

Post-Conflict Security Reconstruction versus Entrenched Elite Interests

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Abstract: Security sector reform (SSR) in the wake of violent conflict is widely considered a prerequisite for long-term peace-building. External actors often invest significant resources to promote the formation of effective armed forces and police units. Even so, the results in many instances are disappointing, even dismal. The argument of this article is that the failure of SSR is often rooted in the diverging interests of external actors on the one hand and local rulers on the other. SSR in the DR Congo serves as an illustration of the argument.

Keywords: Security sector reform, DR Congo, peace-building
Sicherheitssektorreform, Demokratische Republik Kongo, Friedensaufbau

Security sector reform is a prerequisite for long-term peace-building. It may be successful if local and external actors share a common vision¹ or if, at least, expectations converge. In reality, divergent interests are frequent. Local actors enjoy considerable leverage to counter or sabotage external reform strategies if they run against their interests. An emphasis on opposite preferences and interests shaping the interaction between external state-builders and their local partners may correct perspectives that only focus on technical, organizational and institutional processes and constraints, such as resource availability, donor coordination, organizational structures and strategic planning.² SSR reforms as conceived by external state-builders are often not in tune with the imperative of local rulers to stay in power. As a result, there is a disconnect between external and local interests that impedes 'cooperative state-building'. Drawing on the case of security sector reform in the DR Congo, this article illustrates the extent to which policy failure is the result of divergent interests and foreign-driven technical, institutional and organizational approaches that are detached from political context and the preferences of local actors.

1. The Case of the DR Congo

The DRC saw a protracted violent conflict that started in 1996 and formally ended in 2002/2003. Post-conflict elections were held in 2006, which brought incumbent president Joseph Kabila back to power. Even though these elections were widely hailed as a major breakthrough and the start of new era that would lead to peace-building and state-building, these views were too optimistic.

No doubt, SSR in the Congo has been a failure. Violence and insecurity have remained pervasive after the 2006 'post-conflict' elections. Violence has continued in eastern Congo and even spread to areas such as Equateur and Bas Congo provinces that

were barely affected by violent conflict before. The Congolese army (FARDC) is plainly incapable of neutralizing armed groups that are still roaming the country. Still more disconcerting is that the FARDC constitutes the single most important threat to the security of the population as it commits human rights abuses 'wherever it is present'.³

It is insufficient to say that SSR in the Congo has achieved 'limited progress'.⁴ '[I]n fact there is at present no real SSR in DRC'.⁵ This assessment is severe, given the SSR measures by the world's largest UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC), two distinct SSR projects by the European Union (EUSEC and EUPOL) and a plethora of projects undertaken by bilateral donors, including the US, China, Angola, Belgium, France and South Africa. In 2009, the UK joined the club of SSR promoters when it announced a SSR project worth \$131 million.⁶ The large external support for SSR in the DR Congo begs the question why SSR is failing to achieve the desired results.

An answer may be found by taking a hard look at the attitude of the Congolese government towards SSR. As one report has noted, the reform of the security sector in the Congo is 'supply-driven'.⁷ The government fails to provide leadership or to embrace national ownership, therefore, the best intentions and large resources of donors are unlikely to show results. Evidently, the Congolese government has no interest in SSR, or at least not in the form that donors seek to promulgate; the DRC government has other priorities, while the external actors tend to have expectations the government cannot meet. Donors fail to take the political preferences of Congo's elites into account.

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1 Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher, 'The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood', in Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (eds.), *Statebuilding after Civil War*, (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 23-53.
2 David M. Law, 'Conclusion: Security Sector (Re)Construction in Post-Conflict Settings', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2006, pp. 111-123.

3 United Nations, *The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (July–December 2006)*, Kinshasa, p. 19; State Department, *DR Congo Human Rights Report 2009*. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135947.htm>

4 Henri Boshoff et al., *Supporting SSR in the DRC: Between a Rock and a Hard Place*, The Hague, March 2010, p. 4.

5 Hans Hoebeker, Henri Boshoff and Koen Vlassenroot, 'Monsieur le Président vous n'avez pas d'armée. Evaluation de la réforme du secteur de sécurité et son impact sur les provinces du Kivus', in: Trefon (ed.) *Réforme au Congo, Cahiers Africains n°76*, 2009, p. 136.

