

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Sylvain SCHIRMANN, Sarah MOHAMED-GAILLARD, *Georges Pompidou et l'Allemagne, Collection Georges Pompidou – Archives, no.6.*: P.I.E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2012, 408 S. – ISBN 978-90-5201-058-8 – 41,90 €.

Die Präsidentschaft von Georges Pompidou und die Kanzlerschaft von Willy Brandt haben sich bis auf wenige Monate zeitlich genau überschritten. Diese Parallelität ist natürlich nur ein Grund, Pompidous Einstellung und Politik gegenüber der Bundesrepublik im Lichte der Quellen zu betrachten. Es handelt sich bei dieser Dokumentation um die Wiedergabe von Texten zu den für die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen relevanten Bereichen, angefangen mit der Politik über die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit bis hin zur westeuropäischen Integration und den Ost-West-Beziehungen. Die aus den in den *Archives nationales* liegenden Pompidou-Papieren stammenden Texte geben Auskunft über das persönliche Verhältnis von Pompidou und Brandt, das sich durch Sachlichkeit und Informationsbereitschaft, aber kaum durch persönliche Nähe auszeichnete, vor allem aber über die großen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Themen, denen vier Abschnitte gewidmet sind: Die bilateralen Beziehungen mit den Schwerpunkten Kultur und Wirtschaft, die Europapolitik, die Ostpolitik und die Vier-Mächte-Verhandlungen über Berlin sowie schließlich Fragen der internationalen Politik (KSZE, gleichgewichtige Truppenreduzierung, transatlantische Beziehungen, Nahostkonflikt).

Die abgedruckten Texte stellen überwiegend Auszüge aus umfassenderen Dokumenten dar. Das hat den Vorteil, dass damit kürzere themenbezogene Passagen zur Hand sind, aber natürlich den Nachteil, dass der Kontext im Rahmen des jeweiligen Dokuments nicht ersichtlich ist. Merkwürdig ist, dass sich Sylvain Schirmann und Sarah Mohamed-Gaillard, obwohl zahlreiche Briefe von Brandt und Protokolle über Begegnungen zwischen Pompidou und Brandt abgedruckt sind, nicht um die deutsche Überlieferung gekümmert haben. Wenigstens Bd. 6 der Berliner Ausgabe der Werke Brandts und natürlich die einschlägigen Bände der „Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland“ hätten sie heranziehen können.

In seiner fast ausschließlich französischsprachige Literatur heranziehenden Einleitung analysiert Schirmann Pompidous Sicht auf die Bundesrepublik, die dieser einerseits fest im Westen verankert, andererseits aber in Gefahr sah, ihre Westbindung im Zuge einer nun aktiveren Ostpolitik zu lockern. Der französische Staatspräsident unterstützte die Ostpolitik schon deswegen, weil das Frankreich de Gaulles als Pionier der europäischen Entspannungspolitik hervorgetreten war. Aber er erkannte auch sofort, dass die sozial-liberale Ostpolitik den Status quo respektierte, um ihn längerfristig zu verändern. Brandts Ostpolitik rollte die deutsche Frage in einer für Frankreich irritierenden Weise neu auf. Pompidous nie nachlassende Sorge erreichte 1973 in dem von Henri Kissinger ausgerufenen „Jahr Europas“ einen Höhepunkt, als Pompidou auf deutscher Seite lauter Halbheiten und Grautöne entdeckte. Die Bundesre-

publik pendelte in seinen Augen zwischen Neutralismus, europapolitischem Engagement und transatlantischer Orientierung. Aus alldem folgte, dass die Pflege der Achse Paris-Bonn ein verbindliches Leitmotiv war, weil dadurch die Kooperation im bilateralen Verhältnis und bei der „construction européenne“ auf der einen und die Bändigung der als übermächtige Konkurrenz empfundenen westdeutschen Dynamik auf der anderen Seite ineinander griffen.

Der Wert dieser Dokumentation liegt weniger in neuen grundstürzenden Einsichten als darin, dass Textpassagen zu verschiedensten Aspekten der französisch-westdeutschen Beziehungsgeschichte bequem zugänglich werden. Im bilateralen Bereich gehören dazu der deutsch-französische Jugendaustausch oder der von Pompidou angemahnte Französischunterricht an deutschen Schulen, vor allem aber die vielfältigen Kooperationen zwischen den beiden Staaten (u. a. Industriegewirtschaft, Agrarpolitik, Energiewirtschaft, zivile und militärische Luftfahrt, Nukleartechnologie). Auf westeuropäischer Ebene sind es in erster Linie währungspolitische Fragen, die eingehend dokumentiert werden. Zur Auseinandersetzung Pompidous mit der Ostpolitik sind nicht nur die Treffen mit dem Bundeskanzler, sondern auch mit Vertretern der Opposition aufschlussreich. Helmut Kohl, als Nachfolger Rainer Barzels neuer Vorsitzender der CDU, konnte es im Oktober 1973 nicht lassen, sich von den angeblichen „tendances de M. Bahr“ zu distanzieren. Was er damit meinte, wurde sofort deutlich, wenn er die Treue der CDU zum Westen herausstellte. Für Pompidou war es eine Gelegenheit, wieder einmal das MBFR-Konzept der Bundesregierung zurückzuweisen: „La détente ne va pas sans vigilance“ (S. 293 f.).

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Emmanuel MOURLON-DRUOL, *A Europe made of money: the emergence of the European Monetary System by (2012)*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2012, 368 p. – ISBN 978-0-8014-5083-9 – 51,90 €.

This book examines the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), taking a long term perspective, starting from post war monetary cooperation in Europe, through the Werner plan (1974-75), and the start of the EMS (1979). It grounds the research on a variety of primary sources, first and foremost the consultation of archival material in several countries.

The creation of the EMS was a turning point in European monetary history. It reintroduced a semifixed exchange rate regime in Europe, after the end of the Bretton Woods system. It subsequently acted as an external constraint on the economic policies of the participating countries. No less importantly, it was a crucial step on the road to Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. The author rejects a ‘*deus ex machina*’ (p.3) explanation that focuses exclusively on the creation of the EMS in 1978-79 and sets out to investigate the deeper forces that underpinned it.

The main argument put forward in the book is that the establishment of the EMS cannot be understood without considering the supranational, transnational and inter-governmental forces at play. Hence, the book stresses the supranational role played by the Commission, the activity of the transnational community of monetary experts and the intergovernmental leadership provided by some political figures. The book pays attention to shifting economic ideas and the Bundesbank-led transnational learning process that unfolded amongst monetary elites. It argues that European monetary cooperation in the 1970s was a response to the international economic and monetary crisis (p. 10).

The book is well researched and clearly written. It relies on an impressive amount of archival material. The author does an excellent job in explaining with Cartesian clarity, who did what, when, how and most importantly why. It situates the actions of the various actors in the broader economic and political context in which they interacted. It explains the underlying economic and political dynamics – or structural forces – that partly influenced the behaviour of actors. At the same time it also explains how actors shaped the context in which they were embedded.

Despite all its merits, the book suffers from two interrelated shortcomings. To begin with, it uses a rather limited amount of secondary sources, and includes only a handful of works written by non-historians. By now the literature on the EMS and more generally European monetary integration is vast, not only in the discipline of history but also in political science. Hence, one could have expected more stocktaking from the existing literature, for example, just to cite one, the prize-winning work of Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, *The Road to Maastricht* (OUP, 1999). To some extent this disciplinary focus is understandable, and indeed all academics tend to speak primarily to works of colleagues in their discipline – in this case, history. Moreover, historians prefer to rely on primary material rather than citing secondary sources and to be fair the author makes a skilful use of primary sources.

