

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Giuliano GARAVINI, *After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South, 1957-1986*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 291 p. – ISBN 978-0-19-965919-7 – £ 65,00.

After Empires: European Integration, Decolonization and the Challenge from the Global South (1957-1986) is a thoroughly researched, lucidly written and highly original argument about the complex links between decolonization, post World War II debates about development, and the ideas about the process of European integration. While most scholars study European integration in the broad context of the Cold War, focusing particularly on Franco-German and transatlantic relations, Garavini situates the rise and transformation of the EEC within decolonization and Western Europe's changing relations with developing nations in Africa and Latin America. He shows how preoccupied Western European states were with the economic and political fate of their former colonies, how Third World nations attempted, initially with some success, to create greater economic autonomy and a more equitable global division of labor, and why many Europeans and the EEC supported those efforts in the 1970s. The work, which is a revised and updated version of his 2009 monograph *Dope gli imperi*, draws on extensive research in government, UN, and business archives in Italy, the UK, the US and Venezuela. Garavini has also used many online archives and has read deeply in the vast secondary literatures relevant to his themes. Garavini's intervention in studies of European integration is original and provocative in the best sense of the word; it shows what a genuinely transnational history can contribute.

Garavini argues that with the loss of empires, Western Europe was confronted by the emergence of an increasingly vocal and organized Third World, symbolized not only by OPEC, but also by the less studied United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the G77. Decolonization and development presented Europeans with two questions: How might Western European states relate to one another? How should they interact with their former colonies specifically and the broader global South more generally? As he shows, these were answered in tandem, and the shifting answers given helped to define both Western Europe's relationship with the Third World and its post imperial identity.

Europe's first response to decolonization was to turn inward and focus on retaining ties to former colonies through agreements such as the Yaoundé Convention between African states and the EEC. Through most of the sixties, the EEC failed to develop an autonomous relationship with the global South, but this began to change in 1968 and from then through the late 1970s, European politicians, socialist parties, NGOs, students, and the Catholic Church all to varying degrees supported Third World efforts for new kinds of development aid and a more equitable global division of resources. The EEC and Western European countries, he argues spearheaded interna-

tional economic cooperation in the 1970s, at a time when both the US and the Soviet Union were not interested in a cooperative solution to the multiple problems of that troubled decade. They promoted the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, also called the North-South Dialogue, which met from 1975 to 1977.

These alternative visions for a new global economic order were pushed most strongly in UNCTAD, which became, in Garavini's words, a sort of trade union for the Third World. It encouraged the formation of the G77, a group of 77 developing countries, which joined together in 1964 to articulate and promote their common economic interests. Garavini offers a sympathetic but critical reading of the various proposals offered by Third World countries, UNCTAD, the EC, and the Socialist International, under Willy Brandt's leadership. In 1975, with encouragement from some Western Europeans, the G77 proposed a New International Economic Order (NIEO) to the UN. The NIEO, which was passed by the General Assembly, laid out a blueprint for more equitably dividing not only resources but also decision-making power in international economic institutions.

By the late 1970s, however, cooperation among the increasingly economically diverse nations of the global South and cooperation between UNCTAD and the EEC was fraying. By the early 1980s the EEC had retreated back into a regional focus; it distanced itself from the demands of the global South, and softened its own former criticisms of the increasingly popular neoliberal Washington consensus. The EEC, in Garavini's assessment, abandoned aspirations for a more autonomous relationship with the Third World, one that would seek to restructure the global economic order. Europe had successfully abandoned its imperial illusions without finding a meaningful new relationship to the global South. Instead, in the face of the oil crisis, inflation, slowed growth and currency instability of the 1970s, the EC gave priority to deepening economic integration and political ties among its members on the one hand and strengthening its ties to other advanced industrial countries via the formation of the G7 on the other hand.

This original argument is richly detailed in chapters covering the limits of Americanization, the evolution of global trade, the year of oil, and North-South dialogues. The protests of 1968 and the ensuing years in Europe marked a widespread criticism of the prevailing model of growth and consumption and initiated a serious new concern with the economic situation of developing countries. This perspective offers a needed alternative to the frequent dismissals of European Third Worldism as only a romantic, self-centred, and destructive fascination with violence. Of particular importance is Garavini's picture of the diversity and breadth of interest in rethinking Europe's relationship to the global South. He offers a detailed and judicious assessment of the views and actions of leading politicians in several European countries as well as in the EEC bureaucracy. Equal attention is given to the ideas and projects of socialists and Catholics on these issues, and not only Britain, France and Germany, but also Italy and the Netherlands are discussed in depth. The chapters on the seventies look not only at the oil crises and the NIEO, but also follow the debates and negotiations in the ensuing five years about how to implement some of NIEO's promises.

Garavini concludes by sketching the unravelling of EC-Third World ties and the disintegration of both global South solidarity and European concern with a more equitable global order. Yet he insists that one should not read the failure of the NIEO as inevitable. The intensive discussions around and proceedings of UNCTAD show the potential as well as the limits of Third World cooperation and the pervasive European interest in these debates at a time when the US dismissed them. He attributes a great deal of the failure to the second oil crisis and accompanying Volker Shock. One wishes, however, that he had speculated some on whether without these, the EC-Third World collaboration of the seventies might have persisted. Or was it doomed by other structural changes in the European and global economy during the 1970s and the subsequent collapse of communism and emergence of neoliberalism?

Garavini presents his fascinating story as one of failure for both the global South and EC in search of an autonomous global presence. Nonetheless, he richly captures a most interesting moment of possibility that has generally been forgotten in the subsequent triumph of structural adjustment, the ascendancy of neoliberalism, and the growing divisions within the global South.

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Birte WASSENBURG, *Histoire du Conseil de l'Europe (1949-2009)*, PIE Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2012, 643 p. – ISBN 978-90-5201-896-6 – 65,35 €.

L'histoire de la construction européenne a acquis ses lettres de noblesse et tend à occuper la place qui lui revient légitimement compte tenu de l'importance des instances européennes et de la place que l'Union Européenne a pris dans la vie des peuples du continent aux diverses échelles de leur existence. Parmi les instances qui ont joué un rôle majeur voire matriciel pour l'Union, le Conseil de l'Europe occupe une place éminente mais n'a que peu fait l'objet d'études systématiques et globales. L'ouvrage de Birte Wassenberg, maître de conférences habilitée à l'université de Strasbourg, vient magistralement combler cette lacune en proposant une histoire exhaustive du Conseil de sa création en 1949 à 2009. Spécialiste de la coopération transfrontalière, notamment dans l'espace du Rhin supérieur, l'auteur élargit son champ d'analyse par cette histoire d'une institution qui comme le souligne Marie-Thérèse Bitsch dans sa préface «souffre d'un sérieux déficit de visibilité et de notoriété». La renommée croissante de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme dont peu de citoyens européens ou de requérants de celle-ci ont conscience qu'elle est une composante du Conseil de l'Europe, ne saurait masquer les questions qui sont posées en interne au Conseil mais peut être surtout dans des instances extérieures à celui-ci, sur son avenir à mesure que s'accroissent le rôle et le poids de l'Union Européenne. Le travail de l'auteur permet de mettre en perspective les significations et importances successives qui ont été celles du Conseil et d'éclairer par là même ses possibles avvenirs.

