

An Outpost of Atlanticism: Leonard Tennyson, the European Delegation in Washington and the Transformation of US-European Relations 1954-1974

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The formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was a unique event in the history of European inter-state relations, and for this reason it is understandable that from early on it needed to explain its purpose and goals to a wider public.¹ As some have noted, this was as much to explain the economics of integration as it was to contribute towards “the formation of a truly unified Europe”.² Already in 1952 a press and information service was established in Luxembourg under Jacques-René Rabier, and offices were soon created in other European cities to enable a close liaison with the media and wider public opinion. This would become the basis for the gradual expansion of information activities over the coming two decades, a process all the more remarkable because of the lack of an official mandate for an external information service in either the Paris or Rome treaties.³ This article explores an added dimension to the history of the information service, namely the development of the office in Washington DC under the leadership of Leonard Tennyson. Tennyson’s unique role, in terms of running the Third Country programme in the US and his promotion of a distinct Atlanticist perspective, deserves more attention in the history of EU information activities.

Tennyson’s involvement in explaining and promoting the goals of European integration in the United States began with the opening of the ECSC information office in Washington DC in 1953, and he remained in this position for more than twenty years. In doing so he worked through the transformation of US-Europe relations from the export of the American socio-economic model in the post-war decade, through the high point of Atlanticism in the early 1960s, to the increasing assertion of an alternative European model by the early 1970s. In that time Tennyson, an American with a remarkable dynamism and array of public relations skills, built up the Washington office into a vital part of the EC’s external relations

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1. M. DUMOULIN, *What Information Policy?*, in: M DUMOULIN (ed.), *The European Commission 1958-72: History and Memories*, European Commission, Brussels, 2007, pp.507-531. Online. Available at http://bookshop.europa.eu/eubookshop/FileCache/PUBPDF/KA7606187EN1/KA7606187EN1_002.pdf (accessed 16 June 2008).
 2. N.P. LUDLOW, *Frustrated Ambitions: The European Commission and the Formation of a European Identity, 1958-1967*, in: M.-Th. BITSCH, W. LOTH, R. POIDEVIN (eds.), *Institutions européennes et identités européennes*, Bruylant, Brussels, 1999, p.310.
 3. A. REINFELDT, *The High Authority of the ECSC and the “Atlantic Community” in the 1950s: The Information Office in Washington*, in: V. AUBOURG, G. SCOTT-SMITH (eds.), *European Community, Atlantic Community?*, Soleb, Paris, 2008; L. RYE, *The Origins of Community Information Policy: Educating Europeans*, in: W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), *The History of the European Union: Origins of as Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-1972*, Routledge, London, 2008, pp.148, 150.

infrastructure. Committed to the cause of European integration, Tennyson also sought close relations with the Ford Foundation during the 1960s to expand the networks of transatlantic interchange among policy professionals, academics, and journalists. In this way Tennyson fitted perfectly within US internationalist thinking that supported European integration but which sought ways “for safely containing the European Communities and their member states within an Atlantic framework”.⁴ Yet by the end of the 1960s the Atlanticist ideal of a community of shared values within a Euro-American economic, political, and security zone was no longer seen as a viable goal. Tennyson’s last years in the Washington office were dominated by a transition to a European-run operation expressing European concerns. His career as director, spokesperson and link-man for European interests in the United States therefore offers valuable insights not just into the intricacies of the EC information service’s transatlantic operations, but also into the changing perspectives on US-European relations from someone who played an important role in representing the EC to the American public.⁵

Developing a Role: The 1950s

Tennyson arrived in his position as European public relations front man due to concerns that US enthusiasm for the integration process was faltering in the early 1950s. While the launch of the Schuman Plan in 1950 and the treaty of Paris in 1951 had met with official US support, there were plenty of concerns over whether this development would lead to a European cartel opposed to free trade. The proposal of the Pleven Plan for a European army in October 1950 met with similar uncertainty in Washington.⁶ The delay in ratification of Pleven’s proposed European Defence Community did not improve matters, and in late 1952 Secretary of State Dean Acheson strongly recommended to the President of the ECSC’s High Authority, Jean Monnet, that the positive achievements of European integration be more widely publicised in the United States in order to maintain a sense of momentum. Above all, in order “to get full play in American magazines such as *Time*, *Newsweek*, *Life*, *Fortune*, etc., he emphasized that the publicity and information must be geared to the American scene”.⁷ Monnet turned to his close

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4. P. WINAND, *American Attitudes towards European Integration: Equal Partnerships with Europe, Old and New?*, in: P. MAGNETTE (ed.), *La Grande Europe*, Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Brussels, 2004), p.339.
 5. I would like to thank Ella Krucoff and Ingrid Rose for their valuable assistance with this research, and I am especially grateful to Noel Hoffman who granted me access to the papers of her father Leonard Tennyson.
 6. P. WINAND, *Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe*, St. Martins Press, New York, 1993, pp.22-23 and 26-27.
 7. Memorandum of Conversation by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 15 December 1952, in: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, Vol.VI, *Western Europe and Canada, Pt.I*, Dept. of State, Washington DC, 1986, p.257.

friend George Ball, then a partner with law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Ball, and formerly the legal representative for the French government's Supply Council concerning post-war aid and trade agreements.⁸ Ball agreed to help, and Cleary, Gottlieb were officially retained by the ECSC "to advise the High Authority on the Community's American problems" from 1st October 1953 onwards. The first six months were dominated by the manoeuvring in Washington to help secure a major loan for the ECSC, and it was only from April 1954 that the office began to develop a comprehensive programme for public information. It was agreed that Cleary, Gottlieb would be paid \$25,000 plus expenses per year for this service, an arrangement which could be reviewed at any time by either side.⁹ For this purpose Ball hired Leonard Tennyson as 'Information Representative', the person who would build the programme from the ground up.

Before joining Cleary, Gottlieb, Tennyson had worked for several years in the information field. As a press and radio journalist in Europe during the late 1940s, he joined the Labor Information Office of the European Cooperation Administration's Mission in Vienna in 1951 before becoming first the Labor Information Officer and then the chief of the Technical Education Division for the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) in Italy in 1952. By September 1953 he had moved again, this time to running promotional and press operations for the Crusade for Freedom, the fund-raising and publicity arm of the New York-based National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE).¹⁰ It was some time in early 1954 when George Ball brought Tennyson to Cleary, Gottlieb to take over everyday responsibility for the ECSC information programme. Tennyson was officially "a public relations consultant for certain accounts which require non-legal attention in fields of public relations and public affairs".¹¹ The first issue of the Bulletin for the European Community for Coal and Steel, drafted by Tennyson to provide up-to-date information for an informed American audience, appeared in October 1954.

