

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Kristian STEINNES, *The British Labour Party. Transnational Influences and European Community Membership, 1960-1973*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2014, 217 p. – ISBN 978-3-515-10775-4 – 44,00 €.

Harold Wilson has long acquired a reputation as the great enigma of Britain's post-war European policy amongst historians, even though various scholars have set out to investigate the Wilson governments' European policies since the opening of archives in the 1990s. Their works have generally revealed a rather more coherent and proactive European policy than previously acknowledged.¹ As Sir Michael Palliser reflected on the state of the historiography in 2006, 'contrary to a widespread belief that Wilson was a great tactician but a poor strategist; the converse is almost certainly the case'.² Yet, most works have thus far concentrated overwhelmingly on the internal policy-making of the Wilson government or on British diplomacy vis-à-vis the Six. Kristian Steinnes's book now adds a further layer of complexity to the literature by moving beyond British governmental records. Rather than basing his account on the various diplomatic and intra-governmental complexities in the formulation of British European policy, Steinnes instead looks at a previously largely neglected dimension of Britain's move towards Europe, namely at 'the Labour elite's party contacts and collaboration across national borders' (p.19). The book is therefore based not only on research in British governmental and party archives, but it also relies on various international sources, including the archives of the labour movements in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands. In so doing, Steinnes builds on recent historiographical trends to pay greater attention to the transnational and extra-governmental dimensions of European integration.³

Following from his extensive research, Steinnes advances some sophisticated new arguments about Labour's European policy in the 1960s, which seek to revise our understanding of the party's move towards Europe significantly. Rather than accepting the traditional image of a reluctant party slowly coming to terms with British membership, the book instead argues that the Labour party leadership in fact changed

1. M. PINE, *Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing Britain's Membership of the European Community*, I. B. Tauris, London, 2007; H. PARR, *Britain's Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain's world role, 1964-1967*, Routledge, London, 2006; O. DADDOW (ed.), *Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain's Second Application to Join the EEC*, Frank Cass, London, 2003; S. WALL, *The Official History of Britain and the European Community*, vol.II: *From Rejection to Referendum, 1963-1975*, Routledge, London, 2013.
2. M. PALLISER, *Foreword*, in: H. PARR, *op.cit.*, XI.
3. W. KAISER, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007; W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. GEHLER (eds), *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration. Governing Europe 1945-83*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010; W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds), *The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72*, Routledge, London, 2009.

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its attitude towards European integration significantly in the early 1960s already, particularly once it had come to the conclusion that EC membership was in fact compatible with its economic planning policies. Transnational contacts are shown to have played a crucial part in this ‘learning process’, particularly with regard to the party leadership around Hugh Gaitskell and subsequently Harold Wilson. Based primarily on his reading of non-British sources, Steinnes argues that Wilson in particular worked actively to push the European issue on the Labour Party’s political agenda, and that he pursued the goal of British membership persistently throughout the period under investigation. In marked contrast to previous depictions of Wilson being reluctantly dragged towards EC membership by advisers and officials, Steinnes instead suggests that Wilson himself was the one who took the decisive initiative in January 1966 by personally instructing Whitehall officials to study the possibility of British membership after his meetings with Dutch and German social democrats earlier that month (pp.94-95). Once he had made up his mind, so the book argues, Wilson never departed from his strategy. Though domestic or party-political considerations may have restrained his public attitude at times, Steinnes claims, Wilson nonetheless continued to work hard and consistently in order to eventually achieve British entry in spite of various adverse circumstances. Transnational contacts and networks – or ‘influences’, as the book’s title somewhat loosely defines them –, are therefore shown to have constituted a crucial part in the Labour party’s move towards Europe: not only did they influence and shape British perceptions of the European Community in positive ways, but they were also an important diplomatic tool in Britain’s subsequent quest for British EC membership.

Steinnes’s thesis has important implications for our understanding of British attitudes towards Europe in the 1960s, as well as about the dynamics of European integration process more generally. With regard to Britain, the major achievement of Steinnes’s book is that it adds a crucial additional layer to our understanding of the country’s post-war European policy, which is unfortunately still dominated by a historiography that frequently confines itself to British sources and perspectives. By looking at the ways in which the British Labour Party interacted with its Socialist counterparts on the Continent, however, Steinnes shows how the image of an indifferent and aloof party detached from developments in Europe simply cannot be sustained any longer. Instead, it appears that Labour’s ‘problem’ with the EEC was not so much about closer European integration in general, but more about the particular shape and ideological underpinning of the EEC as an institution, particularly since British membership was frequently seen to contradict the party’s economic planning agenda. Labour was by no means alone in these misgivings, as Steinnes shows with regard to the party’s North European Socialist counterparts in particular. Yet, once the political discourse in 1960s Europe had started to move towards conceptions of a ‘social’ or ‘socialist’ Europe, ideas of European integration correspondingly became much more compatible with the more general ideas and aims of the Labour Party and Scandinavian left-wing parties.

Through the prism of the Labour Party, Steinnes’s book therefore also reveals the diversity and complexity in which European integration was debated in post-war

Europe more generally. Indeed, as Steinnes reflects, whereas the European Community in 1958 had been dominated overwhelmingly by conservative parties, '[b]y the time Wilson took office socialist parties had strengthened their position both in the EFTA and in the EEC countries' (p.89). By the mid-1960s, there was thus a clearly detectable ambition both by the British Labour Party and its North European counterparts to use the European Community to carry out social(ist) policies on a European level. At the time, such hopes were seemingly borne out by the fact that electoral circles as well as potential enlargement of the Community were 'likely to strengthen European socialism relative to Christian democracy in the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the EP' (p.114). This drive towards 'Socialism on a European level' (p.148), as Steinnes shows, intensified further during the late 1960s and early 1970s (pp.148-153), with the desire of coordinating socialist policies on a European level becoming firmly 'established' in both the Labour Party and other Socialist European parties (p.153). In so doing, the book thus also offers a powerful warning against a teleological and almost linear narrative of European integration which unfortunately still tends to dominate much of the historiography.⁴ Instead, Steinnes convincingly illustrates the open-ended nature and contingency of the integration process in the 1960s, reconstructing a debate that more often than not transcended national borders and took place outside formal EEC/EC structures.

Yet, while Steinnes's focus on these transnational dynamics provides excellent new insights into Labour's interactions with its Continental allies, the argument becomes somewhat more problematic when the book tries to deduct the Labour Party's more general attitudes towards Europe from such transnational interactions. This applies in particular to Steinnes's interpretation of Wilson, which is based primarily on evidence from interactions in transnational networks or private conversations with counterparts from abroad. Here, Steinnes argues that such effective utilization of contacts should be seen as key evidence that Wilson 'took early initiatives to bring about a policy aimed at finding a way to join the Community', and that he then consciously 'activated a transnational socialist network [...] to facilitate British accession' (p.30). But how sincere was Wilson really in his dealings with other Socialist Parties, particularly when contrasted with his much more cautious – and sometimes directly contradictory – dealings with British colleagues at the time? And what about the often indecisive and haphazard policy-making process of his government over Europe? The book tends to dismiss these contrasting aspects merely as tactical retreats by Wilson to secure his long-term strategy of British EC membership. But may it not be the case that his much more positive attitudes in conversation with European counterparts were subject to similar tactical considerations; perhaps trying to counterbalance the negative effects of his publicly indifferent stance with more forthcoming attitudes in private? Wilson's U-turn on the European question during the opposition years from 1970 to 1974 is similarly brushed off quickly as a party-political ploy in order to secure EC membership in the long-term, even though Steinnes admits

4. For a powerful criticism, see M. GILBERT, *Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European integration*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 3(2008), pp.641-662.

