

A paradox in EU migration management

Abstract

Following the end of the Cold War, migration has, due to securitisation policies, been perceived as a source of insecurity by European societies. This has resulted in the introduction of restrictive migration policies in the member states of the European Union (EU). Similar to national migration policies, those that have resulted at the EU level are believed to be also restrictive. According to many academics, EU migration policies owe their restrictive nature also to the securitisation of migration in the EU. Paradoxically, according to projections for the next decades, the European economy is in need of migrants for its renovation. Following these lines, the argument followed in this article is that, despite the EU needing migrants, the securitisation of migration has been taking place in the EU, denoting a paradox in its approach to migration management.

Keywords: societal security, securitisation, migration, European Union

Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has undergone a transformation. Besides the traditional ones, academics have identified new sources of insecurities that are posing challenges in political and socio-economic terms rather than militaristic ones. Migration, being one of them, has become one of the main sources of insecurity for the member states of the European Union (EU). Migration is an interesting phenomenon that is related with many aspects of political organisation and society, and can be shown as the cause of many problems.

The issue has been a hot topic for political and social debates in EU member states since the early 1970s. In these debates, migration has been increasingly linked with security by political actors. In other words, a securitisation of migration may be observed in many member states of the EU. The result is that member states were able to adopt highly restrictive migration policies in the 1980s.¹

Today, the EU has many policies to deal with and manage migration. The common denominator of these policies is their restrictive nature, while migration issues have also been securitised in the EU. This securitisation has taken place in three connected themes related to the security of the internal market; the security of the cultural identities of European societies; and the security of welfare systems. The result of the securitisation of migration has been that migration and migrants are perceived by many sections of society as threats to their own survival.

1 In the study, the term ‘migration policy’ is used as a general category to define policies on immigration, asylum-seekers and refugees.

Paradoxical to securitisation and the presentation of migration and migrants as existential threats, the EU needs migrants to renovate its economy. It is known that the EU needs human power in the face of demographic ageing and it needs workers and experts in several sectors. Therefore, the EU has tried to be open to migration and to attract migrants. These two practices are in contradiction with each other and, together, they denote a paradox in the EU's approach to migration management.

This article seeks to discuss this argument in three main sections. It starts with a theoretical framework for security and securitisation, which is followed by a section on migration to Europe. The last section tries to discuss the securitisation of migration in the EU.

Security and securitisation

It has been identified that security is an essentially contested concept which is always about survival and about the avoidance of threats.² Scholars from the Copenhagen School say that security is an inter-subjective term as it is socially constructed through interactions.³ According to Waever, by whom the concept of securitisation was coined, security is 'a practice, a specific way of framing an issue'.⁴

Traditionally, security has been examined within the military-political context, in which it has been about the survival of the state and avoiding the existential threats posed to its sovereignty.⁵ However, scholars from the Copenhagen School have observed that:

An existential threat can only be defined in relation to the particular character of the referent object in question,

and, therefore, besides the military-political one, security referents (referent objects) and existential threats can be identified in several other subjects.⁶ According to them, there are five such contexts, or sectors, of security. These are the military; the political; the economic; the environmental; and the societal sectors.

These scholars have examined migration within the rubric of societal security. According to them, the referent objects within the societal sector are the large collective identity groups that 'function independent of the state, such as nations and religions'.⁷ Weaver notes that, in order to survive, a society has to preserve its identity.

2 Münevver Cebeci (2008) *Securitisation* unpublished lecture notes given on 12 December 2008 for the PhD course 'EU as a Global Actor' p. 2.

3 Münevver Cebeci (2004) *EU as a Desecuritization Project* unpublished lecture notes given on 27 April 2004 for the Masters course 'International Politics of the European Union' p. 5.

4 Ole Waever (1996) 'European Security Identities' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34(1): 103-129 at p. 106.

5 Tariq Siddqui (2008) *Securitization Theory and Its Application in Migration* unpublished paper submitted to Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit, Dhaka, pp. 1-32.

6 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 21.

7 *Ibid.* p. 119.

