereby the own self<sup>340</sup>

- Make information palatable and select the sender carefully.
- Promote an open culture of debate.

#### 4.3.5. Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception

The model of the *Dynamic of Reciprocal Threat Perception* builds on the widely accepted assumption that the effectiveness of terrorism is based on how a society chooses to respond to it.<sup>341</sup> It suggests that the prevalent fear in a society expecting mass casualty attacks by terrorists, may pressure terrorist to meet these public expectations “to ‘maintain their own credibility vis-à-vis their audience’.”<sup>342</sup> Through this reciprocal threat perception between perpetrators and victims, “the actual threat itself may well become a self-fulfilling prophecy” Zimmermann suggests.<sup>343</sup> That threat perception may be further amplified through “irresponsible, sensationalist reporting” by the media.<sup>344</sup>

Along the same line is Furedi who posits that “statements that constitute a public acknowledgement of confusion and fear [...] represent an invitation to terror.”<sup>345</sup> According to Furedi, the tendency to demonize adversaries in the matters of security and foreign policy<sup>346</sup> alongside with the publicly presented fatalistic inevitability of another attack<sup>347</sup>, based on a vulnerability-led response to terrorism “is likely to foster a climate that intensifies people’s feeling of insecurity and fear.”<sup>348</sup> Furedi consequently suggests that this type

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339 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21–22.

340 See Karlsson *et al.* 2009 ; Kaniasty and Norris 2004.

341 See Furedi 2007, 42.

342 Zimmermann 2003, 48.

343 *ibid.*, 56.

344 *ibid.*, 51–52.

345 Furedi 2007, 11.

346 See Rothkopf 2016, 62.

347 See Furedi 2007, 8.

348 *ibid.*, 15.

of society's response "helps magnify the impact of terrorism and encourages more attacks."<sup>349</sup>

Relevance:

The following suggestions can be deduced from the model:

Authorities must carefully watch their communications style and question its purpose: Preparing society for potential attacks in the future to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*<sup>350</sup> is prudent. But words need to be carefully chosen as public dread of mass casualty terrorism is made worse through framing the nature of the threat as unpredictable, random and incalculable.<sup>351</sup>

Informing the public of vulnerabilities must also not be simply an exercise to try to pre-emptively deflect criticism away from authorities for their failure to prevent such a future attack: Such a lack of confidence into the ability to protect the society may have worse effects on the society. In all communications, the authorities must have the *Security Communication Vulnerability Paradox* in mind.<sup>352</sup>

Authorities and the media should also withstand the urge for the demonization or mystification of terrorists and thereby aggrandizing them which increases the fear factor.<sup>353</sup> Terrorist should be treated and framed as criminals.

To help curb the effects of the dynamic of reciprocal threat perception authorities should encourage the media to adopt ethical and socially responsible reporting practices that prevent the inflation of fear and stereotypes connected to terrorism, while still respecting editorial independence.<sup>354</sup>

Political and public debate has been focused strongly on complicated "high-end, low probability 'super-terrorism' threats."<sup>355</sup> While the authorities need to plan also for the more unlikely exploitation of specific vulnerabilities, in the communication with the public, the focus should be risk-led

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349 *ibid.*, 15.

350 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 91.

351 See Furedi 2007, 7.

352 See Münkler and Wassermann 2012, 93.

353 See Zimmermann 2003, 11.

354 See White 2020 ; See Basu 2019 ; See Zimmermann 2003, 51–52.

355 Gearson 2012, 171.

rather than vulnerability-led. “A major problem with assessing vulnerabilities is that they seem to proliferate the closer one looks; threats, though dynamic and amorphous, are not prone to spontaneously reproduce.” As Zimmermann points out.<sup>356</sup>

Government must also avoid sweeping generalisation and avoid abstract, impersonal terms and categories like “international terrorism” for example, which can incorrectly compound connected, but still discrete challenges into one large one. This will make the problem of terrorism appear even more complex and challenging on the one hand and thereby even more threatening on the other hand.

*Generalizing the terrorist threat by abstracting it [...], invites the likelihood of an exponential trajectory of analytical error. The nomenclature of the generalization of terrorism in the shape of sweeping, impersonal categories is symptomatic of its reductionist mindset; reductionism, in turn constitutes an invitation to deterministic thought; and determinism, by virtue of its model-like, teleological nature, is frequently quite removed from the nuts and bolts of reality.*<sup>357</sup>

There is a good knowledge about the psychological effect of direct exposure to terrorism, but less so about the impact the threat of terrorism has on individuals indirectly exposed.<sup>358</sup> More research is necessary. Also, the reciprocal effect between the media and government is not fully understood.<sup>359</sup>

Measures to reduce the threat perception in the society can come in many forms. In certain circumstances the use of military personnel to protect public buildings and to patrol streets has shown to reassure the population.<sup>360</sup> At the same time it can also have a deterrent effect.

#### 4.3.6. Appraisal Tendency Theory

The first individual reaction to an event can be broken down into an evoked emotion and the beginning of the initial (cognitive) appraisal of that event.<sup>361</sup> The evoked emotional state an individual is in, impacts on the

356 Zimmermann 2003, 62.

357 *ibid.*, 57–58.

358 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 16.

359 See Kepplinger 2016.

360 See Maulny 2017, 22.

361 See Maguen *et al.* 2008, 21.

ability to process and memorise information and “*plays a role in making judgments based on that information.*”<sup>362</sup> Building on this, the *Appraisal-Tendency Theory* posits that emotions are not always the result of a cognitive appraisal process, but may actually “*elicit specific cognitive appraisals*” that influence subsequent cognitions and behaviour<sup>363</sup> and it postulates that “*once these emotion related associations are activated, subsequent, temporally- and/or affectively-related events are likely to be appraised through a similar lens, regardless of the functionality of the appraisal.*”<sup>364</sup>

Using a multimethod approach in a field experiment with a nationally representative sample, Lerner et al. found that inducing the emotions of “*fear and anger altered beliefs and attitudes regarding matters of national interest. Experiencing more anger triggered more optimistic beliefs; experiencing more fear triggered greater pessimism.*”<sup>365</sup> By priming anger, Lerner was able to activate “*more punitive preferences*” while priming fear activated “*preference for conciliatory policies*”<sup>366</sup>

Lerner et al. are confident that the results from their experiment can be easily transferred into everyday life, where through a sustained exposure to media or government communications, the effects could even be increased.<sup>367</sup>

Maguen et al.’s research endorses Lerner’s findings that specific emotions trigger specific cognitive and behavioural responses which may include “*information about causation and perceived controllability.*”<sup>368</sup> Of great relevance to dealing with the threat of terrorism is Maguen et al.’s finding that the feeling of “*anxiety causes exaggerated estimates of personal risk and uncontrollability across situations, independent of the actual level of risk inherent in particular contexts.*”<sup>369</sup>

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362 Barsade 2002, 654.

363 Lerner et al. 2003, 144.

364 Maguen et al. 2008, 20.

365 Lerner et al. 2003, 148.

366 *ibid.*, 148.

367 See *ibid.*, 148.

368 Maguen et al. 2008, 20.

369 *ibid.*, 20.

## Relevance:

The *Appraisal Tendency Theory* advises that an individual's initial emotional response to a terror attack or a perceived threat “cannot only significantly shape individuals' subsequent cognitions, behaviour, and functioning, but may also impact individuals' ongoing adaptation and influence policymaking and society as a whole.”<sup>370</sup>

It accordingly mandates to take the following actions:

## Monitoring

- It is an accepted fact that you cannot manage what you cannot measure.<sup>371</sup> It is therefore advisable to regularly measure the emotional state of the society. This can be done by regularly consulting and aggregating the research results produced by the private sector (e.g. the annual study “*Die Ängste der Deutschen*”<sup>372</sup>) and by the public sector with each other and by incentivising the alignment of existing ongoing research projects to continuously receive better comparable, better integrated and more conclusive results. Alternatively, the government could order the conduct of the necessary research themselves.

## Examining

- Research has found those so-called “*negative emotions*” like fear and anger have very different effects on the individuals' risk perceptions and thereby influenced their policy preferences. This posits the importance to go beyond just looking at “*global moods*” and to distinguish and examine different emotions which may be evoked by terrorist attacks, like grief, rage or loathing.<sup>373</sup>
- Research by Routledge et al. into the terror management function of nostalgia suggests that it is worthwhile to also include non-basic complex emotions, like nostalgia into the examination.<sup>374</sup> Further effort should be undertaken to identify the triggers (e.g. the style of media reporting, wording of government communication, type of terrorism footage,) for emotions like fear or anger that could be influenced.

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370 *ibid.*

371 Drucker 1986.

372 See Infocenter der R+V Versicherung 2019.


373 See Lerner *et al.* 2003, 148 ; Plutchik 2001, 349.

374 See Routledge *et al.* 2008, 132.

## Shaping

- After monitoring and understanding the effects of terrorism-induced emotions on cognitive appraisal, authorities can shape their own messaging accordingly and encourage the media to avoid unnecessary and extensive reports of hardship on the society.

Figure 9: Non-basic complex emotions evoked by terrorism marked in Plutchik's 3D Wheel of Emotion.<sup>375</sup>



- In the knowledge of the strong influence of *Emotional Comparison* and *Emotional Contagion* on individuals' state of emotional arousal

375 Plutchik 2001, 349.

(especially) in unfamiliar situations, authorities should consider how existing social structures, like NGOs, community groups, sports clubs or the workplace and other opportunities for congregation can be used to purposefully “infect” individuals with desired emotions. While fear and anger-based messaging is usually discouraged, combining the research from Lerner and Plutchik suggests, that encouraging rage and anger may be a short-term remedy to prevent a society to fall into terror, fear and anxiety.<sup>376</sup>

- The public’s confidence level in the ability of the authorities to deal with /prepare for mitigating terrorist attacks is affected by the perceived performance of the government in dealing with other types of disasters.<sup>377</sup>
- *Especially previous terror attacks “are likely to have strong emotions associated with them, such as anger, fear, disgust, etc.”*<sup>378</sup> Authorities must pro-actively manage these feelings and provide adequate meaning that will allow for healthy coping. This must encompass all members of the society, but a special focus needs to be laid on vulnerable groups, people directly affected by an attack and their families and friends. But those indirectly affected which include children, the elderly and women who research shows often find it harder to cope, must also be accounted for.<sup>379</sup>

#### 4.3.7. Mass-Mediated-Terrorism Concept

In line with the widely held understanding of terrorism as communication by the deed, mass-communication expert Nacos *introduced the term Mass-Mediated-Terrorism to describe “politically motivated deeds, perpetrated by groups or individuals for the sake of communicating messages to a larger audience.”*<sup>380</sup>

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376 See Lerner *et al.* 2003, 148 ; Plutchik 2001, 349.

377 See Nacos 2007, 185-186 ; Exemplary are the populations loss of trust and confidence in the aftermath of the poor U.S Government response to Hurricane Katrina in 2001 or in the aftermath of the German government handling of the European Migrant Crisis in 2015 see Infocenter der R+V Versicherung 2019, 3.


378 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 20.

379 See Diederichs 2017, 32.

380 Nacos 2007, 28.

According to Nacos' concept "in mass societies [...] the media provide the lines of communication between public offices and the general public" which together form the so-called "Triangle of Political Communication."<sup>381</sup>

Figure 10: Amended Modell of "Terrorism, the Triangles of Political Communication, and the Internet"<sup>382</sup>



While it has become comparatively easier today through the internet and social networks for terrorists to reach their sympathisers and followers, and to communicate somehow directly with the government via twitter, terrorists are unable to do without the mass media organisations, if they want to reach the wider public and meet their media-centred targets.<sup>383</sup>

381 *ibid.*, 15.

382 Nacos 2006, 4.

383 *ibid.*, 4.