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that ‘the Scandinavian Socialists did not fully grasp Wilson’s tactical manoeuvring at the time, as the nuance between opposing the terms and opposition in principle was hard to discern’ (p.172). If Wilson’s desire to take Britain into the European Community was really as strong as he frequently made it seem in his transnational interactions and contacts, however, why then did he not invest greater personal political capital to get these views heard and accepted in the British public debate? In this regard, it is also somewhat odd that the book ends rather abruptly in 1973 rather than with the 1974-75 renegotiation and referendum, an exercise that severely irritated many of Britain’s traditional allies on the Continent.⁵

This point raises some bigger questions about the comparative importance of transnational dynamics *versus* the manifold other influences on Britain’s European policy; a policy that by that stage had already become notorious for being subject to myriad domestic and party-political considerations. Even if the Wilson government appeared determined and proactive to secure British membership in its dealings with its Scandinavian allies, for example, does this really matter given the fact that its actual policies were then frequently determined by party-political and inter-departmental infighting? With regard to then party leader Gaitskell’s famous 1962 Labour Party conference speech that joining the EC would mean the ‘end of a thousand years of history’, for example, Steinnes surprisingly claims that Gaitskell had in fact ‘increasingly favoured British membership [...] on a personal level’ since late 1961, but that ‘tactical considerations in accordance with rational choice considerations [...] seem to have determined his public statements’ (p.75). To back this up, however, Steinnes relies mainly on an allegedly ‘private conversation’ with a Swedish Press Attaché shortly afterwards, in which Gaitskell apparently ‘felt free to distance himself from the people who opposed membership which he even branded lunatics, thus indicating his personal preferences’ (p.76). It may or may not be the case that these were indeed Gaitskell’s private views; but surely it might also conceivably be suggested that the party leader was in fact merely trying to limit the likely diplomatic damage of his speech by striking a more conciliatory note in private?

But these minor quibbles should not obscure the fact that Kristian Steinnes has written a fascinating and illuminating study that greatly enhances our understanding of the manifold influences on the Labour Party’s European policy in the 1960s, revealing the picture of a dynamic and proactive party which was far from aloof or disentangled from developments on the Continent. The book also manages to shed light on many wider transnational dynamics of 1960s European integration which have frequently escaped the attention of historians thus far. There remains a need, however, for future historians to embed these findings much more firmly within their respective international, domestic, and party-political contexts. The great enigma of Harold Wilson’s European policy has only just started to unfold.

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5. M. HAEUSSLER, *A pyrrhic victory: Harold Wilson, Helmut Schmidt, and the British renegotiation of EC membership, 1974-5*, in: *The International History Review*, 4(2015), pp.768-789.

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Lorenzo MECHI, Guia MIGANI, Francesco PETRINI (eds), *Networks of Global Governance. International Organisations and European Integration in a Historical Perspective*, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge, 2014, 339 p. – ISBN 1-4438-5655-X – 49.99 £.

L'histoire de l'intégration européenne embrasse de plus en plus largement l'histoire globale. Le mouvement ne date pas d'aujourd'hui, mais il est désormais bien identifié à travers des publications centrées sur ces interactions. C'est le cas de cet ouvrage collectif, inspiré par un colloque tenu à Padoue en décembre 2010 et intitulé "The United Nations and European Construction: a Historical Perspective". Réunissant 15 contributions, ce livre dresse un large panorama des recherches récentes sur l'interaction entre les coopérations européennes dans toute leur diversité et l'ONU, toutes deux nées dans la deuxième moitié des années 1940, et ce jusqu'à aujourd'hui.

Sur le plan historiographique, l'ouvrage s'inscrit dans une tradition désormais bien établie de recherches associant les perspectives européennes et globales conduites aux universités de Florence et de Padoue, dont sont issus les trois auteurs du volume. Chacun d'entre eux étudie les interactions entre les Communautés européennes (CECA/CEE) et l'échelle globale, que ce soit à travers l'OIT (Lorenzo Mechi), les politiques de développement africaines (Guia Migani) ou les évolutions socio-économiques (Francesco Petrini). Ils ont réuni des auteurs provenant de huit pays différents afin de proposer une synthèse des recherches les plus récentes. Allant au-delà de classiques actes de colloque, l'ouvrage possède une unité certaine, en particulier du fait de sa solide introduction et de son long index, indispensable du fait de la variété thématique, géographique et chronologique des contributions. Il témoigne des avancées de l'histoire globale de l'intégration européenne sur plusieurs plans.

Tout d'abord, certains débats anciens sont revus à la lumière de recherches récentes. Ainsi du parcours de Jean Monnet, de la SDN à la CECA, de la coopération monétaire internationale, ou encore des interactions entre l'Organisation internationale du Travail et des Communautés Européennes dans les années 1940 et 1960. Ces trois sujets gagnent toujours à être revisités tant ils montrent que les échelles européennes et globales sont imbriquées dès le début.

Un autre apport est le renouvellement des thématiques, par exemple avec le rôle des experts dans le domaine des télécommunications, ce qui fait écho à l'ouvrage récent de Wolfram Kaiser et de Johan Schot sur le rôle des experts techniques dans l'intégration européenne. Les interactions avec de multiples institutions internationales, UNESCO, GATT/OMC, Organisation mondiale de la Santé, ou encore OTAN, sont examinées. De l'autre côté, si les Communautés européennes (CECA/CEE/UE) sont souvent privilégiées, le Conseil de l'Europe est régulièrement étudié, en particulier dans le domaine des télécommunications, de l'OIT ou de l'UNESCO. Les contributions s'aventurent parfois jusqu'aux périodes les plus récentes des années 1990 et 2000, en général en faisant le lien avec des débats historiques anciens, par exemple sur les relations entre Europe et ONU dans le domaine de la défense.

La partie la plus stimulante concerne certainement les années 1970, pour lesquelles de nouvelles études fondées sur archives sont proposées, tant sur l'OIT que sur le système Onusien (en particulier l'ONU, la CNUCED et l'UNESCO). De nouvelles thématiques structurantes pour l'ensemble du dernier tiers du XX^e siècle apparaissent alors, comme l'écologie, la protection des travailleurs ou les relations Nord-Sud. Sur ce dernier sujet, plusieurs contributions revisitent le Nouvel Ordre Économique International (NOEI) de 1973, de sa conception à sa mise en œuvre, par exemple avec l'accord international sur le cacao.

Au fil de la lecture émerge une double dialectique, celle de l'unité et de la diversité des institutions internationales (qu'elles soient européennes ou mondiales) d'une part, et celle de la complémentarité ou de la concurrence entre ces institutions d'autre part. La première approche est liée à l'efficacité, parfois limitée, de ces organismes. L'ouvrage ne contourne pas cette complexité en se livrant à une simple évocation des projets idéels car il se situe nettement dans l'histoire du processus de décision, avec toutes les frustrations que cela implique. Il relève bien souvent l'incapacité des Communautés européennes à agir de manière unifiée au sein des institutions onusiennes, ce qui n'est pas surprenant. Une étude conduite à partir du point de vue de ces institutions onusiennes révélerait une hétérogénéité, un déficit démocratique et une inefficacité sans doute bien plus grande encore. La seconde interrogation concerne en réalité la régulation de la mondialisation et la question de la régionalisation. Certains contributions soulignent la complémentarité entre les deux échelles, notamment dans le domaine commercial avec un couple CEE/GATT, puis UE/OMC. Les relations avec l'OTAN ou l'OIT sont plus ambiguës, et surtout très variables en fonction des périodes.