Yet, given the fact that the literature on European monetary integration is extensive, some of the arguments put forward by the book, though well documented, are not very original, at least for political scientists. The importance of economic ideas and economic elites, the role played by transnational networks of monetary experts, the political impetus provided by political leaders gathered in the European council are all topics that have been extensively discussed – though sometimes not adequately substantiated – by the literature on the politics of European monetary integration. In this respect, this book can be seen as complementary to the existing literature, rather than providing novel insight.

Despite its historical take (or perhaps because of it), the book is very topical because it helps the reader to gather a better understanding of the current crisis in the euro area. The need for monetary union to be complemented by an economic (especially fiscal) union, as well as by a political union, have been long standing issue in the policy debates on European monetary integration, as documented by Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol's book. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area has brought these issues at the forefront.

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Aurélié Élisa GFELLER, *Building a European Identity. France, the United States and the Oil Shock, 1973-1974*, Berghahn Books, New York/Oxford, 2012, 232 S. – ISBN 978-0-85745-225-2 – Hb 75.00\$

Aurélié Élisa Gfeller hat in den letzten Jahren eine Reihe von Artikeln zur Integrationsgeschichte in namhaften Geschichtszeitschriften veröffentlicht. Die in Lausanne, Stanford und Princeton ausgebildete Zeithistorikerin zählt zum immer größer werdenden Kreis von Wissenschaftlern, die die 70er Jahre nicht als Phase der Stagnation im Bemühen um die Einigung Europas verstehen sondern als ein Zeitraum voller Integrationsinitiativen und Schritte zur Einheit des alten Kontinents begreifen. Davon zeugt auch ihre erste Monographie, die sich mit dem Selbstverständnis Europas beschäftigt. Nach ihren auf ihrer Dissertation¹ beruhenden Forschungsergebnissen konstruierten die führenden politischen Eliten Frankreichs eine europäische Identität neben dem eigenen französischen Selbstverständnis, die der Regierung Georges Pompidou als Grundlage diente, die Europäische Gemeinschaften, EG, als europäische Einheit zu begreifen und sie als eigenständige weltpolitische Kraft und Akteurin gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und in der arabischen Welt zu sehen (S. 2 und 85-105). Die europäische Identität stehe nicht im Widerspruch zum französischen Nationalstaat, so die Historikerin, die allerdings nicht von sich ergänzenden Teilidentitäten spricht. Das Konzept sah nach ihrer Meinung vor, Souveränitätsrechte zwischen Nationalstaat und europäischen Gemeinwesen aufzuteilen, so dass die Europäische Gemeinschaft als Weltmacht anstelle und im Interesse Frankreichs handeln könne. Damit habe Frankreich die Tür zur supranationalen politischen Entwicklung Europas aufgestoßen (S. 10). Die Ölkrise bildete die Bewährungsprobe für das neue französische Konzept. Pompidou und sein Nachfolger Valéry Giscard d'Estaing förderten institutionelle Reformen der EG mit der Absicht, die Europäische Gemeinschaft zu einem einflussreichen internationalen Akteur aufzubauen (S. 11).

Gfeller forschte in den Nationalarchiven in Frankreich und den Vereinigten Staaten sowie den Archiven des französischen Auswärtigen Amts, der Europäischen Union in Florenz und der Stiftung Jean Monnet in Lausanne. Zudem wertete sie die französische Presse in ihrem Untersuchungszeitraum von April 1973 bis Dezember 1974 aus, deren Ergebnisse auffällig unvermittelt neben dem von ihr minutiös aufgezeigten diplomatischen Verhandlungsprozess stehen. Sie nutzte auch die Gelegenheit, Zeitzeugen – darunter Giscard d'Estaing – zu befragen und ihre Arbeit mit zahlreichen international anerkannten Kennern der Materie zu diskutieren (S.VI f.). Die Verfasserin will das europäische Selbstverständnis der französischen Eliten analysieren (S. 11 f.), was die Schwerpunktsetzung auf französische Archivalien erklärt und ebenso begründet, weshalb sie auf Archiveisen nach London, Berlin und Koblenz verzichtete, stattdessen die entsprechenden Akteneditionen der Auswärtigen Ämter benutzte und offenbar keinen Kontakt zu Zeitzeugen aus Deutschland und Großbritannien suchte.

1. A.E. GFELLER, *Re-envisioning Europe: France, America and the Arab World, 1973-1974*, Princeton, 2008.

Anders verhält es sich mit den USA. Gfeller bemüht sich, die Hintergründe für die amerikanische Initiative zum „Jahr Europas“ aufzuklären. Dabei konzentriert sie sich zu Recht auf den Sicherheitsberater von US-Präsident Richard Nixon. Henry Kissinger war die treibende Kraft hinter der Initiative, die die amerikanischen Wirtschafts- und Sicherheitsinteressen gegenüber den Europäern stärker durchsetzen sollte (S. 3 und 19). Die Verfasserin hatte offenbar nicht die Möglichkeit, den ehemaligen Sicherheitsberater und späteren amerikanischen Außenminister zu sprechen und sein – zumindest in Teilen – in der Library of Congress aufbewahrten Nachlass einzusehen. Nur an wenigen Stellen ihrer Arbeit geht sie auf die Haltung des US-Außenministeriums ein. Gfeller konzentriert sich auf das Wesentliche. Foggy Bottom war offenbar nicht nur unzureichend in die Initiative eingebunden sondern auch von ihrem Sinn nicht überzeugt.²

Die amerikanische Europainitiative im Jahr 1973 sollte der Nordatlantischen Allianz neuen Auftrieb geben, sich abzeichnende wirtschaftliche Gegensätze unter den Verbündeten versöhnen und vor allen Dingen die amerikanischen Finanz-, Wirtschafts- Sicherheitsinteressen gegenüber den Europäern stärker durchsetzen (S. 19-26 und 196). Gfeller schildert ausführlich und mit vielen neuen Details die Hintergründe des amerikanischen Ansinnens und die Vorbereitung der Initiative. Die US-Verantwortlichen mussten nach ihren internen Analysen und zahlreichen Gesprächen mit Kennern der europäischen Politik sowie offiziellen Vertretern der Verbündeten davon ausgehen, dass ihr Versuch – die amerikanische Führerschaft in Westeuropa vor dem Hintergrund der Entspannungspolitik unter den Supermächten zu erneuern – auf französischen Widerstand treffen würde. Mit der Rolle einer Regionalmacht, wie sie Kissinger den Europäern in seiner Rede vom 23. April 1973 zugewiesen hatte, wollte sich weder die Presse noch die Regierung in Frankreich zufrieden geben. Sie verweigerten sich dem amerikanischen Ansinnen, unter veränderten geopolitischen Verhältnissen in der Welt die US-Führerschaft im Westen wieder zu behaupten. Sie befürchteten, dass die von Washington geforderte Stärkung der transatlantischen Beziehung dazu führen würde, die Europäische Gemeinschaft einen alles beherrschenden amerikanischen Einfluss auszusetzen (S. 30-34). Die französische Regierung lehnte die von den Amerikanern gewünschte gemeinsame Grundsatzerklärung mit ihren europäischen Verbündeten ab.

Die ablehnende französische Haltung nahmen die EG Partner nicht hin. Allen voran bemühten sich, Großbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zwischen Paris und Washington zu vermitteln und eine gemeinsame Erklärung zu den transatlantischen Beziehungen abzugeben. Gfeller beschreibt minutös, wie es den Franzosen gelang, den amerikanischen Plan zu konterkarieren und die ursprünglich angestrebte machtvolle Demonstration atlantischer Einheit in eine Integrationsinitiative umzuwandeln (S. 58-76). Am 14. Dezember 1973 veröffentlichten die Außenminis-

2. Siehe M.J. HILLENBRAND, *Die USA und die EG: Spannungen und Möglichkeiten*, in: K. KAISER, H.-P. SCHWARZ (Hrsg.), *Amerika und Westeuropa. Gegenwarts- und Zukunftsprobleme*, Belser Verlag, Stuttgart/Zürich, 1977, S. 290; M.J. HILLENBRAND, *Fragments of our time. Memoirs of a diplomat*, University of Georgia Press, Athens (Georgia), 1998, S. 330 f.

ter der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften eine Erklärung über die europäische Identität.