Developing a successful information programme in the US was of vital importance considering the crucial role that American political and financial support could play in pushing the integration process forward. It was therefore ideal in this early stage to have this programme run by Americans attuned to the workings of the local political and media environment. Presenting the construction

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8. See D.L. DILEO, *Catch the Night Plane for Paris: George Ball and Jean Monnet*, in: C.P. HACKETT (ed.), *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and his US Supporters*, Jean Monnet Council, Washington DC, 1995.
 9. Papers of the EU Mission to the United States, Washington DC (hereafter 'DC'), Jean Monnet to George Ball, 20 March 1954; Report to the President of the High Authority on the European Coal and Steel Community in American Opinion, 10 February 1955.
 10. Tennyson became involved in NCFE activities through his contact with the former ECA Special Representative W. Averell Harriman, and he would also act as Harriman's speechwriter in this period. See R. ABRAMSON, *Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman 1891-1986*, William Morrow, New York, 1992, pp.503-515.
 11. Leonard Tennyson papers (hereafter 'LT'), Austria File, Tennyson to Hans Thalberg, 21 January 1955.

of Europe in the *lingua franca* of American political experience (a constitution, federalism, the separation of powers) was also of great importance.¹² Tennyson was part of a small team under Ball's direction at Cleary, Gottlieb to run the ECSC Information Office, but from February 1955 he occupied a separate office and was the only full-time staff member on this project. In the circumstances Monnet and the High Authority decided it was "of little short-run importance that the average American should know about the Community. The important thing was to educate those who could take or influence specific action for or against the interests of the Community". The 'machinery' enlisted to achieve this consisted of a monthly newsletter (the Bulletin), the establishment of contacts with academics and universities, the preparation of briefing materials and special briefing sessions for selected journalists, the furnishing of material on ECSC to congressmen, and the organising of lecture tours by either Community visitors or team members themselves.¹³ This was in line with EC information strategy through the 1950s and 1960s, which focused largely on "un public de 'leaders' d'opinion" in the media, academia, and politics.¹⁴ Nevertheless thought was also given to ways to reach out to the wider American public over the longer term, such as by creating and distributing information kits to be used by High School teachers in the classroom.

Despite the size of the task for the EC, Tennyson still ran other projects while he was at Cleary, Gottlieb. These included drafting a plan for an expanded French public relations campaign in the United States based upon the monthly newsletter *France Actuelle* which provided economic information for potential US investors (and which had originally been created by George Ball).¹⁵ Contacts from Tennyson's ECA/MSA days also proved useful, as with a plan for a public relations campaign to attract American investment to Austria in 1955, and a proposal for a similar investment drive in Italy on behalf of the Confindustria in 1956. In that same year he was approached by USIA over the possible development of a large-scale exhibit on US political and economic freedoms to tour Latin America, entitled 'Johnny Freedom'. In each of these ventures Tennyson displayed an incisive experience of the public relations craft, referring to the necessity of defining and dissecting client needs and target audiences before the first step be made.¹⁶

Correspondence suggests that in 1956 Tennyson was still considering incorporating his own public relations business alongside his tasks with the

12. See A. REINFELDT, op.cit., pp.121-129.

13. DC, Report to the President of the High Authority on the European Coal and Steel Community in American Opinion, 10 February 1955.

14. N.P. LUDLOW, *Frustrated Ambitions* ..., op.cit., p.315. See also L. RYE, op.cit., p.154.

15. J.A. BILL, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in US Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997, p.41.

16. LT, Folder France Actuelle: A Public Relations Program for the Comite France Actuelle; Tennyson to Bertrand Hommey, 30 September 1954; Folder Austria: Tennyson to Hans Thalberg (Press Attache, Austrian embassy), 21 January 1955; Folder Confindustria: Tennyson to Antonio Pedinelli (Confindustria), 23 May 1956; USIA File, Johnny Freedom Exhibit Proposal; Tennyson to Michael Barjansky (Chief, Exhibits Development Branch, USIA).

ECSC.¹⁷ But this was not to last. In mid-1955 the High Authority placed the Information Service in Washington on the same budgetary footing as other ECSC bureaux in Bonn, Paris and Rome, confirming the permanent nature of what was initially a trial-run operation.¹⁸ Around this time Tennyson must have become a full-time employee of the ECSC, and the development of the Euratom negotiations, coupled with the eventual signing of the treaties of Rome, saw him take on expanded responsibilities as head of the Information Service in Washington. In January 1958 it was decided to develop the ECSC information apparatus into a Joint Service for the ECSC, the European Economic Community (EEC), and Euratom. Commenting on the task ahead, Tennyson noted that “today, Europe faces the need to explain its own revolution to Americans and to other peoples throughout the world”. But the increasing scale of European integration also brought with it specific demands, a task for which Tennyson would devote the best part of the following decade to realising, as he himself recognised in 1958:

“[T]he external relations of the Communities over the long term will depend for their effectiveness upon wide acceptance and realization of Community objectives as furthering mutual interests within the Western Alliance. Thus, for example, opposition to Community policy arising out of short-term economic measures may only be countered by stress upon the political solidarity of the Communities as an invaluable long-term asset in the Western Community”.¹⁹

Building an Atlantic Community: Working with the Ford Foundation in the Early 1960s

Between 1958 and 1961 the Joint Service was plagued by inter-executive rivalries and a stagnant budget as the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliamentary Assembly attempted to assert greater control over the information apparatus, and it was only in 1961-62 that these struggles were overcome and a settled arrangement agreed upon.²⁰ By that time, the importance of a successful Third Country programme in relation to the United States was fully recognised, and the determination to develop the Washington DC office’s presence in the US was indicated by its move in early 1963 from Cleary, Gottlieb’s Southern building to the Farragut Building on Farragut Square. In early 1961 George Ball had entered the State Department as under secretary of State for economic affairs, and it was therefore appropriate that the Information Office affirm more of an independent

17. LT, USIA File, Mrs. McMenamin (Information Service) to Tennyson, 31 July 1956.

18. DC, Programme d’information pour les Etats-Unis; Extrait du procès-verbal de la 279^e séance de la Haute Autorité du 27 juillet 1955.

19. Memorandum (by Tennyson) on Aspects of a Third Country Information Program, 25 February 1958, quoted in: A. REINFELDT, *op.cit.*

20. See M. DUMOULIN, *op.cit.*, pp.509-511; L. RYE, *op.cit.*, pp.150-153.

identity.²¹ By this stage extra staff were being hired to build up the library and extend its outreach activities with the provision of information.²² It was precisely in this period that Tennyson set out to develop channels for the further development of US-European cooperation.

Some time prior to 1962 Tennyson made the acquaintance of Shepard Stone, who had been the head of International Affairs (US and Europe) at the Ford Foundation since 1954. As is well known, Stone was a committed Atlanticist who had fought hard during the 1950s to build up Ford commitment to projects that would strengthen the ties between the United States and Europe. The creation of the EEC and Euratom in 1957 heightened the need for the kind of ‘transnational institution building’ that Stone was seeking, and he was also keen to foster cross-border cooperation within Europe in key (American-dominated) sectors such as management training and business administration. Stone’s budget for International Affairs grew accordingly from \$5.7m in 1958 to \$10m in 1963.²³ In late 1961 Stone drafted a forward-looking report (‘Program Submission Concerning Future Program Activities’) which included a call “to establish an Atlantic Foundation [...] to support the development of the Atlantic Community in the next decade”.²⁴ The approach of the Ford Foundation in these years fitted perfectly with the thrust of the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations to achieve Atlantic unity in fundamental policy areas.

