
The double force of European categories: “Religion”, “language”, and “territory” as tools of domination and critique¹

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“Religion”, “language”, and “territory” are fundamental semantic topoi in narratives about European integration. At the same time, they lend plausibility to emancipatory imaginations of community. Thus, they are the basis for institutional orders but also open opportunities for voicing critique. The article elucidates this double force by presenting findings from empirical work that examines three levels relevant to the topic: first, the European Union and the Council of Europe, second, German and French public action in the sphere of integration policies, and third, individual actors in Germany and France. The categories of religion, language, and territory are drawn on to translate institutional orders of domination into the praxis of public action and to support practical judgments. Studying how these categories are used is not only useful in describing the interdependencies, processes and interactions that underlie power relations and that can contribute to changing them, they also reveal the Europeanization of normative action.

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“Religion”, “language”, and “territory” are fundamental semantic topoi in narratives about European and national integration (Noiriel, 2005). Moreover, they have been for some time; not only in the context of recent debates about admitting refugees to Germany or the Jihadist terror attacks in France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. As such, these categories contribute to justifying the institutional orders of nation-states, of the European Union (EU), and of the Council of Europe. On the other hand, they are also the foundation for categorizations employed in developing instruments for integration policies and in structuring areas of state competence and jurisdiction. However, “religion”, “language”, and “territory” are not only topoi and categories of governance regimes. Social emancipation movements also draw on them with the aim of calling into question state orders and their (re)production of inequalities. These groups also shape imaginations of community related to concepts of religion, language, and national territory by drawing on the states’ narratives of integration and the categories of integration policies;

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they do so to demand equal treatment or equal rights or to claim recognition of their particular identity. “Religion”, “language”, and “territory” thus bring a double force to bear: a structural force imposed by regimes and an emancipatory force of contestation. On the one hand, these categories are utilized to dominate individuals, control or even stigmatize their modes of action, and prevent equal treatment or access to rights (Tilly 1998). Yet they also support the capacities of individuals to act and to criticize social conditions and political constraints. Consequently, these topoi and the institutional categories derived from them are not only the foundation for institutional orders of domination (Jenkins, 2000). They are also part of the critique that is raised against these orders and contribute to constructions of identity and the emergence of demands for recognition by society (Brubaker, 2015; Jenkins, 1994; Honneth, 1992).

The double force of institutional categories—their force of securing order and of contesting the latter—is also revealed in research on migration and integration. Religious affiliation or secularity, language competence, and identification with a territorially constituted nation are also addressed, albeit if in varying manners, as categories for studies in the social sciences that evaluate how immigrants and their descendants are included in social relations and that identify the achievements and deficits of integration strategies (Obendorfer, Koenig and Diehl, 2017; Tucci and Grohsamberg, 2008). Public policy analyses draw on the categories “religion”, “language”, and “territory” to highlight institutional discrimination (Gomolla and Radke, 2009). Recent assimilation theories discuss these three topoi as categories of symbolic boundaries (Alba, 2005; Gans, 2007). Work inspired by postcolonial studies shows how emancipation or empowerment can take shape through public affirmation of religious, linguistic, or national differences in relation to majorities in societies (Göle, 2015). Research on transnationalism also builds on the analysis of religious, linguistic, or national alterity to describe and explain diaspora relationships generated across the borders of nation-states and diaspora ties that are at times maintained over several generations (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2017).

The various approaches and diverse results of migration and integration research bring attention to a contradictory interplay of the structural and the emancipatory force of categories of public action. Furthermore the historically discernible interdependencies between European narratives on integration, public action in the realm of integration policy, and emancipation movements point to processes generated by this contradictory interplay. Examining the latter can help social scientists avoid reproducing the discursive patterns of state narratives on integration and public action on integration policies or the discursive patterns of emancipation movements in their research. Furthermore, scrutinizing this interplay offers opportunities to deconstruct these discursive patterns from a pragmatic perspective and to elucidate the potential of categories for fostering capabilities to act (Dewey, 2002; Çağlar and Glick Schiller, 2011; Zimmermann, 2006, 2017).

The discursive patterns of state narratives, public action and emancipation movements have to be considered as elements of a common context of interaction, in which social scientists take part on the basis of their approaches to and uses of the categories “religion”, “language”, and “territory”. This context of interaction is unavoidably associated with processes of “superordination and subordination” (Simmel, 2013: 160). Through which the capability to act and the capability to dominate refer to one another and through which the possibilities to define public problems and to deal with them are determined (Bourdieu, 1987; Groenemeyer, 2012; Spector and Kitsue, 1987; Zimmermann, 2003). To the backdrop of these analytical interests and based on my own empirical studies, the following article will unravel the use of the topoi of religion, language, and territory on three levels (Tietze, 2012)—first on the European level, second on the level of German and French public action in the sphere of integration policies, and third on the level of individual actors in Germany and France. I will begin by addressing the semantic

topographies created by the use of “religion”, “language”, and “territory” concepts in official European documents— treaties, regulations, conventions, and state reports or in statements made by the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe (1.). In the next step, the use of these three topoi as categories of public action will be considered by examining German and French public action that addresses issues related to immigration in the spheres of policies on religion, on language, and on residency regulations (2.). Finally, I will demonstrate, on the basis of interviews that I have conducted in the course of case studies, the roles and functions of these three categories within individual constructions of belonging, in relation to Muslim, Kabyle, or Palestinian imaginations of community in Germany and France (3.). The article will conclude with a brief consideration of the asymmetry of the interactions structured by the double—governmental and emancipatory—force of the categories of public action in the sphere of integration policies (4.).

