“Own name” in Knowledge Organization Epistemology: A Philosophical-Theoretical Debate

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Abstract: “Authorship” is investigated in many knowledge areas and can be approached from different perspectives. In this work, it is directly related to philosophy and knowledge organization. As “authorship” is a recurring element in bibliographic records, studies integrating philosophical, conceptual and cultural questions in documentary representation allow for a more critical reflection on the deployment of the use of authoring in informational practices. The overall goal is to understand the perspective of authorship from the notion of “own name,” with the inflection on the philosophical discussion effected in this analysis. This is an exploratory and theoretical study based on bibliographical and documental research, consisting of two steps: the first aims at understanding the philosophical critique of the notion of “first name;” the second discusses the notion in the context of its formulation in the philosophy of knowledge organization. From a panoramic critique of the philosophical debate around the idea of “own name,” we pointed out the emergence of the debate in the contemporary context as it is the case of twentieth century philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Barthes and Foucault. We recognize that, despite changes arising from modernity, the “author” in bibliographic records today still assumes the meaning of “own name,” because it personalizes and organizes knowledge by building standardized access points.

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1.0 Preliminary considerations

> To whoever meditates on the ineffable, it is useful
> to observe that language can
> perfectly name that which it cannot talk about.
> —Giorgio Agamben *A ideia de prosa*

It is said that Bede, father of British historiography and a great scholar of the Renaissance during Charlemagne’s generation, received the epithet “Venerable” after two councils held in Aquisgrana (or Aachen or Aix-la-Chapelle, capital of the Carolingian Empire), in the years 816 and 836. These events took place, among others, exactly in order to include epithets for some authorities of the Catholic Church. Subsequently, this custom would become a rule. Epithets became part of the church's "policy" in relation to own names (Le Goff 2013). However, it is also said that, corresponding to the truth, the angels were the ones who would have formulated the epithet in order to complete Bede's epitaph. In history, there is doubt about the allegoric process and the regulatory process of inclusion of the "title" of "venerable" in the formulation of the names of Catholic authorities.

What is important for us is the fact that "Bede," or "Bede, The Venerable," or "Venerable Bede" are three ways of calling upon the "identity" of one of the greatest wise men of the Middle Ages, responsible for innumerable works in rhetoric, philology, literature, and history. More specifically, we are facing the central argument in the present reflection: a debate about the frontier between the philosophy of "own name," the epistemology of knowledge organization (the theoretical center of our proposal), and approaches to the latter.

"Authorship" permeates several areas of knowledge and may be approached from different points of view. In this article, it is directly related to philosophy and knowledge organization. Since "authorship" is a recurring component in bibliographic records, studies integrating philosophical, conceptual, and cultural issues of documentary representation would allow a deeper critical reflection about the deployment of the use of authorship in informational processes and practices.

According to Otlet (1934), the "author" (and own name thus resulting) represents the inventor or creator of an imaginational or documental work. The Belgian thinker related in §231.2 the different modalities of insertion of own names in traditional documents like printed matter and manuscripts. Among the problems linked to representation and access practices of registered knowledge set by Otlet's view there appears the issue of Latinized own names in the Middle Ages and the presence of works without authorship identification.

The scenario which discusses "authorship" in informational access is the widest one in this research, that tries to point out the reflexive and social character of knowledge organization, especially of descriptive representation. Theoretical reflections about sociocultural issues and documental representation identify a tendency and seek to go beyond the techno-view and assign a philosophical and social function to documentary representation, able to mobilize a society willing to be declared a "knowledge" society, providing access to documents, respecting what is particular to its users and, consequently, contributing to the representation, circulation, use, and production of knowledge.

The main objective is the discussion of the perspective of authorship beginning from the notion of "own name," having as an inflection the philosophical discussion which focuses on this analysis. It is about a theoretical and exploratory investigation based on documental and bibliographical research, comprising two methodological movements of analysis construction: the first aims at understanding the philosophical criticism of the notion of "own name;" the second seeks to discuss the notion in the context of its formulation in the philosophy of knowledge organization. In order to proceed with this reflection, the first point of analysis is the discussion about "knowledge" and "language" in Plato's *Cratylus* dialogue.

Starting from a panoramic critique of the philosophical debate about "own name," we point out the emergence of the debate in our contemporary context as in the case of twentieth century philosophers, especially Barthes, Witgenstein and Foucault. In Foucault's view, the function of the author is directly related to the social, historical, and economic context of a given society. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the author function began to be effaced in scientific discourses and another systematic set of techniques, methods, testing objects, laboratory, and date ascribed validity to discourse and not to the individual who produced it. Nonetheless, this set of elements did not abolish the author of the discourse. The "author" in a bibliographic record presupposes the meaning "own name," since it personalizes and organizes knowledge through standardized access points.