“In the 1960s, the astonishing acceleration of European recovery forced the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to consider that the final victory of the market economy, which Washington had to pursue together with the goal of strengthening American leadership based on military paramouncy and US pre-eminence in the world monetary and trade systems, needed a policy of friendly interdependence, not of counterproductive rivalry, with America’s transatlantic partners”.²⁵

But there were increasing obstacles to overcome. During 1962 the Dillon Round of GATT talks had been stumbling along, and the introduction of the Common Agriculture Policy’s variable levy system in July would lead directly to the ‘chicken war’ fiasco during November. Ball and others in the administration were preparing to lobby hard for the Trade Expansion Bill to pass through Congress. It was a critical phase in which American opinion was sensing that the EEC might become more of an inward-looking competitor than an

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21. M.D. MOSETTIG, *Building European Ties*, in: *Europe*, Special Issue 1995, p.6. Claery, Gottlieb would remain on a retainer as the legal representatives for the ECSC/EEC until a conflict of interest forced them to withdraw from this role in the 1970s.
 22. Alma Dauman was hired to establish the library, and she was joined by Ella Krucoff in 1962. Phyllis Tomlinson, the widow of Monnet’s friend, US foreign service officer Tom Tomlinson, ran the administration.
 23. V.R. BERGHAIN, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001, pp.178-187, 209-211.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
 25. M. GUDERZO, *Johnson and European Integration: A Missed Chance for Transatlantic Power*, in: *Cold War History*, January(2004), p.93.

outward-looking partner. Alongside these deliberations were the increasing difficulties within NATO on nuclear strategy and the Multilateral Force.²⁶

When in early 1962 Tennyson began to draft plans for various measures to increase US-EEC professional interchange, the circumstances were therefore very favourable. His first proposal, which he floated in January as a possible venture for the emerging Atlantic Foundation idea, concerned an internship programme for highly qualified young Americans to spend six to eight months in the institutions in Brussels. Such an experience was meant as a primer for future careers either in government or education, since Tennyson lamented the serious lack of experts in the State Department who understood the Community position well (“there are five, or at the most, six persons with the necessary requirements, and perhaps an equal number in the academic world”).²⁷ He followed this up, in response to requests which he had received from around the US, with a proposal for a post-graduate summer seminar on US-EEC relations, to be conducted by Community officials at an American university. The seminar, aiming for between 50 to 75 participants, would allow both high-grade students and lecturers to keep up-to-date on the latest developments of a rapidly changing environment.²⁸ Stone reacted favourably to these plans, and Tennyson picked up further backing from Commission president Walter Hallstein, influential Harvard International Relations professor Robert Bowie, and from within the State Department itself. By June he had drafted a whole array of proposals “within the Atlantic framework”, leading him to write to Stone that he “would very much like to work out a consulting arrangement with you to help bring these projects into fruition”.²⁹ Alongside the internship programme and the summer seminar, Tennyson ambitiously put forward a broad array of proposals covering the following: an historical anthology of writings on European unification; an agency to arrange short-term lectureships for European experts on integration at American universities; an Atlantic Community Student Assembly to stimulate interest in the role of the Organisation for European Cooperation and Development (OECD); a study of Soviet reactions to the formation of the EEC and the implications for future economic cooperation; and top-level conferences covering long-range economic planning and energy policy in the Atlantic area.³⁰

Financially speaking, the chances of success for Tennyson’s bid were good, since the estimated total cost for these ventures was only \$250,000. Nevertheless, despite his close relations with Shepard Stone, Tennyson faced a crowded field and increasing competition to secure funding for EEC- and Atlantic-related projects. A survey by the Carnegie Endowment identified fifteen major research centres and academic institutes across the USA that were involved in ongoing research in this

26. P. WINAND, *Eisenhower, Kennedy ...*, op.cit., pp.173-190, 222-243, 298-302.

27. Tennyson already had support for the proposal from among others Max Kohnstamm. LT, Ford Foundation 1964 File, Tennyson to B. von Staden (chef de cabinet to Commission President Hallstein); Tennyson to Stone, 25 January 1962.

28. LT, Ford Foundation 1964 File, Tennyson to J. Robert Schaetzel, 19 March 1962.

29. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Stone, 22 June 1962.

30. *Ibid.*, Proposals for European Community and Atlantic Affairs Projects, 22 June 1962.

area, and a further ten in Western Europe.³¹ In July 1962 it was announced that Ford had awarded \$900,000 to the Council on Foreign Relations for two studies on the development of Atlantic policies and institutions and on the international role of the People's Republic of China.³² However, Tennyson's position improved from a proposer to an insider when he secured leave from the Information Service for a 30-day consultancy with the Ford Foundation through November-December 1962, with the task of establishing a set of objective criteria to evaluate existing and potential philanthropic projects.³³

Two reports exist from Tennyson's consultancy with the Ford. The first, under the name of Stone's deputy Joseph Slater, sketches the need to develop frameworks for cooperation at the Atlantic level, a process that would include

“to help develop and support the leadership elements among various segments of the society required for an effective partnership [and] to prevent negative ‘third force’ and other elements which would distort the positive purposes of the Atlantic partnership or create new undesirable tensions”.

Aiming to stimulate economic, scientific, and institution-building ventures, it proposed forming a committee of Atlantic notables such as Jean Monnet, Ford Foundation chairman John J. McCloy, former British ambassador to the United States Oliver Franks, and former NATO secretary general Paul Henri Spaak to administer a minimum budget of \$100m.³⁴ The second draft report is from Tennyson, and offers an insight into his thinking in this area. The draft comments that the concept of Atlantic Partnership was an outgrowth of post-war agreements and organisations such as NATO, the EEC, and the OECD, which now presented the basis both for a greater coherence of policies and the merging of resources to achieve broader results in East-West relations and the Third World. Significantly, while government could lay the foundations,

“it is the proper role of the private sector (the FF) [Ford Foundation] to help pioneer areas in which the concept can be more widely used as an instrument, thus making possible the acceptance of responsibility by the public and governmental sector for action in new fields”.

The report outlined several challenges, dealing with the specific need to dismantle trade restrictions to the broader lack of effective political instruments for Atlantic-wide decision-making. Essential in this respect was the development of an Atlantic consciousness as the new norm for political action, requiring a “cadre of technicians, civil servants, and decision-makers who focus on problems today within the context of the Atlantic Partnership”. To manage this transition an institute was needed to act as central clearing house and initiator of projects to ensure better coordination. Possible Atlantic Partnership initiatives to encourage

31. *Ibid.*, Current Research on the European Economic Community, NATO, and the Atlantic Community, 1 November 1962, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

32. *Ibid.*, Ford Foundation grant for Studies of Atlantic Policy and of Communist China, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 July 1962.

33. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Stone and Joseph Slater, 25 October 1962; Tennyson to Slater, 7 November 1962.

34. *Ibid.*, Ford Foundation Program in Support of the Atlantic Partnership, 29 November 1962.

economic cooperation included a Legal Institute, Economic Programming Institute, Committee on Energy Policy, Institute for Atlantic Statistics, Resources for Development Institute and an East-West Trade Committee. Within this far more ambitious framework, Tennyson's original proposals for internships, summer seminars, and conferences now came under a second heading covering the development of human resources.³⁵

However, the overarching aim for a Ford Foundation-sponsored body to oversee the whole field was impractical and asked too much. The number of different projects already functioning acted as a natural centripetal force against the Ford's attempts at centralisation. Whether Tennyson's temporary consultancy led directly to any results is unclear. He remained closely involved through 1963 in pursuing particular projects, such as the National Planning Association's bid for a large-scale, multinational study of the methods, objectives and implications of economic planning in the USA and Western Europe.³⁶ But Tennyson also continued to search for a direct involvement in the study of Atlantic cooperation. The spectre of Gaullism was now adding a further dimension to the developing relations between the US and the EEC. In a letter to congressman Gerald Ford in mid-1964 Tennyson lambasted de Gaulle's vision of a Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals':