In dem Dokument beschrieben die Außenminister die Gemeinsamkeiten Europas, in dem sie die kulturell-wertebezogene und die politische Identität miteinander verbanden. Die Werte (repräsentative Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, soziale Gerechtigkeit und Menschenrechte), die europäischen Institutionen und der Gemeinsame Markt führten hiernach zu einer eigenen unverwechselbaren Identität. Damit stellten die europäischen Außenminister die Identitätsfrage in einen Zusammenhang mit den politischen Institutionen der Gemeinschaften und sahen in diesen Handlungseinheiten den Ausdruck eines politischen Selbstverständnisses in der EG. Gfeller entzieht sich einer ausführlichen Interpretation der Quelle. Vielmehr legt sie großen Wert auf den Umstand, dass der bis dato für den Nationalstaat besetzte Begriff „Identität“ nunmehr in Frankreich auf Europa Anwendung fand (S. 12 und 75). Der Hinweis auf die politische Sprache bleibt ein Exkurs in einer Arbeit, die methodisch einer klassischen Diplomatiegeschichte entspricht. Die Historikerin beschreibt wie sich die EG ihre Identität auf französisches Drängen hin aus sich selber, nicht in Beziehung zu den Vereinigten Staaten und als eigenständige weltpolitische Kraft definierte (S. 58, 63, 72, 74 und 197 f.). Dabei gelang der französischen Diplomatie ein ungewöhnlicher Spagat. Sie beharrte ganz im Sinne des außenpolitischen Vermächtnisses Charles de Gaulle's auf ihre uneingeschränkte Souveränität und öffnete gleichzeitig die Tür für eine gemeinsame europäische Außenpolitik, die nur auf der Basis von Kooperation und gemeinsamen Absprachen denkbar war (S. 68 und 75).

Ausführlich zeigt Gfeller diesen „Europäisierungsprozess“ am Beispiel der gemeinsamen Nahostpolitik der EG Staaten. Den drohenden Verlust dieser traditionell französischen Einflussphäre konnte Paris durch Zusammenarbeit auf europäischer Ebene wirksam entgegenwirken und auf diese Weise eigene Interessen weiter verfolgen (S. 85-105).

Die eigentliche Bewährungsprobe für eine gemeinsame – mehr auf Unabhängigkeit von den USA bedachte – Politik der EG-Staaten stand freilich noch aus. In der Ölkrise verfolgten die europäischen Staaten eigene nationale Interessen, die eine gemeinsame und abgestimmte Politik unter den EG Staaten unmöglich machten und – bis auf Frankreich – ihre Beziehung zu den Vereinigten Staaten und damit die Atlantische Gemeinschaft aufwerteten. Die Europäer konnten nur mit und nicht ohne und schon gar nicht gegen die Amerikaner die Krisenzeit bewältigen. Während der Ölkrise beeinflussten finanz- und wirtschaftspolitische Entwicklungen die Außenpolitik und verdeutlichten die führende Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten in der westlichen Welt. Gfeller beschreibt detailliert die französische Politik, sich der amerikanischen Krisenstrategie zu entziehen und damit einen stärkeren US-Einfluss auf Europa zu verhindern. Zu keinem Zeitpunkt konnte die Pariser Regierung für dieses Vorhaben die Unterstützung ihrer Partner gewinnen, was Gfeller nicht als Zeichen einer zerstrittenen Gemeinschaft wertet (S. 114-134). Die Historikerin deutet den Fehlschlag der französischen Politik nicht als Niederlage mit einer nachhaltigen Wirkung für die politische Kooperation unter den EG-Staaten, wohl aber musste Paris in der

Folgezeit atlantischen Konsultationsverfahren zustimmen, die mehr US-Wünschen entsprachen und Washington Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die europäische Politik dauerhaft eröffneten (S. 143-157 und 161 f.). Damit stärkte die EG die atlantischen Beziehungen auf Kosten der von Frankreich so gewünschten europäischen Identität.

Der europäisch-arabische Dialog konnte erst nach der Einigung zwischen EG und USA über das gemeinsame Konsultationsverfahren fortgeführt werden, die zu einer Europäisierung der französischen Nahostpolitik führte (S. 115, 133, 154, 178 f. und 198 f.). Es war allerdings undenkbar geworden, eine gemeinsame europäische Politik gegen amerikanische Interessen zu führen (S. 162), was auch nicht mehr im Interesse des neu gewählten französischen Präsidenten lag. Gfeller argumentiert überzeugend, wie sich Giscard d'Estaing von der intergouvernementalen Europapolitik seiner Vorgänger, de Gaulle und Pompidou, entfernte und beide Entwicklungsrichtungen der EG – supranational und intergouvernemental – stärkte, um den Integrationsprozess durch den Aufbau des Europäischen Rats und die Wahlen zum Europaparlament zu vertiefen (S. 180). Die Historikerin führt in die Forschungsdiskussion neue Quellenfunde ein, die das Zusammenspiel von Jean Monnet, Außenminister Jean Sauvagnargues und den persönlichen Überzeugungen des sich der europäischen Einigung verbunden fühlenden Präsidenten aufzeigen und den neuen Kurs in der französischen Europapolitik erklären (S. 180-187 und 198 f.). Die durch die Zustimmung zu Wahlen zum Europaparlament zum Ausdruck gebrachte Stärkung einer supranationalen Institution markierte nach Gfeller einen bedeutenden Wandel in der französischen Europapolitik. Die Regierung in Paris hatte die Konsequenzen aus ihren wirtschaftlichen, sicherheits-, finanz- und machtpolitischen Abhängigkeiten gezogen. Frankreich wollte zukünftig weltpolitischen Einfluss mit und durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft ausüben. Zu diesem Zweck bedurfte diese internationale Organisation eine europäische Identität als weltpolitischer Akteur, um in Augenhöhe mit den USA und der UdSSR handeln zu können.

Es ist das Verdienst von Gfeller, diesen Transformationsprozess des französischen Selbstverständnisses aufzuzeigen. Ihre Perspektive, jeden auch noch so kleinen gemeinsamen Nenner der EG Staaten als Erfolg zu deuten, und ihre Neigung, Sachverhalte thesenartig zuzuspitzen, laden zu kontroversen Diskussionen genauso ein wie ihre Wertungen, die sich oft an den Aussagen und Urteilen französischer Zeitgenossen orientieren (119 f. und 149-153). Das gut lesbare Buch gehört deshalb auf die Literaturliste für ein Seminar im Masterstudium zur Integrationsgeschichte.

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Hans-Peter SCHWARZ, *Helmut Kohl. Eine politische Biographie*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, München, 2012, 1052 S. – ISBN 978-3-421-04458-7 – 36,75 €.

This biography written by the eminent German historian specialized in recent contemporary affairs is as massive as its object – the German Chancellor Kohl, physically

as much as politically a “giant” in the eyes of the author. Large portions of this book are devoted to Kohl’s origins and his career within the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) of his native city of Ludwigshafen in the Palatinate (Pfalz), a German region bordering France in the West that had been, at times, a battleground between Germany and France. Schwarz singles out two factors that have marked the *Kriegskind* (war child) Kohl: One was World War Two, which “owing to the blessing of his late birth” he experienced as a young teenager and not yet as a soldier, but nonetheless as a member of the Nazi youth organization that had to fight the fires resulting from the allied air raids on his home town, one of the most frequently bombed German cities. This experience made him loathe war for the rest of his life. The other factor leaving a lasting imprint on him was the influence of a somewhat leftist political Catholicism to which he was exposed in and out of school during the immediate post-war period. It was an influence, which along with his father’s example induced him to support the local Christian Democratic Party (CDU), when he still went to school.