1. The topographies of territorial, religious, and linguistic semantics in European narratives on integration

In the narratives developed by the authors of documents from the EU and the Council of Europe, the topoi of “religion”, “language”, and “territory” serve to describe “the world of patterned, organized and symbolically-templated ‘ways-of-doing-things’” and in doing so contribute to generating and stabilizing institutional orders (Jenkins, 2000: 10). The meanings associated with these topoi form semantic topographies that, in interaction with other topoi (such as “equality”, “liberty”, or “economic growth”) and their semantic topographies, convey and legitimise the European institutions.

1.1. Topographies of the category of “territory”

In contrast to the EU, the Council of Europe is an international organisation rooted in the principle of respecting member states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty over their territory. At the same time, its statute refers to “the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons [...] of human rights and fundamental freedoms” as the “common heritage” of its members (Council of Europe, 1949, ETS 1, art. 3, 1). Thus, with respect to these meanings, in Council of Europe documents, territory is not only a category of international law with which distinctions regarding national jurisdictions are made. By linking this category to the concept of “heritage”, the category also marks a political culture characterized by universal human rights and fundamental freedoms that are independent of territorial distinctions. The authors of the Councils’ documents—that is, the representatives of the nation-states that are members of this organization—have declared that this political culture is a response to the experience of wars in the twentieth century. In this cultural sense, the Council’s concept of “territory” incorporates ethical and moral meanings. These meanings oblige the member states of the Council of Europe to guarantee in their territories human rights and basic liberties that they define as universal and thus supra-territorial. This understanding, the Council argues, prevents intra-state conflicts and violent border disputes. The Explanatory Report of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, for example, asserts that “far from reinforcing disintegrating tendencies, the enhancement of the possibility to use regional or minority languages in the various spheres of life can only encourage the groups who speak them to put behind them the resentments of the past which prevented them from accepting their place in the country in which they live and in Europe as a whole” (Council of Europe, ETS 148, Explanatory Report).

Like the Council of Europe, the EU is also founded, according to its self-understanding, on a “common heritage” that encompasses “the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and

of respect for human rights” (Document on the European Identity, 1973). Moreover, the authors of EU documents, like their Council of Europe counterparts, refer to memories of the experience of large-scale violence in the twentieth century, emphasizing in particular the phenomena of anti-Semitism and antiziganism. In contrast to their colleagues at the Council of Europe, however, they link the common heritage that determines identity to a concept of post-sovereign space (Jureit and Tietze, 2016). In this space, territory becomes a category that distinguishes the member states from one another. As such, it conveys an understanding of the rule of law, of bans on discrimination, and of social justice—all of which are associated with the goal of “build[ing] a society” rather than merely building an international organization (*ibid.*). In this context, the category of territory first assumes a legal meaning in determining the jurisdictions of member states for specific policy areas, such as EU citizens’ social welfare or how applications for political asylum are dealt with. At the same time, territory serves to define and ensure equal status for member states and equal treatment of EU citizens within the union. In this sense, it becomes a legal and political instrument for bans on discrimination that structure the EU space (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 21). As such, it is an integral element of the ethical meanings that are ascribed to the post-sovereign European space in EU documents, by virtue of the fact that these documents respect “cultural, religious and linguistic diversity” (Article 22 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and also enforce bans on discrimination (Kleinschmidt, 2015; Tietze, 2015). Defining the limits of diversity is within the jurisdiction of member states, because the EU also respects the “national identities” of its member states (TEU Art. 4 (2)). With respect to the protection of national identities, the authors of EU documents reproduce classic concepts of national territory as containers of identity, concepts that are also found in the Council of Europe documents.

A contradiction pervades the semantic topography of “territory” found in EU narratives. “Territory” becomes, on the one hand, an instrument for enforcing equality within the EU space; on the other hand, as in the Council of Europe documents, it ensures the territorial integrity of member states and contributes considerably to determining and maintaining national identity. No such contradiction becomes apparent in the documents of the Council of Europe. In the latter, “territory” is a topos that member states use in their narratives to mark a “superpositive excess” of meaning and to foreground the “socio-political intentions” of institutional orders (Reemtsma, 2001: 145).

1.2. Topography of the category of “religion”

Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and article 10 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union guarantee the freedom of religion; on this basis, religion is understood to be a fundamental perception of the world and life that is chosen by a person and that she or he manifests in the public sphere. The principle of equal treatment spelled out by the Council of Europe and the EU in Article 14 of the ECHR and Article 21 of the EUCFR compliments freedom of religion. Just as individuals may not be discriminated against because of their origins, color of their skin, gender, or economic status, their religious beliefs should also not lead to discrimination.

Religious freedom and equality assign different content to the topos of “religion”. The first is based on meanings that center on the profession of faith. “Religion” differs here fundamentally from politics and is absolutely incomparable with the other forms of alterity protected by the principle of equal treatment. This difference justifies the special status of “religion” in the public sphere. Alterity that is rooted in the profession of faith must therefore be respected and legally protected, in so far as it does not constitute an “instrument of power” (Parliamentary Assembly, 1999, Rec. 1396). In the semantic context of religious equality, however, religion is seen as “one among many markers of dif-

ference” (European Commission and EUMC, 2003: 103). The category of religion does not point to a special phenomenon that might call for special regulations or specific groups to be targeted by European policymaking; instead, it points to religious alterity, which is comparable here to other forms of alterity.

