Moral Judgement
An Introduction through Anglo-American, German and French Philosophy
Abstract
This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works on moral judgement stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world – many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make good moral decisions.
As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue, moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it is by identifying the obligations tied to the multiple dimensions of our identities (e.g., friend, teacher, romantic partner, citizen) that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act. Yet, Aristotle and Kant also remind us that doing so requires the acquisition of moral virtues which allow us to better discern practical reasons in concrete situations.
Schlagworte
action Aristotle Continental Philosophy normativity reason moral judgement moral theory Kant- i–viii Preface i–viii
- 1–14 Introduction 1–14
- 205–214 Notes 205–214
- 215–220 References 215–220
- 221–228 Index 221–228