2.0 Own name dilemma in philosophy: from reality representation to knowledge representation

> Or will the name, so to say, be a logical concept?
> —Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Cadernos 1914-1916*

The relationship between own name and informational representation presents many more elements than the supposedly mere relationship of incorporating a name in a bibliographical system may anticipate at first glance. From Platonic concerns with language to Wittgensteinian and Barthesian anxieties in the twentieth century about certainties, language games, "death" of the author, own names establish themselves as a source of philosophical argumentation and end up transversalizing issues inherent to knowledge organization. Marcondes (1985) shows that Plato's *Cratylus* presents the groundbreaking concern with eliminating flaws in natural languages—in Shannon and Weaver's (1975) view, two millennia later, the construction of the ideal channel to avoid communication noise acting on messages, or simply, the privilege of syntax over semantics and, mainly, over pragmatics.

Considering the philosophy of language, what is central to the development of knowledge organization for different authors, like Budd and Capurro, is the issue of the own name initiated by Plato, which assumes limits of aporia: it is important to identify in this particular discussion general elements of this proper philosophy on the whole such as issues of the typology of what is true, real, and good. In Plato's *Cratylus*, we identify one of the pillars of the philosophy of language in the ancient times. Etymology and form play an important part here. It is a dialogue about the origins of language. Hermogenes and Cratylus have a dialogue and they do it in dialectic form with Socrates. According to Hermogenes, the relationship between name and thing would be a convention, whereas Cratylus says this happens in conformity to the nature of things. Socrates says that first you need to accept the existence of true and false things. This leads to the discussion about what is "true" in the relationship between name and thing—or designation of the nature of the thing and nature of the thing properly said (Plato 1963).

Here we have one of the first ways of classifying language. Socrates establishes with Hermogenes, that the "name is the smallest" part of the discourse (Plato 1963, 13). One of the conclusions that Socrates arrives at in the first part of the dialogue, with Hermogenes, is that the name cannot be given by convention, since it would allow falseness. "The justness of a name, we affirm (Socrates to Cratylus), is that which shows a thing such as it is" (120). Assertion of the mimetic principle in the structure of language and its moral denial is also done here by the academy philosopher (133):

> Socrates: Will you be able to affirm that the name is one thing and that which it designates is another thing?
> Cratylus: Yes.
> Socrates: Will you also agree that the name is an imitation of the thing?
> Cratylus: Absolutely.

In the midst of the attempt to link a moral relationship to the use and determination of uses of the language, in Plato the differentiation of parts of the discourse becomes visible, i.e., names, verbs, phrases, and, at another moment, syllables and letters (135-6, emphasis added):

> Socrates: So, if there is a distribution of this sort, we shall call one of them *truly speaking* and the other one *falsely speaking*. Under these circumstances and considering the possibility of being able to distribute names inaccurately and of attributing to each thing what belongs to it, however, at times, attributing them names that are not convenient, it would then be possible, in this case, to do the same with verbs. Now, if it is possible to proceed in this manner with names and verbs, it is also possible, necessarily, with phrases; because these, as I think, are nothing but a combination of those elements.

However, according to Socrates, it would not be possible to agree with a relationship of absolute identity between names and things since this would mean taking the name for the thing itself. In the passage below, we see one of the unequivocal aspects of the platonic criticism of the world as established by language—in the eyes of the academy philosopher, a confusing world, which would be unable to distinguish between the thing and the representation of the thing (139):

> It would certainly be no laughing matter, oh Cratylus, the effect of names upon objects, of which they are names, in case of absolute agreement with them. Everything would be doubled and it would not be possible to say which is the object and which is the name.

Another important aspect of the dialogue arises here to bring close the philological and the bibliological arts: the proposal, in Cratylus, of the possibility of constructing a method to "know the world" starting from language. To Cratylus, who takes primitive names as identical to things, we would be able, conversely from Socrates's view, to get to know things starting from their names. Socrates refuses Cratylus's view. Here we have a critique of the knowledgeability of things originated in their names—that is, the only way to get to know the thing is through the thing itself (154; 156):

> Socrates: Since names are not in agreement and some assert their resemblance with truth and others claim the same right to themselves, on what base can we, from now on, rely, in order to solve the problem, what can we resort to? ... Therefore, it is enough to agree that we cannot begin from names, but things ... have to know and investigate themselves, starting from themselves.

Given the Socratic argumentation, Cratylus's view was not accepted in ancient times, but questioning it might lead to the reconstruction of the reasons that guide us to take language as a process of knowledge—and, mainly, as knowledge itself. However, the process established towards this change of direction is a long one, and it begins with Aristotelian revision of language, linked to the origin of philology itself.

More than that, the approach that language, as a possibility of knowledge, as Cratylus points out, will have a conceptual impact on the emergence of a bibliological art—and, particularly, on its emancipation in the nineteenth century. Such an art is directly linked to the development of a bibliographic theory or a theory of knowledge based on a bibliographical rationality, which, in turn, will constitute what we currently approach using the terms "knowledge organization."

Questioning about own names (always together with the issue of "name," "noun") is part of the object of philosophical debate from ancient to contemporary times. Twentieth-century philosophy will also approach the object as one of its central elements. Whether through the linguistic turn (and, within it, the relationship between analytical philosophy and ordinary language philosophy), or beginning from the dichotomies between structuralists and post-structuralists, own names will appear, here and there, as an element of investigation between philosophers and theoreticians in the social sciences.