As soon as the authors of the European documents begin to relate the religion-topos to the semantics of culture, they lose sight of absolute religious alterity. “Religion” becomes for them something that is unique to Europe, its history, and its political norms. In this respect, “religion” also takes on ethical meaning in the narratives. It stands for something that can “make society more humane and spread ethical and moral values within society” (Parliamentary Assembly, 1998, Doc. 8270). Religious communities and policymakers share, in this context, the obligation to secure non-violent coexistence within pluralist European society. Moreover, “religion” is culturalized from an historical perspective. In doing so, the authors of official documents focus not only on the cultural achievements of religious communities but also on the violence that members of various religious communities have experienced in European states. Descriptions of contemporary European pluralism, in contrast, are grounded in part in a category of religion that draws on the semantics of identity. Here, the authors of official European documents regard religion in the sense of equal treatment and, on the same level as language and culture, as a part of personal identity. The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, for example, obliges signatory states to enable the members of national minorities “to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage” (Council of Europe, ETS 157). This focus implies that “religion” is also seen as “a symbol for race and ethnicity” (European Commission and EUMC, 2003: 61) and supports the representation of Europe as “unified in diversity”—to cite the official EU motto.

The authors of the European documents relate the four semantic modes without exception to all religious communities, but they focus primarily on the three monotheistic world religions, namely, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. All three are elements of a specific European heritage but not on the same level and not with the same emphasis. In reading these documents, one has the impression that Christianity is more European than Judaism or Islam. The last two are the subject of specific mentions, documents, or provisions that explicitly declare them to be part of European self-understanding. For the Christian religion, in contrast, this is apparently taken for granted. Judaism occupies a special position in documents that focus on the European culture of memory and symbolizes in particular what Europe should no longer be. “The European Union was born from the ashes of the Holocaust” (European Commission and EUMC, 2003: 99). Pronouncements like these create the impression that Judaism’s belonging to Europe results chiefly from the persecution and murder of European Jews during the Holocaust. Judaism is hardly mentioned other than as part of the combined term ‘Judeo-Christian heritage’. Furthermore, European documents generally refer to questions of Jewish religious practice when they discuss and condemn anti-Semitism. As a result, in contexts that utilize the semantics of ethics with respect to religion, Judaism is focused on mainly in the role of a victim, rather than as a moral agent in Europe. In European narratives, Islam belongs to Europe chiefly for two reasons: first, because of the achievements of Islamic intellectuals as mediators between European antiquity and the Middle Ages, and second, because of the presence of immigrants of Islamic faith in contemporary European states. Thus, the authors of these documents refer to Islam with the semantics of culture and identity and render the Islamic religion as an element of what is uniquely European. At the same time, the Islamic religion, in contrast to the Jewish religion, is represented in

the documents of the EU and the Council of Europe as a part of the non-European world, which does not share the same norms and ideals of freedom, plurality, and democracy.

1.3. Topographies of the category of “language”

On the basis of the topos of “language”, the authors of Council of Europe and EU documents categorize social groups in relation to the territories of nation-states. The legal, cultural, identity, and ethical meanings that are ascribed to the topos of language with respect to its distinctions of groups are thus closely linked to those of the category of territory. National languages enjoy priority legally and culturally with respect to the determination of identity and ethical considerations that determine the classification of other languages of a nation-state’s territory; these can be regional or minority languages or the languages of immigrants. The EU’s demands with respect to multilingualism and the 24 official languages of the EU institutions clearly reflect the hierarchization of language categories: “The EU is home to over 60 indigenous regional or minority languages, spoken by some 40 million people. [...] While it is national governments that determine these languages’ legal status and the extent to which they receive support, the European Commission maintains an open dialogue, encouraging linguistic diversity to the extent possible” (https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/multilingualism_en [3-4-2018]). If the authors of Council of Europe and EU documents relate the language category to collectives, then they use the category in the sense of cultural semantics: “Language is the most direct expression of culture; it is what makes us human and what gives each of us a sense of identity” (European Commission COM 2005/0596). In documents from the Council of Europe and the EU, not only regional and minority languages but also the languages of migrants are labeled on the basis of the category of territory.

The connotations of the language topos that mark culture and identity also produce ethical meanings. Thus, in European narratives, protection of minority languages indicates what Europe should not represent: National Socialism and Communist totalitarianism, alongside the persecution of minorities that these two ideologies are associated with. Moreover, the cultural and identity-related meanings of the language category are constitutive for the recognition of pluralism in society. The European Commission describes the acquisition of foreign languages skills as a way “to become more open to other people’s cultures and outlooks” (European Commission COM 2005/0596). EU narratives also ascribe competence to the topos of “language”. Language competence is an instrument with which people can “take advantage of the freedom to work or study in another Member State” and is therefore essential for free movement in the EU’s post-sovereign space (European Commission COM 2003/0449).

What appears to underlie the semantic topography of the language category on a European level is a concept of the order of national pluralism in Tocqueville’s sense, which W. E. Connolly summarized as follows: “[T]he pluralist imagination of Tocqueville [...] is territorial, national and arboreal in form. [...] It consists of a national trunk of common mores rooted in the soil of Christianity with numerous limbs branching out so far as their connection to the trunk allows” (Connolly, 1996: 54). If we apply Connolly’s metaphor to the semantic topography of “language”, then Europe appears in the narratives of the Council of Europe and the EU to be a kind of well-kept forest. This forest is nourished by the humus of Europe’s cultural heritage and consists of trees with the nation-states as trunks and diverse minority cultures as branches. If a person wants to live in this forest, however, then she is obliged to adapt to the network of branches of one of the trees. The concept of the minority occupies a central position in this metaphor, in so far as it ascribes a position to groups on a geographical (in the case of regional languages), numerical (in the case of minority languages), and territorial-historical (in the case of immigrant languages) level and subjects them to the control of nation-states.