"It is a Europe that without the deep and consistent commitment of the United States could result in a Europe dominated, at least strategically, by the Soviet Union [...]. president de Gaulle seeks to isolate Europe from the contamination of US policies, to deny the viability of the Atlantic Alliance and the reality of the thousands of ties that link Europe and the United States together".³⁷

Following up on his consultancy work, Tennyson pursued two projects in 1964. Firstly, he presented a proposal for a Center for North Atlantic Studies to be created at the American University's School of International Service in Washington DC, where he had been a part-time lecturer in political science since 1960. Secondly, in June 1964 he submitted a formal request for a Ford Foundation study grant, to cover the period October 1964 to September 1965. Tennyson started with two premises: that European economic and political unity was a necessity; and that likewise there existed a "requirement of functional unity among the Atlantic nations and adjacent neighbors" that would lead to common policy formulation and implementation. To achieve this he proposed conducting an in-depth review of US policies towards Europe as seen from the side of the EEC. Accepting that there could be a discrepancy between the US concept of its own policies and how those

35. He also put forward the idea for a European Parliament delegation to visit the Congress in order to strengthen the ties between the two assemblies. This eventually occurred in 1972 thanks to the initiative of congressmen Ben Rosenthal and Donald Fraser. See G. SCOTT-SMITH, *Mending the "Unhinged Alliance" in the 1970s: Transatlantic Relations, Public Diplomacy, and the Founding of the European Union Visitors Programme*, in: *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 16 (December 2005), pp. 749-778.

36. The NPA had been Tennyson's envisioned partner in his long-range economic planning conference proposal. LT, Ford Foundation 1964 File, *Achieving the Objectives of the Atlantic Community Countries through Public and Private Planning*, National Planning Association, 15 July 1963; Theodore Geiger (director of International Studies) to Tennyson, 25 September 1963.

37. LT, 1964 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Ford, 31 July 1964.

policies might be perceived across the Atlantic, he wanted to gauge the reactions to and consequences of this gap through interviews with young European professionals. Once again, Tennyson focused on the need to make contact with emerging European leaders in the universities, government bureaucracies, and international organisations who represented a new generation with different views. To facilitate this study, a residence at the Atlantic Institute in Paris would allow travel around Europe. The end product was to be “a constructive critical analysis of US policy in Europe and of US policy affecting Europe in the form either of a series of monographs or as a single book”. Tennyson had paved the way for a year’s leave of absence from the Information Service during a six-week trip to Europe in April-May. In July his request was accepted by the Foundation.³⁸ During the rest of the summer he made preparations for his new task, in particular arranging visits to Harvard’s Center for International Affairs to discuss his plans with Robert Bowie, professor Raymond Vernon, and visiting German scholar Karl Kaiser.

However great his ambitions were and however determined he set out to achieve the goals of his Ford grant, Tennyson was unable to fulfil his proposal. Only fragments of his book project remain in his papers. A brief outline, listing the main points, for a work entitled ‘The Europeans’ (presumably the tentative title of one of his intended monographs) sets out a practical agenda to be covered. Notes exist of interviews conducted in December 1964 – January 1965 with among others Commission executive secretary Emile Noël, Agriculture commissioner Sicco Mansholt’s deputy chef de cabinet Georges Rencki, and Hallstein’s chef de cabinet Karl-Heinz Narjes. Correspondence suggests that he spent a good deal of time at the Atlantic Institute and Jean Duroselle’s Ford-funded Centre d’Etude des Relations Internationales situated in the Institut d’Etudes Politiques. But by March 1965, with problems escalating around the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) talks, the Commission was already demanding his return to Washington. Delays in the bureaucracy meant Tennyson could remain in Paris until mid-June, but the result was the same – he was forced to return to the United States with notebooks and unfinished articles in tow.³⁹ As a result, his ambitions with the Ford Foundation ultimately did not produce many concrete results.

Tennyson left Paris at a time of serious malaise in Atlantic and European affairs. At the end of June the French announced their withdrawal from the discussions on the financing of the CAP and their rejection of the attempt by Hallstein and the Commission to attain greater autonomy over the EEC budget.⁴⁰ The ‘empty chair’ scenario would drag on into 1966, leading Tennyson to describe the situation in an article on the Community as “the most severe crisis the EEC has experienced since its establishment”.⁴¹ Meanwhile the Kennedy Round of GATT talks still had to

38. LT, Ford Foundation 1964 File, Tennyson to Stone & Slater, 18 June 1964; Tennyson to Philip Mettger (director, Governmental Affairs Institute), 21 July 1964.

39. LT, 1965 Miscellaneous Correspondence File, Tennyson to Stone and Slater, 21 May 1965.

40. See N.P. LUDLOW, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge*, Routledge, London, 2006, pp.40-70.

41. L. TENNYSON, *The European Economic Community 1965*, in: *Living History of the World: 1965 Yearbook*, Stravon, New York, 1966.

crack the toughest nut of agricultural trade, and US foreign policy towards Vietnam and the Dominican Republic were causing serious resentment in Europe. Tennyson's last report to Stone and Slater included this sombre assessment:

“It is hard at this stage to assess the damage done, for some period of time, to American leadership of the West in international affairs. Most European countries will be forced to follow the US, like it or not, for the various reasons that have created their dependency. But it is fair to say that the recent events have cooled sentiments in Europe toward new forms of political partnership in the Atlantic sphere”.⁴²

In these circumstances Tennyson did everything he could to ensure smooth transatlantic relations at the top levels of government, despite operating on a limited budget.⁴³ The regular visits of ranking officials from Europe, which in early 1964 had included Sicco Mansholt, Walter Hallstein, and Hallstein's chef de cabinet Karl Heinz Narjes, allowed him to arrange meetings and luncheons for them at Atlanticist institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations, Ford Foundation, and Harvard's Center for International Studies. At the same time he assembled “some twenty people who are professionally involved in one capacity or another in European and Atlantic economic and political affairs” for brainstorm sessions on the handling of transatlantic difficulties.⁴⁴ Tennyson also introduced one member of this group, deputy assistant secretary of State for Atlantic Affairs J. Robert Schaetzel, to the Aspen Institute in Colorado, an indication of the scale of his personal network at this time.⁴⁵ Alongside these manoeuvres Tennyson passed on lists of worthwhile European candidates (“good ‘investments’”) for the State Department's foreign leader program, which issued invitations to influential individuals abroad for tours around the United States.⁴⁶ The extent of his involvement with the program is demonstrated by his contribution to the six-week leader trip of Emile Noël in 1965. Tennyson outlined a whole day-by-day plan

42. LT, 1965 Miscellaneous Correspondence File, Some Notes on the American Scene, 21 May 1965.

43. The budget for representation by the Washington office was only \$1200 in 1964, a hopelessly inadequate figure. LT, 1964 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Narjes, 6 July 1964.

44. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Mansholt, 7 February 1964. Tennyson invited Mansholt to speak to the group during his visit to the US in March 1964 for an off-the-record ‘frank exchange’ that could loosen up the obstacles surrounding the agricultural trade question within the Kennedy Round.

45. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Robert Murray (Program Director, Aspen Institute), 11 March 1964. Schaetzel went on to become US ambassador to the European Communities from 1966-72 and became increasingly active in developing and promoting channels of transatlantic cooperation, including the formation of an Aspen Institute in West Berlin. See V.R. BERGHAHN, *op.cit.*, pp. 276-277; R. SCHAETZEL, *The Unhinged Alliance: America and the European Community*, Harper & Row, New York, 1976.