Therefore, existential threats in the societal sector are represented by those developments that tend to change or impede the preservation of the identities of those collective identity groups.⁸ Weaver *et al.* comment that:

Societal security concerns the ability of the society to persist its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats... therefore societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms.⁹

According to this definition:

Societal security is about the preservation of traditional patterns of language, culture, association and religious and national identity, within acceptable conditions for evolution.¹⁰

Such a definition of societal security inevitably links it to nations and ethnic groups on the European continent.¹¹ According to the scholars, these identity-based collective groups perceive migration as a threatening development for the preservation of their identities. They view migration as a threat to their identities because they think that their identities will be 'overrun and diluted' by incomers and, as a result, that their community will cease to be what it is.¹² In a similar vein, Huysmans says that:

Migration is identified as one of the main factors weakening national tradition and societal homogeneity. It is reified as an internal and external danger for the survival of the national community or western civilization. This discourse excludes migrants from the normal fabric of society, not just as aliens but as aliens who are dangerous to the reproduction of the social fabric.¹³

Unlike security, the concept of securitisation has a clearer explanation. It is, essentially, the process of:

Taking an issue from the basket of normal politics and putting it into the basket of security.¹⁴

- 8 Ole Waever (1996) *op. cit.*
- 9 Steven Vucetic (2002) 'Traditional versus Societal Security and the Role of Securitization' *Southeast European Politics* 3(1), p. 4.
- 10 Nouray Ibryamova (2002) 'Migration from Central and Eastern Europe and Societal Security in the European Union' University of Miami *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series* 1(2), p. 5.
- 11 Ole Waever (1996), *op. cit.*
- 12 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998), p. 121.
- 13 Jeff Huysmans (2000) 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38(5): 751-777, at p. 758.
- 14 Münevver Cebeci (2004) *op. cit.* p. 6.

Buzan *et al.* define it as:

The move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics,

and as the process of presenting an issue as:

Posing an existential threat to a designated referent object.¹⁵

According to scholars from the Copenhagen School, any public issue can be located within three different categories:

- non-politicised issues (issues that ‘the state does not deal with’)
- politicised issues (issues part of which constitute ‘public policy requiring government decision and resource allocation’)
- securitised issues (issues that are ‘presented as existential threats, requiring measures and justifications outside the normal bounds of political procedure’).¹⁶

In the light of this categorisation, securitisation represents the moving of an issue from the non-politicised or politicised categories to the category of securitised issues.

Securitisation starts with a securitising move, in which ‘a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat’.¹⁷ In this rhetoric, the actor ‘dramatizes an issue as having absolute priority’ and, in presenting the existential threat, he or she makes it obvious that this is a matter of survival and, if the threat is not tackled, ‘everything else will be irrelevant’.¹⁸ By calling the issue a security issue, the actor claims the right to cope with it by extraordinary means, to break the political rules of the game.¹⁹

This presentability of any public issue as a security issue also reveals another characteristic of the concept of security: when an issue becomes a security issue in the process described above, it means that security is a self-referential practice.²⁰ Following these lines, security can also be called a speech act, as it is carried out by speaking. In the words of Buzan *et al.* ‘the utterance itself is the act’.²¹

Securitisation begins with a speech act but, for the issue to be securitised, a significant audience should believe the actor and accept the existence of an existential threat. Only if and when the audience accepts it is the issue moved from the basket of normal politics, starting its treatment within the rubric of securitised issues. If the audience accepts that there is an urgent existential threat, it tolerates violations of rules. In this way, the claim of the securitising actor to use extraordinary measures to deal with this existential threat is seen as legitimate (by the audience) and, therefore, the

15 *Ibid.* p. 23.

16 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *op. cit.* pp. 23-24.

17 *Ibid.* p. 25.

18 Ole Waever (1996) *op. cit.* at p. 106.

19 Münevver Cebeci (2004) *op. cit.*

20 Ole Waever (1996) *op. cit.*

21 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde (1998) *op. cit.* p. 27.

securitising actor manages to break free of the procedures or rules with which he or she would otherwise be bound up.²² With this last step, securitisation is completed.

The securitising actor is the person or group that performs the speech act. They do not have to be official, but they must hold a position of authority since it is this that provides the legitimacy with which an issue may be declared to be an existential threat in the eyes of the audience. Mostly, it is political leaders, bureaucrats, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups who become securitising actors. The actor is the person who decides whether an issue is going to be tackled as an existential threat. However, as described above, it is the audience who determines securitisation; it is the audience is the people that the speech act tries 'to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific nature of some issue'.²³ If the audience does not accept the speech act, then it remains an incomplete securitising attempt.

