tian Frenopoulo um Heilung, Arneide Cemin basiert ihre Ritualanalyse auf dem Marcel Mauss'schen Ansatz zu Körpertechniken, und Edward MacRae stellt den öffentlichen Umgang mit Ayahuasca in Brasilien in den Mittelpunkt seiner Abhandlung, um nur einige zu nennen. Die meisten Autoren beziehen sich in ihrer Interpretation der ethnografischen Daten auf ausgewählte ethnologische Theorien, so dass sich durchaus über den ethnografischen Rahmen hinweg Anknüpfungspunkte zu anderen ethnologischen Forschungsfeldern anbieten. Den Lesern bietet sich insgesamt betrachtet ein umfassendes Bild über die gegenwärtigen ethnologischen Studien zu Ayahuasca in Brasilien, aber gleichzeitig auch Ausgangspunkte zu weiteren Untersuchungen. So fehlt der Blick über Brasilien hinaus, nicht nur auf die Verbreitung der Ayahuasca-Religionen in Nordamerika und Europa, sondern auch der Vergleich mit ähnlichen Religionen, wie beispielsweise die Native American Church in Nordamerika, die auf dem rituellen Konsum von Peyote basiert und große Ähnlichkeit mit den Ayahuasca-Religionen aufweist. Mitunter hätte ich mir von den Autoren gewünscht, dass sie einen Blick über Brasilien und den Diskurs in der brasilianischen Ethnologie hinaus werfen (es zeigt sich übrigens immer noch, wie stark Lévi-Strauss brasilianische Ethnologen beeinflusst hat). Auch ist mitunter die Sprache sehr "brasilianisch", d. h. Satzstellung und Redewendung können nicht verleugnen, dass der Text aus dem brasilianischen Portugiesisch ins Englische übersetzt wurde (trotz erneuter redaktioneller Bearbeitung). Dennoch überwiegt die positive Leistung der Publikation, die vermutlich gerade unter Studierenden der Ethnologie weite Beachtung finden wird. Bettina E. Schmidt

Lieberman, Victor: Strange Parallels. Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830. Vol. 2: Mainland Mirrors. Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 947 pp. ISBN 978-0-521-53036-1. Price: £ 83.00

On the half title of the second volume of Lieberman's "Strange Parallels" the reader is run over by effusive quotations from reviews of "Strange Parallels", volume 1, in which the author developed his cyclic-cum-linear model of political organization. This model evolved from a thorough analysis of mainland Southeast Asian polities, especially in Burma and Siam. The core idea holds that these polities lived through sequences of decline and decay followed by ever stronger administrative units, a growing use of cultural items as paraphernalia of power, and an ever wider domain of political control.

Originally Lieberman "intended to write a one-volume history of mainland Southeast Asia from c. 800 to 1830, with a concluding chapter suggesting similarities to premodern Russia." Lieberman is not modesty-ridden. "Not unlike Michel de Montaigne, I found that the more I ate, the bigger my appetite became" (xxi). And he "began to sense that mainland Southeast Asia shared critical developmental features not only with Russia but with other far-flung sectors of Eurasia, and that analysis of those features could help to free Southeast Asia from the historiographic ghetto in which it had long been confined." The awkward comparison aside – nobody forced Southeast Asia into non-consideration by comparison-minded historians –, Lieberman is the first to compare under structural criteria mainland Southeast Asia with Russia and France and Japan, then with China and South Asia, and finally with "the Islands," i.e., island Southeast Asia – as if Japan did not consist of islands. In his own words: "As a scholar of Burma, I attempt to join Southeast Asian to world history for the first time in serious and sustained fashion" (11). The author is going to compare long-term trends to political and cultural integration. There were some attempts to analyse Eurasian topics, yet we have only "a modest comparative literature on pre-1850 Eurasian state formation. … Yet no scholar has considered the central questions of this volume: Why during at least a thousand years did regions on the far reaches of Eurasia, with distinctive social and economic systems and little or no contact, experience parallel consolidations? Why not uninterrupted construction in one region, permanent collapse in another, and random, directionless oscillations in yet a third?" (9 f.). Apart from the fact that there cannot be permanent collapse, there will be lines of consolidation only if the level of abstraction is high enough to leave time and space for nondirectional developments, and definitely nonlinear ones. Among the prominent ubiquitous peculiarities of this consolidation process are according to Lieberman the declining duration and severity of successive periods of fragmentation. In terms of structural consolidation this seems to be a logical step, since much of the administrative elements already exist. In most cases palaces for the ruler and barracks for the military still exist after a decline; much of the waterworks still functions with canals and sluices to be used; bridle and horseshoes, saddle and stirrups have not to be invented again once they had been in use. Tailors will use different cuts, the colours may show different colours, but banners and their meaning do not have to be invented again. And since most people adjust to forms of power and even violence once they get lodgings and provisions, times of anarchy and periods of revolt come to a soon end once a new government satisfies basic needs. Lieberman himself seems to point out this basis and the subsequent additions, when he writes that the first extensive indigenous polities (Pagan, Angkor, and Dai Viet) in their respective sector provided a political and cultural charter for later generations. It is in recognition of this legacy that Lieberman terms these states "charter" polities and the period between c. 850 and 1300 or 1350 the "charter era."