Schwarz goes to considerable lengths to describe Kohl’s early political career: His beginnings as a history student at the University of Heidelberg, that he concluded with a PhD degree for a thesis that analysed the French supported separatist movement in the Palatinate after 1945. Schwarz then details Kohl’s ascent from the rank and file of the local CDU to the leadership of his party in the State of Rhineland-Palatinate and, following his electoral victories, his appointment as Minister-President of his State (1969) and as chairman of the West German CDU in 1973. After some setbacks his moment arrived in the fall of 1982, when the governing Social-Liberal coalition was replaced by a Liberal-Christian-Democrat majority in the West German parliament which voted him into the Chancellor’s office. His earliest major achievement, as Schwarz underlines, was to overcome a formidable public opposition to the deployment of modernized American missiles on German ground.

For the purposes of this journal this reviewer will refrain from dwelling any further on the sixteen years of Kohl’s general role in domestic politics and in foreign affairs. Instead he will focus on the Chancellor’s commitment to the project of a united Europe and the contributions he made in the interest of that objective. Like many others of his generation Kohl was already during his school days ardently pro-European. As Schwarz repeatedly stresses, Kohl was from the beginning a disciple of Konrad Adenauer’s pro-French orientation and adhered to the latter’s European policies including the ill-fated project of a European Defence Community (EDC). In Kohl’s eyes the three pillars on which German national interest rested were to remain a faithful member of the Western alliance, to support European integration and to uphold Germany’s claim for reunification. Under the influence of Walter Hallstein, the first President of the European Commission, and in line with a clear majority of German public opinion he aspired to a politically and at the same time federally united Europe. This was the stance to which he committed the CDU in 1976, i.e. at a moment when he still headed the opposition in the German Bundestag.

As Schwarz does not fail to add, Kohl, for all his pro-European enthusiasm, did not give up the aim of an ultimate German reunification, to be sure to be achieved

within some European frame, and quite early during his tenure of office he coined the phrase, often to be repeated, that Bonn's German and European policies, or, for that matter, German unification and European integration, were the "two sides of the same medal" (p.596). Schwarz leaves no doubt that Kohl's pro-European pronouncements represented a programme to be put into practice, whenever possible, in a close alliance with France. By a fortunate coincidence, the French President François Mitterrand had also recently adopted a pro-European-integrationist programme, at the time, when Kohl took over as Chancellor. No wonder that when taking office he first went to Paris in order to arrive at a Franco-German agreement regarding the future evolution of the European communities (pp.352 f.). Mitterrand in turn backed Kohl in his advocating the just mentioned modernization of NATO's missile defence and expressed his interest in closer economic cooperation within the European Communities. Significantly, this included financial and monetary matters. Kohl's good faith in this respect was tested a few months after taking office: Costly social reforms Mitterrand had enacted had led to increased market pressure against the Franc. Kohl helped France to remain in the "currency snake" by revaluing the DM – an act of support which he would repeat again in the early nineties. Kohl also endorsed the candidacy for the EC-presidency of Jacques Delors, since the negotiations of the Single European Act a key actor regarding the efforts undertaken to strengthen the European Communities.

In this context the discussion was launched on devising a monetary union for united Europe. It pays to take a closer look at the sections of Schwarz's account dealing with this presently so controversial issue. As popular lore wants it, a Franco-German bargain was struck, when Kohl some time in 1989-90 agreed to the Euro in exchange of Mitterrand's acceptance of German unification. Even Kohl himself in his memoirs subscribed to a certain extent to this version of the record.³ Schwarz, however, largely discards this legend. Actually, he demonstrates that Kohl's commitment to the creation of a European currency union preceded the big sea change of 1989. Instead, Schwarz suggests another linkage – the linkage between French pressure to create a European currency union and Kohl's interest in closer Franco-German cooperation in questions of common defence. Both had their reasons. Mitterrand resisted the dominance of the strong DM over the French Franc and other soft European currencies – at one point he went so far as to refer to the DM as the Federal Republic's "atom bomb" serving as the backbone of its power (p.431).⁴ Kohl, on the other hand, in view of the breakthrough of East-Western détente had grown somewhat doubtful as to the validity of America's nuclear guarantee for the security of Western Europe and sought to upgrade France's commitment to the defence of West Germany.

In the end there was a French agreement establishing a Franco-German brigade (pp.428 f.) and, from 1987 and in the face of strong British reservations, a growing

3. See K. SCHWABE's review of Kohl's Memoirs, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 1(2010), p.120.

4. Schwarz's translation is perhaps a trifle too liberal. The original runs as follows: Mitterrand said "Or, sa puissance, c'est l'économie, et le Deutsche Mark en est la force atomique". See J. ATTALI, *Verbatim. Chronique des années 1981-1991*, vol.3, 1988-1991, Fayard, Paris, 1995, p.74.

German inclination to accept the creation of a European currency. A Franco-German council for defence and another one for financial/economic matters were set up in late 1987. Kohl also began to share Delors' conviction that a European reserve currency plus a European Central Bank would make European integration "irreversible" (pp.433, 435 and 463). In March 1988 Kohl in a speech pledged support for a European economic and currency union considering them important steps – and this is important for his original position – on the way to the final goal of a political union. This implied that in Kohl's eyes the founding of a European Central Bank and the introduction of a European currency would occur at the end of the process of constructing a European federal union. In June 1988 the Hannover summit of the European Council had agreed to the appointment of a so-called Delors committee of financial experts, which in April 1989 submitted its concept consisting of three stages in the preparation process for the future Euro-currency.

"Today, in the second decade of the 21st century", Schwarz sums up his findings, "it is possible to ascertain: However the project [of the Euro] would have evolved, this major objective shared by Mitterrand and Delors would have been carried out, be it with Kohl's or with another Federal Chancellor's assistance. Had the upheaval of the years of 1989-1990 not occurred, the convergence would have been even more easily attainable [...]. Looking more closely [one can only conclude] that the New Europe that took shape after the great upheaval of 1989 had already been launched during the short eighties" (pp.484 f.). Schwarz does salvage a trace of the legend of a Franco-German "unification-integration deal" in pointing out to the relation that existed between Mitterrand's consent to German unification and the agreement on a precise date for a governments' conference, which was to work out the terms of a treaty providing for the monetary union. The author depicts the increased pressure that Mitterrand put on Kohl in late 1989 to commit himself to such a date as a prerequisite for a French agreement on further progress in the German re-unification process. On December 6, 1989, on the eve of the EC summit convened in Strasburg, Kohl yielded and proposed late 1990 as a time frame for the governments' conference. Still, Schwarz insists, Kohl's concession was more a matter of form than of substance. In fact, he repeats, Kohl had already "resigned" himself (p.560) to sacrificing the DM on the altar of a European currency. If this was still necessary, some quite hostile international reactions to the prospect of Germany's reunification in late 1989 had confirmed him in his conviction that for a unified Germany a European frame was indispensable, in order to make it palatable to the rest of Europe, and that the monetary union the French government was pressing for had to be an integral part of such European frame. Following Schwarz, one may add, that even after Kohl's concession Mitterrand's resentment of his German "friend's" seemingly unilateral reunification policies remained unabated, that for the French President European integration had to be given priority over Germany's reunification and that it took until the summer of 1990 before Franco-German tensions finally eased off. In accordance with Schwarz' analysis it is then safe to conclude that an immediate link between Kohl's agreeing to a fixed timetable for implementing the EURO and the French government's acceptance of German reunification in reality did not exist.