Lastly, it should be kept in mind that security is always a negative practice and that securitisation represents a failure in dealing with an issue within the framework of normal politics. Ideally, all issues must be tackled as issues of normal politics. Therefore, even if in some cases the securitisation of issues is unavoidable, 'desecuritization must be the optimal long-range option'.²⁴

Migration to Europe

Migration to Europe is an old, recurrent phenomenon. People have been migrating from different geographies to Europe for a long while and for a variety of different reasons. Migration to Europe reached its peak in the aftermath of the Second World War, when European economies expanded rapidly. In these years, migrants were seen as valuable contributors to European economies.²⁵ During the 1970s, European states slowed their recruitment of foreign labour and, in the following years, a gradual shift took place from liberal immigration policies towards stricter ones.²⁶

Despite the stricter policies and regulations of European states, people continued to migrate through family ties and refugee flows. Today, Europe is the home of 56.1 million migrants and it is the second most attractive destination after the US for potential migrants from all over the world. In line with this, all European states are now net immigration countries.²⁷ The member states of the European Union do not want to accept this, and they have been introducing policies to restrict migration, but the projections of the coming decades show that Europe needs migrants.

22 *Ibid.* p. 121.

23 *Ibid.* p. 41.

24 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *op. cit.* p. 29. 'De-securitisation' can be explained as the taking of an issue out of the security basket and putting it back into the basket of normal politics. Then, the use of extraordinary measures is given up and the issue will be replaced by the normal political rules of the game (Münevver Cebeci (2004), *op. cit.*).

25 Maggie Ibrahim (2005) 'The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse' *International Migration* 43(5): 163-187.

26 Nouray Ibrayamova (2002) *op. cit.* p. 5.

27 Christine Boswell (2005) *Migration in Europe* unpublished paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration, pp. 1-23.

Europe needs migrants firstly because European society is demographically ageing. According to projections, demographic ageing will see the population of the EU-25 fall by 48 million by 2050. In addition to that, the result of a decline in fertility and the increase in life expectancy in Europe will be that the proportion of old people within the population will increase. In other words, demographic ageing is seeing to it that the EU population is getting smaller and growing older, and this poses a challenge for the European economy.²⁸

According to figures from Eurostat, the working age population of the EU-25 (excluding Romania and Bulgaria) will fall from 303 million to 297 million by 2020, while the number of old aged people in the population will reach 110 million by 2030. According to these projections, the number of people that can be employed will decrease gradually which, in the end, will hamper the economic growth of the EU. Furthermore, it is known that the EU needs skilled people mainly for the IT sector, as well as unskilled people as a seasonal workforce.²⁹

The EU has been trying to overcome these challenges since the late 1990s.³⁰ In all its communications on the issue, the EU has persistently underlined that the most important thing that can positively change this situation is migration.³¹ According to EU officials, receiving skilled migrants will be a solution to the challenges posed by the demographic ageing of society and for the level of technological development in the EU, which is falling behind in competition with other nations due to the lack of a skilled workforce.³²

In line with these arguments, the EU developed the 'Blue Card' initiative for highly-skilled migrants in October 2007. Being the main policy initiative of the EU to attract skilled migrants from all over the world, the EU Blue Card is modelled on the Green Card used in the US. If it enters into force, the Blue Card will establish a single application procedure for non-EU workers to reside and work within the EU.³³ With the Blue Card, the EU aims to attract up to 20m workers from outside the EU by 2030.³⁴

- 28 Commission of the European Communities (2006) *'The Demographic Future of Europe – From Challenge to Opportunity'* Commission Communication of 12 October 2006 (COM(2006)571) <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/-en/cha/c10160.htm> p. 1 [last accessed on 30 January 2009].
- 29 Christina Boswell (2005) *op. cit.*
- 30 For instance, the EU launched the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. The Strategy sets a new goal for the EU 'to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world' over the next decade. According to EU institutions, immigrants can play an important role in the realisation of the Lisbon Strategy (Deniz Genç (2005) *Multiculturalism and Immigrant Integration in European Societies* unpublished Masters thesis submitted to Marmara University European Communities Institute: Istanbul, pp. 54-72.
- 31 Commission of the European Communities (2006) *op. cit.*
- 32 EurActiv (2008) 'An EU 'Blue Card' for High-Skilled Immigrants?', 22 April <http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/eu-blue-card-high-skilled-immigrants/article-170986>, pp. 1-3 [last accessed 31 January 2009].
- 33 *Spiegel Online International* 'EU Targets Skilled Migrants' 23 October 2007 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,-513083,00.html> p. 2 [last accessed 31 January 2009].
- 34 EurActiv (2008) *op. cit.* p. 2.