Strictly within the scope of the philosophers of the linguistic turn, this adhesion may be visualized in the debates of Russell, Quine, Frege, and Wittgenstein. To Russell, it is possible to reduce "proper names" to "common names," and the reversal would be equally valid, that is, we can reduce common names to proper names. Russell's perspective (Abbagnano 2000) presupposes proper names resulting from elements drawn from direct experience, and having an objective relationship in the context of denotation. Frege, in turn, minds a distinction between denotation and meaning, the latter being something that happens in language assimilation by an individual who knows the language fairly well. Denotation responds promptly to a relationship in reference to the object. As a result, there is a possibility for names (including own or proper names) to respond to different meanings, even when indicating (referring to) the same object or person. Such a solution from Frege (Abbagnano 2000) presents the inference of the non-existence of presupposed particular characteristics about the nature of language.

The well-known deployment of these philosophical issues will reach Wittgenstein's complex thinking. Among previous philosophers of the linguistic turn, like Russell, we centrally have a perspective presented from the logicist point of view. In other words, the aporia of the own name could only be solved through a logical demonstration of the relationship between name and corresponding individual. With the common division of the phases in Wittgenstein's thinking (that is, a first Wittgenstein of formal logic, a second one of ordinary language), such a logicist basis begins to receive other approaches.

In the classical excerpt §79 of the *Philosophical Investigations* (pivotal work of the second phase of his thinking) resulting from discussion of passages about the name, having for interlocutors, for example, Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein (1979, 43-44) displays the following proposition: "Moses did not exist." From this hypothetical observation, his discussion tries to list the semantical consequences like, "Israelites did not have any leader when they left Egypt," or "there was not any man having accomplished all that the Bible narrates about Moses." In Wittgenstein's view, starting from Russell, we would say that Moses can be defined according to different descriptions such as "the man who guided the Israelites," "the man who lived at that time," or "the man who was taken from the Nile by the pharaoh's daughter when he was a child." Likewise, according to a selected definition, the phrase "Moses existed" gets a different meaning. One of the lines in Wittgenstein's reflection is to affirm that, before a statement considering the ontic condition of Moses (the existence of someone considered "Moses"), an open layer of increase in descriptions for such own name will always respond. "Will the name 'Moses' have for me a particular use, solid and unmistakable in every possible way?," questions Wittgenstein (1979, 44).

The answers to Wittgenstein's reflection (second phase) to own names' aporias begin to follow here the well-known direction of the ordinary language debate. The philosopher acknowledges that the use of an own name does not have a certain "rigid meaning," as logical thinkers would like, including him in his first phase, marked by his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. However, absence of such rigidity does not affect its "usage," that is, own names, no matter how imprecise (logically) it may appear, do not make their use absurd in everyday life.

Observations about the use of language (including the appropriation of proper names), lead Wittgenstein (49) to a critical approach of logic. In his words, it is indeed to observe "in what measure logic is something sublime." This sublime character would lead towards a certain "special depth," or "universal meaning," that is, "consideration of logic" as that science which "investigates the essence of all things." Nevertheless, the new Wittgensteinian approach declares this is not the central aim of philosophy, at least, its ordinary philosophy. Depth is not the issue. "We want to understand something that is already in front of us. Since we may appear, in a certain way, as unable to understand it" (49). Here Wittgenstein (1979) encounters from everyday usage of own names the variety and dynamics of living participation in each community using them. The second Wittgensteinian phase about the philosophy of "own names" points to the different experiences of recognition of how an own name was woven as a philosophical object, a first impression, and, mainly the multiple conditions through which it was elaborated in each context.

This vast scenario of multiplicity forwards us to a set of discursive spaces of appropriation of "own names," present in domains like philology (here including grammar and etymology), rhetoric, logic itself, history, mythology, sociology, anthropology, literary studies and legal studies, among others. This "mapping" that never ends offers a large range of clues to understand the route carried by own names, from its plural uses to the attempts at recognition, reflection, and standardization in the scope of knowledge organization. In other words, from the historical importance that is present in the "philosophical condition" of "own names," going through questioning in social studies fields (political, sociological, and anthropological), we come to punctual relevance in the exercise of constructing experiments, of theoretical approaches and approaches applied in knowledge organization in contemporaneity. However, the twentieth century temporal and spatial mark asks us to understand how "poststructuralist approaches" not only abandoned the discussion about own names but made them evident in different cases.

The return to knowledge organization in the last hundred years viewing "own names" as one of its elements also means understanding complex issues cast by philosophers like Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and Jean Baudrillard, among others. This work does not aim to plot only one "poststructuralist" way of apprehending "own names," therefore, we considered work by some of these authors in order to deepen the critical panorama which leads us to the focus of our informational practices.

We may list a few of the general elements placed at the edge between new questioning about "own names" and knowledge organization approaches, among them:

- The condition of the author's invention (which cannot be distinguished from the inference of "own names") in Foucault's analysis starting in medieval times and the questioning of the distinctions of his function since then;
- Destitution of the author as the center of the process starting from enlightened perspectives of the reader as builder of meaning; and,
- Fragmentation of the "ontic condition" of the author and, consequently, of the "evidence" of "own name," in the face of collaborative production practices in a post-web world.