En définitive, cet ouvrage est riche de par son contenu propre, avec notamment de nombreux apports empiriques fondés sur l'utilisation d'archives très variées, mais aussi par son apport historiographique. Il confirme le rapprochement entre histoire de l'intégration européenne et histoire globale. A ce double titre, il aurait sans doute mérité une conclusion stimulante, qui manque à cet ouvrage ambitieux.

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Wilfried LOTH, *Charles de Gaulle*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2015, 331 p. – ISBN: 978-3170213623 – 32,00 €.

Plus de quarante-cinq ans après sa mort, le personnage du Général Charles de Gaulle ne cesse de fasciner les générations de celles et ceux qui l'ont connu de son vivant ou de celles et ceux qui ne le connaissent qu'à travers l'histoire, la télévision, la radio, les livres ou la presse. Idem en Allemagne, où de Gaulle jouit d'une extraordinaire renommée, à la fois bienveillante et critique. Artisan de «l'amitié franco-allemande» pour les uns, il demeure aussi, pour les autres, le pourfendeur d'une Amérique que les Allemands (de l'Ouest) avaient pourtant si vénérée durant la Guerre froide. Com-

ment ne pas se souvenir ici de l'excellent ouvrage que l'ancien correspondant de l'ARD, le regretté Ernst Weisenfeld, avait consacré en 1990 à celui qu'il nomma lui-même «le Magicien à l'Élysée» (*Der Magier im Élysée*, Beck-Verlag, Munich, 1990)? Plaidoyer pro-gaulliste à l'heure où l'Allemagne fêta son unification, le livre de Weisenfeld demeure une référence pour tous les universitaires et chercheurs germanophones qui, peu ou prou, essayent de découvrir, au-delà de l'événementiel, un homme, une pensée et une vision de la France qui désormais paraissent bien lointains.

Il aura néanmoins fallu attendre vingt-cinq ans pour qu'un autre Allemand s'attèle à réactualiser «Charles de Gaulle». En intitulant son livre par le simple nom du premier Président de la V^e République, Wilfried Loth n'a pas pris trop de risques. Le lecteur sait de quoi, et de qui, il en ressort et il en retourne, devine ce qu'il va découvrir ou redécouvrir. Professeur émérite d'histoire de l'Université de Duisburg-Essen, Wilfried Loth est doté d'une renommée qui, à juste raison, dépasse de loin les frontières de la Ruhr et de la RFA. Réputé pour ses travaux et ses conférences, il a toujours fait preuve d'un engagement pro-européen sans failles, ce qui lui vaut d'être encore aujourd'hui, bien que retraité, le meilleur spécialiste allemand de l'histoire de l'intégration européenne.

Bon connaisseur de la France, il l'est aussi de la période gaulliste. Dans son ouvrage de plus de 300 pages, il en fait la parfaite démonstration, sachant énumérer les événements qui ont jalonné la vie du Général, répertorier les nombreuses sources auxquelles il se réfère et classer une à une les nombreuses étapes d'un parcours intellectuel et politique qui n'est pas prêt de s'éteindre dans la conscience de l'histoire et dans l'inconscient des Français. Wilfried Loth retrace ainsi, pas à pas, l'existence d'un homme que d'une part il admire, que d'autre part il dépeint avec un soupçon de méfiance qui se retrouve à travers les pages et les chapitres de son livre. Bien que passionné par l'œuvre de de Gaulle, et pour reprendre les mots du Général, l'auteur «ne fut pas, n'a pas été et ne sera [jamais] gaulliste». Il est certainement trop allemand pour l'être, peut-être trop européen, certainement beaucoup plus proche de la démarche monnetiste de l'Europe qu'il ne l'est de celle de la politique gaullienne.

Son livre ne compte pas moins de douze chapitres qui, de manière purement chronologique, reprennent une à une les périodes clés de la vie de de Gaulle. Par le choix d'une méthode essentiellement narrative, Wilfried Loth respecte au mieux les attentes du lecteur germanophone, qui, plus que cela ne le devrait être le cas chez un francoophone, n'a pas toujours eu l'occasion de se familiariser de près avec le parcours du Général. Grâce à sa présentation simple, mais aussi très méticuleuse, l'auteur touche un public large et composite qui, du néophyte en quête de sillonner la politique française du 20^e siècle, jusqu'à l'universitaire averti, trouve ce qu'il a su découvrir ou ce qu'il a voulu chercher. Livre de référence ou livre de références, avec ou sans «s», le *Charles de Gaulle* de Wilfried Loth mérite incontestablement de trouver sa place dans la bibliothèque, qu'elle soit celle privée d'une personne cultivée ou celle publique d'une institution respectée.

Cet ouvrage se distingue aussi par son grand sens du détail. Même les plus instruits se féliciteront de certaines histoires ou anecdotes qui, au fil du temps, leur auront

échappées. Qu'Yvonne de Gaulle eût des ascendants adultérins du Pape Jules II et du peintre Raphaël (p.25), a de quoi susciter l'étonnement de quelques-uns, tant l'épouse du Général fut connue pour son aspect plutôt austère. Que Georges Pompidou ait refusé, dès 1958, de devenir ministre de l'Économie et des Finances (p.193) n'est pas resté gravé dans la mémoire collective des Français, a fortiori encore moins dans celle des Allemands. D'autres exemples suffiraient également à illustrer ce sens de la précision dont Wilfried Loth ne se prive pas un instant. C'est là indéniablement sa force, mais aussi, quelque part, sa faiblesse. Car à vouloir trop raconter, l'auteur se laisse gagner par la tentation de se perdre dans les méandres d'une complexité historique à laquelle le lecteur lambda finit bel et bien par succomber.

Bien que choisis avec parcimonie, les douze chapitres sont d'une inégale valeur. Peut-être parce que dévoilant une face plus méconnue de la vie du Général, les deux premiers, consacrés à sa jeunesse, comptent parmi les plus réussis de l'ouvrage. Le premier (pp.11-28), intitulé de «Connétable» (p.19), en souvenir de la période du prisonnier de Gaulle, blessé en Allemagne durant la Première Guerre mondiale, insiste sur la carrière militaire de l'élève de l'École militaire de Saint-Cyr. Le second (pp.29-50) porte le titre évocateur «Avec et contre Pétain», dépeignant, avec lucidité et justesse, la reconnaissance, puis la défiance que de Gaulle a pu éprouver envers le Maréchal. Instructives à plus d'un titre, ces deux premières parties du livre permettent de mieux comprendre la trajectoire intellectuelle, idéologique et politique d'un de Gaulle encore peu connu, avant que la Seconde Guerre mondiale ne vienne changer son destin. De même, les passages dédiés au retour du Général au pouvoir en 1958 (pp.173-195) et aux «adieux à l'Algérie» (pp.196-222) sont de bonne facture, parce que bien documentés et fidèles au déroulement des nombreux événements historiques qui ont secoué la France de cette époque. Quoique le lecteur se perde parfois dans le dédale des nombreuses dates de la Guerre d'Algérie, il en comprend mieux ses tenants et ses aboutissants. De même suivra-t-il l'avis de Wilfried Loth, selon lequel le «coup d'État» du 13 mai 1958 n'a pas été fomenté par les Gaullistes, car «de Gaulle n'était nullement disposé à endosser le rôle que lui avaient assigné les frondeurs» (p.175).

