

ism. This would have led the author to undertake a more substantiated analysis of spirit possession as an embodied form of resistance an idea which is mentioned only briefly. In her effort to analyse embodied nationalism by sticking to the concept of “gesture,” the author has isolated possessive trembling (*zakama*) as well as Zairian *animation politique* from a wider range of connected bodily practices, such as jumping, breathing, and especially singing and vocal sound. *Zakama* appears as a soundless practice, although the author herself describes how followers of a church in Luozi speak in tongues while they tremble, and “the air around me is filled with sound and energy” (81). A focus on verbal practices and acoustics (Hunt 2008) would no doubt reveal important continuities between Kimbangu’s glossolalia and trembling and these very practices in Kinshasa’s “Églises de Réveil,” where clapping too is an important ritual gesture.

The reader interested in religion and politics in Africa will find in this book a helpful historical introduction to the case of Lower Congo prophetism and Zairian *animation politique*. Beyond this academic interest, it will surely make the reader discover and think about the political implications of gestures in his/her own everyday life.

Peter Lambertz

Custred, Glynn: *A History of Anthropology as a Holistic Science*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016. 255 pp. ISBN 978-1-4985-0763-9. Price: \$ 90.00

Glynn Custred is professor emeritus of anthropology at California State University, East Bay and a Central Andes specialist. Starting with the 18th century, he sets out to deliver a comprehensive history of the four-field approach and the holistic program of anthropology, as well as a philosophical foundation for both. The book is highly readable and clearly argued, offering broad coverage of a plethora of authors, theories, schools, and fieldwork in four national traditions. Its perspective is epistemological – looking not so much at anthropological data as at how it is handled conceptually – combined with disciplinary history. This is a well-chosen angle which reveals basic presuppositions at play in present-day anthropology – as well as in this book itself.

Before commenting on how his disciplinary history unfolds, let me start with my main reservation. Custred argues that since Franz Boas a holistic, four-field anthropology is “firmly bound together on a solid philosophical foundation ... now firmly established in the university ... based on a sound philosophical consideration of what science is ... [which justifies] the unity in a single discipline of such different fields as biology, linguistics, archaeology, and ethnology” (55, 57, cf. 64 ff.). However, the book is as much a historical analysis of as a partisan plea for the holistic approach! Time and again the latter angle gets in the way of the former one when Custred plays down rifts, fragmentation, and epistemological divergence.

Furthermore, he sees a major divide during the past 50 years between “scientific anthropology” and anthropological activism, but underplays the role of interpretive, culturalist approaches in both. Anthropology has

been described as the most scientific of the humanities and the most humanistic of the sciences. In sync with similar debates in philosophy, there is strong disagreement on which epistemic stance is most appropriate for analyzing anthropological data, the interpretive (*verstehen*) or the explanatory (*erklären*) one, and how, if at all, the two can be combined. In my view *that* is the major divide in anthropology. The philosophical foundation of “scientific anthropology” is much less solid and uniform than Custred wishfully thinks.

This ambitious, deep history of the discipline starts with its twofold roots in Enlightenment thought (stressing the unity of humankind as a species) and Romanticism (emphasizing the diversity of peoples; cf. A. von Humboldt, J. G. Herder). From there on 19th-century developments in various countries are sketched, including theories of race and evolutionist anthropology, with a well-chosen focus on German scholars such as G. Klemm, A. Bastian, and R. Virchow.

Captain Cook and Oceania are duly mentioned, but Custred misses out on how, as Han Vermeulen, an historian of anthropology, has been arguing during the last 20 years, ethnography began as field research by German-speaking historians and naturalists in Siberia during the first half of the 18th century, and was influentially generalized as “ethnology” by scholars in Göttingen (Germany) and Vienna (Austria) during the second half of the 18th century. In his synthesizing “Before Boas” (2015) Vermeulen shows direct lines from here to Franz Boas.

Custred also tries to cast J. F. Blumenbach, one of the 18th-century fathers of physical anthropology, as a forerunner of holism (11 f.), but closes his eyes for the latter’s dualism of human *bimana* versus animal *quadrumana*, which makes him a forerunner not of holism but of a metaphysics of human specialty that keeps holding anthropology captive and divided.

The stress on the influence of 19th-century German neo-Kantianism (H. Rickert!), historicism and hermeneutics on Boas and his disciples is well taken, but again Custred tries to force these developments into a holistic straightjacket. Of course, human sciences can also be nomothetic and natural sciences ideographic, as Custred underlines, but he forgets that the main point of these German scholars was rather the specialty (*Sonderstellung*) of humans as subjective self-conscious agents. The latter require an interpretive methodology, they argued, which is fundamentally different than the explanatory, objectifying one of the natural sciences. Through the Boasians – but also, hardly mentioned, through E. Durkheim, M. Mauss, and C. Lévi-Strauss, under the sway of French neo-Kantianism – this line of arguing flows directly into recent interpretive, culturalist anthropology. Boas’ dependence on R. Virchow, among others, is well illustrated, but Herder’s influence on him was in many respects even stronger.

A similar issue comes up in chap. 6 (Converging Sciences), which, laudably, ties linguistics and cognitive psychology into the analysis: if anything, the ordinary language philosopher John Searle (81) is a fierce critic – witness his “qualia argument” – of the idea that objectify-

ing explanatory approaches could ever fully account for the subjective aspect of humans.