Table 3: Terrorists' "media-centred objectives" according to Nacos.<sup>384</sup>

- Achieve the “awareness of various audiences inside and outside their target societies and thereby condition their targets for intimidation.”
- Receive “recognition of their causes, they want people to ask, Why do they hate us? Why do they attack innocent civilians?”
- Get the “respect and sympathy of those in whose interest they claim to act.”
- Achieve “a quasi-legitimate status and the same or similar media treatment that legitimate political actors receive.”

To achieve access to the “*Triangle of political communication*”, terrorists use highly expressive violent deeds as “*a powerful message that commands the mass media’s attention and thus that of their target audience(s)*”.<sup>385</sup> Terrorist do this by meeting the selection and publication criteria of mass media, as laid-out by Diehl:

- “*Simplification,*
- *Personalisation,*
- *Emotionalisation*
- *Dramatisation,*
- *Pointed communication,*
- *Scandalisation,*
- *Immediacy,*
- *Up-to-date*”<sup>386</sup>.

The willingness of the global media to accept and share terrorist content, first had been drastically proven in the Jordanian desert in 1970 when reporters from Western networks interviewed Palestinian hijackers of four airliners and their hostages on live TV, sending out the messages of the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* to a global audience.<sup>387</sup>

Taking just this one example in figure 11 into account, it is not surprising that by 1987 Livingstone saw “*no limit to the creative opportunities – and danger to the society – for terrorists to dramatize and cajole the press to use their material.*”<sup>388</sup>

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384 *ibid.*, 4–5.

385 Nacos 2007, 197.

386 Diehl 2012, 20.

387 See Tuman 2010, 196–197; Taylor 2014.

388 Livingstone 1987, 217.

Figure 11: Image carried by the press of hijackers and hostages at Dawson's Field in Jordan in 1970.<sup>389</sup>



In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the infotainment characteristics of news media has further increased with commercial networks in the lead, often resulting in emotional, undifferentiated and dramatized reporting of terrorism-related news, with an unchallenged low-point in the reporting on 9/11 and the aftermath by the media.<sup>390</sup>

Despite a widely shared critical retrospective look on the post-9/11 reporting, mass media have continued to promote fear, anxiety and division in society.<sup>391</sup> Through undifferentiated and sensationalist reporting, short of explanations and actionable information which would help their audience to know how to prepare or cope with possible attacks they undermine the *Strategic Resilience* of the societies they are serving.<sup>392</sup> Figure 12 provides examples that promote anxiety and fear.

Using the *Triangle of Political Communication*-model the author will dissect the different interactions between the terrorists, the media and the

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389 Photo taken from Gyr 2014.

390 See Nacos *et al.* 2011a, 197 ; See also Furedi 2007 ; See Truc 2017.

391 See Furedi 2007, 7.

392 See Nacos 2007, 185 ; See Sikorski *et al.* 2017, 846 ; See also Furedi 2007.

public to identify opportunities for intervention by authorities to avert a resilience-destroying effect on the society.

Figure 12: Examples of dramatised and undifferentiated headlines in the media coverage of terrorism.<sup>393</sup>



393 Covers from left to right: The Independent, 12 September 2001, 1 ; The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 16 December 2001, 1 ; The Sun on Sunday 15 November 2015, 1 ; New Statesman, November 2015, 1 ; New York Post 3 December 2015 online ; Newsweek, 8 October 2001, 1.

→ Terrorists to Mass Media (A)

To pass these media *gatekeepers*<sup>394</sup> terrorists need to produce news and deliver content that is “so good”, that the (especially private) media networks feel they cannot ignore it due to their infotainment focus.<sup>395</sup> Correspondingly, terrorists skilfully and purposefully serve the news cycle by producing news content, based on the preferred “*timings, news values, media schemas and frames*”<sup>396</sup> In their work on *Gatekeeping Theory*, Shoemaker/Kohen identified the factors with a special relevance to the terrorist threat which are crucial for far-reaching reporting of an event by mass media and thus for the success of terrorism as a communication strategy:<sup>397</sup>

- *High Level of Deviation*: By a single unprecedented attack, despite possibly being much less bloody than the hundred other small incidents before, by breaking norms that are generally accepted, perpetrators are able to profoundly stir-up the imagination of the masses<sup>398</sup> - and thereby the interest of the media.<sup>399</sup>
- *High Social Significance*: Terrorist attacks are measured by the actual or feared (!) impact on one’s life and society.<sup>400</sup> The negative *primary appraisal*<sup>401</sup> of the threat, one is faced with, due to the targeting of perceived illegitimate targets or vulnerable groups, the exceptional cruelty and viciousness of an attack or through attacks on certain symbolic dates or places, as well as the negative *secondary appraisal*<sup>402</sup> of the resources available to respond to the attack, due to the perceived unpredictability of attacks and the perceived randomness of victimisation, extend the impact of an incident far beyond the direct victim groups to the whole society, especially when the nature of the threat is framed to be beyond

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394 For more on gatekeeping theory see Shoemaker and Kohen 2006 ; Shoemaker and Vos 2009.

395 See Nacos 2007, 37.

396 Kahr *et al.* 2017, 5; For a comprehensive case study on the matter, refer to Schleifer, 2006, „*Psychological warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian media politics and military strategies*”.

397 See Shoemaker and Kohen 2006, 13-15.

398 See Le Bon 2015, 71.

399 See Shoemaker and Kohen 2006, 13-15.

400 See *ibid.*, 13-15.

401 Referring to Park and Folkman's 1997 *Model of Global and Situational Meaning*.

402 *ibid.*

comprehension and the act to be irrational and senseless.<sup>403</sup> Both factors identified by Shoemaker/Kohen<sup>404</sup>, have the ability to punch holes into the held *Just-World-Beliefs* of each individual in the audience that the world is sufficiently just, fair, predictable and safe.

- A third important factor for mass dissemination of “terrorist news” through the mass or traditional media networks is *Visual Impact*.<sup>405</sup> According to mass psychology theory, masses primarily think in images and may mainly be influenced by images through film, photo or narration.<sup>406</sup> Le Bon states that everything that arouses the masses, appears in the form of a gripping clear image in front of them.<sup>407</sup> The facts as such do not attract the popular imagination, but the way they take place does. It is therefore necessary to evoke or plant images in or into the mind of the masses in order to move them.<sup>408</sup> This can happen through non-visual cues like writing or talking. But this takes more time and it is uncertain that the perceived image is the “correct” one. Moving pictures however, accompanied by sound can transmit an emotional experience to their audience, including the feelings of shock, sorrow and fear, and thereby making it far more effective than text or still photos.<sup>409</sup> The media’s perspective and those of terrorist perpetrators on the importance of images, are congruent: without pictures in the media, there are no certain pictures in the mind. And without those, an attack misses a significant part of its purpose for the terrorists.<sup>410</sup> For this reason, the aftermath reporting on attacks is as important as the attack itself.

→Media to Public (B)

According to the *Agenda-Setting-Theory*, the mass media has an important impact on what issues the public assumes to be important and what they

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403 See Furedi 2007, 7 ; See Arce and Sandler 2016: 183.

404 See Shoemaker and Kohen 2006, 13-15.

405 See Kahr *et al.* 2017, 4.

406 See Le Bon 2015, 69.

407 See *ibid.*, 71–72.

408 See *ibid.*, 27.

409 See Livingstone 1987, 218.

410 See Kahr *et al.* 2017, 4.

think about the issue.<sup>411</sup> Their influence can be broken down into two dimensions:<sup>412</sup>

- In the first dimension, the mass media impact WHAT their audience thinks about, by selecting a topic to draw their attention to, also impacting the audience's perception of a topic's importance by building consciousness.
- In the second dimension, the mass media impact HOW their audience thinks about a topic, by choosing a specific angle or frame for their reporting, affecting their audience's interpretations by including, omitting or highlighting specific information.

The *Agenda-Setting effect* has long been proven.<sup>413</sup> The media frequently and successfully have transformed the importance of an issue and thus primed or cultivated affective influence on the audience's criteria for the assessment of the world around them.<sup>414</sup> This agenda-setting ability makes the media an indispensable partner and ally in the authorities' quest to instill or preserve *Strategic Resilience* in the public.

Images, especially on television, can have a direct and elevated impact on audiences' perceptions, as previously posited by Le Bon and Lippmann.<sup>415</sup> Gerbner & Gross identified a correlation between increases in the time people spend watching television, with an increased likelihood that these people would perceive the social reality around them to be identical to the (fictional) reality portrayed on television.<sup>416</sup> This so-called *Cultivation Effect* was especially poignant, when it concerned issues which the viewers had no direct live experiences about.<sup>417</sup> As research suggests, this effect should equally apply to jihadi terrorism which fortunately only a fraction of the total population in Europe have had a direct live experience of.<sup>418</sup>

Gerbner and Gross also identified the effect of frequency learning in the audience, where the frequent depicting of events on television, makes people assume that these events are common in the reality.<sup>419</sup> The effect-

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411 See Lippmann 2013, 7-23 ; See McCombs and Shaw 1972.

412 See Balmas and Sheafer 2010.

413 See McCombs and Shaw 1972.

414 See Nacos *et al.* 2011a, 197.

415 See Lippmann 2013 ; See Le Bon 2015.

416 See Gerbner and Gross 1976.

417 A point also made by Lippmann 2013, 7-23.

418 See Nellis and Savage 2012.

419 See Gerbner and Gross 1976.

iveness of extended TV exposure to fictional narratives or news coverage to alter audiences' attitudes and perceptions has been proven in different studies.<sup>420</sup> This is an indication that the 24/7 news cycle repetitions of terrorism coverage may be problematic.

Considering the large effect that reporting can have on audience's attitudes and perceptions, it is hard to disagree with Furedi who insists that "*mass media carries responsibility how it reports about events.*"<sup>421</sup> He believes that the media has failed in its role as gatekeeper and that its way of communicating about terrorism has contributed unnecessarily to an increased "*public dread of mass casualty terrorism.*"<sup>422</sup> Nacos blames the media's commercial infotainment focus for its failure to properly inform and empower citizens.<sup>423</sup>

This lack of information supplied is also reflected in the findings of a media analysis on the reporting in Germany of the 9/11 attacks. They found virtually no reporting on the background nor any recommendations for the audience how to react to it.<sup>424</sup> It equally found that media coverage in Germany about Salafism was shallow and not very differentiated, and the reporting of risks was vague.<sup>425</sup>

Research conducted by Sikorsky confirms the negative effects that media reporting on terrorism can have. The study found that "*undifferentiated news about IS terrorism indirectly affected participants' attitudes toward the general Muslim population in a negative way.*"<sup>426</sup> It also found that the "*undifferentiated news about IS terrorism increased participants' fear of terrorism.*"<sup>427</sup> In contrast the study found that "*differentiated news [...] [did] not significantly evoke fear.*"<sup>428</sup> It also found that the fear experienced when confronted with information about terrorism acts, was strongly influenced by its framing:

*Exposing participants to information about terrorist acts and highlighting a 'currently high risk of terrorism' significantly increased recipients' fear*

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420 See Atwell Seate and Mastro 2016; See Mutz and Nir 2010 .

421 Furedi 2007, 7.

422 *ibid.*

423 Nacos 2007, 185 ; See also Vowe 2013, 27.

424 See *ibid.*, 18.

425 See *ibid.*, 27.

426 Sikorski *et al.* 2017, 846.

427 *ibid.*, 845.

428 *ibid.*, 848.

