

aparece en las transcripciones es un acierto. En esto se distingue de otras reorganizaciones que se han hecho con otros vocabularios de las lenguas mayas o, en general, de lenguas indígenas americanas, de tal modo que su consulta ofrece más posibilidades. En general, las decisiones de ordenación y de reconstrucción lingüística están bien fundadas y bien explicadas.

Ahora apuntamos algunas cuestiones de detalle. Hay una errata significativa en la página 51, en lo que se refiere a la descripción de la representación gráfica del “cuatrillo” y el “tresillo”, pues están confundidos ambos términos: donde dice “los oclusivos glotalizados, con grafemas nuevos llamados ‘tresillo’ y ‘cuatrillo’ –el tresillo <₄>, el tresillo con h <₄h>, ... y el cuatrillo <ε>”, debe decir “los oclusivos glotalizados, con grafemas nuevos llamados ‘cuatrillo’ y ‘tresillo’ –el cuatrillo <₄>, el cuatrillo con h <₄h>, y ‘tresillo’ <ε>”. Por otro lado, la transcripción paleográfica del vocabulario es muy interesante para el conocimiento del español, porque presenta un nivel de registro que roza a veces lo coloquial y revela bien la oralidad. Sin embargo, son cuestionables algunas interpretaciones de fenómenos que los editores infieren del texto español; así, no consideramos incorrecta la frase *tenemos cargo tuyo*, sino que puede ser variante dialectal o estilística; no hay error de copiado en la palabra *rebino*, que no corresponde al verbo *refinar* sino a *revenir* (32); es discutible que *lantenillas* tenga que ver con la voz *ternillas* (id.); no son casos de voseo algunos ejemplos, como *venistes* o *llegastes* (60), sino que se trata de otro fenómeno, que consiste en añadir una <s> al final de formas verbales del pasado, que fue usual en el español clásico y que continúa en otras variedades del español. En otro orden de cosas, si se mantiene que el autor era conocedor del quiché, no vemos la necesidad de que haya consultado otra fuente para introducir correcciones del tipo “ha de ser” y “es mejor”, pues en nuestra modesta opinión podrían ser derivadas de su propia competencia lingüística (29). Por último, respecto de algunos usos del español, nos permitimos proponer unas sugerencias de cara a una nueva edición: “lexical” puede sustituirse en la mayoría de los casos con el adjetivo “léxico/a”; como nos resulta opaca la frase “las relaciones sinópticas entre los vocabularios”, quizá se pudiera expresar de un modo más claro con la de “sinopsis de las relaciones entre vocabularios”; por último, no nos parece adecuada la denominación de “diccionario de referencia” para el utilísimo diccionario reconstruido a partir del *Vocabulario otlatecas* que constituye la tercera parte del volumen. Pensamos que tanto en español, como en otras muchas lenguas, un “diccionario de referencia” alude a un gran diccionario que todo el mundo consulta; quizá la denominación de “diccionario modernizado” podría haber sido más adecuada.

El “Diccionario k’iche’ de Berlín” es una obra que pretende y, en gran medida, logra contribuir al conocimiento de la lexicografía colonial misionera del quiché. Dürr y Sachse han realizado una edición crítica de un manuscrito inédito que está llamada a ser un referente

para futuras ediciones de vocabularios misioneros de la época colonial, tanto por su rigor y por la amplitud y la profundidad de las descripciones de su estudio introductorio – con unos cuadros esquemáticos de los contenidos que son muy de agradecer –, como por ser su texto aprovechable para el tratamiento digital. La transcripción del *Vocabulario de otlatecas* y su disposición modernizada da acceso a un documento que era prácticamente desconocido y posibilita su consulta de modo fidedigno, eficaz y cómodo.