That with a new recentralizing period beginning in the mid-1400s there happened shifts toward the lowlands at some distance from the old charter capital, and that each state was substantially innovative in administrative and cultural terms, seems self-evident, since otherwise the old state would have functioned and not fragmented.

Territorial consolidation, administrative centralization, and cultural integration are the three processes the author is following up to give a summary of the principal arguments of vol. 1 of "Strange Parallels" concerning the history of mainland SE-Asia. Territorial consolidation

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is brought about and furthered by borrowing major elements in the literary arts and from world religions from "older, more densely settled Eurasian cores," i.e., India and China, and then – through conquest, patronage, and expanding religious networks – these first charter states came into existence. After the first interregnum a new consolidation, starting in the second half of the 15th century, relied mainly on renewed agricultural reclamation, expanding long-distance trade, movements of religious reform, and the introduction of Chinese and more especially European-style firearms. The "new" empires tried to strengthen the gravitational pull of the capital. With the polity becoming wider the king became more ceremonially remote, while the military grip became much stronger, and the whole administrative apparatus acquired many rational elements, like in censuses, cadastres, a refined tax system, and social regulations.

Cultural integration, the third index of general integration, has to do mainly with religious practices, languages, and ethnicity. Whereas "culture" was used by Lieberman much in the way proposed by Clifford Geertz as an unsutured complex of negotiated symbols whose interpretation normally fluctuates (26), he now starts to keep his distance from these silly postmodern ideas: "At the same time within any stable population, by definition, such rules permit a measure of common identifications and implicit understandings." Gone are the days, when symbols let alone power relations were "negotiated."

The general tendency sees in each of the three or four river basins or coastal areas one major religion, one major language, one major ethnicity, the latter in the sense that people say, that they (now) are Burmese, Siamese, or Vietnamese.

Lieberman adds to the three indices of general integration four phenomena which stand for the underlying dynamics of these processes: expansion of material resources, new cultural currents, intensifying interstate competition, and diverse state interventions. Each phenomenon "had a certain autonomy, yet all four constantly reinforced and modified one another" (31). This is flexible enough. Included under the rubric "material expansion" are commercial, demographic, and agrarian expansion as well as the importation of firearms, which together magnified the superiority of emergent political cores over less favored districts. Demographic expansion is seen this way: in the postcharter era "more individualized landholding systems and new commercial opportunities favoured double- and triple-cropping and more labor-intensive systems of planting, irrigation, and harvesting. In circular fashion, the resultant demand for labor encouraged population growth …" (34). In addition to agriculture, handicrafts and retail distribution asked for an additional labour force. Thus between 1400 and 1820 population in the western and central mainland probably doubled, "while in what is now Vietnam it more than tripled." It looks like there is no population growth all by itself.