In addition to this initiative, the European Commission was expected to propose guidelines to attract seasonal workers for the agricultural, construction and tourism sectors in 2009.

Following these initiatives then, in the words of Kofi Annan, ‘The message is clear; migrants need Europe, but Europe also needs migrants’.³⁵ In line with this, according to EU officials, receiving migration is the most important and effective tool in overcoming the problems that the European economy and society are going to face in the next decades. Therefore, the EU is seeking to attract migrants: skilled ones in the short-run; and unskilled ones in the long-run.

The securitisation of migration in the European Union

In the 1970s, there was a thematic change in how the issues of migrants and migration were approached. In this period, for mostly economic reasons, the positive ‘contributor’ image of the migrant turned in the minds of Europeans to a negative ‘public order de-stabiliser’ one. In the 1980s, migration policy discussions in the member states of the European Union became more about protecting public order and preserving domestic stability which were, according to policy-makers, endangered by migration.³⁶ These arguments paved the way for the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of migration in the member states.³⁷ The securitisation of migration was, in turn, followed by the establishment of restrictive national migration policies.

It can be inferred from the material on migration to Europe that the issue has been a very important subject as regards political and societal debates in the member states of the European Union since the early 1970s. However, the issue could become an important one for the European Communities only in the mid-1980s. With the establishment of the Trevi Group, an *ad hoc* Working Group on Immigration in 1986, the Europeanization of migration policy started to take place and only after that did the EU begin to make policies on migration.

Similar to the national migration policies of member states, migration policies at the level of the EU are also restrictive. Huysmans comments that they are driven by ‘restrictive and control-oriented imperatives’ and, therefore, the regulations on migration made at the EU level had the point in common that they all ‘emphasize the need for the restriction of population flows’.³⁸ This restrictive nature of European migration policies has a lot to do with intergovernmental co-operation between the member states. Member states have used the European framework in advancing this co-operation, whereas the European institutions have been more restricted in this field. Despite the

35 Kofi Annan (2004) ‘UN Secretary-General Annan Addresses European Parliament’ speech delivered to the European Parliament on 29 January 2004 http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_3178_en.htm, p. 5 [last accessed 30 January 2009].

36 Maggie Ibrahim (2005) *op. cit.*; Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.*

37 Theodora Kostakopoulou (2000) ‘The Protective Union: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe’ *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38(3): 497-518; Ali Bilgiç (2006) *Securitization of Immigration and Asylum: A Critical Look at Security Structure in Europe* unpublished Masters thesis submitted to Lund University, pp. 20-25.

38 Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.* p. 756.

communitisation of the field after 1997, the backbone of migration policy – the securitised understanding – had already been created and was there to stay. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that, when migration issues were moved to the European level, they had already been securitised in the member states. Similarly, Kostakopoulou says that:

The European Communities have adopted the member states' own discourses on the securitisation of migration policies.³⁹

Hence, the securitisation of migration in the EU can not be separated from that applying in the member states.

According to Huysmans, who focuses on the logic beneath the securitisation of migration in the EU and in the member states, rather than focusing on the process, there are three related themes used in the securitisation of migration.⁴⁰ These are the themes of internal security, cultural security and the crisis in the welfare state. This article follows Huysmans and examines the logic of securitisation in the field of migration in the EU and in the member states.

Migration versus internal security

As regards the internal security theme, it was indicated that the borderless nature of the internal market would have a side-effect, while it would also:

Facilitate the illegal and criminal activities of terrorists, international criminal organizations, asylum-seekers and immigrants.⁴¹

This discourse was put forward by the security professionals who came together for the Trevi group and the Police Working Group on Terrorism, which together prepared the ground for the creation of the Schengen Agreement. Their professional status and their obvious capacity to define security questions made them convincing in the eyes of the public.