There was, however, yet another linkage in Kohl's European concept that Schwarz brings up and that deserves some scrutiny – the linkage between the two goals of a federally structured political union for the EC on the one hand, and the introduction of a European currency on the other. Throughout his life, the Chancellor's top priority had been a European federation, by Kohl often referred to as the "United States of Europe". By that he meant a shared foreign policy and a long term European – or at least a Franco-German – coordination in the field of military security. Institutionally, this would have meant a strengthening of the EC's existing structures, i.e. an introduction of the majority rule in their proceedings, and an extension of the European parliament's responsibilities. In Mitterrand's eyes agreeing to a political union of that sort amounted to an important concession vis-à-vis his German partner. As he explicitly stated in June 1989, such concession demanded Kohl's prior assent to a European currency. After the collapse of the Soviet rule over East Germany and Eastern Europe, Mitterrand preferred a loose all-European confederation outside the European Communities. As Delors took Kohl's side, Mitterrand finally yielded to the latter's plea for a common initiative aiming at a political union. Due to French and British misgivings and much to Kohl's and Delors' disappointment, in the months preceding the Maastricht Conference the deliberations concerning a political union starkly fell behind the negotiations for a common European currency. As a consequence, the Maastricht Treaty remained largely vague regarding a politically integrated Europe. Schwarz concedes, that this was a clear defeat for Kohl's aspirations. The chancellor consoled himself with the prospect that the dynamism unleashed by the other provisions of the Maastricht Treaty would sooner or later provide an impulse for continued discussions about a political union and "federal elements" in it.

As it turned out, he was wrong. French reservations were upheld. Schwarz explains why. One major reason for Mitterrand's increasingly lukewarm attitude regarding a political union was the unilateral position the Federal Republic resorted to in recognizing the Yugoslav break-off republics of Slovenia and Croatia. In the wake of Yugoslavia's disruption there was no such thing as a common European policy. Furthermore, the inclusion into the European Union of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which Kohl strongly advocated despite distinct misgivings on the part of the EC's Southern members, was bound to complicate still further the decision making process within the EC. Also the French concept of a European security organization would entail a clear distance to NATO – an implication that would contradict Kohl's pro-NATO orientation.

Evidently, these divergences reinforced Mitterrand's own reservations regarding a European political union. In early 1997 the French government did come out with the proposal of a "gouvernement économique", apparently consisting of delegates of the member states and working similarly as the European Council. Fearing to be outvoted by economically weaker members and dreading state interventionism the German government declined to consider this suggestion. Thus the former linkage between the future EURO and a political union for Europe had faded away. Looking from the perspective of the present day crisis of the EURO, Schwarz notes that neither the French nor the German governments envisaged the possibility of a political union

for Europe that would both enjoy democratic legitimacy and would coordinate as well as supervise the fiscal policies of the member states of the future “EURO-land”. Schwarz, therefore, makes both France and Germany responsible for the fact that today’s monetary union comes close to an isolated torso within the structure of the European institutions (p.807). In accordance with the German Supreme Court’s definition of the European Union as something like a confederation (Staaten-Verbund), Kohl in February 1994 revised his opinion further by fully parting with his long cherished concept of a European federation, to him by then a “utopia” (pp.709 and 816). At the same time and somewhat inconsistently, he continued to remind his entourage that a monetary union without any kind of a political union “would not make sense” (p.807).

All the more dogged and determined and not unaware of the German voters’ scant enthusiasm vis-à-vis the prospect of losing the DM, Kohl pushed the project of a European currency, considering it the only remaining step towards European unity, a step, that would be immediately palpable as well as irreversible. Germany’s partners had agreed to make a number of concessions to the German ideas of a stable European currency in an open European market: Already before the beginning of the negotiations free capital movement was conceded within the EC; the absolute independence of the future European Central Bank with the sole purpose of assuring the stability of the EURO was accepted as well as the well-known criteria for financial convergence between the members of the monetary union plus a “stability pact”. At an extra European summit held in Brussels on 2-3 May 1998 the eleven original members of the European monetary union gave the final green light for the opening of the third and definite phase of the introduction of the EURO. At the end of the same year the European Council conferred the title of an “honorary citizen of Europe” to Kohl – a title only Jean Monnet had received before. Kohl was praised as the real founder of the new European currency. Schwarz agrees with this, summing up: With all the authority Kohl had gained, whenever possible acting as the “universal harmoniser” among contradictory interests, with a particular eye on the wishes of the smaller members, the German Chancellor was indeed the only political authority of his days to assure the introduction of the EURO in a foreseeable future.

Curiously, as Schwarz has to admit, at the very end of his chancellorship Kohl once more modified his European concept. After a nasty clash with the new French president Jacques Chirac, an even more outspoken anti-federalist than his predecessor, about the personality to be appointed first Governor of the Central European Bank, Kohl turned to the new British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the future leader in the process of European integration. Forgetting the harsh controversies he had fought out with former British governments, above all with Margaret Thatcher, he suddenly began to criticise the centralism of the Brussels institutions and the demands of the European Parliament for an extension of its influence pleading at the same time for subsidiarity among a “Europe of nations”. As Kohl had to resign soon thereafter, on 27 October 1998, as the result of a lost election, Schwarz cannot prove whether or not this represented more than a temporary change of emphasis. Although a party funding scandal, Kohl had been involved in as Chancellor, over-shadowed his years

as an elder statesman, he did not refrain from criticising some of his successors' policy decisions like the admission to the "EURO-club" of Greece or plans to extend the EU to Russia, the Ukraine or Turkey.

In his final assessment of Kohl's standing in Germany's recent past, the author is unstinting in his praise. Schwarz calls him no less than the "architect" of the Europe of today (p.930). It was largely due to Kohl's achievements, he asserts, that Europe came out of the upheaval of 1989 and its repercussions as a relatively stable continent. Schwarz takes Kohl's fervent commitment to the European idea at face value, deeply convinced as this statesman was that this was the only way to prevent future wars on the old continent. Turning to the creation of the EURO, Schwarz characterizes Kohl as "seduced" by the prospect of a (federal, one should add) European Union as the consequence of the creation of a European monetary union. In this process, Schwarz asserts, Kohl's partners like "Gaullist" Mitterrand and the latter's "national-selfish" colleagues from soft currency countries came to act as "fateful figures". "To the damage of all concerned", Schwarz writes, "they persuaded Helmut Kohl, an essentially idealistic European, to submit the monetary system – for all institutions! – to a premature mega-experiment, which in the long run could only turn out to be highly risky". Seen that way Kohl, in the view of the author, embodies "tragic greatness" (pp.935 f.).

Schwarz's ultimate verdict is bound to instigate critical discussions. Critics might ask whether in confronting the "essentially European" German Chancellor with his essentially nationalist non-German opposite numbers Schwarz does these politicians and not least President Mitterrand, really justice. Was the French President merely the instrument of France's political goal of stopping the predominance of the Deutsche Mark? Is it really unlikely that genuine economic and financial considerations may also have motivated Mitterrand's demand to set up the EURO? Was not the French striving for some balance among the bigger members of an integrated Europe understandable as such balance promised long-term stability within the new Europe? On the other hand, did not Kohl personally regard himself as a national patriot pursuing national interests? Admittedly, he defined these basically in European terms, but did this exclude more mundane considerations on which Kohl's European policies may have rested as well?