Among the new cultural currents that favoured political centralization were Theravada as well as Confucian ideology that put the ruler in the position of font of morality and bulwark against anarchy. Training and certification of scholars as well as administrators became common as did an ethic of self-discipline, moral obligation, and emotional mastery, all of which added to the general pacification process.

The main result of the long introductory chapter then is that Lieberman compares polities in what he calls the protected zone that by local standards the political and cultural cohesion in 1830 exceeded that in 1600, which exceeded that in 1400, and so forth. The protected zone is that area of Eurasia which was not to any major degree influenced by Inner Asian nomad warriors. Thus examples stem from mainland Southeast Asia, Japan, Russia, and France. "I could have used England, Spain, Portugal, or Sweden, but French political centrality, the sophistication of French historiography, and a political chronology eerily similar to that of mainland Southeast Asia make it more attractive" (49). Of course is it more attractive to choose examples which from the beginning show the criteria of the core phenomenon to be analyzed and explained. As for mainland Southeast Asia, Lieberman now discusses 9 factors promoting Eurasian Coordination (77–92), which results in the following statement: "All nine factors operated in each of our six realms, which helps to explain why their political and cultural chronologies began to mesh more closely. But the local mix of factors and geographic and cultural contexts differed, which is why we find innumerable specific differences"(92). At what expense is this display of words? The following chapter deals with the mounted warrior, the Inner Asian nomad warriors who invaded the areas of the "precocious" (Lieberman) civilizations, i.e., China and South Asia (he could also have taken as examples West Asia or Northern Africa). It is a matter of the open steppe area where Inner Asian conquest started and later invaded the "exposed zones", the result being externally assisted integration by the Manchu and the Mughal respectively.

Were it not for the detailed material and the rich language which promotes the readability of the following chapters, one might end up confused by the meagre results of the boastful proclamation by Lieberman and the embarrassing view of one of the reviewers that a demanding agenda for future researchers is set here "that makes earlier approaches appear almost Jurassic by comparison."

The good reading stuff is in chapters 2 to 7, where 2 and 3 are devoted to a comparative analysis of Russia and France, and chapter 4 dealing with Japan, which in spite of strong exogenous influences is counted among the "protected zone" territories, mainly since there were no foreign rulers. Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to the "exposed zones," China and South Asia respectively, with South Asia in an "intermediate" position. And, finally, insular Southeast Asia has the privilege to constitute a new subtype (chap. 7) with the Iberian and Dutch colonialists to take over the role of the Inner Asian mountain warriors, thus changing "the islands" to an exposed zone. It is to be hoped that some of the key words (charter state, charter area, protected zone, exposed zone, solar system) will not suffocate the highly interesting reading of chapters 2 to 7 containing many parallels, but also convergences, and

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definitely quite divergent features, which only by force could be streamlined to fit the catchwords.

Wolfgang Marschall

Liebersohn, Harry: The Return of the Gift. European History of a Global Idea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 210 pp. ISBN 978-1-107-00218-0. Price: £ 50.00

Harry Liebersohn is a modern historian whose previous work has been devoted to placing European encounters with other peoples in wider social and intellectual contexts. In this short but extremely suggestive and ambitious book he addresses the classical ethnological contributions to gift exchange with reference to the contemporary circumstances in which those scholars wrote, their personal intellectual formation, but also the long term importance of gift exchange in European societies and in European social philosophy. His main thesis is that the European tradition was occluded towards the end of the eighteenth century, before being miraculously revived at the beginning of the twentieth by early ethnological endeavours. Marcel Mauss's famous essay of 1925 was the culmination which returned "the gift" to Europe. In outlining this analysis, Liebersohn not only shows wide knowledge of the history of anthropology but also engages directly with the ethnological data of Boas, Thurnwald, and Malinowski. Although written primarily for historians (and resoundingly endorsed by the doyenne of US anthropologically-oriented historians Natalie Zemon Davis), this book will also be read with pleasure and profit by ethnologists wishing to understand their own traditions, and in particular how some of their most celebrated predecessors hit upon themes among the *Naturvölker* that turn out to be of universal significance.

