Towards a More Restrictive Interpretation of the Right to Liberty in Article 5(1) ECHR?

Julia Nordvang Johansen

doi:10.5771/1435-439X-2022-1-89

Contents
- Chapter Expand | CollapseAuthorsPage
- 1–2 Titelei/Inhaltsverzeichnis 1–2
- 3–14 The Rule of Law in International Economic Relations Thomas Cottier Thomas Cottier 3–14
- 15–74 Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement – Current State of Play at UNCITRAL EI – IILCC Study Group on ISDS Reform EI – IILCC Study Group on ISDS Reform 15–74
- 75–88 Die Verantwortlichkeit der Inhaber von Konten bei sozialen Netzwerken – eine Verschärfung der Anforderungen durch den EGMR durch sein Urteil Sanchez gegen Frankreich? Georg Ress Georg Ress 75–88
- 89–110 Towards a More Restrictive Interpretation of the Right to Liberty in Article 5(1) ECHR? Julia Nordvang Johansen Julia Nordvang Johansen 89–110
- 111–140 The Right to International Solidarity as a Game Changer when it comes to “Crimes of Solidarity”? Julia Jungfleisch Julia Jungfleisch 111–140
- 141–170 Conversion Therapy and its Compatibility with European Human Rights Law Marcus Veinan Marcus Veinan 141–170
- 171–184 CIL-FIT für die Zukunft? Julia Zöchling Julia Zöchling 171–184
- 185–207 Ultra-vires-Rüge im Namen des Volkes: Demokratiefördernd oder -belastend? Shu-Perng Hwang Shu-Perng Hwang 185–207
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ZEuS Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien , page 89 - 110

Towards a More Restrictive Interpretation of the Right to Liberty in Article 5(1) ECHR?

Autoren

Julia Nordvang Johansen

DOI
- doi.org/10.5771/1435-439X-2022-1-89
- ISSN: 1435-439X
- ISSN online: 2942-3589
Abstract

The contribution concerns the interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) of the right to liberty in Article 5 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It argues that the Court has interpreted the right to liberty restrictively by way of public security grounds, with the result that more room is given to interference by state authorities at the expense of individual protection, compared to earlier interpretations. This assertion is supported by the analyses of four Grand Chamber cases the author believes stands for a restrictive interpretation of Article 5 (1), either through a narrow interpretation of its scope, or a wide interpretation of its exceptions. The use of present-day conditions in the Court’s reasoning is examined to identify their role in the development towards a restrictive interpretation of the right to liberty, and it is argued that the restrictive approach is a variation of the method of ‘evolutive interpretation’. On the basis of the analyses, it is finally argued that the list of permissible detention grounds in Article 5 (1) is no longer exhaustive.
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