En revanche, d'autres chapitres dévoilent certaines faiblesses que l'auteur aurait pu facilement éviter. Sa présentation de mai 68 demeure trop factuelle et l'on aurait aimé comprendre l'évolution d'une société que le journaliste du *Monde*, Pierre Viansson-Ponté, dépeignait, deux mois auparavant, comme celle d'une «France qui s'ennuie». Toutefois n'est-ce là pas l'essentiel, face à la désinvolture scientifique avec laquelle l'auteur aborde la politique étrangère, et notamment européenne de de Gaulle. Ainsi n'a-t-il pas compris la portée stratégique du discours de Phnom Penh du 1^{er} septembre 1966, insistant beaucoup plus sur l'offensive des forces de Hanoï contre celles de Saïgon que sur la condamnation légitime que de Gaulle adressa aux États-Unis, suite à leur intervention sur le sol vietnamien (p.244). Visiblement, Wilfried Loth, l'internationaliste, bien – ou parce – que spécialiste de l'Europe, est là mal à l'aise. Son analyse sur le rapprochement franco-allemand est pour le moins superficielle et sa critique contre la stratégie européenne du Général trop simpliste, pour qu'elle puisse être prise pour argent comptant. L'auteur prend alors résolument fait et cause pour la position allemande lors de «la crise de la chaise vide» de 1965-1966,

considérant même, à l'exemple de Gerhard Schröder, alors ministre des Affaires étrangères à Bonn, que «de Gaulle ne pouvait plus que faire traîner en longueur le boycott» (p.240) qu'il avait lui-même décrété. Pourtant, il s'agit là, ni plus ni moins, d'un jugement à l'emporte-pièce, sachant que la France gaulliste est, qu'on le déplore ou non, sortie renforcée après l'adoption du «compromis de Luxembourg» en date des 28 et 29 janvier 1966.

Wilfried Loth n'est pas seul responsable. Sa manière d'écrire l'histoire demeure très germanique. Elle est précise, sérieuse, scientifique, académique, presque à l'excès, mais rébarbative, voire inefficace. Comme nombre de contemporanéistes germanophones, il raconte l'histoire, mais ne la fait pas vivre. Tout ou presque est juste, mais la justesse des propos ne peut cacher la pauvreté de l'analyse. Le *Charles de Gaulle* de Wilfried Loth est l'exemple même de cet empirisme historique qui, servi avec des louches pleines de dates, de noms, d'événements, se décontextualise d'une réalité politique et intellectuelle. À l'exemple, presque idéal, de la vie et de l'œuvre de de Gaulle, on aurait aimé lire autre chose de plus profond, de plus argumenté, voire de plus culturel. Malgré quelques idées, plus ou moins justifiées, émises en conclusion, selon lesquelles «la grandeur ne serait en fin de compte qu'une notion métaphysique» (p.305), voire quelques critiques acerbes contre l'échec de la politique européenne du Général, l'ensemble demeure imparfait. Imparfait, car comme l'avait écrit François Mitterrand en son temps, «le gaullisme avec de Gaulle, j'y crois, le gaullisme sans de Gaulle, je n'y crois pas». Et chez Wilfried Loth, il n'est presque jamais question de gaullisme! Dommage! Car de Gaulle, sans gaullisme, on ne peut pas y croire non plus!

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P. WINAND, A. BENVENUTI and M. GUDERZO (eds), *The External Relations of the European Union. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, PIE Peter Lang, Brussels, 2015, 402 p. – ISBN 978-2-87574-230-8 – 35,00 £.

As its title makes plain, this books offers several perspectives on both past and current EU's external relations. The book is the result of a conference held in Melbourne in September 2009. It consists of an introduction by co-editors Alessandro Benvenuti and Max Guderzo, nineteen chapters organised in five thematic parts, and a curiously named 'Part VI' that actually only contains the conclusions by co-editor Pascaline Winand.

There is no common underlying argument linking the numerous contributions, and arguments are indeed chapter specific. The title, if descriptive, is slightly misleading; 'external relations' would suggest chapters dealing with either EU's foreign policy or third countries' perceptions of the EU and/or its policies or both. However, only two out of nineteen chapters actually focus on the policy of the EU (or its predecessor): the excellent piece by Marie-Julie Chenard on the EEC policy towards the

People's Republic of China, and the solid, knowledgeable work of Hitoshi Suzuki on EEC and Japan. All the other contributions are about perceptions of the EEC/EU from outsiders. Co-editors Guderzo and Benvenuti explain this at the end of the introduction's second page in presenting the readers with the book's key research questions, which all pertain to 'how the EU has been seen by non-EU countries since its inception in the 1950s'. They then affirm that 'in addressing these questions, this volume aims to throw further light on the distinctive character of European integration and its external dimension' (pp.14-15). I would have much preferred the book's title to adequately reflect this choice; disappointment with a misleading title may be a trivial question, but the point here is that the book's key strength has not been brought to the fore. In current academic, journalistic, and political debates about the EU's international role, we need in-depth analysis of both the elaboration of EU's foreign policy and third parties' perceptions of the European Union and its actions (or lack thereof). This book is a valid and welcomed contribution to the exploration and understanding of the latter, and represents a praiseworthy effort at widening the scope of studies in the field. By gathering numerous contributions, the book spans widely from a geographical point of view (the Americas, the Asian and Pacific region, Africa) and also considers a variety of subjects including states, international organisations, public opinion, and non-state actors.

The promise of a pluralistic set of perspectives on both history and current times is certainly kept. Readers will find contributions from historians and political scientists, as well as from legal and business scholars (Rostam Neuwirth and George Gilligan respectively); there is also a chapter by a diplomat (Ambassador David Daly) offering his 'personal view on the EU's eastward enlargement' (p.15). Regrettably, this volume lacks short biographical notes about the authors; readers will only see authors' name and university of affiliation (not even their department, which could at least have given a hint about their expertise). Since the book is interdisciplinary, information about each author's discipline and field(s) of expertise was paramount to be able to locate their contributions in the academic panorama and debates, and editors should have provided them. All the more so since not all chapters offer a clear introduction explaining the author's approach, methodology, sources, or the overview of the discipline's literature on the subject and of the current scientific debate. Given the book's wide scope, and the many contributions and diverse perspectives it includes, the editors of this volume should have really given a few common guidelines to authors in this respect. Regrettable is also the lack of any bibliography, either at the end of the chapters or at the end of the book.

The nineteen chapters are organised in five parts: the first three follow a geographical criterion (EU's neighbours, the Asia Pacific region, the United States and Latin America); the fourth deals with ACP countries and post-colonial heritage; and the last focuses on EU and International Organisations. Oddly, the chapter on NATO and the EU has not been included in the latter, but placed in the Americas section. While the relevance of the United States is not in question, NATO is an alliance of many states, most of which are Europeans; more importantly, the chapter in this

volume truly deals with NATO as such, hence would have been more incisive if put in Part V.