L'ouvrage est structuré sur un plan chronologique en trois parties, 1948-1969, 1969-1989 et 1989-2009, plan qui installe des séquences homogènes d'une vingtaine d'années qui épousent une existence à intensité variable, soit une lancée forte, un ralentissement marqué puis enfin une relance qui paraît s'essouffler sur la fin de la dernière période. Cette périodisation épouse une histoire continentale dont l'articulation avec les histoires spécifiques des différents États qui composent l'Union n'est pas encore solidement fixée dans les enseignements d'histoire des écoles notamment.

De la première période, initiée par l'usage par Winston Churchill dès 1942 du concept de Conseil de l'Europe, ressort très tôt, après la création du Conseil et son installation à Strasbourg en 1949, le clivage des espoirs fédéralistes opposés à la logique intergouvernementale qui prend le dessus à travers la création du Comité des ministres du Conseil qui a la prépondérance sur ce qui fut à l'époque un événement d'un retentissement peu commun, la première mise en place d'une Assemblée parlementaire européenne. Que le rôle de cette dernière soit resté consultatif n'a certainement pas suffi à effacer de la mémoire des peuples européens l'image d'une possible démocratie continentale. Il est clair aussi que l'impulsion qu'on pouvait attendre de ce Conseil créé par le traité de Londres du 5 mai 1949 a été pour une part entravée par la création de structures de caractère plus opérationnel, comme la CECA, qui ont paru cantonner le Conseil de l'Europe dans un rôle de «tribune de discussion générale de la politique européenne» selon l'expression de Birte Wassenberg. La naissance de la petite Europe, celle des Six marque à partir de 1957, un deuxième temps où s'amorce le processus d'intégration économique européen qui va en quelque sorte fermer la voie d'un rôle global – économique, social, culturel, juridique et politique – pour le Conseil et le spécialiser dans certaines dimensions, les droits de l'homme en particulier et limiter *de facto* son rôle de «chef d'orchestre» de la construction européenne.

Au cours de la période qui suit son lancement soit de 1969 à 1989, le Conseil de l'Europe connaît une certaine forme de stabilisation. La montée en puissance de la CEE, l'exclusion de la Grèce, le coup d'État en Turquie en 1980, les crises à Malte et à Chypre sont des moments difficiles pour le positionnement du Conseil. Par ailleurs, l'intégration de la Grande-Bretagne dans le système communautaire en 1973 fait perdre au Conseil le rôle de tribune britannique face à l'Europe des six. Ces divers éléments conduisent le Conseil à s'interroger sur sa vocation d'autant que le Parlement Européen se met en place sans que soit réellement précisé le partage des rôles entre les deux institutions. Pour qualifier cette période, Birte Wassenberg parle à juste titre de «crise d'identité» du Conseil. L'éclatement du système soviétique et ses effets libérateurs pour les pays de l'Est européen sous sa dépendance vont ouvrir l'opportunité d'une ouverture aussi large qu'inattendue pour le Conseil.

Le discours de Michael Gorbatchev sur la Maison commune européenne le 6 juillet 1989 devant le Conseil de l'Europe, quatre mois avant la chute du Mur de Berlin, amorce un moment fort de l'existence du Conseil qui retrouve sa double vocation de promoteur de la grande Europe et de ferment de la démocratie sur le continent. L'action rayonnante de la secrétaire générale de l'époque, Catherine Lalumière, les

préconisations de la commission de Venise, les soutiens aux écoles de la démocratie politique dans les pays de l'Est européen ont témoigné de la capacité d'initiative et du dynamisme renouvelés du Conseil en cette période cruciale pour le vieux continent. Les sommets des chefs d'État et de gouvernement – Vienne en 1993, Strasbourg en 1997, Varsovie en 2005 – consacrent le rôle paneuropéen du Conseil. Au cours de cette période, la place de la CEDH s'affirme comme éminente dans le dispositif du Conseil, même si très vite après la réforme de ses statuts, la Cour paraît débordée, ployant sous le nombre des requêtes qui lui sont adressées. De 1999 à 2009, elle a reçu 180.000 requêtes individuelles et prononcé 10.000 jugements. Des éléments plus problématiques sont apparus sur la fin de la dernière période. L'élargissement continu de l'Union depuis 2004 lui confère désormais un rôle paneuropéen qui n'est dès lors plus le privilège du Conseil. Le partage des rôles avec l'OSCE dont l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe aurait pu devenir l'organe délibératif, ne paraît pas s'opérer au bénéfice du Conseil. Comme l'indique en conclusion Birte Wassenberg, «la question de la place du Conseil de l'Europe dans l'architecture européenne du XXI^e siècle reste ouverte».

La synthèse présentée par l'auteur est par bien des aspects remarquable et servira longtemps de butte témoin à ceux qui auront à cœur de comprendre dans ses profondeurs l'instance de Strasbourg. La chronologie proposée à la suite du texte est un excellent instrument de suivi du fil de l'histoire de l'institution de même que le riche index alphabétique qui lui est adjoint. Le travail de synthèse est d'autant plus remarquable que ce type d'institution est le plus souvent caractérisé par la pléthore documentaire de laquelle il n'est pas toujours aisé de dégager les éléments significatifs. On aurait apprécié quelques réflexions complémentaires sur les supports d'activités du Conseil, l'évolution de son organisation du travail interne et externe, ses productions et les effets induits sur ceux-ci de la révolution numérique et d'autres dimensions de technologie administrative dans ses fonctionnements. De même peut-on regretter que les aspects humains qu'il s'agisse de l'action de quelques acteurs majeurs ou de l'ensemble des personnels qui ont contribué à la mise en œuvre de l'institution n'aient pas davantage été valorisés. Par ailleurs les impacts locaux de l'institution, sa relation avec le milieu local strasbourgeois où elle s'est enracinée sont plus suggérés qu'approfondis. Ces regrets soulignent *a contrario* que l'ouvrage est avant tout et pleinement au sens large du terme, une histoire politique du Conseil se confrontant avec force à toute la complexité d'une institution dont la structure et le cadre d'action sont plurinationaux. Le travail de Birte Wassenberg permet de rappeler avec brio que le Conseil de l'Europe a été une des briques fondatrices de la construction européenne. Il pose aussi avec acuité la question de son rôle à venir au moment où les peuples d'Europe posent des questions cruciales à leurs dirigeants sur la poursuite de la construction européenne.

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Holm Arno LEONHARDT, *Kartelltheorie und internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien*, Historische Europa-Studien / Historic Europe Studies, vol.16, Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, Zurich, New York, 2013, 861 p. – ISBN 978-3-487-14840-3 – 98,00 €.

Leonhardt's study seeks to restore the concept of cartel to its originally broad range of meanings and to install cartel theory as a means to regulate competition among rival partners not just in the economic domain but also in politics and society at large. Specifically, Leonhardt argues that the concept of state cartels should be recognized as a useful tool in the process of constructing what he claims to be an unbiased international relations theory that is supposed to be free from hegemonic political interests and, within one analytical framework, allows explanations of both conflict and cooperation (pp.656 and 733).