These professionals:

Produced and distributed the internal security knowledge that articulated a continuum between borders, terrorism, crime and migration.⁴²

Bilgiç notes that this discourse indicated immigrants and refugees as sources of insecurity for Europe and that, by linking migration with organised crime and terrorism, the internal security theme was able to construct an assumption that 'migration is a

39 Theodora Kostakopoulou (2000) *op. cit.* p. 509.

40 Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.*

41 *Ibid.* p. 760.

42 *Ibid.* p. 761.

security threat, which must be effectively controlled'.⁴³ The link was constructed so successfully that this understanding became a common sense and, as a result, European Community policies were easily able to connect the abolition of internal borders with the need to strengthen external border controls.⁴⁴ It is said that the 1990 Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 1985 is the best example of the securitisation of the internal market, which formally links immigration and asylum with terrorism, transnational crime and border control.⁴⁵

Migration versus cultural security

The cultural security theme is about presenting migration as a threat to cultural identity. This theme has worked in three different ways. First of all, strict border controls have a cultural dimension. The EU has strengthened its borders against people coming from third countries who are culturally, and sometimes racially, different.⁴⁶ This can also be interpreted as an 'otherisation' process in which the EU has, by demarcating a thick and almost impregnable border to the outside, created a continental dichotomy of 'us' and 'others'; 'Europeans' and 'third country nationals'.

Secondly, in the last decades, European institutions have persistently been calling on member states to step up their efforts towards integrating immigrants in their societies. According to academics, integration can be explained basically as the 'adaptation of immigrants to the culture of the host society'.⁴⁷ Huysmans notes that, by their nature, integration policies indirectly assume that a culturally uniform, homogenous society existed before the migrants came and brought their cultures with them.⁴⁸ In his view, European institutions have, in their continuous highlighting of the need to integrate immigrants, confirmed the nationalist desire for this pre-existing culturally homogenous society while, at the same time, identifying immigrants as obstacles to the realisation of it. Furthermore, this understanding says that it was migrants who ruined the culturally homogenous space, cementing the perception that the different lifestyle and culture of migrants threaten the cultural identity of the society.

Thirdly, the EU has been trying to establish multicultural and non-racist European societies. It has been aiming at this for several reasons, the most prominent of which is the fear of a return to the old (19th century) Europe in which racism and extreme nationalism were common practice.⁴⁹ In the last decade, a rise in racist, xenophobic and extreme nationalist acts have been observed in Europe. It is thought that the Com-

43 Theodora Kostakopoulou (2000) *op. cit.* p. 508.

44 Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.*

45 Ali Bilgiç (2006) *op. cit.* pp 20-25.

46 Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.*

47 Han Entzinger and Frank Biezeveld, quoted in Deniz Genç (2005) *op. cit.* p. 35.

48 Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.* p. 765.

49 According to Waever, the fear of a return to 'old Europe' is a very powerful theme on which the security identity of European integration has been built. Racist and nationalist practices fragmented Europe in the 19th century and led the way for the world wars, so European integration has taken 'old Europe', racism and nationalism as its 'other' and has sought to develop multiculturalism in European societies (paraphrasing Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.* p. 770).

mon European Asylum and Immigration Policy will be a remedy for these problems and that it will assist in the establishment of multicultural and non-racist societies. Therefore, the EU has called for multiculturalist practices in member states and for campaigns against the revival of nationalism, racism and xenophobia.⁵⁰

However, in doing this, it is, in a way, highlighting the cultural difference that migrants carry. It also highlights that migrants carry different cultural identities which once more brings the issue to the argument that European cultural identities are threatened by those of migrants.⁵¹

Migration versus welfare systems

The last theme in the securitisation of migration in the EU and in member states is about presenting migration as a threat to the welfare systems of Europe. The result of successive economic crises and the rise of unemployment in the 1980s has been that competition for the benefits of European welfare states has intensified.⁵² In such an environment, foreigners in the labour market (migrants and asylum-seekers) have become more visible to the eyes of Europeans and a tendency to see them as rivals in the distribution of benefits may be observed. Migrants are increasingly seen as 'having no legitimate right to social assistance and welfare provisions'.⁵³ According to many Europeans, migrants are not a part of 'them', so they should not be recipients of benefits. With this understanding, 'the notions of solidarity and distribution of welfare are coined with the notion of nationality'.⁵⁴ Huysmans terms this 'privileging of national citizens in the distribution of social goods' as 'welfare chauvinism'.⁵⁵