6 'A Multinational Road to Army Reform', *Africa Confidential*, 24 July 2009.

7 Boshoff et al., *Supporting SSR in the DRC*, p. 4.

2. SSR under the Transitional Government

Congo's transition period under the auspices of a power-sharing government began with the peace accord in late 2002 and the elections of 2006. Congo's external backers were the driving force behind the polls and they invested huge resources to organize them. As a consequence, Congo's political leaders, uneasily assembled in the government of national unity, focused on the upcoming election. From their point of view, the elections were a continuation of the war by other means. President Kabila sought to maintain power while the former rebel leaders sought to displace him by winning the elections. In their view, surely they had not fought the war to enjoy the privileges of power during a short transition period, only to lose power again after the polls? Anxieties therefore grew that one side or the other may challenge unfavourable election results by violent means. For the very same reason, none of the leading factions had abandoned control over their best fighting forces. Consequently, the idea that substantial SSR and DDR could be pursued during a transition that was to be ended through elections, proved an illusion.

Given its heterogeneous composition and the distrust among the former antagonists, the government of national unity was deeply dysfunctional. All elites sought to cash in on their access to power, the revenues of which were partly invested in electoral campaigning. In 2005, for example, several million dollars earmarked for military pay "disappeared" each month.⁸ Since the formation of effective security forces was not a national priority, the SSR activities of MONUC and bilateral donors amounted to quick-fix, 'low-level capacity building.'⁹ Furthermore, internationals confined army and police reform to a means for other ends, notably elections, the key objective of the transitional process.¹⁰ This was evidenced by the large-scale support for rapid intervention and anti-riot police units that were deployed in Kinshasa.

3. Post-election SSR

Although the elections of 2006 settled the domestic power struggle in a relatively peaceful way, they did not provide a new momentum for SSR. While donors were eager to discuss with the new government a comprehensive security sector reform, Kabila followed a different rationale. He made clear that a well coordinated multilateral donor approach to SSR was not in his interest. Arguably Kabila's main interest was to push back the international supervisory influence that his government had had to endure during the transition period. While international intervention in the Congo was a far cry from the intrusiveness that other violent places have experienced (i.e. Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia), the representatives of the international community in Kinshasa had made significant efforts to shape the peace process. They repeatedly criticized stalled reforms, human rights abuses and

corruption. To increase leverage over the government, external actors had created the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT), a body of international representatives that accompanied the transition. With the end of the transition this body was dissolved and the Kabila government made every effort to prevent the creation of a follow-up body that could encroach on 'Congo's sovereignty'. The government only agreed to the formation of technical committees ('committee de suivi') for police and justice reform.

Kabila's point of view was somehow understandable. Had it not been the internationals that had pushed for elections? Did they not declare them as 'free and fair'? Did Congo not have now a legitimate government? Clearly, Congo's self-declared partners faced the contradictions of their approach, i.e. pushing for the election of a legitimate government on the one hand, yet seeking to continue to act as a supervisor on the other.

The government's attitude left externally-backed reform in limbo. Foreign officials complained repeatedly that the Congolese government offered neither structure nor process to move SSR forward. It also failed to come up with a vision or strategic framework that donors could support. When donors eventually managed to get the army leadership involved in discussions on a framework for SSR and the chief of staff of the army seemed to agree to a strategic plan, Congo's Minister of Defence interfered and unceremoniously shelved the plan. This clearly underpinned what the president had said all along, i.e. that he had no interest in comprehensive SSR. It should also have served as a lesson. While various and often competing power centres within the government existed, the rebuttal of the army chief signalled that the political hierarchy was intact.