Leonhardt proceeds in seven steps. After introductory surveys of the topic and of the conceptual history of the cartel, which still in the eighteenth century could comprise an agreement among warring parties to exchange prisoners of war, but also a set of rules for the enactment of tournaments (Chapter I, pp.40-48; Chapter II, pp. 49-68), he provides an historical description of what he categorises as 'classical theory' from 1883 to c. 1960 (Chapter III, pp.69-205). Following this exercise in the history of theory, he plunges into empirical matters, examining the transformation of economic organisation, mainly in continental Europe and Japan under US influence during the 1940s and 1950s (Chapter IV, pp.206-407). Next, turning to state cartel, he focuses on Karl Kautsky's early twentieth-century theory of 'ultra imperialism' as a theory of cooperation among rival imperialist governments (Chapter V, pp. 408-477), before moving on to functionalism, which he interprets as a theory of global and regional integration within the framework of cartel theory (Chapter VI, pp. 478-521). He then pleads in favour of combining international relations and regional integration theories in an attempt to explicate Jean Monnet's European regional integration policy of the late 1940s and early 1950s, which Leonhardt considers as applied functionalism (Chapter VII, pp.522-647). The last substantial chapter comprises a survey of select international relations theories, with an emphasis on their deficits and a plea for the use of cartel theory (Chapter VIII, pp.648-733). Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII had been written in an early period of Leonhardt's work on his topic, before Chapters II, III and IV were conceptualised. The study concludes with a summary of the results, a lengthy bibliography and a somewhat parsimonious index, omitting many names of persons referred to in the main text.

Throughout his study, Leonhardt takes issue with mainstream international relations theories, which he associates mainly with 'realist' and 'idealist' approaches, while leaving out revisions that have been proposed since the late 1980s. He also claims that most twentieth-century international relations theories have originated in the UK and the USA. Elaborating on Stanley Hoffmann's and Kalevi Jaako Holsti's observation that the academic discipline of International Relations is an 'American Social Science', which is 'dividing' rather than bridging continents, Leonhardt calls

for a new theory that should not be biased by claims for hegemonic control by the state of its origin. Leonhardt's critique of state of the art international relations theories, despite the limitations of the sample that he takes into account, is basically fair, given the fact that most post-Socialist continental European as well as East Asian and African work on international relations has been drawn on existing US-based theories.¹ Indeed, neither has cartel theory been used in the study of international relations, nor have recent constructivist approaches availed themselves of the tools it provides. Instead, so far, cartel theory has, since the turn of the twentieth century, mainly been applied in studies of private corporations, there seeking to determine the regulation of corporate behaviour under the constraints of market competition. Leonhardt assumes that governments of states can be treated as if they were institutions of management of private firms, that, like private firms, governments of states are involved in a somehow regulated competition in some respects while facing the need to cooperate in the pursuit of common interests in other respects.

In order to demonstrate the possibility of using cartel theory in the context of international relations, Leonhardt contends that early twentieth century Socialist theorists applied the theory within their critical analysis of imperialism. To that end, he scrutinises Kautsky's critical theory of 'ultra imperialism'. Like other Socialist theorists, most notably Karl Liebknecht, Kautsky categorised as 'state cartels' the cooperation among rival imperialist governments for expanding their control onto Africa, West, South, Southeastern Asia and the South Pacific. They argued that imperialist governments were agreeing to restrain their aggressive competition in order to pursue the common goal of imperialist expansion, as private firms would do to advance their control of a market segment. In view of the Berlin Africa conference of 1884/85, Kautsky and Liebknecht would not discount the possibility that rival imperialist governments might, at some point in the future, agree on common principles of managing colonial control, and Kautsky coined the phrase 'ultra imperialism' to denote what he elsewhere called the international of imperialists. Kautsky was fearful that such an international of imperialists might become operative before a Socialist international and argued in favour of applying a flexible strategy of Socialist revolution against potential twists in imperialist government policy. Otherwise, he warned, imperialist governments might succeed not merely in tightening their grip on other parts of the world but also in keeping the socialist revolution at bay.²

1. A. KOTERA (ed.), *The Future of the Multilateral Trading System. East Asian Perspectives*, Rieti, London, 2009; X. GU, *Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen*, 2nd ed., Oldenbourg, Munich, 2010 [first published in 2001], who, at p.90, refers to Confucius's description of the 'Great Union' (*da-tong*) as an instrument of the balance of power. E. di NOLFO, *Degli imperi militari agli imperi tecnologici. La politica internazionale del XX secolo*, Laterza, Rome, 2002; E. di NOLFO (ed.) *Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1986-1992; V. RITTEBERGER, B. ZANGL, A. KRUCK, *Internationale Organisationen*, fourth edition, Springer, Wiesbaden, 2013, pp.17-22; S. ADEM, *Is Japan's Cultural Experience Relevant for Africa's Development?*, in: *African and Asian Studies*, 2(2005), pp.629-664.
2. K. KAUTSKY, *Der imperialistische Krieg*, in: *Die Neue Zeit*, 1(1917), pp.475-487, here p.483.

In his analysis, Leonhardt advances knowledge about the debate about ‘ultra imperialism’ by contextualising Kautsky’s arguments. Existing research literature had focused on examining Vladimir Il’ič Lenin’s well-known attack on Kautsky’s theory in *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, positioning World War I as an engine advancing the Socialist revolution and castigating Kautsky for trying to appease Socialists with the war-prone machinations of the imperialist governments. By contrast, Leonhardt shows that Lenin was wrong in claiming that Kautsky has developed his theory of ‘ultra imperialism’ only after the launching of the military campaigns in August 1914 but had started advocating his theory already in 1912, with Liebknecht having already made similar observations in 1907 (pp.414, 427-428 and 443-444).

However, as Leonhardt’s analysis ably demonstrates, Socialist theorists used the cartel mostly as a metaphor, an analogue or a simile, following a usage common among theorists at the turn of the twentieth century. Hence, they were hardly original in that respect. Throughout his book, Leonhardt adds a wealth of further evidence for the use of the cartel in figurative speech across the social sciences, specifically during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The broad range of disciplines he covers from economics across political science to sociology and contemporary social and international history, allows him to present a unique and, so far, most comprehensive survey. The survey puts on record not merely the popularity of the word and the concept of cartel, but also its adaptiveness to changing contexts as well as its vagueness. Cartels could mean many things for many people.

There are, nevertheless, some problems with Leonhardt’s analysis and argument. First and foremost, his claim that cartel theory can be the basis for an international relations theory remains just that, as Leonhardt does not move beyond critically demonstrating the inaptitude of current international relations theories and deconstructing them as instruments of maintaining hegemony. Moreover, despite his deconstructivist efforts, Leonhardt retains some assumptions inherent in these theories he intends to challenge, mainly that states are in a position of principally unrestrained rivalry in one single global international system, while ignoring the contrary position, argued by natural law theorists, that this is not the case. He also postulates that, at least on principle, international relations theories can be constructed free from political interest and bias, as if the conduct of international relations could be separated from some allegedly purely academic process of the making of international relations theories. Yet, empirical evidence, also from the twentieth century, suggests that the objectifiability of international relations into a complex of theories about them is unlikely at best. If international relations take place in the world and if we are in the world ourselves, objectification seems difficult, not just from the principled point of view of Heideggerian ontology, but also from the practical point of view of politics. The latter is the case, as any theorist nowadays has to reside on the territory and be a citizen in a state, thereby internalising at least some of the biases flowing from citizenship. In consequence, the prospects of unbiased theory making seem slim. Moreover, governments of states, none the least those claiming to be hegemons, have a plethora of possibilities at their disposal to influence not only theorists working close

to government but also those operating in academic environments. The fate of nation-building and modernisation theories concocted as a seemingly academic bodies of thought around 1960 and propagated as a means to steer ‘development’, but subsequently understood as an ideology of the Kennedy era,³ should serve as a warning against untested assumptions about the making of international relations theories.