*reactions, compared to the identical text in combination with information highlighting a current 'low risk of terrorism.'*<sup>429</sup>

This points to the positive role that the media may be able to play during and after an attack. Dissecting the experience of 9/11, Nacos identified multiple occasions where parts of the American media positively impacted on the nation's resilience and cohesion.<sup>430</sup> Nacos found that during a crisis, the media is appreciated for disseminating important information from authorities to their audiences.<sup>431</sup> In addition to the importance of its content, the media's continuous flow of this information can give the audience the feeling of involvement in the news unfolding in a moment of high alertness and distress.<sup>432</sup> Also seeing the familiar faces on the screen and hearing the familiar voices on the radio of "their" news anchors can provide the audience with a feeling of belonging and some normalcy when trying to make sense of the new situation after an attack.<sup>433</sup>

Nacos suggests that the media can also positively influence the audiences' emotional response to the crisis by being a source of "*civic spirit, unity and patriotism*" and by promoting a "*we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment*".<sup>434</sup>

→Authorities to Media (C)

Domestic news organisations can be instrumental in helping to provide mental relief in serious incidents like terrorist attacks on innocent civilians which can create fear and panic in a society.<sup>435</sup> Authorities may usually benefit from the news networks' cooperative mood and their "*follow-the-leader-syndrome*" to be able to go public as soon as possible to frame the incident and their response to it.<sup>436</sup>

The first impression given by the authority's response to a crisis is decisive for the direction of the debate unfolding, once the critical phase is over.<sup>437</sup> The mass media is still the most effective tool to quickly reach the

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429 *ibid.*, 832.

430 See Nacos 2007, 59–60.

431 See *ibid.*, 59–60.

432 See *ibid.*, 59–60.

433 See *ibid.* 59–60.

434 *ibid.*, 60.

435 See *ibid.*, 208.

436 *ibid.*, 106–107.

437 See *ibid.*, 204.



wider public “to project the image of professional, resolute, and competent leadership” and to challenge the image of impotence and weakness, conveyed by successful terrorist attacks, and to preserve *Just-World-Beliefs*.<sup>438</sup>

If authorities do not communicate effectively and continuously with the press in a concise and precise manner during and after an attack, “the result is that rumours, not facts, are reported and attributed to anonymous sources [...] but if crisis managers [...] react to their [the media’s] need for information, they maintain their vantage point from which to frame and shape crisis information and construct the predominant story line.”<sup>439</sup>

→In a crisis situation like a terrorist attack, “response professionals are the most authoritative sources of information and thus are most sought out by the media.”<sup>440</sup> This puts them in the ideal position to influence the public by managing the information and framing the situation.

→Authorities to Public (D)

Just like the internet has enabled terrorists to broadcast their message online and made them more independent from the traditional news media channels, authorities also have been handed tools to circumvent the traditional news media and to communicate directly and unfiltered with the public.<sup>441</sup> However, as adoption of social media is not homogenous across the population, and infrastructure and geographic factors limit its access – even more so during a crisis situation – mass media still remains a vital instrument to reach the wider public, “especially when telling the public what to do and what not to do.”<sup>442</sup> Under the current circumstances, the internet and social media may be understood as valuable augmentations. Using multiple channels (indirectly through the media and directly through social media) to address the public necessitates consistency in the messages to avoid contradiction and prevent confusion.<sup>443</sup>

The technical advancement and diffusion of social media adoption has gone hand in hand with digitization and convergence processes in the

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438 *ibid.*, 203.

439 *ibid.*, 200.

440 *ibid.*, 195.

441 See *ibid.*, 3–4; See *ibid.*, 217.

442 *ibid.*, 205.

443 See *ibid.*, 206.

media that have brought about profound change in the way media is produced, presented, processed, consumed, assessed, adopted, shared or co-created.<sup>444</sup> The advent of the internet has enabled a participatory culture where news, information and content in general is not only consumed, but also created and shared, also called *Prosuming*.<sup>445</sup>

*The Phenomena of Prosumption* has also strongly increased each citizen's potential of using the *Social Influence* and *Emotional Contagion Effect*, as described in chapter 4.3.9.<sup>446</sup> By being a communicator himself, every citizen is able to contribute to increasing security in the society or to its decreasing.<sup>447</sup> To limit its negative effects during a crisis, authorities must carefully monitor social media as well as the mass media to be able to quickly respond to wrong or harmful information, as negative information garners higher attention than the opposite and is more frequently and more widely shared.<sup>448</sup>

The communication needs of the public audience may vary, based on the circumstances. To achieve its positive effect, authorities need to ensure the adequacy of their security communication with the public, knowing what to say, when to say it, how to say it, and whom to say it to.<sup>449</sup>

- *Demographic factors* like age, gender or social status have long shown to produce different communication preferences in crisis situations.
- *Human factors* equally play important roles for successful communication, due to stress and distorted perceptions found to be common in safety-critical situations as well as the spatial and emotional distance of the audience.<sup>450</sup>
- *Psychological factors* may also prevent public service announcements to be followed, for example the *Ostrich Effect* identified by Karlsson et al..<sup>451</sup>

The *Ostrich Effect* describes the selective attention to information by individuals when faced with potentially negative information.<sup>452</sup> It may appear irrational for individuals not to welcome more information on a serious

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444 See Giebel 2014, 369.

445 See *ibid.*, 369.

446 See *ibid.*, 369.

447 See *ibid.*, 370.

448 See Barsade 2002, 652; See *ibid.*, 650.

449 See Giebel 2014, 368 ; See Lasswell 1948.

450 Giebel 2014, 367.

451 See Karlsson *et al.* 2009.

452 See *ibid.*, 96.

issue like a terrorism threat as it could have grave consequences for them on the one hand and would allow them to make better informed decisions on the other. But Karlsson et al. explain the *Ostrich Effect* by the individuals' preference for avoiding the psychological pain, connected with receiving "negative" information, "by sticking their head in the sand".<sup>453</sup> Accordingly, authorities cannot simply assume that public service announcement (PSA) are heard or read before, during or after an attack – despite a sufficient reach of the chosen communication channels- unless people are given the capacity to process and deal with the psychological pain connected with "negative" information.

Beyond the above factors, to fully reap this positive potential effect of its audience, Giebel suggested that the communicating authorities need to embrace the concept of the self-reliant and capable citizen whose existing knowledge, competences and skills should be integrated into the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.<sup>454</sup> These aspects Giebel posits, could contribute significantly to the resilience of a society and have a positive impact on the overall social design of its safety culture.<sup>455</sup>

Simply reaching their audience, has become increasingly challenging for authorities as the previously seemingly homogenous mass media audience today appears to be more segmented and differentiated than ever before, split up over many different channels.<sup>456</sup> While the segmentation and differentiation of the audience may initially increase the cost of communication, through digitalisation and big data it allows for an ever better adaptation/customisation of messages, up to the "segment of one". Mobile phone network-based or mobile app-based alert- and crowd-sourcing security applications are an exemplary way forward to put the concept into practice.<sup>457</sup>

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453 See *ibid.*, 96.

454 See Giebel 2014, 370.

455 See *ibid.*, 370.

456 See *ibid.*, 370.

457 See Diederichs 2017, 87.

Relevance:

To avoid or lessen the *Mass Mediated Terrorism Effect* on resilience, authorities have several interconnected options:

Towards terrorists:

- Authorities should prevent terrorists from being able to pull off operations that fulfil all the criteria of *High Level of Deviation*, *High Social Significance*, and a high *Visual Impact through Direct and Indirect Denial* by establishing a dedicated publicly declared, known, and publicly supported policy that
- Curtails publishing and sharing of terrorist incident-related media and messages,
- Establishes legislation that prevents the political recognition of claims or grievances if they are being advanced by the use of violent coercion through terrorist attacks,
- Mandates the regular conduct of public counter-terrorism exercises to train and display the preparedness of the authorities and society to repel an attack or to professionally deal with its consequences.

Towards the media:

- To instil or preserve *Strategic Resilience* in the public, authorities need to go public as soon as possible and utilise the “*follow-the-leader-syndrome*”<sup>458</sup> to set the stage and frame the incident and their response to it.
- Authorities need to prepare and provide information in a compelling, easy and comprehensible way, to provide data and explanations, to create infographics for use as images, to make it easy for the media to supply the population with actionable and up-to-date information.
- To continue to successfully direct the information flow, authorities should invest into well planned liaising with the media, communicate consistently, be responsive and allow as much access as possible.<sup>459</sup>
- The diligent and confident handling of representatives from the media needs to be part of the first responder leadership training.

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458 Nacos 2007, 106–107.

459 See *ibid.*, 198–199.

- Only in exceptional circumstances where media (live) reporting would endanger the response effort, authorities may consider to temporarily restrict reporting.<sup>460</sup>
- Authorities should proactively make an effort to have an exchange with news networks and journalists in “normal times” to inform them on how a specific type of coverage may unintentionally help terrorist succeed and try to encourage reporting guidelines.<sup>461</sup>
- Responsible-reporting guidelines must protect balanced and differentiated reporting while discouraging the use of emotionalising images and inciting language that may be conducive to create unjustified fears and to stir up blanket out-group stereotypes which could increase the perceived social significance of an attack in the population.
- To support coping in the society, authorities should encourage media to focus reporting on victims and their plight.
- With support of the authorities, the media can function as a platform for “*collective sadness and shared encouragement*” to the bereaved by sensitively featuring the victims and acknowledging their story and grief.<sup>462</sup>
- Authorities should work with the media to provide formats for dialogue in their programme where the audience is given the opportunity to participate in the public discourse, to be listened to and to discuss with experts and or follow Q&A sessions.<sup>463</sup>
- Authorities should include media as active participants in counter-terrorism exercises.

Towards the public:

- Authorities can prepare the society by clarifying that where there is life there is risk and offer mitigating strategies which together will reduce the perceived level of deviation and significance of a terror attack and its psychological impact on the population.

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460 Noteworthy cases include the suspension of the police rescue operation of the Israeli hostages in the Olympic village in Munich on 5 September 1972, after the terrorists were alerted by radio and television about the deployment of the police outside of their building. More recently the live reporting of police operations during the Mumbai terror attacks 26-29 November 2008 allowed the Pakistan-based handlers watching the television to guide the holed-up perpetrators via phone. For another case see also Seow 2018.

461 See Nacos 2007, 215–216.

462 *ibid.*, 60.

463 See *ibid.*, 59–60.

- Authorities should conduct regular public counter-terrorism exercises which make people used to the images related with terror.
- Authorities need to ensure the adequacy of their security communication with the public. This includes the need to be mindful of psychological pain, connected with “negative” information when considering which manner, tone, and time is most acceptable for the specific audience to receive and accept public service announcements.
- Authorities should prepare and provide information in a compelling, easy comprehensible way, provide data and explanations with actionable and up-to-date information.
- Authorities should adopt a *threat-based approach* that “assesses an enemy’s intentions and capabilities” instead of conducting a “vulnerability-based analysis [that] identifies a weakness and hypothesizes a terrorist and a worst-case scenario” which can lead to an atmosphere of fear and fatalism.<sup>464</sup>
- Authorities should reduce the potentially negative effect of social media-sharing by educating society about the problems of terrorist propaganda and building a public consensus for prosecuting those found fearmongering or to be disseminating hateful or inciting content, related to terrorism.
- Authorities must carefully monitor social media as well as the mass media during a crisis to be able to quickly respond to wrong or harmful information, as negative information garners higher attention and is more frequently and more widely shared.<sup>465</sup>
- Authorities should make use of the digitalisation and big data to achieve optimal customisation of messages, up to the “segment of one”.
- Authorities need to embrace the concept of the self-reliant and capable citizen and integrate the existing knowledge, competences and skills in the society into the preventive, proactive and reactive security concept.<sup>466</sup>

Towards themselves:

- To avoid unnecessarily increasing the population’s confusion and fear of terrorism, authorities must ensure that their own released statements are clear, consistent, precise, and differentiated.

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464 Jenkins 2006, 5 ; See Wilkinson 1986, 3.