In January 2010 the Minister of Defence presented a comprehensive reform plan for the defence sector, which was to be implemented in three phases. It was unveiled that the ministry expected the costs of the first phase alone to be \$3 billion. Thus, the government turned discussions with its partners into a 'donor conference'.¹¹ The result was predictable: donors refused to make significant pledges in face of the unrealistic estimates about the costs of SSR. This was not simply a matter of bargaining; donors had come to mistrust the government after years of foot-dragging and they expected that they should have a stake in the drawing up of SSR, not only in financial terms. This, of course, was difficult as the government has proved to be uncooperative in any number of fields and continued to hide real (as opposed to virtual) data on the size of the army, military budgets and expenditure, contributing to a situation where donors expected the government to clean up its act whereas the government was waiting for donors to cough up money for a reform that they were overtly so eager to support. This conundrum was never solved, leading the government to seek fresh money elsewhere (i.e. China). Meanwhile, SSR continued on an insignificant level.

⁸ Englebert and Tull, 'Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa', p. 124.

⁹ Refugees International, *Transition without Military Transformation*.

¹⁰ Renner Onana and Hannah Taylor, 'MONUC and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, pp. 514ff.

¹¹ Boshoff et al., *Supporting SSR in the DRC*, p. 29; Sébastien Melmot, *Candide au Congo: L'échec annoncé de la réforme du secteur de sécurité (RSS)*, (Paris: IFRI, 2008), p. 19.

4. Explaining SSR Failure: Incompatible Interests

Foreign-driven SSR reform faced various obstacles over the years. Donors attributed at least some of them to a 'lack of capacity' of the Congolese state. This view seemed to justify technical solutions (i.e. building administrative and bureaucratic capacities), but it denied political realities: Kabila had overtly rejected a comprehensive SSR plan. The most obvious factor to explain this resistance is the ongoing violence, although largely limited to the province of North Kivu. International actors pushed for SSR although Congo had not reached the post-conflict phase. In fact, violence and internal displacement increased in the wake of the elections. This observation is non-trivial. Given the escalation of the insurgency of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP, led by Laurent Nkunda) since late 2006, the Kabila regime was politically insecure. As a consequence, the regime had little patience to argue about SSR while the army waged military operations in North Kivu that were disastrous as the CNDP dealt humiliating defeats to the army. The little willingness that may have existed to undertake SSR was effectively evaporating. President Kabila had carried large electoral majorities in the Kivus in 2006 on his security promises. The CNDP increasingly became a political embarrassment as voices from the Kivus grew louder about the incapacity or unwillingness of the government to address the human misery. Kabila's handling of the crisis put him under political pressure, as his approach to the Nkunda problem – a military solution – failed time and again.¹² Although Nkunda eventually called for all out national liberation, it is debatable whether he actually intended to march on Kinshasa. The threat from the CNDP threatened the survival of the Kabila regime. Kabila's subsequent decision to invite back the Rwandan army was a daring gamble that could have led to his downfall as it led to a fallout with Vital Kamerhe, a leading Kivu politician and a senior member of Kabila's party. Thus, the quest for regime survival decisively determined the priorities of the Kabila regime.

Ironically, the insurgency in North Kivu increased the government's willingness to engage in SSR, but only in one component: the formation of a rapid reaction intervention force. Whereas the Congolese government was interested in the formation of effective fighting forces, donors sought to initiate structural reform that would promote law-abiding, non-partisan security forces.¹³ Donors such as Belgium and the US have agreed to support the formation of a unit able to crush insurgents and other spoilers. It may also have served as a gesture. Dangling the carrot of a rapid reaction force, it was hoped that the government's overall support towards SSR may be enhanced.¹⁴ Admittedly, the government finally proposed a plan for SSR, but it was more an invitation to donors to put money on the table rather than embarking on structural reform. The half-hearted signals that the government has sent over the past years were mostly meant to avoid the alienation of donors, while also confusing them over the government's intentions.