Esther Hernández

**Eberl, Markus:** *War Owl Falling. Innovation, Creativity, and Culture Change in Ancient Maya Society.* Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2017. 291 pp. ISBN 978-0-8130-5655-5. Price: \$ 95.00

This well-written book addresses innovation and social change among the Classic Maya (300–1000 A. D.) and is highly innovative in itself since it deals with an issue Mayanists have rarely addressed before. It focuses on material and technological changes, but adds a third dimension to the understanding of how a society perceives itself. This is imagination as a potential for innovation used by individuals who are embedded in a society governed by its own logic and ontology.

As the title suggests, one of the examples the author explores is the war owl, an icon which was originally used by the elite who associated it with the underworld and war and which was important to the different local kingships organized as city-states throughout the Maya lowlands. However, as Markus Eberl – a well-known Maya archaeologist with a solid epigraphic, iconographic, and ethnohistorical background – shows, in the 7th and 8th century A. D. these kind of symbols were adopted by common people, farmers, craftsmen, and all those from the lower end of society supporting the institution of Maya kingship. It is precisely this change that the book centres around: “Why did Maya villagers employ elite imagery?” (xiii). The author’s main thesis is that the adoption of a sign such as the war owl should be understood in terms of “innovation as a way to understand social change” (xiv). And innovation, this is the second point the author makes, is not unique to Western industrial societies but quite common among most societies including the pre-Hispanic Maya. The author thus defies the scholarly view based on colonial and modern perception that the Maya were largely “driven by traditions and habits” or by what has become known by the Spanish term *costumbre* (195–197). This rather static view that the Maya were a traditional society often results from the analysis of the colonial period or the ethnographic present by making use of the so-called method of upstreaming (D. Grana-Behrens, *The Past by the Present – Ethnography as a Means to Explain Ancient Maya.* In: H. Kettunen and C. Helmke [eds.], *On Methods. How We Know What We Think We Know about the Maya.* München 2015: 47–64.). Another contradiction arises from the modern orthodontists’

view that the first tooth implant that the Ancient Maya invented, should be taken as something evolutionary (197). Instead, Eberl points out that “innovation has to be decoupled from progress“ and rejects the Western view that innovation is only a “creative activity” within the limiting frame of technical or cultural evolution (201). To the author innovation is rather a social thing *situated* “in the tension between discovering and revealing a desired vision of society” which happens within a structure underlying not only a society but also the human, the individual, both in terms of cognition and agency (212). However, for Eberl, it is the people as individuals rather than the collective who use their abilities and creativity to engage in metaphors and metonymies and thus modify “space-time” that is both structure and culture (31, 194). By imagining material and non-material things like signs, myths, and rituals, the gap between collective and individual structure and reality is symbolically closed and (collective) structure appears as a reality. “Inventions manifest alternative visions of culture” or “possible worlds” and “innovation bridges social realities and desires” (213, cf. p. 171). That is what culture is all about for Eberl, commoners adopting an elite symbol and (re-)shaping the public discourse. They closed a gap between their reality and the structure and that also implies a social change.

From a theoretical perspective, Eberl’s approach is an attempt to better understand how humans (the individuals), as opposed to culture or social structures, are first and foremost responsible for what happens on the cultural and sociological level. Although he relies on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *habitus* and Anthony Giddens’ idea of individual routinization, Eberl does not accept the idea that individuals are will-less subjects exposed to such structures. Instead, they have their own ideas, cognitive frameworks tied to the structuralist framework of society and culture in a relation of mutual dependence (194f.). Hence, learning is neither uncritical copying nor incomplete or defective transmission of knowledge but both repetition and creativity (196). In this sense, Eberl’s approach builds a dialectical model. On the one hand, the author shows how humans are tied to a social structure (Bourdieu, Giddens), while being at the same time subject to a form of cultural transmission which clearly defies the idea of the human as a “blank slate” (P. Richerson and R. Boyd, *Not by Genes Alone. How Culture Transformed Human Evolution*. Chicago 2005; S. Pinker, *The Blank Slate. The Modern Denial of Human Nature*. London 2002). On the other hand, the author points out that individuals are challenged not only by their own cognitive capacity and meta-awareness of the world but also by the existence of an attractor like the Maya rulership. This makes people put things forth and back and allows a general acceptance of innovation and change in the sense of Dan Sperber’s concept of epidemiology. Thus, Eberl recognizes the limitation of Bourdieu’s and Giddens’ theory of social structure and adds agency as a vehicle of innovation and social change (101). Throughout the book, the author draws