46. LT, 1964 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to George Kaplan (Bureau of European Affairs, State Department), 14 January 1964. The impression of the Washington office was that “leader grants seemed to be going to Community people at random rather than for good reason”. Most of his recommendations were indeed acted upon. The minutes from Tennyson's first Washington-New York staff meeting after his return indicate his belief that Leader grants were essential “to promote Atlantic unity” and his determination to “get in touch with Schaetzel to increase quota for Europeans”. LT, 1965 Correspondence File, Summary of Washington-New York Staff Meeting, 29 June 1965. On the history and functioning of the Program see G. SCOTT-SMITH, *Networks of Empire: The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950-70*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2008.

including the officials Noël should meet in Washington and his trip out West to take in the Aspen Institute, Berkeley and Stanford Universities, RAND, CalTech, the University of Texas, and back East to the Council on Foreign Relations, MIT, and Harvard.⁴⁷

Running the Washington Office: The Mid-1960s

Tennyson may have been concerned about the transatlantic relationship, but during this period he built the Washington office into a vital organisation offering a variety of services. Alongside the provision of an expansive library and a public information bureau on European affairs, the office ran speaking tours for Europeans in the US (making use of the Council on Foreign Relations and World Affairs Council networks), and established close relations with Congress and the US press corps to ensure maximum coverage when top-level EC officials crossed the Atlantic. Tennyson also organised the EC pavilions at the Seattle (1962) and Montreal (1967) world fairs. In particular, the office also fulfilled a diplomacy-style two-way function by providing a steady stream of useful information on US policy developments back to Brussels.⁴⁸

However, on a more prosaic level 1964-65 was also a difficult period as new demands brought new problems. Mike Mossetig's brief 1995 history of the Information Service in Washington reports that "‘free-wheeling’ was the word that came out most in describing the early office, a group of Americans used to operating without hierarchy and an ocean removed from their ostensible supervisors" in Europe.⁴⁹ This may well be a truthful reflection of Tennyson's flexible, open-office management approach. His replacement during his 1964-65 stay in Paris, Gianfranco Speranza, later remarked with enthusiasm how "the atmosphere in your office is really something extraordinary, and I certainly did not find anything comparable during my working experiences [sic]".⁵⁰ Yet by the early 1960s serious problems were arising concerning the lines of communication, division of responsibility, and hierarchy within the Washington – Brussels information network, and even within the USA itself. In early 1964 a New York information office to deal with the UN and the local business community was opened under the leadership of the Luxemburger Marcel Mart, a former Groupe du porte-parole official with the High Authority in Luxembourg.⁵¹ Tennyson was

47. LT, 1965 Correspondence File, Tennyson to Noel, 13 July 1965.

48. Ella Krucoff, interview with the author, Washington DC, 10 April 2004.

49. M. MOSETTIG, *op.cit.*, p.6.

50. LT, 1966 EEC Correspondence File, Speranza to Tennyson, 29 April 1966. Speranza was the first European deputy for Tennyson. It was the norm up till then to hire locals for the information offices to reduce salary costs, but Tennyson wanted someone who knew how the institutions in Brussels worked so that he could delegate more.

51. LT, 1964 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Narjes, 6 July 1964.

always on the look-out for competent staff on his trips through Europe and made a special effort to hand-pick his deputies to pave the way for good working relations. But by early 1965, with Tennyson away in Paris, Mart's determination to develop his own role and act alone was causing problems and embarrassment for the Washington staff.⁵² Tennyson's absence was a problem and his return in June was essential to pull the operation together once more.⁵³

On the transatlantic level the problems were more serious. The ever-more-intricate negotiations on agricultural policy and the minimal direct contact between the Commission and de Gaulle, which complicated Community business, made it imperative for Tennyson to have up-to-the-minute information for his American audience. Yet his demands that this be met began to cause friction with a Commission information service already stretched to the limit. It had been Tennyson's initiative during the Kennedy Round of GATT talks to have a specific contact person working with the Commission's spokespersons, the *Groupe du porte parole*, to ensure both a steady flow of information to his Washington office and briefings for the US press in Brussels.⁵⁴ From 1961-65 this was the American Bob Dorang, and although this relationship worked in the beginning, a tense exchange of letters took place between Tennyson and Dorang in late 1964. The problem concerned the need for the Washington office to stay up-to-date on developments in Brussels decision-making. With Tennyson calling for a separate American desk outside of the *Groupe*, Dorang countered by pointing out that there was already resistance to having 'third country nationals' around and that as an American he had since mid-1964 been excluded from attending Council meetings due to the sensitivity of the policy matters discussed. However, Dorang did recognise the importance of Tennyson's concerns:

"With a limited staff, you already are serving a population greater than that of the Common Market states. Additionally, you have in the US the international organization audience. In terms of sheer interest, no third country manifests so much toward the Common Market as the US does. The US is the country whose foreign policy is based in large part on the realization of a European, then an Atlantic, Community. The great instrument for this realization is the Kennedy Round. Thus the period is unusual, the demand is unusual, both for you and the other American who is trying to cater to US information needs on the spot in Brussels, namely myself".⁵⁵

52. LT, 1965 Correspondence File, Van Dyk to Mart, 7 January 1965; van Dyk to Weil, 17 February 1965. Mart had progressed with an initiative to officially link up European Parliamentarians with the US Congress without any clearance from either the Washington office or the State Department. Ted van Dyk, who preceded Speranza as Tennyson's main deputy, also suspected Mart of "a latent anti-Americanism which crops up periodically".

53. One indication of the increased workload and demand being faced by the Washington office at this time is the fact that Tennyson was forced to decline his position as professorial lecturer at the American University in Washington DC for 1965-66, a position he had fulfilled with enthusiasm during 1960-64. LT, 1965 Correspondence File, Dean Bray to Tennyson, 1 June 1965; Tennyson to Bray, 28 June 1965.

54. Ella Krucoff, interview with the author, Washington DC, 10 April 2004.

55. LT, 1964 Personal Correspondence File, Dorang to Tennyson, 2 January 1964.

The Tennyson-Doran fall-out represented in microcosm the strains that were beginning to test the US-Europe relationship by this time, when threats to US farm exports were causing Americans to look increasingly warily across the Atlantic to consider “is the child really a ‘monster’?”⁵⁶ This put the Washington office in a very awkward position. Gordon Weil, who worked in the office during 1963-64, later explained that it was not such an anomaly the office was staffed by Americans because “it was based on the idea that it was in the interest of the United States to have a community [...]. We were clearly there to support what US foreign policy was”.⁵⁷ By the mid-1960s, however, Europe was developing, albeit through a tortuous process, its own identity and its own policies, just as the United States under president Lyndon Johnson became more preoccupied elsewhere.⁵⁸

By 1966 Tennyson seems to have lost some of his earlier enthusiasm for running the Washington office. A letter to Bob Dorang reveals how “once I get back to Europe I may not want to come back to Washington again – ever”.⁵⁹ The standstill and confusion caused by the France-Commission conflict and de Gaulle’s rejection of an expanding supranationalism was certainly one reason. Another was that he became increasingly involved in trying to resolve staffing questions. Running the small Washington office in his own unique style made it essential for Tennyson to secure the services of those who he could work closely with in a mutually profitable way. However, it was not always so simple to achieve this. Marcel Mart left New York in March, and Tennyson’s first choice, his Washington deputy Gianfranco Speranza, decided instead to return to a job in Rome. To replace Speranza with “the ‘right man’”, Tennyson made a determined effort to secure Franz Froschmaier, then working with Directorate General for Competition in Brussels.⁶⁰ Tennyson’s lobbying with Narjes, the Information Service director Jacques-René Rabier and others did pay off, but Froschmaier ended up staying for only 18 months despite Tennyson pleading that “less than two years would be a waste of time”.⁶¹ Meanwhile the demands of distributing posts according to nationality within the EEC meant the New York office post became a ‘political football’ and, after some delay, went not to Tennyson’s candidate, the German Bernd Dreesman, but to the Italian Ciarnelli. At the end of the year Tennyson ran

56. *Ibid.*, Dorang to Ted van Dyk (DC office), 4 January 1964. Dorang resigned at the end of February 1965. Tennyson tried to secure John Newhouse from the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as his replacement, but Newhouse instead went to work at the Atlantic Institute in Paris. Instead the position was held by Gordon Weil (1965-1966) and Steve Friedberg (1966-1968).