Leonhardt is, needless to say, correct in arguing that bias emerging from hegemonic states may not be conducive to appropriate theory making. At minimum, this is so because governments of hegemonic states will pursue interests and face problems not relevant for governments of other kinds of states (pp.658-659) and may even suppress the generation of theories they do not like (pp.663-668). Thus, for one, the ubiquitous yet arcane debate over the alleged necessity of making the choice between multilateralism and unilateralism, obviously, requires the perception of the capability of a government to make this choice. Hence, the debate does not carry any significance for states other than seeming hegemonies. Leonhardt, for his own part, seems to want to avoid this dilemma by suggesting the making of international relations theories in small states, mentioning Singapore as a candidate (p.659). Yet, apart from the fact that no distinctly Singaporean international relations theory is on record, would a small-state bias necessarily carry less weight than hegemonic state bias? At least, Walter Mattli’s attempt to construct a regional integration theory from an explicitly Swiss perspective augurs in favour of a negative response. For Mattli struggles with the problem of how the government of a state can respond to a regional integration process that takes place all around its borders without directly involving institutions of that state in political decision-making.⁴ This is a problem that only few governments have. Nevertheless, Leonhardt seems to expect that international relations theories can be constructed without bias if only willingness to do so is there (p.656). But this expectation seems vain, given the fact that the making of international relations theories is an innately political process in its own right. Hence, any attempt to disentangle international relations theories from the political contexts within which they were generated, seems utterly vain. Moreover, even if this could be done, it would be bad service to social sciences, bent on avoiding the pitfalls posed by the dialectics of the enlightenment. If, as Jürgen Habermas insisted, practice is the sole research guiding interest that the social sciences may legitimately subscribe to, and if practice can only mean betterment of society, social scientists must be partisans. For what constitutes betterment of society cannot be dictated but must be negotiated among holders of subjective perceptions. In short, Leonhardt fails to demonstrate that cartel theory is superior to any past or current international relations theory in reducing bias.

Leonhardt would have had a point, had he been able to argue that cartel has already successfully been tried out for international relations. So he actually does when discussing ‘ultra imperialism’. He believes that Kautsky and Liebknecht consciously applied cartel theory to international relations, expecting that capitalists might restrain

3. M.E. LATHAM, *Modernization as Ideology. American Social Science and “Nation-Building” in the Kennedy Era*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2000.

4. W. MATTLI, *The Logic of Regional Integration*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

their competition in efforts to rescue capitalism and that imperialist governments would follow. Indeed, Kautsky, in a few remarks, referred to some “cartel relations among states”, which might in the end suppress their rivalries.⁵ However, in most statements, in which Socialist theorists used the words cartel or trust in the context of international relations, they did not explicitly identify relations between states as a category of cartel relations but associated the latter as an analogue, metaphor or simile with the former.⁶ And Kautsky removed the explicit identification of the foreign policy of imperialist governments with the cartel policy of corporate actors from the draft version of his article on ‘ultra imperialism’ before it went into print in August or early September 1914.⁷ Moreover, Lenin, in his scathing criticism of Kautsky’s concept of ‘ultra imperialism’, rejected the idea that governments of imperialist states might compromise on essentials and did so at the time of World War I in view of continuing and intensely fought out rivalries.⁸ Socialist theorists themselves recognised the obvious obstacle against the identification of relations between states as a type of cartel relations: Whereas business cartels would operate under state law and often under government control, state cartels did not. Thus Liebkecht already denounced the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 as the “Hague Comedy”, which, he thought, was laughable because the Czar had provided the ‘main authorship’.⁹ In the early twenty-first century, there is no need for argument any longer whether Kautsky’s or Lenin’s war-time diagnosis about the fate of capitalism was more appropriate, as both of them failed, Kautsky because of the war, and Lenin because of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, neither of them can boost Leonhardt’s claim that cartel theory can help making sense of international relations better than any other theory.

A further stumbling stone obstructs that path, as Leonhardt is not only unwilling to treat analogues, metaphors and similes as elements of figurative speech, but is also unwilling to distinguish methodologically between word and concept. Thus, whenever he encounters the word cartel, he expects to meet the concept of cartel as well. This is most notable in his sketch of the history of the word cartel (pp.50-54), where he identifies recorded changes in the meaning of the word with postulated transformations of the concept. If, by contrast, Leonhardt would have proceeded semasiologically by asking which words might have represented which aspects of the concept of cartel other than the word cartel, he would have encountered quite a number of

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5. K. KAUTSKY, *Der erste Mai und der Kampf gegen den Militarismus*, in: *Die neue Zeit*, 2(1912), pp.97-109, here pp.107-108.
 6. K. LIEBKNECHT, *Militarismus und Antimilitarismus* [1907], in: K. LIEBKNECHT, *Gesammelte Reden und Schriften*, vol.1, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1958, pp.247-456, here pp.269-270.
 7. K. KAUTSKY, *Der Imperialismus*, in: *Die neue Zeit*, 2(1914), pp.908-922, here 921; based on Kautsky, *Der internationale Kongreß und der Imperialismus*. Ms. Amsterdam: Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Kautsky Papers A 56, p.8. See also: K. KAUTSKY, *Zwei Schriften zum Umlernen*, in: *Die Neue Zeit*, 2(1915), pp.33-42, 71-81, 107-116, 138-146, here pp.144-145; K. KAUTSKY, *Der imperialistische Krieg*, op.cit., p.483.
 8. V.I. LENIN, *Vorwort* [to Nicolai Bucharin, *Weltwirtschaft und Imperialismus*; Dec. 1915], in: V.I. LENIN, *Werke*, vol.22, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1972, pp.101-106, here p.106.
 9. K. LIEBKNECHT, *Militarismus*, op.cit., p. 270.

international relations theories built on the assumption that rivalries can and will eventually become subjected to patterns of self-regulation, from Justus Lipsius and Johannes Althusius at the turn of the seventeenth century to Ernst von Beling, Hans Kelsen and Alfred Verdross in the early twentieth century.

There are, in addition, a number of minor defects in this heavy book that should not remain concealed. Leonhardt neither provides a systematic description of what he takes to be ‘cartel theory’, but obliges readers to piece together bits of that theory that are scattered throughout the work. Nor does he offer a definition of cartels appropriate for his purposes. His description of cartel theory within economics is, with these limitations, comprehensive, whereas his observations regarding other disciplines are sketchy. Thus, Leonhardt treats functionalism, as if David Mitrany had invented it in 1943 (pp.478-479), although the ‘functional’ approach to international relations *avant la lettre* is much older.¹⁰ Moreover, most of Leonhardt’s analysis, even in his empirical chapters, remains free from evidence drawn on unpublished primary sources, which is particularly disturbing in his discussion of Jean Monnet’s allegedly ‘functionalist’ approach. Had Leonhardt considered not only Monnet’s Memoirs but also archival records, he would have understood that Monnet’s approach to international politics had nothing to do with Mitrany’s ‘functionalism’ and that, by consequence, it makes little sense to delve into questions about Monnet’s dependence on Mitrany’s work. True, both the political practitioner and the theorist had the restoration and maintenance of peace as their common goal and also had a *faible* for institutions. But not all institutions are cartels. Mitrany in 1943 looked at the prospects of global integration, short of ‘International Government’, while Monnet aimed at cooperation among neighbours in fields of activity, where competition involved only a few private actors and government control was intense anyway. Contemporary observers noted that the early European institutions looked like cartels, as Leonhardt ably describes. But Monnet himself rejected this view.

