

ing explanatory approaches could ever fully account for the subjective aspect of humans.

Chapters 8 and 9, on physical anthropology and archaeology, are short and somewhat old-fashioned. They do not mention the sort of exciting new developments that a journal like for example *Evolutionary Anthropology* is full of and which show up at least some local convergence – between explanatory approaches in various fields. Examples of such developments are dual inheritance and cultural niche construction. Tellingly, the rift between explanatory processual and predominantly interpretive post-processual archaeology, connected and contributing to the epistemic divide in anthropology, is not discussed.

Chapters 10 to 13, again very readable, deal with 20th-century developments in US anthropology, but rather selectively. Like the rest of the book they are also fairly unsourced, and much less structured and chronological than one would wish, if only for didactic purposes. Nonetheless, here Custred is at his best. We learn about the importance and nature of fieldwork, theoretical diversity, institutional developments, influences from British social anthropology, ecological anthropology, and the anthropology of art. Chapter 14 deals with linguistic anthropology, and in chapters 15 and 16 the author offers an excellent case study of combined approaches to the ethnography of the Andes culture area.

Custred believes that the main epistemological divide is scientific versus activist anthropology (e.g., p. 237). I do not agree: it is that between *erklären* (explanation) and *verstehen* (interpretation)! The latter approach follows on from an adamant metaphysic of human uniqueness which runs like a red thread through the discipline's history, *pace* Custred, and dictates an interpretive human and, morally speaking, humane science.

To him, “scientific” is, rather mono-theoretically, much closer to explanation than it is to interpretation (cf. chap. 5); so is consilience, in line with biologist E. O. Wilson's book on that subject. That the holistic perspective in anthropology comprises “knowledge of the whole ... increased through knowledge of its various parts” (87) again is a rather atomistic, reductionist, and as such scientist view. This leaves about half of the discipline out.

Why are most North American and European cultural and social anthropology – as variegated as both are – emphatically anti-Darwinian, and more concerned with meanings than with causes, with agency than with the laws of life? Why did Marshall Sahlins (only mentioned with respect to his earlier work) leave the American National Academy of Sciences in 2013, when life-sciences-inspired Amazonia specialist Napoleon Chagnon was elected a member? Why was there fifty years of Chagnon-bashing in the American Anthropological Association (AAA), and the reverse in the life and cognitive sciences oriented Human Behaviour and Evolution Society (HBES; not mentioned), which lauds Chagnon as one of its culture heroes? Why is the latter, author of one of the best sold ethnographies ever (two million copies) not mentioned in a major, 1,000 page recent encyclopedia of theory in anthropology (edited by R. J. McGee and R. L. Warms in 2013), nor, incidentally, by Custred? Why did

the AAA, controversially, drop the word “science” from its mission statement in 2010?

Such questions remain unanswered in this book. In fact, very many anthropologists still see culture as an extremely variable, relatively autonomous layer superimposed upon humankind's uniform biology. For them the distinctive quality of human beings is not that they live in and adapt to a material world, like other organisms, but that they do so according to meaningful, culturally variable symbolic schemes. They see humans as self-conscious, morally responsible agents, so different from other species that they require an approach which, they claim, is irreducible to that of the life and other natural sciences. In this ongoing dualism of a perhaps predominantly “neo-Kantian” discipline evolution is excluded from cultural studies. Efforts to bring the symbolic and moral world of society and culture within reach of behavioural ecology or evolutionary psychology meet a lot of resistance.

Nevertheless, I found Glynn Custred's book both enjoyable and provocative. Provided one keeps the above reservations in mind, his history of the holistic ideal in anthropology is, all in all, a welcome contribution to the reflexive awareness of the historicity and theory-laden character of knowledge, an awareness which is essential to the anthropologists's training and trade. As a plea for the holistic ideal the book also constitutes relevant early 21st-century source material for epistemological analysis itself.

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Dedenbach-Salazar Sáenz, Sabine (ed.): La transmisión de conceptos cristianos a las lenguas amerindias: Estudios sobre textos y contextos de la época colonial. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2016. 307 pp. ISBN 978-3-89665-652-0. (Collectanea Instituti Anthropos, 48) Precio: € 39.00

In the introduction of the volume “La transmisión de conceptos cristianos a las lenguas amerindias: Estudios sobre textos y contextos de la época colonial,” Sabine Dedenbach-Salazar Sáenz explains that the book aims to show the linguistic methods used by the missionaries in their translations of Christian concepts, so that the native population could understand them and accept the new religion. By doing so, they thus created, on the one hand, “una lengua de cristianización” (a language of Christianization), and, on the other hand, a certain “nativización” (nativization) of the new religion. In addition to the introductory chapter, the book has twelve, highly interesting articles dealing with the strategies used by missionaries for the conversion of non-Christians and the transmission of religious texts and concepts.

Charles Garcia notes that the priests who went to America to Christianize the new land followed the same procedures as their predecessors did in the “Old World.” In the Early Middle Ages, the missionaries told the proselytes that their gods were demons serving Satan, the personification of all evil. The heathen sanctuaries and amulets were destroyed and replaced by churches and crosses. Since most of the rural people could not read, the primary texts of the Christian Doctrine were transmitted orally.

These texts were repeatedly recited, so that the people could memorize them. García also notes that Latin, the language in which the texts were written, was innovated with borrowings from Greek, Hebrew, or Armenian in order to translate the religious concepts that were missing in Latin.