External actors attributed contradictory statements by officials to a failure of communication within the Congolese administration. However, it is revealing that of the three components of SSR (i.e. defence, police, justice), defence was by far the most problematic subject, while the politically secondary fields (police and justice) made at least some tacit, though still disappointing progress.¹⁵ It is no coincidence that, contrary to what happened in the police and justice sectors, the government refused to set up a joint government-international partner forum. Confusion among outsiders does not mean that important decisions are taken without the knowledge and approval of the president. It was the president who directed the military campaign against the CNDP and later the joint Congolese-Rwandan operations against the FDLR.¹⁶ Likewise, it has been alleged that Kabila took the decision to ask MONUC to leave the country, without consulting his generals.¹⁷ The presidency is also at the heart of pervasive patronage networks. No state official was ever brought to court for alleged fraud or the embezzlement of funds. None of the individuals from the Ministry of Defence and the national army who diverted \$8 million of the money earmarked to pay army soldiers has been brought to justice. The security services and some of their leaders are at the heart of the government's patronage networks. Providing them with resources, or letting them embezzle public resources (or not), is part and parcel of regime survival. Hence, neither they nor the government have an interest in creating an army with clear lines of command, efficient bureaucratic structures and democratic oversight. This is one of the principal reasons why the EUSEC project of the EU, which seeks to separate military command structures from the bureaucratic structures responsible for the army payroll has had limited success. Generals and commanders would cut the branch on which they sit if they were to cooperate with EUSEC.

5. Preliminary Conclusions

Since President Kabila's election in 2006, the political system remains exceedingly autocratic and corrupt, and political power is highly personalized. There is no reason to expect that SSR can move any faster than other (externally-driven) efforts directed to reform the nature of the state.¹⁸ Security is imperative for the government; expecting Kabila to let external actors have a substantial say in the (re)organisation of the security forces was, and is, misplaced. He does not share the emphasis on human rights of external SSR promoters. The very existence of bureaucratic state structures could expose rulers to a wide range of uncertainties. With respect to security, Will Reno has explained that rulers tend to take decisions that actually weaken their national armies.¹⁹ Regime survival would require inefficient security forces, because, as Reno notes, a functioning

15 Hoebeke et al., 'Monsieur le Président vous n'avez pas d'armée', in: Trefon (ed.), *Réforme au Congo*.

16 When operations against the FDLR in 2009 started, the chief of staff of the Congolese army conceded that he was not informed.

17 'UN-Blauhelme sollen Kongo verlassen', *Die Tageszeitung*, 27 May 2010.

18 Boshoff et al., *Supporting SSR in the DRC*, p. 9.

19 William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

12 Believed to have some 5,000 troops, the CNDP faced a Congolese army which had an estimated 20,000 soldiers in North Kivu.

13 Boshoff et al., *Supporting SSR in the DRC*, p. 9.

14 I owe this observation to Hans Hoebeke.

army constitutes an independent power base from which challengers to political rulers may emerge.

To understand the failure of SSR, it is instructive to reconsider pre-war Congo and President Mobutu's (1965-1997) security policies. Since Congo's independence, the army has always been a force of disorder. During the post-colonial period, the capacities of the army deteriorated sharply for a variety of reasons, including pay irregularities and shortages of supply and housing. This in turn increased the indiscipline of soldiers that preyed on the population. Fear and resentment characterized the relationship between the population and the army. The pinnacle of the downturn was reached in the early 1990s, when army units went on looting sprees across the country. When faced with insurgents, the combat record of the army was exceedingly poor and only outside help secured the defeat of the Katanga rebellions in 1978 and 1997. Although Mobutu himself denounced the army as a 'scourge', he was the architect of its decline. Since his coup in 1965, Mobutu had sought to ascertain his grip over the army by creating patronage networks and inducing rivalries among different factions and army leaders that was intent to impede 'the emergence of a unified security force with a single command structure.'²⁰ Mobutu constituted the centre of gravity, using patronage to foster the personal loyalty of the generals, while encouraging competition among them and tolerating 'inept performance as the price of personal security.'²¹ This has deeply compromised the capacities and discipline of the army, undermining its fighting power and turning it into the major threat for the population. As one observer wrote at the time: 'It is the very importance of the military in Zairian [Congolese] politics that makes it so dangerous to Mobutu, and it is this threat precisely, the necessary fear of the military, which results in Mobutu's extraordinary efforts to divide, control, manipulate, politicize, and otherwise deinstitutionalize and de-professionalize it.'²²