Lack of interest in archival sources also seems to have prevented Leonhardt from looking at the abundance of little used records, preserved in the Moscow state archives, on the Socialist International, on the case of which he might actually have been able to demonstrate the usefulness of his cartel theory approach for international relations. Furthermore, some of Leonhardt’s critical comments are of little help. Thus his condemnation of the historiography of international relations suffers from high selectivity of reading and indiscriminate judgment (pp.360-407). Referring, in this context, to Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s work as ‘path-breaking’ (‘*richtungweisend*’, p. 407), albeit not particularly relevant for international relations in 2013, is not an indication of innovativeness of approach. Lastly, Leonhardt’s work is not well integrated. The early papers, forming the second part of the study, feature much material that ought to have been presented in the first part, such as the description of Monnet’s

10. For one see: A.E. ZIMMERN, *International Organization. Its Prospects and Limitations*, in: A.E. ZIMMERN, *The Prospects of Democracy and Other Essays*, Chatto & Windus, London, 1929, pp. 211-232 [first published in: *Atlantic Monthly* (September 1923)].

role to the end of World War II, and there are frequent repetitions (for example, at pp.656-658, 671-674 and 696-698).

Despite these shortcomings, Leonhardt's study is a welcome and persuasive plea for revisionism in theorizing about international relations. His arguments about ruminative attitudes towards theories originating from the interests of self-proclaimed superpowers are sound; his demand for the fusion of international relations and regional integration theories is provocative; his revisiting of Socialist international relations theories is refreshing. Under the label of cartel theory, Leonhardt subsumes a set of approaches to social phenomena that have for some time attracted theorists, whose work he did not include into his already extensive scope, namely philosophers and jurists working within the traditions of natural law theory. These traditions have abounded with attempts to conceptualise the regulation of conflict without resort to institutions. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, adherents to natural law theories have had a difficult stance, and that situation has hardly improved in the twenty-first century so far. Leonhardt's plea for the revision of international relations theory is a call to bring natural law theory back in.

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Harold JAMES, *Making the European Monetary Union. The Role of the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Origins of the European Central Bank*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, 2012, 567 p. – ISBN 978-0-674-06683-0 – 32,55 €.

Der vorliegende Band ist eine grundlegende Studie der Geschichte der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU), von den Anfängen in den 1960er Jahren bis zur Gründung des Europäischen Währungsinstituts im Jahr 1993. Das Besondere an diesem Werk des in Princeton lehrenden Wirtschaftshistorikers Harold James ist der Fokus auf die Expertenebene und insbesondere auf die Rolle des Ausschusses der Präsidenten der Zentralbanken der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. James interessiert vor allem, wie diese Gruppe von Zentralbankern ihren Einfluss auf Debatten über europäische Geldpolitik, und mithin auch den Politikprozess, stetig vergrößern konnte: "What follows in this book might be seen as the story of the central bankers' committee as a caterpillar that turned into the chrysalis of the European Monetary Institute and then eventually became a beautifully winged but fragile butterfly (the European Central Bank)" (S. 23). Die Studie basiert auf einem intensiven Archivstudium, für das dem Autor Zugang zu bislang verschlossenen Akten der Europäischen Zentralbank und der Bank for International Settlements (BIS) gewährt wurde. Diese beiden Institutionen haben im Übrigen das Projekt in Auftrag gegeben, wie der Präsident der EZB, Mario Draghi, und Jaime Caruana, Generaldirektor der BIS, im Vorwort schreiben.

Da zumindest im 20. Jahrhundert Geldpolitik nie in einem rein europäischen oder gar nationalen Rahmen betrieben werden konnte, verbindet der Autor in einer chronologisch angelegten Struktur die europäische mit der globalen Ebene. James zeigt so eindrucksvoll, dass die verschiedenen Entwürfe für die WWU immer auch eine Antwort auf globale Herausforderungen des internationalen Währungssystems waren.

Das Auftaktkapitel bietet eine Abhandlung über die gewachsene Bedeutung von Währung für den Nationalstaat. Der Wert und die Stellung der eigenen Währung sind im Laufe des 20. Jahrhunderts immer wichtiger geworden, ebenso unterschiedliche Philosophien der Geldpolitik, ein Umstand, der einer Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion in Europa alles andere als förderlich war. Es folgt ein Kapitel, das die Ursprünge des Ausschusses der Zentralbankpräsidenten in den 1960er Jahren darlegt, die James einbettet in die Versuche der EWG Kommission, angesichts der neuartigen Herausforderungen des Gemeinsamen Marktes und der Turbulenzen im internationalen Währungssystem eine enge Kooperation in der Wirtschafts- und Geldpolitik der Mitgliedstaaten zu erreichen. Die Gründung des Ausschusses im Jahre 1964 geht auf einen Vorschlag des Wirtschafts- und Finanzkommissars in der EWG, Robert Marjolin, zurück. Leider hat James nicht dessen Nachlass gesichtet und so stützt sich die Bewertung Marjolins ausschließlich auf die Archive der Zentralbanken, die der Einmischung der Kommission natürlich skeptisch gegenüberstanden. Die Idee einer unabhängigen Zentralbank hatte sich in den 1960er Jahren in Europa noch nicht durchgesetzt und so war die Gründung eines Ausschusses der Zentralbanker alles andere als unumstritten – sowohl auf Seiten der Politiker als auch auf Seiten der Zentralbanker, die sich nicht für politische Zwecke einspannen lassen wollten und die zumeist der Ansicht waren, dass Währungspolitik in einem transatlantischen Rahmen stattfinden sollte. Der Ausschuss bewahrte sich diese Unabhängigkeit, nicht zuletzt weil er zeitgleich mit den Treffen der G-10 und der BIS in Basel, und nicht in Brüssel, zusammentrat.

Im dritten Kapitel stehen die krisenhafte Lage des internationalen Währungssystems Anfang der 1970er Jahre sowie die erste ernsthafte Initiative für eine WWU, der Werner Plan, im Zentrum der Analyse. Laut James rückten zwei Themen in den Vordergrund, die zentrale Aspekte der Währungsintegration bleiben sollten: die Europäische Rechnungseinheit und die Beziehung zwischen Geldpolitik und Wirtschaftspolitik. Die Arbeit im Werner Ausschuss förderte zwei gegensätzliche Positionen zutage: die der so genannten ‘Monetaristen’ und der ‘Ökonomen’. Letztere wurde insbesondere von der Bundesbank vertreten, aber auch in deutschen Regierungskreisen und von den Niederlanden geteilt. Vertreter dieser Position gingen davon aus, dass eine Währungsunion nur nach einer langen Periode der wirtschaftlichen Konvergenz möglich sei. Die Monetaristen, deren Vertreter hauptsächlich aus Frankreich, Italien, Belgien und Luxemburg stammten, sprachen sich dagegen für eine frühe Verwirklichung der Währungsunion aus. Als Kompromiss sah der Werner Plan eine Parallelentwicklung der Integration von Wirtschafts- und Währungspolitiken vor, eine Lösung, die eigentlich niemanden zufrieden stellte, was letztlich zum Scheitern des Planes beitrug.

