

men are primarily “hormone-driven” (compare also the cognate word *wěřō* “intoxication”).

However, a detailed critique of the translation would not only go far beyond the scope of this review, it would also be quite unnecessary as the editors prove themselves expert translators. An outstanding achievement, this book is a monument of scholarship on Mpu Monagaṇa’s *Sumanasāntaka*. The text edition and translation make this Old Javanese poem accessible to a global audience and will, together with its accompanying elucidating essays, undoubtedly remain a standard reference for generations to come.

Edwin P. Wieringa

Zucker, Eve Monique: *Forest of Struggle. Moralities of Remembrance in Upland Cambodia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2013. 235 pp. ISBN 978-0-8248-3805-8. Price: \$ 28.00

This absorbing book delivers the reader into a Cambodian village in the southwest of Kampong Speu, deep in the Cardamom Mountains. The author provides an historical background of this forested region that has provided geographic isolation for those seeking refuge as fugitives, political insurgents, or visionaries over the centuries. The area region made strategic sense for the Khmer Rouge guerillas when they were seeking to occupy an area in the early 1970 onwards, where they could prepare and gather the infrastructure for their revolution.

The author begins with narrative material illustrating villagers’ past challenges and current daily lives. While presenting what seems to be a standard ethnographic study of a place she calls O’Thmaa, Zucker masterfully stitches together the trepidation within residents from the Khmer Rouge fallout that lingers in this particular place. She did not seek testimony from residents about the Khmer Rouge era and its aftermath. But through the course of her conversations with villagers, she learned about Khmer Rouge recruitment tactics and behavior by building trusting relations with those she came to know over the course of a few years. The themes, trust and morality, emerged as a central struggle for respondents in her study. How can one trust anyone who has violated the essential core of individual, collective, and ancestral well-being? How can people trust those who took away their future potential, forever? In this regard, Zucker strove to comprehend and explain Khmer perceptions of the static and shifting moral order in the context of O’Thmaa. In her sample, she found that the majority of adults who were former Khmer Rouge soldiers had lived their formative years under the regime. With little Buddhist or animistic exposure, they have been more vulnerable to missionaries’ imported projects, and more likely to adopt Christian, ideological views of a moral order. “In any case, these children of the revolution, who grew up without much *direct* Buddhist influence, were probably easy converts for the Methodist missionaries, who offered spiritual salvation as well as material help in the form of food and education” (111). What gets lost in conversion, she poses, is the advancement of moral messages embedded in Khmer mythical stories that highlight “being honest and bearing

traits of clarity and wisdom” (173). Regardless of avenues chosen, villagers’ trust of former Khmer Rouge seemed to increase as they witnessed former soldiers’ struggling to be released from their past – which yields another dimension in this “Forest of Struggle.”

Her book unfurls the living story of people and place. Her methods of inquiry allowed respondents to stretch out their lived history in ways that did not always shine a spotlight on the traumatic past. Zucker’s unyielding attention to context with an inclusive methodological process allowed her to generate and gather vital, contradictory experiences. All too often researchers of the Khmer Rouge period push for consistency and conclusions. What makes this work peculiarly powerful is the analysis of contradictions between and within respondents, which is most representative of how traumatized people experience their lives. In addition, the reader gains a sense of how the insulated, geographic “place” protected and abandoned children, youth, and adults under the Khmer Rouge. I would surmise that villagers’ experiences of confusion gave the Khmer Rouge one of its advantages as they curtailed resistance and increased compliance among villagers.

Zucker has lifted the bar for Cambodian genocide literature, while demonstrating the power of pursuing a classic ethnographic study. She has avoided the trap of over theorizing or intellectualizing on why the regime did what it did. Rather, her inquiry accounted equally for the utilitarian nature of the metaphysical influences in a particular mountain area where tigers still roam. What made Zucker’s book so remarkable for me was the way she accounted for a landscape that can absorb its inhabitants suffering. In this way, she brings a vital ethnographic lens to our genocide literature. “Features of the landscape also remind Cambodian people of particular moral tales, which are told and passed on to their children, who are then able to narrate them themselves ... But it is not just the mythical tales of the ancestors and enchanted creatures that are told; historical events are also absorbed into the land’s features” (134f.).

“Forest of Struggle” offers room for contemplation on *ritualcide* under the Khmer Rouge, and the protective strength offered by traditional rituals that protect people and their living places. (Relevant to this book under review is the operation of ritualcide – emanating from the strategic breakdown or blockage of access to traditional protective rituals by the Khmer Rouge. See: LeVine, Love and Dread in Cambodia. Weddings, Births and Ritual Harm under the Khmer Rouge. Singapore 2010.) Zucker accounts for the ways that men and women who were adults under Democratic Kampuchea reflect back in time on all that had been customary before the Genocide, but those who were children under DK cannot do this. A child’s reflective capacity for judging normal from abnormal had no developmental chance to solidify. The demographics of the region under study demonstrated how elderly sources of historical and ritual memories are disappearing.

In the concluding section of the book, Zucker discusses the ongoing Khmer Rouge Tribunal. For me, it was here that she sold herself short of heightened brilliance. I am confident she could have taken her thesis that next

ethnographic step and led the reader to contemplate further the metaphysical advance for the “Forest of Struggle.” By side stepping the Tribunal, she could have discussed avenues to advance ancestral justice. Clearly her

research points to indigenous, if not cosmological, sources from which villagers might gain access to the lived history whispered within their forested mountain.