465 See Barsade 2002, 652 ; See *ibid.*, 650.

466 See Giebel 2014, 370.

- Authorities must not hide their own lack of clarity behind unspecific terms.
- Authorities need to avoid compounding and generalising discrete threats by using terms like “international terrorism”.
- The usually high diversity of stakeholders with different interests who are affected in a terror attack on soft targets, demands a thoughtfully planned management of crisis communication that includes industrial, commercial and other non-governmental stake holders.<sup>467</sup>
- Crisis communication mechanisms need to be trained and tested before and included as an essential component in counter-terrorism exercises.<sup>468</sup>

#### 4.3.8. The Robespierre Affect

A large-scale research study conducted at the *University of Mannheim* on the physiological and psychological effects of television violence, observed the attempt of viewers to conclude a perceived open-ended chain of violence through the usurpation of punitive power.<sup>469</sup>

This development of violent reactions within the audience has turned out to be expected, especially if the portrayed illegitimate violence is directed against a sympathetic victim and is not going to be expiated or resolved.<sup>470</sup> Rather, the empathy with the victim and the associated anti-violent impulse provoke a violent backlash via a victim-perpetrator dialectic.<sup>471</sup>

The occurrence of the *Robespierre Affect* does not depend on the prevalence of gruesome visual images but is dependent on the way how the violence is embedded in the narrative and dramaturgical context.<sup>472</sup> If a solution to the “victim’s question” is denied or no convincing solution is offered, an outburst of *Robespierre’s Affect* is likely.<sup>473</sup>

This reaction model can be modified or lessened through fear of imminent sanctions and of other risks related to one’s own violent action, but

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467 Nacos 2007, 197.

468 See *ibid.*, 200–201.

469 See Grimm 1998, 117.

470 See *ibid.*, 117.

471 See *ibid.*, 117.

472 See *ibid.*, 117.

473 See *ibid.*, 117.

cannot be altered altogether: The aggressive-moral impetus remains in the imagination, where it can be freely used for subtle forms of aggression and violence legitimisation.<sup>474</sup> Accordingly, the way in which that build-up of morally fuelled aggression is expressed, does vary depending on the avenues available to the individual. It may range from “only” the construction of an enemy image to the endorsement of violence, to conducting violent activities.<sup>475</sup> Studies also found that it may be a conduit for political protest and increased approval of political violence.<sup>476</sup>

#### Relevance:

Authorities and press need to pay attention to the effect of open-ended chains of violence on the audience when reporting about events. They need to check their narrative.

Law enforcement authorities should review their policies on the permissibility of online content, regarding what is considered an *illegal incitement to violence*. The research shows that there are ways to create violent outrage through media which may so far, not be covered by law.

The energy created through the moral outrage can be targeted and/or channelled by terrorists or other non-government actors to polarise society. Authorities and the press need to predict the possibilities of it and prepare for it by carefully balancing their reporting. The press and society need to be alert not to accept self-defeating narratives from terrorist which blame the West.

Perpetually spinning their own credible and effective counter-narratives which provide explanations and means that avoid uncontrolled violence, may be a necessary and effective tool available to the authorities.

Authorities need to create narratives that would allow reaping the activating energy (created due to the violation of the personal sense of justice, based on the suffering of the victims) and channelling it into a useful purpose, e.g. when an all-society / community rally-around-the-flag effort is needed.<sup>477</sup> It should also be remembered that anger and fear are both considered negative emotions, but are connected to different states of mind.

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474 See *ibid.*, 115.

475 See *ibid.*, 115.

476 See *ibid.*, 115.

477 See *ibid.*, 111.



It is no coincidence that Palestinian groups repeatedly call for the “day of rage”.<sup>478</sup> Anger and rage can overcome fear in the short term, provide a feeling of clarity and controllability and may be activated to preserve resilience in a dread situation.<sup>479</sup>

#### 4.3.9. Emotional Contagion / Social Influence Theory

Emotions simply understood as “*subjective feelings*”, are “*intense, relatively short-term affective reactions to a specific environmental stimulus.*”<sup>480</sup>

Emotions may be the result of a cognitive conscious appraisal process but may be equally evoked by *Emotional Contagion*<sup>481</sup> and *Emotional Comparison*<sup>482</sup> which impacts the consecutive behaviour of individuals or groups.

Not all emotions are transferred with the same ease. Research found that negative emotions are more easily transferred than positive ones as well as emotions that are strongly expressed.<sup>483</sup>

#### Emotional Comparison

Social emotional comparison is the conscious adaptation of a sentiment, based on the perceived group’s prevailing emotional response to a threatening or ambiguous situation, like a terrorist attack.<sup>484</sup> These observed emotional responses “*provide embodied information about the costs and benefits of anticipated action, information that can be used automatically and immediately, circumventing the need for cogitating on the possible consequences of potential actions*”<sup>485</sup> allowing the observing individual to adequately set his own level of arousal.<sup>486</sup> On the group level, the *social comparison of emotional states* leads to group mood convergence and an

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478 See Neack 2013, 115.

479 See Lerner *et al.* 2003, 148.

480 Barsade 2002, 647.

481 See Hatfield *et al.* 2016.

482 See Schachter 1959.

483 See *ibid.*

484 See *ibid.*

485 Zadra and Clore 2011, 676.

486 See Bartel and Saavedra 2000, p.199.

aligned perception of the environment.<sup>487</sup> *“Most of the time it makes sense and looking upon the reactions of others for directions has unquestionable survival value, but from time to time social influences may backfire and be misdirected.”*<sup>488</sup>

### Emotional Contagion.

Emotional contagion describes this unconscious transfer of emotions/moods between individuals or groups based on physical mimicry and the following self-evaluation.<sup>489</sup> It *“has significant implications for group cohesion [...] and group survival (e.g., fearful facial displays and vocalizations as a means for alerting other members of the group to imminent danger).”*<sup>490</sup>

If individuals or groups who have become „infected” by an emotion through contagion, do not realize that *“they have caught it as a result of someone else’s emotion, they will [then] experience the origin of the feeling as coming from themselves.”*<sup>491</sup> The emotions can then alter the individuals’ appraisal process of events and thereby their actions. Barsade described this as a *“combinatory effect”* where people are *“not realizing that their seemingly cognitive and rational consideration of the facts is actually a product of other people influencing their mood and that this mood, in turn, is influencing their cognitive processes.”*<sup>492</sup>

The important role that emotions play when trying to preserve societal resilience in face of a terror threat, has been confirmed by Le Bon who posits that the art of arousing the imagination of the masses is the art of governing them.<sup>493</sup> The gripping, clear images that are produced through demonstrative and destructive acts of terrorism are meant to arouse strong emotions in the people’s minds – evoking feelings of fear, anxiety and death salience which may trigger the experience of loss of control and a loss of meaning.

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487 See *ibid.*, 197.

488 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 210–211.

489 See Gump and Kulik 1997, 305.

490 Levenson 1996, 186.

491 Barsade 2002, 680.

492 *ibid.*, 679.

493 See Le Bon 2015, 71–72.

Le Bon argues that facts as such do not attract the popular imagination, but the way they take place.<sup>494</sup> New convictions and beliefs of the masses spread only through the process of contagion, never with the help of reason.<sup>495</sup>

Relevance:

The theories posit that the actions by the authorities play an important role: their response in words (“speech acts”) and deeds offers an interpretation of the threat and any connected events to the observing media and the public, they themselves partly rely on to determine their own reaction.<sup>496</sup> The opinions of recognized authorities have a strong influence on the masses, regardless of truth or error. To guide the population’s thoughts and feelings, the message needs to be delivered in a credible way that corresponds to held beliefs of the population.<sup>497</sup> This is true for expressed emotion as well, since negative strong emotions, like anxiety and fear are easily transferred among people who Barsade refers to as “*walking mood inductors,*” *continuously influencing the moods and then the judgments and behaviors of others.*<sup>498</sup>

Therefore authorities need to show forth calmness, confidence and control on all levels, beyond what is being said and what is done in the awareness that “*emotion[s] can [...] influence pre-attentive perceptual processes.*”<sup>499</sup> To achieve group resilience, the messaging needs to be broad and wide-reaching, to encompass all stakeholders and groups including survivors, and thus to reach a critical amount of people to have an impact – people who have concerns or are anxious need to have a place to go to deal with them.

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494 See *ibid.*, 71-72.

495 See *ibid.*, 121.

496 See Lippmann 2013.

497 See Le Bon 2015, 120–121.

498 Barsade 2002, 679.

499 Zadra and Clore 2011, 677; See also Phelps *et al.* 2006 ; A negative example has been the reaction by Ms Mogherini, Head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to the terror attacks in Brussels in March 2016, who in her facial expression and demeanour on live television showed strong vulnerability and anxiety, the opposite of what a political leader in such a situation should present. Source: Burrows 2016, online.

By achieving group resilience, authorities can instill individual resilience.<sup>500</sup> Due to its proven potential to activate masses, large social platforms and relevant discussions with contagious emotional potential should be monitored and automated analysis utilized, to get an earlier indication if an “emotion” is spreading.<sup>501</sup> The accountability of providers of mentioned on-line platforms for enabling the unchecked virality of inciting and seditious unlawful messages should be debated.<sup>502</sup>

Access to and influence on relevant community groups and stakeholders need to be established before an event and the need for emotional contagion of targeted groups arises. Tools in use in the UK are “*Servator*”-public reassurance measures, “Step-Change” – E-Learning campaigns, in cooperation with businesses, as well as the use of mobile apps.

Beyond simply trying to respond to evoked emotions set by terrorist events, authorities should make use of research beforehand and have available a tool box and influencers will allow them to actively create moods (including anger or desire for vengeance) which could have fear-cancelling effects when needed.<sup>503</sup> This challenge is made even more formidable in the open liberal societies, with activities by malign foreign actors who covertly exploit the emotional contagious potential of social media in the society.<sup>504</sup>

#### 4.3.10. Affiliation Theory

In social psychology, affiliation is understood as the tendency to seek the company of other persons, independent of the feelings towards these others, for a variety of reasons.<sup>505</sup> An external threat or ambiguous situation like terrorism triggers fear in individuals and motivates them to seek the company of others who are faced with the same threat.<sup>506</sup> This personal tendency towards affiliation is utility-driven, as individuals try to gain cognitive clarity about the level of threat they are facing to allow for countermeasures and a reduction in anxiety levels.<sup>507</sup>

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500 See Barsade 2002, 644.

501 Mirbabaie 2020.

502 See UK Home Office and UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 2020.

503 See *Appraisal Tendency Theory* in chapter 4.3.6.

504 Ewing 2017.

505 See Buunk and Dijkstra 2007, 330.

506 See Kassir *et al.* 2012, 342–343; see also Schachter 1959 ; see also Byrne 1961.

507 See Rofe 1984, 235 ; see also Rofe 2006, 1781.

Affiliation tendencies are accordingly related to or are directly affecting behaviour, observable during crisis, for example information search and sharing, threat perception, escape (to familiar persons or places), and evacuation of the family or countering panic.<sup>508</sup> In the long term, affiliation can provide psychological and physical support to disaster response.<sup>509</sup> Affiliation in these cases can be categorised as *problem-focused coping* attempts as well as *emotion-focused coping* attempts as part of the *Meaning-Making Coping Process* to reappraise an incongruent *Global-* and *Situational Meaning*.<sup>510</sup>

A study conducted in Israel among adults and children faced with weeks of terrorist attacks in the run up to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Iraq War in 2003 found that “*affiliation tendencies are determined by the perceived benefit- versus- damage that may be derived from being with others.*”<sup>511</sup> This “*benefit–damage perception*” itself is determined by three variables:

- “*The characteristics of the stressful situations,*
- *The individual,*
- *And the potential affiliates.*”<sup>512</sup>

Especially strong tendencies for affiliation were found in so called “*dangerous–avoidable situations*” (like war or terrorism): Where individuals thought that they were unable to change the source of the threat, they were seeking relevant information to be better prepared for the threat.<sup>513</sup> Individuals showed “*preference to be with similar others*” only if the “*need for cognitive clarity*” had not already been sufficiently served through other sources, like government information or through the media.<sup>514</sup> In these cases, the reported levels of anxiety were lower and individuals did not show interest to discuss the threat or seek further information. Instead, they sought the company of others to distract themselves from the threat and reduce their own level of anxiety.<sup>515</sup> In these cases, adults and children

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508 See Diederichs 2017, 20.