Wechselkursschwankungen rückten in den 1970er Jahren immer mehr ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit. Das vierte Kapitel behandelt daher die ‘Währungsschlange’, jenes Reptil, das die europäische Antwort auf die einseitige Aufkündigung des Bretton Woods Systems fester Wechselkurse der US Regierung im August 1971 war. Trotz des Scheiterns dieses Versuchs, feste Wechselkurse beizubehalten, meint James, dass im Rückblick ‘all the failures, the dead ends in the reform discussions, and the aborted initiatives eventually led to a refined sensibility about how institutional change could be accomplished in a highly complex system’ (S. 90). Somit änderte sich auch die Rolle des Ausschusses der Zentralbankpräsidenten, der immer mehr ins Zentrum des Geschehens rückte und die Reaktion der Europäer auf die internationalen Ereignisse orchestrierte. Diese neue Rolle erforderte institutionelle Anpassungen: ein Ausschuss der Stellvertreter bereitete nun die Treffen des Ausschusses vor; *ad hoc* Expertenkomitees wurden eingerichtet.

Kapitel fünf behandelt das Europäische Währungssystem (EWS), das eine der wenigen Initiativen war, mit deren Ausarbeitung die Zentralbanker nur am Rande betraut waren. Angesichts des eingeschränkten Erfolgs des EWS fragt James daher: ‘Can European integration be simply a creation of political will, or are there bureaucratic or technocratic conditions that dictate the trajectory of development?’ (S. 146). Er schlussfolgert, dass politische Initiative allein nicht ausreichend sei. Die Marginalisierung des Ausschusses habe nicht zuletzt zu einer mangelnden Loyalität der Zentralbanker gegenüber dem EWS-System beigetragen. In einem kurzen sechsten Kapitel beschreibt James die Phase der frühen 1980er Jahre, die er als eine Übergangsphase betrachtet und in dem er eine Bilanz des EWS zieht. Die Probleme waren mannigfaltig und trotz jahrelanger Zusammenarbeit gab es in den Mitgliedstaaten immer noch wenig Einigkeit über Grundprinzipien der Währungs- und Geldpolitik.

Im siebten Kapitel untersucht James die Arbeiten des Delors Komitee in dem alle EG Zentralbankpräsidenten Mitglieder waren. Delors Verdienst sei es gewesen zu erkennen, dass, anders als beim EWS, die Zentralbanker in eine Lösung einbezogen werden mussten: ‘Binding them in opened the way to a process of innovation’ (S. 213). James zeigt in einer äußerst detaillierten Analyse der Debatten im Delors Komitee wie Zentralbankautonomie und ein Bekenntnis zur Preisstabilität, vehement von der Bundesbank verteidigt, immer mehr als Grundbedingungen für eine Währungsunion gesehen wurden; ein Konsens, den die Mitglieder des Ausschusses in künftigen Verhandlungen vertraten, oft auch gegen den Willen ihrer Finanzminister. Auch der Gedanke einer Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Modell der Bundesbank wurde im Komitee von Bundesbankpräsident Karl Otto Pöhl vorgebracht und stieß auf Zustimmung. Der Delors Bericht wurde als Grundlage für weitere Verhandlungen angenommen.

Die Rolle des Ausschusses in der Ausarbeitung der Statuten der EZB und des Europäischen Währungsinstituts ist Gegenstand des achten Kapitels. Unabhängigkeit und Geldwertstabilität wurden als Grundprinzipien in den Statuten verankert. Im Hinblick auf die WWU wurde die Rolle des Ausschusses der Zentralbankpräsidenten gestärkt. Er verwandelte sich in eine Art Proto-Zentralbank, um den Prozess der In-

stitutionenbildung zu bestimmen und, wie James unterstreicht, eine Vision zu verwirklichen. Der Vertrag von Maastricht und das Statut der EZB waren jedoch letztendlich politische Kompromisse. Die Rolle der EZB in der Bankenaufsicht beispielsweise wurde entgegen der Empfehlung der Zentralbanker minimiert. Der Souveränitätsverlust für die Mitgliedstaaten in der WWU war minimal, und die Verantwortung, die Zentralbanker in dem neuen System für wirtschaftliche Stabilität und soziale Ordnung übernahmen, war laut James zu hoch. Das letzte Kapitel behandelt die Krisen des Wechselkursmechanismus in den frühen 1990er Jahren, die James als eine wichtige Fallstudie für die aktuelle Finanzkrise ansieht.

Die ausführliche Analyse der Verhandlungen über die WWU lassen die Schwächen und das Ungleichgewicht des Systems klar hervortreten, was dieser historischen Studie Aktualität verleiht. Im Schlussteil des Bandes fasst James in einer kurzen aber gründlichen Analyse die jüngere Geschichte der Währungsunion zusammen und stellt somit eine Verbindung zu den jüngsten Ereignissen her. Nicht nur in diesem Teil zeigt die Studie letztendlich auch die Grenzen des Einflusses technokratischer Experten in der EU auf, denn die Lösung der Finanzkrise liegt bei den Politikern und beinhaltet eine Bereinigung der Asymmetrie in der WWU in Richtung einer föderalen Fiskalunion, einhergehend mit einer Reform und Stärkung der Gemeinschaftsinstitutionen, der Bankenaufsicht und –kontrolle; vieles davon verbunden mit einem weiteren Souveränitätsverlust für die Mitgliedstaaten. Das Buch geht weit über die im Untertitel angekündigte Studie des Ausschusses der Zentralbankpräsidenten hinaus; die politische Ebene und wissenschaftliche Debatten werden stets in die Analyse mit einbezogen. Der zum Teil exklusive Zugang zu Archivquellen, die Breite des ausgewerteten Materials und die scharfen Analysen des Autors machen dieses Buch zu einem neuen Standardwerk der Geschichte der WWU. Ein Apparat mit diversen Statistiken und einer Chronologie der Ereignisse ist eine wertvolle Ergänzung. Allerdings wäre eine Bibliographie wünschenswert gewesen. Das Buch ist sowohl für ein spezialisiertes Publikum in Wissenschaft und der Finanzwelt als auch für die breitere, an der Vorgeschichte der WWU interessierte, Öffentlichkeit von Interesse.

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Corine DEFRANCE, Ulrich PFEIL, *Eine Nachkriegsgeschichte in Europa 1945 bis 1963*, Deutsch-Französische Geschichte (hg. v. Gudrun Gersmann und Michael Werner) Bd.10, WBG, Darmstadt, 2011, 324 S. – ISBN 978-3-534-14708-3 – 69,90 €.

Hélène MIARD-DELACROIX, *Im Zeichen der europäischen Einigung 1963 bis in die Gegenwart*, Deutsch-Französische Geschichte Bd.11, WBG, Darmstadt, 2011, 404 S. – ISBN 978-3-534-14709-0 – 69,90 €.

Franco-German relations are one of the most important fields of research in historical and political science. Its importance for the process of European unity in the course of 20th century European history is particularly emphasized and both volumes to be presented support this perception. They form part of a series of 11 volumes published by the German Historical Institute in Paris in both German and French, covering Franco-German history from the Middle Ages until the present day. With the publication of volumes 10 and 11, the project for the latest period of contemporary history has now been completed.¹¹ The idea of the series is to cover Franco-German history according to the concept of “histoire croisée”, as laid down in the nineties by one of the editors, Michael Werner. It is a concept which does not only aim to approach the period from a comparative point of view, but also to regard it as an entangled history which involves cultural, political, societal and mental transfers and which can only be understood in the light of its reciprocal influences. The concept, however, is received in highly differing ways by individual authors. Corine Defrance and Ulrich Pfeil are rather sceptical with regard to the possibilities of implementing a “histoire croisée”, which up to now has represented a theoretical programme and which still requires practical implementation. Hélène Miard-Delacroix makes the “entangled history” her guideline for illustration by consciously highlighting historical markers and processes to work out synchronous and asynchronous developments. Naturally Defrance and Pfeil do this, too and, as a consequence, both volumes provide a wide panorama of societal, economic and cultural history which still places most emphasis clearly on developments in politics and history.