The semantic topoi that are ascribed to “language”, “religion”, and “territory” in narratives about European integration introduce contradictions and tensions into the well-kept order of the European forest. With “a certain historical irony” (Coulemas, 1991: 14), these topoi not only shift standards by relating the individual nation-state trees in the forest to one another. What is more, the semantic topoi—especially the competence meanings of “language”, the profession-of-faith meanings of “religion”, and the ethical meanings derived from “territory” with respect to European political culture—generate notions of equality that call into question the orders of pluralism founded in the nation-state and introduce a new dynamic into public discourse on these orders.

2. The structural force of categories: “territory”, “language”, and “religion” in French and German public action

The European topographies of “religion”, “language”, and “territory” influence national narratives about integration in the member states of the EU and the Council of Europe and, conversely, these European narratives emerge from national narratives. Nonetheless, these interdependencies do not mean that the differences between the narratives of the member states and their public action in the realm of integration policies disappear, in particular when public action in the sphere of integration policies aims to emphasize the identity meanings of the “territory” topos. The European semantic topographies are interlinked with legal and political-normative principles and therefore set standards for defining national public policies and for determining national public action on integration policies (Koenig, 2007). Yet, these principles and standards are translated into categories of integration policies on the basis of diverse historical and institutional configurations (Laborier and Trom, 2003). The European meanings of the three topoi, as well as the legal and political-normative principles and standards associated with them, interact with the specific knowledge of each nation-state and the corresponding categories of religion, language, and territory (Raphael, 1996). The following section aims to demonstrate this interaction. It begins by addressing the contrasting developments of integration policies in Germany and France in order to describe how the structural force of the categories of territory, language, and religion shapes integration policies in the two countries. I will then consider two examples—German integration policies towards Muslim immigrants and their descendants and the development of French language policy, especially as it relates to schools—in order to outline how these interactions generate shifts and changes in the way in which problems of integration policies are defined and dealt with on the basis of public action.

2.1. German and French narratives on integration

In the post-war years, the dominant view held in Germany and France was that the territory of the state delimited an economic container. This container was rooted in a Fordist concept of economic relations and thus in a system of “tiers of inequalities” (Castel, 2009). As a concept designed to fit the white man who spoke the national language, whose background was shaped by a Christian religion and who was generally employed in industry, this idea relegated migrants, “guest workers”, immigrants from the former colonies and their descendants, and women to a “residual” or “peripheral” position within the German or French working population (Castel, 1995: 597).

In the 1950s, German public action with respect to migrants in Germany was rooted in economic concerns about reconstruction and the projected development of the domestic workforce. The upward social mobility that many of the country’s citizens experienced was seen as justifying integration of those who had been expelled or fled from the former German provinces in Eastern Europe and from the Soviet zone and East Germany as

well as labor recruitment abroad, which began in the late 1950s. In the same period, economic concerns also shaped perceptions of migrants and refugees in France. However, French narratives in the 1950s were shaped by a transformation triggered by decolonialization. As France's former colonies gained independence, the French government and other interest groups were forced to abandon the imperial categories and standards for economic calculations they had upheld as long as the country was a colonial power. France's economic capacities now had to be based solely on its European territory. France's former colonial subjects become foreign workers.

In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, categorizations on the basis of the "religion" and "language" topoi became increasingly significant in defining integration policies, in particular in the context of family reunification following labor migration. Family reunification rose considerably after recruitment of foreign workers was officially ended by France in 1972 and by Germany in 1973 (Berlinghoff, 2013). The presence of families from abroad on French and German territory was framed as a temporary arrangement. The religious practices and languages of immigrants and their families were regarded as the expression of a foreign nationality and served to justify the conceptualization of temporary integration and discriminatory practices with respect to civil rights and access to social services and benefits. In France, the notion of a temporary and economically legitimated pluralization of what was imagined as national homogeneity, was accompanied by the republican promise that anyone could become a French citizen through work and education—in other words, based on their personal merits. The contradiction between the meritocratic narrative on immigration and integration and the narrative on immigrants as only temporarily present on France's state territory, not only undermined the persuasiveness of both narratives but also reproduced the hierarchies of the colonial distinction between here and there. The meritocratic narrative referred primarily to Western European labor migrants (as Italians, for example) and refugees from the Warsaw Pact states. The "temporary-arrangement" narrative was applied for the most part to those who came to France as immigrants or refugees from its former colonies (in particular in North Africa). In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, this contradiction in the integration narratives led to increasing critique and protest on the part of immigrants' descendants. At the same time, the contradiction repeatedly triggered violent responses to the discrepancies and ambivalence that accompanied it. The social conflicts generated by this contradiction found their expression in phenomena such as urban unrest (the so-called *émeutes*) (Tucci and Groh-Samberg, 2008) and the rising number of voters who support the right-populist political party Front National. However, both these phenomena merely permanently reproduce these discrepancies and ambivalence.