Chapters 8 and 9, on physical anthropology and archaeology, are short and somewhat old-fashioned. They do not mention the sort of exciting new developments that a journal like for example *Evolutionary Anthropology* is full of and which show up at least some local convergence – between explanatory approaches in various fields. Examples of such developments are dual inheritance and cultural niche construction. Tellingly, the rift between explanatory processual and predominantly interpretive post-processual archaeology, connected and contributing to the epistemic divide in anthropology, is not discussed.

Chapters 10 to 13, again very readable, deal with 20th-century developments in US anthropology, but rather selectively. Like the rest of the book they are also fairly un-sourced, and much less structured and chronological than one would wish, if only for didactic purposes. Nonetheless, here Custred is at his best. We learn about the importance and nature of fieldwork, theoretical diversity, institutional developments, influences from British social anthropology, ecological anthropology, and the anthropology of art. Chapter 14 deals with linguistic anthropology, and in chapters 15 and 16 the author offers an excellent case study of combined approaches to the ethnography of the Andes culture area.

Custred believes that the main epistemological divide is scientific versus activist anthropology (e.g., p. 237). I do not agree: it is that between *erklären* (explanation) and *verstehen* (interpretation)! The latter approach follows on from an adamant metaphysic of human uniqueness which runs like a red thread through the discipline's history, *pace* Custred, and dictates an interpretive human and, morally speaking, humane science.

To him, “scientific” is, rather mono-theoretically, much closer to explanation than it is to interpretation (cf. chap. 5); so is consilience, in line with biologist E. O. Wilson's book on that subject. That the holistic perspective in anthropology comprises “knowledge of the whole ... increased through knowledge of its various parts” (87) again is a rather atomistic, reductionist, and as such scientist view. This leaves about half of the discipline out.

Why are most North American and European cultural and social anthropology – as variegated as both are – emphatically anti-Darwinian, and more concerned with meanings than with causes, with agency than with the laws of life? Why did Marshall Sahlins (only mentioned with respect to his earlier work) leave the American National Academy of Sciences in 2013, when life-sciences-inspired Amazonia specialist Napoleon Chagnon was elected a member? Why was there fifty years of Chagnon-bashing in the American Anthropological Association (AAA), and the reverse in the life and cognitive sciences oriented Human Behaviour and Evolution Society (HBES; not mentioned), which lauds Chagnon as one of its culture heroes? Why is the latter, author of one of the best sold ethnographies ever (two million copies) not mentioned in a major, 1,000 page recent encyclopedia of theory in anthropology (edited by R. J. McGee and R. L. Warms in 2013), nor, incidentally, by Custred? Why did

the AAA, controversially, drop the word “science” from its mission statement in 2010?

Such questions remain unanswered in this book. In fact, very many anthropologists still see culture as an extremely variable, relatively autonomous layer superimposed upon humankind's uniform biology. For them the distinctive quality of human beings is not that they live in and adapt to a material world, like other organisms, but that they do so according to meaningful, culturally variable symbolic schemes. They see humans as self-conscious, morally responsible agents, so different from other species that they require an approach which, they claim, is irreducible to that of the life and other natural sciences. In this ongoing dualism of a perhaps predominantly “neo-Kantian” discipline evolution is excluded from cultural studies. Efforts to bring the symbolic and moral world of society and culture within reach of behavioural ecology or evolutionary psychology meet a lot of resistance.

Nevertheless, I found Glynn Custred's book both enjoyable and provocative. Provided one keeps the above reservations in mind, his history of the holistic ideal in anthropology is, all in all, a welcome contribution to the reflexive awareness of the historicity and theory-laden character of knowledge, an awareness which is essential to the anthropologists's training and trade. As a plea for the holistic ideal the book also constitutes relevant early 21st-century source material for epistemological analysis itself.

Raymond Corbey

Dedenbach-Salazar Sáenz, Sabine (ed.): La transmisión de conceptos cristianos a las lenguas amerindias: Estudios sobre textos y contextos de la época colonial. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2016. 307 pp. ISBN 978-3-89665-652-0. (Collectanea Instituti Anthropos, 48) Precio: € 39.00

In the introduction of the volume “La transmisión de conceptos cristianos a las lenguas amerindias: Estudios sobre textos y contextos de la época colonial,” Sabine Dedenbach-Salazar Sáenz explains that the book aims to show the linguistic methods used by the missionaries in their translations of Christian concepts, so that the native population could understand them and accept the new religion. By doing so, they thus created, on the one hand, “una lengua de cristianización” (a language of Christianization), and, on the other hand, a certain “nativización” (nativization) of the new religion. In addition to the introductory chapter, the book has twelve, highly interesting articles dealing with the strategies used by missionaries for the conversion of non-Christians and the transmission of religious texts and concepts.

Charles Garcia notes that the priests who went to America to Christianize the new land followed the same procedures as their predecessors did in the “Old World.” In the Early Middle Ages, the missionaries told the proselytes that their gods were demons serving Satan, the personification of all evil. The heathen sanctuaries and amulets were destroyed and replaced by churches and crosses. Since most of the rural people could not read, the primary texts of the Christian Doctrine were transmitted orally.