These post-Wittgensteinian contemporary foundations define the difficulty of dealing with the apparent objective condition of "own names" and they become intertwined in the current dilemmas of knowledge organization. Besides, the ties, the knots, and the scattered threads, which still exist in the philosophy of "own names," have in knowledge organization, not only a reflex (the applied manifestation of its problematics) but the possibilities of emergence and development as well. In other words, we noticed that the horizons of the organization, representation, and access to contents and to continents were always interwoven in the philosophical and informational debate when dealing with "own names." This is what we will discuss in the following paragraphs.

3.0 Own name in knowledge organization

> Allonymes. On donne ce nom à ceux qui, en publiant un ovrage, se cachent sous le nom véritable de quelque auteur de réputation, et cherchent à leur attribuer des ouvrages qu'ils n'on pas faits.
> —Gabriel Peignot, *Dictionnaire raisonné de bibliologie*

According to Esteban Navarro and García Marco (1995), knowledge organization is a discipline geared to the study and development of the foundations and the techniques of planning, construction, management, use and evaluation of systems of description, cataloguing, ordering, classification, storage, communication, and retrieval of documents. Therefore, it acts in three perspectives: representation, organization, and communication of human knowledge.

Authorship may appear in organization as well as representation of knowledge. Though they look similar, organization and representation have their own connotations. Brascher and Café (2008, 5) claim:

> Therefore, information organization is a process that involves the physical and content description of informational objects. The product of this descriptive process is information representation conceived as a set of descriptive elements which represent the attributes of a specific informational object.

Whereas, (6):

> Knowledge organization, in turn, aims at constructing models of the world that compose abstractions of reality. Consequently, these two processes generate two distinct types of representation: information representation, conceived as a set of attributes representing a particular informational object and is obtained by processes of physical and contents description.

Taking into consideration these differences, it is assumed that the action of identifying authorship, and establishing and standardizing access points in a bibliographic record, is part of knowledge organization, and the transcription of authorship in area 1 of the *International Standard Bibliographic Description* (*ISBD*), as it appears on the title page of a book, would be information organization. The document being represented may provide data for information organization referring to authorship in a clearer manner than that of the organization of authorship knowledge, the latter being directly related to the philosophical issue of "own name" and knowledge organization.

In 1968, Roland Barthes published the article "The Death of the Author." In this text, Barthes (1988) states that the writer is a social being, historically constituted, who produces a text based on other texts. The author function is also approached in "What is an Author?," Foucault's paper to the Société Française de Philosophie in 1969. According to him (2006, 46), some "discourses are made available with the 'author' function, while other ones are devoid of it." It is important to emphasize that the emergence of the author in the Middle Ages coincides with the dawn of better structured catalogs. Before medieval times, there were clay tablets and lists with bibliographical data, but it is not known (Garrido Arilla 1996) whether those lists were mechanisms for information search and retrieval or only inventories. The process of elaboration of more structured catalogs is a result of actions carried out centuries before. For instance, in the second century bibliographical organization became more specific and individualized (Caldeira 1984, 261), "when Galen, Greek physician, made a list of his works so they would not be confused with work done by other authors." In this case, the introduction of authorship was a mechanism of organization that allowed for the personification of knowledge, besides an important element for individualizing documents. Since then, lists with bibliographical data have become more elaborate and a process of identification of documents has been initiated, through which descriptive elements are included to provide a detailed and trustworthy representation, differentiating a document from the others in the collection.

Nevertheless, it was only after the Middle Ages that author identification became recurrent. This ascertainment does not mean that there were not authors before this period though. It reveals a modification in the relationship between the author and the text, occurring during the medieval times and the development of catalogs that began to incorporate, in its descriptive elements, the name of the author to identify the work. In the eighth century, in medieval libraries, one of the first lists with data about author and title appears; this list is part of a book. It is not possible to observe any ordering, neither to classify nor alphabetize; this list was closer to an inventory than a search and retrieval tool. It was only in the ninth century that better structured catalogs appeared. The Reichenau Library in Germany compiled several catalogs between the years 822 and 842. The first one kept the works of an author together; another one had information about the number of volumes or scrolls and the works kept there. In 831, St. Riquier Abbey in France compiled a catalog, which also presented the contents of volumes or scrolls with entries for the authors yet without a perceptible order (Strout 1956).

Catalogs continued to develop and improve. In 1247, a list from the Glastonbury Abbey Library added a varied designation to book description. For instance, useless, legible, good—probably disclosing their physical status. In 1372, in England, York Augustinian friars organized a list in which the works of an author were separated when subjects were distinct. In 1558, the catalog of Bretton's convent in Yorkshire included an entry for names of editors and translators (Strout 1956). The first systematic entries of author names ordered alphabetically are found in the indexes of prohibited books established in the sixteenth century. This is what Foucault denominates "penal appropriation of discourses"—the fact of being submitted to persecution and condemned for a text considered transgressive (Chartier 1999, 34).