In Germany, in contrast, where the legal context differed from that in France, a similar meritocratic narrative on integration could not become established in the 1970s and 1980s. Instead, a narrative emerged that conceptualized the German territory as composed of *Sozialräume* (social spaces) represented by municipalities and neighborhoods. The critique of this narrative was marked by two competing, alternative culturalistic ideas, which dominated German debates on integration policies into the 1990s. Both narratives related the territory to the imagination of a cultural and religious community. One position advocated retaining the culture of origin, including the languages and the religious practices of immigrants, as a means of achieving a "multicultural society" which was a goal that municipalities and neighborhoods were expected to promote. The second position was diametrically opposed and founded on having immigrants and refugees return to their country of origin. In this case, learning German or including Muslim religious practice in the institutional order were considered unnecessary, because the specific cultures and religions (especially Islam) were seen as incompatible with other preexisting cultures and religions on the German state territory. The debates centering on these two

conflicting, culturalistic narratives escalated in the 1980s and early 1990s, to the extent that the controversy created a discursive space in which racist acts of violence could occur in Germany. In retrospect, the arsonist attack on a house in Solingen, which was perpetrated shortly after the so-called “asylum compromise” was reached in 1993 and in which five people were killed and seventeen suffered serious injuries, can be identified as a watershed (Herbert, 2001). In the ensuing period, a narrative on migration, refugees, and integration in relation to legal issues gained ascendancy. This shift was the prerequisite for reform of Germany’s citizenship law implemented in 2000 as well as for the immigration law enacted in 2004, which sets the standards for Germany’s current integration policies. In the context of these policies, opportunities for migrants to learn German and evaluating the German language skills of immigrants and their descendants have become key instruments of integration policies. Furthermore, including Islam in the regime that regulates the separation of religion and the state is now considered an issue to be dealt with by integration policies, including policies labeled “naturalization of Islam” (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, 2005).

In France, where the meritocratic narrative has shaped how legal questions are addressed since the 1970s, there was no similar shift with respect to public action in the realm of integration politics in the 1990s and 2000s. Currently, legal claims regarding citizenship and naturalization continue to be identified with the abstract and universal French concepts of equality and integration. These concepts mean that it is possible to distinguish the population according to social status. However, they also conceal intersections between social inequality, the experience of migration, French colonial history, and diverse language and religious practices behind a “veil of ignorance” (Estèbe, 2015). “No form of particularism can [justify] claims to special political rights” (Marcou, 2002: 57). In France, state institutions and public action are supposed to generate and monitor territorial unity. Their role is to compensate social inequalities in the various areas of the national territory with the help of welfare-state instruments for redistribution and, by means of state education policies, to emancipate people from their various communities of origin and develop their capacities to participate in republican civil culture. Within this framework, representatives of the French state and administration (at least officially) address solely social and economic differences between citizens and those immigrants who are legally permitted to reside on French territory, as well as differences related to their respective places of residence, work, and education. Thus, the diverse religious needs of immigrants come into focus for public action only to the extent that they are linked to inequalities that are socio-structural and that can be addressed territorially.

2.1. Public action and the category of religion: A German example

Under Germany’s former citizenship law, religious practices of Muslims were defined as extraterritorial factors that were localized beyond the state’s borders (Galembert, 2003). This extraterritorial conceptualization assumes the congruence of the national state territory and a specific cultural community as well as the congruence of a specific cultural community and a religious community. Issues related to the Muslim religion were therefore delegated to the Turkish state. Underlying this policy is the notion that affiliations with religious communities are a cultural trait of groups that can be localized territorially. It builds upon the idea that religious affiliation and the practice of a specific religion is an expression of loyalty towards both a religious community and a political entity. Thus, there is a prevalent assumption that being Muslim is part of being Turkish, just as being Catholic is equated with being Bavarian and Protestantism is equated with being from northern Germany (Çağlar, 1996). Ascribing religious denominations territorially—nationally, locally, or regionally—has its roots in the development of German states with

a predominant religious denomination in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Schilling, 1998). On the other hand, it promotes the idea that religious affiliation and citizenship have ethnic foundations; that is, that they are supported by “birth and ancestry”, as Paul Kirchhof, a former judge at the German Federal Constitutional Court, has asserted in the context of the introduction of European citizenship (Kirchhof, 1992: 866). Since the reform of the citizenship law in 2000, policy makers on the local, state (the German Länder), and federal levels of German government have negotiated with other stakeholders about the “naturalization of Islam”. Their predominant perspective is that Muslim religious practice is an expression of ethnicity and is, as immigrants become potential citizens, an issue to be dealt with by domestic government. Public action that addresses the inclusion of Muslim religious practice in the German regime of the separation of state and religion is based primarily on an application of the category of religion on the terms of the semantics of identity. This framing is demonstrated, for example, by the concept behind the establishment, in 2006, of the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islam Conference, DIK) and its goals. The German Ministry of the Interior perceived the DIK as a means of promoting “the integration, in the spheres of religion and social policies, of the Muslim population” (Bundesinnenministerium, 2006). The DIK related discussions about regulating Muslim religious practice to security concerns posed by terrorist groups and to issues of social policy such as “growing deficits of Muslim immigrants in education and on the job market” (ibid). In establishing the DIK, the representatives of the German Ministry of the Interior extended the differences of professing a faith between Muslims, Christians, or Jews to differences that distinguished the Muslims as a social group from the Germans. The policy-makers involved mixed challenges related to policies on religion and problems of a socio-structural nature, to transform “religion” into an instrument of policies on integration that subsumed activities of Muslims in society under a single topos. Nonetheless, according to Germany’s self-definition as a secular state governed by the rule of law, questions of religion are to be dealt with independent of other social and political issues. Given the special status of professions of faith, religious issues are subject to special regulations. Moreover, in Germany, policies on religion fall within the jurisdiction of the Länder and their governments and administrations. The DIK is thus an instrument of integration policy that, while it symbolizes the intention of the nation-state to realize the inclusion of Muslims, does not deal with the conflicts involved on a practical level. This practical work takes place on the level of the Länder, in conflicted negotiations about Staatsverträge over who is authorized to draw up curricula for teaching Muslim religion in schools, or about training theological staff to teach these classes.