Following the conscious choice of the editors, each section features chapters offering a historical perspective and others dealing with contemporary perceptions. I am not sure that the outcome is exactly collaboration between contemporary historians and political scientists in terms of cross-fertilisation, which Winand warmly advocates in the conclusions (pp.384-385); yet it is certainly a commendable attempt at bringing representatives of the several disciplines together. The sections are quite diverse in terms of inherent consistency, assortment, and additions to the scientific debate(s) specific to area studies. Part I is meant to deal with the relations of the EU (and EEC before) with its neighbours. Much literature exists on this broad topic across the academic disciplines represented in this book. Yet this volume's section only counts two contributions, one of which (Daly's) is an insider's view and the other (Karolina Pietras') hardly fits into the scope (see my comment below). Ambassador Daly's contribution could have been accommodated in the book as a preface or special contribution, which would have also given it more prominence. Part II on Asia Pacific Region and Part III on the Americas are the richest and most diverse. In addition to Chenard's and Suzuki's excellent contributions, I recommend Natalia Chaban and Sarah Christie's chapter on New Zealand's perceptions of the EEC in the 1950s (their title actually yet wrongly says 'EU'), which is a clever, sound, and very intriguing analysis of the matter. Likewise, Serena Kelly's chapter analysing and questioning views of the EU as a normative power in New Zealand and Singapore is highly stimulating; I hope for more articles adopting her approach and exposing arguments in the same clear and well-constructed way. I am no expert in the field, but I would recommend reading Emilian Kavalski's sound, innovative, thought-provoking chapter on relations (and misunderstandings) between the EU and India. Also enriching is Edward Moxon-Brownie's chapter on Latin-American perceptions of European integration, which is to praise for its methodological rigour and thorough critical review of the literature. Part IV probably does not have an entirely accurate title, but its two chapters by Ferdinand Leikam and Laura Kottos respectively are of outstanding academic quality. Leikam's well-researched contribution has the merit of relying not only on British archival sources, the bias of which he duly acknowledges in the analysis, but also on African Commonwealth countries' diverse materials. Kottos offers more a thinking piece, in which she discusses in a brilliant and critical way the copious literature on the subject under her scrutiny. Part V about the EU and international organisations also features two chapters only. Rostam Neuwirth's contribution focuses on the interaction between the EU's own legal order and the international legal system, highlights the points of friction as well as of mutual contact, and explores the possibility of convergence. George Gilligan's chapter analyses the EU's regulatory initiatives concerned with taxation obligations and the inevitable contest it generates with other international organisations active in the field of multilateral regulations, in particular the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Both articles are rich in detail, well-constructed, and convincingly argued; they also make legal and fiscal matters very accessible to non-expert col-

leagues. My only remark is on Neuwirth's choice to never explain why convergence between the two systems would be a good thing; in lack of explanation and/or a brief report on the scientific debate on the subject, the reader is left with the impression that a teleological attitude might be guiding the argument.

Overall, the quality of the chapters varies across the book. Some general common guidelines from the editors as to the structure and necessary components of the chapters would have probably led to a better result. Editors should have also asked some authors to redress the focus of their chapters to the key research questions of the book, i.e. third parties' perceptions of the EU/EEC or relations between third parties and the EU/EEC. To make but one example, Rémy Davidson's excellent chapter on the transformation of the EU-NATO partnership is well argued and solidly supported by evidence; yet it mostly focuses on NATO's 'transformation from a static, defensive alliance to an offensive, counter-terrorism organisation' (p.272) and devotes only two out of sixteen pages (pp.268-70) to EU-NATO relations. In other cases, the inclusion of a chapter looks a very long shot; it is not clear, for example, how a study of French and German press' perceptions of Polish movement *Solidarność* (chapter by Karolina Pietras) actually fits in the book's scope or in the 'EU external relations with its neighbours' section. The impression is clearly of being presented more with a conference proceedings publication than an edited volume. In addition, such a diverse collection of contributions should have been preceded by a robust introduction. Yet nowhere in the introduction are methodological questions addressed, academic debates and literature(s) reviewed and appraised, or thought-provoking arguments offered. Readers interested in finding the thinking piece that gives an overall view of current scientific debates, some provocative arguments, and considerations for future research may go straight to Pascaline Winand's conclusions. In the first pages (pp. 377-385) Winand actually offers what would have been a perfect introduction; she then provides an intelligent presentation/review of all chapters, each of which is extensively dealt with and embedded in a critically conceived framework of analysis underlining the many features, vectors, and approaches proposed in this variegated book. Without implying that the chosen structure of the book is weak, my impression is that the overall outcome could have been more innovative and effective in adding to the academic debate had the book been organised following the framework and sections that Winand adopted in her contribution.

The co-editors (and conference conveners)'s effort to gather numerous and variegated perspectives on the question of how non-EU subjects (be they people, states, or organisations) have perceived the EU over time is certainly commendable and represents a step in the right direction. Yet the outcome suffers from the co-editors' minimalist approach to arrange the material. Some additional effort could have turned this collection of diverse contributions into a coherent pluralistic and multifaceted whole likely to have a bigger impact in several academic fields.

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Robin de Bruin, *Elastisch Europa: de integratie van Europa en de Nederlandse politiek*, 1947-1968, Wereldbibliotheek, Amsterdam, 2014, 325 p. – ISBN 978-90-284-2375-6 – 29,95 €.

As captured in the title *Elastic Europe* (“Elastisch Europa” in Dutch), this book argues that for Dutch politicians “Europe” was an attractive and flexible ideal. Robin de Bruin, assistant professor at the University of Amsterdam, examined how Dutch politicians looked at the threats and opportunities offered by post-1945 European cooperation. While they all embraced it as a key solution to pressing contemporary problems, Dutch political parties interpreted “Europe” in their own ideologically-coloured and pragmatic way; hence the adjective “elastic” in the title.

While the subtitle puts European integration before Dutch politics, the content of the book actually turns the order around. The focus is almost exclusively on Dutch political parties and their representatives, and their views *vis-à-vis* European integration. This order makes a lot of sense, taking into account the book's connection to a research project into the Dutch nation-state since 1815. “Elastisch Europa” is a good addition to books already published in this series.

The book zooms in on three parties in particular; the Catholic party KVP (“Katholieke Volkspartij”), the labour party PvdA (“Partij van de Arbeid”), and the (“Anti-Revolutionaire Partij”). The choice for these three is briefly motivated, but also the exclusion of significant others (i.e. a smaller Christian party and the liberal party) is touched upon (p.17). One conclusion of De Bruin’s book (if not *the* conclusion) is that the discussions within Dutch political parties have been more ideologically-inspired than hitherto expected. To do so, De Bruin used a productive mix of archival material stemming from the political parties and individual politicians, with (auto)biographies, and in-depth historical studies.

Other conclusions by and large stem from the book’s engagement with the state of the art. In the introduction, De Bruin inserts himself into a twofold historiographical debate. The introduction kicks off with a rather extensive historiographical discussion. On the one hand, the tone of voice seems tailored towards a Dutch discussion (i.e. by referring to the work of Mathieu Segers, Luuk van Middelaar, and Thierry Baudet), but also by touching upon the Eurosceptic atmosphere that seems widespread in the Dutch political and societal landscape today. An important aim of De Bruin’s book is to historically engage with visions of the European future of the 1950s and 1960s, as this could inform this contemporary debate within the Netherlands (p.13). On the other, De Bruin also takes issue with more general historically-informed interpretations of European integration. One of these are (neo-)realistic interpretations. They tend to take European cooperation as a special form of foreign policy. For De Bruin, the realist perspective tends to brush over certain beliefs, ideals, and ideologies within the nation. His detailed study zooms in on just that, and thus provides a counter-narrative. Though not engaging with this subfield of integration studies, “Elastisch Europa” should hence be seen as a more constructivist approach. In addition, De Bruin also engages with Alan S. Milward’s more national-economic

thesis. While dismissing the theory of federal supranational-minded Great Men, Milward's famed gauntry is that national states embraced European integration in order to safeguard their domestic economic and structures. According to De Bruin, Dutch politicians were able to reconcile their immediate domestic concerns with the pragmatic European opportunities. The European project was however seen as more than just an extension of national(ist) policies.