Such critical remarks should not detract from Schwarz's admirable achievement to have transformed the record of the most recent past into history, delivering an admittedly long, but nonetheless highly readable and captivating, if not outright fascinating, account. No scholar dealing with European integration in the last half-century can afford not to make full use of this rich presentation, which again and again discloses a host of hitherto unpublished documents. One can only urgently recommend an early translation into English.

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Sebastian REYN, *Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010, 547 p. – ISBN 978-90-8964-214-1 – \$US 79.00.

Sebastian Reyn has written an extensive and important book on transatlantic relations during the Cold War. He set out to examine American perceptions of Charles de Gaulle from 1958 to 1969, but has done both more and less than this. He has done more by narrating, in detail, the myriad crises and complex decisions faced by leaders of the Western Alliance in a particularly complicated period of international history. Reyn's full and detailed catalogue of events is a useful reference for students of American foreign policy, European-American relations, and the Cold War in Europe. Reyn puts a finer grain on the events previously described in excellent earlier accounts by scholars such as Marc Trachtenberg, Jeffrey Giauque and Thomas Schwartz.⁵ If Reyn has done less than he set out to do, it is because he does not establish a framework for analyzing American perceptions and the connection between perceptions and policy. Nonetheless, he reveals a number of paths where future historians, interested in a more analytic treatment of this period, will tread fruitfully.

Reyn builds his narrative on thorough research in numerous archives, including four Presidential Libraries. He demonstrates how de Gaulle was both hero and villain in the eyes of United States officials: a staunch ally at times, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also an enemy whose policies threatened to undermine the structures of European integration and Atlantic defence built up since 1945. For the most part, however, de Gaulle was more villain than hero. Ultimately, Reyn argues that de Gaulle's challenges to American policy defined the limits of American power in Europe and bankrupted hopes for an Atlantic Community.

Reyn succeeds in relating a complicated tale of international relations that involves many actors. While the United States and France are his primary subjects, he incorporates the United Kingdom and other allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into his narrative. He begins with a study of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy's responses to de Gaulle's proposals for a tripartite – that is French, British, and American – directorate atop NATO. While the memorandum itself is well known, Reyn describes the less familiar aftermath. Eisenhower and Kennedy both sought to placate de Gaulle without granting his wishes. This involved a lengthy triangular correspondence and unfruitful meetings of officials from all three countries. In the end, the United States rejected the tripartite proposals, citing a threat to the broader Atlantic alliance system. Nonetheless, Reyn claims that both "Eisenhower and Kennedy ended up extending the 'special relationship' with Great Britain to France" (p.76). Students of transatlantic relations will be puzzled by

5. M. TRACHTENBERG, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1999; J.G. GIAUQUE, *Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 2002; T.A. SCHWARTZ, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003.

Reyn's claim: Anglo-American co-operation on nuclear matters, intelligence sharing, and informal consultation between diplomats and planning sections of the State Department and Foreign Office was always far more intimate and special than any such relationship with France.

American disagreements with France, particularly over economic issues, became more pronounced in the early 1960s. Reyn's second chapter examines Kennedy's reactions to de Gaulle's plans for a "European" Europe. Reyn calls this period a "tug-of-war" over the future of European integration. He points out the inherent paradox in American hopes for the continuation of European integration in the style of Jean Monnet: American officials supported such a policy to limit de Gaulle's ability to act independently, but its success would have required de Gaulle's full-throated support. This was not to be.

Where chapter one considered American attempts to placate de Gaulle, and chapter two stressed the ambiguity of the larger Atlantic relationship, chapter three focuses on the clash between France and the United States after 1963 that had been building up for five years. Reyn details the Anglo-American Nassau conference and Charles de Gaulle's press conference that effectively ended the first British application to join the Common Market. He argues American policy became much less ambiguous after the veto, and Washington sought "to isolate France within Europe by simply forging ahead with American policies as if there were no de Gaulle" (p.182) Reyn's interpretation of this period dutifully represents the views of the contemporary State Department. This is not, however, the whole story. As Marc Trachtenberg has argued, 1963 saw the Kennedy administration rethink its European policy and reach out to France.⁶ Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defence, led a project intended to share nuclear technology with France; it lost steam after Kennedy's assassination because of Lyndon Johnson's concern with Asia, rather than any specific effort to isolate France.⁷

Reyn's fourth chapter is a study of the various efforts to establish a jointly owned and operated Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). Reyn makes a novel case that it was French opposition to the MLF that led both the Federal Republic and Johnson to abandon the policy. Reyn records all of the threats and ominous grumblings from the Élysée over the MLF, with their implicit threats to the future of the Common Market and NATO. Certainly, Johnson's National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy knew that pushing the MLF would require a fight with de Gaulle, and this was one of many good reasons to abandon the MLF. Reyn's emphasis on the role of French thinking is a good corrective to what is otherwise a well-documented period of transatlantic disagreement.

Chapter five considers the American response to the most significant French challenge to American leadership in Europe: de Gaulle's request for NATO forces to leave France, and his withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated military

6. M. TRACHTENBERG, *op.cit.*, p.357.

7. TRANSCRIPT, *Roswell Gilpatric Oral History Interview I, 11/2/82, by Ted Gittinger*, Internet Copy, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

command in 1966. Reyn acknowledges that de Gaulle's request was tied up with several other elements of American policy in NATO, including the establishment of a nuclear consultative committee, Anglo-American-German negotiations over troop payments, and the major study of NATO's future known as the Harmel Report. He does a fine job of showing the connections between these thorny problems.

A puzzle remains, however, in linking American perceptions of de Gaulle and American policy in 1966. Reyn notes that the "Atlanticists" in the State Department – proponents of deepening and broadening connections between Western Europe and North America – were livid at de Gaulle's actions. Yet Johnson, and other officials who Reyn calls the "pragmatists", refused to be provoked by de Gaulle and avoided any tit-for-tat policies. How and why was there such different thinking in Washington? State officials, Reyn explains, were overwhelmingly influenced by Monnet and his integrationist ideas, and viewed de Gaulle as a threat to the construction of Europe. But what about the pragmatists? Surely in a study of American perceptions of de Gaulle, it would be worth fully exploring what drove the pragmatists: After all, it was they who decided on and executed policy in response to the French request.

Finally, in the sixth chapter, Reyn argues that in the final years of the Johnson administration, and then under President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, American policy moved from "divergence" to "accommodation" with France. Following the mould of his earlier chapters, Reyn focuses on personalities and relationships, such as the close bond between Nixon and de Gaulle. This stands in place of a more thorough consideration of policy formulation and its execution. Thus the decision and practise of American nuclear sharing with France – a policy that Eisenhower and Kennedy had agonized over – is rather quickly covered in only two paragraphs. Ultimately, Reyn argues that de Gaulle had "provided a foreign policy paradigm that Nixon and Kissinger were to follow". While this, perhaps, gives too much credit to de Gaulle, Reyn is clearly correct that de Gaulle, more than anyone else, defined the limits of American power in Europe (p.352)

Reyn presents a staggering amount of detail to his readers. He is so deeply engaged with his subjects that he seems unwilling to leave out any detail of their lives that might have influenced their beliefs – personal histories, such as those of Jean Monnet, run for several pages. Speeches and other quotes appear in frequent, lengthy block quotes. Reyn writes well and clearly, and so this detail does not make for an onerous read. But this approach to diplomatic history raises some important methodological questions. In his concern to capture what officials said and wrote, and to understand what they thought about de Gaulle or transatlantic relations, Reyn largely ignores whether and how these thoughts were translated into policy and action. There is an odd disconnect between Reyn's history of American foreign policymakers and American foreign policy in this era. This partly stems from Reyn's decision to privilege State Department opinions as the opinions of the United States Government as a whole. Reyn is entirely correct that many American officials were frustrated by de Gaulle, afraid of what his policies would do to Europe, and rabidly anti-Gaullist. Nonetheless, the United States consistently avoided any confrontation or conflict with

de Gaulle. When de Gaulle insisted that any atomic weapons in France be under French command, the United States reacted quickly and without dissent by redeploying nine squadrons of fighter-bombers from France to Germany and Britain. When de Gaulle withdrew the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO command, alternate arrangements were made to ensure contact between French and NATO fleets. Similarly, NATO entered into negotiations with French military authorities after the 1966 withdrawal to maintain a link between NATO forces and French divisions in Germany. Americans might have despised de Gaulle, but American policy adapted graciously to his wishes. How would policy have differed if American perceptions of de Gaulle had been positive?