2.2. Public action and the category of language: a French example

“La langue de la République est le français” [The language of the Republic is French] is the first sentence of Article 2 of the French constitution. This sentence, which was introduced prior to ratification of the EU’s Maastricht treaty, invokes the phrase used to refer to the public school system L’école de la République [the school of the Republic]. The intention is thus to identify the political ethic of the republican educational system with the national language and make the presence of the political ethic felt symbolically. This “astonishing reference” in effect “delegitimizes all other languages in France” ... “just as the expression ‘école de la République’ implies that any school that is not subject to the state’s authority is illegitimate” (Encrevé, 2002: 134).

Paradoxically, as a result of the political and moral meanings ascribed to France’s national language, the acquisition of language skills by migrants and their descendants was not assigned a high political priority in the sphere of public action on integration policies until well into the 1990s—and this pertained to both French and the language of origin. That

the children of migrants would speak French when they attended the école de la République was taken for granted. Moreover, it was expected that migrants would be competent in French, as a kind of positive effect of the French colonial period. Trust in the assimilative power of republican institutions thus led to indifference on the part of the state towards the, at times, considerable language problems that immigrants faced. Furthermore, it concealed complex and confusing administrative practices aimed at regulating the social integration of immigrants' family members who followed their relatives to France (Lazaridis, 2001: 203). It was not until 1995 that acquiring language skills was recognized as a problem of integration policies and the instruments of language policies in public action were redefined. State organs first determined the needs of migrants with respect to language education and defined the extent of measures needed; the task of realizing these language programs was delegated to various public and private institutions. Since 2007, newly arrived migrants are obliged to participate in a "parcours personnalisé d'intégration républicaine" [personalized program for republican integration] within the framework of the Contrat d'Intégration Républicaine and the language courses it includes (Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration, 2016).

In France, supplemental language lessons in immigrants' language of origin, which are organized on the basis of bilateral treaties with the countries of origin and can be implemented as a result of agreements reached by the Council of Europe, have always been regarded with distrust by state authorities and, in contrast to public action in Germany, have not been viewed as a tool for promoting integration. In the second half of the 1990s, the Haut Conseil à l'Intégration (High Council for Integration, HCI) advocated measures within the school system to ensure the rights of children to become more familiar with their families' language of origin and the traditions of their families' milieu. However, in 2004, the members of the Commission Stasi recommended abolishing supplementary language courses in the languages of origin because it purportedly impeded *cohésion sociale* (Rapport Stasi, 2004). They proposed that instead, foreign language instruction should be given a higher priority for all pupils and that Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish, or Berber languages, for example, should be taught without reference to their significance as the language of origin for immigrants to France (ibid: 118-119). Beyond the realm of the public school system, Arabic as well as Berber languages that are spoken in North Africa are recognized as "langues de France" within the framework of the official *patrimoine linguistique français*, which defines how France implements the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. These languages therefore come under the jurisdiction of the Délégation générale à la langue française of the Ministry of Culture. The Délégation is responsible for promoting the dissemination and use of the French language and also for fostering the *langues de France* within the sphere of cultural policies. As a result, North-African Arabic and the Berber languages of North Africa are reduced to their cultural significance and, in a manner of speaking, made to serve the goals of French cultural policy.

3. The transforming force of the categories of "religion", "language", and "territory": Muslim, Kabyle, and Palestinian imaginations of community in Germany and France

As discussed in the previous section, the categories of "religion", "language", and "territory" make it possible to translate narratives about national integration into structures and goals for public action (Commaille, 2014). In this process, they not only produce social groups that can be addressed with political demands and described (Giraud et al, 2018; Müller, 2014; Renard 2018), in part by using "statistical arguments" (Desrosières, 2008). They also contribute to identifying and justifying problems that should be dealt with through public action. The three categories thus represent constitutive instruments

for shaping the biopolitical policies (in Michel Foucault's sense) with which migration is to be administered and pluralism in society can be controlled. Their capacity to establish hierarchies of different groups in society, to discriminate groups with regard to their access to rights, or to stigmatize some and not others is founded to a large extent on the ascriptions, shifts, and denial of the meanings of the topoi of "religion", "language", and "territory"—for example, the focus of the religion category on its semantics of identity and its special legal status or the outdated culturalization of languages of origin. With respect to the hierarchizations, discrimination, and stigmatization that are associated with such shifts and denials of meaning (Martiniello and Simon, 2005; Noiriel, 1997), individual actors draw on the public action categories of "religion", "language", and "territory" to shape their constructions of belonging to imagined communities. I will elucidate this further in the following paragraphs by presenting findings from case studies about Muslim, Kabyle, and Palestinian constructions of belonging among immigrants in Germany and France.

In their imaginations of community, the interviewees in my case studies use the categories of "religion", "language", and "territory" to relate their constructions of Muslim, Kabyle and Palestinian belonging to the institutional orders in Germany or in France. They problematize, on the one hand, the discriminations and stigmatizations they experience in relation to these categories and express their feelings of injustice with their help. On the other hand, respondents evaluate public action in both countries on the basis of the categories' semantics as they appear in the European, German, or French narratives on integration. The three categories serve to describe and deal with problems in society. In this process, they become tools for voicing respondents' critique of German or French integration policies. Nonetheless, these categories can only assume this role in the Muslim, Kabyle, and Palestinian constructions of belonging if they are linked to the ideas and interests of each imagined community, as demonstrated by the narratives of the interlocutors interviewed for these case studies.