In the seventeenth century, the development of catalogs was dealt with by several publications. In France, Gabriel Naudé emphasized that the most important function of a catalog was to find books and identify them in a bibliographical manner. He recommended (Strout 1956) a catalog divided in two sections, one by subject and another one by author. Naudé presented the library as a necessarily public and universal institution. Public in the sense of open to all and universal for including every author (he did not write "book" but "author") who might have written about the diversity of topics, which are interesting to human beings, particularly arts and sciences (Coelho 1997, 77). At the time Naudé used the term "author," the author's function was consolidated and the work was intimately linked to the author. Underneath the unfolding of this modern rising view, where Naudé's point of view is embedded, we can find Barthesian criticism. Barthes (1988, 66) draws attention to the image of literature in present culture which is tyrannically centered on the author, the author's person, and "the explanation of the work is always searched on the side of whoever produced it, as if through the allegory more or less transparent of fiction, it were always in the end the voice of one and only person, the author, delivering his 'confidence'."

Following mutations in catalogs, it is possible to notice the absence of author identification many times. Catalogs with more elaborate authorship issues appeared during the Middle Ages. Whether by coincidence or not, it was at that period that censorship of works and authors became more rigorous. At that time, the work was condemned together with the author, therefore, identification was necessary to make censorship tangible. Probably an author's absence or presence are related not only to censorship issues; authors did not emerge insofar as it mighth have been necessary to punish them during the Inquisition. The "emergence" of the author is also related to the necessity of acknowledgement of an author by society.

The author is a modern character, undoubtedly a product of our society inasmuch as, out of the Middle Ages, with English empiricism, French rationalism, and the personal faith of Reformation, it discovered the individual's prestige or, as it is more nobly said (Barthes 1988, 66), of the "human being." Chartier (2008) discloses to us a concrete alteration in authors' behavior, still in the relationships of the passage of medieval times to modern times, when he makes a comment about the book offered to the prince. "In the book, the dedication to the prince is, initially, an image … they are the frontispieces which represent the "author," kneeling, offering to the prince … a richly bound book, containing the work that he created" (186).

Once the author began to be recognized as responsible for his discourse, he became a very important descriptive element in information representation. The emergence of the "author" function and the way society regarded him altered authorship identification in catalogs. After the Middle Ages, the presence of authorship becomes increasingly more evident. There are two ways to justify adding authorship as access points in catalogs (Needham 1964):

a) to find a specific document when the author is known;
b) to find which documents of a certain author exist in the library.

Other characteristics justify including authorship in catalogs: identification and selection of similar documents, with different authors. Considering the "geometric" multiplication of the documental production, century after century, after the fifteenth century, it became increasingly necessary to list elements which could help organize, identify, and select documents. Authors and other responsible personnel, like translators, editors, among others, are fundamental elements for search, retrieval, and selection of documents.

Hence, the author function is directly related to the social, historical, and economic context of a society. For a certain amount of time and in some societies, texts considered literary (narratives, tales, epics, among others) were received anonymously without requiring recognition of authorship. Nowadays, the author function in a literary work plays a fundamental role. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the author function began to be effaced by scientific discourses (Foucault, 2006) and another systematic set of techniques, methods, experimental items, laboratories and dates is what attribute validity to discourse and not any longer the individual who produced it.

Needham (1964) points out that search according to topic is emphasized in the scientific and technological milieu, where the author has been less important. Particularly after the nineteenth century, growth in scientific production and increase in search according to topic culminated in the development of documentation. As documentation prioritizes dealing with information according to topic, Wersig (1993) considers it as an indicator of knowledge depersonalization. Prioritizing search according to topic, the author is no longer the most relevant criterion for retrieval. Though it remains as an important element, it is part of a set of elements and it will not always be the major one for the search, retrieval, and selection of documents by users.

Foucault (2006) restricted the characteristics of the "author function" considering the author of a text of a book the one to whom the creation of a text is attributed. However, he recognized that the author function is only one of the specifications of the different functions that someone may assume in relation to a discourse. The four characteristics of the author function are thus summarized (56-57):

> The author function is linked to the legal and institutional system that encompasses, determines, articulates the universe of discourses; it is not exerted evenly and in the same manner on every discourse, every period of time and every type of civilization; it is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a discourse to his producer, but through a series of specific and complex operations; it does not resend pure and simply to a real individual, possibly giving place to various "Is" (first person pronoun in the plural) in, simultaneously, various subject-positions that different classes of people may occupy.

From the four characteristics listed by Foucault, the first and the second are intrinsically linked to issues of knowledge organization and may be visualized in the representation of a document.

Cataloging codes, one of the tools that guide the organization (access points with responsibility for the work) and representation (transcription of areas) of authorship allow us to verify that the author of the discourse can "occupy" several spaces. The same person may even possess several identities (pseudonyms, for example, or a situation in which someone exerts a public office and his discourse becomes identified with an institutional discourse) in order to "organize" his discourse, that is, using the concept "own name" in his multiple discourses.