509 See Spence *et al.* 2007.

510 See Park and Folkman 1997.

511 Rofe 2006, 1781.

512 Rofe 1984, 235.

513 See Rofe 2006, 1782.

514 *ibid.*, 1782.

515 See *ibid.*, 1788.

showed a preference for the company of “*non-anxious others*” to help them cope emotionally.<sup>516</sup>

Relevance:

- The need to affiliate with others during a terror threat situation will vary depending on the coping abilities of individuals, their perception of the threat and the available “others”.<sup>517</sup>
- Affiliation behaviour can help reduce anxiety in people and increase the feeling of belonging. Authorities should therefore make use of it and facilitate opportunities for the people in the society to come together, especially after an attack, like it was done in Paris right after the bloody attack on the magazine “*Charlie Hebdo*” in January 2015. The authorities should also make use of existing social and community structures and engage community leaders below the national level, to allow people to come together and find comfort in each other at the community level.
- Victims of terrorist attacks and their families as well as first responders are especially vulnerable and may strongly benefit from affiliation. Frameworks have to be created to facilitate their coming together.
- Through their accurate, timely, calm and transparent (as much as possible) information sharing, authorities may satisfy the “need for cognitive clarity” and reduce potential anxiety. This may reduce individuals search for and acceptance of unverified information from others, potentially through social media that could create more anxiety.
- When deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media) it should be considered that beyond the reception of necessary and actionable information that supports coping, the majority of people may prefer distraction from the threat rather than continuous reminders.
- This holds true for children as well who have less ability to cope with a threat, compared to adults, and accordingly, exposing them continuously to threat-related messages is likely to increase their level of anxiety. While the children’s need for cognitive clarity about the threat has to be addressed by providing the necessary information about the situation, by explaining how the authorities are responding, by informing them on

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516 *ibid.*, 1787.

517 See Rofe 1984, 235.

what they themselves can do and by addressing their questions, children should be shielded from continuous exposure to messages without any new actionable information and rather be distracted and encouraged to continue to live their lives normally.

#### 4.3.11. Conservation of Resources Model

The *Conservation of Resources Model* is based on the assumption that “people strive to retain, protect, and build resources and that what is threatening to them is the potential or actual loss of these valued resources.”<sup>518</sup> It is the deprivation of “resources [perceived to be] needed to realize personally relevant goals” that the individual experiences as stressful.<sup>519</sup>

Accordingly, the psychological impact of exposure to terrorism on an individual may be determined by the extent to which the resources of the individual will be affected, this includes possible economic, social as well as psychological resource loss.

Research by Hobfoll et al. found that in general those with fewer resources to begin with (indicated by low socio-economic status and limited self-efficacy), find it harder to cope with the effects of terrorist attacks, as they lack redundancy to replace lost resources and are more likely to develop *post-traumatic stress disorder* (PTSD).<sup>520</sup>

Especially for these more vulnerable groups, but also profiting all, the development and application of a “*resource loss questionnaire*” is recommended.<sup>521</sup> According to Hobfoll et al. this should function as a “*quick screening tool [...] to identify high-risk individual[s]*” or groups who can then be administered the suitable level of care.<sup>522</sup>

Fear-based messages that would unnecessarily increase the perceived threat to the individual’s resources through government or media, should be avoided.<sup>523</sup> Instead, adopting this resources-focused model in a terror threat scenario mandates authorities to publish information about the social, psychological or material support available to individuals and to

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518 Hobfoll 1989, 513.

519 See Dechesne 2012, 85–86.

520 See Hobfoll et al. 2006, 215.

521 *ibid.*, 215.

522 *ibid.*, 215.

523 See *ibid.*, 215; see also Nacos 2007, 21.

provide guidance for coping effectively with the threat.<sup>524</sup> The development of the guidance for targeted self-efficacy coping (which has been identified to play “a key role in stress reactions and quality of coping in threatening situations”<sup>525</sup>), should be carefully done in consideration of “the specific efficacy cognitions and skills that pertain to terrorism, that individuals must acquire and sustain when threatened by terrorism.”<sup>526</sup>

Relevance:

The *Conservation of Resources Model* allows for making further practical assumptions for building *Strategic Resilience* in the face of a terrorism threat:

In order to allow victims and their families to continue their lives and close the terrorism chapter as best as possible, it is necessary to bring them (as soon as possible) into the “status quo ante”, as close as possible into the state which they had, before the attack happened.

The loss of social bonds through the killing of significant others can be of fundamental shock for individuals as “the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation.”<sup>527</sup> The perceived lack of attachment and isolation of survivors in the hospital, or of bereaved families is “linked to a variety of ill effects on health, adjustment, and well-being”.<sup>528</sup>

Therefore, social support and psychological support need to be provided to the survivors, but also to their mourning relatives or any significant others affected by the attack, to allow them to continue their lives and routine as soon as possible.

To allow for a psychological closure and continuation of their lives, it is important to those affected by an attack, to see a fast trial and the punishment of the perpetrators (see *Just-World-Beliefs Theory*<sup>529</sup> and *Robespierre Affect*<sup>530</sup>). Before this has happened, their psychological well-being /resources will stay impeded.

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524 See Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 221 ; see also Hobfoll *et al.* 2006, 215.

525 Benight and Bandura 2004, 1131.

526 Hobfoll *et al.* 2006, 215.

527 Baumeister and Leary 1995, 497.

528 *ibid.*, 497.

529 See chapter 4.3.2.

530 See chapter 4.3.8.



Closure also means that sufficient funds need to be provided in a timely fashion to pay for hospital costs, for funding necessary operations, for remodelling of housing if necessary, for regular therapy and ongoing care to help in allowing these people to continue their life. The financial obligations they had to meet before the attack for themselves or their dependants, need to be acknowledged and covered.

For business owners whose premises have been destroyed or damaged through an attack or have been simply sealed-off due to the spatial proximity to an attack, are likely to face a great threat to their economic resources if they are unable to continue trading for a time. Resulting payment defaults or even bankruptcies can affect multiple stakeholders, including employees, customers as well as suppliers and the local community in general. The authorities need to have these potential negative effects in mind when legislating and acting after an attack as well as to have to encourage the business community to work out specific business continuity plans for these types of events.

The wider public is also affected in the aftermath of a terror attack. Different types of resources may be affected, e.g. through necessary change of the routine due to the interruption of transport services or other infrastructure after an attack or due to avoidance behaviour of specific areas (e.g. crowded places) due to fear.

Removing tangible and visible damages to infrastructure and ensuring its functionality as soon as possible after an attack is therefore important to preserve those “resources” and the citizens’ trust in them.<sup>531</sup>

#### 4.3.12. Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model


In line with the author’s understanding of a resilient community, Kaniasty & Norris suggest that *“heightened communal sacrifices and concerns for each other could mitigate adverse psychological consequences of disasters or even take the disaster-struck community “beyond its pre-existing levels of integration, productivity, and capacity for growth”*.<sup>532</sup>

531 On July 07.07.2015 jihadi terrorist suicide bomb attacks on three underground trains (and a double-decker bus) killed 52 people and injured 700 more. The *London Tube* resumed its service the next morning except for the stretches directly affected by the bombs.

532 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 202.

Their *Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model (SSDDM)* explains the development and impact of social dynamics in the community on individual coping in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters (like terrorist attacks) that disrupt “*the social context within which individuals and groups function.*”<sup>533</sup>

Figure 13: *The Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model.*<sup>534</sup>



Following the instantaneous “*mobilization of social support*” in the initial phase of a disaster, victims often experience a deterioration of social support in the aftermath that negatively affects their coping and recovery abilities.<sup>535</sup>

The SSDDM model posits that this perceived deterioration of social support which negatively affects the mental health of victims, may be reduced (or deterred), by addressing / enhancing three facets of social support as shown in the table below.

*To an important but incomplete extent, the initial mobilization of received support counteracts this deterioration and preserves perceptions that supportive networks are still in place (protective assistance). Through this process of deterioration deterrence (paths support mobilization and protective assistance combined [see graphic above]), mobilization of received support indirectly affects mental health by preserving perceptions of social support.*<sup>536</sup>

533 Fritz 1976, 651; See Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 200.

534 Figure adapted from *ibid.*, 207.

535 *ibid.*, 207.

536 *ibid.*, 207.

Table 4: Social support and post-disaster social dynamics.<sup>537</sup>

| Social support facet     | Post natural disaster process                                   |
|--------------------------|---|
| Received social support  | Initial mobilization of the actual receipt of help              |
| Social embeddedness      | Initial sense of togetherness followed by a longer term decline |
| Perceived social support | Longer term decline in the sense of being connected with other  |

As the table shows, managing perceived social support deterioration is a multidimensional problem with different, but connected facets.<sup>538</sup> Accordingly, the levers / types of social support needed to effectively counteract the negative effects of SSD are multi-faceted, and may require a „*host of policies, programs, and changes in our ways of thinking*” – depending on the issue and the affected individuals.<sup>539</sup>

It is important to note that the way institutionalized support is given, may inadvertently increase trauma and emotional distress, as post-disaster support is often not distributed equally or according to the “the *rule of relative needs*”, but based on “*pre-existing socio-political and cultural structures*” in the community, putting those with status and more available assets at an advantage to receive support.<sup>540</sup>

In the uncertainty, vagueness and confusion during and in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, “*informational support may be even more important than tangible support*”, providing accurate, timely and transparent information to the affected population.<sup>541</sup> “*Otherwise [the authors suggest], authorities will exacerbate processes that contribute to support deterioration.*”<sup>542</sup>

“*Notwithstanding the essential role government agencies and other formal sources of support play in the aftermath of disasters, the greatest challenge lies in fostering naturally occurring social resources which are most vital for disaster victims, especially with regard to exchange of emotional support.*”<sup>543</sup>

537 Table adapted from *ibid.*, 201.

538 See *ibid.*, 220.

539 *ibid.*

540 *ibid.*, 206; *ibid.*, 220.

541 *ibid.*, 220–221.

542 *ibid.*, 220–221.

543 *ibid.*, 221.

Relevance:

The *Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model* provides good indicators of which types of policies and programs in the aftermath of man-made disasters may be supportive to the mid- and long-term emotional coping of victims.

– *Provide early, abundant, and visible social support*

Through their actions, compassion and words early into the crisis, authorities can “vaccinate” the victimised individuals with the belief that support will be available, if needed in the future. This can help confirm held *Just-World-Beliefs* and may reduce the perceived deterioration of support in the long run, allowing for better coping and faster recovery after an attack.

Actions include

- Availability of Informational support –
  - Clear pathway and transparency about the way forward,
- Provision of Material support,
- Availability of Medical support,
  - Disaster medicine
  - Restorative medicine
  - Recovery medicine
  - Psychological support,
- Availability of Financial support
  - Access to emergency funding for serving urgent payments
  - Medical costs
  - Adequate level of compensation
    - Injury compensation
    - Loss of property compensation
    - Loss of business compensation,
- Availability of emotional support
  - Showing compassion for the victims
  - acknowledgement of their suffering by high-ranking representatives of the state
  - Societal/national solidarity (e.g. blood donations action).<sup>544</sup>

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544 An example where in the eyes of the victims that solidarity was missing, was the sending of invoices for the certification of death by the Charité Hospital to families of victims killed during the Berlin Christmas Market Attack in 2016, just three days

– *Provide fair support*

“Authorities need to keep a close watch on *“the equity of distribution of social resources”*.<sup>545</sup> If help is made available, it needs to be distributed fairly – based on real needs, not based on status. Otherwise, it could harm community cohesion which itself is an important mitigating factor for adverse psychological reaction in a post-disaster scenario.