Reyn makes clear that he is primarily concerned with examining “American perceptions of de Gaulle”. He explains that his is not a “study of French foreign policy [...] but of the United States’ response to this policy” (pp.13-14). Historians are always faced with the difficulty of limiting their study to practicable proportions, and that Reyn felt this impulse to constrain his study is understandable. But the decision to study American perceptions of de Gaulle, separate from de Gaulle’s policy and actions is an awkward choice. Reyn subscribes to the common view – shared, incidentally, by his American subjects – that de Gaulle had an unchanging vision of world affairs that he had set out in his memoirs and adhered to unflinchingly. But it takes two to tango: diplomacy is by definition an iterative process. What if the United States had followed through on John Foster Dulles’ 1958 promise of a nuclear submarine for France (pp.38 and footnote 71)? And what if the United States had not been so quick to scuttle Eisenhower’s proposal of tripartite machinery on a “clandestine basis” that the President made to Harold Macmillan and de Gaulle at Rambouillet in 1959 (p.58)? What if the United States had done some diplomatic spadework in Paris before the Nassau Agreement, had been more charitable in their definition of what non-nuclear weapons systems could be sold to France, or, for that matter, been genuinely willing to extend the nuclear special relationship to France? There was a cycle in American and French reactions, where actions of one state reinforced the perceptions of the other. Did it have to be this way? Could the cycle have been broken by either country? We cannot know without a deeper consideration of the connection between both American and French policy.

Finally, there remain questions about Reyn’s basic conceit that American policy rested on a search for an Atlantic Community. Reyn notes that the concept of an “Atlantic Community” was vague, and he leaves it that way. But he makes a case for Atlantic Community as the “foreign policy paradigm” that undergirded a broad, bipartisan policy consensus for US policy towards Europe (pp.18-19). Readers learn on the last page of the book that the “Atlantis” of the title, lost during the de Gaulle years, was a “North Atlantic Community” (p.374). Reyn has put far too much stock in the notion that American policymakers wanted, and sought, such a community. While talk of an “Atlantic Community” can be found in the words of Eisenhower and Dulles, and is notable in Kennedy’s public rhetoric, it is far more difficult to find concrete examples of American action taken specifically to establish such a community. The word itself was considered problematic in the White House: in the Kennedy

years, the word “community” was deliberately and consciously replaced by “partnership”. When basic American policy towards the Atlantic nations was reconsidered in 1964, it stated explicitly that “Atlantic Commonwealth” – a synonym for Atlantic Community – was “beyond our capacity to accomplish and [...] contrary to our interests”.⁸ Reyn is certainly right that some Americans dreamt of “Atlantis”. And these Americans, notably – but not only – George Ball and Walt Rostow, wrote prolifically with vivid, passionate memoranda and letters studded with historical allusion. As a result, the historical evidence they left behind makes a strong case for an Atlantic dream. This thinking, however, was almost exclusive to Ball, the European Bureau (EUR), and the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State. Other parts of the State Department such as Western European Affairs (WE), the Pentagon, and the staff of the National Security Council had no time for Atlantic fairy tales. If Atlantis never existed, it was never lost.

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Laurence BADEL, Hélène MICHEL (dir.), *Patronats et intégration européenne. Pour un dialogue disciplinaire raisonné*, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2011, p.175 – ISBN 978-2-296-55498-6 – 17,00 €.

In recent years a few voices in the field of the history of European integration have advocated a closer link with the other social sciences, and particularly with the growing bulk of Political Science literature on the European Union, in the conviction that this is a necessary step to amend the historiography of European integration from its fundamental weaknesses. The volume under review here, issued from an interdisciplinary seminar held in Strasbourg in March 2010, is an attempt to foster this dialogue in studying the role of the business milieus in European integration. The book consists of an introduction and seven chapters, four contributed by historians, the others by two political scientists and a sociologist. The fundamental aim, as stated by the two editors in the introduction, is not to give “des leçons à l’autre mais de lui fournir les éléments lui permettant de comprendre et d’utiliser au mieux les recherches produites” (p.11). In this perspective, each chapter is conceived as a presentation of the basic traits of a particular field of research. Thus, Françoise Berger’s contribution presents an overview of the achievements and limits of the historical literature on the relation between industrial sectors and integration. Andy Smith’s chapter presents a frame of analysis of the EU sectoral policies and their impact on the European industry, inspired by a political economy approach, with a concrete application to the wine sector. Marine Moguen-Toursel and Neil Rollings offer an overview of the development of Business History and of its contribution to the historiography of

8. MEMORANDUM, Revision of NSC Memorandum of April 25, 1961, entitled ‘NATO and the Atlantic Nations’, 24.01.1964. Available in the online DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS REFERENCE SYSTEM, Thomson Gale, Detroit, MI.

European integration and reflect on its complementarity with political science. Arnaud Mias, in a truly interdisciplinary manner which mixes the viewpoint of the sociologist with some of the classical historians' crafts (use of primary sources, periodization), provides an analysis of the role of business in industrial relations and of the evolution of the "social dialogue" at the European level. Olivier Dard reconstructs the development of the French historiography on the "patronat" stressing the evolution from value laden and normative approaches to a more neutral and detached stance. Guillaume Courty analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the political sociology of the interest groups, advancing many suggestions for a possible heuristic refinement of the field. Finally, Laurence Badel's contribution depicts the emergence inside the French school of international relations history of the "patronat" as an autonomous research subject, highlighting the influence of a key scholar like René Girault, and the contribution of this school to the development of the field and to its progress.

Some common traits emerge out of these contributions, such as the stressing of the need to overcome a State-centric approach; the need to refine the research tools in order to acknowledge the complexity of the business world, not reducible to its peak organizations; the difficulty in assessing the delicate and ever changing balance between State power and transnational interests. The editors' introduction and Badel's final chapter do a good job in mapping up the common ground between the disciplines and identifying new possible lines of research. However, the overall impression that emerges from the book is that of a difficult dialogue, in which, notwithstanding the goodwill of the participants, in many instances the chapters fail to speak to each other. Many of the contributions (Berger's, Dard's, Smith's, Courty's), while presenting a useful summary of the state of the art in their field, offer little or no suggestions about the possible ways of integration with other disciplines. Thus they seem to neglect the fact that by now the debate on the "contamination" between history and other social sciences has gone beyond this very preliminary stage and some concrete proposals have been advanced, especially with regards to the study of the role of transnational actors in European integration.⁹ True, some of the contributions, such as Mias's and Moguen's and Rolling's, constitute excellent examples of an intelligent application of an interdisciplinary approach, but even in these cases what emerges is a sort of "unidirectionality". Following a more general trend, history is seen, at best, as a source of data for empirical tests, but it is ignored as a contributor of heuristic concepts or of a general interpretation. This is perfectly understandable, since very few historians of European integration care to present an original interpretation of their subject susceptible to raise the interest of scholars in other fields of the European studies. In fact, the historiography on European integration only recently has begun to emerge from an isolation that, in the past years, had confined it in a residual role with little to offer to practitioners of other field, or even to other historians, in terms of agenda setting capacity or the advancement of new interpre-

9. See for ex. W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds), *The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72*, Routledge, Abingdon, 2009, especially chapters 1 and 2.

tations. As stated by one of the more active proponents of a new course in European integration history: “Despite recent attempts to develop a conceptually and methodologically more sophisticated approach, and also to enhance interdisciplinary communication with the social sciences, the historiography of the EU is still very marginal within the larger field of modern history and even to the study of the contemporary history of Europe since 1945”.¹⁰ On the other hand, historians, in the not yet so common cases of scholars who do not ignore the debates going on in other domains of social research, have the tendency to uncritically adopt concepts and definitions which, as Courty’s essay eloquently demonstrates, are not exempt from blunders.