In their imaginations of their respective community, respondents confirm and reinforce ideas and interests of Islam, Kabyle language culture, or Palestinian nationalism. For example, they underline the links between the Kabyle language and geographical conditions in Kabylia by asserting that the Kabyle people's spirit of resistance stems from the region's harsh climate on Algeria's eastern Mediterranean coast. Such confirmations and reinforcements demonstrate that constructions of belonging involve "affirmative engagement" (de Certeau, 1990). This affirmative engagement represents a specific mode of action: the activity of believing (de Certeau, 1985). Independent of the realm of action to which it is linked (religion, mathematics, advertising, or politics, for example), this activity ties "speaking" to "doing", as de Certeau explains.

A dual movement is rooted in the activity of believing. According to de Certeau, in the course of the activity, people categorize objects and people and in doing so create order. Moreover, they develop alternatives to existing orders. Due to this dual movement, constructions of belonging overlap and call into question implicit understandings and institutionalized commitments. For example, by categorizing St. Augustine, Zinedine Zidane, and herself as Kabyles, one respondent first creates an order. At the same time, however, she outlines with that order an alternative to generally established classifications and groupings, such as those that consider St. Augustine to be part of European culture or Zidane to be a member of the French nation.

The alternative orders devised by people in the act of believing are only plausible when and if they are set in relation to the institutional order beyond the imagined community. To refer to another person as a Muslim sister or Muslim brother does not, for example, become compatible with the acts of third parties in an interaction until this label is situated within the community in relation to the rules for Islamic life, or for active participa-

tion in the community life of a mosque. With respect to its general plausibility in society, this classification as a sister or brother must refer implicitly or explicitly to the category of “religion” and the relevant public action. Similarly, the community work of Palestinian associations in Berlin only acquires a specific Palestinian meaning because representatives of these organizations relate this community work to the memory of nakba, the displacement of Palestinians from what is today Israel. In doing so, they also take up a broader perspective that refers to the institutional category of “territory” and its possible meanings.

As these examples demonstrate, inner-communitarian ideas and interests become socially productive—at least in pluralistic societies—only through their nexus with public action categories. The extra-communitarian categories reframe individual acts of believing as more objective and make it possible to generalize the individual activity of believing. Moreover, they serve as a kind of transmission belt between the individual and the collective level, because they ensure that constructions of belonging are compatible with the acts of third parties within and beyond the imagined community. With regard to the categories of “religion”, “language”, and “territory” in national public action, it is apparent that they lend social plausibility to the alternative systems of order created by the constructions of belonging to transnationally imagined communities. Thus, reference to them is the keystone of critical practice, as it is developed by my respondents.

For example, one Muslim woman refers to the notion of the equality of men and women institutionalized in the Islamic faith to criticize the privileges of men in the mosque she attends. At the same time, she relates this inner-Islamic idea to the European ban on discrimination of women and criticizes the special gender discrimination that Muslim women are exposed to, for example by debates about the Islamic veil in France or by dismissive stares when a student wearing a head scarf applies for an internship. A Kabyle man explains that his personal mission is to create an alternative historical account of suppressed peoples by writing about the Kabyles. The way in which their language and culture has been suppressed today and throughout history, he argues, is proof of deficits in European concepts of democracy. A Palestinian points out that young Palestinians growing up in Berlin are “homeless people”, because they have no recognized “nationality” that ensures they have the same access to social rights and benefits afforded every other refugee.

These examples show that the categories of “religion”, “language”, and “territory” serve to expose credibility gaps between institutionalized ideas and the manner in which they are implemented in public action. While exposing credibility gaps, my respondents attribute different utopian and ideological functions to these categories (Ricoeur, 1986). Those who employ the categories in a utopian mode establish perspectives that are detached from social practices, and reject the social world based on an “all-or-nothing” logic. Those who proceed within the ideological mode attempt to use their constructions of belonging to conceal ambivalence, justify the power of an authority with respect to the imagined collective, and to achieve the integration of their imagined community. Practices of critique founded in constructions of belonging are thus based on a variety of utopian and ideological processes that shift and relocate the meaning of public action categories.

For all my respondents, the categories of “religion”, “language”, and “territory” serve an ideological function as a means of integrating the imagined community and delimiting its boundaries with respect to other social groups. This ideological function is demonstrated by the following example: “People [...] expect [Muslims] to sit still in a corner. And [most of them] do [just that]. But now there are a few who say ‘I won’t be quiet anymore.’ And at some point [...] some [organization, NT] will be recognized as a corporation under pub-