– *Fostering sources of non-formal social support*

The formal expression of government social support is insufficient to preserve the necessary sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. Social support should be broadly based and nourished from the community level (through support from social groups and associations, victim support groups, workplace etc.), and most importantly from the individual level (through social support from friends, family and next of kin).

– *Restore sources of social embeddedness*

The alternative “natural“ sources of social support mentioned above, may be disrupted though, due to the loss of significant others, separation from existing social circles through forced lifestyle changes because of an injury, to long recovery times away in hospital or rehabilitation, or to mental problems that prevent a return to the workplace. To mitigate the consequences, authorities need to plan for such situations and manage them by facilitating the creation, accessibility and use of alternatives sources for social interaction, sharing and grieving.

– *Protect sources of social embeddedness*

To counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community embeddedness and cohesion, an inclusive community dialogue needs to have been established beforehand. This will allow communities to be sensitized and reassured about its inclusiveness and help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions.<sup>546</sup>

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after the attack with a robust request for payment – while it took nearly eight weeks for the Governing Mayor to send his condolence notice. Source: Kurpjuweit 2017.


545 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 220.

546 See *ibid.*, 221.

#### 4.4. Chapter Conclusion

Through the analysis above of the relevance of the identified models and theories for substantiating Münkler & Wassermann's *Strategic Resilience* concept, the author was able to deduce and distil a total of 197 measures. As the graphic shows, the numbers of measures are unevenly distributed across the models, suggesting varying opportunities and thus needs for government engagement.

Figure 14: Distribution of 197 measures across the 12 Theories/Models.<sup>547</sup>



In this bulk and arranged along their theoretical origins, as shown in the table on the following pages, however, they are not helpful to form a whole-of-government approach which would be required, to successfully lead a whole-of-society-effort towards *Strategic Resilience*. While the policy measures are also not universally transferable or applicable to form such a whole-of-government-effort, they can form the basis for further analysis in the next chapter to develop generally applicable, yet actionable principles which any government can follow if they intend to strengthen the *Strategic Resilience* of their open society against jihadi terrorism, as this work has set out to do.

547 Author's own work.

*Table 5: Collection of measures deduced from the assessment of the different theories.<sup>548</sup>*

| <i>Model of Global and Situational Meaning</i>  |
|---|
| 1. Authorities should ensure that there is adequate support available to first responders/emergency personnel and their families during deployment and in case of injury (physical AND mental) or death.  |
| 2. Authorities should support the selection and weaving of different memories into a meaningful narrative that lets people make sense of previously traumatic events in their lives and their connection to others and allow them to re-write history – or rather the memory of it. This allows individuals as well as the society to turn moments of defeat into moments of triumphant defiance and personal growth. |
| 3. Authorities need to establish and monitor procedures for trauma intervention/ therapy after exposure to an attack, to avoid compounding trauma and functional impairment. This is especially important for front-line staff, but equally for those indirectly exposed.   |
| 4. Authorities should consider scripting scenarios and adaptation of scenario-plays that can be shown in live shows in amusement parks to increase awareness, and which could also help with recruitment. This should be connected to activities on different touchpoints, e.g. schools for maximum effectiveness.  |
| 5. Authorities should establish a compelling narrative that provides meaning and purpose which allows the individual to make sense of the potential threat and to expect better personal coping with any direct suffering and thereby reduces the perceived threat to his psychological resources.  |
| 6. Authorities should establish a shared meaning and purpose in the society, to ensure its defiance and unity in face of the terrorist threat.  |
| 7. Authorities should incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills, for example by increasing the first aid training hours required to receive a driver's licence.   |
| 8. Authorities should further incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills, for example by offering advantages to certain citizens, who have the right qualification (like certified first aid skills), by offering free access to community infrastructure like swimming pools or sports facilities or preferred access to public housing or university accommodation.  |
| 9. Authorities should, as a preventive measure against potential resource loss, encourage development of social resources, through supporting and enabling the creation and strengthening of social bonds in sports and social clubs, associations, inter-generational projects, neighbourhood groups, volunteers' opportunities, and neighbourhood management.   |
| 10. Authorities should incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills, for example by requiring drivers to come back into training and prove their abilities in first aid and rescue skills on a regular basis.  |
| 11. Authorities should incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills by trying and offering new formats of training like "First-Responder Parties" like "Tupperware Parties", where the training is held at home among friends.   |
| 12. Authorities should prepare content for vulnerable groups, for example young people to be equipped with skills to be able to better respond if a situation should arise.   |

548 Author's own work.

13. Authorities should set up infotainment-based facilities where families, groups and school classes can train and learn about the looming risks and practice the response to them in a playful manner. This may also help recruitment of first responders and should be connected to activities on different touchpoints, e.g. schools for maximum effectiveness.
14. Authorities should put in place generous compensation policies for material losses, suffered in or as a consequence of an attack. This must include personal and business losses (considering the large number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) in Germany), for example because of destroyed or cordoned off premises.
15. Authorities should support individuals in equipping themselves with the necessary skills to be able to undertake problem-focused coping by educating, training and providing them with the necessary support. The skills include: first aid skills, basic rescue and evacuation drills, active shooter training, self-defence, or training in terrorism awareness/vigilance.
16. Authorities should take a whole-of-government approach and long-term focus with the aim to nudge people's global beliefs about terrorist attacks towards a coping-friendly-meaning.
17. Authorities should try to influence global beliefs held in society, not only using classic crisis and security communication, but through practical activities and legislation, whether financial, political, legal or otherwise
18. Authorities can support the development of an increased general proficiency in the society to cope with negative emotions through long-term programs adapted to the target segments as part of curricula in schools, apprenticeship programs, university or driver's licence training (to prevent road rage).
19. Authorities need to fulfil society's demand for more security, but also to communicate the countering concept of accepting uncertainty far and wide for the greatest impact. (see *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox*).
20. Authorities need to consider the impact of past government performance in dealing with other types of crises on public confidence in the ability of the authorities to prepare for and mitigate a future terrorist attack.
21. Authorities need to put a focus on the prevention of large-scale attacks, especially chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. They should also communicate their efforts and achievements and put the probability of such attacks being successfully conducted, into perspective. Authorities must also communicate their ability to cope with the effects of such attacks through large scale exercises, involving police and emergency services responders.
22. Authorities should improve perceived ability of individuals to respond to an attack, through awareness and skill training.
23. Authorities should incentivise the brushing up of first aid skills, for example by reducing car taxes or fees for the driving test for citizens who maintain and prove their skill set.
24. Authorities should identify and analyse the existing *Global Meaning* (including the *Just-World-Beliefs*) held in the society, and anticipate the threat and impact, posed by and to the meaning by terrorism. Prophylactically, they should proceed to uncover and distil meaning and purpose from these threat scenarios. After that, the findings should then be infused into the existing *Global Meaning*.
25. Authorities should increase knowledge and awareness of first aid skills through rolling out "Public Days" like First-Responder Days more prominently and in close cooperation with local community.
26. Authorities should utilise their recognized authority to frame attacks, in order to provide meaning and to encourage resolve, unity and defiance in the public.



27. Authorities should provide the population with a compelling meaning and purpose WHY they must endure the hardship and suffering terrorists may inflict on them through their brutal killings and atrocities. Authorities should thereby be able to communicate a compelling narrative about who the terrorists are and what they are fighting for.
28. Authorities should stay away from fear-based messaging that would only play further into the hands of the terrorists, when addressing the terrorist threat.
29. Authorities should support emotion-focused coping of citizens by taking congruent actions, including speech acts and through utilising the “*follow-the-leader-syndrome*” of the media.<sup>549</sup> Authorities may also use the effects of emotional contagion and create large gatherings offline or online, and instruct multipliers (like the media) and influencers that will unconsciously instil a new interpretation of events in the individual.
30. Authorities should prepare for and use the opportunities opened through a traumatic event like a terror attack, to shift opinions /global beliefs and thus galvanize the cohesion of the society.
31. Authorities should as a responsive measure provide and promote opportunities for affiliation which is a natural reaction after the loss of social resources.
32. Authorities should support citizens to improve their problem-focused coping abilities to reduce the perceived impact of an attack.
33. Authorities should communicate about risk and reassure through “*adequate disaster planning and emergency response systems*”<sup>550</sup> to mitigate effects of existing memory of previous similar traumatic events. As these may make the individual “*overestimate statistically small, but affectively potent risks*”<sup>551</sup>, like the “*dread risk*”<sup>552</sup> of becoming a victim of a terror attack, and make him emotionally respond to it accordingly.
34. Authorities must consider the individual threat perception about terrorism (influenced by demographic factors like gender, age, education and ethnicity) when trying to support the population in a resilient response. The authorities should ideally identify typical behavioural patterns (and preferences) during disasters and address the groups accordingly.
35. When deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media) authorities should consider that beyond necessary and actionable information about the situation, and how they are planning to respond and what the citizens themselves can do, further continuous reminders about terrorist threats are likely to increase the recipients’ level of anxiety, especially if they have previously experienced similar events.

549 Nacos 2007, 106–107.

550 Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 30.

551 Maguen *et al.* 2008, 19–20.

552 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

*Just-World-Beliefs Theory*

36. Authorities should show no shyness in acknowledging the sacrifice of those carrying the burden /those most affected by terror attacks (e.g. French police officer; Boston Marathon attack)
37. Authorities should prevent the isolation and the blaming of victims by preventively connecting their fate and sacrifice to the fate of the nation, city, town, community etc.
38. Authorities should support the litigation by affected victims for financial compensation from the perpetrators or involved third parties, e.g. to serve the people's need for justice by supplying a financial settlement.
39. Authorities should provide necessary support like an adequate victim compensation and psychological support to sustain the *Just-World-Beliefs* during and after an attack.
40. The authorities should anticipate and respond to efforts by terrorist groups and their sympathizers in the West to deliberately exploit upheld *Just-World Beliefs* in Western societies by portraying the West as the rightful target of attacks to remedy an injustice. Authorities need to recognise this as psychological warfare and must carefully choose their actions and their communication strategy consistently along their own narrative.
41. Authorities should not underestimate the people's need for justice or just simply for revenge after an attack, to support their coping.
42. Authorities should deconstruct the prevailing concepts of justice and deservingness ruling society, when defining and establishing the role of victims of terrorist attacks in the society.
43. Authorities should preview possible scenarios of threats to *Just-World-Beliefs* and develop satisfying answers to the „Why“ (must we endure this?) question which will be raised by the people, media, political opposition as well as the terrorist sympathisers.
44. Authorities need to provide meaning to the struggle and the hardship put on individuals and the society, resulting from the authorities' political choices.
45. Authorities must ensure the ability to adequately respond to an attack in a timely manner to satisfy the *Just-World-Beliefs* – this may involve law enforcement, justice system, and health and social system.
46. Authorities should ensure an adequate level of victim compensation as a tangible and visible public acknowledgment of sacrifice and innocent suffering.
47. To avoid victim blaming out of envy, authorities should prepare and steer any necessary public discourse about the amount or legitimacy of compensation of terrorism victims early and with confidence.
48. Authorities should ostracise and where necessary, legally prosecute transgressions in the press or social media which are attacking victims or their families.

*Logo Theory*

49. Authorities need to provide first responders with a compelling meaning and purpose, why they and their families potentially must endure greater hardship in the conflict with terrorists, than the rest of the citizens.
50. Authorities should support victims to discover that there is at least something good in their suffering – and encourage them to actively pursue and look for new possibilities of meaning in the suffering.
51. Authorities should support victims to adopt a meaning orientation with a focus on the future, on a purpose that will promise fulfilment the future.