In Mesoamerica and South America the meta-language or source language was usually Spanish or Portuguese, but it could also be Latin. As García, Otto Zwartjes likewise encountered Hebrew loans in the Latin and Spanish sources analyzed by him, and he also found “technical terms derived from the Arabic grammatical tradition” (47), such as the term *al-‘awāmil*¹⁴, i.e., “operators, producing a certain effect upon something,” which could be subdivided into *lafziyy* (expressed) or *ma‘nawī* (abstract). In addition, Zwartjes discusses the translation of the Latin verb *sum, es, fui* (to be) and its connotations into languages spoken in Mesoamerica and South America (Chiapaneco, Cholón, Dohema, Huasteco, Kakchikel, Mam, Mixe, Náhuatl, Tupí, Tzotzil, Xinka, Zoque), the Philippines (Iloco, Tagalog), and Granada (Arabic).

For the transmission of religious texts the missionaries also used a lingua franca as meta-language instead of Spanish, Portuguese, or Latin. The meta-languages treated in the present volume are Maya (Arzápalo), K’iche’ (Sachse), Tarascan (Jiménez y Monzón), Náhuatl (Danielewski, Ruhnau), Quechua (Dedenbach-Salazar Sáenz, Husson), Guaraní (Chamorro), Tupinambá (Barros e Monserrat), Chiquitano (Falkinger).

As regards the transmission of Christian concepts, the missionaries used the following methods: the use of borrowings (from Greek, Hebrew, Latin, Spanish, and Portuguese), calques or loan translations, neologies, literal (word-for-word/sense-for-sense) translations, transpositions, modulations, adaptations, and periphrases. Borrowing seems to be the most frequently employed method in the translations of religious documents. In addition to Spanish or Portuguese loanwords, the translators at first also used words from the object language or target language, i.e., the indigenous language at issue. Ramón Arzápalo shows that in such cases the indigenous “equivalents” of Catholic concepts retained their cultural load, so that they did not produce the translation desired by the priests. In “Calepino de Motul” (ca. 1600), for instance, the lexeme “church,” is translated into Maya as *kuuna* (divine house) or *yotuch kuu* (house of God). For the Maya the lexeme *kuu* referred to “deity/deities,” and, since the Spanish word “iglesia” did not mean “the place where the God lives” but “a place of divine cultus,” they considered *kuuna/yotuch kuu* as “the place for worshipping their deity/deities.” This heathenish interpretation is not what the priests had in view. Later on, the Spanish borrowing “iglesia” is employed for the translation of the concept “church.” Frauke Sachse also talks about the reuse of K’iché words to transmit Christian concepts, such as the terms *kobj’al* and *okisab’al*, both meaning “belief” (105) and *q’anal raxal* meaning “yellowness-greenness” (107). They were used for the translation of the concepts “faith” and “(divine) glory,” respectively.

Nora Jiménez and Cristina Monzón show that the notion of “faith” is explained by means of the hagiogra-

phy of Saint Eustace in Tarascan, in other words, “having faith” = “to live as Saint Eustace.” Monzón, Dedenbach-Salazar Sáenz and Elke Ruhnau shed light on the translation of the concept *alma/ánima* (soul) in Tarascan, Quechua, and Náhuatl, respectively. The missionaries tried to translate “soul” as *mintzita* (heart) in Tarascan, as *kama* (spirit), or *sunqu* (heart) in Quechua, and as *teyolitia* (the one who makes someone live) or *tonally* (warmth, summer, day, sign (of the birth) of the day, destiny) in Náhuatl. Angelika Danielewski deals with the translation of the word “paradise” in Náhuatl. The translators employed the terms *ilhuicatl ihtic* (inside heaven) and *tonatiuh ichan* (house of the sun) to interpret the meaning of “paradise.” Jean-Philippe Husson shows that the salutation “Ave Maria” (Hail Mary), for lack of an equivalent, is translated as *muchaycusayqui* in Quechua, literally meaning “I nicely adore/kiss you.” The Guaraní people used several nouns to indicate “God” and “devil.” Graciela Chamorro reveals that all these “equivalents” are in fact neologies. The same happens in Brazil with the vulgarization of Tupinambá. Cândida Barros and Ruth Monserrat show, for instance, that *Tupã* (God) became *Tupána* and the discontinuous negation “a ...i” became *niti(o)* in the vulgar language.

In conclusion, we can say that “La transmisión de conceptos cristianos a las lenguas amerindias” is worth consulting. It contains many phrases and terms in a large range of indigenous languages, used by different missionaries to exemplify certain religious notions and ideas. By comparing the examples from different sources and by scrutinizing them in detail, the authors of the articles could reveal the real, underlying meaning of the native term in question. Arzápalo, Jiménez y Monzón, and Monzón also added a text transcribed in the indigenous language followed by a translation in Spanish. Arzápalo includes a transcription of the first folio of “Chilam Balam de Chumayel,” a pre-Hispanic manuscript, in which he shows that a Maya discourse has a quadripartite arrangement based on the points of the compass: East, North, West, and South. In the text, they are indicated by means of the colours red, white, black, and yellow, respectively. The text added by Jiménez y Monzón is “Vida de San Eustaquio” (Life of Saint Eustace). Monzón appends to her article “El testamento de Magdalena Ocuyma (Ocuyma 1596)”, that is, “The Testament of Magdalena Ocuyma (Ocuyma 1596).” So, “La transmisión de conceptos cristianos a las lenguas amerindias,” in sum, is a fascinating book. It not only gives an insight in the strategies of the Church to propagate the faith and to convert non-Christian souls, it also contains a wealth of concepts and texts in indigenous languages all over the world.

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Ehret, Christopher: The Civilizations of Africa. A History to 1800. 2nd ed. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016. 470 pp. ISBN 978-0-8139-2880-7. Price: \$ 35.00

The first edition of this book appeared in 2002. It is addressed primarily to teachers and students in North