More fundamentally, in my view, the entire exercise would have benefited from a clearer identification of the basic questions that the interdisciplinary co-operation is supposed to answer. Between the late 1970s and early 1980s a new approach to the study of the relations between the economic interests and the State, the “corporatist synthesis”, revolutionized the historiography on American foreign policy, through the works of authors of the like of Thomas J. McCormick, Charles Maier, Michael Hogan. They were inspired by the political science debate on the interest groups which centred around the contrast between the pluralist approach, which viewed the decision-making process as the end product of the interplay of numerous private, voluntary, democratic groups competing with each other in a relatively coequal way in an open society, and the fledgling neo-corporatist approach, which instead stressed the asymmetries of power and the role of the State. At the core of their approach were the search for answers to – in McCormick’s words – “hard problems that lie at the core of any effective system for historical analysis. Who exercises power? How? Why?”.¹¹ Today, much of the literature on European integration and economic interests, and some parts of the book under review here, expunges the questions of power and conflict from the centre of its analysis, which is, most of the time, very theory-driven with little empirical content, focusing attention on very particular, sometime even esoteric questions, that seem to happen in a vacuum, where the dynamics and the cleavages characterizing the European societies are not present. As a result, one is left wondering: why should I adopt this particular set of assumptions or, from the viewpoint of a political scientist, why should I get into this tortuous historiographical debate? How can it help me to answer the basic questions at the heart of my research? It seems to me that a meaningful answer to these questions imply the overcoming of the timidity and narrowness with which the subject is approached. Especially when studying the role of pressure groups and their relation with the political power, the issues of power and conflict are rather obvious problems to engage with. As stated by Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, the Dutch political scientist who has produced some of the more interesting contribution on transnational business, it is important “not only to establish that the ‘politics of big business matter’ (Cowles

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10. W. KAISER, *Bringing People and Ideas Back in: Historical Research on the European Union*, in: D. PHINNEMORE, A. WARLEIGH-LACK (eds), *Reflections on European Integration. 50 Years of the Treaty of Rome*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009, pp.22-39 and 34.
 11. T.J. MCCORMICK, *Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History*, in: *Reviews in American History*, 4(1982), pp.318-330, here: p.323.

1995), but also to analyse and explain ‘the politics’ or political strategies of big business”.¹²

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Erik JONES, Anand MENON, Stephen WEATHERILL (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, 893 p. – ISBN 978-0-19-954628-2 – 102,00 £.

Die politische und die wissenschaftliche Debatte über die europäische Integration konzentriert sich seit einigen Jahren ganz auf die anhaltende Finanzkrise, die gerne und nicht ohne Hintergedanken als „Euro-Krise“ etikettiert wird. Wie einseitig diese Krisenperspektive ist und welche Errungenschaften es eigentlich zu bestaunen und zu verteidigen gilt, lässt sich in diesem beeindruckenden Band nachlesen. Die Herausgeber, zwei Politologen und ein Jurist, haben über 60 ausgewiesene Kolleginnen und Kollegen, in der Mehrzahl Politologen, aber auch einige Historiker, für das ambitionierte Unternehmen gewinnen können, den Stand der Forschung über die EU zu rekapitulieren. Entstanden sind auf diese Weise 58 höchst präzise und informative Beiträge, die in souveräner Manier den jeweiligen Kenntnisstand und die wichtigsten Forschungskontroversen präsentieren.

Die Herausgeber haben die Beiträge unter zehn Gesichtspunkten zusammengefasst. Zunächst werden die einschlägigen Theorieansätze präsentiert, die zur Erklärung des Einigungsprozesses entwickelt und erprobt worden sind, insbesondere der Realismus, der Neofunktionalismus, der Konstruktivismus und das Mehrebenen-Modell. Anschließend stehen die maßgeblichen Verträge im Mittelpunkt, vom Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl über die Römischen Verträge, Maastricht, Amsterdam und Nizza bis zum Vertrag von Lissabon. Auch gescheiterte Vorhaben wie die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft oder der Verfassungsvertrag werden nicht ausgespart, da auch Fehlschläge Lehren bereithalten.

Der dritte Teil beschäftigt sich mit den Hauptakteuren des Einigungsprozesses, darunter mit den Gründervätern, allen voran Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer und Alcide de Gasperi, aber auch mit den deutsch-französischen Tandems Helmut Schmidt – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing und Helmut Kohl – François Mitterrand oder bedeutenden Kommissionspräsidenten wie Walter Hallstein oder Jacques Delors. Berücksichtigt werden aber auch „problematic partners“ wie Charles de Gaulle und Margaret Thatcher, denen der Autor des entsprechenden Beitrags – vielleicht etwas zu optimistisch – nur einen „comparatively limited impact on the integration

12. B. van APeldoorne, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration*, Routledge, London, 2002, p.5. The reference contained in the quotation is to M.G. Cowles, *Setting the Agenda for a new Europe: the ERT and EC 1992*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4(1995), pp. 501-526.

process“ (S. 216) zugesteht, sowie „famous non-performers“ (S. 233) wie Franco Malfatti, Gaston Thorn oder Jacques Santer. Im vierten Teil geht es um die Mitgliedsstaaten – allerdings nicht um einzelne, sondern um Gruppen wie „große“ gegen „kleine“ Staaten, „alte“ gegen „neue“ und „reiche“ gegen „arme“ Mitglieder.

Der fünfte Teil ist den Institutionen gewidmet, der sechste den wichtigsten traditionellen Politikfeldern im Bereich Wirtschaft, also dem gemeinsamen Markt, der Handelspolitik, der Wettbewerbspolitik, der Agrarpolitik oder der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Im siebten Teil werden neuere Tätigkeitsfelder wie Umweltpolitik, Sozialpolitik und Energiepolitik untersucht, anschließend die außen-, sicherheits- und innenpolitischen Aktivitäten der EU einschließlich erster Ansätze zur geheimdienstlichen Zusammenarbeit. Der neunte Teil befasst sich mit den wichtigsten Kontroversen, die den Einigungsprozess begleitet haben, etwa über das vermeintliche „Demokratiedefizit“, die Frage einer „europäischen Identität“ oder die Existenz einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Im zehnten und letzten Teil wird die Frage nach dem Verhältnis zwischen EU und Mitgliedsstaaten noch einmal aufgegriffen, diesmal jedoch unter stärker theoretischem Blickwinkel, unter Überschriften wie „Europeanization“ oder „Politicization“.

Thematische Breite und inhaltliche Fülle des Handbuchs sind, um es zu wiederholen, wirklich beeindruckend, auch Historiker der europäischen Integration finden darin eine Vielzahl von wichtigen Details und methodisch-theoretischen Anregungen. Allenfalls die Dominanz der englischsprachigen Forschung in den einzelnen Beiträgen ließe sich monieren. Alles in allem also ein gelungenes, höchst hilfreiches Nachschlagewerk, keineswegs unkritisch im Urteil, aber doch von einer erfreulichen Grundsympathie für das europäische Projekt getragen.

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