52. Authorities should embrace the idea that the provision of meaning in a crisis is as important as are material and social support for the victims.
53. Authorities need to help the victims to find this orientation as the latter can endure the worst conditions if they can put a meaning to it.
54. Authorities should consistently live up to the shared values and meaning they proclaim in their words and actions and stay aligned across the whole-of-government.
55. Authorities can tap into the six emotional needs man has, to create a meaningful narrative: The Need for Security / The Need for Adventure/Variety. / The Need for Significance / The Need for Connection / The Need for Growth / The Need for Contribution
56. Authorities need to instil shared common meaning and values in society to help it maintain its defiance against an aggression.
57. Authorities should respect that the process of transforming held *Situational Meaning* or and *Global Meaning* may be a longer- or shorter-term process and will require continuous care even after a new meaning has been accepted.
58. Authorities should focus their effort on weaving, sustaining and strengthening a defiant meaning-orientated narrative that will support attitudinal heroism towards the threat of death from terrorism.

*Terror Management Theory*

59. Authorities should consider the particular needs of direct victims and indirect victims concerning the building of close personal relationships and a focus on the in-group.
60. Authorities should make information palatable and select the sender carefully to overcome the public ignorance and rejection of threatening information and their senders.
61. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through conducting building evacuation exercises.
62. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through defibrillator demonstrations and training.
63. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through emergency preparedness demonstrations and training.
64. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through lifesaving / first aid demonstrations and training.
65. Authorities should support societal bonding through social activities like clubs and sports in a whole-of-government approach.
66. Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions, by establishing a debating culture based on the strength of rational arguments, already in schools and live it by example in politics. Authorities should promote an open culture of debate to reduce the ignoring and rejection of threatening information and their senders.
67. Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions, by ensuring that people are exposed early to other views and learn how to cope with them.
68. Authorities must help create opportunities that allow citizens to personally grow and confirm their self-esteem by contributing to something bigger than just themselves, and thus experience meaning, higher purpose and belonging.

69. Authorities should address the problem of individuals' aggression against people supporting opposing opinions by making clear demands for „No-Violence“ early and continuously, and enforce them.
70. Authorities should address the problem of individual's aggression against people supporting opposing opinions by trying to channel the aggression in a productive way.
71. Authorities should support the creation of and high regard for volunteering opportunities in a whole-of-government approach.
72. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through security briefings, demonstrations and training.
73. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through the establishment, training of and guidance to self-help neighbourhood vigilance groups.
74. Authorities should develop an inclusive societal and community model that finds roles for everyone as a whole-of-government approach.
75. Authorities should establish and strengthen inclusive community or neighbourhood management that will be a source of support in crisis and will enhance problem-focused coping.
76. Authorities should establish symbolic means for confirmation of an individual's own worldview and own identity to reduce the perceived threat posed by opposing opinions and help society to develop other coping mechanisms.
77. Authorities should facilitate the building and the use of personal relationships at the community level to overcome in- versus outgroup set-up (e.g. through urban and neighbourhood planning and management).
78. Authorities should promote exchange and interaction across ethnicities to quench stereotypes and build relationships early, to overcome an in- versus outgroup set-up in a crisis.
79. Authorities should in a whole-of-government approach establish a culture that provides “*a shared symbolic conception of reality which in turn imputes order, predictability, significance, and permanence*”<sup>553</sup>
80. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through workplace business continuity planning and training.
81. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through training of (social) media literacy skills to be able to better deal with information during crisis.
82. Authorities should undertake efforts to boost the self-help capability of individuals for practical coping with a threat. These can comprise advice and training.
83. Authorities should provide possibility for affiliation and the development of close personal relationships to support coping of the population.
84. Authorities should support the improvement of problem-focused coping abilities of the citizens through public service announcements, while being mindful of psychological pain connected with “negative” information.
85. Authorities should undertake efforts to develop consensus in society on what heroism entails, to utilize the nationalistic excitement usually evoked by a terror threat and then nudge/ channel the passion and effort in a productive direction.

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553 Greenberg *et al.* 1986, 206.

86. Authorities need to nurture the feeling of belonging and secureness in the societal and cultural setting and social framework which create meaning and the perception of comprehensive order and predictability, to help people overcoming the fear of death (evoked by the terrorism threat).

87. Authorities should assess how make use of the fear diminishing (positive) effect of hate.

*Dynamics of Reciprocal Threat Perception*

88. Authorities should look at media censorship as one tool to help curb the negative effects of the Dynamics of Reciprocal Threat Perception through the media.

89. Authorities must carefully watch their communication style and question its purpose: Preparing society for potential attacks in the future to avoid the pitfalls of the *Security Psychological Vulnerability Paradox* is necessary. But words need to be carefully chosen as public dread of mass casualty terrorism is made worse through framing the nature of the threat as unpredictable, random and incalculable. Informing the public of vulnerabilities must also not be a simple exercise to try to pre-emptively deflect criticism from authorities for failure to prevent such a future attack. Such a lack of confidence into the ability to protect the society may have worse effects on the society. In all communication, the authorities must have the *Security Communication Vulnerability Paradox* in mind.

90. Authorities should conduct more research on the psychological impact that the threat of terrorism has on individuals, in contrast to the well-researched impact of direct exposure to acts of terrorism.

91. Authorities should take informed decisions on the appropriate means to reassure the population through action instead of just words. Measures to reduce the threat perception in the society can come in many forms.

92. Authorities should ensure that in the communication with the public, the focus should be risk-led rather than a vulnerability-led.

93. All the while the authorities need to plan also for the more unlikely exploitation of specific vulnerabilities through “*high-end, low probability ‘super-terrorism’ threats*”.<sup>554</sup>

94. Authorities and the media should also withstand the urge for the demonization or mystification of terrorists and thereby aggrandizing them which could increase the fear factor. Terrorist should be treated and framed as criminals.

95. Authorities should avoid sweeping generalisation and abstraction, impersonal terms and categories like “International terrorism” that can incorrectly compound connected, but discrete challenges into one large threat. This would make the problem of terrorism appear even more complex and challenging.

*Appraisal Tendency Theory*

96. Authorities should undertake necessary research to identify the triggers (e.g. the style of media reporting, wording of government communication, type of terrorism footage) for emotions like fear or anger.

97. Authorities should regularly monitor the emotional state of the society.

98. Authorities should examine and distinguish the different effects of so-called “*negative emotions*”, like fear, anger, grief, rage or loathing (that are likely to be evoked by terrorist attacks), on individuals’ risk perception (and their influence on their policy preferences).

554 Gearson 2012, 171.

99. Authorities should examine the terror management function of non-basic complex emotions like nostalgia and develop tactics to utilise them.
100. After monitoring and understanding the effects of terrorism-induced emotions on cognitive appraisal, authorities should shape their own messaging accordingly and encourage the media to adapt their messaging style to avoid unnecessary mental hardship on the society.
101. Authorities should consider how existing social structures, like NGOs, community groups, sports clubs or workplaces or other opportunities for congregation can be used to purposefully “infect” individuals with desired emotions through “Emotional Comparison” or “Emotional Contagion”, to help coping with unfamiliar situations.
102. Authorities should develop the ability to incite carefully targeted rage and anger as a short-term remedy, to prevent a society from falling into fear and anxiety due to the “*dread risk*”<sup>55</sup> of terrorism.
103. Authorities should proactively manage strong emotions (such as anger, fear, disgust, etc.), associated with previous terror attacks, and provide adequate meaning that will allow for a healthy coping. This must encompass all members of the society. But authorities need to lay a special focus on vulnerable groups, people directly affected by an attack and their families and friends as well as those indirectly affected who research shows, often find it harder to cope, which include children, the elderly and women.

*Mass Mediated Terrorism Concept*

104. To reduce the level of deviation authorities should fight terrorists’ narrative by getting Muslim scholars to condemn them.
105. Authorities should assure that terrorists are brandished in society as outlaws to reduce sympathy and support.
106. Authorities should request providers of critical infrastructure to build redundancies into the systems to reduce the potentially negative social significance of the terrorism threat.
107. Through direct denial, authorities should make it hard for terrorists to conduct large-scale operations and thereby reduce the perceived potential size of an attack.
108. Authorities should go public as soon as possible and use their authoritative position to influence the public by managing the information and framing the situation and their response through the media.
109. Authorities should make news networks and journalists aware, through media guidelines or advice, which type of coverage is problematic because it advances the terrorists’ objectives.
110. Authorities should encourage the media to focus their reporting on victims and their plight, instead of on the perpetrators.
111. Authorities should ask the media not to be too concrete in their description of gory details of an attack and use little emotion.
112. Authorities should consider laws that regulate showing the carnage from terrorist attacks in the media.
113. Authorities should invest in good liaison with the media to be able to responsibly influence the information flow, if needed.

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555 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

114. Authorities should acknowledge the role of the media for distributing important information to their audiences during crisis and should work with the media to assure a continuous flow of information in the moment of high alertness and distress that can give the audience the feeling of being involved in the unfolding events.
115. The Media should avoid spreading inconsistent or exaggerated reactions and appeals which help to *“augment the sense of danger and ensuing confusion.”*<sup>556</sup>
116. Authorities should in addition to communicating accurately, give people capacity to process and deal with the psychological strain, connected with “negative” information.
117. Authorities should make arrangements to visually conceal attack sites to reduce the visual impact of an attack.
118. Authorities should equally provide the media with a steady flow of information during and after a terrorist attack.
119. Authorities should assess the appropriate frequency and tone of their communication since the selection and volume of news impacts the public’s perception of the importance and urgency of problems and issues.
120. Authorities should be able to challenge the image of impotence and weakness conveyed by terrorists’ successful attacks by feeding the media’s *“need for information”*<sup>557</sup>. They should *“maintain their vantage point from which to frame and shape crisis information and construct the predominant story line”*<sup>558</sup>
121. Authorities should encourage and support the media to provide a platform for mutual encouragement and collective grief by sensitively featuring the victims and their story and grief.
122. Authorities should support the media to allow them to positively influence the audience’s emotional response to an attack, by being a source of *“civic spirit, unity and patriotism”* and promoting a *“we-are-all-in-this-together sentiment”* during a crisis.<sup>559</sup>
123. Authorities should provide the media with footage, so that they are not dependent on using terrorist sources.
124. Authorities should support the media to provide formats in their programme for dialogue where the audience is given the opportunity to participate in the public discourse, to discuss with experts and or to follow Question & Answer sessions.
125. Authorities should cooperate with the media to assure that during a crisis the audience can see the familiar faces of “their” news anchors on the screen and hear their familiar voices on the radio. This can provide a feeling of belonging to the audience and of some normalcy when they try to make sense of the new situation after an attack.
126. Authorities should try to manage the visual (emotional) impact of an attack by providing the media with access but asking the media to carefully select the images to avoid unintended consequences.
127. Authorities may have to consider restriction to reduce the visual impact of an attack in a state of emergency.

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556 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 211.

557 Nacos 2007, 200.

558 *ibid.*

559 *ibid.*, 59–60.