lic law [Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts, KdöR], and then [we will have proper representation]". The person who said this has decided that he no longer wants to remain silent about his situation; he confronted the teacher that refused to recommend his nephew for placement in a Gymnasium [the German secondary school that qualifies pupils for university entrance]. The teacher had argued that Turkish children were incapable of the level of achievement that had to be reached in order to succeed in this type of school. One could say that my respondents transform their respective imagination into specific German or French Muslim, Kabyle, or Palestinian communities by generalizing their individual constructions of belonging and their expressions of critique with the help of an ideological use of the public action categories of "religion", "language", and "territory". By relating their constructions of belonging and their feelings of injustice to these categories, they draw at the same time on legal rights and rules and on the semantic topographies in which they are embedded. The Muslims interviewed in the case studies refer to the public-action category of "religion" and link this category to individual rights, to its special status in the public sphere, and to demands for specific organizational structures. Kabyle respondents relate their constructions of belonging to the public action category of "language", which they discuss on the backdrop of France's history of immigration and French colonial history. Furthermore they link this category to minority rights asserted on the European level. In doing so, they refuse to accept the scheme of the *patrimoine linguistique français*, which relegates Berber languages to the status of a cultural phenomenon that needs to be preserved as if in a museum. Palestinian interviewees underline the significance of the institutional category of "territory" and refer to so-called habitual residence in Germany. The European legal concept of habitual residence enables them to relate their perception of legal and social injustice to their situation in Berlin. In this regard they articulate and pursue legal claims with respect to legalizing their residency status and to receiving social benefits in Germany.

Depending on whether a respondent assigns a utopian or an ideological function to a specific public action category, they play out different meanings of the European semantic topographies of the categories of "religion", "language", and "territory". When the interviewees who described themselves as Muslims, for example, elucidate feelings of injustice in regard to racial and ethnic stigmatization and discrimination, they adopt the meanings of the European category of "religion" with respect to professing faith. In doing so, they can expose the credibility gaps between individual religious freedom and anti-discrimination laws and their implementation in Europe. In these cases, religious freedom and the European ban on discrimination serve a utopian function. Additionally, they can also engage with the category of "religion" in an ideological mode to advocate equal representation in their dealings with the state. In this instance they emphasize the anti-discrimination law and draw on semantics of identity of the category of "religion".

4. The categories and their social impacts

Using semantics produced on the European level is not specific to Muslims' critique of German or French public action. All respondents refer to meanings that they explicitly locate on the level of the EU or the Council of Europe. With such references, they draw on the "socio-political intentions" (Reemtsma) that are embedded within institutional orders. In this respect they are neither more or less European than other actors who demonstrate their perception of injustice in public, for example, on the basis of imaginations of communities that functionalize the topos around "national sovereignty" for ideological and utopian goals. Nonetheless, they underline that "Europe" is a framework and a platform for "practical judgment" (De Munck and Zimmermann, 2015). Actors refer to Europe as a more or less undifferentiated configuration consisting of the EU and the Council of Europe and project in situ values (desirable principles) and norms (obligatory

principles) onto it. Their goal in doing so is to lend plausibility to their experience in society and their perceptions of injustice with respect to public action and to counter the power of national regimes over their individual options for action. Built on the European scale or framed by references to Europe, the practical judgements elucidated by my case studies mirror a form of European identity (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009: 4). This form of European identity is rarely been taken into consideration by analysis based on surveys, but participates in the processes of Europeanization (ibid: 8) and contributes to the politicization of European identities (ibid: 11).

While invoking the European scale for their practical judgments and thus attributing significance to it, my respondents at the same time functionalize, in an ideological and utopian manner, the national categories of religion, language, and territory. They reinterpret in their own way the three categories that structure the European and national narratives of integration and public action in the realm of integration policies and that characterize, last but not least, a specific use that social scientists make of the categories of religion, language, and territory for studying immigrants' integration (Johansen and Spielhausen, 2012). These categories, through which people and social pluralism are administrated and hierarchies between social groups are shaped, become venues of asymmetric interactions. In other words, the different meanings ascribed to "religion", "language", and "territory", on the one hand, and the diverse uses of these categories, on the other, inspire, respond to, reinforce, and/or transform one another. What is at stake in these interactions is the power to define access to rights and to equal treatment, plus to determine the "right" interpretation of integration as well as the limits of social pluralism. Because the relations underpinning these interactions are asymmetric, the categories of "religion", "language", and "territory" nonetheless constitute, as venues of these interactions, a breeding ground for reproducing inequality and discrimination.

This breeding ground for reproducing inequality and discrimination is based largely on the semantic polyphony of the categories of public action. As demonstrated in the first part of this article, the significances, ascribed to the topoi "religion", "language", and "territory" on the European level, oscillate between universal (non-national) values and norms, on the one hand, and affirmations of the national order of Europe, on the other. They open up the possibility to structure in different ways the narratives of European and national integration and thereby the possibility to counter the practical judgements of actors. The use of the three topoi as categories of public action on the level of German and French in the sphere of integration policies, duplicates this ambiguous polyphony and links it with political (in and for the national context determined) objectives, like administrating and restraining pluralism or securing hierarchies between social groups, as I have analyzed in the second part of this article. Framed by such political objectives, the categories of public action "religion", "language", and "territory" become powerful tools in the processes of "superordination and subordination" described by Simmel and their use generates public problems as well as advocates inequalities and discriminations.

In the final analysis, the European topoi and categories of religion, language, and territory incorporate a dynamic contradiction. Representing a breeding ground for inequalities and discriminations, they also recall and keep available the "socio-political intentions" embedded within the European and national institutional orders. In this respect, they represent venues of domination and of critique that politicizes inequalities and discriminations, as I tried to demonstrate by the case studies in the third part of this article. Alike the work organization influences the forms of protest or of resilience and resignation of workers (Linhart, 1978), the European topoi and categories of public action not only determine the practical judgements of those who criticize the redistribution of institutional goods, the out-put of public action or the unequal access to rights, but also produce

these criticized injustices. Fostering and constraining at the same time the capabilities to act, they contribute to transform the institutional orders, at least in the context of the EU, into open processes.

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