Liebersohn opens with the trial of Warren Hastings in late-eighteenth-century London. The former governor of Bengal was accused of accepting illicit gifts for personal profit. Edmund Burke denounced his corruption from the vantage point of an evolved stable system in which social regulations were regulated by all manner of gifts and tribute; in his world view the *zamindars* of Bengal were the equivalents of the gentry in Britain. By contrast, James Mill could see no place for such lubrication in his model of rational administration, which gained general acceptance in the course of the nineteenth century, along with his son's utilitarian philosophy. Liebersohn then steps back more than a century to investigate the diversity of this "liberal" tradition. He starts with Thomas Hobbes, who acknowledged the importance of the voluntary gift, just as Adam Smith made room for it alongside his theory of "commercial society" a century later. By contrast, Bernard Mandeville represented the narrow strand of liberalism that posits self-interest as the sole and universal key to human nature. Liebersohn then jumps to Friedrich List and the formation of the German Historical School in mid-nineteenth-century Germany to find academic alternatives to rampant utilitarianism. In particular, Karl Bücher provided more nuanced accounts of how economic life varied in the stages of evolution. Eventually, in the later editions of "Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft," Bücher recognized the need to complement his emphasis on household autonomy by integrating gift exchange.

Chapter 3 depicts the communitarian obverse of this liberal tradition, starting with Adam Ferguson's "rude republic of virtue" and continuing in the nineteenth century with Lewis Henry Morgan, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels. None of these authors paid significant attention to gift exchange. Liebersohn's main point is that their naïve visions of primitive communism were just as distorted as the extremes of Mandeville and Mill. Only the consolidation of ethnological fieldwork in the work of Franz Boas, Richard Thurnwald, and Bronislaw Malinowski brought the gift back into focus, by setting aside the futile European dichotomies which opposed liberal-individualism to socialist-collectivism. Despite the differences between them, Liebersohn holds that all of these scholars were deeply marked by their professional training in Germany. Finally, in his last substantive chapter he shows how the polymath Marcel Mauss drew on their contributions, and on a great deal more from his networks of collegial reciprocity in the Durkheimian school, to produce the definitive synthesis; this retained an evolutionist narrative but argued at the same time for the political necessity to embrace new forms of gift exchange in rebuilding European societies after the devastation of the First World War.

A historian who ventures to trespass in the sacred core of another discipline takes risks in some ways as bold as those taken by Thurnwald and Malinowski in Melanesia. Compression of this complex tale into a text of 170 pages, many of which are devoted to biographical details of little relevance to the main themes, will leave some readers dissatisfied. Historians may wonder why Liebersohn explores Hobbes but not Locke. Why Ferguson but not Rousseau? Why overlook large bodies of classical and medieval scholarship? Anthropologists may also complain about omissions, though Liebersohn does in his notes provide helpful long lists to show his awareness of recent contributions, in French and German as well as English. Some will protest that he is too generous to his heroes, especially to Mauss, who for all his selfless dedication to the Durkheimian collective was not as forthcoming as he might have been about his debts to Bücher and other German scholars. Malinowski cognoscenti will notice that he is presented as a son of Poland; but Cracow was part of the Habsburg Empire at this time. Malinowski did not obtain his doctorate in physics but with a philosophical study based on the positivism of Ernst Mach, which was more significant for his functionalist theories than his later studies in Germany. The island of his most celebrated fieldwork Kiriwina is erroneously named Kiriwana; Frazer, whose paradigm he displaced, is Fraser. Worse (since we generally consider personal names to be inalienable possessions), it is embarrassing to come across Marilyn Weiner (replacing Annette) and Arthur Radcliffe-Brown (replacing Alfred). Liebersohn has found a few nuggets in the archives, such as a delightful put-down of Malinowski by Mauss ("décidément un malin, pourvu d'un piètre courage"). But I was disappointed that he does not dig much deeper into the case of Thurnwald than Marion

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