4.0 Critical reflections about own names nowadays

> In Middle High German it seems to be quite rare to mention a name without saying a prayer or a formula of hidden modesty ... Clarification of the issue is not as necessary as it might look. This contributes to the knowledge of the idea that medieval man had about himself.
> —Ernst Curtius, *Literatura europeia e idade média latina*

Alexandria bequeaths to us a series of clues which could become criteria for a decision if we considered a historical-arbitrary basis of identifying "when and where" the issue of own names became elementary for practices of organization, representation, and access to contents and continents. We will not attempt to discuss them here. Our inflection point (which simultaneously presents itself as a criterion) deals with the so-called "Homeric Question." Among the practices of construction of a remote science of language, there are experiments of knowledge organization, recognized particularly beginning from the works of Callimachus, scholar, philologist, and librarian. Spina (1994, 66) states that:

> Throughout this period, also called Alexandrine and extending approximately from the year 322 to 146 B.C., scholars from everywhere took their places as librarians at the famous Library of Alexandria, with its 490 thousand volumes and 43 thousand housed at the Serapeum, for lack of space, which became the greatest center of hellenic culture in the Ancient Times. Ordering and cataloging of these works raised problems related to their authenticity, to the lives of the authors, and afterwards to the elaboration of texts to the public and to the schools.

After two millennia, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the development of theories, approaches, and organizational tools and of the use of information continued to have own names as a central process. An example is given through Peignot's (1802a,b) (Figure 1) and Otlet's (1934) concern with the description of documents and the imperative of own names (Figures 2 and 3).

Peignotian entries are structurally concerned with, on one hand, the need of recognizing a certain "particular life of own names," and, on the other hand, their "public living experience," a "language game" which results in the variation of signifiers and signified according to each "way of life," each social class, each environment, each context. Figure 1 presents part of a long list of true names and "artificial" names identified by Peignot (1802b).

The "subjectivity" considered by Otlet (1934) evokes the complexity of own names in the social context (not only nowadays) and, consequently, the challenges for knowledge organization. In 1802, through evident influence of the Belgian lawyer Gabriel Peignot, there already was an interest in the issue of own names in entries like *allonymes*, *cryptonymes*, *pseudonymes*, *hétéronymes*, *anonymes*. Figures 2 and 3 show the applied theory of "own names" in the making of catalographic cards in handmade form.

Currently, the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA) has been developing several conceptual models using computerized tools for bibliographical assets, beginning with the *Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records* (*FRBR*), related to bibliographical assets in general, afterwards with the *Functional Requirements for Authority Data* (*FRAD*), a conceptual model specifically related to responsibility (or authorship), and finally with the *Functional Requirements for Subject Authority Data* (*FRSAD*), related to the themes dealt with in the documents. The two first models approach authorship in the organization and representation of information and knowledge, as follows.

The *FRBR* model defines the bibliographic record (IFLA 1998, 7):

> As added data associated to entities described in catalogs of libraries and national bibliographies. Within these added data there are descriptive elements like the ones defined in the ISBD's; elements of data used in headings for people, collective entities, titles and topics, that function as storage tools or index entries; other data elements used to organize a record file, like classifying numbers; notes like summaries and abstracts; and specific data [relative] on library collections, such as access and call numbers.

In this definition, we can affirm that authorship is present in bibliographic records (documental representation) in two distinct moments: in the organization, when placed in access points; and in representation, when making the bibliographic description, following the areas that are part of the *ISBD*.

The aim of our study would not be in the transcription of authorship in the areas of bibliographic description but in the access points, since they organize individuals' aggregate knowledge. In this sense, the concept of "own name" permeates the representation of the person (author) included in the authority record, defined as (*FRANAR* 2007, 1): "a gathering of information about an entity's instance having its name used as an access point controlled by citations or bibliographical records in a library catalog or bib-



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NOMS SUPPOSÉS.	NOMS VRAIS.
	de Constantinople, qui se fit moine.
Chrysippus	Libert Fromond.
Cleophilus, Octavius	François de Fano.
Clevier (Thomas du	Bonav. Desperiers.
Clouset ou Duclouset	Jean Coustel et Isaac le Maistre.
Clocpicre	Voltaire.
Cocaius Merlinus	Théophile Folengi.
Colet Champenois, Claude . .	Gilles Boileau.
Colvinus	Louis Dumoulin.
Columba	Jean Coster.
Comes ou de Comitibus	Majoragius.
Conchlax	Pamphile d'Alexandrie, selon Suidas; et Nicandre, selon Galien.
Constantius, Marcus-Antonius.	Etienne Gardiner.
Copus, Alanus	Nicolas Harpsfeld (1).
Corallus et Cordatus	Ulric Hutten.
Corona ou Coronæus, Jea. . .	Jean-Etienne Menochius.
Covelle, Robert	Voltaire.
Crapin	Jean Tristan de S.-Amant.
Crassinius	Charles Sigonius.
Critobulus	S. Jérôme.
Crox (Florent de	Jean Lepelletier.
Cubstorf	Voltaire.
Cyprianus, Carthag.	Erasme.