57. Gordon Weil, quoted in M. MOSETTIG, *op.cit.* See online version, available <http://www.eurunion.org/delegati/history.htm> (accessed 26 June 2008).

58. See T. A. SCHWARTZ, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2003, especially pp.234-236.

59. LT, 1966 EEC Correspondence File, Tennyson to Dorang, 6 January 1966.

60. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Narjes, 7 January 1966.

61. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Froschmaier, 21 February 1966. Tennyson was able to replace Froschmaier with another hand-picked candidate, Alessandro Silj, an official with Euratom who had been a fellow at the Harvard Center for International Affairs (where Tennyson first met him). Silj stayed until March 1970, to be replaced by another Tennyson choice, Dutchman Guy Vanhaeverbeke.

into difficulties once again with the American position on the Groupe du Porte Parole. In 1964 Bob Dorang had been followed by Gordon Weil from the Washington office, but in 1966 Weil's replacement Steve Freidberg ran into bureaucratic trouble in Brussels over his appointment. The delay meant that Tennyson had to face a period with no American (or, coincidentally, British) representative on the Groupe to deal with the US press and operate as a channel of information.⁶²

By the end of 1966 the tenor of transatlantic relations had altered dramatically. Charles De Gaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO's military command in March of that year had set the tone. A Department of State briefing paper for the National Security Council in May 1967 made the following succinct point:

“[D]uring the previous two or three years relations with Western Europe had suffered great strain: trade controversies, offset divergences, non-proliferation suspicions, French challenges to NATO and attacks against the dollar, unease in Europe because of the Vietnam war, and discontent in the US over the reluctance of the Atlantic partners to share global management burdens”.⁶³

De Gaulle's second veto on British EEC membership in November 1967 confirmed the “undercurrents of scepticism about the goal and destiny of European integration and construction”.⁶⁴ In a letter to Narjes in early 1967 Tennyson gave his own views on the changing circumstances. The troubles had led to a slow-down in business for the Washington office, there even being serious indecision over what to organise in the name of the Six to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the treaty of Rome.⁶⁵ On the American side Lyndon Johnson's declaration of a shift in US attention away from Europe towards “a more balanced global policy” was illustrated by the fact that “there aren't many outstanding ‘Europe hands’ left in important places in the State Department these days”.⁶⁶ The mood in Washington was grim on the chances of rescuing the Kennedy Round (which did finally culminate, against the odds, in a successful agreement on 30 June 1967).⁶⁷ What is more, Tennyson had received clear indications of the changing attitude of the Ford Foundation:

“It is quite apparent that the Ford Foundation, once the strongest bastion of support for US-European undertakings, is moving away from any particular concentration on European matters. Rather it appears that from now on, support of various projects in Europe will be on an *ad hoc* rather than a long-range policy basis. This is due, in

62. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Jean Rey, 4 November 1966. Friedberg would be the last US representative on the Groupe.

63. M. GUDERZO, *op.cit.*, p.99.

64. *Ibid.* p. 97.

65. This is interesting considering the French insistence during 1963-64 to increase Third Country information programmes at the expense of educating the European publics about integration. See N.P. LUDLOW, *Frustrated Ambitions ...*, *op.cit.*, pp.323-324; M. DUMOULIN, *op.cit.*, p.516.

66. LT, 1967 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Narjes, 2 February 1967. The only exception was the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Leddy (soon to be replaced by Deane Hinton).

67. T.A. SCHWARTZ, *op.cit.*, pp.169-174.

part, to the departure of [John] McCloy from the board and the appearance of [president McGeorge] Bundy and [vice-president David] Bell. Bell, in particular, has been in most of his professional life concerned with problems in developing countries and simply doesn't have the feel for European affairs".⁶⁸

Tennyson was quite right in his assessment. Bundy instigated a severe cut-back in Ford expenditures in an attempt to recover from the excessive outlays of the previous decade, and the promotion of European integration was no longer at the top of the agenda. McCloy's departure removed Shepard Stone's most important ally on the Foundation's board and signalled a significant changing of the guard and of direction. With the writing on the wall, by the end of 1967 Stone had left his position as head of International Affairs.⁶⁹ Tennyson therefore lost a close ally for his Atlanticist schemes. In May 1967 he was one of the principal organisers of a major conference co-sponsored by the American University and Johns Hopkins-SAIS that sought to highlight and promote graduate-level area studies and research programmes focused on the European and Atlantic regions. Top-level American universities participated: Harvard, Rutgers, Pennsylvania, Georgetown, Virginia, Duke, George Washington, Virginia, Columbia, and Princeton. This was typical of the kind of initiative that Tennyson wanted to pursue with Stone and the Ford Foundation during 1962-64, and fitted with Ford's previous interest in promoting Atlanticist thinking for Atlanticist solutions. Yet the Foundation, a logical choice to back such a venture, was not involved.

'Europeanisation': The Late 1960s / Early 1970s

The cooling of transatlantic relations from the previous enthusiasm and optimism entered a new phase in the late 1960s as the Community, dealing with its own internal questions, began at the same time to gradually assert its own institutional and international identity. An important aspect of this process was the issue of the Community's representation with its most important partner in the world, the United States.⁷⁰ As mentioned above, the fact that the Information Service in Washington had been staffed predominantly by Americans may have been prosaically a matter of money, but it had also been in perfect tune with the fact that European integration was considered a basic pursuit of US foreign policy from the Marshall Plan onwards. By the late 1960s this assumption could no longer be so easily made, and it was apparent that the EEC needed to come out from under the shadow of an all-encompassing US foreign policy by presenting its own identity and purpose. Inevitably this would have profound implications for Tennyson's

68. LT, 1967 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Narjes, 2 February 1967.

69. V.R. BERGHAIN, *op.cit.*, pp. 250-253.

70. Thus Piers Ludlow refers to the GATT talks during the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds and other activities as 'vital stages in the Commission's emergence as an international actor of some note, N.P. LUDLOW, *Frustrated Ambitions* ..., *op.cit.*, p.309.

position and status, both from the point of view of the Americans and the Europeans. Guy Vanhaeverbeke, a Dutch official with the Economic and Social Committee in Brussels who Tennyson hired in 1970 for the Washington office, recalled the following:

“Nobody who knew Leonard Tennyson would contest that he was extremely valuable. He had very good relations with the American press, and he was not at all bureaucratically-minded, he was very straight-forward. At some point, and I can testify to this, it became a little strange to hear an American defend European standpoints vis-à-vis the American press, the American administration, the American business world, American universities, and there was a genuine feeling – and he understood that – that he needed a European accent, whether German Italian or Belgian, you know. So at some point the feeling that a deputy would not suffice and that the real boss of the Information section of the delegation should be a European”.⁷¹

In December 1967, following the creation of DG X for Press and Information a month earlier, the embassies of the Six in Washington together recommended to the Commission that it establish its own representation to do business directly with the US government. Tennyson was involved at the highest levels, having been a party to the initial discussions in Brussels during autumn 1967 with new Commission president Jean Rey.⁷² His suggestion was not for a “haut fonctionnaire” position, which would inevitably become embroiled in diplomatic shenanigans, but for a “technical delegation” made up of specialists able to deal with the intricacies of transatlantic issues.⁷³ Tennyson’s argument for this distinction was that a proposal for a diplomatic presence was only going to hold up the necessary upgrading of the Community’s presence in Washington. As expected, French Foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville vetoed the combined recommendation of the Six’s embassies. Instead, the Commission could send technical specialists for limited periods without needing to request approval from the Six governments.⁷⁴ Before long the implications of this issue, to do with the transition of the EEC from hybrid organisation to official international actor, began to be very apparent. Whereas Tennyson and his Washington office colleagues had occasionally joined meetings between visiting Community officials and their State Department counterparts, the Department began to insist that these meetings be closed. Tennyson complained that this prevented him from fulfilling his job, and that the arguments used to support the policy, for instance that his presence would affect the chances of establishing Community representation in Washington, were spurious in the extreme. Yet significantly his complaint drew a negative from his former ally, ambassador Robert Schaezel in Brussels, who had to “confess that I am in

71. Guy Vanhaeverbek, interview, Brussels, 13 November 2002.

72. LT, 1968 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Rey, 3 January 1968.

73. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Jean-Francois Deniau (Commission), 12 February 1968. Tennyson offered a list of candidates for such a technical delegation which included both Froschmaier and Silj.

74. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Albert Coppé (Commission), 28 February 1968. In contrast Schaezel was pushing for the Commission to go for full diplomatic status, a move which Tennyson did not find “politically very realistic”.

substantial agreement with their position”.⁷⁵ There is a strong sense from this exchange that Tennyson, long the EEC’s point man in Washington and at the centre (if not the initiator) of events, from this moment on would need to adapt to a changing diplomatic environment.

By March 1968 these developments had entered a new phase. There were indications that the Commission might soon appoint a chief representative in Washington, and that this could well be Curt Heidenreich, the representative of Euratom in Washington since 1958. The Tennyson-Heidenreich relationship was never an easy one. While they occupied parallel positions in terms of hierarchy, there was an irresolvable but constant contest over who occupied the most senior position. Their clash of personalities was exacerbated by the close proximity of their offices.⁷⁶ For Tennyson, placing Heidenreich in charge would have been a bitter pill to swallow. Unfortunately, events moved from bad to worse. The fusion of the European executive (ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC) led to Heidenreich being named ‘directeur de bureau de liaison à Washington’ despite him having no apparent increase in responsibilities. Tennyson lamented this development:

“As a result, confusion in government, embassies, the press, and elsewhere exists as to competences. But perhaps most serious is that State Department officials here have received instructions from the US Mission in Brussels to treat only with Mr Heidenreich ‘on matters of substance’. Since ‘matters of substance’ can be interpreted as meaning anything from the text of a press release to a declaration by the secretary of Agriculture to ban chicken liver exports to the Community, this can effectively cut me and all of my colleagues in the bureau off from excellent contacts and relations with the State Department and with other government agencies which we have enjoyed for more than fourteen years”.⁷⁷

Tennyson was also aware that the steady stream of reports on American economic, monetary, and trade issues which his office channelled to the Commission were now under scrutiny as to their official credibility. As he made clear, he did not want Heidenreich’s new-found seniority for himself – “indeed, as an American, I could not and would not aspire to any ‘official’ representative role”. But for the first time his identity as an American was now an unavoidable issue. Heidenreich had received the upgraded label because he was the most senior European with an information/liaison role in place in Washington. Fortunately, the choice for the Commission’s representative (for commercial relations) did fall on someone Tennyson admired, Pierre Malvé, who arrived in September 1969. But the problems of coordination remained, as Guy Vanhaeverbeke witnessed:

“I remember in my very first week I was there [1970], there was a reception on the top floor of the State Department, the Secretary of State was there, and right ahead of

75. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Schaezel, 12 February 1968; Schaezel to Tennyson, 20 February 1968

76. P. WINAND, *The US Mission to the EU in “Brussels DC”, the European Commission Delegation in Washington DC and the New Transatlantic Agenda*, in: E. PHILIPPART, P. WINAND (eds.), *Ever Closer Partnership: Policy-Making in US-EU Relations*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2001, p.128.

77. LT, 1968 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Axel Herbst (director general, External Relations), 1 May 1968.

me the three men, Heidenreich, Tennyson, and Malvé each shook hands with the secretary and said they were the representative of the EC!”⁷⁸

Matters became worse in 1969 with the arrival of the new Nixon administration. Tennyson was of the Marshall Plan generation that had worked hard to achieve European integration as a solution to European political and economic instability. That this was to the benefit of US interests was taken as given. Yet in contrast to previous policy in taking the EEC seriously as an international institution, the realist bilateral diplomacy of the Nixon administration deliberately neglected it. In particular Tennyson viewed the arrival of Henry Kissinger to a position of influence over US foreign policy with some trepidation. By March 1969 he was writing to Jean Monnet to persuade him to make a trip to Washington and use his influence in US elite circles to improve relations. The Kissinger position by then was clearly a lack of interest in European developments as a whole, marked by the statement “we can get along with whatever they do”. “At worst”, Tennyson remarked,

“it means that Mr Nixon will exercise his ‘pragmatic’ approach and return to bilateralism in dealing with Community nations on economic and commercial affairs; at best, it means that the US will not exert its influence in Europe, regardless of what may happen to the Community”.⁷⁹

The result of this was that there was no longer any attempt in the administration to understand the reasons behind Community decisions and policies, leading to trade disputes being regarded in isolation and not in the context of the necessary processes of Community development. The linkage between US national interests and European integration had been broken. The EEC restrictions on US soy bean imports due to the CAP was the first such case to cause such a response. The changed atmosphere was epitomised by an article by *New York Times* journalist Edwin Dale in the London *Times*, entitled ‘The American Dreams That Went Wrong’.⁸⁰

Cleverly, Tennyson used this situation as a reason to improve the status of his office. The soy bean decision had been made without any obvious appreciation for its effects on other countries, particularly the USA. In a letter to Agriculture commissioner Sicco Mansholt he outlined a tactic to deal with this new state of affairs whereby the Commission

“often fails to give its proposals a perspective within the overall framework of its general policy [...]. It can and should use its Information Service as an instrument of policy. An information service which is well-integrated with the Commission should perform the function of supporting Commission proposals and actions. This can be done only if the Commission is ‘information-oriented’ and provides framework data and a rationale for its decisions. Of late, we note that the information bureaux, because of an apparent lack of coordination, are sometimes forced to apologize for, rather than to affirm, Commission actions”.⁸¹

78. Guy Vanhaeverbeke, interview with the author, Brussels, 13 November 2002.

79. LT, 1969 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Monnet, 7 March 1969.

80. *The Times*, 24 September 1969. Tennyson, George Ball, and Jean-Francois Deniau all sent letters to the editor in protest against the tone of Dale’s article.