As this is a publication in a series on Franco-German history and has the character of a handbook, the individual volumes have a tried and tested structure. Part 1 is a chronological representation of Franco-German relations of the period in question; part 2 is devoted to the main prospects for research and controversies. Finally, the third part offers the reader a comprehensive, systematic bibliography. The series is meant to be an introduction for students and for historical researchers alike and understandably offers no new insights for readers active in the field of research. The authors, all recognised experts in the field of Franco-German relations, succeed in

11. The French editions are: C. DEFRANCE, U. PFEIL, *Entre guerre froide et intégration européenne. Reconstruction et rapprochement, 1945–1963*, Presses universitaires du Septentrion, Villeneuve d’Ascq, 2012; H. MIARD-DELACROIX, *Le défi européen, de 1963 à nos jours*, Presses universitaires du Septentrion, Villeneuve d’Ascq, 2011.

clarifying a number of questions by their choice of topics and critical discussion on the usual clichés. At the same time, myths about Franco-German relations are debunked. Defrance and Pfeil, for example, cast doubt on whether the magical date 1963 was the decisive turning point in the process of Franco-German reconciliation. It is neither the signing of the Elysée treaty which laid the foundation stone for Franco-German friendship, nor the relationship of Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle which laid Franco-German enmity to rest – although this is a widely supported thesis – but rather the result of commitment to civic relations between the Germans and French that had started as early as 1945. In this way, the actions of the much lauded political “couples” of the time are put into perspective; the highly symbolic diplomacy of such groups would not have functioned without the corresponding rapprochement through civil relations. The book takes an extensive look at this phenomenon.

In line with the research activities of the authors, central problem areas are outlined which so far have received little attention, such as, for example, the cultural relations or the role of the GDR in an “asymmetric three-way relationship”. Other sections go into the alternating perception and role of historical science as a “vector of rapprochement” or outline the changes and modernisation tendencies of both societies since the end of the Second World War. Parallel developments and harmonization of the standard of living, which are discussed under the rubrics of Americanisation, Westernization and Globalisation, form the basis for an understanding. Thankfully, both volumes broach the issues of convergences in economic development which are clearly recognisable, despite the fact that research often emphasises these differences in economic philosophies which form the basis for Franco-German co-operation in Europe. In addition, Miard-Delacroix goes into central socio-political areas still relevant for the years after 1963 and for political discourse in the present day. They cover issues such as the significance of “1968”, the differing ways of handling political terrorism, the dissimilarity of political cultures (which becomes particularly clear in the role and evaluation of communism), commemorative culture, milieus, values and way of life.

This broad panorama of Franco-German entangled history which both books unfurl is held together by a notional leitmotif. As the titles of the publications make clear – interestingly enough with differing emphases in the German and French editions – Franco-German post-war history is inseparably linked to the history of European integration. Defrance and Pfeil’s chronological representation reads like an introduction to the history of European unification, which includes the respective stages such as the Council of Europe, Schuman Plan, Pleven Plan, Treaties of Rome, etc. In Miard-Delacroix’s book the EEC/EU receives wide coverage. Defrance and Pfeil emphasise that European integration didn’t become possible at all until Franco-German reconciliation had taken place in the 1950’s. Miard-Delacroix points out the much cited motor function of the Franco-German pair and devotes an own chapter to this topic. In it she works out the pre-requisites and the “Franco-German methods” which helped to mutualise compromises and ideas and illustrates this by using examples such as the Council of Europe or the economic and currency union. Why, however, there were still difficulties in some places and the fact that individual national

interests dominated is not explained further, such as when the motor started stalling in Nice under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac. On the whole, however, the author makes it clear that Germany and France were not only the driving force, but, as a rule, the benefactors of European unification. In this way, the interaction between Franco-German bilateralism and Europe is accurately described. Surprisingly, despite the approach of linking social and political history, we can still see on the covers of the German editions the “couples”: De Gaulle and Adenauer symbolically embracing in 1963 and François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl hand in hand, standing over the graves of Verdun in 1984. So even the publishers and authors were unable to escape the all-powerful trend to personalize and be fascinated by symbolic gestures.

Both volumes provide concise overviews of Franco-German history, structured in a chronological, living history and illuminate the denseness of themes, controversies and approaches covered in research. In this way they help to keep track of an area of research which is, in the meantime, overflowing and they have, for the foreseeable future, produced fundamental introductory works on Franco-German history which can be referred to for a better understanding of the process of post-war European integration.

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Albrecht ROTHACHER, *Die Kommissare. Vom Aufstieg und Fall der Brüsseler Karrieren. Eine Sammelbiographie der deutschen und österreichischen Kommissare seit 1958*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2012, 254 S. – ISBN 978-3-8329-7097-0 – 44,00 €.

This is an unpleasant book. On the one hand it provides the reader with information about the political career, the performance and the shortcomings of 14 German and 3 Austrian EU Commissioners, which is indeed a very commendable task and a valuable addition to the research on the personnel dimension of European integration. On the other hand it is loaded with lots of strange and polemic comments especially on public figures and politicians of the “left”. Foreign minister Joschka Fischer for example is portrayed as a “former thug and successfully rehabilitated professional receiver” (Ex-Schläger und erfolgreich resozialisierter Berufshehler – p.31); the famous German scholars Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer are described as authors of “unreadable, hermetic treatises” (unlesbare, selbstreferentielle Traktate – p.88). And when Rothacher mentions Commissioner Günter Verheugen’s birthplace Bad Kreuznach he adds a footnote informing the reader that near Bad Kreuznach the American Army had established in 1945 some of their infamous camps “where two to three million German prisoners of war were cooped up for months in the open air suffering privation” (p.153). What might be the idea behind this remark? In the context of the book it seems to be completely irrelevant in any case.

The book consists of two parts. The first four chapters provide general information about the (political) socialization and career of the EU Commissioners, common characteristics, recruitment procedures, allocation of responsibilities, payment, ways and styles of working, organizational make-up, their role in EU policy-making, perceptions and preferences, and attitudes toward European integration. Although Rothacher served within the EU apparatus for 27 years, he reveals no secrets or private details concerning the 17 Commissioners. What may decrease the “value” of the book seen from a historian’s point of view is that it is based on publicly accessible sources without exception. At least the author promises a “critical appreciation of personalities with indisputable contributions to European integration” (p.7).

The second part of the book is devoted to the biographies of the 17 German and Austrian Commissioners from Walter Hallstein to Günther Oettinger and from Franz Fischler to Johannes Hahn. Common characteristics, according to Rothacher, are: middle class origin, for the most part mediocrity, no European expertise or enthusiasm, and party membership – whereas in the German case, correspondingly to the political balance of power, all established political parties were represented (with a slight predominance of the CDU/CSU), all Austrian Commissioners belonged to the conservative ÖVP. These biographies are without doubt nice to read. But instead of telling anecdotes it would have been more important to focus on the European dimension of these careers: Did the German and Austrian Commissioners, for example, fall victim to the European “bacillus”, making them blind to “their” national interests (p.129), as the late Bavarian Ministerpräsident Franz Josef Strauß once had feared? Did some sort of “Europeanization” of the Commissioners take place, as some of the European founding fathers had expected – or did national orientations and behaviour patterns keep the upper hand? What were the results of the initial German access to decisive dossiers like competition policy, single market, or industrial policy? Mentioning Helmut Schmidt’s and Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s “lack of elementary manners” (p.30) would prove important – provided that they behaved this way only vis-à-vis European institutions and representatives. But at least as far as Schmidt is concerned, this seems to be doubtful.