To make these points, De Bruin provides three main reasons why politicians in the Netherlands saw "Europe" as necessary and inevitable, but also as a solution. First, European integration would lead to economic scale increase and rationalisation. The post-war generation of politicians unequivocally saw this as a crucial step in enhancing Dutch standards of living. This was at least partially grounded in their past experiences of global depression and unemployment – in their eyes caused by a lack of international cooperation. At the same time, during a brief Interwar period, these politicians became acquainted with the rhetorical solution of a European panacea. Dutch policy-makers thus underwrote the problems of a lack of cooperation in Europe, and looked back in order to go forward.

Second, and related, political parties argued that European integration offered a way out of that other Interwar disease, namely nationalism. Cooperation, it was argued, would bring about peace and stability. Although political debates on Europe retained a certain national character, parties also coloured in the European outlines with their own respective ideological preferences. That being said, De Bruin shows how parties quickly learned to comprise, both on the European as well as national level.

Third, De Bruin points to the newly emerging international political constellation. Whereas the United States offered a (financial) helping hand, the Soviet Union posed an alleged cunning threat. For a large group of Dutch politicians, European unification offered a way to form a third block within the world, and to keep the continent safe. In that sense, very much like during the Interwar, "Europe" presented itself again as a catch-all solution to the problems of the time and modernity at large. But despite being some sort of a catch-all solution, European integration did not fit all without adjustment – hence the elastic or flexible Europe. The unique contribution of De Bruin's book is that it shifts the focus away from the more 'official' locus of Dutch European policy, namely the ministry of Foreign affairs. Instead, the author examines the viewpoints within the Dutch political system, with special attention for the ideological cleavages, and developments within political parties as well.

De Bruin offers a good in-depth analysis of the European allegiances of Dutch politicians. Interestingly enough, De Bruin does not zoom in on the "usual suspects", but by and large on lower level party functionaries and politicians. Some of the actors discussed are well-known, but De Bruin made a good effort combining them with less well-known Dutch politicians. In doing so, he is able to provide a nuanced image of the Euro-feelings of the first generation of Dutch politicians of the three parties under scrutiny. What De Bruin makes clear in his book are the initial expectations that Dutch politicians had of European cooperation. He argues convincingly that the

atmosphere in the Netherlands was genuinely pro-European, and that all main actors saw benefits from building a common European future. European integration was embraced with such enthusiasm that Dutch mainstream parties were willing to downplay parts of their ideological differences, after a long period of pillarization. While De Bruin shows how party politics had to adjust and compromise, this is always presented as a response to the unfolding of European cooperation. In other words, other factors that might have helped changes in the orientation of Dutch political parties fall outside the scope of this study. The *Trente Glorieuses* also brought about major socio-economic and cultural changes, and political parties needed to respond to this as well.

Another perk of the book is De Bruin's attempt to chart the opinion amongst Dutch citizens through a number of less-obvious sources. For example, by using (rather unique) two consultative referenda in middle-sized cities Bolsward and Delft, he shows how a majority of the Dutch citizens voted pro Europe. Voters had to answer "yes" or "no" to 1) a united Europe, 2) under a European government, and 3) with a democratic representation and a European constitution. Taking into account that reception research is always difficult, and his detailed view on the political landscape, De Bruin paints a convincing picture of European enthusiasm.

The audience clearly is a Dutch one, judged by the specific focus but also the language of the book. Parts of his book already made it into a recent Dutch handbook on European integration history.⁶ That being said, De Bruin's thesis does provide pointers for other more nationally-oriented histories of European integration. Luckily, a number of English-language publications preceded "Elastisch Europa", and thus non-Dutch speakers can take stock of De Bruin's thesis as well.⁷ A clear plus is the accessible style of writing, that will also speak to a non-academic audience.

Finally, the conclusion disappoints a bit. Though length is not always the best yardstick, only nine pages briefly sum up the main findings, and largely misses further pointers for the book's contribution to the historiography (which there certainly are). It also lacks a more systematic comparison between parties, or a broader discussion of the findings in the light of future research (Dutch and non-Dutch). Therewith De Bruin sells his findings a bit short.

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6. W.P. VAN MEURS et al., *Europa in Alle Staten: Zestig Jaar Geschiedenis van de Europese Integratie*, Uitgeverij Vantilt, Nijmegen 2013.

7. See e.g. *The "Elastic" European Ideal in the Netherlands, 1948-1958. Images of a Future Integrated Europe and the Transformation of Dutch Politics*, in: M. BEERS, J. RAFLIK (eds), *Cultures Nationales et Identité Communautaire: Un Défi pour l'Europe? / National Cultures and Common Identity: A Challenge for Europe?*, Peter Lang, Brussels 2010), pp.207-216; and "Europe" as a "Hothouse" for Dutch Domestic Politics, 1948-1967, in: A. VARSORI et al (eds), *European Parties and the European Integration Process, 1945-1992*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2015, pp.337-348.

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Bernhard GOTTO, Horst MÖLLER, Jean MONDOT, Nicole PELLETIER (eds), *Nach „Achtundsechzig“. Krisen und Krisenbewusstsein in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1970er Jahren*, Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 2013, 193 p. – ISBN 978-3-486-72195-9 – 34,95 €.

In a way, the here presented book is the continuation of the compilation on the 1960s, edited by the same team and compiling the scientific results of a German-French cooperation project of University Bordeaux 3 and the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich.⁸ Now the volume to be reviewed here views at the 1970s as a decade of crisis and perception of crisis. In this context, the “key year” (p.VII) of 1968 is considered the decisive *caesura*. The editors and authors are fully aware of the fact that a structure along decades is somewhat artificial. Accordingly, right at the start, Horst Möller in his conceptual contribution on the 1970s as a “contemporary-historical epoch threshold” makes clear that every kind of periodisation always depends on the respective guiding question.

What is true for international relations is not necessarily true for the economic, social or cultural development. The here discussed decade, to which research has attributed a number of attributes and characteristics, may definitely be considered a decade of crisis deserving particular emphasis, for both neighbours this side or that side of the Rhine. However, the chronological boundaries of the epochs cannot be clearly defined, and given the findings, the term “crisis” may be convincing at best for the “crisis of the social state” (p.5). This finding seems to be confirmed by the other contributions on political history and the history of ideas, as indeed they show that this decade was less problematic than suggested by the crisis rhetoric of the contemporaries. In his contribution on the parties and the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany Udo Wengst for example shows that – contrary to Jürgen Habermas’s thesis of West Germany being “ungovernable” – we observe a broad politicisation concerning topics of foreign and home policy, a politicisation which stabilised the political system. At the same time the 1970s mark the peak of the major parties of CDU and SPD, with fabulous numbers of members and votes, thus rather suggesting a broad participation of the citizens.

On the French side on the other hand, this becomes obvious by Sylvie Guillaume’s essay, one must state a lack of liberal discourses, not at last as Liberalism did not really fit to the binary political system of the V. Republic. In this context, a mood of reform and the thus connected initiatives did not really run parallel but followed each other, as it becomes clear by Bernhard Gotto’s contribution, who views not only at one of the classical political pairs but compares the period of office of the first Social Democrat Federal Chancellor, Willy Brandt to that of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the first non-Gaullist President of the V. Republic. Both started with programmes of home-political reform whose failure was inevitable, due to the insufficient scopes of the actors as well as with regard to the high expectations fuelled by them.

8. B. GOTTO, H. MÖLLER, J. MONDOT, N. PELLETIER (eds), *Krisen und Krisenbewusstsein in Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1960er Jahren*, Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 2012.