The political imperative of personal and regime security decisively determines government policy towards the security sector, the imperative trumps military capacities and professionalism. The Mobutu period saw endless restructuring of the army. Then, as today, foreign partners trained elite units that were to bridge the tension between requirements of regime security and actual security threats. Yet, as Young and Turner concluded: 'The security forces are one major component of the crisis of the contemporary state. No formula has yet been discovered to make the FAZ [army] a reliable and proficient force for the actual defense of the country, even though diverse training programs have imparted skills to a large number of individual officers and soldiers.'²³

A brief glimpse at the Liberian case reveals how the political context matters for SSR. Liberia's pre-war political setting, including the security sector, shows striking similarities to pre-war Congo. Yet, SSR in Liberia has been relatively successful.²⁴ What accounts for this outcome compared to the DRC? The

main cause seems to be that Liberia's elected post-conflict government under President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf broadly shared the reform agenda for the security sector that Liberia's external backers promoted. Contrary to Kabila, Johnson-Sirleaf was not part of the powerful elite factions that fought the war. When she was elected in 2006, Johnson-Sirleaf was far from being a newcomer to Liberian politics, but lacked a coercive power base that she could seek to maintain. Thus, she reckoned that close cooperation with Liberia's external partners was the safest road to consolidate her power and to reign in, if necessary, violent competitors. In addition, strong outside control had already been established under the transitional government. The government also supported the international approach to make a truly fresh start in the security sector. The army was effectively dissolved and then re-constructed. All this by no means implies that relations between the Liberian government and donors were free of tensions. It is simply to suggest that Johnson-Sirleaf's preferences within Liberia's post-conflict setting were in sync with donors.

6. Between Discourse and Reality: The Role of External State-Builders

Congo's external backers are far from innocent bystanders in the ongoing SSR crisis.²⁵ This is not only a result of the divergent interests between the Congolese government and the so-called international community. In fact, the international community is itself characterized by competing interests and a lack of cohesion. Donors failed to agree on common principles and approaches, playing into the hands of a government that favoured bilateral SSR projects as a means to evade too close outside interference.

A major deficit of foreign-assisted SSR in the Congo has been the near total lack of coordination and harmonization of outside efforts.²⁶ For a variety of reasons, key players of SSR in the Congo like China and Angola have been reluctant to insert their projects in an overall and well-coordinated approach. Western countries have not led by example, although often portraying themselves as supporters of multilateralism. Ever since the EU started SSR projects in the Congo, the EU and the UN (i.e. MONUC) have competed with each other to lead international assistance to SSR in the Congo.²⁷ Institutional self-interest was a cause for ambiguous donor activities. Because of relatively short programme cycles (and the political uncertainty of the environment), donors aimed to achieve quick wins, i.e. visible, results-oriented outcomes that can be measured.²⁸ However, this quick-win approach *de facto* avoided institutional reform and considerations of accountability and justice.

20 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 266.

21 Young and Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, p. 264.

22 Cited in Young and Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, p. 274.

23 Young and Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, p. 275.

24 International Crisis Group, *Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform*, Brussels 2009.

25 Caty Clément, 'Security Sector Reform in the DRC: Forward to the Past', in: Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), *Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments*, (Hamburg: Lit, 2009), pp. 98-117.

26 See for example the 'Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness' of 2005.

27 Melmot, *Candide au Congo*, p. 16.

28 Boshoff et al., *Supporting SSR in the DRC*, p. 10.

7. Do Peacekeepers and State-Builders Overstay their Welcome?

SSR cannot be divorced from the overall political context. It is embedded in a wider political field, in which local actors seek to consolidate their power. The peace-building and state-building industry has undergone a significant expansion over the last decade. Ambitions with regard to the problems that need to be fixed in so-called failed states have grown explosively, and wide-ranging and sophisticated strategies have emerged, assuming that foreign actors can engineer political change long after the war has ended. Post-conflict peace-builders and state-builders presume that their support is solicited or at least tolerated by the host government. In Africa, however, one observes a backlash against long-term presence of international peace-builders. Notwithstanding Darfur, where peacekeepers were not welcomed to begin with, the examples of Burundi, DR Congo and Chad indicate that the presence of well-meaning external actors is less than welcome. The most spectacular example is the DR Congo, where President Kabila in 2009 announced that he expected the UN to present a plan for the progressive drawdown of MONUC until June 2010. His request rattled the UN, the Security Council and MONUC, for it came at a time when the situation in the country was extremely worrying, especially in North Kivu and in Equateur province. There was a lot of unfinished business in the Congo and a reduction of MONUC forces, let alone its drawdown, was premature. Kabila's demand also raised hackles, because it was correctly perceived as a strong signal that the government had little willingness to cooperate with its external supporters to address these vital concerns.