81. LT, 1969 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Mansholt, 31 January 1969.

Tennyson was once again assuming the role of Atlanticist bridge-builder, encouraging Mansholt to send over spokespeople from the Agriculture Directorate in order to explain Community policies to their American counterparts. But opportunities to do so were now limited. Proposals to brief the congressional members of the NATO Parliamentary Committee before their trip to Europe in September 1970 were rebuffed by both House and Senate, leading to the group appearing unduly ignorant of European affairs when they met the Commission.⁸² Related to this was a decline in the number of European lecturers on Community history and policy being sent to the United States. Whereas between ten and twelve a year used to go, by 1969 DG X had reduced the number to two. When his complaints to Rey and others in Brussels fell on deaf ears, Tennyson turned to Schaetzel to try and turn the trend around.⁸³

The period from 1970 to 1974 was marked by increasing uncertainty for both Tennyson and the American staff who worked under him. What form 'Europeanisation' would take for the Washington office remained relatively unclear. Tennyson was faced continually through 1970-71 with communication problems with Brussels and budgetary constraints and a staff shortage in Washington during a period when improving relations with the US should have been a priority. Correspondence with Steve Freidberg, the American representative on the Groupe du Porte Parole, once again illustrates how the demands of the Washington office for up-to-date information out of Brussels simply could not be met by the existing apparatus and information channels. In a period of Community re-prioritising, especially in the wake of the 1969 Hague conference and the beginning of European Political Co-operation, it was inevitable that the information operations in Washington would be re-evaluated. Proposals for abandoning the monthly American magazine *European Community* (produced by Tennyson since 1954) in favour of more specialized publications aimed at target audiences sounded worthwhile, but Tennyson was not convinced that DG X had the expertise to produce quality publications directed at American concerns.⁸⁴ With these changes being planned in Brussels, Tennyson no longer always received the back-up that he once had.

By late 1970 it had been decided for the following year to unite the separate offices of Tennyson (Information), Heidenreich (Community Liaison) and Malvé (Community Commercial Relations) and transform them into a full delegation under an official representative with ambassadorial rank.⁸⁵ Tennyson tried to smooth the process by calling on Jacques-René Rabier, the long-running ECSC and Joint Service Information chief and the new director general of DG X, to insist that the incoming representative channel all information questions and policy issues to

82. LT, 1970 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Camille Becker (chef, DG X/A-6).

83. LT, 1969 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Schaetzel, 13 October 1969; Schaetzel to Tennyson, 21 October 1969.

84. LT, 1970 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Jules Gerard-Libois (chef, DG X/A-4), 22 September 1970.

85. P. WINAND, *The US Mission* ..., op.cit., p.130.

Tennyson's own office. This was doubly important because the official relationship between the information offices in Washington and New York had never been resolved, Mart's replacement Ciarnelli continuing to function as an independent actor despite Tennyson's constant claim for seniority for Washington.⁸⁶ Not for nothing did Tennyson direct his deputy Guy Vanhaeverbeke at this time to

“be the watchdog and chief lubricant of relations between the Information Office and the [Euratom] Liaison Office, doing everything to ensure better communications and cooperation between the two offices (and New York), stressing the need for genuine two-way communications, and finding means and ways of sharing or dividing work and responsibilities”.⁸⁷

But a trip to Europe in November 1970 only confirmed that DG X was “as confused as they were at this time last year” about their general direction and focus.⁸⁸ Schaetzel as ever worked hard to bring clarity to the situation, arranging a meeting between USIA director Frank Shakespeare and DG X commissioner Albert Borschette to coincide with Tennyson's European trip as “an excellent opportunity to use [Shakespeare's] important office to underline the need to Borschette for more Community attention to the US-EC information area”.⁸⁹ But the lack of direction remained.

In October 1971 the first official head of the delegation, former Italian ambassador Aldo Mazio, arrived in Washington. Mazio was appointed as much for his ambassadorial rank and Italian nationality as anything (the Italian Franco Maria Malfatti then being Commission president and Italy held the presidency of the Community), and for Tennyson he therefore represented the token symbolism that he had feared. With no background in the European institutions and no up-to-date understanding of transatlantic relations to give strong leadership to the delegation in Washington, the situation was not improved. As Pascaline Winand states, the Nixon administration, despite ignoring the Community, did grant the delegation diplomatic status in December 1972, but “it took time for Brussels to define exactly what it should do”.⁹⁰ With diplomatic recognition secured, Mazio left in 1974 to be replaced by Jens Otto Krag, the former Prime minister who had taken Denmark into the EEC. By that time Tennyson had left the service of the Community, and unfortunately for all concerned it was not a mutually acceptable departure.

Tennyson knew he had to make way for the Europeans who were arriving in greater numbers after 1971. The entry of the United Kingdom into the Community in 1973 marked an obvious turning point in terms of the EC's relations with the English-speaking world, making ‘Europeanisation’ in Washington all the more

86. LT, 1970 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Rabier, 30 November 1970. Matters were not helped by the fact that DG X commissioner Albert Borschette was also more interested in upgrading the New York office, with its focus on the local financial and media outlets located in that city, at the expense of Washington. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Becker, 30 November 1970.

87. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Vanhaeverbeke, 3 November 1970.

88. *Ibid.*, Tennyson to Becker, 30 November 1970.

89. *Ibid.*, Schaetzel to Tennyson, 9 November 1970.

90. P. WINAND, *The US Mission ...*, op.cit., p.131.

inevitable. There was also an awareness that the transition might not be so smooth. In his letter to Jacques-René Rabier in November 1970 Tennyson had pointed out that the American staff members who had been in the office for more than five years should “receive through simple contractual agreement some assurances and benefits to which they are normally entitled”.⁹¹ However his own position was a case apart. His official Commission pension began in 1964, leaving the 1954-63 period still to be negotiated, and it was the need to arrange a mutually acceptable settlement which kept him in the Washington office until 1 October 1974.⁹²

Conclusion

When Tennyson left his post in 1974 as the Washington delegation’s head of information, it represented the culmination of a gradual ‘Europeanisation’ of the EC’s presence in the United States and symbolised a major turning point in US-EC relations. His official role in the transatlantic press and information field had spanned four decades, and in important ways his career forms a kind of ‘signpost’ with which to track the changing nature of transatlantic relations from the 1940s to the 1970s. For the Marshall plan and its successive organisations he had been involved in informing Europeans about the American economy as a model of efficiency and the blueprint for future European development. In the 1960s he became an important link-man between the ‘Europeanists’ in the State Department and the ‘Americanists’ in the EC as they tried to bring Atlanticist cooperation into reality. By the 1970s, however, his continuing leadership of the EC information services in the US was considered by a new generation of Europeans as something of an anachronism, an unwelcome symbol of Europe’s post-war dependence on the United States. This attitude was justifiably resented by many of the Americans who had worked hard to inform their own countrymen about developments in Europe. Tennyson had been a skilful and highly credible manager of European interests in Washington, respected both by his staff and his broad network of professional contacts on both sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, for Europe to move on, the Europeans needed to speak for themselves.

91. LT, 1970 Personal Correspondence File, Tennyson to Rabier, 30 November 1970. “Unlike other bureaux, we have no patron in the Commission to wage battles on our behalf”.

92. Ella Krucoff, interview with the author, Washington DC, 10 April 2004.