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If on the whole the focus of the contributions is on political-history issues, it is most of all French authors who deal with the socio-economic *caesurae* of the 1970s which is actually crucial for the perception of crisis. Jean-Francois Sirinelli sheds light on the end of the “Trente Glorieuses”, that epoch of constant economic growth since the Marshall Plan, coming to a sudden end with the Oil Crisis of 1973. He considers the latter part of the “vingt décisives”, the crucial twenty years between 1965 and 1985 which were characterised by fundamental social and cultural breaks. The significance of the *caesura* of 1973 becomes similarly obvious by H el ene Miard-Delacroix’s contribution which sheds light on the oil price shock and its consequences for French society. She identifies the change of values, the challenges for the German-French relations and characterises the year 1973 as an “irruption fracassante” (p.60). This socio-economic perspective is completed by Pierre Guillaume’s contributions who, in a short though instructive contribution, analyses the extension of the social state in France and by Bernard Poloni’s analysis of the different social constitutions in the two countries.

At the level of international relations, the crisis of the relations to the USA works as a catalyst for the German-French relations. Georges-Henri Soutou identifies the delimitation from the Carter administration as the core of a return to the German-French driving force in Europe which, he says, made the relations of the two governments closer than ever without, however, the relations being completely free of second thoughts, particularly on the French side. This perspective is continued by Veronika Heyde and Verena Sattler. Both of them – the former by the example of the OSCE and the latter by the example of Middle East policy – make obvious how much the French attitude was always also oriented at the independence of the country’s foreign policy. Finally there is also a view at the home-political topics of terrorism and inner security. Here Markus Lammert states a tightening of security policy in France in 1968 and thereafter, without this – as it happened in Germany – leading to radicalisation and even armed underground fighting, not at last as the left-wing discourses were more connected to the concept of freedom than in the Federal Republic.

The volume concludes with a contribution by Eva Oberloskamp on German-French cooperation in the field of fighting terrorism which, despite difficulties of practical implementation and a relative lack of success, still played a pioneering and crucial role for European cooperation in this field. This is yet another hint at the oft-quoted role of German-French cooperation as a driving force for Europe. Also, this volume only marginally touches any German/French comparison. Not all national examples have a counterpart on the opposite side. For example, a contribution on the German social system would have been a desideratum, to be able to make a reference to the French “ tat-providence”. Even in the age of Europeanisation and globalisation there remain national particularities which can be clearly identified only by way of comparison and which transcend the purely national perspective. For the authors, crisis is less an analytical category, instead it is a contemporary perception which is qualified by the (comparative) retrospective view.

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Andreas MORING, *Liberale Europapolitik 1949-1989. Die Europapolitik der FDP zwischen 1949 und 1989*, DemOkrit. Studien zur Parteienkritik und Parteienhistorie, Bd.4, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2014, 617 S. – ISBN 978-3-631-64801-8 – 99,95 €.

Although Germany's liberal party, the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei or FDP), during the 40 years covered by the book took part in the Federal government for more than 30 years, the party leadership was unable to build up an image as Germany's "European" party *par excellence* as did the Conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU). This is really astonishing, since the FDP's ideas of Europe and European integration, as Andreas Moring stresses with justification, have to be seen as an important and decisive factor to the understanding of the European policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The problems addressed by him are, among others: What was typically "liberal" concerning the FDP's European policy? Which ideas of Europe did the party support? Did the FDP prefer alternatives to the prevailing concepts of integration policy? Or was the party lacking in a clear European goal or vision?

After a short overview of plans of Europe characteristic of political liberalism during the 19th and 20th centuries, Moring starts his investigation of the FDP's European policies and politics in 1949. In contrast to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's CDU, European integration and German reunification seemed to be equally important from the FDP's point of view. Therefore the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community was supported by the FDP only to the minimum necessary to meet the expectations of the Christian Democratic coalition partner because the ECSC might make unification more difficult. The European Economic Community however came under severe criticism and was accused to be "undemocratic", "dirigiste" and "protectionist" – and therefore rejected by the FDP, at that time not a member of the German government. The party instead preferred some sort of free trade area including all European countries outside the Soviet hemisphere.

Back in the ruling coalition, the FDP after 1961 brought its European policy more and more in line with the course of the CDU: European integration was now seen as a cornerstone of West Germany's "reasons of state" or *Staatsräson* (p.300). The FDP, too, supported more determined than before the goal of a political European Union. And, last but not least, the party's influence in European politics grew since the early 1970s, when Ralf Dahrendorf and, in 1974, Guido Brunner, both members of the FDP, became EC Commissioners. In 1975 the FDP came out in favour of a European community based on democracy, transparency, rule of law and freedom of establishment (p.467). A last exclamation mark was put in launching the "Genscher-Colombo-Plan", when in 1981 the West German free democratic Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Italian colleague suggested to reinforce political co-operation in the European Union including some sort of a European Act for revising decision-making in favour of the European Parliament and the European Commission.

Moring's book is based principally on published documents. It therefore offers no new findings or insights. Moring's contribution to the historiography of European integration has to be seen in his complex and comprehensive reconstruction of the European ideas, policies and politics of an important protagonist within the European arena. In my opinion he even underestimates the role of Franz Blücher, Minister of the Marshall Plan in the formative years of European integration, in bringing back West Germany to the European stage after 1949. Perhaps it was the FDP's openness towards alternative – and sometimes unsuccessful – concepts of European integration that may explain why the FDP missed the title of Germany's most pro-European party.

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Giovanni BERNARDINI, *Nuova Germania, antichi timori. Stati Uniti, Ostpolitik e sicurezza europea*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2013, 310 p. – ISBN 978-88-15-24693-6 – 25,00 €.

Giovanni Bernardini's volume deals with one of the most crucial episodes in the history of the Cold War: the new Eastern policy (*Ostpolitik*) developed by the Social-Democratic leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Based primarily on unpublished documents in the *Bundesarchiv* in Koblenz, the *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* in Berlin, the *Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* in Bonn, the *National Archives and Records Administration* and the *National Security Archives* in Washington DC and the *Archives Nationales de France* in Paris, in particular, Bernardini's work aims at answering three distinct but closely intertwined research questions: what were the origins of the *Ostpolitik*? how did it interact with the strategy of *détente* developed by the United States (US) in the same period? what was the role it played in the wider context of the so-called Great *Détente*?

The book is composed of four main parts, arranged according to a chronological order.

The first chapter outlines the background to the United States' and West Germany's process of rethinking of their respective foreign policies towards the end of the 1960s. On the one hand, it analyses motives and purposes of the US. As remarked by Bernardini, President Richard Nixon and the influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, did not aim at radically altering or overcoming the bipolar order. They simply wanted to pursue the traditional containment policy by adapting it to changing conditions. The United States was in the midst of a recession and the Nixon Administration needed to ease tension with the Soviet Union (USSR) to cut back on public spending. Meanwhile, the US was facing the emergence of a multipolar world and a crisis in the transatlantic relationship; the Nixon Administration, consequently,

desired to come to terms with its main enemy also as a way to reassert the United States hegemony, especially over the Western bloc. On the other hand, the first chapter closely examines the root of the *Ostpolitik*. Bernardini emphasises the revolutionary significance of the new approach to international politics adopted by the leader of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) and minister for Foreign Affairs, Willy Brandt. He also stresses the great contribution made to this approach by the Brandt's team of collaborators, especially Egon Bahr, Under-Secretary and Head of the Policy Planning Staff in the German Federal Foreign Office.