In its radical form, welfare chauvinism depicts migrants as people who reap the benefits of welfare systems illegitimately; migrants are shown as exploiters who commit welfare fraud. In a more moderate version, welfare chauvinism tries to legitimise the establishment of restrictive migration policies by using problems in the European economies. In this view, economic recessions decrease employment opportunities for migrants and, when they are unemployed, their costs as regards welfare systems increase. According to this view, migration should be restricted not because migrants commit welfare fraud but 'because the welfare system should first provide benefits and welfare for its "own" people'.⁵⁶ In their discourses, welfare chauvinists use metaphors such as 'flood', 'invasion' or 'swamping' of migrants. Geddes says that these words can be accepted as an anti-immigration vernacular and adds that these metaphors 'frame the debates about international migration and present it as a threat to welfare security'.⁵⁷ Huysmans mentions the same thing and comments that such metaphors:

50 Deniz Genç (2005) *op. cit.*

51 Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.*

52 Ali Bilgiç (2006) *op. cit.* pp. 20-25.

53 Nouray Ibryamova (2002) *op. cit.* p. 6.

54 *Ibid.*

55 Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.* p. 767.

56 *Ibid.* p. 769.

57 Andrew Geddes, quoted in Ali Bilgiç (2006) *op. cit.* p. 19.

Portray immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees as a serious threat to the survival of the socio-economic system.⁵⁸

It may be noted that the EU sustains welfare chauvinism in many of its regulations. Most importantly of all, it favours free movement of the nationals of member states in the labour market and social policy areas,⁵⁹ whereas its strategy for third country nationals is based on a refusal of the economic rights granted to EU nationals.⁶⁰

Conclusion

Migration is a multi-faceted phenomenon that is related to many aspects of political organisation and society, and it is such a meta issue that it can be shown as the cause of many problems. For Europe, migration is not something new; Europe has always received migrants. However, in the 1970s, they became a main topic of political discussion on public order and domestic stability in the member states of the European Union. In these discussions, migrants were shown as the causes of economic and societal problems and were criminalised by political actors. The result has been that Europeans have started to perceive migration as one of the main sources of insecurity. By constructing this perception, the political actors have been successful in securitising the issue. The securitised understanding of, or approach to, migration has also been successfully transferred to the EU level, where the Europeanization of migration policies started to take place in the 1980s.

Migration was securitised in the EU by the use of three related themes on internal security, cultural security and the crisis of the welfare state. Together, these themes have been used to depict migrants as potential contributors to terrorist activities and organised crime; as a threat to the cultural identity of society because of their different cultural background; and as people who reap the benefits of the welfare system illegitimately and who commit welfare fraud to exploit the system. Securitisation through the use of these arguments became successful in the EU and it resulted in the introduction of highly restrictive migration policies.

Interestingly, and despite the issue of migration being securitised by the EU through the presentation of migration and migrants as existential threats to European society, the EU's economy and society are in desperate need of migrants for the purposes of renovation. For that reason, the EU has introduced several measures to attract migrants. The EU wants to attract up to 20 million skilled migrants by 2030, as well as unskilled migrants in the long-run. This denotes a paradox in EU migration management because, on the one hand, the EU is trying to attract migrants; however, on the other hand, it has securitised the issue of migration. These two practices of the EU contradict each other concerning its approach to migration management. As long as the issue is securitised, Europeans will be against receiving new migrants as they will not be able to differentiate between skilled and unskilled migrants in their normal lives.

58 Jeff Huysmans (2000) *op. cit.* p. 769.

59 *Ibid.*

60 Ali Bilgiç (2006) *op. cit.* p. 24.

In conclusion, it can be said that Europe needs migrants; however, the securitisation of migration at both the national and the European level cements the presented negative image of migrants and strengthens the argument that migration poses an existential threat. If the EU wants to attract migrants to satisfy the well-being of its economy and society, it has first to fix this paradox. Fixing this paradox means that the EU must initially de-securitize the issue of migration since securitisation is:

A negative practice, always a failure in dealing with an issue within the framework of normal politics,

while ‘desecuritization must always be the optimal long-range option’.⁶¹

61 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *op. cit.* p. 29.