Figure 1. Pseudonyms identified by Peignot (1802b).

liographical file." Establishing a record of authority has a fundamental role in knowledge organization, since it allows the identification of the subject of the discourse in its various bibliographic identities. Intending to better organize and represent authors is the Virtual International Authority File (VIAF), integrating several catalogs and authority registers. No matter the spelling of a name or the way an author is known, all the varied forms of name can lead to the author of a discourse. In this context, in the manner adopted to arrange the access points of a biblographic record, the "author" would solely be identified by a number code—in VIAF it would be the VIAF ID. There is also another number to render the author uniquely, the International Standard Name Identifier (ISNI). These initiatives, as we can see, are attempts to organize discourses and link them historically to their authors, connecting people and documents. Thus, just as a book has its ISBN, a journal has its ISSN, a person would have his ISNI.

It is believed that the development of conceptual models and identification codes for authors indicates a search or a return to the theoretical foundations of the discipline in order to find solutions to the documental representation of contemporary problems. The author begins to be perceived as one of the possible functions of the relationship between the person as an entity and the entities of Group 1 of the *FRBR* conceptual model, representing a document: "Work, Expression, Manifestation, and Item," no longer identified with the various functions under the term "author."

For quite a while this bonding conception was in conformity with the demands that existed, but it is no longer satisfactory. Initially, the image of the author was enough to identify a document. As time went by, other functions, such as the compiler and the collective entity, undertook the role of the "author" to render a more precise description, more detailed, up to the moment when the "author" and the "authorship" (any indication of responsibility for a certain resource) became so extensive, comprising so many possibilities, that, instead of facilitating the documental handling, it made it trivial. Everything could be

0.125

Nom (11), Prénoms (12)

Millésime (15). — *Titre de l'ouvrage* (211). — Nom, prénoms et qualités de l'auteur (212, 213).

Lieu d'édition (221), firme (éditeur) (222), année (223), quantième édition (224), nombre de volumes (231), format (232), nombre de pages (234), illustrations (234), prix (225).

[Notes (3) — Notes analytiques — Notes critiques — Indices divers de la classification, etc.]

0.075

Provenance de la notice (4).
Titre de la collection (41).
Bibliographie (42).

Service intérieur (5).
Cote de placement (51).

Destination de la fiche (52)

Figure 2. Theoretical model of Otlet's catalographic card (1934).

DURAND, Charles 537

1921. — *Traité général d'Electricité,* par Charles Durand, professeur au Collège de France,

Paris. L. Maillard, 1921, 3e édition, 2 vol. (0,24 × 0,165), XXII, 440-475 p. 12 pl. 20 francs.

[Electricité théorique, Electricité appliquée. — Chap. VII, théorie des ions. — Ouvrage pour spécialistes.]

[537+537.18+621.3]

Bibliographia Universalis. Contribution nº 117. Fiche nº 224.
Louis Forchamps.* 1933.

Nº 418
537

Catalogue méthodique.

Figure 3. Applied model of Otlet's catalographic card (1934).

considered the "author" in the elaboration of a bibliographic record, however, this conception is not shared either by users or creators of the document.

The path of authorship and author reveals that the preliminary conceptions permeated practical solutions to the formulation of bibliographic records, information organization and retrieval. That is, solutions were centered in the convenience of documental processing. Currently the adopted conception for the conceptual models tries to integrate the view of knowledge production with users.

In parallel to theoretical and applied concerns, the reflex of the imperative of "own names" is easily recognized in a social context that mainstreams the theories and practices of knowledge organization. Even a society based on the idea and the use of a personal image as "identification" (photographs of faces, for example), the "own name" continues to be a key element, "access point," source of alterity still inherent to the subject. Private tools like Facebook, and public tools, like the curriculum directory Plataforma Lattes prove how the necessity of the image does not necessarily substitute the imperative of the "own name." Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this discussion.

The breakthrough of a "society of images" (and, particularly, a "society of facial images," or, still, a "selfie soci-

Figure 4. Sample of Facebook profile. https://www.facebook .com.

Figure 5. Sample of Plafaforma Lattes—CNPq. http://lattes.cnpq.br/.

ety") is closely related to language games which manipulate names and images of faces, profiles, etc. As early as 1934 Otlet stressed the need of certain authors to relate their names to photographs (pictures) in books. Along with the identification of movements that intend to enhance the difference between representing the author of a document (information representation) and the author as access point (knowledge organization), it is possible to ascertain the difficulty of matching the documental representation with its large volume of documental production and the necessity of feeding databases. Such a "selfie society" is already "manifested" in knowledge organization, but with the flaws and challenges of the current cultural changes. A typical example is the aforementioned VIAF case. It is a catalog of records of authority from different national and/or local bibliographic agencies. Its main function is the identification and description of authors, allowing the insertion of an image related to the entry.