not only on Maya examples but underpins his arguments by cross-cultural references spanning a wide range of regions and periods. On some occasions, however, the author could have made better use of comparative examples from Mesoamerica. For instance, he refers to the concept of penance (*ch’ab*) which, as a condition for new life, was important to the ancient Maya. However, he could also have mentioned that penance (*tlamacehua*) was equally important to the Aztecs in Central Mexico during the Postclassic (1400 until the Spanish conquest) as it expresses a relation to the gods who once created the world by sacrificing themselves (cf. M. León-Portilla, *Those Made Worthy by Divine Sacrifice. The Faith of Ancient Mexico*. In: G. Gossen [ed.], *South and Meso-American Native Spirituality. From the Cult of the Feathered Serpent to the Theology of Liberation*. New York 1997: 43).

The book consists of seven chapters illustrated by figures, maps, and tables throughout. There is neither a “classic” introduction nor a conclusion. Chapter 1 can be seen as a general introduction that addresses the topic from a Maya perspective but may also be regarded as an introduction to the theoretical and methodical aspects of sociology and cognitive anthropology. Chapter 2, then, at quite some length, turns to the theoretical foundations of the book, in particular to the models of society as proposed by Bourdieu and Giddens as well to cognitive anthropology and epistemology in general. Here the author addresses the question of how symbolic communication challenges social structure and culture through invention. To demonstrate what ancient and modern Maya culture is all about, the author underpins his theoretical argumentation by ample use of illustrations taken from epigraphy and iconography, ethnohistory and ethnography. Chapter 3 focuses on how the Classic Maya society learned (court-based, situated) and correlates its findings with experiences from modern ethnography among the Maya in Guatemala. Here Eberl centers on the Maya elite. Interestingly, to the author particular craftsmen, like sculptors mentioned on public monuments (cf. 120–123), belong to the elite rather than to the common people. In general, he uses archaeological data (settlement pattern, construction volume, population, social inequality, and wealth based on the Lorenz Curve and Gini Index) in studies conducted at two sites (Dos Ceibas and Nacimiento) in the hinterland of Aguateca, situated in the Petexbatún region in Guatemala. Chapter 4 criticizes Giddens’ social structure as “out of time and space” (104) and asks how ideas become reality, e. g., how imagination translates into invention on the part of the individual. In order to provide the reader with a broader perspective, Eberl turns to ontology which, to him, is the key to understanding how the Classic Maya handled their world. Eberl then deals more generally with what he metaphorically terms the “Garden of Forking Paths,” e. g., the cognitive model of an individual’s decision-making which allows innovation to be nested within a cognitive model of “networked worlds” that connects past, present, and future

in a specific way (111–113). It is here where the individual and the structural world are becoming interlinked and innovation is turning into an important instrument based on individual imagination. In Classic Maya terms such a process, however, happens between humans and gods and relies on a particular production logic: “creation is vested in the supernatural and everything is or can be animated” (115). Later on in the book the author provides examples for innovation such as the use of petrified wood for polishing or drilling despite other kinds of drilling instruments already existing (127). Chapter 5 not only addresses power and status but tries to show that all members of a society are involved and may control different resources. Here the author addresses the “free-will” of the individual and his ability to intervene. For instance, there is the practice of some elite people from Copan, Honduras, who adorn their houses either by royal ballcourt’s signs like a skull-shaped, or macaw-shaped stone axe (called *hacha*, another well-known ball play instrument), or other signs like the so-called mat motive (142–148). Chapter 6 addresses the question of how innovation changes social structure. It is here, where the author centers on the so-called war-owl icon and *ajaw* sign that stand for rulership (178–184). For objects to be able to signal a type of status, it is prerequisite that their value, at least, be understood. Thus, not any kind of object but only certain items were susceptible to innovation and change. Eberl states greenstone ornaments, jaguar furs, and marine shells, which are findings of his archaeological studies conducted at the two aforementioned sites near Aguateca (165). Thus, many of the changes that scholars suppose to have taken place in the course of Maya history, seem to signal social rather than technological innovation. The final chapter 7 summarizes the findings and the thesis of the book.