Consequently this book, as already mentioned at the beginning, leaves a rather mixed impression. Rothacher’s findings, for example that all German governments had the tendency to send second-class staff to Brussels, or that more often than not there was a discrepancy between the German economic power and the “intellectual power” of German Commissioners, are accurate, but not really new. His anecdotic writing style is nice to read but misses most of the important problems of European integration.

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Gérard BOSSUAT (ed.), *La France, l'Europe et l'aide au développement. Des traités de Rome à nos jours*, Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, IGPDE, Paris, 2013, 257 p. – ISBN 978-2-11-129374-8 – 18,00 €.

The development cooperation policies of the European Community have received increasing attention from historians in the last few years. What *La France, l'Europe et l'aide au développement* does, is to trace a balance of the most recent studies on the subject, and to propose a general overview on the evolution undergone by the EC cooperation from 1957 to nowadays. Even if the book is based on a conference celebrating the 70th anniversary of the *Agence Française de Développement*, the focus lies on Europe rather than on France. The French bilateral cooperation policies are not directly under scrutiny here.

The conference had an official character, being organized and supported by public French bodies. The set of participating authors is remarkable for its high level and for its international character, and most of all for its variety. There are those who study cooperation and those who practice it, there are those who provide aid and those who receive it. There are historians and political scientists, adopting perspectives ranging from institutional to sociological ones. Thanks to the authors' variety, light is put on different relevant aspects of EC cooperation and different points of views are adopted. As a result, quite a round picture and a pleasantly polyphonic one is provided.

Book chapters are arranged in three sections following a chronological order: the origins of development aid 1957-1975, enlargements and new aid paradigms 1975-1995, and questioning the European approach to development 1995-2010. A fourth section is made of the transcript of a final roundtable where new horizons and future trends of cooperation were discussed. The chapters deal with two major topics in fact. Some of them discuss the evolution of the French influence on the EC cooperation, in terms of aims, means, achievements – especially up to the 1970s. Most of the other chapters focus on the general evolution of the EC cooperation since the 1970s.

The French influence on the EC cooperation was decisive in its formative period. In her chapter Guia Migani shows well how fundamental was the role played by the French government in initiating the EC development cooperation by imposing the association of the overseas possessions to the EEC. The French government exerted a decisive influence on the design of the framework of the EC cooperation. Migani shows the political salience that the French government attached to the association, and how it constantly defended it from criticisms and challenges.

While Migani focuses on the French government's influence on the framework of cooperation, Véronique Dimier focuses on French officials' influence on the workings of cooperation. In particular, Dimier shows the influence exerted by former French colonial administrators employed as officials by the EC Commission. Thanks to their experience and expertise, they strongly affected the institutional culture and the methods of EC cooperation, leaving a long-lasting legacy. Dieter Frisch, a former

leading official of the Commission, discusses one more form of French influence over EC cooperation, namely the French government's influence on the workings of cooperation. Such an influence was present, but it was relatively hindered by the highly fragmented French competences in the field.

To analyse the extent of French influence over the EC cooperation means also to look at the impact exerted by other competing sources of influence. Gordon Cumming discusses the influence exerted by Britain indeed, highlighting its achievements: the enlargement of the association, the amendment of some of its traits, the attention to human rights and to aid effectiveness, and so on. However, it is hard to evaluate the impact of British influence since factors other than it were pushing in the same directions. Moreover, most British initiatives encountered only a limited success.

Authors discussing French (and British) influence over the EC cooperation make their case convincingly overall. A methodological problem arises however when looking at the sources that they quote: Migani and Cumming discuss the influence exerted by France and Britain by referring almost exclusively to French and British sources respectively, and Dimier discusses the influence of French officials by quoting almost exclusively interviews to them. Were not such chapters resting on larger historical research, there would be an evident risk of bias in the selection of the sources.

The second group of chapters propose long-term general overviews on some important trends of the EC development cooperation since the 1970s. Giuliano Garavini considers the evolution of the EC cooperation in the context of the more general evolution of the relations between industrialised and developing countries, identifying two major turning points. In the early 1970s, cooperation gained increased internal and international salience, and it was identified by the EC as a means to achieve a distinctive international role. The 1981 Cancun meeting marked the transition to a new period, whereas EC cooperation was aligned to the Washington consensus, its ambitions were downsized and the role of public actors was reduced. A similar picture is provided by Philippe Hugon in his chapter. By comparing EC cooperation in 1975 and 1995, he identifies the gradual disappearance of its exceptionalism.

In contrast to Garavini's and Hugon's overall critical stance on the evolution undergone by the EC cooperation, Olivier Cattaneo provides a more positive picture. In particular, he stresses the positive aspects of the closer relations established between the EC cooperation and the EC commercial policy. The creation of the WTO and its challenge to the preferential EC commercial policies towards developing countries was a crucial turning point in this respect, leading to the innovations introduced by the 2000 Cotonou Convention. Also Bernard Petit provides a positive picture of the evolution undergone by the EC cooperation in the last couple of decades – which he decisively contributed to design in fact.

An agreed periodisation of the evolutions undergone by the EC cooperation from the 1970s to nowadays still has to emerge, awaiting deeper historical research and debate. What emerges from these chapters, is that the 1970s should probably be treated as a unit, with the 1975 Lomé Convention emerging not as a turning point but

rather as apex of a period of exceptional attention to development. EC cooperation underwent a turning point in the early 1980s, and then one more turning point around the mid 1990s, which lead to the innovations of the Cotonou Convention.

In contrast to the first group of chapters, the chapters dealing with the 1970s onwards look at the EC cooperation in general, without paying any special attention to the French case. As a result, we end up learning very little about the influence exerted on the EC cooperation by France and French people from the 1970s onwards. The lack of attention to the French case in this respect is a pity, especially because it is a historically very interesting question, relatively understudied so far. How did France meet the challenges to its predominance over the EC cooperation? How did François Mitterrand's France respond to the neo-liberal challenges to its model of cooperation?

La France, l'Europe et l'aide au développement discusses the origins, motivations, forms and means of the EC cooperation. What is substantially excluded from the analysis is the impact that EC cooperation had – which is not exactly a marginal aspect. The choice to focus on the donors' perspective is legitimate indeed, but to take at least partially into account the outcome of their activity would have further enriched the book. For a book celebrating an anniversary and aiming at providing a large overview for a relatively broad audience, it would have also been useful to have a reference appendix section, including substantial statistical data, maps and a chronology of main events.

It is probably inevitable that something is excluded from a book considering such a large time span and such a rich and diverse set of points of view. What the time span and points of view considered do provide is valuable indeed. They provide a good summary of the state of the research in the field, effectively highlighting the most relevant issues. They provide a general overview on the history of the EC cooperation, achieving a good balance of synthesis and analysis. Finally, they provide useful indications on aspects of the subject that need to be further researched, especially whereas results of political science research need to be complemented by historical research.

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