An example of current criticism about the realtionship of "own name" and "identity image" is in the conflicting application found in the context of the VIAF. In contrast to the expected correspondence, what we generally find, like the model in Figure 6, inside the catalog of authority is the image of the bibliographic resource (author's book) instead of the "image referring to the name" (a photograph of the author's face). We notice here the play between the imperative of the author face to face with the imperative of the resource, origin of one of the most classical discus-

Figure 6. Authority record—Barthes. http://www.viaf.org/viaf/44295 060/#Barthes,_Roland.

sions in the twentieth century, with Barthes's previously mentioned work about the alleged "death of the author."

In ongoing searches (systemically allowed by VIAF), the "author" has his condition not only "recognized," but also rendered "existent" starting from the "image" that identifies him. To a certain extent, it is like a "return" or "statement" of the presence of the image of authorship, over and above the name, within the work as stressed by Otlet (1934). We recognize the difference of an image adopted in a publication, with various objectives, such as a commercial one, and its application in an international system of authorities. This fact calls our attention, since, in the second case, we are facing a process and an intellectual product, the VIAF, of substantiation of the "own name," linking it to an identity image in our contemporary world.

Another example of criticism within the scope of "own names" in knowledge organization is related to metadata. There are several metadata indicating the author in only one of their fields. In this case, either information representation contained in the document or access point organization will leave a gap. This is what happens to digital repositories using the Dublin Core, which has only one field to indicate the author in its record. This field may use control and standardization of the author's name, as established by the "authority record." In this case, the author's form as it appears in the title page of a document will not be transcribed. In case the form is adopted as it appears in the document, there will be no standardization of access points, resulting in dispersion of the discourse.

Identification of the varied forms (spelling, complete or abbreviated name, pseudonyms, different identities for a person who has a political office etc., already announced in the nineteenth century in Peignot's view) has to be contemplated.

5.0 Final comments

> L'auteur joint souvent à son nom ses propres titres, qualités, notamment ceux de sa profession ou ceux des ses titres scientifiques qui forment son autorité quant à l'ouvrage.
> —Paul Otlet, *Traité de documentation*: *le livre sur le livre; théorie et pratique*

One of the keenest ways of considering the "epistemology of knowledge organization" envisaged in an approach of "own names" that is part of our informational thinking is found in Otlet's (1934, 251) expression in the piece §251.22 (an integral part of 251.2. L'auteur et l'oeuvre): "L'auteur est l'element subjectif de la connaissance." Observing the history of catalogs and tools used to organize and represent documents, the author was always present. At times, his simplified identification was enough. Currently, the importance of standardization for search and retrieval of information is considered. Bearing in mind the clashes in philosophical issues and different branches of knowledge, we can bring together some elements that converge to a critical reflection about "own names" in the theory and practice of organization, representation, and access to recorded knowledge. Recognizing logic as fundamental discursive space between information retrieval and philosophy, we noticed, as dealt with in the debate about analytical philosophy (considering Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein), the essential imperative of the accurate representation of an "own name" (the name of an individual objectively representing his work).

On the other hand, considering the philological tradition of library and information science studies, we also get to another point of the cited frontier. To philology, concerns with documental authenticity involve authenticity of the work, genuineness of documents, and paratextual relationships. However, this is only the beginning of an extensive discursive activity in the humanities and the social sciences about "own names," present in mythology, history, political science, rhetoric, law, sociology, anthropology, among other branches of knowledge.

In sociological terms, for instance, potential problems related to own names coming from or impacting knowledge organization are innumerable. In studies of gender and scientific communication, the challenges of the representation of feminine proper names give us an example of the difficulty of identifying gender and the possibility of analyzing the dilemmas of the relationships between sexes. Otlet (1934) highlighted the delicate practice of suppressing the names of authors of women's works, names that disappeared forever, according to his point of view. Other social elements directly affect the possibilities of understanding own names within knowledge organization, such as adopting certain surnames of power, cultural differences due to marriage or religious conversion, or, besides, civil, professional, and anonymous titles, pseudonyms, plagiarism.

If we would consider rhetoric as our starting point, we would go back to "Bede's issue" and the construction of epithets in the context of the Catholic Church at the end of the first millennium. This one and those other examples demonstrate the complexity and the relevance of studies about "own names" and their place in the epistemology and history of knowledge organization.

Facing such challenges, this sort of theoretical and exploratory study aimed at a debate of ideas about "own names" developed inside and outside knowledge organization, to clarify the discussion in this case. This course of action showed how extensive an issue this is and the need for disciplinary dialogues resulting from the epistemological magnitude of the object being studied. We recognize, to a certain extent, an alleged "invisibility of what is apparent," or "neutrality of what is multiple."

In other words, we realized how "own names" first undergo a condition of precise and objective elements, "easily" defined and formalized. It would be about a logical element in its very nature or a case of standardization to be made simple. This first impression that appears in Cratylus's discussion, a classical Platonic dialogue debating the origin of names, clashes with the turbulent, socially, and culturally founded history of "own names" and their usage. Therefore, such dynamics lacks critical attention from knowledge organization, responsible for thinking and implementing ways to identify, order, and access contents and continents, activities that now recognize, now establish, now efface the "own name" as a social-cultural element, prior to an "access point."

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