Daniel Grana-Behrens

**Friedl, Erika:** *Folksongs from the Mountains of Iran. Culture, Poetics, and Everyday Philosophies*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2018. 230 pp. ISBN 978-1-78831-017-8. Price: £ 59.00

History and poetry are opposite and intertwined. The unfolding of history is made of discontinuities, poetry instead, especially when recited, aspires to turn occasions into moments of eternity, repositories to be activated when in need of words to comment on a situation, to express affects, to mark a life (birth, marriage, death). This is how the relation between history and poetry has been thought of since Vico’s “New Science”: poetry offers a language to make sense of a people’s history, while history sediments the metaphors of poetry into a logic if not a metaphysics. A similar approach emerges from the pages of Erika Friedl’s remarkable book presenting a collection of 616 songs in Luri language along with translation, commentary, introduction, and glossary. Friedl collected the songs during her long-term research (1965–ongoing) in the Southwest of Iran, in the

mountainous region of Boir Ahmad, mostly in the town of Sisakht. The volume is the newest in a series Friedl has devoted to an “inventory of a Lur community” (3) and is a companion to her other volumes about proverbs and tales of the area.

Though Friedl is cautious in delineating any strict ethnic identification, and though her song commentaries can be read as a history of this community’s relationship to the outside world, the term folk in the title frames the idea that the poetry in this book embodies the ethos of a distinct people with a distinct language and worldview (or “everyday philosophies” as she terms it). Friedl describes the drastic changes this community underwent in the last fifty years, from absence of state infrastructure to pipes and tourism, from tribal conflicts to the Islamic Republic, from no literacy to mass higher education, but one gets the sense that Lur inhabit a world of their own.

Materializing the link between poetry, people, and ethos, the book’s format is the outcome of two complementary lines of scholarship. On the one hand, the book follows the anthropological tradition developed by Boas and Sapir of turning ethnographic encounters into written texts, constituting a collective cultural and linguistic archive: the songs are anonymous and we are not told who sang them, though Friedl often describes the occasion or year of their performance. On the other hand, the volume is in dialogue with the genre of folklore studies promoted by Iranian intellectuals throughout the 20th century and dedicated to catalogue everyday forms of life of the rural and nomadic populations living on the Iranian plateau. As Fazeli highlighted in his research on the history of anthropology in Iran, these folklorists were celebrating the diversity of the peoples of Iran. While constituting rural populations as an object of research and wonder for educated and urban middle classes, they were also contributing to renew a sense of belonging among these communities in a rapidly changing world. This commitment is evident in Friedl’s pages that offer an archive of Lur resilience and creativity.

When a song is extracted from the event of its performance and put into a different medium, its articulation changes drastically in ways that should not be celebrated, nor dismissed as inauthentic. What matters is to reflect on how media transformations modify the conditions of possibility for reception. In this case, the songs’ sounds, colors, and affects, but also the everyday circumstances of their often improvised performance, are substituted by the black and white space of a book page, with lines in Latin script and Stone Serif font: italics for Luri, bold for the English translation, and regular style for Friedl’s commentary. Each song is numbered.

In the written, silent medium of the book, semantics (what does it mean?) take precedent over semiotics (how does it mean?), while the relationship between history and poetry is reconfigured. The song-events turn into monuments: their muted lines are given a chance to endure through time as products of the culture and history of a people, but they lose their immanent space-