Peg LeVine

Réponse à K. Mackowiak. – L’auteur d’une recension a toujours le droit de faire une sévère critique d’un ouvrage pourvu qu’il s’appuie sur des faits exacts. Cela ne semble pas être le cas de la critique que Mme Karin Mackowiak fait de mon ouvrage “Mythes grecs d’origine. Vol. 1 : Prométhée et Pandore”, dans l’*Anthropos* 108.2013/1 : 331.

Par exemple elle écrit : “Au fil de compte-rendus de lectures qui gênent la fluidité et avantagent des détails fort pointus pour un public non-spécialiste ...” Or j’avais prévu l’objection. Le livre est en corps 10 et les compte-rendus en question en corps 8. C’est même expliqué en page 4 de couverture : “Les passages les plus techniques, dont la lecture n’est pas indispensable à la compréhension du livre, sont en caractères plus petits et peuvent être sautés sans dommages”.

Mais le principal reproche que me fait Mme Mackowiak est, si j’ai bien compris, non pas d’être “vernantien”, mais de l’être presque exclusivement, et d’ignorer les autres apports. “L’ouvrage est une porte ouverte vers le plus pur structuralisme ‘vernantien’ ... Mais ne peut-on s’inspirer de ces recherches et d’autres conjointes pour renouveler plus avant le débat hésiodique ?”. “Car, mis à part les références structuralistes classiques – Jean-Pierre Vernant, Marcel Detienne, Nicole Loraux pour ne citer qu’eux –, on ne trouve que très peu de renvois à des recherches ‘extérieures’ : le colloque ‘Le métier du Mythe. Lectures d’Hésiode’ qui s’est tenu en 1996 à Lille, et la thèse d’État de J.-C. Carrière, heureusement, aident à varier certains propos mais jamais dans la mesure où ils auraient permis de renouveler la réflexion sur le mythe des races”.

Je ne cache pas ma dette vis-à-vis de Jean-Pierre Vernant qui est probablement celui des auteurs de sciences humaines qui m’a le plus influencé. Mais je ne suis pas servilement “vernantien”. Je ne suis pas d’accord avec la façon dont il oppose les deux versions du mythe de Prométhée et Pandore d’Hésiode : ma position étant plutôt celle de J.-C. Carrière (60–62), ni avec le statut qu’il donne à l’Espoir resté dans la jarre (76 s.), ni avec le rapprochement qu’il fait entre les hommes d’Argent et les Titans (251–261) que je propose plutôt de rapprocher

des hommes de Bronze. Et je ne suis pratiquement jamais d’accord avec N. Loraux, par exemple lorsqu’elle ne veut pas faire de Pandore une métonymie de la Terre (51 : n. 75) ou lorsqu’elle refuse un corps à Pandore (491) et un modèle à ce corps (50), enfin lorsqu’elle exclut le passage de l’unique Pandore aux femmes en général (57 : n. 88 ; 120 s.).

Et contrairement à ce qu’affirme Mme Mackowiak d’autres auteurs sont abondamment cités. Avec l’ordinateur c’est facile de compter : l’ouvrage le “Métier du Mythe” 110 fois, J.-C. Carrière 78 fois, (dont six pages quasi-intégralement reproduites pages 69–75 à propos de l’Espoir dans la jarre), sans oublier M. L. West (24 fois) M. C. Leclerc (qui comme J.-C. Carrière faisait partie de mon jury de thèse) 78 fois, W. J. Verdenius 27 fois, et bien d’autres encore comme A. Bonnafé, G. Devereux, G. Arrighetti, L. Kahn, C. Ramnoux. Il n’est d’ailleurs pas sûr que tous ces auteurs, sans être des épigones de J.-P. Vernant, soient en contradiction avec lui, loin de là.

Mais le plus étrange sous la plume de Mme Mackowiak c’est l’expression “structuralisme ‘vernantien’”. Ainsi peut-on lire “à brasser les thèses scientifiques essentiellement structuralistes” ou encore “[p]our qui approche Hésiode comme un structuraliste à l’exclusion du reste”. Ni J.-P. Vernant, ni moi-même ne sommes structuralistes. J.-P. Vernant s’en est longuement expliqué dans un article intitulé “Raisons du Mythe” qui constitue le dernier chapitre de “Mythe et société en Grèce ancienne” (Paris, 1974). Il reprend et critique l’analyse “à l’américaine” que C. Lévi-Strauss fait du mythe d’Œdipe (240 s.) puis il montre que la méthode Lévi-Straussienne est inapplicable aux mythes grecs en prenant l’exemple d’Hésiode justement (246).

Quant à moi je consacre un chapitre entier (ch. X : 375–404) à la critique du structuralisme. Après avoir, à mon tour et à ma façon, démontré l’inadéquation de la méthode structuraliste au mythe de Prométhée et Pandore chez Hésiode, je n’hésite pas à traverser l’Atlantique pour exprimer mon scepticisme quant à l’application de cette méthode aux mythes amérindiens eux-mêmes.

Patrick Kaplanian