Based on his personal convictions and experience as mayor of West Berlin, Brandt became convinced that the time had come for West Germany to abandon the Hallstein Doctrine, which implied the refusal to establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In its stead, Brandt was determined to put into place a strategy of dialogue with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, including East Germany; the aim was to use cooperation to improve material conditions of all Germans, create a new system of security in Europe and ultimately favour reunification of West and East Germany. This strategy was not only at odds with the conservative views of the *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU), but also different and distinct from the American version of détente. While Brandt and Bahr were working on a German road to détente, which aimed at breaking bipolar confrontation and divisions, Nixon and Kissinger prioritized the dialogue between the two superpowers with the intention of stabilizing the bipolar order.

The second chapter investigates the early stages of development of the *Ostpolitik*, from the formation of a coalition government of Social Democrats and Liberals chaired by Brandt in mid-1969 to the Brandt's visit to Erfurt in East Germany, which culminated in a historic meeting between the Chancellor of the FRG and the Prime Minister of the GDR, Willi Stoph, in early 1970. That was the period when Brandt and Bahr laid the groundwork for a new Eastern policy and Bernardini is effective in describing and discussing the complex relationship between this course of action and the United States strategy.

The government in Bonn made every effort to reassure the Nixon Administration that its foreign policy was compatible with US interests and objectives. At the same time, it moved ahead fast to strengthen diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with Eastern countries, especially the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR. The Nixon Administration, meanwhile, faced a tricky dilemma. The most prominent members of the government of the United States apart from the Secretary of State, William Rogers, were worried and sceptical about Bonn's initiatives. They regarded the *Ostpolitik* more like wishful thinking than an actual policy. In addition, they considered it as a risk to the German commitment to the West and to the United States leadership in Western Europe. However, the Nixon Administration could not publicly oppose Brandt's government since this path might undermine the alliance with the FRG and endanger the détente as a whole. As a result, President Nixon limited himself to

monitoring the first steps of the *Ostpolitik* without making full use of all the means at his disposal to stop it.

As narrated in the third chapter, contrary to what Nixon and Kissinger expected, the government in Bonn made significant progress, thereby putting the US largely on the defensive.

Between late 1969 and early 1970, the government of the FRG was in the vanguard in supporting the Soviet Union-sponsored conference on European security, on which the US Administration was very hesitant. In mid-1970, despite some qualms and reservations from the United States, Chancellor Brandt and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor Walter Scheel signed the Treaty of Moscow with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kosygin, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko. The signatories recognised the inviolability of European borders, including frontiers between Poland and East Germany and between West and East Germany. Also, they explicitly ruled out the use of force in settling disputes in Europe. In late 1970, finally, Chancellor Brandt and the Prime Minister of Poland, Józef Cyrankiewicz, signed the Treaty of Warsaw. Despite persistent concerns in Washington, the signatories solemnly confirmed the main results of the Treaty of Moscow. They renounced territorial claims and the use of force in European relations. Moreover, they recognized the Western border of the Polish People's Republic, imposed on Germany at the 1945 Potsdam Conference.

Widespread public support for the Eastern policy of West Germany and the exacerbation of domestic divisions in the FRG reduced the United States room for manoeuvre even further. Public identification of the Nixon Administration with opposition to the *Ostpolitik* might alienate sympathy for the US in the European public opinion, thereby undermining the transatlantic relations. On the other hand, the US Administration's opposition to the *Ostpolitik*, if expressed publicly, could decisively contribute to the collapse of the Brandt's government; this, in turn, could lead to accusations of interference in the internal affairs of Bonn and attempts on the national sovereignty of the FRG against the United States. The US Administration, at the same time, could not openly support the *Ostpolitik* without fatally demoralizing the traditional ally of the United States and main opposition party in West Germany: the CDU.

The fourth chapter, finally, focuses on the last stages of development of the Brandt's Eastern policy, from negotiations on Berlin to the parallel preparation of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), before concluding with the analysis of the ratification of *Ostpolitik* treaties.

Bernardini highlights the great significance of negotiations on Berlin in the relationship between Brandt's Germany and Nixon's United States. The former mayor of West Berlin considered an agreement on Berlin as the culmination of his entire strategy. Nixon and Kissinger, on the other hand, strongly opposed such an agreement; in their view, the betterment of everyday lives of Berliners, which was the main aim of that accord, did not justify the worsening of the existing legal-political set-up

in the city. Initially, Nixon and Kissinger did not hesitate to enter into direct conflict with Brandt, not least because of the undue pressure he was placing on the United States to consent to that agreement. Afterwards, however, the desire to please the European public opinion and the need to strengthen the transatlantic relationship led to a dramatic change of mind in the Nixon Administration. Aware that an agreement on Berlin could be perfectly compatible with the whole complex of negotiations with the Soviet Union, Nixon eventually agreed with Brandt in supporting a new arrangement over the divided city, which resulted in the signature of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin in the second half of 1971. This document was important in reactivating contacts and communications between the two sectors of the city and in improving living conditions of Western Berliners; more significantly, it was crucial in paving the way for the mutual recognition between West and East Germany in the Basic Treaty, which was signed in late 1972 and entered into force in mid-1973.

While it was the key actor in the so-called “bilateral *Ostpolitik*”, according to Bernardini, the government in Bonn was not the main protagonist in the multilateral dimension of the European détente, which featured the MBFR talks and the CSCE. The US Administration had the final say in issues concerning disarmament and, more generally, security in Europe. Consequently, all the governments of the European Community (EC) which were involved in the European Political Cooperation (EPC), including that of the FRG, were eventually constrained to follow the leadership of the United States and, in particular, to reluctantly accept the downgrading of the CSCE and the total separation between the CSCE and the MBFR. That said, Brandt’s government was crucial in supporting the CSCE and influencing the Helsinki Declaration, the final act of the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Helsinki Accords, in fact, contained principles and formula which were also at the basis of the *Ostpolitik*, including the principle of inviolability of borders, promotion of human and cultural contacts and increase and normalization of economic relations.

Bernardini’s volume, in conclusion, is an engaging, elegantly written, meticulously documented and well-argued study, which establishes itself in the best tradition of diplomatic historiography and makes a valuable contribution to the comprehension of both the Cold War and transatlantic history. Alternative sources, including newspapers, might have profitably complemented historical archives; analysis of events, reflections and dynamics, however, is accurate and thorough. Positions and interactions between the FRG and the US are reconstructed in a very efficacious and reliable fashion. Contrary to what the author himself writes in the introduction, attention is not only paid to the relatively small group of politicians that was directly involved in negotiations but also to a plurality of actors which were in some way concerned with the *Ostpolitik*: political parties, trade unions, pressure and interest groups and above all public opinion. The author is not interested in taking into consideration parallel and significant phenomena such as the Vatican’s new Eastern policy. Nor he is interested to explain the part played by the *Ostpolitik* in the political transformation of West Germany and the new place it began to occupy at both continental and global

level. Although these choices are made with adequate explanation, they appear to be highly questionable.


That said, Bernardini is able to answer the research questions in which he had an interest. He is successful, in particular, at providing convincing evidences against the still widespread idea that the *Ostpolitik* was a mere German version of the US-led détente. As effectively shown in the study, Brandt's new Eastern policy and Nixon's policy towards the Soviet Union were two distinct and even conflicting strategies; while the US aimed at conserving and stabilizing the European order, the FRG wished to overcome it. In this sense, accordingly, it clearly transpires that the *Ostpolitik* was more influential than the US strategy in creating the conditions for the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which eventually led to the end of the Cold War.

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