It seems apparent that the UN peace operations have outlived their usefulness from the point of view of the Congolese, Burundian and Chadian governments. This is perhaps less evident in military terms. Especially in Congo and Chad, UN forces, although heavily criticised, are still able to protect the government from turmoil and violent challengers. Even so, these governments may feel secure enough to dispense with UN forces. More important are the political concerns that are tied to a continuous and sizeable foreign presence – it implies that the states in question are 'failed' or exceedingly weak, that they need international tutoring and that this justifies some level of political intrusion. Pushing out or reducing the number of external peacekeepers aims at separating the tenuous link that exists between peacekeeping objectives in the narrow sense and the fact that they provide justification for politically intrusive engineering that impose constraints on host governments. Thus, Kabila's move was seen as a step to avoid too much outside scrutiny ahead of the general elections scheduled for 2011. Kinshasa became increasingly sensitive to outside criticism, denouncing it as a form of neo-colonial interference.

It is far from clear whether the three recent examples of Burundi, Chad and Congo are announcing a trend that the governments of other intervention countries will emulate, but it is obvious that self-referential donor ambitions are disconnected from local preferences. As Christopher Clapham has noted, local elites (the 'peacekept') have 'enormous

leverage' over peacekeepers.²⁹ They instrumentalize external actors. Peacekeepers can be perceived as resources that local elites try to capture.³⁰ The Congo is a powerful illustration of this extraversion. President Kabila asserted claims on resources and authority in an effort to reinforce his power vis-à-vis his domestic competitors.³¹ As long as he was in a position of weakness, Kabila saw MONUC and other interveners as a useful tool to keep his challengers at bay. After the 2006 elections, these same interveners have become a liability. Their attempts to restructure state institutions and domestic politics stands in the way of raw power politics. Local elites have enormous leverage because they face few constraints, have a long-term view of what they are trying to achieve and have a far better understanding of local politics than outsiders.³² Kabila's attitude towards MONUC demonstrates that he can get away with a confrontational stance.

What can be done? The following suggestions are informed by scepticism and realism. As Barnett and Snyder have noted, 'Except in the smallest countries and those that have the highest salience for powerful international actors, stable solutions that conform to outsiders' preferences cannot be externally enforced.'³³ An obvious precondition for greater success is that outsiders significantly improve their understanding of the countries, in which they intervene. They need to analyse the interests and preferences of local actors and assess them in relation to their own. They also need to understand that their own intervention has intended and unintended consequences. Additionally, external actors need to agree on a common vision, agenda, principles and strategies. Leverage requires a minimum of coherence. However, responding to resistance by withdrawal is probably not a wise decision. Engagement should be informed by what is feasible, not only by what is desirable. A negotiated process that leads to compromises and where donors can achieve some of their goals is surely better than an attempt to impose reform blueprints. Finally, SSR suffers from its state-centric objectives. By putting most of their eggs in one basket (the state, i.e. government) external actors make themselves utterly dependent. The implication for SSR is that donors need to work more closely with political and societal groups and institutions that make security forces more accountable.

29 Christopher Clapham, 'Peacekeeping and the Peacekept. Developing Mandates for Potential Interveners', in: Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2002), p. 45f.

30 Clapham, 'Peacekeeping and the Peacekept', p. 44.

31 On extraversion, see Jean-François Bayart, 'Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion', *African Affairs*, Vol. 99, 2000, pp. 217-276.

32 Clapham, 'Peacekeeping and the Peacekept'.

33 Michael Barnett and Jack Snyder, 'The Grand Strategies of Humanitarianism', in: Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 169.