128. Authorities should cooperate with social networks to reduce the visual impact of an attack by, for example watermark images of attacks, so that they can be removed from social media.
129. Authorities should prosecute sources of fake news during the response phase after an attack.
130. Authorities should effectively include the citizens in their security effort as every citizen is a communicator and able to contribute something to the goal of increasing security in the society.
131. Authorities should educate and train the population to increase their level of preparedness and self-help capabilities in the case of a shut-down of a critical infrastructure, to reduce its social impact.
132. Authorities should conduct large public counter-terrorism exercises which make people more used to these kinds of images, thereby reducing the visual impact of an attack in the future.
133. Authorities should support citizens to improve their emotional-focused coping abilities to reduce the perceived impact of an attack.
134. Authorities should recognise the citizens as experts of everyday life and take them seriously, consciously integrating their skills in the preventive, proactive and reactive security management.<sup>560</sup>
135. To reduce social significance of threat: Improve the primary and secondary appraisals of an attack in the *Initial Appraisal Process*, so that the appraised *Situational Meaning* of an attack shows higher congruence levels with the held *Global Meaning*.
136. Authorities should clarify that there is risk in life (like terrorism), to reduce the *Security Psychological-Vulnerability Paradox*.
137. Authorities should adopt a threat-based approach that “*assesses an enemy’s intentions and capabilities*” instead of conducting a “*vulnerability-based analysis [that] identifies a weakness and hypothesizes a terrorist and a worst-case scenario*” that can lead to an atmosphere of fear and fatalism.<sup>561</sup>
138. To reduce the visual impact of photos etc., authorities should educate society that footage shared by terrorist is propaganda.
139. Authorities should install a thoughtfully planned management of crisis communication in a terror incident that reflects the diversity of stakeholders with different interests
140. Authorities should not simply assume that public service announcements (PSA) are heard or read before, during or after an attack – despite a sufficient reach of the chosen communication channels. The originators of the PSA need to consider which style, tone, and time is most fitting for the specific audience to take in and accept the information.
141. Authorities should support citizens to improve their emotional-focused coping abilities to reduce the perceived impact of an attack

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560 See Giebel 2014, 370.

561 Jenkins 2006, 5 ; See also Wilkinson 1986, 3.



142. Authorities should regularly provide updated information for the population after a crisis situation. The searching for new information can reduce the audience's feeling of helplessness and senselessness, evoked by the attack, and provide "*the feeling of doing something*"<sup>562</sup>, connecting them to something bigger, becoming part of a community tragedy.
143. The websites and the twitter accounts of authorities should be seen as fast and reliable sources of information for the public and the media alike in a crisis situation. It allows the recipients to receive guidance and stay connected.
144. Authorities should "*communicate calmness, confidence, and an aura of control to a shell-shocked, fearful or impatient domestic public.*"<sup>563</sup>
145. Authorities should "*use the extraordinary public attention in order to get their message across, to demonstrate their composure, and to convince citizens to keep their cool and trust that the authorities will do everything possible to protect and assist them.*"<sup>564</sup>
146. Authorities should arrange for fast carrying out of forensics to clear attack sites as quickly as possible, to reduce the visual and psychological impact of an attack.
147. Authorities should make arrangements to repair any damages at the attack sites as quickly as possible, to reduce the visual and practical impact of an attack.
148. In the aftermath of an attack, authorities should offer support in a retrospective "sense-making", through communicative intervention measures that enable the recovery of personal control and replenishment of lost resources.
149. Authorities should consider different communication approaches, depending on the target segment. Authorities also need to consider that vulnerable individuals may have a higher prevalence of avoidance behaviour.
150. A well-planned management of crisis communication should be in place that is especially considering the needs of vulnerable groups during and after a terror incident.

#### *The Robespierre Affect*

151. Authorities should review their policies on the permissibility of online content in regard to what is considered an *illegal incitement to violence*. The research shows, that there are ways to create violent outrage through media which may so far not be covered by law.
152. Authorities and the press should foresee the possibilities of terrorist or other non-government actors to polarise society through targeted communication to create moral outrage and prepare for it by carefully balancing their reporting. The press and media need to be alert not to accept self-defeating narratives from terrorist that blame the West.
153. Authorities and press should pay attention to the effect of open-ended chains of violence on the audience when reporting about events. They need to check their narrative.
154. Authorities should spin own credible and effective counter narratives over a long time that provide explanations and means that do not have to lead to uncontrolled violence and may prove itself to be a necessary and effective tool in the future.

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562 Nacos 2007, 59.

563 *ibid.*, 194–195.

564 *ibid.*, 204.

155. Authorities may help the population to overcome the stifling fear from the “*dread risk*”<sup>565</sup> of terrorism in the short term, by stirring up anger and outrage in the society, which provides a feeling of clarity and controllability.
156. Authorities need to create narratives that would allow reaping the activating energy of anger (created due to the violation of the personal sense of justice based on the suffering of the victims) and canalising it for a useful purpose e.g. when an all-society / community rally-around-the-flag effort is needed.

*Emotional Contagion / Social Influence Theory*

157. Authorities should be aware of the impact of observed emotional responses and utilise this knowledge about social emotional comparison in their crisis management and communication plan.
158. Authorities should establish access to and influence on relevant community groups and stakeholders, before an event and before the need for targeted emotional contagion of these groups arises. By achieving group resilience, authorities can manage individual resilience.
159. Authorities should monitor social platforms and relevant discussions with contagious emotional potential to get an earlier indication if an “emotion” is spreading that may activate the masses.
160. Authorities should showcase calm, confidence and control on all levels beyond what is being said and what is done in awareness that “*emotion[s] can [...] influence pre-attentive perceptual processes.*”<sup>566</sup>
161. Authorities must carefully consider their response to terrorist threats in words and action as these offer an interpretation of the threat and any connected events to the observing media and the public which they partly rely on to determine their own reaction.
162. Authorities should avoid “*inconsistent and often exaggerated reactions and appeals [...] [that] may augment the sense of danger and ensuing confusion.*”<sup>567</sup>
163. The authorities should deliver their message in a credible way that corresponds to held beliefs, in order to be able to guide the population’s thoughts and feelings.
164. Authorities may impede gatherings or demonstrations that want to disseminate opposing views that may lead to an adverse emotional contagion by encouraging the organisation of in situ counter protests or online through Facebook / Twitter shit storms by non-state actors.
165. Authorities should assure that their messaging is broad and wide-reaching, encompassing all stakeholders and groups, including survivors, to reach a critical amount of people, to have an impact on group resilience. Authorities should assure that people who have concerns or are anxious, are offered a place to go to deal with these feelings.
166. Authorities should be aware of the “*combinatory effect*”<sup>568</sup> of emotional contagion and provide a mood picture congruent with their messaging.

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565 Gigerenzer 2004, 286.

566 Zadra and Clore 2011, 677.

567 Kaniasty and Norris 2004, 211.

568 Barsade 2002, 679.

167. Authorities should make use of research and have available a toolbox that will allow them to actively create moods (including anger or desire for vengeance) which could have fear-cancelling effects when needed, instead of only responding to emotions evoked by terrorist events.

*Affiliation Theory*

168. Authorities should facilitate the creation of frameworks that allow victims of terrorist attacks and their families who are especially vulnerable, to come together to benefit from affiliation.
169. Authorities should support the establishment or support existing frameworks that allow first responders who are especially vulnerable, to come together to benefit from affiliation.
170. Authorities should consider when deciding on the frequency of public messaging about terrorist threats (through government or media), that beyond the reception of necessary and actionable information that support coping, the majority of people may prefer distraction from the threat rather than continuous reminders.
171. Authorities should satisfy the need for cognitive clarity and reduce potential anxiety through accurate, timely, calm and transparent (as much as possible) information sharing.
172. Authorities should also make use of existing social and community structures and engage community leaders below the national level, to allow people to come together and find comfort in each other at the community level.
173. Authorities should facilitate opportunities for the people in the society to come together especially after an attack, as affiliation behaviour can help reduce anxiety in people and increase belonging (as it was done after the Attack on Charlie Hebdo).
174. Authorities should address children's need for cognitive clarity about the terrorism threat by providing the necessary information about the situation and explanations how the authorities are responding together with any information what the children themselves can do and address their questions.
175. Authorities should ensure that children are shielded from continuous exposure to messages without any new actionable information and rather be distracted and encouraged to continue to live their lives normally.

*Conservation of Resources Model*

176. Authorities must also consider compensation for losses endured, not necessarily due to terror attack, but already through a terror threat. For example, loss of income due to cancellations of events, based on intelligence assessments or on directly expressed threats that lead to the withdrawal of the authorities' permission to let the event start or continue.
177. Authorities should undertake all efforts to allow for a psychological closure and continuation of survivors' lives. It is important to those affected by an attack to see a fast trial and the punishment of the perpetrators (see *Just-World-Beliefs Theory* and *Robespierre Affect*). Until this has happened, their psychological well-being /resources may be impeded.
178. Authorities should ensure that psychological support and social support is provided to the survivors but also to their close family / mourning relatives affected by the attack, to allow them to continue their lives and routine as soon as possible.
179. Authorities should help to bring victims and their families (as soon as possible) into a state as close as possible to where they were before the attack happened, in order to allow them to continue their lives and close the terrorism chapter as soon as possible,

180. Authorities should provide sufficient funds in a timely fashion to pay for hospital costs, fund necessary operations, remodelling of the living spaces, if necessary, regular therapy and ongoing care to help to allow victims and their families to continue their lives. The financial obligations they previously fulfilled for themselves or dependents, need to be considered and covered.
181. Authorities should regularly conduct contingency planning exercises together with the providers of critical infrastructures and all stakeholders.
182. Businesses are an essential part of a vibrant and resilient community. If they are negatively impacted from an attack, the negative impacts on them are felt by multiple stakeholders. The authorities need to have these potential negative effects in mind when legislating, compensating and acting after an attack to try to minimize unnecessary hardship on businesses.
183. The authorities should encourage and support the business community to invest in their security (e.g. building security) and to work out business continuity plans in preparation for terror attacks, since businesses are an essential part of a vibrant and resilient community.
184. Authorities should conduct special contingency planning together with the critical infrastructure providers to reduce the potential social significance of the terrorism threat.
185. The authorities should educate and support the business community in what they can do to reduce the risk of attacks from happening at their site and how to reduce the impact of an attack if it happens, as businesses are an essential part of a vibrant and resilient community.
186. The authorities should focus on removing tangible and visible damages to infrastructure and ensuring its functionality as soon as possible after an attack.
187. Authorities should develop and apply a “resource loss questionnaire” as a “quick screening tool [...] to identify high-risk individual[s]” or groups to whom can then be administered the suitable level of care.<sup>569</sup>

*Social Support Deterioration Deterrence Model*

188. Authorities should facilitate the establishment of an inclusive community dialogue that will allow communities to be sensitized and reassured of their inclusiveness before the need arises and help disperse divisive rumours or suspicions. This can counteract the potentially corrosive effect of a religiously or ethnically motivated attack on the feeling of community embeddedness and cohesion.
189. Authorities should assure that if help is made available, it needs to be distributed fairly – based on relative needs, not based on status. Otherwise, it could harm community cohesion which itself is an important mitigating factor for adverse psychological reaction in a post-disaster scenario.
190. Authorities should provide early and abundant informational support to the most affected that gives a clear pathway and transparency about the way forward.

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569 Hobfoll *et al.* 2006, 215.

191. Authorities should enable and support the fostering of sources of non-formal social support that help preserve the sense of togetherness and connectedness in victims. This social support should be broadly based and nourished from the community level (through support from social groups and societies, victim support groups, workplace etc.) and most importantly the individual level (through social support from friends, family and next of kin).
192. Authorities should facilitate the creation, accessibility and use of alternatives sources for social interaction, sharing and grieving in order to mitigate the consequences of the loss of previously existing “natural” sources of social support after the terrorist attack.
193. Authorities should provide early, abundant, and visible social support including availability of emotional support to victimized individuals,
194. Authorities must show compassion for the victims, officially acknowledge the victims’ suffering, and give proof of societal/national solidarity.
195. Authorities should provide early, abundant, and visible social support including the availability of medical support to victimized individuals, including disaster medicine, restorative medicine, recovery medicine and psychological support.
196. Authorities should provide early, abundant, and visible social support, including availability of financial support to victimized individuals that may cover access to emergency fund for serving urgent payments, adequate level of compensation, medical costs, injury compensation, loss of property compensation, loss of business compensation.
197. Authorities should provide early, abundant, and visible social support to “vaccinate” the victimised individuals with the belief that support will be available if needed in the future.

